the history of psychology conceived as social psychology of the past

J ~ ~ l of the History of the Behauioral Sciences 15 0979): 103-114.

THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY CONCEIVED AS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PAST

ROBERT 1. WATSON, SR.

Social psychology supplies an arra of concepts that may be used in the study of the history of psycholofy., The,point ofYdeparture for discussion is attitudes conceived as acquired behaviora dispositions which are related to an approach previously used in historical study, so-called prescriptive attitudes. Prescriptions as they relate to personality, role, self, development, values, and motivation in interaction with group behavior are then examined systematically through illustrations of how they have been or may be applied as aspects of a conceptual framework for the study of the history of psychology.

This article is concerned with what might be conceived as an inversion of a currently popular controversy in social psychology about whether or not social psychology is es- sentially an historical endeavor. A paper by Kenneth Gergen making this assertion in- itiated an extensive series of papers with an agreement and disagreement by Barry Schlenker and others.2 The proposition I advance here is that historians of psychology might find it worthwhile to consider adoption of conceptual frameworks from social psychology for the study of the history of psychology. By urging this perspective I hope to stimulate more historical research, especially among interested psychologists who are searching for a means to focus their interests.

Before examining social psychology as a framework for the study of the history of psychology, a word must be said about earlier systematic frameworks. At the beginning of the 1960s the explicit conceptual schemes that had been held by historians of psychology in the United States, broadly speaking, were representative of either the Great Man or Zeitgeist theories, that is to say, the dynamics of history were attributed to the individual or to social forces, respectively. Attention to other and more precise models for the dynamics of historical analysis have been evident since that time. Even before the sixties the more broadly psychoanalytic approach of Sigmund Freud and the more narrowly psychohistorical approach of Erik H. Erikson were receiving professional attention from historians. In a preliminary way in 1965,4 in a more formal way in 1967, and again in 1971,8 and several times thereafter I and others have applied the prescriptive approach. Somewhat later, the work in terms of dialectics by Willem van Hoorn and the very impressive array and interplay of developmental concepts marshalled by the late Klaus Riegel made their appearance.8

For some years I have been engaged in the application of what I have called prescriptive theory - attitudes taken by persons toward the content and the methods of studying psychological problems, while changing in a specifiable variety of ways, still manifest fundamental similarities over an extended period of time. Methodological and contentual prescriptions will both serve as introductory illustrations. Whether to adopt either a rationalistic attitude (conceiving reason as the major method of acquiring knowledge) or take an empirical attitude (conceiving experiences as the major method) was perhaps the salient psychological problem for centuries in the beginning of the

This article is based on an invited paper presented at the meeting of the Division of the History of Psychology of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, California, August 1977.

ROBERT I. WATSON, SR. is Adjunct Professor of Psychology, University of Florida and former editor of JHBS. His latest book is The History of Psychology and the Behavioral Sciences: A Bibliographic Guide.

103

104 ROBERT I . WATSON, SR.

modern p e r i ~ d . ~ Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza adopted a rationalistic stance, while Bacon and the British associationists from Locke through Bain took an empirical view. Only in relatively recent times was the bipolar dilemma solved by the emergence of a rational, that is to say, logical-empiricism. One may wish to refer to this final product as a dialectic shift, but the development over the centuries that preceded this shift can be conceived in nondialectic terms. Turning to contentually oriented prescriptive attitudes, an illustration covering the entire modern period can be summarized as follows: There has been a shift from regarding psychology as primarily contentually subjective, through a position that regarded it as primarily contentually objective, to the current position that acknowledges that, while still primarily contentually objective, some contentually subjective aspects are legitimate phases of contemporary psychology.

What I propose is to place prescriptive theory in a larger context - that of a social psychology of history.’O Topics integral to social psychology - group, personality, role, attitudes, values, and the like - have been employed sporadically in historical work. But to my knowledge no one has attempted to consider systematically the major aspects of social psychology as the framework for the study of the history of psychology. I wish to make explicit that all major categories of social psychology and their interrelations may be fruitfully suggestive both of research ideas and of a systematic orientation to the study of the history of psychology.

My first crude insight into the matter came from the realization that prescriptions, as I had used the concept in work in history, are specific manifestations of the broader conceptual category of attitude which is a salient concept of social psychology. Hereafter “attitude” and “prescription” will be used to indicate the general and the more specific meanings, respectively.

Could not this intellectual kinship of prescription in history and attitude in social psychology be extended to other social psychological concepts so as to make them relevant to historical study? That this would be plausible is supported by other con- siderations. For the historian, the documents he or she studies also reflect history as a social phenomenon. Concepts that apply to the present may have counterparts or precur- sors that apply to the past. The persons of history lived, the events took place. Reconstruction never succeeds but always we strive for it, even though we achieve only an approximation. Should not history be studied with the full conceptual armamen- tarium of the social psychologist? Would not a systematic review of the major topics of social psychology yield an array of categories that could be thought of as those of the social psychology of the history of psychology?

The most general formulation to be made of the content of social psychology in- volves a recognition that both individual and social factors are involved. Here we have a suggestive comparability in social psychology with earlier formulations arising from the Great Man and Zeitgeist approaches to history which were statements of emphasis on the importance of one or the other of the two factors. The recognition of both as con- tributing in an interactive fashion does not commit one to either emphasis which, it would seem, was demanded in these earlier conceptualizations. In the discussion of the contentual topics of social psychology which follows, an interactive relationship is assumed to be present. The view of social psychological phenomena as a consequence of interaction of both individual and group factors seems to permeate its contentual problems. For example, volume four of Gardner Lindzey and Eliot Aronson’s Handbook of Social Psychology bears the title Group Psychology and the Phenomena of Interac- tion,” attesting to the importance that interaction has achieved in the field. Among the

HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 105

problems discussed under this heading are group problem solving, group structure, and national character. Another volume in this series is devoted to the individual and the group and is also steeped in interactive conceptualizations. Acceptance of their mutual contribution helps to differentiate and, in my opinion, to broaden the field beyond that expressed in some sociologically oriented historical endeavors. There has been a major formulation of a sociological-anthropological approach to the dynamics of history. In 1969 an historian, F. R. Berkhofer, published A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis in which he drew upon his training in anthropology and sociology in for- mulating his approach.12 Typical of the topics he considers are society and culture and systems analysis. He does not use social psychological concepts other than the group for his major framework. The importance of individually oriented influences are lost sight of in what is an almost exclusively social formulation. We can and do, according to the task and our biases, stress either individual or social factors. I t is my bias that a social psychological approach, as differentiated from a sociological-anthropological approach, at least seems to call for a greater breadth.

What are the topics embracing individual and group in interaction which make up much of social psychology and which are relevant to the history of psychology? Although there are other formulations of the content of social psychology (for example, Krech and Crutchfield's use of the dynamics of field theory 18), the most general way of doing so takes into account at least personality, role, self, development, attitude, value, and motivation as they interact with group behavior.

Initial presentation as a mere shopping list of the major categories to be filled from the shelves of social psychology serves to make clear that whatever organization and coherence is imposed beyond this point is a matter of choice. Others might find value in what I am suggesting about social psychology as a framework, without necessarily accepting the particular formulation to follow in which attitude in its general sense and group are central. One could make any one of the social psychological categories just mentioned the salient one, the point of departure from which to build out to the others. Candidates for formulation from social psychology from which one could then extend to other categories of social psychology already exist - Berkhofer with the group as such, Erikson with personality, and Riegel with development. In the psychohistorical tradition some extensions to other social psychological concepts have been made, for example, by Robert Lifton to cultural values l4 and by Robert Rossell to groups.16

Consideration of attitudes in its general sense as a conceptual tool for work in history must involve more than merely casually appropriating the concept of attitudes in the ordinary sense and using it in relationship to other social psychological categories. One must consider in some depth what social psychologists are writing about attitudes and then examine their findings in relation to an historical context.

Attitude has been a dominant problem in social psychology. Individuals as separated in time as Willard Thomas and Florian Znaniecki 1e in 1918 and Gordon Allport l7 in 1935 called it the central problem. Though not so prominent in the last twenty years or so, according to Donald Campbell it is still of substantial importance."

In working with the relatively unexplored area of the application of social psychology to history, it is judicious not to limit the situation by too sharp delimitations of the boundaries. This renders Campbell's concept of acquired behavioral disposition^,^^ which includes attitudes, a plausible place from which to start. Acquired behavioral dispositions is a rich construct, as Campbell argues, precisely because of its multiple connotation value.

106 ROBERT 1. WATSON, SR.

An admittedly selective list from the seventy or so terms, besides attitude, that Campbell lists as falling under his rubric includes acquired drive, belief, disposition, hypothesis, intention, interest, motive, opinion, personality trait, role perception, predisposition, tendency, and value. Many of those just mentioned were singled out because of their connotation of motivational or goal attributes. To historians concep- tualization in terms of “belief,” “intention,” “motive,” and “value” is essential in examining the dynamics of history. Prescriptive attitudes are “motives” and “values” in the sense of being acquired behavioral dispositions. Until empirical e,vidence can be ad- duced to demand their sharp distinction, these terms, which have in common the idea that experience has modified the behavioral tendencies of the individual, will be considered as potentially available for application under this rubric.

That acquired behavioral dispositions are dispositional means that we can still study them profitably without necessarily knowing much about their origins. Historical research can detect the presence of attitudes more readily than it can identify the sources of the attitude. For example, we can establish that Wilhelm Wundt rejected utilitarian aims for psychology more readily than we can establish the reasons for rejection of these aims. Writers of history implicitly take full advantage of the distinction between dispositional and causative factors. The summariziny history of the textbooks is more often written at the level of disposition. Studies in depth through the monograph or article re- quire one to go beyond to examine causative factors.

If attitudes and other acquired behavioral dispositions constitute a dominant problem in social psychology, then considerable efforts in research and theory must have resulted. This implies that the historian has a rich source in social psychological literature to examine for his purposes. I t almost goes without saying that much of the research of the social psychologist is quantified in nature. The historian’s transfer of quantitative approaches to his problems might well be the major advantage of adopting a social sychological framework.

reading literature for potential research topics? Though not confined to it, the social psychologist has the considerable advantage of dealing with living subjects, while the historian is primarily confined to documents or other artifacts. The historian, then, might do well to read social psychological studies for their potential application to documents. A considerable research literature exists, for example, on the problem of consistency of attitudes. An analysis of writings of historical figures prepared at different times appears a promising approach. An illustration might be comparison by content analysis using prescriptions as content categories applied to the various editions of Wundt’s Grundzuge accompanied by the still earlier Beitruge on the hypothesis that no substantial shifts in Wundt’s prescriptive allegiances occurred over time. Shifts in attitude that did turn up then could be evaluated. Earlier applications of prescriptive dimensions to content categories by Barbara Ross 2o and Kenneth Gibson z1 suggest this and other comparable studies are methodologically feasible.

Continuity, or lack of continuity of prescriptions when applied to individuals or groups from a slightly different perspective may lead to problems in interpretation. Even if there were no fundamental change as was hypothesized for Wundt, there would still be an account of the development of nuances. This problem of consistency-inconsistency becomes more obvious when we consider the attitude of someone well known, even notorious, for shifts of perspective. John B. Watson is a case in point. The nativistic views expressed during his espousal of the instinct doctrine gave way in later years to an extreme environmentalism.

W K at is the crucial difference between the social psychologist and the historian in


Exceptions and incongruities that would almost certainly emerge in both proposed studies epitomize the advantage of quantified research in history - the detection of the nature and extent of divergences from a general pattern. Unsupported historical acumen, the usual approach of the historian, allows selection of what to report. In such cir- cumstances, it is much easier to minimize discrepancies either because they were not found or were disregarded in the narrative. Quantified findings have the sobering correc- tive of being public property, and the interpretations offered by the historian are thus rendered capable of examination by others against the findings themselves.

There is no doubt whatsoever that there are countless leads for quantified and non- quantified research to be found by examination of the literature on attitudes and, for that matter, the other social psychological categories. A few instances of how social psychological concepts of attitude illumine the history of psychology seem in order.

Attitudes toward persons and toward situations, we are told by social psychologists, may not necessarily be in agreement. Perhaps the best known manifestation is the often demonstrated inconsistency of attitude toward individual members of a minority group as compared to expression of attitudes toward the minority group in general. Milton Rokeach has proposed that two attitudes are involved - one activated by the object, in this case the person, and the other activated by the situation.22 Some attitude-based behaviors are more determined by a powerful attitude toward the object; other behaviors are more determined by a strong attitude toward the situation. I would hazard the guess that this helps to account for the exception to his general prescriptive attitude of anti- utilitarianism that Wundt made in the case of Emil Kraepelin. Wundt encouraged his studies of the nosology of mental diseases by psychological methods. I t would be fruitful to explore whether this apparent inconsistency cannot be attributed in part to Wundt’s perception of Kraepelin, not as a psychologist where application is not to be tolerated, but as a psychiatrist who by definition is in another and applied field. It might be noted in passing that cognitive dissonance theory would seem applicable in this and similar historical situations.

In social psychology it is commonly accepted that attitudes may be expressed positively at a cognitive level without there being present a strong action component. This helps to explain the important position given G. Stanley Hall in our history despite the relative absence of significant research. He adhered to a battery of methodological attitudes appropriated for a scientist, “believed in research” and urged his students to un- dertake it, but he did relatively little research himself, nor did he carry on the task (as Wundt did) of integrating his students’ research into a larger pattern.

The self-concept and values are integral aspects of the theory of attitude structure and change, according to David Katz and Ezra S t ~ t l a n d . ~ ~ Campbell argues that attitudes and values are fundamentally ~imilar,~’ and indicates that attitude objects have valences, positive and negative. Value systems are organizations of attitudes with emphasis upon how one ought or ought not to behave. They tend to be more abstract, less tied to specific attitude objects, and to represent ideal modes of conduct. The individual’s own organization of attitudes may be referred to as a value system. Because he has an image of himself, the value system is often involved in his self-concept. Having an image of himself as adhering to certain values, a threat to any system may have the effect of a direct threat to the ego.26 History is replete with bitter controversies in which a criticism of one’s system is interpreted as an attack on the self.

For historical study, a particularly relevant formulation is that of ego instrumental attitudes, as described by Katz and Stotland.2B Holding particular attitudes may main-

108 ROBERT I. WATSON, SR.

tain a psychologist’s conception of himself as a particular kind of person and therefore create ego satisfaction. The behavioral component of such an attitude is the tendency for one to express both to himself and to an audience appropriate behavior. The ego or self is very much involved and, without stretching this meaning too far, the value structure of the individual is made up of attitudes.

The group as relevant to history will be considered next. In social psychology a group is typically conceived as possessing certain salient characteristics - a perceived bond among its members, a conception of a group task, and a recognition that leader- follower relations are present. Allegiance to bond, task, and leader is present in varying degrees, but at least a minimal allegiance is required for an individual to be a group member.

Among the groups relevant to the historian, none are of greater significance than the schools of psychology. In a previous publication I formulated a definition of a school as a group of psychologists having a perceived common positive allegiance to a pattern of prescriptions and, generally, an acknowledged leader.2’ This position is, to some extent, shared by others. In factor analytic ratings by individuals knowledgeable about schools of psychology, Arnold Fuchs and George Kawash found prescriptive patterns that I am now relating to a larger historical analysis.28 In the fourth edition of The Great Psychologi~ts,~~ prescriptive theory has served as partial background for discussion of schools, as it also has in Melvin Marx and William Hillix’s second edition of their book, Systems and Theories in Psychology.so The allegiance of Gestalt psychology to molar, central and contentually subjective prescriptions, and of behaviorism (although having other positive prescriptive commitments) to molecular, peripheral, and contentually objective prescriptions is illustrative of how schools differ in prescriptive allegiances.

Although this discussion centers on the group, there is a facet of attitude theory that is also relevant. Instead of speaking of a pattern of prescriptions as characterizing schools of psychology, one might refer to them as value systems. The Fuchs and Kawash study did not study behaviors; they asked their subjects what prescriptions they ascribed to behaviorism, to psychoanalysis, and the like.31 Marx and Hillix emphasize that the function of systems is to direct the psychologist to what ought to be studied.32 I have made the same point in connection with prescriptive theory. Schools of psychology, then, are social psychological group value systems, sharing philosophical and methodological views.

Manifestations of prescriptions change with time, as demonstrated in the social psychological literature on development in which different manifestations of the same attitude in infancy, childhood, and adulthood are shown. So, too, over historical time a prescription may show different manifestations. Methodological objectivity was aggressively defined by John B. Watson in his quest to make psychology contentually objective. But forty years before, Wundt had advanced his rules for the proper use of in- trospection in relation to experiment, in a similar quest to make as methodologically objective as possible his contentually subjective psychology. These and the other prescriptive attitudes give both continuity and discontinuity to psychology as a science and are related to the development of the discipline.

History is a network in which events are also influenced by factors other than those now under discussion. The interactional character of social life is generally well known, wherein any factor may have reciprocal influence upon others - for example, attitude affects group membership and group membership affects attitude. To quote Katz and Stotland:


At one stage or another in the development of an individual or of a social unit, a factor may exert more influence than it receives. This imbalance may, however, be mere ha penstance. A eneral theory should not be invalidated because at another

period of social stability, group membership may be a dominant influence on the attitudes of members. Durin a period of social change, the attitudes of people may

are a function of group membership would be as limited as those which hold that group membership is a function of attitudes. To be truly general a valid psychological theory must, therefore, encompass both directions of influence.ss

This proposition has application in history. For example, allegiance to a school of psychology can determine attitudes or attitudes can determine allegiance. Historically speaking, it may be said that on the occasion of a “scientific revolution” in the Kuhnian sense, personal attitudes of individuals are a more dominant influence than those of group membership. When behaviorism was in the process of formation, Watson, Dunlap, Max Meyer, Weiss, and the others probably had their prescriptive attitudes already formed before they rallied in various ways under the banner of behaviorism. In times of “normal science” group membership as a determinant dominates. Today, those joining the ranks of subscription to the experimental analysis of behavior, to a much greater extent than was the case earlier, join the group with attitudes vaguely defined and then have prescriptions sharpened according to those of the group.

Psychologists of a particular nation supply another form of group; admittedly not very cohesive, but a group nevertheless. A research strategy from social psychology that seems pertinent is the investigation of what is called the degree of cohesiveness. I would hypothesize that shared methodological prescriptions would work toward cohesiveness and that varying and antagonistic methodological or contentual prescriptions might serve to disrupt the group structure. In regard to the latter, in various publications but particularly in a recent consideration of the history of clinical psychology (to be published), I chose to emphasize the lack of cohesiveness between academic psychology with predominant allegiance to the nomothetic prescription (the search for general laws) and the idiographic posture of clinical psychology (the understanding and explanation of individuals and specific events). There are, of course, a host of nonprescriptively oriented factors such as common training, common antagonists, common membership in societies, sharing in the role of a psychologist, personal friendships, realization of a shared history, and the like that would have to be brought into consideration.

Groups called “communities” by Kuhn,B‘ characterized by allegiance to a paradigm, hold promise as a vehicle for approaching history through a social psychological framework. I see no reason to change my opinion, first voiced in the sixties, that psychology lacks an all-embracing universally accepted contentual paradigm.a6 Another way of stating the matter is to say that psychology has been and is a discipline without a commonly shared paradigm. This meaning is but one of twenty found by Margaret Masterman to have been used by Kuhn in his original monograph. Nevertheless, it seemed to be the meaning that psychologists who have published on the matter adopted in claiming that psychology has achieved a paradigm. A survey by Liechtenstein s7 shows that claims have been made that the paradigm of psychology is or has been Fechner’s psychophysics, Titchener’s structuralism, Pavlov’s conditioned response, Hull’s hypothetico-deductive model, Kbhler’s isomorphism, and Skinner’s operant behavior.

period t R e influencing fg actor becomes the influenced factor. For example, during a

determine group members E ip. Theories based upon the proposition that attitudes


No matter the stage of history that these paradigms were supposed to have appeared, I would argue that at that time, past or present, sufficient disagreement, sometimes majority disagreement, among psychologists existed, making incorrect any claim that any of these claimants was all embracing in nature. Some of these protagonists do modify their claim about universality by admitting the existence of some opposition but express confidence that the view they espouse is the coming paradigm. As Hobbes said of miracles, if not experienced, it is merely a belief. If I may add a twenty- first meaning to paradigm, they are “part” paradigms in the sense that part of the then current practitioners of the science followed that particular paradigm.

Is a part-paradigm any more than what we have been calling schools of psychology? What differentiates a school in psychology in the prescriptive sense, from perhaps the same individuals making up the collective group of followers of a part-paradigm? I would suggest that it is the major direction of exhibited effort - followers of the schools directed much of their efforts toward defending their prescriptive allegiances and at- tacking others who held-contrary allegiances and while doing so, depend upon a somewhat vague array of scientific achievements. Following a part-paradigm directs attention to the crucial scientific achievements that signalized that particular paradigm and to the work necessary to fill out the paradigm. Puzzle solving and instrumentalism (other meanings of paradigms) allow normal science in the Kuhnian sense for a restricted area or areas to proceed to fill in the details. The research on operant psychology and its practitioners by David Krantz, while not directly addressing the issue of a scientific community, clearly concerns operant psychology both as a community following a part- paradigm and a school.SB

I am not alone in seeing a provocative relationship between attitude and paradigm. Eileen McDonagh analysed what she called the social psychological foundations of the Kuhnian thesis with particular emphasis upon showing the similarities of the paradigm to attitudes including a detailed analysis of three theories of consistency of attitude - balance (Heider), congruity (Osgood and Tannenbaum), and cognitive dissonance (Festinger).S* She found fundamental similarities between the definitions, func- tions, and criteria for change of attitudes and of paradigms. Kuhn’s depiction of paradigm acquisition, she argues, could apply equally to attitudes.

The personal motive expressed through prescriptive attitudes toward psychology needs examination against what is known about otherwise expressed personality characteristics of historical individuals. I am somewhat dubious about the direct fruit- fulness of prescriptive theory when its categories are applied directly to the personality characteristics of historical figures. It may be that Wundt’s allegiance to structuralism, molecularism and, possibly, staticism and James’s predominant acceptance of func- tionalism, antimolecularism, and developmentalism gives us leads from which to examine their different personalities, but it may be no more than that. It may well be that examination in depth of the idiosyncratic prescriptive allegiences of a particular psychological figure is more fruitful. Without going into depth, it is easy to see that William James with his paradoxes, his digressions, and his contradictions would be an apt can- didate for historical study in this fashion.

My present impression, however, is that the most fruitful way to apply prescriptive theory to personality would be to use it for the examination of the history of personality theories, as such, of course supplemented by other social psychological conceptualizations.


Personality study is regarded today as part of psychological science, and more specifically, social psychology. For modern views of personality to come into focus, there had to be the parent science of psychology from the matrix of intellectual history. I t follows that there could not be modern views of personality until psychology existed as a self-conscious discipline. In its modern form, science, itself, began to take shape only a short 400 years ago, and psychology in that sense came into being 100 years ago. Since modern personality studies, at least in part, arose from the general psychological science, we will find its characteristic study of even more recent origin. To rephrase a statement of Hermann Ebbinghaus about psychology adopting experimentation as the method of choice, personality study has had a very long past but a very short history. The presence of a science indicates that there is a community of workers who identify themselves with its study, who see their role as students of personality. A student of personality in this modern sense is aware of what he is studying, and that one of his concerns is a theory of personality which, in turn, implies that he has some conception of its various aspects.

A vastly longer period in the search for the person took place while these group- centered characteristics of agreed-on scope, scientific base, and awareness of role were absent. Prescriptive theory supplies a background of parameters to examine personality before a deliberate conscious view of personality made its appearance. Earlier speculations and insights were not directed to a consciously held theory of personality, in the sense called for by the current view. Although inquiries about the nature of man were made, other inquiries predominated. Personality, as such, was not of central concern but rather religious, medical, philosophical, governmental, or literary matters. Accounts of the nature of selfhood, of psychological development, and other personality facets did oc- cur, but they were placed in the context of other primary concerns. They were discussed by these earlier thinkers only to the extent called for by their more specific intent. This often resulted in relatively short discussion, imbedded in a context which was neither psychology nor personality in the contemporary sense. This state of affairs arose precisely because the paramount interest of these thinkers was not in personality. Yet they were concerned with and took stands about prescriptions that were to become integral aspects of a personality theory.

The most salient prescriptions that emerge in the approaches which would become the study of personality are: that the individual is of a paramount concern (idiographicism); that there is developmental change in the individual (developmentalism); that factors making for change in the individual must be emphasized (dynamicism); that there are irrational as well as rational factors in the make-up of the person (irrationalism); and that there are factors in the experience of the individual of which he is aware and others of which he is not (unconscious mentalism).

These predisposing trends came together in consciously thought-through theories of personality only after the roles of psychologist (and psychiatrist) were established in modern times. After that time we can evaluate personality theories, properly so-called, with emphasis upon the way they integrate or fail to integrate these heretofore disparate prescriptive trends of idiographicism, developmentalism, dynamicism, irrationalism, and unconscious mentalism, and perhaps other prescriptive approaches.

Of the various categories of social psychology mentioned earlier all have at least been touched upon except that of role. The role of psychologist as a student of personality was just indicated. Characteristic expected behaviors associated with roles such as scientist, psychologist, professor, therapist, departmental chairman, editor, or politi-


cian either separately or in combination come to mind as relevant to the history of psychology. The role of scientist will serve as an illustration pertinent to historical study. It is generally considered that this role is shared among scientists from the various fields. Scientists share in certain common attitudes about the investigations they conduct as scientists. It follows that methodological prescriptive commonalities are to be identified. The psychologist’s role as scientist can be conceived as being expressed in adherence to methodological prescriptions. Wundt, again, may serve as an example. In his self- conscious aim to make psychology a science, as well as making himself a scientist, he expressed adherence to methodological objectivity and empiricism. He carefully ar- ticulated rules for the relation of experiential reports to experiments, he disclaimed metaphysical issues; i.e., rationalistic assumptions. Supporting empiricism, he employed quantitativism by applying measurement when he found it feasible to do so. He proceeded both inductively and deductively, and he accepted determinism. This may serve as a brief summary of how Wundt conceived his role as a scientist-psychologist.

In closing I would like to return to the broader issue of the usefulness of social psychological concepts to the historian, no matter the particular form it might take. When a psychologist turns to work in history he brings to it a body of knowledge about social psychology that could provide a framework from which he could hope for exciting cross- disciplinary developments. It might even be the basis for a major contribution to the general study of history beyond that of psychology itself, since the social psychological approach is of even wider import than has as yet been indicated. Systematically speaking, social psychological conceptions concern historical persons, and events in areas other than the history of psychology and use of social psychological categories provide a common ground for the study of history of each of the other sciences, a comparative history among them, and possibly history in general. More specifically, I examined attitude theory in the form of prescriptive theory relative to the history of the social sciences in another paper.4o Consideration of these possible extensions, however, must be left for other occasions and other persons.

NOTES

1. Kenneth J . Gergen, “Social Psychology as History,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

2. Barry R. Schlenker, “Social Psychology and Science,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

3. Erik H . Erikson, Young Man Luther, A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Norton, 1958); Erikson, Ghandi’s Truth (New York: Norton, 1969); Erikson, Lcife History and the Historical Moment (New York: Norton, 1975). 4. Robert I . Watson, “The Historical Background for National Trends in Psychology: United States,”

Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 1 (1965): 130-138. 5. Robert I . Watson, “Psychology: A Prescriptive Science,” American Psychologist 32 (1967): 435-443. 6. Robert I. Watson, “Prescriptions as Operative in the History of Psychology,” Journal of the History

of the Behavioral Sciences 7 (1971): 311-322. 7. Willem van Hoorn, As Images Unwind: Ancient and Modern Theories of Visual Perception (Amsterdam:

University Press Amsterdam, 1972). 8. Klaus F. Riegel, “From Traits and Equilibrium toward Developmental Dialectics,” in Nebraska

Symposium on Mofivation, ed. William J. Arnold and James K. Cole (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), pp. 349-407; Riegel, Psychology of Development and History (New York: Plenum, 1976); Riegel and G. C. Rosenwald, eds., Structure and Transformation: Developmental and Historical Aspects (New York: Wiley, 1975).

26 (1973): 309-320.

29 (1974): 1-15.


9. Robert I . Watson, Sr., The Great Psychologists, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1978). 10. There is still another field closely related to, but distinguishable from, social psychology that could augment this framework for the study of the history of psychology - the psychology of science. It is mandatory that psychology study science because it is a form of human behavior and experience. It must therefore study itself - the psychology of psychologists. Consider some of the now traditional problems of the psychology of science - creativity, originality, productivity, experimental bias, reasons for scientific belief, influence of personality and ambition, reasons for choice of career, and the sources of reward sought. These characteristic problems of the psychology of the science can also be conceived as relevant problems for the historian of psychology. 11. Gardner Lindzey and Eliot Aronson, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed., vol 4, Group Psychology and the Phenomena of Interaction (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969). 12. Robert F. Berkhofer, A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis (New York: Free Press, 1969). 13. David Krech and Robert S. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948). 14. Robert J . Lifton, “On Psychohistory,” in Explorations in Psychohistory: The Wellfleer Papers, ed. R. J. Lifton with E. Olson (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), pp. 21-41. 15. Robert D. Rossell, “Micro-history: Studying Social Change in the Laboratory,” History of Childhood Quarterly 3 (1976): 373-400. 16. Willard I . Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918). 17. Gordon W. Allport, “Attitudes,” in A Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. C. Murchison (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press, 1935), pp. 789-844. 18. Donald T. Campbell, “Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Dispositions,” in Psychology: A Study of a Science, vol. 6, Investigations of Man as Socius: Their Place in Psychology and the Social Sciences, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 94-172. 19. Ibid. 20. Barbara C. Ross, “Psychological Thought within the Context of the Scientific Revolution, 1665- 1700” (Ph.D. diss., University of New Hampshire, 1970). 21. Kenneth R. Gibson, “The Conceptual Bases of American Psychology: A Content Analysis of the Presidential Addresses of the American Psychological Association, 1892-1970” (Ph.D. diss., University of New Hampshire, 1972). 22. Milton Rokeach, “The Nature of Attitudes,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 1, ed. D. L. Sills (New York: Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, 1968), pp. 449-458. 23. David Katz and Ezra Stotland, “A Preliminary Statement to a Theory of Attitude Structure and Change,” in Psychology: A Study of Science, Vol. 3, Formulations of the Person and the Social Context, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 423-475. 24. Campbell, “Social Attitudes.” 25. 26. Ibid. 27. 28. Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences 10 (1974): 352-366. 29. Watson, The Great Psychologists. 30. Melvin H. Marx and William A. Hillix, Systems and Theories in Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973). 3 1. Fuchs and Kawash, “Prescriptive Dimensions.” 32. Marx and Hillix, Systems and Theories in Psychology. 33. Katz and Stotland, “A Preliminary Statement,” pp. 425-426. 34. Thomas H. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 35. Watson, “Psychology: A Prescriptive Science.” 36. Margaret Masterman, “The Nature of a Paradigm,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. lrme Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 59-90. 37. Paul E. Liechtenstein, “A Behavioral Approach to Phenomenological Data,” Psychological Record

Katz and Stotland, “A Preliminary Statement.”

Watson, “Psychology: A Prescriptive Science.” Arnold H. Fuchs and George F. Kawash, “Prescriptive Dimensions for Five Schools of Psychology,”

21 (1971): 1-16.


38. David L. Krantz, “The Separate Worlds of Operant and Non-operant Psychology,” Journal of Applied Behavioral Analysis 4 (1971): 61-70; Krantz, “Schools and Systems: The Mutual Isolation of Operant and Non-operant Psychology as a Case Study,” Journal ofthe History of the Behavioral Sciences

39. Eileen L. McDonagh, “Attitude Changes and Paradigm Shifts: Social Psychological Foundations of the Kuhnian Thesis,” Social Studies of Science 6 (1976): 51-76. 40. Robert I. Watson, Sr., “Prescriptive Theory and the Social Sciences,” in Determinants and Controls of ScientiJic Development, ed. K. D. Knorr, H. Strasser, and H. G. Zilian (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975),

8 (1972): 86-102.

pp. 11-35.

the history of psychology conceived as social psychology of the past

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