Army, ancient Near EastANTOINE JACQUET

Starting in the fourth millennium BCE,

Mesopotamian sources attest to war between

Sumerian city-states as well as military expedi-

tions against foreign peoples. Armed forces

must originally have been enlisted through

temporary conscription, but it is likely that

there soon emerged professional armies that

were composed of recruits enrolled for long-

term service, hierarchically organized, and of

substantial strength.

MILITARY SERVICE

Throughout ancient Near Eastern history a

twofold system of military enlistment was in

use. One element comprised a core of perma-

nent troops surrounding the king, who was in

charge of war, and the other involved levying

troops through conscription when necessary.

The term “troop” (Sumerian ERIN2,

Akkadian s:abum) denoted men mobilized in

the service of the king, whether in time of

peace or war; the same system of mobilization

could be put into effect for accomplishing

public works, maintenance of order, or war.

The troop’s composition depended on the

needs and resources of the palace. Profession-

alization of the army implies maintenance of

the troops by the royal administration, for it

does not seem that any authority but the king

had the prerogative of mobilizing armed

forces. The first reference to a standing army

seems to be the mention of a body of 5,400

companions whom Sargon, king of Agade,

maintains in his service (twenty-fourth

century). Later on, a year name of Sulgi, king

of Ur, commemorates the recruitment of

a corps of pikemen chosen from the popula-

tion of Ur; this is often interpreted as indicat-

ing the formation of the first standing army

(twenty-first century; see UR III DYNASTY).

During theOld Babylonian Period (beginning

of the second millennium), military corps were

differentiated on the basis of the soldiers’ origin,

specialization, or post. Texts from Mari, for

example, mention urban garrisons (s:ab birti),

the palace guard (s:ab bab ekallim), the corps

of engineers (s:ab tupsikkani), and various typesof expeditionary forces, such as the “troops of

the Banks of the Euphrates,” as well as troops

of the Suhu, the Lullu mountaineers, or the

“Bedouin” Hana (see HANA, HANAEAN; LULLUBI).

These texts show, moreover, the methods

by which the king of Mari tried to impose

military service on nomadic or semi-nomadic

populations. The chiefs of the Hana (termed

sugagum) were charged with enlisting Hanaean

troops, but unwillingness and flight often

frustrated the effort. Meanwhile, Babylonian

texts refer to permanent forces maintained

by the palace, which in some cases were com-

posed of foreigners, for example, the “Amorite

troops” or “Kassite troops.” Some of these

troops must have served effectively as

mercenaries. In a later period, the Amarna

letters (fourteenth century) mention mili-

tias composed of exiles or fugitives called

h˘abiru, who served whichever leader would

maintain them (notably Abdi-Asirta, king of

Amurru).

An important innovation, which originated

in the Ur III period and became widespread

in the early second millennium, was the

institution of land tenure linked to military

service: fields under royal domain were allotted

to farmers who in turn bore the obligation to

furnish a soldier equipped for combat. This

system of service, termed ilkum, proved very

durable, since it continued in use until the

Achaemenid period (see ILKUM). The Laws of

Hammurabi (eighteenth century) contain

several stipulations concerning the rights

and duties of persons holding ilkum fields,

during both war and peace. In principle, the

ilkum-holder was prohibited from hiring a

substitute to perform military service in his

stead; contemporary documents show,

however, that people did sometimes hire sub-

stitutes (termed tah˘h˘um). Ilkum-fields, over

which the king retained eminent domain,

The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, First Edition. Edited by Roger S. Bagnall, Kai Brodersen, Craige B. Champion, Andrew Erskine,

and Sabine R. Huebner, print pages 730–734.

© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

DOI: 10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah01014

1

were inalienable but transmissible by inheri-

tance, provided the heir continued to perform

the required service. Hammurabi’s Laws

also address the problems arising in case of

the ilkum-holder’s temporary or long-term

absence and the circumstances under which

his family could retain possession of his

field. Although ilkum-fields were under the

administration’s control, they nonetheless

tended to become private property.

In Assyria, with the formation of a veritable

Assyrian state in the fourteenth century,

the king relied mainly on the local nobility

to recruit troops. He would summon

large landholders to provide soldiers, whom

they were in charge of recruiting, equipping,

and maintaining. Meanwhile, the Middle

Assyrian Laws indicate that some categories

of soldiers were directly dependent on the pal-

ace, and they provided certain guarantees to

these soldiers and their families in case of death

or capture (see ASSYRIAN KINGS, MIDDLE ASSYRIAN

PERIOD).

During the Neo-Assyrian period (early

first millennium), troops were levied from

the Assyrian peasantry, who owed military

service to the king every year after the agricul-

tural season; the administrators responsible for

each district were in charge of levying troops.

Meanwhile, the royal army (kis:ir sarri)

comprised a core of soldiers in permanent ser-

vice as well as specialized corps (such as engi-

neers, siege specialists, charioteers, and later

cavalry) that were under the direct control of

the central administration. In order to increase

the strength of campaign forces and garrisons

stationed across an ever-expanding empire,

Assyrian kings also had recourse to recruit

from local populations having a military

specialty, but such troops could be difficult to

manage. At the same time, vassal kings were

obliged to provide the Assyrian king with

additional troops during major campaigns.

Finally, victory over a foreign state entailed the

incorporation of some part of its troops into the

Assyrian forces, as happened for example after

Assurbanipal’s victory over Elam and the

capture of Susa. The same system was

adopted by the Neo-Babylonian kings when

they defeated Assyria in the late seventh

century. The disappearance of Assyrian troops

from the sources after that point is no

doubt explained by their integration into the

Babylonian army.

Under the Achaemenid Empire, the mainte-

nance of military reserves in Babylonia was

organized on the centuries-old ilkum system:

the palace provided farmers with land in

exchange for their furnishing and equipping

a soldier. The farmer and his family lived on

the income of their land allotment, for which,

in addition to military service, they were

obliged to pay imposts both in kind and in

silver. The size of the field was proportional

to the type of combat unit in which the soldier

served; thus the allotments were termed “prop-

erty of a bow,” “of a horse,” “of a chariot,” and

so on. This system of tenures, sometimes

incorrectly termed “fiefs,” simultaneously

served to provide the king with soldiers and

to develop royal lands.

MILITARY HIERARCHY

Although military nomenclature and organi-

zation changed over the course of Mesopota-

mian history, elements of continuity in the

structure of the armed forces can be observed

from the Neo-Sumerian through the Neo-

Babylonian period.

From the Ur III period onward, every

military corps was organized in a hierarchy

comprising five levels, which are distinguished

in administrative texts insofar as they had

different tax duties. More or less the same

structure is found in the Amorite kingdoms

of Mari, Esnunna, and Babylon during the

Old Babylonian period (see BABYLON; HAMMURABI

OF BABYLON AND HIS DYNASTY; MARI (TELL HARIRI)).

At the base of every corps is “the troop”

(Akkadian s:abum) composed of “soldiers”

(redu). The soldiers are organized in units of

ten (esirtum) under the command of an officer

(waklum) of inferior rank. Five of these

basic units constitute the next higher unit, a

platoon under the command of a “lieutenant”

2

(laputtum). Two such platoons of fifty men

constitute one “section” (pirsum), or company,

under the command of a “captain” (termed rab

pirsim in Mari, or rab h˘at:t:im in Babylonia).

Two or three sections form a “division”

(lıtum), or battalion, of 200 or 300 men, led

by a “commander” termed rab amurrim

(literally, “chief of the Amorites”). Finally,

a “regiment” (ummanum) consists of four or

five divisions, or one thousand men, under

a “general” (alik pan s:abim), usually the king

himself or a close relative. To this structure

must be added other offices that belonged to

every commander’s entourage but exercised

no military command, notably the “Amorite

scribe” (t:upsar amurrim), who served as

chief administrative officer, and the diviner

(barum), without whom no military operation

could be undertaken.

Respecting the hierarchywas a seriousmatter,

especially in the distribution of spoils or special

rewards. Instances of disciplinary crises and

conflicts of authority are attested in the royal

correspondence of Mari. Occasionally one can

follow the careers of individual officers, the

most spectacular example being that of S˙illi-

Sin, a mere captain who was chosen by the

army to be king of Esnunna. The sources also

indicate the privileges associated with certain

offices, such as allotments of land, larger rations,

or the right to a seat at the king’s table.

In the Assyrian Empire, especially during

the Neo-Assyrian period (ninth to seventh

centuries), any dignitary or court official

could be appointed to either civilian or

military office and find himself in charge of a

fortress or even a province. Another feature of

the Assyrian Empire was the key role played by

the qurbutu, royal officers who facilitated

articulation between the capital and the

various fields of operation across the empire.

Diversity in hierarchical organization

resulted from the specialization of certain

units, notably in communication and intelli-

gence, administration, the corps of engineers,

cavalry, and chariotry. Nevertheless, one still

finds a similar hierarchy within every military

corps in this period. The troops of the army

(s:abu) are under the command of “decurions”

(rab esirte), then of “lieutenants” (rab hanse),

each in charge of fifty men. These units in turn

form sections of one hundred soldiers

commanded by a “centurion” (rab 1 me’at).

A regiment comprising one thousand men

was under the command of a “general” (rab 1

lim or rab kis:ri). The highest military office was

that of turtanu, corresponding in rank to

a “field marshal.” Soon two officers came to

hold this title simultaneously, the turtanu “of

the right” and the turtanu “of the left”; both

were responsible for the security of regions

within Assyria, until the Sargonid kings

assigned that function to the “Chief of the

Eunuchs” (rab sa resi). As in other periods of

Mesopotamian history, the king himself was

commander-in-chief. Arsenals, barracks,

horses, and chariotry were directly under the

authority of the king and the general staff

composed of his relatives.

The Neo-Babylonian military hierarchy is

poorly known but seems to have been modeled

on the Assyrian army. Most officers of high

rank were dignitaries of the court. Information

drawn from institutional archives indicates

that troops were again organized into

units of ten, fifty, one hundred, and one thou-

sand men, under the command of officers

bearing the same titles as in the Neo-Assyrian

period.

The Achaemenid army had its own organi-

zation. Although the system of land tenure

for military service wasmodeled on the ancient

ilkum-system, the distinction between the

archery corps (which comprised most of

the troops enlisted in Babylonia) and the

cavalry and chariotry corps gave rise to a new

hierarchical structure. The organization of

military landholders into special districts

called hat:ru suggests that these units may also

have constituted the basic element of the

army’s structure.

MILITARY STRENGTH

Kings needed to know the military strength

available in their realms, as this determined

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both their foreign policy and the management

of provisions and weaponry to be supplied

in case of mobilization. The Mari archives

illustrate how the census (piqittum) of the

population was regularly conducted in order

to determine the current strength of the armed

forces, taking into account casualties and

desertions. The figures were normally kept

secret. However, generals had to make the

numbers known when they approached allied

territories in order to obtain provisions

adequate to the needs of their forces; their

scribes often exaggerated the numbers, giving

the impression that the army was larger than

it was in order to obtain larger quantities

of provisions. Rarely do numerical data

pertaining to the strength of the armed forces

represent factual reality, as such information

was subject to manipulation for strategic as

well as rhetorical and propagandistic purposes.

While many letters and royal inscriptions

provide quantitative information of this kind,

the numbers are usually unverifiable.

The largest army on record in the early sec-

ondmillennium is that led by Isme-Dagan, son

of Samsı-Addu, during his conquest of lands

east of the Tigris, which was purported to be

sixty thousand men strong, including allied

troops. To this figure must be added the army

of Mari that went to the rescue of Qatna at the

same time, as well as any additional troops of

Samsı-Addu and Yasmah-Addu. Mari’s armed

forces were smaller under the subsequent king,

Zimrı-Lım; during his time, reliable sources

indicate that Mari had an army of 4500 men,

not counting allied forces. Meanwhile, his

powerful neighbor Esnunna sent an army of

13,000 to 20,000 troops (according to various

sources) against the southern regions of the

kingdom of Mari, and 30,000 against the

southern Sindjar. Larsa mobilized perhaps

40,000 soldiers before being defeated by the

forces of Babylon and its allies. For the later

second millennium, no reliable information is

available. The army that fought on the Hittite

side at the battle of Qadesh (early thirteenth

century) may have numbered 66,000 men (see

QADESH, BATTLE OF).

The annals of Neo-Assyrian kings often

describe the army, tending to emphasize cavalry

and chariotry over infantry. Shalmaneser III

(r. 858–824) reckoned his army at 120,000

men. Historians generally reduce this number

to a more credible figure of 75,000 infantry,

5000 cavalry, and 6000 chariotry troops for

2000 chariots, totaling 86,000 men. According

to the same king, he fought against a coalition

comprising 3940 chariots, 1900 horsemen, 1000

camels, and 60,000 infantry troops at the battle

of Qarqar (853; see QARQAR; SHALMANESER III).

Those figures likewise are certainly exaggerated,

or at least rounded up. No information about

the military strength of the Neo-Babylonian

kings is available. As for the figure of 1,700,000

men, including “Assyrians” and “Chaldaeans,”

that Herodotus (7.60) gives for the army led

by Xerxes at the beginning of the second

Persian War, it reflects the Greek picture of the

huge demographic potential of the Achaemenid

Orient rather than historical reality.

SEE ALSO: Fortifications, ancient Near East;

Warfare, ancient Near East; Weaponry, ancient

Near East.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Abrahami, Ph. (1992) “La circulation militaire dans

les textes de Mari : la question des effectifs.” In

D. Charpin and F. Joannes, eds., La Circulation

des biens, des personnes et des idees dans le

Proche-Orient ancien: 157–66. Paris.

Abrahami, Ph. and Battini, L., eds. (2008) Les

Armees du Proche-Orient ancien (IIIe–Ier mill. av.

J.–C.). Oxford.

Briant, P. (1996) Histoire de l’Empire perse. Paris.

Cardascia, G. (1958) “Le fief dans la Babylonie

achemenide.” In Recueils de la Societe Jean

Bodin 1: 55–88. Brussels.

Charpin, D. (1987) “La hierarchie de l’armee

babylonienne.” Mari: Annales de Recherches

Interdisciplinaries 5: 662–3.

De Odorico, M. (1995) The use of numbers and

quantifications in the Assyrian Royal inscriptions.

Helsinki.

Durand, J.-M. (1998) Documents epistolaires du

palais de Mari, II: 361–8. Paris.

4

Fales, M. (2000) “Preparing for war in Assyria.” In

J. Andreau, P. Briant, and R. Descat, eds.,

Economie antique. La guerre dans les economies

antiques: 35–62. Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges.

Lafont, S. (1998) “Fief et feodalite dans le Proche-

Orient ancien.” In E. Bournazel and J.-P. Poly,

eds., Les Feodalites: 517–630. Paris.

Malbran-Labat, F. (1982) L’Armee et l’organisation

militaire de l’Assyrie. Geneva.

Steinkeller, P. (1987) “The administrative and

economic organization of the Ur III state:

The core and the periphery.” In McG. Gibson and

R. D. Biggs, eds., The organization of power:

19–41. Chicago.

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