Army, GreeceADAM SCHWARTZ

The concept of “army” in Archaic and Classical

Greece was very different from the modern

notion. With the possible exception of SPARTA,

standing armies were virtually unknown dur-

ing the entire period, whereas armies (perhaps

more accurately termed militias), drafted ad

hoc from among citizens aged between eight-

een and sixty, were the norm. From the earliest

times, armies were apparently organized,

called up, and deployed for battle according

to complex kinship ties, such as phylai

(“tribes”) and their subdivisions, for example,

phratriai (“brotherhoods”) (Hom. Il. 2.362–3;

Hdt. 6.111.1; Meiggs and Lewis 1988: no. 51;

Plut. Arist. 5.4–5; Cim. 17.3–5; for a list of the

several variants with sources, see Jones 1987:

394–5); it may be inferred that early raiding

parties at sub-state level were even less formally

organized. The use of kinship groups as a basis

for military organization was retained until the

end of the Classical period, as can be seen

from the common practice of tabulating casu-

alty lists accordingly (Pritchett 1985: 139–45;

Jones 1987: 395).

The command structure was generally

equally uncomplicated. In the case of ATHENS,

we have little more than glimpses of the pre-

Kleisthenic army organization other than the

office of supreme commander (polemarchos:

[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 3.1); but after 501/0 BCE ten

STRATEGOI (one from each phyle) were elected

annually along with a corresponding number

of junior officers, responsible for army subdiv-

isions (taxeis and lochoi) or other arms (such

as cavalry), but subordinate to the strategoi

([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.2; 61). An exception to

this, in almost all respects, was Sparta. Here,

full citizens (homoioi, “equals”) were raised to

be professional soldiers from boyhood, and

adults were expected to pursue a career of

exercising and fighting as full-time HOPLITES.

The army organization was comparatively

sophisticated, with an intricate command

structure and rank from the polemarchoi, com-

manding the largest units – at different times

defined as lochoi or morai (each comprising

between 500 and 900 hoplites: Plut. Pel.

17.4 ¼ Ephoros FGrH 70 F 210 (500 men);

Kallisthenes FGrH 124 F 18 (700); Polybius fr.

60 Buttner-Wobst (900)) – and down to the six

file leaders in each enomotia (groups of thirty

to forty hoplites: Thuc. 5.68.3; Xen. Lac.

11.4–6; see in general Lazenby 1985: 4–10,

52–7). The uncommon level of discipline and

military efficiency resulting from this arrange-

ment made the Spartan army the fear and envy

of other Greeks, as is evident from THUCYDIDES’

approving remark: “almost the entire Spartan

army, except for a small part, are officers under

officers; and the responsibility for seeing

that an order is carried out falls upon many”

(5.66.4).

The dominance of the hoplite phalanx in

Greek land warfare until the end of the Classical

period ensured that the hoplite corps formed

the backbone of all but a few armies. Causally

linked to hoplites’ military preeminence was

their political influence and social status. In

oligarchic poleis, citizenship and eligibility for

offices were frequently conditioned by hoplite

or cavalry service; and as hoplites were nor-

mally supposed to pay for their relatively

expensive equipment, large parts of any given

population were automatically debarred from

franchise. An Athenian decree from the late

sixth century BCE requires cleruchs (see

CLERUCHY) on Salamis to be able to present

hoplite equipment worth a minimum of

30 drachmas (Meiggs and Lewis 1988: no. 14;

cf. Thuc. 8.97.1), twice the monthly income of

a skilled workman one century later (Randall

1953: 207–10). The forbidding costs of main-

taining horses and providing equipment

meant that only the wealthiest citizens could

afford to serve as horsemen ([Arist.] Ath. Pol.

7.3–4), and accordingly most poleis were

unable to field a powerful cavalry force.

Despite the apparent lack of political

incentive for the poor, most polis armies

nevertheless induced them to serve and

The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, First Edition. Edited by Roger S. Bagnall, Kai Brodersen, Craige B. Champion, Andrew Erskine,

and Sabine R. Huebner, print pages 737–739.

© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

DOI: 10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah04047

1

included corps of light-armed warriors or

skirmishers, such as various types of javelin-

throwers, archers, slingers, or simply stone-

throwers; and light-armed warriors serving

alongside the hoplites are attested very early on

(Tyrt. fr. 11.35–8; 19.2, 19–20 West; Mimn. fr.

14.5–8 West). Due to the limitation inherent in

the census qualification required for hoplite

service, light-armedwarriors probably normally

outnumbered the hoplites of any given army,

though literary sources typically do not bother

to give precise figures (Thuc. 2.13.6–7, 31.2;

3.87.3; 4.93–94.1 (and cf. 4.102.2); 6.69.2; Xen.

Hell. 4.2.16–17; 6.1.8). The reason for this bias

is partly ideological: the static and unyielding

nature of hoplite fighting was idealized,

and the fluid, mobile nature of skirmishing

consequently perceived as cowardly (Hom. Il.

11.384–95; Pl. Leg. 706c–d; Dem. 9.48–9, and

cf. Thuc. 4.126.5). The military importance

of light-armed troops increased with the

PELOPONNESIAN WAR, a trend that accelerated

through the fourth century BCE and led to an

evolution of traditional troop types and tactics

(see IPHIKRATES; PELTASTS).

The ideology of an amateur military

notwithstanding, a number of poleis or feder-

ations introduced elite corps into their

armies at some point. Equipping and train-

ing these picked troops was, at least in

part, financed by the polis. This was the

case at SYRACUSE (600 men: Diod. Sic. 11.76.2),

BOIOTIA (300 men: Diod. Sic. 12.70.1), ARGOS

(1000 men: Diod. Sic. 12.75.7), ARCADIA (1000

men: Xen. Hell. 7.4.22, 33–4; 7.5.3), ELIS (300

men: Xen.Hell. 7.4.13, 16, 31), and the famous

Theban SACRED BAND (hieros lochos) formed

of 150 pairs of homosexual lovers (Plut.

Pel. 18).

Specialized training did not meet with

universal approval outside Sparta: in Plato’s

dialogue Laches, two seasoned Athenian gen-

erals disagree about the merits of teaching

young hoplites advanced weapons training

(Lach. 178a–183b), and a similar dismissal

is startlingly expressed by XENOPHON, who

argued that phalanx fighting was for everyone,

since “[w]e cannot help hitting something

when we strike” (Xen. Cyr. 2.1.16, cf.

2.3.9–11), but who saw nothing wrong with

physical training of a more general nature

(Mem. 3.12.5). Nevertheless, by the mid-330s

BCE, a system of two years of compulsory train-

ing and introductory patrol and garrison duty

for eighteen-year-old males (epheboi) became

formalized in Athens (Burckhardt 1986:

26–75).

SEE ALSO: Archers, archery; Cavalry, Greek;

Kleisthenes of Athens; Phalanx (hoplite);

Phratry; Slings, slingers; Warfare, Greece;

Weaponry, Greece.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Burckhardt, L. A. (1986) Burger und Soldaten.

Aspekte der politischen und militarischen Rolle

athenischer Burger im Kriegswesen des 4.

Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Stuttgart.

Cartledge, P. (2001) “The birth of the hoplite:

Sparta’s contribution to early Greek military

organization.” In Spartan Reflections: 153–66.

London.

Christ, M. R. (2001) “Conscription of hoplites in

Classical Athens.” Classical Quarterly 51:

398–422.

Jones, N. F. (1987) Public organization in ancient

Greece: a documentary study. Philadelphia.

Lazenby, J. F. (1985) The Spartan army.

Warminster.

Lissarrague, F. (1990) L’autre guerrier. Archers,

peltastes, cavaliers dans l’imagerie attique. Paris.

Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. M., eds. (1988) A selection

of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth

century BC. Oxford.

Pritchett, W. K. (1979–91) The Greek state at war,

vols. 1–5. Berkeley.

Randall, Jr., R. H. (1953) “The Erechtheum

workmen.” American Journal of Archaeology 57:

199–210.

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