1

Manfred Spiesberger

idheap (institut de hautes études en administration publique)

University of Lausanne

Route de la Maladière 21

CH-1022 Chavannes-près-Renens

Switzerland

Tel: ++41-21-6940729

e-mail: Manfred.Spiesberger@idheap.unil.ch

The end of Soviet-Parliamentarism in Russia 1991 - autumn 1993

Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops/Mannheim, 26-31 March 1999.

Workshop: European Parliaments: Rediscovering, Refocusing of Reinventing? David Judge

and Gabriella Ilonszki

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Soviet August 1991-coup, an increasingly aggravated power struggle

began in the Russian Republic between Parliament and Presidential System. The Russian

soviet-constitution served as a suitable basis for this power struggle, fixing an unclear

separation of powers. After its partial liberation from communist party domination, the

Russian political system oscillated between a presidential and parliamentary system. Finally a

parliamentary majority incapable of compromise exaggerated their challenges vis-à-vis the

presidential system, to which the Russian president Yeltsin reacted in using his powers by

dissolving the parliament.

2

1. Introduction

In Russia, autumn 1993 saw the bloody showdown of a long-lasting power struggle between

parliament and president. This event marked the end of the history of soviet-democracy; a

democracy model, which attempted to realize “participation in the shape of the polity”

(Fetscher 1975, 195) in a diametrical manner as in a representative democracy. The article

describes in chronological order (1991 until 1993) the events which aggravated the power

struggle between the two actors - president and parliament. It focuses on institutions and their

personifications; how they acted in the power struggle, how they were instrumentalized,

which factors contributed to the aggravation of the power struggle, what role the system’s

structure had to play, and how one institution finally met its end. Before the events are

sketched out, however, a description of soviet-democracy should serve to give an idea of the

basic system’s structure in Russia at that time.

1.1. Soviet-democracy

Let us first go into more detail concerning soviet-democracy.1 Democracy as such consists in

three key concepts: on the one hand people's rule and, on the other hand, the closely-related

concepts of freedom and equality.

In soviet-democracy people's rule is conceptualized in a completely different way as in

representative democracy. According to the soviet-approach the goal is to attain the highest

possible degree of identification between those who rule and those who are ruled.2 People

should rule themselves and realize therefore a maximum of self-determination (Kriele 1994,

309). This ideal status is envisaged, in line with Marxist theory, for a future form of life called

communism where society and state will be fully integrated (Held 1987, 131).

The concept of freedom in soviet-democracy is linked to the over-riding ideology of

socialism/communism. Advocates of soviet democracy conclude that the greater the degree of

identification between rulers and the ruled, the greater the resulting degree of freedom (Kriele

1994, 280). In the end that would mean, that if this ultimate identity-democracy were set up,

then the state as such would perish and freedom as well as equality would become reality

1

I have chosen not to differentiate exactly between the concepts of soviet-democracy and

socialist/communist theory, because this would go beyond the scope of this article, and in addition,

they are often viewed as one concept. 2 That is why Kriele (1994, 300) categorises soviet-democracy as identity democracy.

3

(Kriele 1994, 286). According to Marxist reasoning, freedom demands that society as well as

the state have to be fully democratized. This status of absolute democratization can only be

attained if all social classes and class power of any kind are removed (Held 1987, 122). By

destroying these antagonistic class structures, equality will consequently be achieved. But

ultimate freedom and equality are only projected for the future stage of communism; before

this ideal stage is reached, a phase with restricted freedom, called dictatorship of the

proletariat, has to be passed through. This phase serves to suppress the class of former

exploiters (Held 1987, 122-128; Sartori 1994, 434-440).

The practical organization of soviet-democracy has been described by Karl Marx, according

to experiences taken from the commune of Paris of the year 1871. Later, theoretical and

practical models of soviet-democracy were based on Marx’ work.

This model3 is based on grass-roots organization and redistribution of tasks according to the

principle of subsidiarity. As a result there will be self-government at the lowest and the

middle level. For the rest, tasks that cannot be fulfilled at a sublevel, will be the responsibility

of the national soviet.

Concerning elections in a soviet model, functionaries are elected indirectly. The electorate,

which is organized at grass roots according to respective units has to elect delegates for a

soviet on the next level up, for instance at community level. These soviets now proceed to

elect of delegates for a higher level (a region, for example) and so on till the top of the state,

where we can find a national soviet. The core concept and essential feature of

soviet-democracy is the bound mandate or recall. That means that the elected delegate is not

free in his or her decisions, but bound to instructions by his or her voters. So delegates are

responsible to their voters, they are subject to permanent control by the voters, they are

accountable to their voters and finally they can be recalled.

A further distinct feature of soviet democracy has to be seen in the abolition of the separation

of powers. At least executive and legislative powers have to be merged. Marx, in addition,

opted also to integrate the judicature and thus to submit all powers to direct responsibility vis

à vis the grass roots level. The abolition of officialdom, universal and equal suffrage, public

accessibility to all assemblies and finally a universal competence for the soviet (which

consequently is empowered also to restrict rights to freedom) can be cited as other claims of

3 In the following, I describe a general model of soviet-democracy and its main features. This

description is based on contributions of Kriele (1994, 302), Bermbach (1973, 165), Schwendter (1970,

47-48), Fijalkovskij (1973, 129), Macpherson (1983, 127), Held (1987, 127-131, 136).

4

soviet-democracy.

1.2. The Russian parliament – a model of soviet-democracy

In March 1990 a parliament, founded on the model of soviet democracy, was elected in

Russia. This parliament consisted of two elements: there was the huge Congress of People‘s

Deputies, numbering 1068 members. According to the soviet principle of delegation, a

reduced working parliament was elected by the Congress. This so-called Supreme Soviet

fulfilled the task of usual parliamentary day-to-day work and was composed of 252 members.

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet supported by a Presidium acted as head of parliament.

This new parliament, elected as a consequence of reforms initiated by Michail Gorbachov,4

became, in contrast to its streamlined predecessor, an active component of the political system

(ND5 1989/12, 40). As far as the deputies were concerned, they were elected in single

electoral districts, the majority of whom had to compete with other candidates. Hence, the

present members of parliament considered themselves as highly legitimated and cultivated a

self-confident behaviour corresponding to their new role. They now really played an active

role in political life; in contrast, deputies of the pre-reform period, had occupied only an

honorary post (Heinrich 1994, 37).6

Some typical soviet-democratic features of the Russian parliamentary system can now be

pointed out: firstly, the election of deputies in single electoral districts. Especially the fact that

they were presented by societal units or voters' clubs and not on a party list has to be

emphasized. Secondly, the way in which the supreme soviet was elected is worth particular

mention: the congress as the basic institution delegated deputies at the higher level of the

supreme soviet. Thirdly and finally, a merger of executive and legislative power for the

parliament as well as the president has to be mentioned. I will go into more details on this

subject later on.

4 Gorbachovs reformed parliamentarism brought in 1989 a more liberally elected parliament to the

Soviet Union; elections then followed in the Federative Republics. Thanks to reforms, parliaments

finally got a say in political life. 5 ND = Narodni Deputat

6 Deputies of the completely streamlined Russian parliament (a Supreme Soviet), which existed until

1989, had occupied an honorary post; a duty, emptied of almost any function and sense, reduced to an

award for deserving citizens and communists. Thus, one can agree with Patzelt (1995, 372) in

describing their forum, the Supreme Soviet, as reduced to the function of a platform for state

ceremony.

5

2. The beginning of the Russian power struggle – 1991

The end of the year 1991 also marked the end of the seventy year history of the Soviet Union;

to the surprise of a lot of observers, it was simply dissolved.7 As long as the Soviet Union

was present on the political scene,8 it served as a common enemy for the main political

players in Russia. The united front in the battle against the centre, whose political influence

had to be curbed, disguised the inner-Russian power struggle between parliament and

president. The leading actors of the two sides were Ruslan Khasbulatov - Chairman of the

Russian Supreme Soviet - versus Boris Yeltsin.9

Already in the course of the year 1991 the first signs of – sometimes even considerable

–dissonance began to surface between Yeltsin, serving the first half of the year still as

Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and his Russian parliament. In January 1991, for

instance, parliament refused to support Yeltsin in his policy regarding the Baltic Republics.

The summer of this year then saw the coup carried out by the men who sought to restore the

Soviet Union to its former glory. This event necessitated and contributed to a strong alliance

between parliament and Yeltsin, now Russian president elect. But shortly after the coup, in

September, the functionary of the presidential apparatus, Sergei Stankevich, bemoaned an

ongoing power crisis: “The confrontation between representative and executive bodies is

rising.... Today different sources issue Ukasy10

, which contradict one another....” (MN11

1991/39, 9). As a result of the soviet-democratic mingling of powers laid down in the

constitution, both the executive and representative branches were empowered to pass laws.

This unclear distribution of powers led to a chaotic confusion of law.12

Shortly after the August coup, the 5th Congress of People's Deputies was convened. It

brought a remarkable success for Yeltsin because the deputies - facing the deepening

7To mention briefly the milestones of the end of the Soviet Union, I recall the famous August 1991

coup against president M. Gorbachov and the meeting of the three Slavic Republics in the form of

their presidents Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevic in Brest in autumn 1991 (agreeing on the

dissolution of the SU and the formation of the CIS). 8Here is meant the Soviet Union versus the fifteen Federative Socialist Republics (such as the Russian

Federative Socialist Republic,..), making up the Union. 9Boris Yeltsin, a reformist but nevertheless long-serving communist cadre (consequently brought up in

the Communist Party system and thus versed in this kind of politics), became Chairman of the Russian

Supreme Soviet in May 1990 - hence being Head of State in the Russian Federative Socialist

Republic. One year later he was elected Russian President with a convincing majority of 57.3%. His

term as President commenced on 10 July 1991 when he was sworn in before the Russian Congress of

People's Deputies. 10

Ukasy means decrees, which have legal power. 11

MN = Moskovskie Novosti 12

See especially the article by Dominic Gualtieri (1993a, 10-15) "Russia's New War of Laws".

6

economic crisis in Russia - agreed to strengthen the executive powers of the President.

Nevertheless one could observe a rising tension between the two bodies in the aftermath of

the event. The conflict occurred primarily in the economic field, which the Russian

government had in the meantime inherited from its Soviet counterpart (Meissner 1992c, 494;

Rahr 1992a, 9). The Supreme Soviet, on the one hand, denied Yeltsin their approval of a

decree liberating the Russian State Bank from parliamentary control. On the other hand, the

Soviet refused early in December some proposals regarding decrees for economic reform

(MN 1991/50, 5).

In the second half of 1991 the Russian Vice President, Aleksander Rutskoi, intensified the

criticism concerning the government, thereby siding with parliament. Rutskoi, at this time a

fairly popular politician in Russia, focussed his attacks - like his new ally - on the negative

effects of reform policies introduced by the government. He ridiculed certain members of

government in Yeltsin's sphere by characterising them as “...educated boys in pink shorts,

who act far off real life..” (MN: 1991/50, 5). The Vice President's statement gives an idea of

the quality of the political discourse in Russia at this time. His political reorientation can be

explained by his disappointment regarding his career aspirations: in the aftermath of the coup,

Rutskoi obviously expected to be directly involved in the government. These expectations

were not fulfilled, on the contrary, he lost some of his competencies and was finally - in

February 1992 - entrusted with responsibility for agriculture, a traditional penalty job in the

Soviet era (Luchterhandt 1993, 12; Rahr 1992b, 2-3).

3. The aggravation of the Russian power struggle – 1992

In spring 1992 the power struggle between parliament and presidential system became

increasingly aggravated. It came finally to the surface on the 6th Congress of People's

Deputies in April 1992 and resulted in an open conflict between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov

(Heinrich 1994, 38).13

Khasbulatov, like Rutskoi a former supporter of the President, had

followed Yeltsin as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and was therefore head of parliament.

Well aware of the upcoming troubles, Yeltsin tried to counter the expected attacks on reform

policies by restructuring his government. The 6th Congress indeed showed no signs of

reaching a compromise: it issued a declaration through which Yeltsin would have been

deprived of the right to decide on the structure and personnel composition of the government

13

See the article by Rahr (1992c, 1-7) "Winners and Losers of the Russian Congress".

7

(Meissner 1993a, 665). In the same way the deputies aimed to cut the presidential

decree-making power, which they had conferred on him during spring 1991 and during the

coup. However, Yeltsin succeeded in fending off the imminent restrictions on his

competencies. The price he had to pay was the offer to resign as Prime Minister within three

months and the announcement of a cutback of the presidential apparatus. This apparatus had

in the meantime evolved into a quasi executive, parallel to the government (Meissner 1993a,

665). By using these compromise tactics, the president was able to keep his leading reformers

in the cabinet and only had to redistribute responsibilities among them.

Another source of conflict occurred at the 6th Congress in the form of the planned new

constitution for the now renamed state Russia - Russian Federation. There were several

different concepts under discussion, oriented in their construction towards the political system

along the respective mandator. Parliament presented a draft constitution, which opted for a

preponderating parliamentary system; on the contrary the presidential project foresaw, not

surprisingly, an overwhelming importance of the president (Meissner 1993a, 665-666). The

existing parliament had no great interest in treating this question quickly, because a reformed

political system would have meant its dissolution and so the deputies would have lost their

rather important position as well as their privileges.

In spite of the provocation launched by the congress, Yeltsin had to accept only minor

restrictions of his far-reaching presidential power. As the president was skilful at utilising

compromise tactics, he was also able to keep reformers in government. At this point it would

be wrong to hold only the congress responsible for the power struggle and to describe this

body as acting far from political reality. The results of an opinion poll published in the

Moskovskie Novosti (1992/23, 8) show that 42% of people interviewed declared their

confidence in the legislative. The executive amassed a hardly better 43%. True, Khasbulatov

would have liked to return to the days when the government was subordinate to the Chairman

of the Supreme Soviet; in that case he would have been in the dominant position.

Khasbulatov's behavior can be explained in the same way as Rutskoi's: like the vice president,

his aspirations to a direct implication in the executive had been ignored and refused several

times (MN 1992/40, 6-7).

3.1. The Security Council and other supplements to the presidential system

During the summer of 1992 the president proceeded to make changes within the state

8

authorities. He invented a Security Council, a body which had already been planned for some

time and which was to belong to the inner circle of presidential bodies. An Ukas issued one

month later defined its competencies in the following way: decisions made by the Security

Council have to be implemented by the subordinate executive - this meant not only local

administrations but also the heads of ministries - within two days from the date of issue

(Meissner 1993a, 671; MN 1992/29, 4). The power potential conferred upon this new

institution was obviously remarkable and the Moskovskije Novosti (1992/29, 4) even

described the proceedings as a hidden coup d'etat. Thus the tendency to develop the

presidential system as a second comprehensive executive was reinforced.

To come to terms at least with the centrist factions in parliament,14

Yeltsin integrated Viktor

Chernomyrdin and Vladimir Shumeiko – representatives of industry – into the government

and resigned himself as prime minister in April 1992 (Rahr 1992d, 3). However, in the wake

of this government-reshuffle he was able to upgrade his leading reformer Egor Gaidar to the

acting head of government (Meissner 1993a, 669-670).

Another change concerned the already existing Consultative Council, whose members were

given the status of ministers of the Russian Federation. Some two new bodies were invented

in autumn 1992: first an Expert Council to the President was created, while an existing Expert

Council subordinate to the government was dissolved. Finally the president established a

Council of the Heads of the Autonomous Republics15

under his own chairmanship (Meissner

1993b, 735).

On the one hand, all this restructuring and the upgrading of the presidential apparatus has to

be seen in the context of the concessions which Yeltsin had made to the congress. Since the

president had accepted to regroup the government and feared losing control of it to

parliament, he created the Security Council as a kind of fallback institution to guarantee the

enforcement of his policies. On the other hand, he tried to strengthen his proper power basis,

so as to be well prepared for the awaited further conflicts with his counterpart. That is why

one could observe a splitting of executive competencies, redistributed between presidential

bodies and the government. In another attempt to broaden his basis, Yeltsin tried to found his

rule also on the regions and autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. With this

strategy he aimed to win the support of the regional bigwigs for himself and to harness their

14

It was only the so-called reformers or radical democrats present in the Parliament on whose support

Yeltsin could count without reservations. 15

Besides regions, there are also Autonomous Republics as sub-units of the Russian Federation.

9

opposition to the parliament. The establishment of the Council of the Heads of the

Autonomous Republics was a step in this direction. As far as the loyalty of the heads of the

regional administrations (Governors) was concerned, Yeltsin could count on them, because it

was himself who had named them in the aftermath of the Soviet coup (Meissner 1993b,

736).16

The parliament and its chairman Khasbulatov showed no signs of being very much impressed

by the various restructurings within the presidential system.17

Khasbulatov declared that one

had to react in a calm manner to the efforts being made to strengthen presidential power

(Meissner 1993a, 675). The chairman was not really worried at this point, because he knew

that the parliamentary majority was behind him. In addition, there was still a huge apparatus

in place, to support the chairman. It dated from the days of Yeltsin's chairmanship and was

now at Khasbulatov’s disposition (Rahr 1993a, 51).

In the following, table 1 gives an overview of the Russian state authorities in summer 1992:18

Power organs

of the state

Parliament Presidential System

Presidium/Chairman

of the Supreme Soviet

President

Supreme Soviet

Presidential bodies

Government

- Security Council - Prime

Minister

Congress of People‘s Deputies - Secretariat - First

Vicepremier

- Administration -

Vicepremiers

- Consultative Council - Ministers

- Experts Council

- Council for Matters of the

Federation and Territories

- Council of Heads of

16

The governors had also founded a Council of the Governors subordinate to the President. 17

Presidential system in this context means the government as well as the various bodies of the

presidential apparatus. 18

The compilation of state authorities is based on the preceding explanations concerning the various

restructuring in the system and on the articles by Meissner (1993a, 657-677; 1993b, 727-747) in

Osteuropa.

10

Autonomous Republics

- Council of Governors

3.2. The 7th Congress of People's Deputies - December 1992

The 7th Congress of People's Deputies was convened for two weeks beginning on 1

December 1992. It served as a forum for the increasing confrontation, whereby the deputies

had two objectives in mind, the first being to get the government under the control of

parliament and the second, to further restrict the special powers of the president. In the eyes of

the congress' majority the president had to be deprived - by means of a constitutional

amendment – of his right to designate and control his cabinet. The attack failed to reach the

necessary two-thirds majority by a mere four votes (Die Zeit 1992/51, 5).

Since Yeltsin wanted to get the necessary confirmation for his head of government, Egor

Gaidar, he had to concede further competencies to parliament.19

As a result the congress

attained the right to pre-select candidates for the prime ministership. And the Supreme Soviet

was given the authority to confirm the ministers of the four power-portfolios Security,

Defense, Domestic Affairs and Foreign Affairs (Meissner 1993b, 742-743). The congress

went on with the agreed procedure for the prime ministership: the president presented in the

pre-selection round several candidates and obliged himself to choose one of the three top

placed. Gaidar came in third place and thus would have been a possible future Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, Yeltsin opted for Viktor Chernomyrdin trying once more to build a bridge to

the centrist parliamentary factions (especially the Citizens' Union) (Meissner 1993b, 746).

Some constitutional amendments to curtail the presidential decree powers were also passed by

the congress. The most important stipulated that parliament could suspend presidential

decrees without consulting in advance the only recently established Constitutional Court

(Meissner 1993b, 742-743; Wishnevsky 1993a, 1).20

But for the time being, Khasbulatov

and Yeltsin agreed not to apply the amendments and thus to postpone the significant

curtailments to the presidential powers. The deal was to delegate the solution to the system's

crisis to the people. For this reason a referendum was announced for the 11 April 1993, where

the people were to decide on the basic principles of a new constitution (Meissner 1993b, 745).

19

To keep Gaidar in office, confirmation by the Congress was needed.

11

As a result Yeltsin could overcome the resistance of the political system only by accepting

substantial cuts in his powerful presidential position. Beyme (1994, 247) describes these

events as “strange compromises…., which were unique in the history of parliamentarism”.

More worrying still, in political reality, this permanent conflict between parliament and

president rendered the necessary consequent reform policy much more difficult and

threatened to make the system as a whole non-governable. But it has to be stated that until

then parliament had not removed but only curtailed the special powers conferred on Yeltsin in

November 1991. These powers were limited for the duration of one year and included the

authority to designate the government and the local authorities as well as decree powers to

push through reform policies. However, parliament seemed disposed to limit the restrictions

of the special powers not only to the already agreed co-decision concerning the appointment

of the government. The deputies wanted to go further, as the constitutional amendments to

weaken the president had only been postponed until the planned referendum. It would be

misleading to accuse solely parliament of prolonging the power crisis; it wanted to get back

the temporarily delegated competencies, and hence aimed at a reparliamentarisation of the

system. Of course, this strategy (the strategy of the counterparts) did not contribute to

establishing a well functioning and governable political system.

3.3. The Constitution

The Russian Constitution, founded on the model of the soviets, served as a suitable basis for

the power struggle.21

Since it did not unequivocally define the separation of powers, it

allowed the rival parties to present themselves respectively as highest authority of the state. In

article 104 it was stated that the congress has to be regarded as the highest body of state

power in the Russian Federation (Teague 1993, 2). That is why, according to part two of the

same article, the congress was empowered to “decide any question concerning the control of

the Russian Federation” (ND 1992/10, 68). Compared with this and according to article

121.1, the president occupied the post of highest authority of the Russian Federation (Teague

1993, 3).

In effect there had not yet been any formal clarification on the orientation of the political

system. The Constitution served as a proper basis to enable it to oscillate between a

presidential and parliamentary bias. As a result both sides had the authority to pass legislation

20

A Constitutional Court was not established in Russia until October 1991. 21

The Russian soviet-constitution dated from the year 1978 but has been modified a few times.

12

without any substantial limitations. They used this right fairly intensely and consistently, and

therefore the beginnings of many conflicting interests could be identified (Gualtieri 1993a,

10).

In this constellation of two competing state-organs, parliament had the advantage of a formal

superiority. It had the right to impeach the president, whereas the president had no right to

dissolve parliament (Tolz 1993, 3). Bearing in mind the confrontation of powers, it seems

quite ironic that the 6th Congress passed a constitutional amendment stating that “the system

of state power in the Russian Federation is based on the principles of a separation of powers

between legislative, executive and judicature” (ND 1992/10, 68).

As regards the Constitution for the Russian Federation, it must be pointed out that it was

definitely contradictory, but it was nevertheless the political actors, who used this instrument

in a dubious manner for their power struggle. In effect, both organs demanded that the

respective counterpart act in accordance with the Constitution, a fairly pointless appeal, as

breaking the Constitution had become something of a routine for the highest government and

state organs in Russia (Slater/Tolz 1993, 1).

3.4. The Russian parliament – structure and culture22

After having described the various presidential bodies, I will now turn to the parliament and

give a short overview of its structure and culture. In this article, parliamentary structure is

limited to alliances of deputies, called parliamentary groups and on a higher level blocks,

because they well illustrate the dividing line between supporters and opponents of the

governmental and presidential policy.

The majority of deputies – around 80% - joined together to form parliamentary groups, a

process, which had already started at the 1st Congress in May 1990 (Meissner 1993b, 738). At

least 50 deputies were needed to constitute a parliamentary group. They then had to agree on a

common program which had to be registered at the Parliamentary Presidium. A distinct

feature of early reformed Russian parliamentarism is that membership of these parliamentary

groups fluctuated heavily (ND 1992/18, 17-20). It was a sign that true parliamentary life

22

In addition to literature cited, this chapter is also based on an interview I conducted in Moscow with

Professor Korobeinikov, the former head of the sociological service of the Parliamentary Centre of the

Russian Federation.

13

evolved in a kind of anarchic process and deputies now had to cope with liberties totally

unknown to the former, merely formal institution under the monolithic rule of the communist

party, which had no say in real political life.

Membership of a parliamentary group offered some important advantages: Deputies obtained

a privileged right to speak before the Supreme Soviet and what is more, only via their group

were they able to exercise real influence on legislation (ND 1992/18, 18). The repartition of

the deputies among the various groups was determined by the most important question which

dominated the political arena and that meant on the direction of economic policy. This

prevailing hot topic hindered in a certain way a constructive dialogue on the more and more

urgently needed political reform. There was only a little space left and, on the parliamentary

side, not very much interest in discussing a transformation of the political system to a real

representative democracy with a suitable parliament.

Table 2 lists the 14 parliamentary groups which existed at the end of 1992:23

1. Agrarian Union 8. Radical Democrats

2. Democratic Russia 9. Homeland

3. Communists of Russia 10. Russia

4. Left Centre – Cooperation 11. Free Russia

5. Fatherland 12. Change of Power – New Politics

6. Union of Industry 13. Understanding for Progress

7. Union of work – Reform without shock 14. Sovereignty and Equality

Superior units were formed by the parliamentary groups beginning with the 5th Congress

(1991). They merged into three so-called blocks and one political alliance. While the

formation of a block required the merger of three groups, the alliance consisted of only two

groups (Barsenkow 1993, 347; ND 1992/18, 17). The tougher the conflict between parliament

and presidential system got, the faster this concentration process evolved. The three blocks

and one alliance were as follows:24

Blocks:

1. Russian Unity (R. E.) - consisted of the parliamentary groups Agrarian Union, Communists

of Russia, Fatherland, Russia.

2. Union of Productive Forces (S. S. S.) - consisted of the groups Change of Power - New

23

Data taken from Barsenkow (1993, 336-346).

14

Politics, Union of Industry, Union of Work - Reform without Shock.

3. Democratic Centre (D. Z.) - consisted of the groups Left Centre - Cooperation, Free Russia,

Sovereignty and Equality.

Political Alliance:

Reform Coalition (K. R.) - consisted of the groups Democratic Russia, Radical Democrats.

The then existing Sociological Service of the Parliamentary Centre conducted an opinion poll

among the deputies at the 7th Congress (1992). The results show the orientation of the blocks

regarding the economic reform policy of the government; the questions asked focussed on the

privatisation of enterprises and on private land-ownership. These topics dominated the

political discussions and served as matters of conflict for the power struggle.

Table 3

Opinion on governmental direction R. E. S. S. S. D. Z. K. R.

Direction is right, it has only to be implemented 1.8 12.5 11.9 48.9

Direction is right, but fundamental corrections are

necessary 36.8 66.7 83.1 46.7

Direction is wrong, but taken corrections will help

overcome it 10.5 2.1 1.7

Direction is wrong 49.1 14.6 2.2

No answer 1.8 4.2 2.2

Abbreviations: R. E. - Rossiskoje Jedinstwo (Russian Unity)

S. S. S. - Sojus Sosidatelskich Sil (Union of Productive Forces)

D. Z. - Demokratitscheski Zentr (Democratic Centre)

K. R. - Koalizija Reform (Reform Coalition)

The data show to what level the blocks approved of the reform policy of the government and

the extent of their support for the presidential system: At the ends of the spectrum we can

find, on the one side, the Reform Coalition consisting of the main reformist groups, nearly

50% of whom fully supported governmental policy. On the other side we find Russian Unity,

almost 50% of whom were opposed to governmental policy. Russian Unity was composed of

communist and nationalist groups, which evidently conducted a tough opposition policy

24

For data see Barsenkow (1993, 347).

15

regarding the government and president. The centrist blocks occupied a middle position but

were staggered in their assessment between the extreme positions. The Union of Productive

Forces was more critical of the governmental policy than the Democratic Centre, but with the

increasing tension, both blocks turned against the president’s camp and sided more and more

with the tough opposition.

The famous and well respected deputy Viktor Sheinis provides a good impression of

parliamentary culture. He described the work of the 6th Congress (1992) in the following

way: “… to discuss and decide on hundreds of amendments to documents changed the

congress into a kind of editing commission consisting of nearly one thousand members. There

were fights which almost turned violent to get access to microphones. The congress was also

rich in allocated insults and in delegations becoming hysteric. And additionally it was rich in

infinite remarks made by the chairman [Khasbulatov], who considers himself an exceptional

joker and unmatched mentor” (Sheinis 1992, 55). Rude insults in parliamentary debates had

to be regularly observed and, considering the afore-mentioned it should come as no surprise

that Sheinis vehemently complained about the lack of a qualified parliamentary culture (ND

1992/18, 13; Sheinis 1992, 55).

With the increasing political tension, manners in parliament became increasingly rude. The

next, 7th Congress reached the stage of striking disputes between the deputies (Meissner

1993b, 742).25

The end of the parliament in 1993 culminated then in a bloody showdown.

4. The end of soviet-parliamentarism in Russia – 1993

The parliamentary-presidential power struggle came to a head in the year 1993. Parliament

intensified its tactics of obstruction and threatened to make the whole system non-governable.

Finally it exaggerated the challenges vis-à-vis the presidential power to such an extent that

Yeltsin decided to dissolve the parliament, well aware of his acting in breach of the

constitution (MN 1993/39, 1). A radical minority could not accept this state of affairs and was

responsible for the bloody dispersion of the parliament in October 1993.

25

A vivid picture of the atmosphere of this 7th Congress is given by Christian Schmidt-Häuer in Die

Zeit (1992/51, 5).

16

4.1. The 8th and 9th Congress of People‘s Deputies – March 1993

The 8th Congress, an extraordinary one, was convened from 10-13 March 1993. The usual

conflict was going on, but with the difference being that the congress was now consciously

heading for confrontation with the president. The congress annulled not only the agreed

compromise on the referendum concerning a new constitution, but also the special powers

conferred on the president. That meant he was deprived of his decree power as well as of the

possibility to designate ministers and governors (Wishnevsky 1993b, 2).

The data from an opinion poll among the deputies illustrate their critical position regarding

the president and the intense confrontation: 76% of deputies considered cooperation with the

president, which had lasted at this time for two years, as negative (Korobeinikov 1993a, 2) .

Other indicators underscore the far-reaching parliamentary opposition to presidential policy.

Asked whether a referendum could reflect the true will of the people in the present political

situation, 49% of deputies replied with a straightforward no. 32% found it rather questionable

to hold a referendum and only 18% declared their unreserved support for this concern of the

president (Korobeinikov 1993a, 2).

The deputies viewed the president’s project for a new constitution in the same negative way:

52% declared that the adoption of a new constitution would not contribute to overcoming

economic and political crisis. 23% of deputies thought that this project would have only a

small impact and a mere 22% considered that it was of great or at least reasonable importance

(Korobeinikov 1993a, 3). All these data show the hostile position of parliament towards the

presidential regime. Moreover they prove that the centrist blocks had ceased to occupy the

middle position and had moved to the anti-presidential camp.

Yeltsin's reaction to the massive degree of interference in the presidential system followed

promptly. As he was threatened with losing his main executive prerogatives he turned to the

media and launched the idea of dissolving parliament and governing by special rule

(Wishnevsky 1993c, 5-6). The idea of excluding the obstructive parliament from political life

and therefore making short work of it had been discussed for quite a while in the entourage of

the president. Comments on this subject appeared from time to time in the press. It is easy to

understand that the parliament reacted to this provocation with fierce opposition (Rahr 1992e,

15; Wishnevsky 1993b, 2). But Yeltsin did not introduce the proposed measures and left it at

threatening parliament.

17

The Supreme Soviet on the contrary called for immediate steps to impeach the president and

decided to convene an Extraordinary, 9th Congress on the 26 March 1993. The sole basis for

these measures was Yeltsin's provocation in the media. Since parliament considered itself as

protector of the constitutional Grail, it advanced the impeachment under the sole item of the

agenda: “Urgent measures for the maintenance of the constitutional system” (quoted in

Wishnevsky 1993c, 7).

An opinion poll conducted among the deputies once again illustrates the extensive opposition

Yeltsin had to face in parliament. 58% of deputies considered the conditions for an

impeachment as wholly fulfilled; 17% were less convinced and thought that the justification

for such proceedings would on the whole be insufficient. Only 21% of deputies completely

rejected the impeachment (Korobeinikov 1993b, 3). Yeltsin's basis in parliament had become

fairly meagre and when the deputies were finally balloted on the subject, they missed the

necessary two-thirds majority by only 72 votes (Slater 1993b, 5).

However, the congress agreed to hold a referendum. This concession was made difficult by

the fact that they modified the questions posed by Yeltsin. By appealing directly to the

people, the president tried to liberate himself from the blockade imposed by the parliament. In

that way he hoped to get rid of this annoying instrument, which was no longer adequate for

political reality. But the rules of the game were dictated by his counterpart.

4.2. The referendum – April 1993

The referendum was held on 25 April 1993. As the congress had successfully established the

questions, it hoped to considerably weaken the president's position. It turned out to be a

misperception of political reality. But by way of these tactics, the congress had headed off the

danger of a popular vote on a new constitution, which would have meant its dissolution. So

the following questions were submitted to the people (Slater 1993a, 11-12):

Do you have confidence in the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin?

Do you approve of the socioeconomic policies carried out by the President of the Russian

Federation and the government of the Russian Federation since 1992?

Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections to the Presidency of the Russian

Federation?

Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections of the people’s deputies of the

Russian Federation?

18

But the congress sought to establish further handicaps and invented for this purpose a rather

specific and unusual majority mode. 50% of the electorate and not only of the voters was

required to approve of a question (Slater 1993a, 12). In the eyes of the parliament the

president could do nothing but lose, because it seemed highly doubtful that the voters could

be sufficiently mobilised. As a consequence of the fixed majority mode, the higher the level

of abstention, the lower the degree of assent. That would have meant, on the one hand, a

narrow vote of confidence in the president and his economic (reform) policy. On the other

hand, it would have averted anticipated elections and prolonged the status-quo.

Then the Constitutional Court got involved; it decided to decrease the high majority level at

least for the first two questions, thus establishing the usual mode where the majority of

participating voters counts. Regarding the second two questions on anticipated elections, the

congress variant remained in place (Slater 1993a, 12).

The referendum brought a clear success for Yeltsin; especially when looking at the dry figures

without calculating the dubious majority mode. The voters passed a vote of confidence on the

president, as he attained 58.7%. But more surprisingly, people even accepted his economic

policy. In spite of the remarkable changes and difficulties caused by reform policy, 53% were

in favour.26

In contrast, voters clearly disapproved of the parliament. 67.2% declared that anticipated

elections of People’s Deputies should be held. But this negative vote for the parliament did

not result in elections, because for this question the participation of 64.5% of the electorate

had to be taken into consideration.27

That condition decreased the unfavourable outcome of

nearly 70% to a mere 43.1%, thus below the 50%, which would have been necessary to

invoke early elections (Slater 1993, 12).

To mention finally the result concerning the fourth question: 49.5% voted in favour of early

presidential elections; a value, which was decreased according to the majority mode to 31.7%.

At first glance this may seem to detract from the president’s success. But it has to be said that

Yeltsin himself had called for approval of all four questions, arguing that citizens should not

be confused (Slater 1993a, 13).

26

Yeltsin's leading reformer, Egor Gaidar, had initiated radical changes to the economic system a year

before the referendum. He became famous as Shock Therapist, starting his therapy with price

liberalisation. 27

Against the predictions of a high rate of abstention, the turnout of 64.5% (participation) showed that

the people followed the events regarding the power struggle with some interest. And though the

parliament had counted on low participation to come out victorious, this did not come about.

19

If the parliamentarians had taken a realistic view of the situation, they would have accepted

defeat at that point and would therefore have had to agree to early elections.28

They should

have renounced their obstruction strategy and allowed for an adaptation of the political

system to meet the demands of the inevitable reform policy. The 9th Congress had already

pushed the whole political system to the brink of collapse when the deputies had tried to

impeach the president. At this point it would have been high time to come to terms with the

presidential system, and thus find a solution to the problem of the separation of powers. The

people had pointed out their position in the referendum: they disapproved of the parliament

and they obviously did not agree to an impeachment of any kind – nearly 60% in favour of

the incumbent president was a strong argument.

4.3. The end – summer/autumn 1993

The referendum's outcome calmed down the political situation only in the short term. Yeltsin

did not have a formal mandate to get rid of the parliament and tried to find a loophole by

ways of establishing a constituent assembly. This planned assembly should furnish the

presidential regime with an appropriate parliament, in other words with an institution more

submissive to the president. With this strategy, however, the congress, which was empowered

to pass a new constitution, would have been set aside (Tolz/Wishnevsky 1993, 4).

Despite its defeat in the referendum, parliament continued to operate an obstruction policy. At

the same time the deputies’ corpus became more and more radical; so, for example,

Khasbulatov and Rutskoi now sided with the extreme opposition, composed of communist

and nationalist forces (Slater 1993b, 5-6). As a result Rutskoi demanded the re-construction of

the Soviet Union and Khasbulatov, for his part, pleaded for the creation and election of a

parliament for the Union (MN 1993/39, 8). But one could now identify an increasing mood of

doom within parliament. In summer 1993 liberal deputies boycotted the supreme soviet, and

other leading parliamentarians attempted to find an arrangement with the presidential system

(Gualtieri 1993b, 32).

Already diminished, parliament was now dominated by a majority no more able to

28

In the course of the power struggle parliament had already become fairly unpopular (Slater 1993a,

13). This evolution was confirmed by the referendum, bolstered by figures.

20

compromise. In this final phase it intensified once more, but for the last time, its challenges

vis-à-vis the president. The supreme soviet, for instance, put the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol

under the rule of Russian law.29

Moreover it dismissed the head of the Committee for State

Property, Anatoli Chubais, and tried to fire further members of the president’s team (Rahr

1993b, 5). At last it was the president, who put an end to the history of soviet-parliamentarism

in Russia. On 21 September 1993 he dissolved the congress as well as the supreme soviet by

using his powers (MN 1993/39, 1) and ignoring the constitution. A radical minority did not

accept this move of the president and caused, for a large part, a bloody showdown one month

later.

6. Conclusion

We have now seen the evolution and the end of the power struggle in Russia; all this against

the background of soviet-democracy. Special emphasis has been placed on the question of

institutional design. Quasi-democratic institutions evolved in Russia at the beginning of the

90's. Their equivocal design, an emanation of soviet-democracy ideals, furthered this struggle,

as illustrated by the role of the constitution. The result of this permanent struggle for power

was a rather chaotic situation in Russian politics. A solution had to be found. Of course, it

need not necessarily have culminated in a bloody showdown; this was up to the political

actors.

In the aftermath of the October 1993 events, the soviet democratic model was passé. It had

been replaced by a parliament, elected on a clearer basis, one cleansed of soviet relicts. But

this new parliament, called The Duma, had been remarkably restricted in its competencies. As

a result of the success in the power struggle, the president and his entourage were able to

fashion the political system to meet their requirements. That meant, of course, that the

president‘s dominant position of power was fixed.30

One could now ask, whether soviet-democracy is a completely outdated concept and of no

more relevance in Russia? Advocates of the soviet idea can today still count on a certain

degree of support for their position. Representatives of this faction, trying to appeal to

potential voters by playing on nostalgia with regard to aspects of the Soviet past, have been

29

Sevastopol has always greatly concerned Russian nationalists; they, for example the Mayor of

Moscow Juri Lushkov, regard it as a Russian city. 30

See Mangott (1996, 4-5) for details on the current design of the presidential system in Russia.

21

reelected to the new Duma.31

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation can be cited as

a good example of a party applying this strategy. In the election campaign for the Russian

presidential elections of June 1996, the veteran cadre and chairman of the CP, Gennadi

Siuganov, announced the Communists‘ intention to retransform the parliament into a Supreme

Soviet and thus to revive soviet-parliamentarism (NZZ32

1996/67, 7). The same tendency can

be seen in the party denomination All Power to the People. This party, founded by the

Ex-Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Nikolai Ryshkov, is also represented in the Duma

(NZZ 1995/299, 5). Its denomination harps back to Lenin's and Gorbachov's slogan All Power

to the Soviets, by which they advocated their respective idea of the soviet-system.

But it has to be stated that all the aforementioned tendencies rest on the level of political

rhetoric. The era of soviet-democracy seems in reality to be over in Russia.

31

See Mangott (1996, 10-21) as far as elections to the Duma of December 1995 are concerned. 32

NZZ = Neue Zürcher Zeitung

22

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