the impact of economic development on land functions in singapore

Geoforum. Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 143163. 1993 0016-718993 $6.00+0.00

Printed in Great Britain 0 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd

The Impact of Economic Development on Land Functions in Singapore

WARWICK NEVILLE,* Auckland, New Zealand

Abstract: Government intervention at all levels has created direct links between economic development and land functions in Singapore. The catalyst bringing economic development and land function together is the operation of the instruments of implementation of government policy. These mechanisms are the product of a pervasive political corporatism which derives much of its authority from the Confucian~st ethic underlying the predominant Chinese cultural value system.

Introduction

Singapore is one of the newly industrialised countries of the Third World. Its general location and specific situation within Southeast Asia were explicitly chosen by its founder for the geographical advantage they conferred on the prospective entrepot. These factors continue to be important to the country’s functions in the late twentieth century but, as an independent republic operating on the scale of a city- state, other considerations have become equally sig- nificant. Space is a major and persistent issue not only because of its perceived limitation on future expansion but also because of the implied constraints of the physical environment on current economic growth.

In terms of land area, Singapore is only 623 km2 in extent and comprises one main island and many smaller ones. The land area has undergone a 7.6% increase since the early 1960s as a direct response to the shortage of land and the heightened competition this induced between major land functions. The expansion in land area has been achieved by substantial coastal reclamation and by realignment of the coast- line in the course of creating impounding estuarine reservoirs for freshwater storage. Despite this signifi-

* Department of Geography, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand.

cant enhancement of the land resource, there is an almost complete lack of other physical resources and a limited degree to which self-sufficiency can be achieved in supplying even the most elementary needs such as fresh food and water.

Since independence in 1965, there has been an increasing awareness of a need to compensate for these inherent shortcomings, and this has largely been achieved by operating a disciplined, rigorous, cen- trally planned economic and social regime. Such measures are seen as necessary in order to optimise the utility of the expanding built environment which is being radically altered in the course of responding to the needs of economic growth.

This paper focuses on the close relationship between economic development and the changes in the land functions of Singapore. The inherent characteristics already cited, together with government policies and institutional structures, have incited a directness and vigour in both public and private responses to the process of change. Four of the major sectors targeted for development by the Singapore government have been chosen to demonstrate the nature and scale of economic development and its major manifestations in the landscape. These sectors are: manufacturing; commerce (especially financial and business services); public housing; and the physical infrastructure

143

144

(with the specific examples of public transport, pri-

vate transport and utilities). The catalyst bringing

economic development and land function together is

the operation of the instruments of implementation;

those discussed are considered to be of greatest sig-

nificance for the four major sectors of development,

particularly as far as their manifestation in the land-

scape is concerned.

Priorities in Development

Industrialisation

Newly independent Singapore faced a number of

serious obstacles to the process of industrialisation.

There was an abundant supply of unskilled iabour but

militant action by some sectors of the labour move-

ment had a destabilising effect which was discourag-

ing to entrepreneurs. Promotion of capital-intensive

production was problematical because of the pool of

underutilised labour and the structural immobility of

capital. The commercial sector was still profitable,

investments were predominantly short-term, and

among traders there was a general lack of industrial

expertise and management. Despite steady growth of

the economy, the domestic market for manufactured

goods was small and there was considerable resist-

ance towards local brand names. Extensive involve-

ment of government was considered essential if

Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 213993

Singapore was to overcome these intrinsic problems

and to attempt to match the conditions and incentives

already established in some other Asian countries.

The early import substitution strategy was super-

seded by the promotion of exports based on foreign

investment. particularly by multinational companies,

actively encouraged by the government. In the 198Os,

enhanced skills, technology and the intensification of

capital investment were aimed at increasing the

value-added component. For the 199Os, government

is encouraging automation in manufacturing and pro-

motion of Singapore from a mere production base to

a centre for firms’ operational headquarters sup-

ported by additional functions such as research and

development, and financial, administrative, technical

and management services to their subsidiaries in the

region.

The net outcome of these policies has been the widely

acclaimed success which saw a t~nsformed, modern-

ised manufacturing sector expand from a share of

GDP of less than 12% in 1960 to more than 28% in

1980 (Table 1) in an economy averaging a growth rate

of about 9% per annum over that period. But

measured on this basis of share of GDP, manufactur-

ing was not the most rapidly growing sector in 1960-

1990: this was achieved by financial and business

services which contributed slightly less than manufac-

turing in 1960 but had outgrown it by 1990, earning

almost 30% of GDP (Table 1).

Table 1. Singapore: GDP by industry, 1960-199Q*

%

1960 1970 1980 1990

Agriculture and fishing 3.6 2.3 1.2 0.3 Quarrying 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 Manufacturing 11.9 20.7 28.1 26.4 Utilities 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.x Construction 3.5 6.9 6.2 5.1 Commerce 34.4 28.6 20.X 15.6 Transport and communications 14.0 11.0 13.5 11.8 Financial and business services 11.8 14.2 19.0 29.7 Other services 18.1 13.4 8.8 9.2 Total: Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

S$million 2089.6 5739.7 26074.8 69258.7

* Statistics listed are at current market prices and exclude the import duties and imputed bank service charge listed in the original tables. Source: derived from DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS (1983,199O).

GeoforumNolume 24 Number 2/1993

Commerce: financial and business services

Financial and business services were an integral part of earlier commercial activity in Singapore’s entrep6t function. The dominance of commercial activities centred on trade (and exclusive of financial and business services) exceeded one-third of total GDP as recently as 1960 (Table 1) but growth in commerce has not matched that in either manufacturing or financial and business services.

In a re-evaluation of strategy during the recession of the mid-1980s it was decided to promote financial and business services (already an integral part of the capital-intensive, high-technology industrialisation process) as the driving force of the economy rather than manufacturing. By 1989, financial and business services were substantially exceeding earnings by each of the other major sectors including manufacturing. The long-term expansion of the financial and business services sector was also an integral part of the major thrusts in the economy other than manufacturing: tourism (serviced by a strong hotel/retailing function); construction (of which a major element is the massive public housing programme); and transport and communications.

Public booing

From its inception, the government viewed provision of public housing as an essential complement to economic development if the population was to be stable and supportive of the fundamental economic restructuring process that diversification implied. Such a policy necessitated the addressing of accom- modation problems of crisis proportions.

Extreme overcrowding of shophouse accommo- dation in the central area had resulted in gross residential densities in some street blocks of up to 2500 persons per hectare in areas where usually only one or two floors of the shophouses were residential (COL- ONY OF SINGAPORE, 1955, p. 53). Deterioration of large areas of these shophouses was exacerbated by lack of maintenance and by rent control (an anachro- nism still being phased out in 1991). Furthermore, for decades, central slum areas had been complemented by burgeoning squatter settlements on the urban periphery and infiltrating the built-up areas of the city

145

(TEO and SAVAGE, 1985, p. 56; HILL, 1986, p. 25).

As the provisions of the public housing programme took effect and the severity of the housing shortage was gradually alleviated through the 1960s and 197Os, greater attention was paid to the quality and style of public housing. The programme’s emphasis shifted from low- to middle-income consumers, from renter to owner occupancy, from isolated dwellings-only estates to more integrated residential/servicing/ manufacturing townships, and from central to decen- tralised and even peripheral estate and new town locations.

Despite the progressive elaboration and improved standards both of the housing units and the estates, speed of construction has increased from an average of 10,640 units per year in 1960-1969, to 24,590 units per year in 1970-1979, and to 32,780 units per year in 1980-1989. From a level of just 9% of the population living in public housing in 1960 (when the population numbered 1.65 million), the proportion had risen by 1990 to 87% of the total population of approximately 3 million people.

Infrastructure: transportation and utilities

Under the British colonial administration, infrastructural development as a component of public capital expenditure on economic development was com- pletely dominant. In the period 1955-1960,98.9% of these funds were devoted to transport, communications and utilities, and only the small remainder to factors of production (STATE OF SINGAPORE, 1961, p. 26).

The newly independent Singapore government indi- cated that indust~alisation was to provide the major thrust in economic development but considered that the government’s task was mainly to create the conditions (including a sound physical infrastructure) which would induce substantial private capital, both local and foreign, to move into manufacturing (STATE OF SINGAPORE, 1961, p. 34). Vigorous implementation of this policy transformed the partly river-based, lighterage system into two major deep- water ports which provide multiple terminals accom- modating annually (by 1990) some 40,000 container

I46

ships, bulk carriers, cargo freighters, coastal vessels and passenger liners. These developments have resulted in Singapore becoming the busiest port in the world in terms of shipping tonnage handled, surpassing Rotterdam and Kobe, and having the largest container terminal operation, recently exceeding that of Hong Kong.

An efficient road network to service the ports and airports (and their free trade zones) as part of the genera1 infrastructure supporting production has been an integral component of the development of transportation in Singapore. Widespread affluence, which has accompanied the success of economic development strategies, has resulted in large numbers of private cars also using the road system.

Increased integration of places of work, education, shopping and residence has become an established strategy to minimise mobility and especially frequent commuter travel. In an attempt to increase the use of public transport services, there has been a continuous upgrading of the public system through rationalisation of bus services, operation of bus lanes at peak hours, licensing of large numbers of taxis and the maintenance of relatively cheap fares, the com- mencement late in 1987 of the mass rapid transit (MRT) train system which is being progressively expanded to outlying areas, and the integration of an automated bus and rail ticketing system.

However, a considerable degree of prestige attaches to car ownership and as incomes rise cars are increasingly preferred to public transport even for the jour- ney to work (SPENCER and CHIA, 1985, p. 308). Nevertheless, the level of ownership is low-about nine cars per 100 population. In the late 198Os, the modal split among passenger vehicles (excluding the MRT which had just begun) on the basis of passenger kilometres travelled favoured public transport: buses, 50%; cars, 37%; and taxis. 5% (CHIA, 1991). The MRT train system has syphoned off a signi~cant proportion of the passenger traffic but further expansion and upgrading of all parts of the public transport system are planned in order to minimise the use of private cars.

Of the utilities in Singapore, water supply has by far the greatest competitive significance for land function. As with fresh food production (NEVILLE,

Geoforum~olume 24 Number 211993

1992), Singapore has long been forced to abandon any goals of self-sufficiency in water supply. About half of the demand is met from reservoirs in local catchments but the remainder must be imported from Johor, Peninsular Malaysia.

Major Land Functions

The elements of the development process discussed so far have their manifestation as major components in the landscape of Singapore. Allocation of land to particular functions has changed significantly since 1967 (Figure 1) with industry, housing, transportation and utilities comprising the main consumers (Table 2). The relatively small proportion devoted to living space is only partly accounted for by the inclusion of ‘other uses’ (such as catchments and extensive military land) in the total area and reflects the high-density characteristics of public housing. The fact that space allocated to infrastru~tural uses substantially exceeds residential space, and that the working space occupied by commercial and industrial activities is equivalent to more than three-quarters of the residential area, further highlights the concentrated nature of the urban residential function in Singapore. With the continued expansion of both industry and public housing, their development has become increasingly integrated with the newer industrial estates designed to be substantially self- contained urban centres.

An important element in the government’s initial drive towards industrialisation was the provision of industrial sites (YUEN, 1991). Although there were certain localities in Singapore which were primarily industrial in character, the pattern of development had been haphazard. The Colonial Development Corporation and the SIT had each initiated a scheme to assist in industrial development by acquisition of land, and this experience formed the basis for further projects. The government undertook to provide the land, cleared of squatters and with leases for 99 years for each industrial plot in several estates suited to small-scale industries. In addition, the matching of the needs of economic diversification and employment was to be most decisively achieved by the

GeoforumNolume 24 Number 2/1993 147

0 5 10 km I J

IlLLULU Rubber or Coconut assoc. with Livestock

Housing Institutions. Special Use Industrial and Ha&ours

Figure 1. Land use in Singapore, ca 1967. Sources: based on REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (1970) and DE KONINCK (1970).

establishment of the very large Jurong industrial area in which an iron and steel mill was the key component attracting ancillary heavy industry.

By 1968 the success of this project necessitated the creation of the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) which was commissioned to provide the physical infrastructure not only for the well-established Jur- ong industrial estate but also for other new or expanding industrial estates elsewhere on the island. The JTC now manages all the major industrial estates and allocates prepared industrial land sites with supporting infrastructure for companies wishing to erect their own purpose-built factories; constructs standard single-storeyed factory buildings, enabling a quick start-up for small to medium-sized industries; builds multistoreyed flatted factories suitable for light, non- polluting industries near residential areas; and provides port and bulk cargo handling facilities at the Jurong Industrial Port. In 1990, the JTC managed 24 industrial estates of which Jurong, with 4600 ha of developed land, is the largest. Altogether some 5020 companies are located in the industrial estates, and

almost 73% of the manufacturing labour force is employed by these companies; another seven estates are planned (MINISTRY OF COMMUNI- CATIONS AND INFORMATION, 1990, p. 44).

Not surprisingly, given the scale of resources committed to industrialisation, this sector has become a major consumer of land (Figure 2). Over the period 1967-1988 industrial development recorded by far the largest relative expansion in land allocation, increasing by 391% to become the third largest land user in the built-up area after residential and transportation uses (Table 2), and even larger than the declining agricultural area.

Commercial land

The transformation of the central city over the last 30 years has been no less comprehensive than that of the urban periphery as the highly diverse mix of land uses [described in a benchmark study by BELLE’IT (1969)] has undergone a major process of sorting and

148 GeoforumNolume 24 Number 2/1993

Table 2. Singapore: land-use distribution*

Land use

Living space Residential

Working space Industrial9 Commercial Agriculturalll

Subtotal Community uses

Open space? Institutional**

Subtotal Infrastructural uses

Transportationtt Utilities*$ Ports and airports

Subtotal Other uses

Central catchment§§ Cemeteries etc.l\jl

Subtotal Total

1967t 1988 2030$

km* % km2 % km2 %

76.0 13.0 80.0 12.8 151.0 20.6

11.0 54.0 110.0 7.2 8.0 12.5

146.7 53.0 24.0 164.9 28.3 115.0 18.5 146.5 20.0

13.0 18.0 31.0 15.0 41.0 61.0 28.0 4.8 59.0 9.5 92.0 12.6

20.6 62.0 81.0 4.4 12.0 23.0

14.1 19.0 41.0 39.1 6.7 93.0 14.9 145.0 19.8

91.7 53.0 53.0 183.3 223.0 145.5 275.0 47.2 276.0 44.3 198.5 27.0 583.0 100.0 623.0 100.0 733.0 100.0

* Source: based on Straits Times (1989, 1990) and LIM (1988, p. 81). t Subtotals are compatible with later data, but internal categories are estimates based on LIM (1988, p. 81). $ Estimated on the basis of a population of 4 million, possibly ca 2030.’ 5 Including warehousing. 11 Including quarrying. 1 Including outdoor recreation. ** Including education, hospitals, libraries, sports complexes, theme parks, museums, etc. t? Including MRT rail system, roads. $$ Including telecommunications. $3 Plus reservoirs, swamps, streams, drainage canals. /I/( Plus land under clearance or development, military and other special uses.

differentiation. The ill-developed and diffuse nature

of the central business district (CBD) characteristic of

so many Asian cities has now moved much closer to

the model of the medium-sized Western city, recent

years witnessing the substantial exclusion of retailing

activities from the CBD concurrently with the demise

of most major department stores. Influenced by the

development of new towns and tourism, specialist

outlets, often grouped together in malls and large

complexes, have relocated along several major radial

arteries out of the central area of the city, and in

suburban localities. Tourist hotels and restaurants

tend to be scattered around the periphery of the CBD

and have gravitated more particularly towards the

major tourist retailing areas to the north of the CBD.

Expansion of the CBD asymmetrically has resulted in

substantial abutting areas in very central locations

retaining the highly mixed and undifferentiated land

uses of earlier decades in traditional shophouse units.

Implementation of recent and more conservationist

policies aimed at redevelopment and refurbishment

(rather than demolition and replacement of earlier

low-rise buildings with high-rise office blocks) will

greatly extend the life of this large area previously

designated for clearance.

By contrast, financial and business services tend to be

much more concentrated. The development of

modern, high-rise buildings in the CBD has been

devoted predominantly to office uses, and in this area

few buildings are more than 20 years old and during

that period have totally changed the skyline of the

CBD. However, the land area devoted to all types of

commercial activity’ is modest, increasing between

1967 and 1988 by little more than 10% (Table 2), and


Developed Estates

Planned Estates

Figure 2. Industrial estates, 1989. Source: based on JURONG TOWN CORPOR- ATION (1989).

reflecting the generally efficient use of land through

redevelopment and high-rise, high-density concen-

tration.

Public housing land

This sector, more than any other, has been developed

with the scarcity of land clearly in view. From the

inception of the Housing and Development Board

(HDB) and its programme, concentration of the

majority of the population in high-rise, high-density

housing was the fundamental principle (CHENG,

1990, p. 37), surpassing and influencing all other

considerations of design, location, consumer prefer-

ence and the like. Consequently, despite the scale of

the programme and the provision of more than

680,000 apartments between 1960 and 1990, the land

required to achieve this result was quite modest and

the impact on the landscape is one of intensive use of

land by multistoreyed apartment blocks rather than

low-density residential dispersal (Figure 3).

HDB gross residential densities are set at 64 dwelling

units or 280 persons per hectare, or net residential

densities of 200 dwelling units and 880 persons per

hectare (WONG and YEH, 1985, p. 8). These cri-

teria provide new towns for 150,00~300,000 resi-

dents in 30,000-60,000 dwelling units on areas of

500-1000 ha. This intensive use of residential land by

the public sector was the main factor in keeping down

the increase in land allocated to residential functions

to little more than 5% in 1967-1988, in a period when

housing units of all types and in both public and

private sectors more than doubled from just over

264,000 to over 529,000 units. The most remarkable

consequence of this efficient use of land was that (in

1988) residential uses of all types occupied only

12.8% of the island-a larger area (but a smaller

share, because of the additional reclaimed land) than

in 1967 (Table 2).

Infrastructural land

The particular circumstances of Singapore as a global

city, city-state and nation state result in dispro-

150 GeoforumNolume 24 Number 211993

Completed HDB Housing

0 5 1Okm q Under Construction

t I

Figure 3. Public housing, 1990. Source: based on HOUSING AND DEVELOP- MENT BOARD (1990).

portionate allocations of land by metropolitan city standards to the components of physical infrastructure. When telecommunications and utilities are added to transportation (including ports and airports) these functions exceed the land area occupied by housing and, even without the inclusion of reservoirs and catchments, comprise almost 15% of the total area (Table 2). In addition to meeting domestic demands these activities reflect the regional and global service functions (based on Singapore’s locational advantages) which have necessitated amplifying the provisions of the road network, the ports, and airports and airfields (which support major commercial functions including Singapore’s own major international airline, regional aircraft servicing operations and the military functions of the nation state and its allies). Because these all function as government or quasi-government operations they are allocated resources, including land, in much the same way as industry, housing and other sectors of government participation or intervention.

The dedication of land to transportation in support of

production (insofar as it can be viewed as functionally separate) generally raises fewer problems than the multipu~ose movement of people which often necessitates convergence on major thoroughfares into the central city and greatly accentuates problems of congestion. As noted earlier, the adoption of land use development strategies for minimising the need to travel by making new towns as autonomous as possible has been fundamental to government passenger transportation policy in recent decades. Beyond this, in localities toward the centre of the city, disruption of other activities and preemption of land for transport networks is being minimised by construction of the MRT underground system (Figure 4) and the commissioning in 1991 of the first of a series of major expressway links underground. Nevertheless the land allocated to transportation alone by 1988 was 3 times that in 1967, reflecting the major role that this part of the infrastructure has played in Singapore’s development over that period.

Although utilities as such occupy less than 2% of the total area of Singapore. catchments and reservoirs


m Restricted Zone

Figure 4. Transportation network, 1990. Sources: MINISTRY OF COMMUNI- CATIONS AND INFORMATION (1990) and SINGAPORE NATIONAL

PRINTERS (1988).

contributing to the water supply constitute a significantly larger component of the overall spatial distribution of major functions (Table 2). The protected catchment together with several of the major reservoirs towards the centre of the island cover 2059 ha (CORLETT, 1991, p. 142) but such local sources are able to supply little more than half of Singapore’s needs, with the balance of the 1.1 million m3 required daily piped across the causeway from Johor, Malaysia (Figure 5).

instruments of Implementation

Of primary importance to the success of the economic development programme in Singapore have been the resources available-not the physical resources, whose absence is perennially regretted, but capital, labour and land. Secondly, regulation and control mechanisms put in place by the government (often unique in character, or in their particular form of application) have largely determined the precise

manifestations of economic development in the Iand- scapes of Singapore. Thirdly, the nature and role of government has been crucial in determining the rate and direction of change in the process of economic development and its impact on land functions.

Resources

Capital. At the time of internal independence in 1959, Singapore did not have a central bank2 but, together with the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak and Brunei, was a member of the Currency Board of Malaya. Although part of the currency reserves could be used for local investment, the capital expenditure required for the implementation of development plans could not be met by means of deficit financing (as commonly practised elsewhere) but had to be drawn against the real financial resources available. Given the existing financial institutions, capital investment therefore had to be based on domestic savings and the investment of international capital,

1.52 GeoforumiVolume 24 Number 2/1993

V” & Reservoirs

0 5 TO km @ Waterworks I Abstraction Stations

Figure 5. Reservoirs and waterworks supplying Singapore, lY90. Upper: Johor, Malaysia; lower: Singapore. Source: PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD (1990).

Since local resources were heavily committed to the and profits. Although slow at first, the proportion of entrepot trade and conservative in attitude towards foreign equity investment increased rapidly in 1970- shifting sector, Singapore relied heavily on direct 1980 and since then annual figures have oscillated at foreign investment for economic development right levels of just under 40%. Foreign investments have from the start and under various pioneer industry become characterised increasingly by direct (rather projects offered major incentives including fiscal than portfolio) investments in the form of wholly benefits and the unrestrained repatriation of capital foreign owned or majority foreign owned firms. Fifty

GeoforumNolume 24 Number Z/1993

percent of foreign equity investment in all sectors in 1988 originated (in order of importance) in the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom.

Foreign investments are encouraged in virtually all sectors of economic activity in Singapore but the focus on manufacturing persisted until recently when it was matched by that in business and ~nancial services-paralleling their performance in the economy at large. In 1988,43.0% of foreign equity investment went into manufacturing and 42.4% into business and financial services. However, the net investment commitments in manufacturing by foreign countries amounted to 89% of the total in 1990, with nearly four-fifths of that amount from the United States and Japan. In this sector, foreign investment is concentrated in petroleum refining, electronics and machinery; in the business and financial sector, in which most of the world’s,major banks are represented, foreign financial investments are concentrated mainly in investment holdings and banking activities.

Although international capital investment was of fundamental importance to industrialisation, domestic savings also played an important role, making a direct impact on the public housing programme largely because of the compulsory nature of private saving. Singapore has an exceptionally high savings rate: the ratio of gross national savings to gross domestic product rose from a negative rate of -2.4% per annum in 1960 to 42.8% per annum in 1989 (MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, 1989) generally placing it first amongst countries listed by the World Bank [e.g. WORLD BANK (1990, Table 9) lists Singapore as highest with 41% CDS/GDP in 19881. This combination of private (voluntary and compulsory) and public savings had, as one of its major components, the compulsory contributions to the Central Provident Fund (CPF3) which comprise about 31% of gross domestic savings, with a further 63% being public-sector saving comprising operating surpluses/profits of the seven major statutory boards and the government’s budget surplus, and just 6% voluntary private saving.

The CPF was established to provide social security benefits for employees on retirement and is funded entirely from substantial employer and employee contributions. The CPF has a large balance

153

(S$36,051,500,000 in 1989), most of which must be invested in government securities [89% were invested in Singapore government securities in 1989 (MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, 1990, p. 104)], effectively transferring control over these resources from employers/employees, through the statutory board, to the public sector. A proportion of these government funds has been made available to the HDB at low rates of interest to support its building programme, and individuals are also permitted to withdraw limited but substantial amounts from their accounts in order to purchase an owner- occupied HDB unit,4 a provision which some con- sider may impair members’ ability to finance their livelihood in old age (LIM, 1988, p, 90). Under this structure, therefore, not only is the bulk of private saving available to government but a proportion of compulsory private savings is being invested by CPF members specifically in the pubhc housing sector.

Labour. This constitutes another major factor of production which has been of critical importance in the economic development of Singapore (PANG, 1988). In 1959, an unemployment level of 13.2% of the labour force necessitated urgent and specific measures to create manufacturing jobs. The limited success of the import substitution phase, especially once Singapore was out of the expanded Malaysian Federation, and the spectre of huge job losses with the withdrawal of the large British military presence encouraged the progression to export-oriented industrialisation. This necessitated not only an intensified effort to attract international investment into export- oriented manufacturing but persuaded the government of the need for greater control over the main factors of production, including the creation of a more biddable labour force. Regulations were introduced to curtail and circumscribe the bargaining power of the unions, and under the Employment Act, 1968, and the IndustriaI Relations Amendment Act, 1968, hours of work were increased, conditions of service constrained, the importance of collective bargaining curtailed, the prerogatives of management enhanced and the whole employment climate made more attractive to prospective entrepreneurs.

By the beginning of the 1970s the unemployment levels of a decade earlier had been halved and the attraction of relatively cheap iabour, increasingly stable political conditions and an expanding economy

154

were decisive in developing Singapore’s momentum

into industrialisation. By the mid-1970s the begin-

nings of a move to higher value-added export-

oriented investments and a tightening labour market

had the potential to bring about substantial wage

increases. In an attempt to avert this problem,

increased numbers of foreign workers were given

entry to the country but, by the late 197Os, shortage of

labour threatened to become the most serious con-

straint to further industrial expansion.

The continued presence of substantial numbers of

foreign workers and the implied dependence of cer-

tain industries on this type of labour, together with a

consciousness of the emergence of countries in the

region capable of providing alternative sources of

cheap labour, resulted in a further review of policy.

Again government intervened to implement a correc-

tive wage policy encouraging substantially increased

wages in order to generate labour rationalisation and

promote the substitution of capital-intensive tech-

nology which would ensure higher value-added pro-

duction. Despite the considerable success of this

restructuring, these measures have not reduced the

long-run importance of foreign labour which has

become an integral and essential part of the unskilled

and semi-skilled labour force.

Land. The intervention and, more significantly, the

direct participation of government as the main land

owner in the land market is a decisive factor in the

determination of land function and ultimately there-

fore of land‘use. Consequently government policies

promoting land-use planning rather than market

forces are largely responsible for the emerging pat-

terns of land functions and land uses. State ownership

increased from 31% in 1949 (when Singapore was still

a British colony) to 44% in 1960 (immediately follow-

ing internal independence), and to 76.2% in 1985

(MOTHA, 1989, pp. 7-8), a share which is still

expanding and assures the government of an unchal-

lengeable role in making decisions on land allocation.

There is, of course, great diversity in the current land

use of government land from wasteland and new

reclamation to high-rise housing or commercial

development so that, at any given time, there are

substantial constraints on immediate implementation

of changes in land function or land use. This limi-

tation also applies to the protected water catchment

which comprises about 10% of the total land area and


occupies the highly accessible and desirable central

part of the island. But given the government’s record

of comprehensive and decisive action on acquisition,

development, demolition and redevelopment, even

this area, with its high potential values, its additional

and alternative uses, may not be sacrosanct-at least

in its entirety.

This substantial share in the ownership of land was

achieved in three main ways: through the transfer of

British military land to the Singapore government (a

legacy of the country’s major garrison function and

the British military withdrawal in the early 1970s);’

by extensive coastal reclamation; and above all

through land acquisition. As previously noted, the

expansion of this ‘fixed’ resource by about 7.6%

through reclamation,6 rather than constituting a great

accretion in land area (which in a larger country

would appear unremarkable) reflects the small size of

the country and, ultimately, the absolute scarcity of

this fundamental resource (Figure 6). Consequently,

even though substantial areas still remain to be devel-

oped, it is not difficult for the government to justify its

dominant role in conserving and husbanding this

important asset for the overall good. However, it has

been argued that, while a large amount of land

banking may facilitate public development, stabilise

land values and capture capital gains made by the

public, it may also encourage misuse of land re-

sources by government because of the lack of the

checks and balances which market forces would pro-

vide.

Regulation and control

Land acquisition. Although the state inherited sub-

stantial land holdings from the British colonial

administration, even greater control over the land

and land functions was deemed necessary. Acting on

the basis of the argument that the good of society

collectively is more important than that of any indi-

vidual in that society, the Singapore government

passed the Land Acquisition Act, 1966, an act de-

scribed as “a radical piece of legislation, analogous to

a land reform act” (LIM, 1988, p. 62), with the

primary aim of solving the housing problem. The then

Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, was reported in the

Singapore Business Times (1985) as saying that “the

GeoforumNolume 24 Number 211993 155

0 5 10 km t 1

-L- Shoreline c. 1967

Coastal Reclamation

Fresh Water Storage

Figure 6. Reclamation, 1960-1990. Source: compiled from various sources.

PAP government in its early days broke the law to break the back of the housing problem we. . . therefore, took overriding powers to acquire land at low cost which was in breach of one of the fundamentals of British constitutional law-the sanctity of property. But that had to be overcome because the sanctity of the society seeking to preserve itself was greater. So we acquired at sub-economic rates.” Compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes is fixed at either 1973 market rates or at up to the current market value as zoned (i.e. without anticipating any zoning change which would almost certainly enhance values), whichever is the lower, a ruling which was reconfirmed in a court case in 1990 reducing compensation paid by the HDB to a private land owner (Sunday Times, 1990).

Such large-scale land acquisition through the implementation of a decisive positive-regulatory strategy has enhanced the scope for the rational designation of land function not only for (mainly public) housing but also for commerce, industry and the physical infrastructure (roads, energy, ports, airports); and complete dominance of government at all

stages of the process is ameliorated to a degree by ‘sale’ (allocation) of some state land for private development. However, this ignores a number of issues such as the institutionalisation of inequities in wealth through the acquiring by government of the capital gains generated by public effort and the inequity which results from extensive acquisition of private land. Some landowners have been disadvantaged by acquisition of their land at below market prices, others see the value of their land fall in anticipation of acquisition, while yet others achieve enhanced gains because acquisitions are reducing the amount of private land available. Consequently, even if it is accepted that land acquisition enhances the possibility of home ownership for large proportions of the population by redistributing wealth, it does so inequi- tably among private landowners: in effect there is also a transfer of wealth from landowners whose land is acquired to those whose land is not acquired.

Furthermore, the assumed efficiency of an integrated government programme of land allocation could be subverted by the ready availability of extensive tracts of land acquired at below market prices and with no

156

clearly designated purpose and, particularly where

such land is left idle for long periods, could result in

prodigality or inefficiency. As of 31 March 1989, the

HDB was managing, on an agency basis, 5963 ha of

the undeveloped state land owned by the Ministry of

National Development (HOUSING AND DEVEL-

OPMENT BOARD, 1989, p. 60). In some instances,

where farmers have been affected by land acquisition

and subsequent resettlement but have been occupy-

ing land not immediately required for development,

they have been granted a yearly extension to continue

‘non-pollutive’ farming (HOUSING AND DEVEL-

OPMENT BOARD, 1988, p. 76), a gesture which

pleases farmers and makes use of otherwise idle land

even though unlikely to be conducive to efficient

farming. Nevertheless, the extreme compactness of

housing units in particular suggests that inefficiencies

are largely confined to the transitional phase; once

developed, use of land is neither profligate nor in-

efficient. Such absolute power of land acquisition

may well be unique; it permits the government to

acquire substantial parcels of land quickly and

cheaply for all types of public development; and it is a

powerful tool for implementing government policy

not only for public housing (especially home owner-

ship) but also for many other official projects.

Physical planning. The ‘town planning’ approach

initially developed by the British was introduced to

Singapore by the colonial administration with the

implementation in 1958 of the first Master Plan,

followed from 1965 onwards by five-yearly reviews.

However, such short-term planning mechanisms,

aimed primarily at implementing statutory and regu-

latory requirements, did not lend themselves to

establishment of long-term goals, nor did the project-

by-project approach to land use by the government

during the 1960s (GAMER, 1972, p. 132) serve to

enhance the integrated development of Singapore. In

recognition of this deficiency and largely as the result

of the advice of one of a series of advisory teams to

visit Singapore, ‘a guiding concept’ recommendation

was adopted and developed into a long-term plan by

1967, ultimately evolving by 1971 into the first version

of the Concept Plan. The essence of this guiding

concept was the establishment of a number of dis-

persed and relatively self-contained regional centres

linked by a comprehensive infrastructure, and it is

this broad plan [somewhat modified from the original

proposals of a ‘radical expansion plan’ or a ‘ring cities


plan’ (STATE OF SINGAPORE, 1965)] which has

been adopted (Figure 7).

The Concept Plan, also subject to periodic review,

aims to provide an integrated land function and

transportation plan as a basic framework to guide the

allocation of scarce land resources among the many

competing claimants (URBAN REDEVELOP-

MENT AUTHORITY, 1990, p. 13). This change of

focus is considered necessary by the Urban Redevel-

opment Authority (URA) in order to slow down the

rate of ‘urbanisation’ (referring not to the population

but to the expansion of the built-up area) to cater for a

relatively greater role for private-sector participation

in land development as the major components of the

public-sector contribution (reclamation, public hous-

ing, an integrated transportation system) are largely

completed; and to enhance all aspects of the popu-

lation’s living conditions, including the physical en-

vironment, as greater affluence raises aspirations for

a better quality of life.

The broad objectives and policies of the Concept Plan

developed by the URA are now being translated into

specific provisions for each area of Singapore through

the preparation of some 50 detailed Development

Guide Plans specifying the mix of land uses, intensity

of development, and priorities for change. Ultimately

the Development Guide Plans, a few of which have

already been completed, will replace the Master Plan

and will similarly be subject to regular reviews.

The most recent review of the overall Concept Plan

(1987-1991) has demonstrated the need to adopt a

new set of strategic principles in land-use planning if

the revised objectives are to be met. The Plan encour-

ages substitution of capital and technology for land:

such measures are exemplified in the agrotechnology

parks which create alternatives to earlier types of

agricultural practice; and additional investment in

environmental control technology to minimise land

buffer requirements for pollutive activities. An inte-

grated approach to the provision of certain types of

public facilities ensures that their planning and design

optimise utility by sharing: for example, functional

integration of recreational facilities for schools, com-

munity centres and sports complexes in new towns.

Land-use allocation is also intended to be sufficiently

flexible to provide for contingencies and for future

opportunities which cannot be anticipated. Finally,


Regional Centre: @ - Jurong East

@I - Seletar

@ - Tarnpines

@I - Woodlands

Housing

industry, Commercial Central Area inf~st~c~re Community Space Agriculture Special Use

Figure 7. Concept Plan, 1991. Source: Sunday Times (1991).

improved quality of development, in housing design, better allocation of public space and access to faciii- ties, is intended to compensate for the constraints inherent in the small size of the country.

The latest version of the Concept Plan provides for a population of about 4 million (which may eventuate by about 20307) with broad demographic parameters considerably altered over the period since 1967 (Table 3). Such a total is regarded as a viable balance between the comprehensive provision of the services necessary to a ‘quality’ life style and the critical mass required to ensure continuing economic growth at around annual rates reducing from 46% by the year

Table 3. Singapore: broad demographic profile, 1967- 2030*

1967 1988 2030t

Population (million) 2.0 2.6 4.0 Household size (persons) 5.8 4.3 3.1 NO. of households (million) 0.34 0.60 1.35 Labour force (million) 0.58 1.25 1.76

*Source: based on Straits Times (1990). tQfficially designated as ‘Year X’, estimated at cu 2030.’

2000 to 2.5-3.0% up to the year 2030. This implies an increase in the level of ‘urbanisation’ {again referring to the proportion of land in the built-up area) from about 46% in 1988 to about 60% in approximately 2030. The land area required would necessitate a continuing programme of coastal reclamation ex- tended to water depths of up to 15 m, compared with previous limits of 5-10 m, in order to achieve the additional 110 km2 (or over 15%) expansion of land area which would increase the country’s total land area to about 733 km2. The development of several regional centres would expedite decentrahsation of commercial activities from the central area to the towns of Jurong East, Seletar, Woodlands and Tam- pines, reducing commuter travel times and peak hour congestion. The average residential floor space occupied per person is to be increased from 20 to 30-35 m2 as part of the enhanced living environment, with leisure and recreational open/green space being maintained at the present level of 0.8 ha per 1000 population.

Resettlement. The major powers of land acquisition necessitated a complementary policy of resettlement

158

for owners and tenants being evicted, and the HDB’s Resettlement Department is the principal authority for resettling ‘squatters’-the residents who remain after acquisition. The clearing of squatters from government land, while primarily making way for imminent development, is also used ‘to improve’ the environment and has included the relocation of the pig farmers, removal of squatters from catchment areas, and “the clearance of unsightly structures along major thoroughfares for sprucing-up projects” (WGNG and YEH, 1985, p. 308). Nor are the dead immune as by 1985 nearly 120,000 graves had been exhumed by the HDB. With the whimsical application of the apposite phrase the same authors note that “this effort has rendered twenty-one cemeteries free of encumbrances for development”.

Resettlement compensation payments are Ed gr&a, but both their nature and the cash amounts paid out have changed considerably over the years. In the early 1960s compensation for evicted farmers included alternative farming land with a house in an agricultural settlement as well as cash compensation for recognised improvements for which all bona fide

‘squatters’ were eligible (REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, nd). However, with successive policy reviews, the quickening pace of urbanisation and industrialisation, and the acquisition of land for non- agricultural purposes, farmers were increasingly dis- couraged from taking such an option, and progressively more attractive terms for the purchase of HDB flats persuaded many to accept, though not before some families had been relocated 2 or 3 times and were eventually obliged to seek non-farming employment. The non-farming majority among families being resettled are offered HDB flats and earlier resistance to moving into high-rise apartments (by seeking alternatives in the private sector) has gradually dissipated as living in public housing has become the norm.

Eligibility for public housing is strictly determined and subject to an income ceiling which has often been modified upwards and differs for rental and home ownership flats. Owners of private properties are generally not eligible for HDB housing and those who sell private property must wait 30 months before they are eligible for registration on the waiting list. There are also elaborate regulations for HDB flat owners to prevent profiteering by resale which. in simplified

Geoforum~olume 24 Number 211993

form, amount to a payment of a 10% levy on the sale price of their first HDB flat, and the resale of any subsequent HDB flats to the Board at the Board’s price. A number of other constraints include the maintenance of approved ethnic distributions in housing blocks or estates (for Chinese, Malays and Indians} so that considerations other than those of the market are inherent in every transaction. Conse- quently, while the purchase of a flat is widely regarded as an investment opportunity for middle- and lower-income families, capital gains are likely to be limited and the opportunity for accumulating real estate is minimal. Furthermore, ownership of public housing involves no land ownership but ownership of an apartment; and even this ‘ownership’ is, in fact, a 99-year lease from the government via the HDB which retains quite rigorous management restrictions on use and resale. Strictly speaking, therefore, both land and housing remain in government ownership.

Although housing features as the major component in the resettlement process, shops, factories and other types of unit are also affected. Retail functions and outlets for basic personal services (clinics, doctors’ surgeries, etc.) were readily integrated into housing estate developments from an early stage, and higher- order functions (schools, cinemas) have been part of neighbourhood and town centre planning in all new towns. The large tracts of land required for industrial estate development have increasingly been Iocated adjacent to, or as part of the larger, more recent new town developments, achieving some degree of integration between the labour pools of the housing estates and nearby job opportunities.

Transport mode. The adoption of such land-use development strategies for minimising the need to travel has been fundamental to government passenger transpartation policy in recent decades (RIM- MER, 1986, p. 130). However, the combined effects of modernisation, economic and population growth, and rising levels of living have increased mobility and the demand for private cars. Consequently there has been a continual expansion and upgrading of the road and expressway network-a strategy which has relied for its effectiveness on concurrent changes in public transport provision and constraints on the growth in numbers of private vehicles in use on the roads.

The policy of pr~~rn~~ting public transport has been

GeoforumNolume 24 Number 211993

reinforced by a complementary policy of constraining

the ownership and use of private cars. This has mainly

been achieved through the imposition of high duties,

registration fees and road taxes; in fact, until 1990

most disincentives were fiscal in nature. As early as

1981 the government’s intention had been announced

to discourage the numbers of private cars exceeding a

ratio of 1:12 people (SPENCER and CHIA, 1985, p.

306), a relatively modest level of ownership but one

now exceeded by the ratio, previously noted, of about

1:ll. However, the central problem is essentially a

city one: that of limited land available for allocation

to roads and carparks. The issue is less one of a rising

car:people ratio than of traffic congestion on a road

network which, in much of the built-up area, is

reaching the limit of above-ground development as

reflected, for example, in vehicle numbers per kilo-

metre of road: 81 vehicles per kilometre in Singapore

compared with 62 in the United Kingdom, 43 in

Japan, and 27 in the United States (LEE, 1990, p. 1).

Since the early 1970s when the additional regis-

tration fee (ARF) for new cars was introduced, the

rate has escalated progressively from a modest, 10,1.5

or 25% of open market value (depending on country

of car origin) to 100% in 1975. In that year the

government also introduced the preferential addi-

tional registration fee (PARF) in order to encourage

the scrapping of cars by their tenth year. Under this

scheme a purchaser who scrapped or exported a car

less than 10 years old could buy a new car at a greatly

reduced rate of ARF. Subsequent increases in vehicle

sales resulted in the ARF being raised in increments

to 175% of the open-market value of the new vehicle

with an accompanying increase in the PARF rates.

Despite the consequent high car prices, the govern-

ment was not satisfied with the results because the

increase in numbers could not be directly regulated

and in 1990, in accordance with the recommendations

of a Parliamentary Select Committee on Land Trans-

port Policy, instituted a quota scheme for new cars.

Under the quota scheme a fixed number of additional

new vehicles is allowed into Singapore over a given

period and an intending purchaser must bid for a

licence to buy: if successful, the bidder is awarded a

certificate of entitlement (COE) to purchase and own

a car, and this entitlement must be renewed after 10

years (if the car has not been scrapped or exported by

then) by paying the prevailing quota premium. A

159

modified version of the PARF scheme operates to

encourage the disposal of older vehicles and a road

tax surcharge of 10% per year for vehicles more than

10 years old up to a maximum of 50% was also

imposed in 1990. The new system adopted a first-year

quota of 50,000 vehicles of all types (except scheduled

and school buses which are considered to be alleviat-

ing rather than perpetrating the problems of conges-

tion) which is close to the average annual growth rate

of 4.3% for the last 15 years. Depending on traffic

conditions, the second-year growth limit is expected

to be between 2.5 and 3.0% (LEE, 1990) so that the

amount of several thousand dollars that the COE

adds to the cost of a car is likely to escalate with rising

demand.

In 1991, as a concession to those who do not use their

cars during the day, the government introduced the

‘weekend car’ scheme for which reduced registration

and other fees apply. This permits use on weekday

evenings, on public holidays and at weekends from

mid-afternoon on Saturdays. Other direct constraints

on car use include: the Area Licensing Scheme which

precludes private passenger vehicle access to a re-

stricted zone (Figure 4) (this is an area substantially

larger than the CBD and includes major shops as well

as offices) during peak hours morning and evening

unless a fee is paid; almost universal parking fees

(including all p u ic bl’ h ousing estates) which are sub-

stantial, especially towards the city centre, where

kerbside parking is forbidden and private carpark fees

are prohibited from undercutting government

charges; substantial fines for parking offenses which

are rigorously policed; a recent reduction in the

statutory carparking provision required of developers

and the conversion of some government carparks to

other (mainly office) uses; and high taxes (about 50%)

on fuel. Provision of fringe carparks with a shuttle bus

service, car pooling and encouragement of staggered

working hours have proved largely unsuccessful, but

enlarged parking facilities are to be provided at outly-

ing stations of the more popular MRT train system.

Although some regulations have aims other than

limitation of numbers of private cars (notably the

environmentally beneficial tax differential favouring

unleaded fuel and the requirement that from 1993 all

new cars must be fitted with catalytic converters; and

the revenue-earning ‘three-quarters tank’ rule which

prevents the Singapore motorist from driving to

160

Johor Bahru to fill up with cheap Malaysian fuel) they

serve to reinforce the increasingly unattractive and

onerous status of being a car owner. For many

Singaporeans car ownership is a receding possibility

because of the high cost of purchasing and running a

car, and, from opinions expressed in the ‘letters to the

editor’ of the Sr~its Times following the introduction

of the quota system, many regard the system as

inequitable. Given the importance of car ownership

to most Singaporeans, constraints on USC rather than

on purchase are perceived as fairer. Some of the

regulations relating to use, such as the Area Licensing

Scheme and the ‘weekend car’, will disappear when,

in 1996, the electronic road pricing system is intro-

duced. This will consolidate most user charges and

ensure payment according to actual usage with differ-

ential rates for the more congested ring roads,

expressways and central area streets at peak hours.

Singapore has only a single tier of government: the

central national government based on a unicameral

parliamentary system. The PAP has been in power

since 1959, the year in which Singapore achieved

internal self-government and a general election was

held for the first fully elected legislative assembly.

Turnover of personnel has been relatively slow and

gradual, and several senior ministers were in cabinet

and other influential positions for 25 years or more;

Lee Kuan Yew, who became Prime Minister in 1959,

retired froni the premiership in 1990 but remained in

cabinet as a senior minister of government. There has

therefore been a long period of political continuity

during which policies consistent with the philosophy

of the one dominant political party have evolved and

developed.

The municipal government which had existed during

colonial days was gradually divested of its powers

during the early 1960s as executive and administrative

functions were relocated in government departments

and statutory bodies. The 27 town councils estab-

lished between 1989 and 1991 have a very limited role

largely confined to delivery of services to the public

housing estates in which they are based. The impact

of government iegislation and administrative de-

cisions is therefore direct and immediate without any

filtering through regional and local government, or

Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 2/1993

opportunity for procrastination by demurring local

interests.

The combined phenomena of centralised adminis-

trative structures and continuity in government have

provided a basis for integrated and fairly consistent

economic and social planning on a comprehensive

scale (despite some notable reversals of policy) which

could probably not be replicated in a larger nation

state. Centralisation of decision making at the top

level based on an efficient and comprehensive moni-

toring and data collection system, arrived at with a

large clement of pragmatism, assures effective im-

plementation with some degree of deccntralisation at

the operating level.

Such an approach has been feasible in Singapore

largely because of its size and administrative coher-

ence. The inner leadership fulfils many of the func-

tions of a central economic planning agency and the

compact size of the economy and the c~)mp~Iratively

few large implementing agencies enables effective

coordination both vertically and horizontally. Since

I965 Singapore has manoeuvred itself into the some-

what exceptional position of few internal or external

constraints on development because of its high level

of domestic saving, ~~CcurnuJati~~n of substantial

official reserves and continuing capital inflow, all of

which expedite flexibility in planning. As a small

country and city-state largely devoid of powerful

sectional interests, Singapore has had no major re-

gional divisions, sectoral lobbyists or other interest

groups attempting to exert economic leverage.

Such circumstances have meant, for example, that

infrastructure projects associated with economic and

social development, and necessitating removal and

relocation of large numbers of urban residents, have

produced no neolocal organisations attempting to

protect the perceived interests of those affected

whereas administrators in some other major cities of

Southeast Asia have engendered such reactions

(ALDRICH, 1985).

Such observations add weight to the contention first

advanced in detail for Singapore by DEYO (1981)

that corporatism, based on a relationship of economic

and political subordination between the state (as

representative of national interests) and particular

social groups (notably labour), provides the most


useful theoretical insights and understanding of Singapore’s development. These views have sub- sequently been eiaborated and developed in the Singapore case [notably by RODAN (1989)] with some qualification of the corporatist interpretation.

Corporatism in Singapore was not a consequence but a prerequisite for the country’s inco~oration into the new international division of labour, and (building on elements of its British colonial heritage) had already provided the basis for the PAP’s political hegemony. The policy decision to seek international financial support and move into export-oriented indust~alisation (following the limited success of the import substitution strategy) coincided with the expanding interests of international capital so that the timing and macro conditions, largely outside the control of the Singapore government, proved advantageous.

There is, however, a further major factor determining the efficacy of the corporatist approach in Singapore: cultural values. Although Singapore is a multicultural society, the numerical predominance of the Chinese (who comprise over three-quarters of the population) combined with their propensity for achieving economic dominance has resulted in an administrative system in which Chinese cultural values are fundamental to its operation. “Without doubt, the system adopted is more that of a Confucianist bureaucratic state, rather than that of a Western or Japanese style democracy” (LIM, 1988, p. 64). The hegemony of the state is apparent in its ubiquity and intervention at every level of life, justified on the assumption that the government is in the best position to inform people of what they need and to make enlightened decisions on their behalf (CLAMMER, 198.5, p. 160).

Central to the predominant Chinese cultural value system is the Confucian ethic in which individual interests are subordinated to those of the wider society: the family is the fundamental unit (which sub- sumes individual interests) and all families taken together form society. By analogy, the nexus between a good government and its citizenry is itself familial. This perception of wider interest promotes a high degree of social conformity and an almost reverential attitude to authority which readily translates into a widespread faith in the judgment and policy formu- lation of both the political and bureaucratic levels of government, and elicits a high degree of civic

161

obedience. Such a social contract is reciprocal: affec- tionate care for the greater welfare of the people at the least cost to the nation elicits filial piety and loyalty. “Statecraft is primarily an extension of family management. . . political liberty is primarily a product of state organisation” (GAYLE, 1986, p. 109).

Conclusion

The role of government in Singapore’s economic development has been crucial. While this is widely acknowledged and analysed in terms of the major economic parameters of development there has been less recognition of the decisive role of government in establishing, implementing and maintaining the instruments considered necessary to ensure appropri- ate outcomes. In fact the universality of the application of corporatist modes of control extends beyond industrialisation and even beyond the broader economy to the whole of society-a characteristic evident in this paper in the non-productive aspects of the housing and private transport examples. The enhancement of comparative advantage by government intervention is reflected directly in the highly structured landscape of Singapore as configured by the mechanisms regulating economic activity, public functions and facilities, and the ownership and use of private property.

The constraints on behaviour implied by the mechanisms used to achieve the degree of success that Singapore has experienced are an inherent part of the particular corporatist strategy and style adopted by the Singapore government. Acceptance of such an all-embracing political corporatism is best under- stood in terms of the Confucianist ethic which is a pervasive element of Singapore society. The pre- eminence of the principle that the needs of society as a whole supersede the rights of the individual or family provides an ideal basis for the political corporatism which has produced Singapore’s contemporary economic development and functional landscape.

Acknowledgements-The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Jan Kelly of the Geography Depart- ment, University of Auckland, in compiling Figure 6 and drawing all the maps; and the provision of research facilities by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

162 ~eofo~m~oIume 24 Number 211993

Notes DEYO, F. C. (1981) Dependent Development and Indus- trial Order: an Asian Case Study. Praeger, New York.

GAMER, R. E. (1972) The Politics of Urban Development in Singapore. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.

GAYLE, D. J. (1986) The&all Developing State. Gower. Aldershot.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

The same or similar terminology is used in Tables 1 and 2 to describe categories of GDP and land use, but the underlying concepts differ somewhat; nevertheless, the comparison is broadly indicative of relative significance in the economy and the landscape respectively. The Monetary Authority of Singapore did not com- mence operation until 1971. The CPF is a contributory fund set up to provide retirement pensions derived from enforced savings. It is structured so as to accumulate substantial funds which are accessible to the government, and was established in 1955 by the British colonial administration. Since 1964; from 1981, CPF members have also been permitted to use their funds to purchase private apartments for their own occupancy, under the Approved Residential Properties Scheme. The area devoted to military uses was established in the bench-mark 1967 Land Use Survey of Singapore’s Main Island when land dedicated to the use of ‘Military Establishments (Local and British Forces)’ amounted to 22.2 square miles (57.5 km*) or 10.6% of the total area (CHUA, 197411975, p. 4); an update was published in 1975 164.5 km2 or 10.8% of the expanded land area (MOTHA, 1989, p. II)], but statistics since then have subsumed military areas under the broader ‘Special Uses’ category. This figure refers to reclamation since 1960; important but smaller areas were reclaimed much earlier mainly west of the Singapore River mouth as part of the development of the CBD. The published information avoids citing a year, prefer- ring to focus on a population size of 4 million to be anticipated at some future date designated ‘Year X’; on current assumptions this might be ca. 2030.

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the impact of economic development on land functions in singapore

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