the european union and a changing europe: establishing the boundaries of order

Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 34, No. 1 March 1996

The European Union and a Changing Europe:

Establishing the Boundaries of Order

MICHAEL SMITH* Department of European Studies,

Loughborough University, Loughborough LEI 1 3TU, England

Abstract

This article seeks to explore the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the changing European order, with particular respect to the ways in which the EU structures and shapes the boundaries between itself and the broader European arena. It evaluates a range of available international relations theories, and adopts a ‘critical neoliberal-institutionalist’ approach to the problem. It applies this approach by assessing the EU’s boundary-constructing and boundary -maintaining behaviour in a number of areas, before developing two models of the EU’s role: the ‘politics of exclusion’ and the ‘politics of inclusion’. After spending most of its life practising the ‘politics of exclusion’, the EU has moved towards a ‘politics of inclusion’ to reflect the changing demands of the European order. Nevertheless, the tensions between the two types of politics will continue to be a central feature of the EU’s role.

I. Introduction

The European Union (EU) and the European Community (EC) before it have performed central but ambiguous roles in the changing European and interna-

* This article has benefited greatly from both discussion at the JCMSILoughborough Colloquium and from subsequent comments from the two JCMS referees. The responsibility for the finished product is of course entirely my own. Q Blackwell Publishen Lcd 1996,108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. USA

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tional order, and the ambiguity of the EU’s role has been amply underlined by the radical changes taking place in post-Cold War Europe. At one and the same time, the EU has appeared as a model of democratic and economic stability to be pursued by the new or newly-democratic countries of Europe, and as a symbol of how far they have to go to reach the promised land. Equally, the Union has acted as a centrepiece in the development of a new European economy, but also as a barrier to flows of goods, services and people which do not satisfy its demanding entry criteria. The forces of change have been welcomed in the EU, but they have also met apparent obstruction and diversion. What, therefore, is the EU’s role in the development of a new European order?

This article aims to clarify these paradoxical relationships, and to provide a focus for the study of the EU and the changing European order. It proceeds broadly from a base in the literature of international relations and international order, but also attempts to link this to the EU’s internal order and processes. It begins by setting the context for the specific arguments made in the article, by referring to a range of available perspectives for the study of the EU and the European order. It then proceeds to focus on a central dimension of international institutional arrangements - the construction of boundaries and the resulting problems of exclusion and inclusion - in relation to the EU. On this basis, it defines two broad-gauge models to represent the ‘politics of exclusion’ and the ‘politics of inclusion’, and relates these briefly to issues in the development and extension of the EU. It concludes that the tension between the ‘politics of exclusion’ and the ‘politics of inclusion’ is central to the present and future roles of the EU, and that this generates further questions for research.

After evaluating a range of available approaches, the article takes as its conceptual focus a neoliberal-institutionalist perspective, but attempts to enrich this with the insights of critical perspectives. As such, it reflects both a mass of literature on institutions and multilateralism in international relations, and the ‘reflective’ approaches adopted by a range of post-structuralist and post- modernist writers, and builds on attempts at synthesis made by Keohane and others (Keohane, 1989; Ruggie, 1993a; Walker, 1993). Its conclusions might therefore best be characterized as those of a ‘critical neoliberal-institutionalist’ approach, and as focusing on the construction of ‘negotiated order’ within a multilayered environment - an environment displaying both institutional and normative challenges.

11. Context

In the European order of the 1990s’ as noted above, the EU is an ambiguous symbol. Arguably, this reflects not only the specific conditions of the post-Cold War world, but also a set of embedded historical tensions in the development of

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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND A CHANGING EUROPE 7

the EC and then the EU (Milward and Sflrensen, 1994; W. Wallace, 1990). These entities have rested and now rest intimately on a highly-developed notion of the state and the relationship between state and society, yet they have also been a challenge to conventional notions of statehood. They can be seen alternatively as magnifying the characteristics of interstate politics, or as subverting them; often, they have appeared to do both simultaneously. They can be seen as an emanation of the state system or as an agent of its transformation (Miall, 1994, Ch. 1; Milward and Swensen, 1994; W. Wallace, 1990; Waever, 1990). The central focus of this article is analysis of a particular dimension to this general ambiguity: the ways in which the politics of inclusion or exclusion, of access and control contribute to the evolving relationship between the EU and a changing European order.

At one level, this relationship reflects the internal dynamics of the EU. In the run-up to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) it is clear that the debate about institutional development within the Union raises issues about the shifting distribution of influence between both Member States and the core institutions themselves, for example on the roles of the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament or on the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The notions of a ‘hard core’ of EU Member States capable of proceeding towards greater union at a faster pace than those of the periphery, and the associated ideas of ‘variable geometry’, carry with them a set of assumptions about hierarchy, balance and control. As such, they carry implications for the drawing of internal boundaries to the activities or the legitimacy of the Union.

The unease and complexities caused by this relationship are not merely an ‘internal’ phenomenon: rather, they underline the linkage between the internal EU order and the development of the broader European and international arenas. Although there has been a move to include in the EU the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the seemingly inexorable logic can be defied, and indeed has been defied, particularly by the Norwegians and the Swiss in their decisions to abstain from membership. At the same time, the apparent desire to exclude or to postpone entry for Central and East European Countries (CEEC) because of the anticipated costs of internal adjustment has been itself defied by powerful logics of political pressure and popular mobility, as in the case of Poland, for example. Whereas Poland might be seen as constituting a type of ‘buffer zone’ between insiders and ‘real’ outsiders, there is evidence that an exclusion zone might operate to affect the relations between the EU and Mediterranean countries, a possibility that has led to increasing debate among EU members. Political and economic realities do not therefore operate in a simple or linear way, and the incidence of transnational problems


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such as migration and environmental degradation has only served to emphasize the contradictions and paradoxes.

If we are to move beyond this rather impressionistic level of analysis, it is important first of all to evaluate the relationship between the EU and the European order at the level of general structures and theoretical perspectives. On this basis, it will be argued that the EU poses conceptual problems for the dominant established international relations perspectives: realist-neorealist, liberal-pluralist, world systems. It is not fully described by any of them, and its role and impact are equivocal whichever perspective is adopted.

For realist analysis, based on the interaction of sovereign states in an ‘anarchical society’ (Bull, 1977), the Union can appear alternatively as an expression of statehood and state behaviour, or as an example of the ways in which responsible state authorities negotiate continuously to constitute international order. But this raises questions about the extent to which the EU is simply an epiphenomenon - a dependent variable whose fate is determined by the interplay of state interests. It also begs the question of ‘responsible statehood’ and the congruence or ‘fit’ between the EU and the European order of the 1990s (M. Smith, 1994; Keohane et al., 1993). The problems of ‘eastern enlargement’, of the Mediterranean and of relations with the former Soviet Union have all displayed tensions in these areas.

Realism thus suggests important questions about the extent to which the EU is constituted by or constitutive of statehood. In classical realist terms, it is apparent that the impact of the EU on Europe through its enlargement and its expression of norms relating to sovereign and civic statehood is significant, demanding attention and analysis. When a neorealist perspective is adopted, bringing into play the central role of international structure and the distribution of power, it further appears that the EU can function as a mechanism through which states in Europe and beyond have attempted to manage the implications of bipolarity and the imperatives of superpower competition. Not only this, but the internal distribution of influence within the EU can be analytically linked to the broader international structure: the roles of France, Germany and the United Kingdom thus become inputs not only into the EU process but also into the broader world order.

The issue of European order in the 1990s creates problems for such an analysis, however, especially because there appears to be no settled structure of power in Europe and around it, and because the removal of the superpower ‘overlay’ has thrown states back on their own resources. The mosaic of a ‘neo- medieval’ Europe with highly fragmented and often localized power sources puts into doubt a notion of the EU based on an identifiable power structure and consequent behavioural patterns (Hoffmann, 1992; Ruggie, 1993a; M. Smith, 1994). Not only this, but it is evident that there is an intimate linkage between the


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internal development of the EU and its institutions and the broader European order, which is not solely attributable to the interests, power or policies of major European states. Whilst some analyses have noted this connection, it is doubtful whether it can be accounted for simply within an interstate or intergovernmental framework (Moravscik, 1987, 1994; Marks et al., 1994).

Liberal-pluralist analysis of the EU might be thought better suited to acontext in which statehood is questioned, and in which transnational or subnational patterns of influence and interaction are salient. It is beyond doubt that the Union operates to attract the interest and activities of a wide range of transnational and subnational actors: the continuing power and attractions of neofunctionalist analyses, and the broader range of post-Maastricht constitutional forms in the EU reflect this perception in important respects. But does this represent a transcendence of the state system? On the one hand, it can forcefully be argued that the EU is a ‘safe’ form of pluralism, effectively tolerated by state authorities in return for the preservation of their core privileges. Structural realism would recognize well the flourishing of pluralism beneath an umbrella of state power.

Where the umbrella is removed or damaged, however, more difficult questions arise: can the EU preserve its position as the centre of attraction for non- governmental actors when its structural relationship to state authority is questioned, and when its own relative lack of autonomy is highlighted? In security policy especially, the putative extension of EU powers post-Maastricht arguably coincides with a phase in the evolution of European order when this extension is least sustainable because of changes in the structure of the state system and the character of governance. The shifting balance between adherence to the CFSP or to relatively unmodifed balance-of-power politics by countries such as Britain and France at least provides some evidence of the frictions generated. Such a line of argument is defensible until one begins to question the nature of governance structures in the ‘new Europe’; when the question is posed, it is clear that the role of the EU in fostering new patterns of public and private governance is central to its place in the 1990s (Sbragia, 1992; Marks et al., 1994), and that this is not fatally undermined by the continuing search for national security. There is thus an unresolved tension between the EU as a ‘policy space’ inhabited by a plurality of actors clustering around specific issues and concerns, the broader implications of a developing EU ‘government’ with its assumptions of comprehensive order, and the practice of classical interstate politics.’

Questions about the relationship of the EU to patterns of governance and power that do not necessarily coincide with state structures can partly be answered by a focus on transnational capital and globalization, such as that embodied in world systems analysis. If the EU is viewed as a vehicle for the

This question is given more detailed attention from the point ofview of state forms by James Caporaso (see pp. 29-52 in this issue). 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1996

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extension of the capitalist world economy in a changing Europe, an agent for the penetration of vulnerable state structures and for the imposition of rule through the penetration of national and local structures, then the growth of the EU has a certain sense of inevitability about it, and must be judged in the light of models of the western market economy which have a decidedly ideological, as well as a practical, economic and social aspect to them. But this misses the point that state structures and state resistance to penetration can hold back the advance of capitalism - and of the EU - at least temporarily. Adoption of a ‘holistic’ approach to the building of market and governmental structures sharpens this tension rather than resolving it (Reinicke, 1992), by bringing together the driving forces of state interests and power, market logics and social needs.

Given these conceptual uncertainties, it is argued here that the most plausible and helpful starting point for an analysis of the EU and its links to a changing European order is a neoliberal-institutionalist approach. This form of analysis has been developed in the workof Robert Keohane particularly (Keohane, 1989), and attempts to reconcile the continuing vigour and prominence of states with the growth of international institutions broadly defined. It differs from realism and neorealism by taking seriously the growth and variation in international institutions, and by exploring the ways in which they modify state expectations and behaviour. It differs from liberal pluralism by stressing not the inevitability of cooperation and the growth of transnational relations, but rather the difficulties of co-operation which are at the root of the growth of many international institutions. Finally, it differs from world systems analysis by accepting the autonomy of both state authorities and international institutions, and by viewing international order as the product of an interaction betweenvigorous state strategies and often equally vigorous institutional development.

Neoliberal institutionalism thus enables the analyst to confront the notion of the ‘active state’ capable of learning, adjustment and variety with the institutional and normative constraints and opportunities offered in a highly-developed form by the European Union (M. Smith, 1994; Ikenberry, 1986; Mastanduno ef aL, 1988; Keohane, 1989; Keohane et al., 1993). Such an approach also enables analysis to raise questions about the normative position of institutional structures and actors, particularly as expressed in rules and notions of legitimacy or international conventions. Instrumental judgements about the regulation of international transactions or the costs to state authorities of participation can thus be accompanied by judgements about prevailing expectations and normative considerations affecting the validity and solidity of international agreements.

This, however, raises additional issues. In particular, it points to questions about the nature and effects of ‘investment’ in institutions such as the EU, and the ways in which this shapes perceptions and actions on the part of the major ‘investors’ (H. Wallace, 1994, p. 89). It also suggests questions about the



conservative bias of institutionalist approaches, which are directly raised by a number of writers operating in the critical tradition (Walker, 1993, pp. 70,82- 7; Cox, 1986). This has been recognized by Keohane in his attempt to bring together both a ‘rationalist’ approach to institutions and a ‘reflective’ approach, of which he says:

These [reflective] writers emphasise that individuals, local organisations and even states develop within the context of more encompassing institutions. Institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power. Institutions are thus constitutive of actors as well as vice versa. It is not sufficient in this view to treat the preferences of individuals as given exoge- nously: they are affected by institutional arrangements, by prevailing norms, and by historically contingent discourse among people seeking to pursue their purposes and solve their self-defined problems. (1989, p. 161, emphasis in original)

A neoliberal-institutionalist approach thus draws attention both directly and indirectly to the ambiguous position occupied by the EU in a changing European order. In particular, it helps analysis to capture the complex and subtle interactions between material and normative structures, and between the persistent vitality of states and the increasingly dense web of international institutions and private networks centring on the EU. It appears that there is thus no mutual exclusion of Union by states or of states by Union; the strength of the EU comes from the ways in which they interact and adapt to changing international structure. Equally, there is no exclusion of the ‘internal’ policy spaces and policy processes of the EU by the ‘external’ demands of the world economy and political system, or vice versa. But in stating this position, one becomes aware of the silences and exclusions that are defined by such a focus, and of the assumptions about stability and change which are essential to it. The argument in this article is aimed at sharpening and clarifying the ways in which this tension permeates the relationship between the EU and European order.

111. Towards a Framework for Analysis

The foregoing review suggests that the interaction of states, institutions and norms implicit in a neoliberal-institutionalist approach can form the basis for further analysis of the relationship between the EU, states and other forces in a changing European order. At one level, the Community is a function of the active responses of state authorities to change and its implicit costs. At another level, it is a reflection of a normative consensus which provides at least some form of route map for those attempting to find their way in a disorderly and volatile continent. Finally, the EU offers an institutional context in which the interactions 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1996

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of state and other agencies can be ordered, and in which the costs of change can be distributed according to relatively well-defined conventions. This set of properties is visible in both the internal working of the Union and in its external policy-making (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991; M. Smith, 1996).

But this general statement begs the question of specific mechanisms and effects. This article argues that a key dimension in assessing the relationship between the EU and a changing European order is that of inclusion and exclusion. The key variable, therefore, is the ability of the EU to draw, to maintain or to modify a boundary between itself and the more general European order. This is a particular expression of the neoliberal-institutionalist focus on the role of institutions in ordering relations between states and other actors, and throws into sharp relief the ways in which institutions can divide and exclude as well as accommodate and include within the European arena.

Why are boundaries important? The power of inclusion or exclusion relates intimately to issues of access and control, representation and ‘voice’ and the availability of information. Not only this, but it focuses attention on the linkage already suggested between the internal order of the EU and its external position or role. Each of these areas is central to many strands of thought in both international politics and political theory (Walker, 1993). Each in turn is well signalled by a liberal-institutionalist approach to the relationship between institutions and the broader order in which they are implanted, and particularly to the relationship between institutions and statehood. When one adds to such an approach an awareness of the implications for political discourse within the EU, and the links between this and political action, one can begin to get to grips with an elusive phenomenon.

The sophisticated institutional mechanisms of the EU are the most obvious example of the ways in which the EU can structure and control the linkages between insiders and outsiders, but there are other less tangible ways in which the Union operates to order the expectations and the cultures of those to whom it relates in the European setting. From the point of view of state authorities, both inside and outside the Union, these are central elements in calculation and the formation of strategies. From the perspective of the European order more broadly defined, they are critical components of the ‘fit’ between institutions, values and consensus which is a foundation of stable order or the breakdown of which is a generator of wide-ranging (often disorderly) change (M. Smith, 1994; Walker, 1993). Robert Cox has identified this ‘fit’ and its implications of stability or order with

a concept of hegemony that is based on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain degree of universality (that is, not just as the overt

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instruments of a certain state’s dominance). In this formulation, state power ceases to be the sole explanatory factor and becomes part of what is to be explained. (1986, pp. 222-3)

This gives an apriori basis for arguing that the EU’s boundary construction and maintenance functions are important constitutive elements not only in the strategies of its members and other states, but also in the broader European (and by implication, world) order. Further strength is added to this conclusion by the arguments of John Ruggie who concludes, on the basis of an examination of modernity and territoriality in international relations, that the EU may express the transcendence of established modernist forms and the establishment of a genuinely ‘multiperspectival polity’ (Ruggie, 1993a, pp. 172-3). In such a polity, the positions and actions of Member States or other actors in the EU process are not treated as ‘external’ events or issues; rather, they are endogenous to the preferences and positions of all involved, making it impossible to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ for all practical purposes. The preferences and institutional positions of each state involved in the EU thus become part of the preferences and positionsof all others, providing a powerful set of institutional and normative constraints. By definition, the costs and benefits implied by such mutual entanglement are not - or not as fully - applicable to outsiders.

In order to explore this line of analysis more fully, the argument proceeds in two main stages. First, it explores the nature of boundaries in the EU context and links them to ideas about statehood, the European order, and representations of the EU itself. Second, it proposes two models for consideration - the ‘politics of exclusion’ and the ‘politics of inclusion’ -and relates them to the EU. These two stages lead to a conclusion which reassesses the overall argument and proposes further developments.

Boundaries, Orders and Representations An exploration of the ‘boundary problem’ in the context of the EU and its links with the European order demands an assessment of the concept of ‘boundary’ itself. At the most general level, the idea implies a disjunction between an entity (here the EU) and its environment (here the European order). It is clear that the disjunction can be more or less formal, sharp and permeable; in any case, the concept of ‘boundary’ is distinct from that of ‘frontier’, given its implications of construction, maintenance and surveillance in addition to those of contact (Taylor, 1989; Walker, 1993: pp, 127-40). In the case of the EU, it can be argued that four types of boundary exist or can be constructed between the Union and its environment: geopolitical, institutionalflegal, transactional, and cultural. Each of these can be identified for analysis, and each has its distinctive implications (for an approach with some of the same distinctions, see Reinicke, 1992, Ch. 3). (0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1996

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The geopolitical boundary. From its inception, the EC and then the EU have carried important connotations of security and stability which are closely linked to elements of geopolitics. Realist analysis has often tended to emphasize this aspect of the ECEU boundary question at the expense of others. It is clear, though, that the notion of the ECEU as an island of stability, and a piece in the jigsaw of the Cold War, is tied closely to the constitution of a geopolitical boundary between the CommunityKJnion and the disorderly and/or threatening world outside. It might thus be argued that the description by Joseph Joffe of the US as ‘Europe’s pacifier’ could be turned around to present the ECEU as ‘America’s European pacifier’ (Joffe, 1984), playing an essential part in maintaining the division of Europe and establishing the presumption of order in the western half of the continent. Although the conceptual and institutional separa- tion of NATO and the ECEU has been maintained, there are strong grounds for arguing that they are two sides of the same coin: that the geopolitical order established as a result of NATO would have been very much more difficult to maintain without the accompanying presence of the EC. Additionally, this relationship had important effects in buttressing the hierarchy within the EC, by linking Franco-German relations in that context to the broader political and security context, although the tensionsof the 1960s demonstrated that this did not provide the entire answer to tensions in the geopolitics of Western Europe.

In many of the scenario-building efforts of the post-Cold War era, there has been an explicit assumption that the EU will function to maintain a bounded area of order. Implicitly, this order entails the stability of the countries within the EU and their political institutions. Although the EU has a long way to go before it can be seen as constituting geopolitical order independently of established military powers, it already forms an important element in the calculationsof members and non-members about the future stability of Europe, and this reflects the salience of its geopolitical boundary (Miall, 1994, Ch. 10; Treverton, 1992; Keohane et al., 1993; Story, 1993).

To talk about the geopolitical boundary between the EU and its environment is to imply that there are distinct geopolitical - and for that matter, geoeconomic - differences between insiders and outsiders, and that these have become more distinct as a result of two processes: the post-Cold War disorder, and the post- Maastricht redrawing of the boundary itself. Both outsiders and insiders have been heard to worry about the ways in which broader European order can be promoted or jeopardized by the manipulation of the boundary (Bulmer and Scott, 1994, Ch. 1; Lutzeler, 1994, Ch. 12; H. Wallace, 1994). It is clear that the boundary itself is an artefact, but also that it can by its very existence arouse or thwart the expectations of European state authorities. The clearest example of this phenomenon is the way in which the security problems of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states have created tensions both within

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the EU and between the EU and the outsiders. Jacques Delors on one occasion compared Europe to a village, in which the EC was the largest house: ‘we are its sole architects; we are the keepers of the keys; but we are prepared to open its doors and talk to its neighbours’. The tensions are clear even from this brief assertion (Kaldor, 1990, p. 245).

The institutionalllegal boundary. One of the reasons for apprehension or expectation in relation to the EU’s geopolitical boundary is contained in the second dimension to be explored here: the strength of the EU’s institutional and legal boundary. One of the most potent features of the EU’s international existence is the position it occupies as a ‘community of law’ and the promoter of an image of civic statehood. As implied earlier, this accounts for at least some of the attraction of the EU to outsiders. But it also creates a severe gradient or set of obstacles between the aspirant insider and the ‘promised land’ of EU membership. Not only this, but it creates a powerful coalition of those in the EU itself who wish to preserve the strength of this boundary, and the value of their ‘investment’ for national purposes, as well as for the more general benefit (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991, Ch. 1; H. Wallace, 1994, p. 87).

There are thus in effect two dimensions to the institutionalflegal boundary erected by the EU. In the first place, it constitutes a powerful set of institutional and legal incentives for the establishment and maintenance of civic statehood. As a consequence, it exerts a major prop for the achievement of societal security and the maintenance of legitimacy in the insider countries, whilst at the same time exacting a price in terms of their conformity to the EU method and the internal negotiation process (Waever et al., 1993). This dense and pervasive set of institutions and practices is one of the central boundary markers between the EU and its European environment. Secondly, though, the EU has made it an aim to promote the intensification of institutional contacts and the promotion of civic statehood across Europe as a whole in the post-Cold War era. In this sense, the geopolitical and the institutional/legal boundaries of the Union come into very close alignment, and this has not been lost on outsiders, whether they be the United States or the countries of the former Soviet bloc.

This juxtaposition of the inside and the outside, of the intensification of institutional and legal engagement within the EU alongside the promotion of civic statehood and the rule of law as more general Europeangoods, is at the same time one of the most potent assets and one of the most delicate balancing acts of the EU (H. Wallace, 1994; van Ham, 1994; Keohane et al., 1993). As such, it is deeply implicated in what Gordon Smith (1994) has called the ‘triple revolution’ of the post-Cold War period and the process of applying liberal democracy and the rule of law in central and eastern Europe. It is also thereby engaged in an intense institutional competition with other bodies such as the CSCEIOSCE, the


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outcome of which is difficult to predict (Smith and Woolcock, 1993; van Ham, 1994; Mortimer, 1992; Alting von Geusau, 1993; Davidson, 1993; Rummel, 1991-92). This can at times produce a significant distinction between the more pragmatically determined institutional boundary and the formal legal boundary established by the EU, for example in the case of those ‘outsiders’ who nonetheless have practical access to the EU process. This tension will be explored further below.

The transactional boundary. By definition, the creation of a customs union and a common external tariff creates a transactional boundary. In the case of the EC/ EU, the disparity between the growth of intra-trade and the development of external economic linkages has been notable, and it constitutes one of the major achievements of the original Community concept (Milward and S~rensen, 1994). The completion of the single market has sharpened a number of the ways in which this particular boundary both operates and is perceived by outsiders, adding new dimensions of regulatory structure to the ‘traditional’ issues of trade. The threat of exclusion or of discrimination has led at governmental level to intense and sometimes acrimonious negotiations with the aim, on the EU side, of preserving the gains of the single market; for outsiders the difficulty has at times appeared to be precisely that, with the result that they have tried to affect the regulatory and other frameworks in such a way as to preserve their effective access.

The parallelism between the single market programme and the Uruguay Round of the GATT (as in an earlier phase between the Kennedy Round and the completion of the customs union) was thus always likely to lead to tensions and the difficulties of playing amultilevel negotiation game; but the impact of the end of the Cold War gave a new focus and intensity to the issues, both for the ‘first wave’ of new members and for the queue of associates and potential additions. A key issue was the extent to which the problem of internal development and external boundary maintenance could be reconciled in a comprehensive programme (H. Wallace, 1990; Reinicke, 1992; Cable, 1994b). Recent debates about the tensions between multilateralism and regional bloc-building can thus be viewed in the context of the political economy surrounding the EU’s transactional boundary (Ruggie, 1993b; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1992).

The transactional boundary, though, is in many ways a very permeable one at the day-to-day level. Whilst the political rhetoric of discrimination and exclusion has had a good airing during the past few years, the reality of interpenetration and globalization has made the notion of an impermeable boundary less appropriate than ever (Bressand, 1993). The boundary can be breached, it can be infiltrated, it can be overlaid with networks which are relatively uncontrollable by governing authorities. The most extreme examples



of such loss of control can occur in areas of criminal activity such as the illicit drugs trade, but the problem is manifested in many areas involving the large- scale movement of goods and people.

This does not mean that the transactional boundary is without significance, particularly when it comes into close proximity to the geopolitical and the institutionalAega1 boundary. The gradient between insider status in the EU and the single market and the many outsiders who would wish to operate on equal terms with EU members is steep, and in many areas well guarded. It has been noted by a number of commentators that the ‘living-standards boundary’, and the disparity between the boundaries for different types of transactions (free movement of capital or technology as against persons, for example) are a potential source of instability and disorder both inside and outside the EU. Nor is it likely that simply paying the outsiders to stay away will work on a long-term basis: the attempts to regulate access to the EU through the distribution of economic and technical assistance are an interesting, but some would say a quixotic way of policing an increasingly porous boundary (Waever et al., 1993; Cable, 1994a; Kolankiewicz, 1994).

The cultural boundary. The construction of the EU is in many ways a construction of difference between the assumed culture of the insiders and the outsiders. Inasmuch as the EU is a powerful community of values, those values can be expressed or written in such a way as to make others a threat, or to extend to others the benefits of the EU culture. Without accepting the entire post-modernist agenda, it is quite possible to identify a powerful theory and discourse of ‘European exceptionalism’ not unlike that which has been identified in United States international policy. Whilst the member countries of the Union make much of their continued cultural differences, there is arguably much more of an assumption of difference between those inside and those outside, and this has a political and an economic resonance. The implied linkages between non-Union status and disorder or disruption can clearly be overplayed, but they erect another type of boundary, easier for some to overcome than for others (Kaldor, 1990; Waxer et al., 1993; Cable, 1994a).

This cultural boundary is expressed partly in the development of a complex hierarchy of agreements between the EU and outsiders within the European order. In many cases, these appear to be instrumental and technical, but in others they also carry explicit assumptions about the practice of good government and the dangers of nationalist and other forms of extremism. Such assumptions can be reinforced strongly by the geopolitical, institutionalflegal and transactional boundaries identified earlier. Indeed, when all four of these dimensions come together, as they have in dealing with some of the ex-Soviet states, there can be a powerful representation of the EU as a force for division, threat and discrim-


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ination - the more powerful for never being fully or publicly stated or recognized. Here, there is a potent link to issues of identity within both the EU and the wider Europe which have powerful resonances not always (in fact hardly ever) channelled through the institutionsof the EU. As Stanley Hoffmann has recently argued, ‘[tlhe face the Union shows to its members is unfinished. The face it presents to the outside is often unpleasant’ (1994, p. 20). The linkage between these features is exposed the more clearly by a focus on the EU’s cultural boundary.

The EU, it is clear, has both boundaries and a boundary problem. Whilst much attention has in the past been focused on the ‘internal frontiers’ constituted by the deepening of the integration process, the debate about federalism and subsidiarity or the openness of the political structures evolving in the EU, the argument here has stressed the linkages between the internal debate and the external manifestation of the problem. This has implications for both statehood and state strategies and for the European order, as has been noted. It can give rise to powerful perceptions and representations of the EU: as a ‘fortress’ with walls to be scaled or breached, as a ‘magnet’ attracting outsiders and allowing them access, albeit on the EU’s terms. In the light of the discussion earlier of the nature of European order in the 1990s’ it is apparent that neither the ‘fortress’ nor the ‘magnet’ image is without relevance. A third image is also possible: that the EU is (or ought to be) a ‘mosaic’ rather like the broader European order, and that this has powerful implications for the ability of the Union and its members to construct or sustain the boundaries outlined here (Hoffmann, 1992; Cohen, 1991). This brings the argument to the ‘politics of exclusion’ and the ‘politics of inclusion’.

IV. The ‘Politics of Exclusion’ and the ‘Politlcs of Inclusion’

The purpose in this part of the article is to outline two models of ‘boundary politics’ in relation to the EU, the first based on the ‘politics of exclusion’ and the second on the ‘politics of inclusion’. The underlying argument is that for much of its existence, the EC was based on an explicit or implicit ‘politics of exclusion’. It has moved some distance towards a ‘politics of inclusion’, but there are still important areas of variation. Liberal institutionalist analysis would imply two rather different sets of consequences from this state of affairs: on the one hand it might be argued that strong but bounded institutions would be functional for the relationship between the EU and the European order. On the other hand, it could be concluded that the movement towards a ‘politics of inclusion’ would be functional for the relationship between the EU and the European order by improving the fit between institutional and other dimensions of the order. It is unclear, however, whether this would be functional for 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1996


individual states or groups of states, or for non-state groupings both within and outside the EU. These implications will be taken up in the final part of the article.

The Politics of Exclusion The European Communities established in the 1950s were predicated in many ways on exdusion and exclusivity. In turn, this implied the drawing of strong and well-delineated boundaries between the Communities and their environment. In broad terms, this was functional for both the European order and for individual states or groups of states during the 1950s and 1960s; this became less clear as change in the European and international arenas accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s.

A key feature of the ‘politics of exclusion’ was the close linkage between the EC and the Cold War international system. The Communities functioned to reinforce the East-West divide, and in turn to reinforce the Western system of alliances and economic institutions. It could be argued that this was true not only at the international level, but also within member countries of the EC, with the establishment and maintenance of anti-communist coalitions and broadly conservative regimes. There was a very strong geopolitical boundary between the EC and the Soviet bloc, alongside an equally strong cultural boundary; at the same time, there was an institutionalflegal boundary between members of the Western system and the six original members of the EC, which to some extent corresponded to transactional boundaries. As the 1960s progressed, the maintenance of the institutionalflegal boundary became more difficult in the light of changes in state strategies within Western Europe, and some significant shifts in international economic transactions. But the enlargement of the EC during the 1970s and 1980s took place still within the system of exclusion constituted by the geopolitical and cultural boundaries of the Cold War. During the late 1980s, this came under increasing pressure both from within the Western system and from outside (Allen and Smith, 1991-92; Story, 1993, Ch. 1; Altingvon Geusau, 1993).

Another central characteristic of the ‘politics of exclusion’ was the strength of the institutional and legal arrangements within the Communities. There were pressures, debates and disagreements, but they took place within a strong underlying consensus about the Community method and its application. Argu- ably, they also reflected assumptions about hierarchy within the Community order, as noted earlier. The enlargement of the Communities put pressure on these arrangements, but the premise of exclusion and exclusivity could be effectively maintained with new members making substantial adjustments in state strategy (often in anticipation) and a firm line drawn between the ‘community of law’ and broader European or international processes. As with the

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geopolitical and cultural boundaries, the pressure of change in the broader European order during the 1980s eventually had a substantial effect on the ability to maintain this component of the ‘politics of exclusion’ (H. Wallace, 1990; Laursen, 1991-92; Rummel, 1992).

Finally, the ‘politics of exclusion’ rested firmly on the assumed conceptual clarity of the Communities and their boundaries. It was clear to all concerned what it meant to be inside and to be outside, and this had a stabilizing effect through both the reduction of uncertainty on the part of outsider states, and through the establishment of clear lines between the EC and the broader European order. The generation of a complex web of association and other agreements did not undermine this essential clarity; rather, it defined it still further by creating a hierarchy of access and privilege both in economic terms and sometimes in broader political terms. By the late 1980s, though, the status of this set of relations, and the conceptual clarity of both insiders and outsiders about the position of the Communities and their boundaries, were far less clear (H. Wallace, 1990; Michalski and H. Wallace, 1992; Story, 1993, Ch. 1).

The ‘politics of exclusion’ thus rested on a number of foundations. The view of the EC’s development was linear, and of its methods monolithic. Energy was expended on the containment of disturbance and disruption. Linkage was downgraded externally, whilst it was upgraded internally. There was a focus on hierarchy, control and difference which demanded major adjustment of state strategies and institutions before insider status could be conferred, whilst a complex hierarchy of agreements emerged to contain the expectations and strategies of outsiders. This was embedded in a stable (or rigid) European order, in which the geopolitical division predominated and in which the EC constituted a major element of the division which characterized the order as a whole.

The ‘Politics of Inclusion ’ During the 1980s, there was a move in the EC from the premise of exclusion and exclusivity towards a ‘politics of inclusion’. This was not simply or even primarily a process directed towards the external world; activities such as those in the single market programme evoked a sense of greater flexibility and inclusivity through the erosion of rigid versions of the ‘Community method’ and the linkages between market-driven and socially-shaped policy agendas. At the same time, the imperatives of competition in the global arena produced devices such as the EUREKA programme, which brought together the R&D activities of members and non-members, governments and private groupings (Peterson, 1993). But towards the end of the 1980s, the demands facing the EC and then the EU were fundamentally affected by radical change in the European order. In these circumstances, the model for EU policy and assumptions moved markedly but not completely towards that of the ‘politics of inclusion’. 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1996


The first central component of such a ‘politics of inclusion’ is the assumptions it makes about the nature of European order and European statehood. Whereas in the Cold War era it was possible to make relatively broad and rigid assumptions about the division of Europe and the differences between different sub- orders in Europe, the transformation of the European order since 1989 has raised major questions about this element. The geopolitical boundary, which had seemed permanent, between the ECEU and the east, suddenly appeared to be permeable or leaky. Indeed, the promotion of this permeability by the EC and its members had been a force in the changes within Europe, and was to remain a key variable in the subsequent developments. Alongside this, the cultural boundary, which had been in a sense subsumed by the geopolitical realities of the situation, became a significant independent factor. For the EC, the freeing up of this key set of boundary conditions has created dilemmas as well as opportunities, not least because of the expressed wish of many outsiders to ‘return to Europe’. Significantly also, these developments have created conceptual and analytical challenges to match the policy challenges (Mayall and Miall, 1994; Rengger, 1993).

One of the key dilemmas of both analysis and policy is about where, if anywhere, the geopolitical and the cultural boundaries should be redrawn. In the former case, the initial drawing of the boundary was a function more of superpower confrontation than of the EC’s independent action; the EC in a sense had simply accommodated itself to the boundary, and its disappearance created considerable uncertainty. Not least was this because the EClEU did not and still does not possess the central ‘classical’ means of drawing geopolitical boundaries or establishing geopolitical order, that of military capacity (Hill, 1994). In the new ‘mosaic’ of European security order, it is not clear at all where the EU’s priorities lie. In the case of the cultural boundary, the assumption that difference started at the inner-German border and continued to Vladivostock has had to be reappraised in a radical fashion, and no substitute has been found (Hoffmann, 1994; Rummel, 1992).

This means that the geopolitical boundary of the EU has changed from one which seemed to put a ‘security blanket’ over a divided Europe to one in which a multilayered conception of political and security space has to be contemplated. This is not easy for the EU as a set of institutions to accommodate, although the moves towards regional and other forms of subsidiarity within the Union give some basis for new thinking. It is also not easy for EU Member States to absorb, and there is a genuine dilemma about the ways in which a security architecture might be rebuilt, or whether it is necessary at all. In this situation, the pressure to redefine a geopolitical frontier in terms of economic and societal values has been strong. The entry of Finland, for example, might be construed as creating a new imperative for geopolitical redefinition because of its common border with


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Russia, whilst the perceived challenge of central and eastern Europe, or of the Maghreb, has equally played a part in debates about ‘who is us?’ in the EU.

Alongside the transformation of the geopolitical boundary and the fragmen- tation of the cultural boundary has gone the redefinition of the institutional and legal boundary associated with the EU. In part, this is a function of institutional change and shifts in the structure of influence within the EU itself (although there remain a number of important unanswered questions in this area). But it is also a reflection of the increased density of institutions in Europe as a whole, not merely in the EU. The institutional richness of post-Cold War Europe (or institutional overcrowding, as some would have it) makes for a radical change in the nature of the European order. It also has an important, if ill-defined, impact on the status of the EU institutions. From a situation where the EU was the strongest available institutional model, if not the only one, there has emerged an environment of much greater institutional variety. The ‘politics of inclusion’ depends intimately on this variety, and the EU has responded by attempting to define new levels of institutional relationship roughly approximating to its established hierarchy (Smith and Woolcock, Ch. 2; Keohane et al., 1993; Alting von Geusau, 1993). As noted earlier, the question arises of tensions and divergence between the (relatively unchanging) legal order of the EU and the (relatively dynamic) institutional framework might this create either new channels for access, or a desire to reassert the purity of the EU’s legal method?

One of the challenges this highlights is that the ‘politics of inclusion’ as apparent in the European order of the 1990s does not depend upon the establishment of institutional or legal hierarchies, leastwise not if those are assumed to be relatively fixed. Rather, it demands an application of what might be called ‘fuzzy logic’, whereby approximations and an inevitable dynamism are characteristic of boundary-building. The EU has thus had to move towards a method both internally and externally which stresses variety and lateral thinking, rather than linear development. But the difficulty is that the institutional set-up of the Union still privileges a linear set of assumptions about the ways in which outsiders become insiders: that they should form an orderly queue, and not attempt either to jump it or all to get on board at the same time. Whereas this may have worked with relatively homogeneous groups of outsiders in the Cold War structure, it is not on the face of it a functional stance for the 1990s. For the EU, the problem on the one hand is that of ‘carrying capacity’, and on the other that of maintaining an increasingly permeable set of boundaries. The contrasting stories of the 1993- 94 accession negotiations, the Europe Agreements and the co-operation agreements with ex-Soviet republics are particularly relevant in this context. A parallel but not completely analogous challenge is faced by NATO, with equally uncertain outcomes.



The ‘politics of inclusion’ in the 1990s thus emphasizes a range of qualities which have not always appeared highly developed in the EC and the EU. They demand diversity of method and paths of development. They do away with the notion of a fixed set of boundaries, and they may lead to the internalization of disturbance rather than its containment, partly because of the fuzziness of the boundaries or their disappearance. They add to a dense set of internal linkages a more complex set of external linkages, in which the geopolitical, the institutional, the transactional and the cultural can mingle very closely indeed. They focus on access rather than on control, and in doing so they may expose vulnerabilities in the EU or encounter resistance from those whose established positions are threatened. John Ruggie has referred to this and related processes as the ‘unbundling of territoriality’: a process which throws into question the entire logic of a ‘politics of exclusion’, and which generates the impetus towards a ‘multiperspectival’ European polity (Ruggie, 1993a, pp. 172-3).

Beyond a Boundary? The EU and the European Order in the Late 1990s

The discussion above has created two stylized but historically grounded models of EC and then EU relations to the broader European order: the ‘politics of exclusion’ and the ‘politics of inclusion’. It has also made plain the ways in which these tendencies overlap and coexist in the real world of European politics. What are the implications of this inevitable untidiness and ambiguity?

One implication is the development of parallel processes in the EU for the establishment and maintenance of boundaries. In the first place, there is still a powerful language of ‘Community policy-making’, evoking the clarity and the consistency reminiscent of the early days, and placing a high value on the gradient between outsiders and insiders. In the second place, there is the equally long-standing discourse of what can now be called ‘Union policy-making’, with a central role for interstate politics and the calculation of costs and benefits, both of exclusiveness and of inclusiveness. But these have been joined by a third discourse, that of ‘negotiated order’, in which not only the outcomes but also the process itself of EU boundary setting is a matter of negotiation and the ‘social construction of order’ (M. Smith, 1996).

This means that the EU and its members have had to learn a new politics of inclusion which focuses less on difference than on variety, and less on the maintenance of boundaries than on their continual redrawing. Boundaries in this conception are for crossing rather than defending. In relation to state strategies, they emphasize the notion of active adjustment by outsiders and insiders alike, which has the effect of reshaping the form and the meaning of the institutional context in the EU. In relation to the changing European order, they uncover the tension between the notion of the EU as an island and an example, and the impression that the EU’s benefits can be multilateralized and disseminated. 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1996

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But it is also possible to argue that in the post-Cold War era the logic of a politics of exclusion remains powerful. Rather than disappearing or being irrevocably penetrated, the boundaries have simply moved and are managed in the established fashion at different points in the European and world arenas. This raises important questions both about the extent to which the institutional benefits of the EU can be seen as private or public goods in the circumstances of a potentially very disorderly Europe, and about the extent to which negotiated order can be achieved in those conditions.

This means that the most profitable way of analysing the role played by institutional boundaries in the relationship between the EU and the European order is in terms of a shifting and uneven balance between the logics of inclusion and exclusion. Seen in this light, the issues with which the EU is grappling in the late 1990s express a significant but not necessarily decisive twist in this balance. As noted by the Reflection Group preparing proposals for the 1996 IGC, the ‘shadow of the future’ hangs over the EU’s internal institutional development, and in many respects that is the shadow of the outsider; the development of intensive structured dialogues with the most significant outsiders in central and eastern Europe is a creative way of attempting to move ‘beyond a boundary’, but it is not entirely clear whether this overcomes the boundary problem. The ‘shadow of the past’ is thus not entirely expunged: the legacy of division and the accumulated investment of EU members in the mechanisms of exclusion guarantee that the tensions will persist, and that at times they will exercise a pervasive influence on the development of the EU. Moving ‘beyond a boundary’ is thus in many ways a utopian prescription, since it neglects the real tensions in the EU process and also some of the most interesting research questions arising about the relationship between the EU and the European order.

V. Conclusions

On the basis of the arguments developed in this article, the following conclusions can be drawn:

First, there is support for the utility of a neoliberal-institutionalist approach to analysis of the relationship between the EU and the changing European order. The value of a perspective which focuses on the interaction between vigorous state policy and the development of a dense institutional setting is apparent, since it throws up important questions about both the past development of the EU and its present and future impact. Second, the concept of boundaries and boundary-drawing behaviour is a fruitful way of focusing a neoliberal-institutionalist approach, since it



generates both an awareness of the existence of institutional boundaries between the EU and outsiders, and a sensitivity to the normative assumptions they reflect. Third, the notion of boundaries, their construction and their maintenance provides a basis for discussion of the ‘politics of exclusion’ and the ‘politics of inclusion’ in relation to the EU. Such a discussion in turn sharpens awareness of the tensions and shifting balances both within the EU and between the EU and the European order, which are likely to be central to future policy developments.

It could on this basis be argued that the impact of the EU’s boundary-drawing activity can be seen in three ways. First, it can reinforce both existing state strategies and the European order. Second, it can accommodate change within those strategies or the European order. Finally, it can transform state strategies and the European order. These are important distinctions because they go to the heart of the role played by the EU in both the ‘old Europe’ and the ‘new Europe’. The burden of the discussion here is that, on the whole, the impact of the EU has been such as to reinforce or to accommodate state strategies and the established European order. There is little a priori basis to argue that the EU has played a transforming role, either in the old Europe or the post-Cold War Europe. Indeed, as one argument has it, the EU has played a key role in moving ‘from one containment to another’ (Story, 1993, Conclusion). As noted above, this reflects the perception that the boundaries have simply moved to accommodate new political and other realities: more is included in the EU, but this does not mean that a politics of inclusion has fully established itself.

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