The Fate of the Republic

James Burk

D uring the fall of 1998, the House of Representa- tives struggled over whether to impeach Presi-

dent Clinton. In the end they did. Future historians will judge whether the struggle was necessary or might have been averted and whether members of this body executed their responsibilities as wisely as possible under the circumstances. Steeped as we are in current events, it is too soon to know what judgment histori- ans will reach. They will have, as we do not, the ben- efit of hindsight to aid them in their task. They will know on what terms Clinton's administration was con- cluded and they will weigh in the light of future events, as we cannot, how that conclusion colored the ad- ministration's accomplishments and affected what contribution they made to the life of our democracy. In the midst of the struggle, we are doomed to igno- rance about how it will turn out.

To be sure, we are familiar enough with the details of the conduct that sunk the president into crisis. At the heart of the matter is what Clinton admits was his wrong and blameworthy conduct in carrying on an il- licit relationship with Monica Lewinsky and, more important, his less than forthright acceptance of pub- lic responsibility for this misconduct. But after a year's investigation we disagreed about whether these fail- ings were public matters or whether they required a formal public response. Among political, legal, and media elites there was a wide and genuine difference of opinion about what should be done. While some news accounts suggested otherwise, the difference of

elite opinion was found in public opinion as well. Despite uncertainty about how to respond, it became certain that members of Congress could not simply ignore the matter. For better or worse, the controversy reached beyond a question of how to evaluate one man's poor judgment and bad behavior. It became a loud and deeply partisan political controversy. As I write, it is moving toward resolution, but is not yet resolved.

Under these circumstances, it is tempting to focus attention on what is necessary for action, narrowly to examine the political and legal factors that may affect the outcome, to see what levers we or others might pull to bring tangled controversy to a just and decent end. That, at least, is certainly what members of the Senate must do after the vote for impeachment. Nev- ertheless, we are not required to succumb completely to this temptation. We are easily blinded by politics that are reduced to close study of each new twist in legal stratagems or each release of public opinion polls in search for clues about swings in public mood and political momentum. There are other, more insight- ful, ways to approach the study of political contro- versy than by asking, what should be done. We gain perspective on (and relief from) the confusing vola- tile spectacles of daily events if we take time to fol- low one of these.

Consider, for example, current speculation about how any course of action might affect the country as a whole. No matter what one supposes the proper dis-

THE FATE OF THE REPUBLIC / 41

position of the president's case should have b e e n - - whether to impeach and to convict, censure and re- buke, or forgive and overlook the transgression--none doubt that more was at stake than whether the presi- dent and his inner circle remained in power. Indeed, quite striking to me, has been the sense widespread, albeit for different reasons, that nothing less than the fate of the republic is at issue in the handling of Clinton's case. My purpose in this paper is to exam- ine different arguments about why that may be so. It will be convenient and descriptive to treat these under three large headings, each one familiar to social theo- rists who argue about the conditions of a good soci- ety. One is law's role in the enforcement of morals. Another is the need to maintain the rule of law. And, third, is the relation between moral vigilance and a free society. It is not very challenging to wonder where the president's supporters and accusers might stand under each of these headings. The serious question is whether it is really true that the republic's fate is in doubt. Why has this tawdry scandal led serious people to suspect that so much is at stake and what weight should we give to their suspicions? These are impor- tant questions. Perhaps I should confess at the outset my skepticism that the republic is in grave jeopardy as a result of this presidential crisis. Even so, there is much to learn about the problems facing our polity and our ability to meet them by examining the source of these alarms and (if I am right) the reasons why they are false alarms.

Enforcing Morals Without doubt, law and morality are intimately re-

lated. Of course, not all law deals with moral matters. But many laws define behaviors outside the bounds of moral acceptability, specify procedures by which such behaviors may be identified when they occur, and state how such behavior should be punished. In these cases, the enforcement of law and the enforce- ment of morals are overlapping activities. There are many questions about how extensive this overlap should be, especially at the margins. In liberal societ- ies, we readily agree that conduct harming another often violates both the dictates of morals and the law. Yet hard questions arise about what constitutes harm, how great the harm must be before it is subject to le- gal remedy, and what degree of responsibility persons can reasonably be assigned for the consequences of their actions. The questions are hard because legal punishment intrudes on one's life, liberty, or property. We are required to balance the harm done by the act we would punish against the harm done by the pun-

ishment proposed. Failure to do so, we suspect, turns law into an instrument of vengeance, with the good of justice left behind. There is much less agreement that the law should enforce moral conduct when the con- duct in question is supposed to harm no other. The realm of morality is vast and the requirements it im- poses, supposing for the moment there is consensus on this score, are often beyond the ability of the best of us to meet. A society whose law aimed to punish any immorality whenever it occurred would require a vast machinery of enforcement appropriate for a the- ocracy perhaps, but threatening to the aims of liberal society. A liberal society, as John Smart Mill instructed, should leave us free to pursue our own happiness. We should not have to worry that the government will punish us if we choose a course that others believe is morally wrong or unwise, so long that is, as we do not harm others in the process. Here too there are hard questions about how broadly to define this sphere of action that is protected from the law, if only because there usually is no bright line to distinguish acts that harm others from those that do not. Nevertheless, we believe that both individual and social well-being are enhanced when there is a realm of privacy (or natural liberty) that is safe from legal intervention.

These questions are especially hard when they are transferred to the realm of politics and the issue is whether and how to judge the moral conduct of public officials. Whatever right to privacy ordinary citizens may enjoy, public officials are often required to sacri- fice some privacy because of the power they wield and because they are supposed to be accountable to us. This is not to say that public officials have no rights to pri- vacy. As Dennis Thompson observed, their right to pri- vacy is diminished only insofar as necessary to ensure the needs of democratic accountability. He argues that there are substantive criteria that should help determine how far privacy may be compromised; speaking gener- ally, "the private life of a public official should not be disclosed unless it is relevant to his or her official du- ties." Obviously the claim requires specification. We tightly assume that we need to know more about the private lives of those who wield the greatest power over us. Even here, our right to know depends on there be- ing a close connection between the private activities and the official's public performance. When private activity directly impairs the capacity of an official to perform his job then there is a strong basis for claiming that the public has a right to know about it and, per- haps, depending on the exact circumstances, to take punitive action or action to remove the person from office. But should the official engage in private activity

42 / SOCIETY �9 MARCH/APRIL 1999

that becomes known and is scandalous to some, evok- ing moral disapproval, that does not necessarily justify the loss of privacy much less provide a ground for fur- ther legal action. "It is not enough," Thompson con- cludes, "to point to the public scandal an official's con- duct may cause. The question must always be asked: shouM the public be scandalized?"

The relevance of this discussion to Clinton's case is obvious. Clinton's liaison with Lewinsky was clearly a private consensual activity between two adults. We may argue that it harmed no one or, if it did, the per- son most harmed was Mrs. Clinton, who had legal and other remedies available to her. It was not a public matter. It certainly did not directly impair Clinton's ability to perform his public office. This seems at one glance an example of conduct, however reprehensible, that belongs within the protected private sphere and should never be made an object of public inquiry. On this ground, we may question the legitimacy of the public investigation of it by the Office of the Indepen- dent Counsel. If Clinton gave evasive and misleading responses about his conduct to his aides, investigators and the public, that was unfortunate but still an under- standable and excusable defense of his right to pri- v a c y - a n d not very different from the conduct of many ordinary citizens caught in similar circumstances. Now, if this argument is accepted, it follows that the House of Representatives had no grounds to impeach the president. Indeed, the case against impeachment would be strong. As Clinton's lawyers argued repeat- edly before the House Judiciary Committee, the presi- dent may have misbehaved morally, but moral mis- conduct of this kind is rarely punished by law and usually only in conjunction with some other offense. It surely fails to justify an act as drastic as impeach- ment. While there is no uncontested understanding of what constitutes an impeachable offense, there are good reasons for assuming that impeachment requires conduct that undermines the integrity of the public office or is a genuine abuse of political power. If the president is impeached and removed from office for this relatively minor misconduct, the effect will be radically to lower the threshold of impeachment. Fu- ture presidents will be held hostage to the whims and approval of Congress in a way that our constitutional framers never intended, subverting the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches and treating lightly the results of popular elections. Over 400 historians publicly announced, the result would have "the most serious implications for our constitutional order," it would permanently disfigure and diminish the presidency.

This is a forceful argument and yet not without flaws. First, it is not difficult to see a connection between Clinton's private conduct and his capacity to perform his public office. It is now widely regarded as an abuse of power for institutional leaders--in business, univer- sities, churches, and political off ice-- to engage in sexual relations with subordinate employees, even when the relations are apparently consensual. Nor is it un- usual for such conduct to be formally censured, espe- cially if the leader tries to cover up the conduct. Often enough, the penalty is removal from office. This fact alone may not be sufficient to justify impeaching the president. The framers clearly thought that elections (not impeachments) were the proper means by which the public should hold representatives accountable for bad behavior. Nevertheless, given current social conven- tions, Clinton's bad behavior lowers his influence and impairs his ability to lead other public officials who are held to the standard at the peril of their jobs. This is most pertinent perhaps as it affects relations between the president and the military.

Second, quite apart from whether it would be justi- fied, it is doubtful that impeaching Clinton would so strongly damage the office of the presidency as the historians suppose. Their argument is sometimes based on a projection from the case of Andrew Johnson, whose impeachment (they say) weakened the presi- dency for the remainder of the nineteenth century even though it led to no conviction. Perhaps this was so. Yet the presidency today is quite different from what it was a century ago. The powers and responsibilities of the president have expanded greatly. (Indeed, not so long ago one of the historians now worried about weakening the presidency wrote a book to warn us about the dangers of an "imperial" president.)

The Rule of Law Clinton's impeachment would not reverse this struc-

tural change. No future president with a minimum of self-control and moral authority could easily be pre- vented from exercising power. Even if Congress, con- trolled by a faction hostile to the president, proposed on frivolous or merely partisan grounds to hold the president hostage by threats of impeachment, it is not clear that theirs would be the final word. Congress, after all, is held accountable for its actions by frequent elections. Indeed, the historians' case is remarkable for its lack of faith in the ability and wisdom of the electorate to oust a Congress that might abuse its power in this way. Recent elections suggest that their faith- lessness is unwarranted.

There is another way to approach the matter and

THE FATE OF THE REPUBLIC / 43

that focuses less on the purely immoral conduct that led to the president's crisis and more on the president's attempt to cover up his conduct by putatively illegal means. This of course was the approach taken in the referral to Congress from the Office of the Indepen- dent Counsel. It was a theme hammered by Republi- can members of the House Judiciary Committee and by those who voted ultimately in favor of two articles of impeachment for consideration by the Senate. What- ever one thinks of the president's sexual relations with Lewinsky is irrelevant. From their perspective, the problem is that the president stepped outside the bounds of the law to prevent people from learning about the relationship. He is supposed to have com- mitted perjury when testifying about it before the grand jury hearing evidence gathered by the independent counsel and when he was deposed in the civil suit brought against him by Paula Jones. He is supposed to have obstructed justice by encouraging other wit- nesses to perjure themselves, corruptly influencing potential witnesses so that they would offer false and misleading statements, and concealing evidence that had been subpoenaed. He is supposed by some to have gone further still to abuse his power.

There is debate about how strong the evidence is in support of all these suppositions. But there seems to be consensus that the evidence is strongest with re- spect to the charge of perjury. Perjury alone however may be charge enough. If the president testifies falsely under oath to subvert a legal inquiry he is, they say, attacking the integrity of the judiciary and failing in his duties as the nation's chief law enforcement of- ricer. It is not just a crime. It is a crime against the state. It may not equal in its audacity and abuse of power the activities that eventually forced Richard Nixon from office, but that is not the threshold to be crossed before impeachment is justified. As one House Judiciary Committee member said, "Perjury is a crime that undermines the very basis of the rule of law." Failure to impeach the president for such a crime ob- viously threatens the republic, for the republic is noth- ing if it will not uphold the rule of law. Another com- mittee member told how quick the danger could spread. He noted that the head of the Drug Enforcement Agency thought it necessary in September 1998 to warn agents that crafty and evasive answers before judges would not be tolerated, a warning issued, this member thought, owing to the poor example set by the president. Surely it is true that a democratic re- public must maintain the rule of law if the regime is to retain the confidence of the people and ultimately its legitimacy.

This too is a forceful argument, but like the earlier one, it has flaws that reduce its persuasive power. First, it is at best premature to say that Clinton's conduct has undermined the judiciary. The legal system has yet to move to a conclusion and, in this case, it cannot do so while Clinton is a sitting president. Sitting presidents, many legal scholars believe, cannot be indicted or tried for crimes. But they are not above the law. The law is patient and ready to wait until the president's public service ends before pursuing its claims for justice. If Clinton was not impeached but was indicted, tried, and convicted for perjury after leaving office, one would have to say that the rule of law was maintained.

Second, it seems utopian to suggest that if a presi- dent fails to obey a particular law or otherwise attacks the judicial system the result will be a collapse of the rule of law. Presidential respect for the law is essen- tial to the health constitutional government. Violations of the law are not to be encouraged or approved. Nev- ertheless, the rule of law is not so fixed and brittle that any particular violation of it will shatter the whole. There are other instances in our history when presi- dential conduct has not conformed strictly to the let- ter of the law. In most cases, from Abraham Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus to Ronald Reagan's support of the Contras, the violations were made in pursuit of a larger policy goal. That does not mean they were all justified or even if they were justi- fied that they were harmless in their consequences. These acts set precedents that might threaten the rule of law. But there is a difference between those viola- tions and the present case. Assuming that Clinton com- mitted perjury, one could not claim that any public good excused or justified the violation. His would be a petty crime, not a matter involving state policy. It would certainly be no attack on the judiciary compa- rable (say) to Franklin Roosevelt 's court-packing plan. The crime would be distasteful, more so because done by a president, but its significance would have to be kept in perspective. While crimes of this kind are fre- quently discovered and prosecuted, they are not be- lieved to be serious enough to prosecute in every in- stance. No one expects an end to the rule of law as a result.

Third, the argument to maintain the rule of law as- sumes that the rule of law is an unqualified social good. In fact, as Judith Shklar has eloquently explained, that is never the case. Every system of justice entails in- justice. That means we must put aside our naive trust in the rightness of rules; we cannot uncritically accept every allegation of wrongdoing arising from the crimi- nal justice system. We must consider the possibility

44 / SOCIETY �9 M A R C H / A P R I L 1999

that an injustice is being done. A Democratic member of the House Judiciary Committee invited us to do this when she claimed that the president was a "poster boy" for the bad prosecutors in America. There was nothing worse, she said, than being targeted by a law enforcement investigation led by an abusive prosecu- tor who would go to any lengths to ensure a convic- tion. Implicitly, the abusive prosecutor she had fore- most in mind was Kenneth Starr, the independent counsel investigating Clinton. But she meant to asso- ciate him with others at work throughout American society. The law is not always unbiased. Strong resis- tance by African Americans to impeaching Clinton is not simple partisanship. Nor is it approving of his ex- tramarital relationship. It rests rather on direct experi- ence with a law enforcement system that is too fre- quently biased against them. Such experience would heighten skepticism toward charges brought against Clinton to protect the sanctity of a law that has abused them. Suspicion of bias is prompted also by the se- crecy that surrounded the work of the independent counsel assembling the case against Clinton. Secrecy is usually a wholly appropriate strategy in building a case. But it stands in sharp contrast to the public hear- ings that preceded (and explained the reasons for) Nixon's resignation. A secret investigation of the presi- dent can do little to educate the public about its fair- ness. Simply accepting the investigation's findings may intensify rather than satisfy doubts about the in- tegrity of the process. Examined in this light, proceed- ing with an impeachment may seem to be unjust. Far from upholding the rule of law, it will seem to be a corruption of law. Should Clinton be removed from office, overturning the results of his popular election, the corruption would be that much worse.

In short, it is far from clear that failure to act against Clinton's alleged perjury undermines the rule of law and threatens the republic. That is far too simple a claim. The strength of the rule of law does not rest on the prosecution of every violation against it. It rests rather on people's confidence that the law has stood (however imperfectly) on guard against injustice to encourage the cause of justice.

Moral Vigilance The third and final argument about the threats posed

to the republic stems from a broad and familiar one about the strength of society depending on the moral character of the people. This association holds par- ticularly true in free societies where external restraints on the conduct of individuals and groups of individu- als are neither as numerous nor as binding as they of-

ten are under other regimes. Liberal democratic re- publics presuppose a capacity to restrain the pursuit of personal or parochial interests in the light of some higher principles or values. Morris Janowitz referred to it as the capacity for personal and social control, while Edward Shils referred to it, more simply, as ci- vility. This capacity is found, in varying degrees, in both individuals and groups. Its strength is a product of social life. It is nurtured often by the example set by a few individuals and groups in public and private life. It is, however, no simple matter to enumerate what kinds of action exemplify civility because they are so various. They range from the willingness of citizens to bear arms in defense of their country to the com- passion of neighbors who volunteer to build homes for the working poor. Harder still is to say what social conditions are minimally necessary to encourage people to act in this way or to indicate how much ci- vility is required to establish or sustain a civil society. Universal civility is not required (or desired) to set the tone. Most difficult is to say precisely what higher principles or purposes should restrain which pursuits of self-interest and to what degree. Nevertheless, we can say, first, that civility is present when we live as members of the community who understand that no one of us can thrive without moderating our pursuits, taking account of the needs and well-being of others, and considering what is good for the whole society. Second, when the possibility for living in this way is diminished, the most likely result is to encourage ran- corous conflict, distrust, and demoralization threaten- ing to a free society.

In his recent book, The Death of Outrage, William Bennett has applied a variant of this argument to the current presidential crisis. As his purpose is polemi- cal, to arouse the public to alarm about President Clinton's conduct, he sweeps aside the difficulties that beset and qualify both theoretical and empirical claims based upon this argument. He writes as if its major claims are uncontested and that there is no doubt about the content of American ideals (to include intolerance of sexual "indiscipline"). He is certain that our well- being as a society depends on our willingness to make moral judgments. Good character he believes is a re- quirement for national prosperity and for institutional leaders. He is equally certain that there is much in Clinton's conduct that warrants our reproach. If we accept the defenses Clinton offers and choose to over- look what he has done, he warns we are on a path to "moral bankruptcy," that we are bound to damage the country, "its standards, and our self-respect." As the book title suggests, he is concerned that that is the

THE FATE OF THE REPUBLIC / 45

path we are on, that the public has not shown suffi- cient outrage at this "assault on American ideals." Not surprisingly, then, most of the book consists of a re- view of many of the particular defenses and other coun- sels for "just moving on" and it attempts to tell why they are not persuasive. There is no need to summa- rize those contentions. Important here is the larger ar- gument within which the various refutations are framed. It can by summarized as follows. By failing to respond to Clinton's alleged offenses we are com- mitting an act of intellectual and moral disarmament and that threatens our capacity to remain a free soci- ety. This "loss of outrage" is symptomatic of our wor- risome condition. We cannot long thrive as a country if we are unwilling to live by our ideals and to require that our leaders do so as well; "we desperately need to recover them, and soon." Otherwise, our democracy is threatened by internal corruption as real and deadly as were the external threats of "Nazism and Japanese imperialism, and, later, Soviet communism."

I focus on Bennett's book because it is among the most responsible of a number of books, articles, and essays that follow a similar line. In any case, it is not an argument to be taken lightly. The underlying idea that indifference to moral corruption is incompatible with a good society is hard to dispute, whether we look at our own society or at others further removed in place and time. Yet it remains a question whether the idea actually applies in this case. It supposes what I think is questionable, namely, that the moral fabric of society is made from whole cloth, that it is seam- less. If it was, then failure to uphold any one moral tenet would indeed damage (even ruin) the whole. That would mean every good deed reinforces every other good, as any wrongdoing hurries corruption. Our high- est duty would be to act without transgressing even the least moral law. But we know that is not the case. Ours is a pluralist society in its morality as in all else. That means there are times when the pursuit of one good comes into conflict with another. There are many examples of the fact, as readers of Isaiah Berlin will know. It is evident in the present case from the two arguments we have already considered. The first ar- gument sought to maintain a strong executive branch to promote the good of separating powers as a check against the concentration of governmental power. To do this required adopting a narrow view of what was an impeachable offense. The second argument sought to maintain a strong judiciary able to defend and up- hold the good of the rule of law. To do this required adopting a broad view of what was an impeachable offense. Both arguments aim to promote a particular

good. Yet, if each argument is accepted at face value, both cannot succeed. Either we promote the separa- tion of powers or we maintain the rule of law. In this case at least, we cannot do both simultaneously. Con- sider what this implies. When different goods pull people in different directions, a muted reaction recog- nizing various goods does not necessarily indicate the absence of anger and outrage found in the morally in- different. Nor is it evidence of republic-threatening moral corruption. It might indicate instead a prudent desire to approach the conflict of goods with balance and caution. Only those who were certain that the goods they would promote are good over all could ar- gue otherwise with confidence.

Apart from this logical difficulty, Bennett's argu- ment rests on the questionable empirical claim that the American public has lost its moral sense. If it had not, he reasons, it would show greater outrage, even anger, at the president's evident misconduct. This claim contradicts the available poll data. The most frequently reported polls tell us that the president's approval rat- ing is high, indeed often higher in 1998 than in prior years, and that the public is strongly opposed to im- peaching Clinton. These data, however, are mislead- ing. The data on presidential approval are subject to broad interpretation. They are not narrowly focused judgments of the president. When questions are fo- cused more narrowly on the president's character, then the data, as reported in a recent issue of The Public Perspective (Oct./Nov. 1998, pp. 20-37), portray a very different picture. Public belief that Clinton is "honest and trustworthy" has dropped from over 50 percent in 1993 to between 28 and 31 percent, depend- ing on the precise question asked in August 1998. And belief that Clinton has "high personal moral and ethi- cal standards" has dropped from 44 percent in 1994 to just 19 percent in August 1998. In September 1998, 90 percent believed it was important for the president to provide moral leadership for the country, but only 30 percent thought Clinton was doing so. It is true that only a minority (27 percent according to a CNN/ USA Today/Gallup poll in December 1998) prefer the alternative of impeaching Clinton. But it is also true that only a minority (37 percent) prefer to take no pu- nitive action whatsoever. These data do not support the idea that the public is morally uncritical of the president's conduct, however approving they may be in general of his "handling of the presidency." On the contrary, about two-thirds of the public hold a disap- proving view of his moral character and prefer to take some punitive action against him for his alleged mis- conduct. On balance, the public's response is differ-

46 / SOCIETY �9 M A R C H / A P R I L 1999

entiated and complex, weaving wisely between the temptations of absolute judgment and irresponsible indifference. There is no evidence of unwillingness to live by ideals that sustain the life of the republic.

My arguments are not meant to exhibit a kind of liberal complacency or to encourage a Panglossian view of our political state. There is a presidential cri- sis. It stems from Clinton's ill-advised sexual affair and subsequent acts to limit public knowledge of the affair and was intensified by the House of Represen- tatives' decision to vote for two articles of impeach- ment. It would be better for us all if none of this had happened. But it has and it is a serious and unprec- edented affair that raises important questions for the country, quite apart from any decision made about the president. We have encountered many of them here. For instance, do public officials have a fight to pri- vacy that protects them from prosecution for even scan- dalous behavior and if so where should that line of protection be drawn? How difficult in general do we wish it to be for Congress to undertake impeachment proceedings against the president? And what do we think an impeachable act should be? Are we better served by knowing in advance what the threshold for impeachment is or is it wiser to leave the matter vague, allowing future generations to decide the matter as they think best? Given the importance and difficulty of educating the public about the fairness of investi- gations that lead to an impeachment charge, are we advised to rely on the independent counsel system or are we better off encouraging Congress to take the lead through special investigations? How do we bal- ance conflicting goods in our efforts to maintain the integrity of our pluralist moral order? These questions raise fundamental issues about what counts as wrong- doing by public officials and how we should respond to wrongdoing when it occurs. They are questions that demand prudence on our part to answer, even more when we must accept the possibility that some presi- dents possess no prudence of their own.

Nevertheless, at this moment, the crisis does not raise questions about the fate of our republic. We ex- amined the main arguments that suggest the opposite

is true. They were based on sound assumptions but reached exaggerated conclusions. They overlooked critical factors or employed questionable logic or ig- nored relevant empirical evidence. Common to them all at one point or another, they failed without reason to trust the judgment of the people. That is a striking commonality considering their different beliefs about how the crisis should be met. If one doubts that voters can hold public officials to account, that citizens are confident in the rule of law, and that people can make prudent judgments when faced with the moral com- plexities of life, then the republic may seem to dangle by a thread. But there are no good reasons for doubt in the present case. Speaking in favor of impeachment at the Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris felt compelled to remind the delegates that "This Magis- trate [the president] is not the King but the prime-Min- ister. The people are King." And so it is here still. There may someday be an apocalypse in the life of this re- public, but so long as Morris's observation holds, it is not apocalypse now.

SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS

William J. Bennett, The Death of Outrage. New York: Free Press, 1998.

Morris Janowitz, On Social Organization and Social Control. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1991.

David Maraniss, The Clinton Enigma. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.

Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen. New York: Free Press, 1998.

Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civility. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997.

Judith N. Shklar, The Faces oflnjustice. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

Dennis E Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987.

James Burk is professor of sociology at Texas A&M University. He is a former editor of the journal Armed Forces and Society, available through the Transaction Pe- riodicals Consortium.