the european union in crisis || legitimacy and eu foreign policy

Legitimacy and EU Foreign Policy

Nicola Chelotti and Volkan Gul

1 Introduction

Traditionally, foreign and defence policy is an area relatively insulated from the

public, for a bunch of reasons, including security concerns, need of expertise, rapid

decision-making, low salience for the electorate. The executive is the main actor in

foreign policy, whereas national parliaments tend to have less power and a lower

profile. The European Union (EU) is not an exception1: the decisions are mostly

made by two bodies, the European Council and the Council of the EU, which are

composed by the heads of state and/or government and by national ministers,

respectively. Paradoxically, this might not excessively jeopardise the legitimacy

of EU foreign policy, since they are elected politicians, clearly visible to national

citizens, and legitimised at the domestic level. In addition, they make (almost) all

the decisions by consensus, so that no government can be said to be outvoted or

marginalised by the rest of the member states. It is not surprising then that there

have not been so many studies on the legitimacy and/or democracy of EU foreign

policy (Sjursen 2011a; Vanhoonacker et al. 2010).

However, a closer look at its decision-making process reveals how several

dynamics and practices have altered the image of EU foreign policy as a purely

N. Chelotti (*)

Department of International Relations, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United

Kingdom

e-mail: [email protected]

V. Gul

Evliya Celebi Yerleskesi, IIBF Kamu Yonetımı Bolumu, Dumlupinar Universitesi, Oda No: 39,

Kutahya, Turkey

e-mail: [email protected]

1 For the purposes of this chapter, foreign policy refers to the more traditional diplomatic, security

and defence aspects of EU’s external relations, whereas other policy areas (trade, development

policy, environmental policy, etc.) are not covered by the analysis.

# Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

K.N. Demetriou (ed.), The European Union in Crisis,DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-08774-0_11

199

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

intergovernmental system, indirectly legitimised by the preponderant role of

nationally designated officials. As the chapter makes it clear, EU foreign policy is

mostly prepared and finalised, with certain discretion, by unelected national

diplomats, the majority of whom resides in Brussels, who often change the national

position and come to a joint definition of EU foreign policy. As a result, this chapter

investigates the legitimacy of EU foreign policy, by exploring its structures,

procedures and processes. In this vein, it does not focus on input or output legiti-

macy, although some aspects of citizens’ participation will also be analysed. Its

starting point is instead when citizens have already submitted their interests and

deals with the internal, institutional decision-making process, or throughput

(Schmidt 2013; Wimmel 2009), and its normative legitimacy.

The chapter is organised as follows. The next section briefly explains and

summarises the decision-making process of EU foreign and defence policy,

illustrates how it has evolved (and changed) over the years, and highlights the

main points of contention with regard to the legitimacy of the system. A second

section introduces the concept of legitimacy, disentangles its various dimensions,

and presents and discusses the framework of the chapter. Next, the framework is

applied to the process of EU foreign policy: in particular, four normative

conceptions of legitimacy are identified, and explored: citizens’ participation,

transparency, accountability and deliberation. Finally, a concluding section briefly

summarises the main findings of the analysis.

2 EU Foreign Policy: The Quest for Legitimacy

When European states firstly decided to coordinate their foreign policy by

launching the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, the legitimacy of

the whole new project did not seem a particularly controversial issue. After all, the

system was in the hands of elected politicians (heads of state and/or governments;

foreign ministers), who met a few times per year in order “first, to ensure greater

mutual understanding with respect to major issues of international politics . . . and,second, to increase solidarity between the member states by working for a

harmonisation of views, concertation of attitudes, and joint action when it appears

feasible and desirable” (Davignon Report 1970. In Ifestos 1987: 152). It was a frank

discussion of foreign policy issues in a European context, with a club-like atmo-

sphere, where each leader had the opportunity to take the floor and indicate his/her

views, and where, ultimately, each decision, statement or actions was taken con-

sensually (Nuttall 1992). The system was constructed along clear intergovernmen-

tal lines: the EPC was kept separated from the framework of the European

Economic Community (EEC), whose institutions (Commission, Parliament and

Court of Justice) were minimally, if at all, involved in the process. Elected

politicians were in control of the EPC agenda and direction for other two reasons.

Firstly, the EPC had very few rules and procedures, and produced very few

documents, which facilitated that control, and increased the (sense of) ownership

of heads of state and/or government and foreign ministers. Secondly, the

200 N. Chelotti and V. Gul

bureaucratic level of the executive branches had a secondary role in the manage-

ment of the EPC, in its very early stages. The number of national officials involved

was relatively modest—at least four meetings per year of the heads of the political

departments in the national foreign ministries, and a few working parties composed

by junior officials. Their job was to prepare the work for the ministerial summits,

gather data relating to some specific issues, and envisage some possible solutions.

Since the 1970s, this system has been gradually and deeply changed. The EPC

was expanded, deepened and finally integrated in the architecture of the European

Union (EU), and upgraded into a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) with the

treaty of Maastricht (1993). A few years later, member states started to cooperate

also in defence matters, developing what the Lisbon treaty (2009) has then

re-branded as the Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). The story of the

progressive institutionalisation of EU foreign and security policy has been compel-

lingly explained elsewhere (Nuttall 2000; Smith 2003). What is relevant for the

purposes of this chapter is to analyse how the CFSP/CSDP currently functions,

what the main actors are, how decisions are made—in order to evaluate then the

legitimacy claims, and identify the legitimacy sources, of this policy regime.

One thing should be clarified at first: in spite of all the changes and the treaty

revisions of the last three decades, EU foreign policy remains formally an intergov-

ernmental project, and has not been communitarised. For sure, the links between

EU supranational institutions, the Community policies, and the CFSP/CSDP have

been (both formally and informally) intensified and strengthened. Yet, cooperation

in foreign and security policy still falls within the remit of the Foreign Affairs

Council (FAC), which meets once per month—and of the European Council. The

upgrading of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy (HR), and the creation of the European External Action Service

(EEAS), following the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, have certainly introduced

some potentially innovative elements in decision-making process, since these

actors, inter alia, are in charge of chairing the great majority of the CFSP/CSDP

meetings and have been granted the right of initiative. Nonetheless only the

28 national ministers are entitled to vote and formally adopt any CFSP/CSDP act.

In other words, (almost) all the decisions in this field have to be approved and

signed by elected politicians.

In reality, however, the picture is much more complex and blurred. First of all,

the administrative level of the national executives has gained much more impor-

tance in the policy process. Not only has the number of committees and groups

increased (around 35 in the CFSP/CSDP), and their policy remit expanded (to cover

also aspects linked to civilian and military missions), but the nature of their job has

been progressively transformed. The preparation of the FCA meetings led to a de

facto legislative delegation: policy dossiers are not only drafted, but in many cases

pre-cooked and finalised by national diplomats. The pace of the CFSP/CSDP

activities is so intense that ministers have the opportunity to analyse less than one

third of foreign policy issues, and just rubber-stamp the rest (Juncos and Pomorska

2011). As a result, the legislative locus of EU foreign policy has been, to a great

extent, changed: it is still within the intergovernmental Council of ministers, still

Legitimacy and EU Foreign Policy 201

negotiated and approved by national representatives, but the balance has shifted in

favour of the bureaucratic level, at the expense of the political one (Bickerton

2011).

The bureaucratisation of EU foreign policy needs to be further specified. The

administrative level in the national capital extensively relies on their Brussels-

based national diplomats (who have been appointed to the national Permanent

Representations in the Belgian capital, PermReprs). Being at the core of the

CFSP/CSDP policy process, acquiring a sensible process expertise and knowledge

of the state of play, and given the information advantages that they consequently

develop vis-a-vis the national capital, the Brussels-based representatives play a

decisive (often primary) role in both formulating and negotiating the national

position in Council committees. Half of them affirm they have sufficient leeway

in their activities (Chelotti 2013). They have become a sort of a semi-autonomous

body (Sjursen 2011b). In addition, residing permanently for several year in Belgium

and getting constantly in contact with EU institutions and the other EU colleagues

lead national Brussels-based officials to become socialised to EU norms and

logics—thus developing (also) European allegiances and valuing being part of an

“EU foreign policy” (Aggestam 1999; Cross 2011; Juncos and Pomorska 2006;

Tonra 2001). However, the situation is not so clear-cut and socialisation processes

have a more ambiguous impact on these diplomats’ identities. On the one hand, if

many of them really adopt pro-European orientations, an equally good number of

representatives maintain exclusively national identities. On the other hand,

pro-European loyalties are not necessarily a consequence of the contact with

Brussels and EU institutions, since their adoption is explained also by previous,

non-European socialisation (in national or in other international settings) or simply

personal preferences or idiosyncrasies. In other words, a good number of more

supranationally oriented diplomats come to Brussels with already a positive attitude

towards a common and strong EU foreign policy (Chelotti 2011).

We have clarified so far what actors make decisions in EU foreign and defence

policy: negotiations are mostly finalised in the lower levels of the Council of

ministers, by national officials with little (perhaps increasing) input from other

EU institutions. The section now investigates the practices of the CFSP/CSDP

policy-process. How do these officials reach a common position? How are

differences solved? Needless to say, the picture is heterogeneous and indicates a

mixture of different styles and tactics. Different practices coexist and inform the

decision-making process (Chelotti 2011). Veto threats—though occasionally pres-

ent—are not a recurrent tactic in the Council, and the overall atmosphere is said to

be cordial and positive. Compensatory arrangements—in the form of issue-linkages

and side-payments—regularly occur, according to the 63.5 % and 31.6 % of the

diplomats, respectively. National positions are therefore rather frequently changed

and exchanged in order to foster consensus. On the other hand, it is also not

uncommon that EU foreign policy is more jointly and endogenously defined, and

becomes a collective enterprise, where the boundaries of the national positions

become blurred. National diplomats frequently engage in argumentative processes,

according to almost 85 % of the delegates, and the same percentage inform that


disagreeing with the instructions of the national capitals, as to convince them to

change the original position, is a practice that occurs (either frequently or occasion-

ally) in Council negotiations. In this context, the expertise and the resources of the

HR and the Commission are constantly sought by around 70 % of the national

representatives. Their information and positions are said to affect the working

activities and negotiations of the Council committees.

What are the consequences of this ‘government in the shadow’ (Juncos and

Reynolds 2007) on the legitimacy of the CFSP/CSDP and its decision-making

process? Are these formal and informal procedures, mechanisms, and the decisions

that spring from them, legitimate (Sjursen 2011b)? Christopher Lord (2011) argues

that even if the system was strictly intergovernmental, with foreign ministers in full

control of the process and representing/defending the national interests exoge-

nously defined, it would need more direct forms of legitimation (from the

European Parliament, for instance).

Nonetheless, what has emerged from this brief overview of the policy-process is

that the CFSP/CSDP has moved beyond pure intergovernmentalism (Sjursen

2011b): elected politicians participate in the negotiations only to a limited extent,

with the balance of power shifted towards the national diplomats based in Brussels.

The negotiation process is complex, multi-dimensional and fluid, where national

positions are often defined, merged and collectively elaborated throughout the

process. Member states do often change positions during the negotiations

(to facilitate agreements): in this context, national representatives may not be

adequately authorised through the vertical, indirect democratic channels (Heritier

2003). Supranational dynamics are thus said to inform a formally intergovernmen-

tal structure (Howorth 2012). As a result, the next section introduces and discusses

the concept of legitimacy, and sets up a framework in order to suggest a response to

the CFSP/CSDP’s quest for legitimacy.

3 Legitimacy

In this section, we will discuss how legitimacy is understood in the context of

EU. In its essence, legitimacy is about how political authority is perceived and

accepted. However, what legitimacy entails is far from agreed. Does legitimacy

create political authority or justify authority?, what are the sources of legitimacy?

and what is the relation between democracy and legitimacy? Although these

questions important for philosophical debates, we are more interested in how

legitimacy is discussed in the context of the EU governance and specifically in

CFSP. Before moving on CFSP, it is useful to see how legitimacy discussion has

emerged and evolved in the context of the EU.

For the EU, the problem of legitimacy is relatively a recent one. It has emerged

after the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Until then, there was no concern for legitimacy

because the EU was thought to be accepted on the basis of technocratic success or

‘permissive consent’ (Follesdal 2006b; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999). This was

what Monnet and others also thought; as long as the EU solves the issues that are


important for the people that cannot be solved by individual member states, there

will be no problem of legitimacy because people’s perception will be positive

(Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Rhinard 2002). In addition to this utilitarian or

technocratic justification of the EU, the legitimacy was believed to come from the

member states (indirect or borrowed legitimacy) who are legitimate nation states

(Lord and Magnette 2004).

However, with the Europeanization of the areas that were seen as the exclusive

areas of nation states, the EU has started to affect daily lives of citizens of member

states more than ever, while national governments are losing some of their decision-

making power (Horeth 1999). Changing the Council’s decision-making rule from

unanimity to qualified majority rule also signalled this loss and questions about

legitimacy have become more salient than before (Follesdal 2006b).

The problem of legitimacy of the EU is a complicated issue. There are different

sides to it with different “solutions”. In addition, “solutions” for certain issues

might create tension with other aspects of the decision-making. For instance, if we

want to strengthen the parliament, as it is the only institution directly selected by

citizens, it will have negative effect on the effectiveness of decision-making

because it will make decision-making more difficult and time consuming (Horeth

1999).

In addition, it is clear that legitimacy debates in this context are not only related

to one’s understanding of legitimacy but also related to one’s vision for the

EU. There is no consensus on what the EU actually is, and maybe more importantly

what it ought to be in the future. EU is a complex set of institutions, rules and

regulations. It does not stand as a single entity. Although whether it is a suprana-

tional or intergovernmental entity, or both, is a matter of debate, it is clear that the

EU is ‘the product of a compromise between numerous foundational visions, it rests

on a plurality of ideas about the rightful exercise of political power’ (Lord and

Magnette 2004: 199). Hence, the legitimacy in the context of EU cannot be

considered in one-dimensional way. Such complexity both in the concept of legiti-

macy and the EU makes us cautious about making general conclusions. Any

analysis will be limited to its own context and adopted conceptions. This does not

mean that anything goes, but it only reminds us the contextual nature of social

research.

Fortunately, in this complexity and variety, there are some common themes and

terms that we can see in different author’s works. To start with we have descriptive

and normative senses of the term. While the former has to do with people’s beliefs

about a political regime (Weber 1964), the latter is concerned with the justification

of political power and the obligations it might impose on people. In addition, any

discussion of legitimacy in the context of the EU mentions input and output

legitimacy (e.g. Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999).

Input legitimacy suggests that a decision is legitimate when citizens can contribute

to its making (government by the people) (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999). Output

legitimacy, on the other hand, is concerned with the decisions and problem solving

capabilities. However, there is no universal meaning. As Schmidt (2013) states the

scholars can be classified into two: institutional and constructivists. While


institutional scholars focus on ‘institutional form and practices’, constructivists

focus on ‘the EU’s ideas and discursive construction’ (Schmidt 2013: 5). Such

difference in focus also changes how one perceives input and output legitimacy. For

institutional scholars, output legitimacy is related to ‘policy-related performance of

the EU’s ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions’, ‘the balance of institutional structures’

and ‘community-enhancing performance of policies themselves’, and input legiti-

macy is related to ‘the EU’s ’majoritarian institutions’ and the representation of

citizen demands primarily through elections’ (Schmidt 2013: 5). For

constructivists, on the other hand, output legitimacy is related to how the EU policy

decisions ‘resonate with citizen values and build identity’, and input legitimacy is

related to communicative practices during elections and with the publics and

whether they contribute to collective identity formation (Schmidt 2013: 5).2

Finally, there are some efforts to have a comprehensive understanding of legiti-

macy (Wimmel 2009; Lord and Magnette 2004; Follesdal 2006a; Bellamy and

Castiglione 2003). The aim is to have a framework that we can use when we deal

with legitimacy in the context of the EU. Among different attempts Wimmel (2009)

seems to offer the most comprehensive analytical tool to be used in the evaluations

of European governance. It involves most important and discussed aspects of

legitimacy in the EU governance. In the remaining of this section, we will introduce

his framework and later in the chapter we will apply it to CSFP/CSDP.

Heuristic by Wimmel Wimmel offers four main categories with three

sub-categories in order to capture the legitimacy debates in the context of EU

governance. The four main categories are concepts, objects, variables and standards

of legitimacy. The concepts of legitimacy tell us under what conditions a decision

or a political body is legitimate. There are three concepts of legitimacy according to

Wimmel: Legality, acceptance/compliance and normative justification.3 Briefly,

legality concerns merely with legal foundations of decision-making. Whether rules

and regulations are followed is the main concern. Acceptance/compliance is the

descriptive understanding of the term. It is concerned with the belief people have in

the political entity. Finally, normative justification is concerned with subjective

norms that are required for legitimacy. For this concept of legitimacy, first we need

to find a fundamental value (e.g. individual freedom), justify its importance and

argue that any legitimate body should guarantee that fundamental value. As

Wimmel states it is the most controversial and intangible concept of legitimacy

(2009: 187).

2We can also see terms like social and formal legitimacy. While the former is about the acceptance

of decisions by citizens, the latter is about legal basis of decisions or political bodies (Horeth

1999). In the case of the EU, formal legitimacy is rarely a consideration. However, social

legitimacy is often sought aspect of decision making. We can think social legitimacy as the

descriptive understanding of the term. Here, people’s beliefs about political authority and obliga-

tion are key to the legitimacy of a political body.3 In fact, they are better called as conceptions. For the difference between concept and conception

see Weale (2007: 134).


The objects of legitimacy ‘indicate certain empirical entities that can be

subjected to a normative evaluation, depending on which concept of legitimacy is

chosen’ (Wimmel 2009: 188). In the context of the EU governance, they are

political system, institutions and policy decisions. Briefly, political system refers

to the EU as a whole; institutions refers to particular institutions we would like to

evaluate and policy decisions refers to specific decisions made in the EU. All

evaluations of these objects are dependent on one’s adopted concept of legitimacy

introduced above.

The variables of legitimacy ‘are changeable factors on which, depending on the

respective legitimacy concept, the evaluation of democratic legitimacy can be made

dependent’ (Wimmel 2009: 190). The three common variables are ‘participation

(input), process (throughput) and results (output)’ (Wimmel 2009: 190). Briefly,

participation (input) variable looks at the level of citizen involvement in the

decision-making process; process (throughput) looks at the existing decision-

making processes in the EU institutions or the EU as a whole and for result (output)

variable ‘the decisive factor is not the extent to citizens are involved in policies

(input) or how the institutional decision-making process functions (throughput), butrather the quality of the final results and balances (output)’ (Wimmel 2009: 191).

Finally, there are standards of legitimacy that are used in the evaluations. ‘With

respect to the EU, three standards by which the political legitimacy of certain

objects along the three variables could be evaluated have been distinguished—

counterfactual ideal-types, nation-states and other international organizations’

(Table 1) (Wimmel 2009: 192).

4 Analysis

After presenting the main characteristics of EU foreign policy and introducing a

conceptual framework which has disentangled, and identified, several aspects of the

concept of legitimacy, the rest of the chapter is devoted to applying Wimmel’s

comprehensive structure to the CFSP/CSDP: is the EU’s cooperation in foreign and

security policy legitimate? A couple of points need to be clarified at this point.

Although it is certainly possible to analyse all the various (twelve) dimensions

identified by, and discussed in, the framework, this is not the aim of this

Table 1 Wimmel’s heuristic

Concepts Objects Variables Standards

Legality Political

system

Participation (Input) Counterfactual ideal-type

Acceptance/

compliance

Institutions Process

(Throughput)

Nation-states

Normative justification Decisions Results (Output) International

organizations

This table is the rewriting of Wimmel’s Table 1 (2009: 195)


contribution. More specifically, we are interested here in one of the objects of

legitimacy—(a set of) EU policy decisions, i.e., foreign and defence policy,although indirectly part of the analysis can also be referred to one of the EU

institutions, i.e., the Council of the EU—and in one of the variables of legiti-

macy—the process of EU foreign and defence policy, although some aspects of

participation/input will be briefly touched upon. As explained above, the starting

point, and the puzzle, of this chapter are the profound transformations of the CFSP/

CSDP decision-making process, and their consequences on the legitimacy of this

policy regime. On the other hand, we will conduct our analysis by applying all the

three standards of legitimacy, counterfactual ideal-types, the nation-state, and

international organisations.

Finally, with regard to the concepts of legitimacy, we will primarily focus on

normative justification. As Wimmel (2009: 187) mentions, this is the most often

used, controversial and challenging understanding of legitimacy in the context of

the European Union. Legality in itself is not a big concern for the CFSP/CSDP

decision-making process. The system, as reported above, remains intergovernmen-

tal, where decisions are prepared by officials who belong to the national executives.

The committee system in EU foreign policy is perfectly legal: these committees and

parties have been established over the years by legal acts of EU institutions and

actors. The Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) and the Political

Security Committee (PSC) are directly established by EU treaties; the EU Military

Committee and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management by a

Council act (Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001, and Council

Decision 2000/354/CFSP of 22 May 2000, respectively). The other, lower-level,

working parties are set up by, or with the approval of, Coreper with the objective of

carrying out certain preparatory work defined in advance. In addition, if these

bodies concretely prepare and also de facto make final decisions, they are not

allowed to officially adopt any act. (Almost)4 all CFSP/CSDP documents and

actions have to be signed by Foreign Affairs ministers in their monthly meetings

in Brussels to enter into force.

On the other hand, acceptance/compliance refers to the actual, existing support

by the citizens (to EU foreign policy). One way to look at, and measure, it is to rely

on public opinion surveys. In the context of the EU, a very useful instrument is

provided by the Eurobarometer surveys, which closely monitor the evolution of the

public opinion in EU member states. Although not specifically addressing the

support towards the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process, the Standard

Eurobarometers explore, inter alia, how many Europeans are generally in favour

of a common foreign or defence policy at the EU level. The Eurobarometer

79 (Spring 2013) reveals that 64 % of Europeans support the CFSP, while 27 %

oppose it (QA.20.2). Needless to say, there is a considerable variance among

member states: the highest scores are registered in Slovakia (77 %), Bulgaria

4 The Political and Security Committee can adopt, in few and circumscribed circumstances,

CFSP/CSDP acts without the formal approval of the political level of the Council.


(76 %), Germany (75 %), Lithuania (74 %), Latvia (74 %), with the support falling

below the 50 % threshold in Malta, United Kingdon, Finland, Denmark and

Sweden. The consensus is remarkably higher in the case of a common defence

policy (QA.20.4): 74 % are in favour, whereas only 19 % are opposed to it. In all the

28 member state, an absolute majority of citizens support the CSDP—the support

being higher (85–86 %) in Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Luxembourg, and lower

in Ireland, United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden (between 53 and 58 %).

To sum up, in the rest of this section our analysis will mainly investigate the

legitimacy (normatively defined and justified) of the process/throughput of the

CFSP/CSDP decisions, in relation to, and comparison with, the nation-state, inter-

national organisations and some counterfactual ideal-types.

We have identified four norms through which to evaluate the legitimacy of the

decision-making process of the CFSP/CSDP: (a) citizens’ participation in the

process; (b) transparency; (c) accountability; (d) deliberation. These principles

frequently recur in the literature on legitimacy, democracy and EU governance.

They are widely considered as the backbone of any legitimate political process. For

instance, Rhinard (2002) mentions intelligibility/clarity of the system of decision-

making; deliberation; accountability as the three democratic principles of a com-

mittee governance. Sjursen (2011b) focuses on autonomy (largely understood in

terms of transparency) and accountability. The four norms are firstly briefly

presented, and then discussed and assessed.

Citizen participation Citizen participation can be discussed broadly under input

legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013). More citizen participation

democratically legitimises the process. However, citizen participation can be direct

or indirect. Direct citizen participation suggests that citizens actually be present in

the process and have a say, or even making the decisions by themselves. This is

suggested by participatory democrats (Barber 1984; Pateman 1970). In the context

of EU, the prospects for direct citizen participation is not there.5 What does citizen

participation mean for the EU? Title 2 of Treaty of European Union discusses

democratic principles of the union. Fischer-Hotzel (2010) shows that especially

articles 10 and 11 understand citizen participation as a right to voice and as a way of

consultation. There is no connection of citizen participation to decision-making

processes. One exception to this can be European Citizen Initiative (ECI), which

gives power to the citizens to call the Commission to propose legislation. However,

there is a million signature threshold and it poses problems for its practicability

(Fischer-Hotzel 2010). A quick look at the website of ECI6 confirms the concern for

practicability. At the time of writing this chapter, there were seven open initiatives,

seven closed initiatives. There was only one initiative submitted to the Commission

and no initiative was answered by the Commission. Although there might be

5One might even argue that such prospects do not exist for democratic system (Plotke 1997).6 http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/finalised/answered


http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/finalised/answered

various reasons for this, it is clear that the initiative is not creating space for citizen

participation.

In our analysis of citizen participation, we can think of two ideal types. One is an

ideal type of indirect citizen participation that will have some effect on the

decision-making. It is democratically desirable that citizens feel and observe that

their participation is making a difference. If this is an ideal type of indirect citizen

participation, it is clear that CFSP/CSDP is not very legitimate at all. The role of

European Parliament is limited and also as argued earlier in practice CFSP/CSDP is

made by bureaucrats in Brussels. However, nation states and international

organizations will also fail such test. In a national context, citizens vote for their

representatives who make decisions of all sorts, with the exception of certain

decisions that require referendums. However, MPs do not make decisions by

themselves. At the end of the day, national MPs also delegate foreign policy making

to ministers and ministers to bureaucrats. Therefore, the issues of citizen participa-

tion in the CFSP/CSDP is broadly related to the general problem of the bureaucra-

tization of politics that distance decision-making from citizens, and in this respect

nation states are not different.

On the other hand, if we think of a purely intergovernmental body as our ideal

type standard, the picture seems to be more varied. The reason for having an ideal

purely intergovernmental body as a standard is the fact that the literature seems to

become worried once CFSP/CSDP moves away from intergovernmentalism in its

practice, (Sjursen 2011a). In addition, Sjursen (2011b: 1081) offers four constituent

pillars of intergovernmentalism as follows:

(1) the nature of the actors involved in making decisions; (2) the procedures through which

decisions are made; (3) the scope and type of powers that are delegated; and (4) the raison

d’ etre of the co-operative endeavour. These pillars are to some extent interdependent.

Among these pillars, the first one is related to citizen participation, which is a

key issue for her (Sjursen 2011b: 1089). Here, our examination needs to be careful

about practices and formalities due to the difference between them. Hence, we can

argue that in formal terms CFSP/CSDP is legitimate because it is formally an

intergovernmental body with unanimity is in operation. However, the legitimacy

issues are related to its practices; the slips from intergovernmental decision-making

locate CSFP/CSDP even further from citizen participation, which occurs funda-

mentally through national governments, civil associations and MEPs.

Finally, we also have a good picture for CFSP/CSDP when compared to inter-

national organizations. Citizen participation and influence to the organizations like

UN is very limited, if there is any. Of course, this is an assumption requires an

empirical study that we do not have space and intention to do. Still, citizen

participation in these organizations’ decision-making process seems to be less

than the EU due to the immediacy and proximity of EU matters for the citizens

of EU. Thus, CSFP/CSDP’s legitimacy is higher than international-organizations.


Transparency Although transparency does not constitute a form of political legiti-

macy per se, it is usually considered as a prerequisite for exercising popular control

over the executive (Heritier 2003), or as a crucial factor for the ability of those

affected by laws to be also their makers (Sjursen 2011b). Without transparency,

other principles (accountability, for instance) cannot function properly. Transpar-

ency can be defined as “the right to know who makes which decisions when”

(Heritier 2003: 815), and involves three dimensions. Firstly, it refers to the identifi-

cation of the people who makes decisions. As Rhinard (2002) underlines, the

individuals involved, and the policy-making, should be identifiable and intelligible.

A second important element is the access to information, here understood in its

passive variant,7 as the importance of obtaining information about the decision-

making process, and access to its documents and outputs. Thirdly, transparency also

means strategies, and openness, of communication—that is, the role that policy-

makers have in transmitting information to the public, through information

brochures, information on the internet, oral presentations (Heritier 2003).

Since May 1999 (when the Amsterdam treaty came into effect), the system of

CFSP/CSDP (and, in general, of the Council of the EU), which was rather opaque

and secretive until then, has increasingly become more open: article 15(3) of the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union constituted the legal basis for the

Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001, which regulates public access to European Parlia-

ment, Council of the EU, Commission (and then also European Council)

documents. More rules specifying public access to Council documents are found

in one annex to the Council’s rules of procedure. In addition, the Council annually

publishes a report on the access to Council documents. A public register of Council

documents has been operational since January 1999. As a result of these changes, as

well as other features of the CFSP/CSDP policy regime, is the decision-making

process in this field transparent? The wide and decisive role national officials play

in the policy-making, the increasing reliance on Brussels diplomats, and the

consequent fragmentation of the executive power are said to make “it more difficult

to identify who really decides” (Sjursen 2011b: 1084). However, this is only

partially true and could be further specified. If a system where only foreign

ministers make decisions is clearly more transparent and simple, the membership

of the PSC and Council working groups appears, overall, clear enough (Rhinard

2002).8 It is relatively easy to find the names and the contact of the national

diplomats who participate in the CFSP/CSDP committee system. A website

(EU Whoiswho) offers information on the members of the 28 national PermReps

(and on the corporate board of the EEAS), divided for field of expertise and

7Active access, which indicates the possibility of transmitting information and/or demands to

decision-makers, may be subsumed under the first principle that we have identified—citizens’

participation in the policy process.8 Furthermore, the problems usually associated to first pillar working groups (for instance, the

same membership in Council working groups and Commission expert committees) do not apply to

foreign and defence policy.


competence. In addition to this, most PermReps have their own websites which

contain detailed information on their personnel (names, contacts, portfolios, etc.).

Consequently, it might be not so hard to identify the actual national bureaucrats

responsible for the preparation of a certain dossier. In addition, many of their

meetings are formal, whose calendar is published online on the Council’s website.

The consensus rule makes all of them potentially accountable, even in those cases

where it is not immediately evident what delegation has introduced a policy item

and pushed for it.

Secondly, many CFSP/CSDP documents are now available on the Council

register—not only the final outputs of the negotiations, but also preparatory

documents, background notes, videos, press conferences and releases, round-tables,

agendas, minutes of the meetings, etc. Some sensitive documents are available only

behind explicit request to be sent to the Access to Documents department of the

Council (and some documents are not available at all), although more efforts should

be made to make Council officials more responsive. Some of these documents

contribute also to the third dimension of transparency—that is, communicating the

workings of the Council to the public. Arguably, this is done either through national

ministers (or the HR) in public hearings and press conferences, or through standard

documentation prepared by the Council Secretariat (or the EEAS)—and not really

by the national officials participating in the CFSP/CSDP committee and parties,

who remain in the shadows of the communication process. Furthermore, these

initiatives are not very well-publicised in the member states’ domestic political

systems, and do not reach the vast majority of citizens.

The counterfactual ideal-type(s) to apply in these cases are not very easy to

discern. An ‘idealistic’ indicator of transparency would suggest that all the

decision-makers should be easily identified, and all the documents and minutes

should be published and available to the European public. If the objective of having

a complete and exhaustive map of CFSP/CSDP diplomats (along with the objective

to increase the communication quantity and quality) is perfectly reasonable (and not

that far from being already realised), more problematic appears the full availability

of documents and information. The Council of the EU can be seen indeed as both a

legislative (open to the public scrutiny and demands) and an executive branch. In

this latter case, good reasons may exist to protect the secrecy of the negotiation

processes. Complete and open information may lead to immovable positions, and to

a blocked decision-making process (Heritier 2003; Risse 2004). In addition, foreign

and security policy is widely regarded as a special case, where national security

concerns take often precedence over issues of publicity and transparency.

If we analyse, indeed, the transparency of foreign policy in both the nation-states

and international organisations, we can safely argue that the CFSP/CSDP not only

does not suffer from a transparency gap, but in some aspects appears even more

legitimate. Foreign policy is increasingly conducted by the executive also when

formulated in national or international settings. Foreign policy has indeed strength-

ened the executive not only in European (Moravcsik 1994) and international

matters. At the national level too, the executive gained a predominant position to

the detriment of the legislative branch: the parliamentary oversight is limited, and


national governments have substantial leeway in the national conduct of foreign

policy (Tonra 2009). This leeway may be substantial also in cases of military

operations, which are not infrequently discussed and sanctioned by national

parliaments ex post—after their authorization from the governments. And, within

the executive, the balance has progressively shifted in favour of the bureaucratic

layers (as opposed to the elected politicians). The bureaucratisation of (foreign)

policy is therefore a prerogative not just of the CFSP/CSDP: the involvement of

national officials in the formulation and negotiation of (foreign) policy is a more

general feature of modern politics (Bickerton 2011).

In this respect, the identities and activities of national bureaucrats are often more

easily ascertainable in the FAC than in national ministries or in the UN, NATO or

G8. The organisational charts contain less information, and are less complete at

both the national and international level. Understanding who is in charge of a

particular portfolio or dossier is much harder in many cases. Their meetings are

not so well publicised as it is in the EU, where, as mentioned above, a calendar of all

the parties’ and groups’ sessions is set up and constantly updated by the Council

secretariat. Similarly, internal documents, preparatory material, minutes, etc. are

very rarely available to the national citizens. In this vein, the CFSP/CSDP is a more

transparent (and legitimate) policy regime when compared to international

organisations and also to most of member states’ foreign ministries.

Accountability Although it might be not so difficult as often assumed to determine

what diplomats were actually involved in a CFSP/CSDP decision, the key role of

these non-elected officials creates problems of excessive power and of accountabil-

ity (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010). Identifying the loci of the decision-making process

is one thing. Another goal of any transparent process is to explore to whom (and to

what extent) these people render account. Accountability is usually seen as a

relationship “between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation

to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass

judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens 2007: 467). Unanimity

facilitates again the job of the controllers, since national decision-makers can be

considered accountable for any CFSP/CSDP statement, action, programme.

However, from our previous analysis of EU foreign policy’s decision-making

process, we have pointed out that bureaucrats, not only (more than) politicians, are

heavily involved in the elaboration of the CFSP/CSDP; and that Brussels-based

diplomats have acquired a certain leeway, and power, vis-a-vis the domestic branch

of the national administration. This means that we have four different chains of

accountability: (a) elected politicians-electorate; (b) bureaucracy-electorate;

(c) bureaucracy-elected politicians; (d) Brussels-national capital. The instruments

at disposal change depending on which chain we take into account. For instance, if

sweeping officials out of their office is a crude and improbable mechanism, other

ways for holding national bureaucrats accountable before the electorate are legisla-

tive investigations, judicial oversight, electoral threats towards politicians respon-

sible for that ministry (Rhinard 2002). We do not have enough space here for


exhaustively analysing each of these accountability chains; in the following, we

offer a speculation on some of the defining features of accountability processes in

the CFSP/CSDP decision-making.

Firstly, one of the main problems associated to supranational or deliberative

intergovernmentalism lies in the fact that the PermReprs’s activities are relatively

unchecked by the national capital (Chelotti 2013; Sjursen 2011b). However, this is

only one aspect of the eventual problem. At the end of the day, Brussels-based

diplomats are still national officials sent by their states to the Belgian capital to

negotiate and make deals on their behalf. Why is it a problem if Brussels-based and

not capital-based bureaucrats elaborate and finalise national positions? It might be

argued that the diplomats in the national capital are closer to the priorities and

sensibilities of the state’s elected government, public opinion, or parliament. Or,

more incisively, the problem exists insofar as these diplomats become socialised to

EU values, shift their identities and shape the CFSP/CSDP (also) by referring to

principles and interests of the EU system as a whole, rather than to those of the

individual member states. In this case, they would come to represent the entire

European polity, and not just the national one. The empirical data suggest a

heterogeneous reality: only some of Brussels-based diplomats have developed

pro-European (supranational) identities, whereas an equally good number of

representatives look at EU foreign policy through intergovernmental lenses. In

addition, the supranational orientation of some officials is not necessarily due to

EU socialisation, since (good) part of explanation lies in their previous (domestic)

experiences or personal characteristics (Beyers 2005; Chelotti 2011; Hooghe 2005).

The main problem, however, is the general lack of accountability channels

between the bureaucracy and both elected politicians and the electorate. The further

power shift to PermReps is only a possible ‘aggravation’ of what appears a wider

and more systematic obstruction. National parliaments control to a certain extent

the decision-making process and outputs of the FAC, either through a document-

based scrutiny (which aims to scrutiny all the incoming documents and process

information) and/or through a mandating system (which aims to issue a mandate to

the ministers before they participate in the Council decision-making process). In

practice most systems contain elements of both, although the parliaments of the

United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, France and Germany tend to adopt a

document-based model, and the parliaments of Denmark, Finland, Poland a

mandate-based model, among others (Maurer and Wessels 2001; Raunio 2009).

Besides, variation exists in terms of frequency of the meetings, the information at

disposal and the overall efficacy of the oversight. In general, however, EU

documents arrive to the national parliament (and also to the national ministries)

very late, and the ability of the national parliaments to constrain national ministers

and shape their action in Brussels is limited—and even more so in foreign and

defence policy. What is particularly important for our argument is that this (mild)

control concerns either the activities of the FAC in general or an exchange with the

ministers. To what extent the national parliament is able to influence or supervise

what CFSP/CSDP officials do in their committees is not fully clear, and arguably is

even more restricted. Occasionally, ministers and also diplomats (ambassadors of


the Coreper or the PSC) report to the national parliament, explaining and justifying

the position of the state within the CFSP/CSDP. To sum up: though mildly

responsive, the national delegates to the CFSP/CSDP have rarely (hardly) an

explicit mandate from the electorate/national parliament when negotiating: this

applies to both the elected politicians and (even more evidently) the bureaucratic

level.

Thirdly, problems of accountability arise also because national representatives

very infrequently (threaten to) veto CFSP/CSDP decisions. As mentioned above,

they resort to a wide panoply of tactics, including integrative bargaining (issue-

linkages and side-payments), institutional cooperation with the Commission and

the HR, argumentation. This is said to frustrate or violate the various accountability

chains: if negotiators change their mind during the policy process, either because

they strike a compromising deal involving several items or because they are

persuaded by their colleagues’ better arguments, this might create a problem with

the national political system (Risse 2004). Yet, again, this challenge might be less

severe than it first appears. On the one hand, the infrequency of the national

mandate paradoxically reduces the risks of ignoring or, worse, deviating from,

the guidelines of the national level (however defined). On the other hand, a mandate

requires the delegate not just to advance a specific set of policies per se, but to

promote the principled reasons that underlie them. In this case, as long as national

representatives respect, and reveal, this reasoning, compromising or deliberating

might be considered legitimate (Bellamy 2012).

How do we situate this discussion within a broader context and comparison? The

debate over the accountability of the CFSP/CSDP is still at an early stage, and

against which benchmarks we should assess these processes and mechanisms it is

not immediately evident (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010). Again, imagining an execu-

tive (politicians and bureaucrats) fully and constantly reporting to, or checked and

instructed by, the national parliament is neither realistic nor desirable, for many

reasons (inflexible negotiating strategies; speed and overall efficiency of the

decision-making process; but also lack of time and resources of the controllers;

etc.). If we instead compare accountability practices in the CFSP/CSDP to the

nation-state and international organisations, we can overall conclude that account-

ability credentials of CFSP/CSDP decision-makers are mildly accountable

(Rhinard 2002) and roughly match the standard of other existing political

organisations. Foreign and defence policy is removed further from citizens’ influ-

ence also at the national level. The necessity of expertise and secrecy, the frequent

invocation of national security make scrutiny very hard, and a familiar problem,

also at national level (Tonra 2009). On a whole, it is probable that the national

parliament participates (and is able to control) a bit more in national foreign policy

(although identifying purely national foreign policy, completely separated from the

CFSP/CSDP, is increasingly difficult): eventually, the difference is certainly a

matter of (small) degree rather than kind. On the other side, given the scope of

the CFSP, and the partial interpenetration of the European and national political

system also in foreign and defence policy, national diplomats (more than

politicians) involved in the workings of the UN system, NATO and G8 are less


frequently and effectively connected with, and checked by, the domestic monitor-

ing procedures.

Deliberation Deliberation is a hype word in today’s policy making. However, it is

difficult to define it clearly and unclarity in its meaning brings the danger of concept

stretching that deliberation might lose its meaning because of meaning everything

(Stenier 2008). Nonetheless, we can have working definitions. Mendelberg (2002:

153) summarizes that ‘deliberation is expected to lead empathy with others and a

broadened sense of people’s own interests through an egalitarian, open-minded and

reciprocal process of reasoned argumentation’. Hence, in its basics, we can think

deliberation as a type of communication that involves egalitarian reasoned

discussions with willingness to change minds at the face of better argument without

coercion or the threat of coercion.

Democratic decision-making process can accommodate compromise and per-

suasion (in terms of willing to change one’s mind) (Bellamy 2012). In addition,

Neyer (2003) takes the argument a bit further and argue that deliberation rather than

bargaining, brings efficiency, effectiveness and high quality output. What delibera-

tion can or cannot do is contested, too. The effects of deliberation on political

system and deliberators are far from resolved. It is true that in the literature we find

a broad array of ‘benefits’ of deliberation such as improving knowledge, increasing

cooperation and civic mindedness among participants and legitimizing the

decisions (Fishkin 2009; Delli Carpini et al. 2004). However, several studies

show that these effects are highly context dependent and it is difficult to come a

general conclusion like deliberation does this or that (Delli Carpini et al. 2004).

Another question is to whom is it legitimate?. We need an actor to decide on the

existence of deliberation and then accept it as legitimizing decision-making pro-

cess. On the one hand, we have citizens. For citizens, deliberation might not be a

legitimizing factor because citizens might not observe it. They might not be aware

of deliberations that take place behind close doors. In addition, given the lack of

knowledge about EU governance, citizens might not even be aware of CFSP/CSDP

meetings and how they proceed.

On the other hand, we have governments, and they are in a better position to

observe deliberation because their bureaucrats would be deliberators. However,

here, the role of mandate in the CFSP/CSDP becomes important. As seen in our

working definition of deliberation, the willingness to change one’s mind is crucial

for deliberation and in the CFSP/CSDP such willingness seems to hinge on the

subject matter and also on the strength of mandate. If there is weak mandate, then

we can have more scope for deliberation in the CFSP/CSDP. However, if there is

strong mandate, then deliberation can hardly be observed.

Finally, as argued CFSP/CSDP/CSDP process seems to slip away from

intergovernmentalism, even if it is incrementally, we can see some acceptance of

deliberation as a mode of communication in practice. In fact, we know that CFSP/

CSDP decisions are not only made by following mandates but also there is ‘culture

of consensus’ (among others, Howorth 2012; Juncos and Reynolds 2007, 2009;


Nuttall 2000; Tonra 2001). Although theoretically deliberation does not have to

lead to consensus, which is a common and wrong assumption about deliberation,

such culture implies that deliberation is taking place in the CFSP/CSDP. Therefore,

some decisions of CFSP/CSDP can be seen as legitimized by deliberation

preceding them.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the concept of legitimacy in the context of EU foreign

and defence policy—and in particular, in relation to its decision-making process

(or throughput). The system has clearly gone beyond pure intergovern-

mentalism, and the influence of national diplomats is certainly a major compo-

nent of the CFSP/CSDP. Nonetheless, while exhibiting several weaknesses and

concerns for EU democracy, it has also shown that the overall picture is probably

not as severe as it is often assumed. Better, the legitimacy problems of the CFSP/

CSDP have to be further qualified and specified. Firstly, the CFSP/CSDP

appears legitimate in terms of both its legality and acceptance among the

electorate (where public support for EU foreign and defence policy is used as

a proxy for acceptance). Secondly, if we take into account several normative

concepts of legitimacy and compare them with the national and international

level, citizens’ participation in the process, transparency, accountability and

deliberation in the EU appear well within the standards of Western political

structures. This does not mean that problems of insulation or accountability of

unelected national officials do not exist. Certainly some correctives should be

conceived and applied to make the system even more transparent and account-

able, for instance, although these correctives should always be weighted against

other potentially relevant and equally legitimate norms, such as the speed and

efficiency of the decision-making process. Foreign and defence policy remains

an area where decisions in many cases need to be taken very quickly, and

sometimes, with some degree of secrecy. The question arises then if there are

some policy areas (or issues) which not necessarily have to be tackled through

(full) public participation and deliberations. Finally, and to a certain extent

counter-intuitively, in some aspects the CFSP/CSDP turns out to be even more

legitimate than national structures. In terms of control of bureaucrats’ activities,

the identification of where decisions are made and by whom, or access to foreign

policy documents, the EU level appears even more legitimately grounded: the

public space in the CFSP/CSDP is more accessible, transparent and potentially

more accountable than many national foreign policy systems.

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