ORI GIN AL PA PER

The Disciplines of Engineering and History: SomeCommon Ground

Priyan Dias

Received: 15 February 2013 / Accepted: 15 April 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The nature of engineering and history as disciplines are explored and

found to have some striking similarities, for example in the importance they place

on context and practitioner involvement. They are found to be different from sci-

ence, which focuses more on universal generalizations rather than on the particulars

of given situations. The history of technology is paid special attention, because the

discipline has developed in a way that incorporates both scientific (generalizing) and

historical (context specific) characteristics. Proposals are made for giving historical

studies greater space in engineering education.

Keywords Context � Generalization � History of technology � Particulars �Practitioner � Science

Introduction

Engineering and History may seem strange bedfellows, but are not devoid of some

linkages even now. There is a growing literature, including books and journals, on

the history of engineering and more broadly on that of technology. Some

engineering schools offer courses on the subject too. What this constitutes is an

interaction of the two disciplines. This paper will however look deeper at the nature

of the two disciplines and identify some similarities in their very approaches and

methodologies. The main strategy employed is to consider how both disciplines

differ from science. Science itself is now taken to comprise a range of disciplines,

including the social sciences. In this paper however, we take science to mean the

natural sciences and physics in particular, because it is the science most relevant to

P. Dias (&)

Department of Civil Engineering, University of Moratuwa, Moratuwa 10400, Sri Lanka

e-mail: priyandias55@gmail.com; priyan@uom.lk

123

Sci Eng Ethics

DOI 10.1007/s11948-013-9447-2

most branches of engineering. The paper will conclude by deriving some

suggestions for both engineering practice and education.

Engineering is Broader than Science

Engineering is grounded in science, but far from being merely an ‘applied science’,

it has been shown to be broader and richer than science, taking engineering design

as an example (Dias 2013). We could view (engineering) science as the core or

kernel of engineering design knowledge; a core however that is overlaid by ‘rules of

thumb’ (also called ‘heuristics’) such as engineering idealizations, margins of

safety, design philosophy and the design process. Before employing engineering

science theories, we have to adopt a particular design philosophy, decide on margins

of safety and idealize the real world into a model to which scientific or mathematical

theories can be applied; and all this has to be done within a design process that will

involve collaboration and communication, not least with those who will fabricate,

maintain and utilize the designed artifact (Dias 1994).

Taking engineering practice more widely, Heidegger’s (1962) example of a

carpenter hammering a nail is very insightful for highlighting another aspect of the

relationship between engineering and science. The ‘primordial’ experience of the

carpenter is a seamless web of activity without any deliberate ‘scientific’ rationality

on his part. It could be said that he is exercising ‘know-how’ (associated with

engineering) as opposed to ‘know-what’ (associated with science). However, when

there is a breakdown in this ‘everyday’ experience, say when the hammer is too

heavy, the carpenter will have to resort to ‘mentality’ and study properties such as

the weight of the hammer object; or if the head comes off the handle, he will have to

give careful attention to issues of joint behaviour. In fact, Heidegger said that it is

only at such breakdowns that observation and reflection (inclusive of scientific

investigation) took place (Dias 2006). Once again this displays the breadth of

engineering over science (i.e. knowing-what is only a part of knowing-how). It also

shows that practical engineering activity is intimately bound up in context. The

elegance and ingenuity of engineering solutions are in their fitness for the specifics

of the context; whereas science (and especially an engineering science such as

physics) tries to strip away context in order to arrive at ‘universal’ or ‘essential’

context-independent laws.

Can History be Scientific?

The above question was examined in an article by the eminent Oxford historian Sir

Isaiah Berlin (1960). The question is prompted by the assertion of Descartes in the

seventeen century that history could not claim to be a serious subject for study, in

comparison to science. So, although a nexus between science and history may at

first sight appear to be promising, given that both deal with facts, they do so in very

different ways. Science actually deals with both facts (particulars) and theories

P. Dias

123

(generalizations), and the latter are probably more important than the former

(Polanyi 1958).

It is the inability for history to arrive at general theories, and the predictions that

can be made using those theories, that makes it very different from science, and

creates the perception that it is inferior to science. Berlin (1960) points out the

differing status given to theory in the two disciplines. In science, greater confidence

is placed in theory, which leads to an anomalous observation being treated with

suspicion. In history on the other hand, it is the anomalous or unique event that will

invite interest, and any attempt to explain it away in the light of a theory of some

sort will be treated as methodologically suspect (i.e. as being ‘addicted’ to theory).

However, Berlin (1960) argues that the great explanatory power and rigour of

science is bought at a price, namely the price of richness. In order to arrive at

universal laws with general applicability, it can deal with only a tiny slice of nature

(Dias 2008). This was well articulated by Einstein (1934) himself: ‘‘���In regard to

his subject matter, on the other hand, the physicist has to limit himself very

severely: he must content himself with describing the most simple events which can

be brought within the domain of our experience; all events of a more complex order

are beyond the power of the human intellect to reconstruct with the subtle accuracy

and logical perfection which the theoretical physicist demands. Supreme purity,

clarity and certainty at the cost of completeness…’’

Berlin (1960) concludes by affirming this richness as the strength of history. So,

quite in contrast to attempting comparisons with science, history as a discipline

should be secure in its own strengths. In fact, he says that it is only when history

artificially delimits its scope, for example in a discipline such as economic history,

that some kind of model building is even conceivable, akin to that practiced in

science. History of technology is another example he quotes, an area we shall deal

with later in some detail.

Berlin says two other things of note. The first is that the historian is not so much

an observer (as in the case of a scientist) but an actor (having personal involvement).

This involvement is required both to ‘enter into the mind’ of another society about

which (s)he is writing, and also to make judgements about sifting the various

historical material available. This difference between practitioner involvement and

detachment is seen in reflective practice and technical rationality approaches

respectively too (Schon 1983; Dias 2002), in turn linked to systems and science

approaches respectively (Dias and Blockley 1995).

The second is that particulars in science (i.e. facts) are seen as instances of the

general (i.e. theory), whereas particulars in history (which could be termed ‘events’)

are seen as parts of the whole (which could be termed a ‘situation’). We have seen

already that the focus in history is on particulars and that in science on

generalizations. What we now see is that the relevant hierarchical relationship

(Dias 1996) in science is one of generalization (instance-class relationship), whereas

in history it is aggregation (part-whole relationship). He also says that the parts that

are aggregated into wholes can be of diverse character and be at various levels of

definition (ranging from psychological through sociological to economic factors).

This would be considered inadmissible in describing scientific causality.

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Popper on Science and History

The philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper (1960) too has written about the

scientific status of history, in particular about its inability to make reliable

predictions. ‘‘If it is possible for astronomy to predict eclipses, why should it not be

possible for sociology to predict revolutions’’, he asks, and proceeds to show that

belief in historical destiny (i.e. historicism) is sheer superstition. This is because of

the nature of history, involving as it does the observation of human actors in their

contexts. Here it is only trends (at most) that can be identified inductively, rather

than universal laws that can be tested. Predictions, according to Popper were

possible only in experimental sciences, whereas observational sciences yielded

‘prophecies’. It should be noted that Popper’s (1989) scientific methodology of bold

theory conjecture and attempted refutation through critical testing was framed in

opposition to induction. He argued that induction was not logical (but only

psychological) and also that every inductive observation was theory laden anyway

(Popper 1968; Magee 1973).

Another criticism about historicism was that it involved ‘whole society’

phenomena that were both difficult to assess and also led to social tyranny.

Interestingly, Popper did advocate a role for ‘experiments’ in history (as opposed to

mere observation). He called this ‘‘piecemeal social engineering’’, whereby a

specific concrete social problem could be addressed by some kind of policy

intervention. Since the sphere of intervention was limited, he argued that the effects

could be observed and the policy judged critically for its soundness.

Popper’s approach can be seen as bestowing some sort of scientific character on

history or at least sociology. On closer examination however, it is an analogy with

the scientific method that Popper draws. This is depicted in Table 1. Popper’s

‘‘piecemeal social engineering’’ has similarities to his cyclic scientific methodology,

and to the idea that the growth of knowledge is evolutionary, with errors being

eliminated during each cycle of growth.

How then could we ensure error elimination? For one thing, it was desirable for

Popper that it be possible for rulers to be removed periodically based on public

Table 1 Karl Popper’s cyclic problem solving methodology

Domain Science History

Problem domain, P Growth of knowledge Social change

Creativity of trial solution (TS) Competing hypotheses Pluralism in society

Adopted trial solution Chosen theory Elected leaders

Error elimination (EE) (method) Critical testing (scientific

community)

Public opinion

(population)

Error elimination (EE) (result) Refutation of theory Change of leaders

Problem solving scheme

(Pi ? TS ? EE ? Pi?1)

Cyclic methodology Piecemeal social

engineering

Rejected alternative Induction Historicism

Result of alternative Authoritarianism Tyranny

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opinion (analogous to theory refutation based on critical testing in science). He said

therefore that the important question was not ‘‘Who should rule?’’ as raised and

pursued by Plato and Marx, but rather the question of ‘‘How can rulers be

removed?’’ (Popper 1999). For another, Popper valued a society with diversity

(analogous to competing hypotheses in science). He considered pluralism or the lack

of a unifying idea in the Western democracies to be a strength rather than a

weakness (Corvi 1997).

Finally, Popper proposed various ideas for evaluating whether a particular piece

of ‘‘social engineering’’ was successful or not. He said that we should look not for

evidence that our policies were having the desired effect, but rather for evidence that

they were not. In a robust democracy, this is often ensured through parliamentary

opposition parties. It is this type of incremental change that Popper espoused, rather

than manipulating societies to align with some grand historical inevitability,

supposedly derivable from the ‘scientific’ study of history. This is what he called

historicism, and argued that it led to social tyranny. He was especially critical of

Marxism. This is similar to his rejection of induction, which in fact is what

historicism is based on. Note that Notturno (2000) has argued that there is a link

between induction and authoritarianism in scientific institutions, parallel to the

tyranny that is linked to historicism.

History of Technology

We consider now some aspects of the history of technology, because that is an area

where there is already some nexus between history and engineering, a key

component of technology (Dias 2013). This field has seen some growth in the recent

past, especially within the Science, Technology and Society (STS) community.

Recall Berlin’s suggestion that such focused histories could be more theoretical than

general history. A good starting point would be to consider the reflections of Wiebe

Bijker (1995), after at least two decades of working in the field. He argues that there

are three strands or models for pursuing STS studies, as follows:

1. The storytelling model, where one is faithful to the intricacies of the historical

development. This model, described as being scorned by academic sociologists,

corresponds to Berlin’s vision for general history.

2. The theoretical generalization model, where one attempts to produce ‘‘general

typologies, precise conceptual definitions and macrotheoretical schemes’’. This

model, described as eliciting the derision of historians, corresponds to Berlin’s

suggestion that artificially delimited histories could tend towards being more

‘scientific’ (and hence less ‘historical’).

3. The political activist model, where there is a dissatisfaction with academic

pursuits at the expense of immediate societal tasks. This can be seen as a

parallel to the difference in the goals of science and engineering being

described as ‘understanding’ and ‘useful change’ respectively (Dias 2013).

Bijker (1995) does propose some theoretical constructs after considering the

history of the bicycle, Bakelite and fluorescent lighting. Some of these are:

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1. ‘Interpretive flexibility’, where the notion of a ‘bicycle’ meant different things

to different groups, until its shape and form were largely ‘stabilized’ or

achieved ‘closure’at the end of a period of development.

2. ‘Relevant social groups’, being the groups that would contribute to the above

interpretations.

3. ‘Technological frame’, taken to mean the heterogeneous elements that

contributed to the ‘stabilization’ of Bakelite, involving both artifacts (ranging

from celluloid itself to extrusion machines) and social groups (ranging from

chemists to machine designers).

4. ‘Power relations’, taken to mean the differences in social power among the

differing social groups associated with the introduction of fluorescent lighting;

for example groups such as the dominant electric lamp companies and the

utility companies who distributed power.

At the same time, his actual descriptions of ‘‘bicycles, Bakelite and bulbs’’ are

clearly in storytelling mode, with all the heterogeneous idiosyncracies of the

artifacts and their ‘object worlds’ (Bucciarelli 1994) revealed.

This heterogeneity is perhaps better expressed by Law (1987), who attributes

Portugese marine expansion in the fifteen and sixteen centuries to ‘‘heterogeneous

engineering’’ that associated into a network such disparate elements as people, skills,

artifacts and natural phenomena. Each of these elements comprised their own elements,

with (1) people ranging from sailors through hostile Muslims to the King of Portugal; (2)

skills ranging from navigation to sailing; (3) artifacts ranging from vessels through the

compass and astrolabe to bronze cannons and cannonballs; and (4) natural phenomena

ranging from the winds and waves to the geography of oceans and continents. It is

interesting that Law also employs engineering metaphors such as force, strength and

durability; for example by referring to the durability of the associated heterogeneous

elements arising out of their strength to dissociate hostile forces (also heterogeneous),

comprising Muslim traders, inadequate vessels, and treacherous weather.

The above accounts of the history of technology convey the intimate interaction

between technological and social factors. They are however focused more on the

development of technology. Engineers are probably equally interested in being seen as

contributing to social change through their inventions. While such contributions have

been celebrated by Florman (1994), the historical account of the Gutenberg press by

Cook (1995) demolishes the myth that a single technological entity can by itself create

social change, in this case the increase of literacy. Rather, he shows that many other

elements were also required in order to increase literacy, such as paper manufacturing,

liberal scholars who promoted social equality and the growth of a mercantile class. Once

again we see heterogeneity, and are reminded of Berlin’s observation that the parts

comprising historical wholes can be of diverse nature and at various levels of definition.

Comparing Science, History and Engineering

We are now ready to make a formal comparison between science, history and

engineering, as set out in Table 2. The goal of science is the discovery of general

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laws, with particulars (called facts) seen as instances of laws. The goal of history is

the description of situations, with particulars (which are called events) being parts of

the situations. It should be noted however that the description may even be of an

event; and also that the particulars could be heterogeneous in nature. The goal of

engineering is the generation of solutions, with the particulars (called features)

characterizing that solution; it is, like in the case of history, a part to whole

relationship. For example, traffic flow through a critical intersection could be

controlled by many alternative or complementary features, such as traffic lights, a

roundabout, pedestrian overpasses or even alternative routing. These features both

depend on and influence a range of psychological, technological, sociological and

economic aspects. Also, some engineering features can be small details that are

crucial for the successful implementation of the solution. For example, the

behaviour of an entire structure could depend on the proper fabrication of a simple

connection. Attention to detail is a watchword of the engineering profession.

For science (and especially physics), context is largely unimportant, as

articulated by Einstein (1934), since science seeks context independent generaliza-

tions. Context however is very important for both history and engineering, being a

framework for interpreting events in history and a means of constraining solutions

for engineering. A constraint-free design space may look very easy, but the designer

will then have no basis for choosing among alternatives. Furthermore, constraint-

free spaces do not exist in real life. The importance of context is also why

engineering solutions cannot be transplanted from one situation to another, whether

it is replicating a specific building technology from one country in another, or even

finding overseas markets for hand held power drills (e.g. if the target overseas

market has users with smaller stature and grip).

Generalization for science means the framing of universal laws, with predictions

based on them used for testing the laws. If the laws are well established of course (e.g.

Newton’s laws in terrestrial situations), predictions are used as the basis for design

and planning. Where history is concerned, as Popper has cogently stated, it is only

Table 2 Comparison of science, history and engineering

Domain Science History Engineering

Goal (whole) Discovering laws Describing situations Generating solutions

Particulars Facts are instances

of a law

Events are parts of a

situation

Features characterize the

solution

Context Ignored to focus on

the ‘essential’

Crucial for interpreting

events

Important for constraining

solution

Generalization Laws can be framed

and tested

Trends can be identified

inductively

Theory and codes contribute to

total solution

Prediction Crucial for testing

theory

Possible if at all only in a

general or trivial way

Simulation is a part of the

process; but contexts change

Practitioner Detached from the

discipline

Brings a perspective to the

discipline

Brings experience and skill to the

discipline

Repeatability Important hallmark Precluded by differences in

context

Precluded by differences in

context and practitioners

The Disciplines of Engineering and History

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trends and not laws that can be gleaned, and prediction is suspect at best. Such

predictions, if based on historicist ideas, can lead to social tyranny too. In engineering,

the generalization of interest is theory, i.e. the theories of engineering science. As

mentioned at the outset, they are at the core of engineering design and practice, but

overlaid by several other layers of heuristics. Some of these heuristics themselves are

generalized into codes of practice, which give guidance on the ‘standard’ approach to

engineering practice. Where prediction is concerned, simulating envisaged scenarios

in mathematical models is a way in which engineers try to cater for all eventualities

(Dias 2007). However, since engineering is a discipline that has to deal with new

contexts and clients all the time, there is at best limited scope for using past experience

for predicting what the overall solution will be.

The practitioner is considered to be detached from the discipline in the practice of

science. In contrast, both history and engineering will be practitioner dependent; in

history for a particular perspective on events and situations, and in engineering for

practitioner experience and skill. This practitioner dependence is why Schon’s (1983)

notion of reflective practice has been applied to engineering (Dias and Blockley 1995).

Finally, repeatability is seen as an important hallmark of science. Here too, the

historical sciences such as geology and evolutionary biology cannot really

demonstrate repeatability like in experimental sciences. However, exact repeatabil-

ity in history is virtually impossible because of differing contexts and in engineering

because of differing contexts and practitioners.

In concluding this section, there are two caveats we must bear in mind. First, we

should remember that the picture of science presented in Table 2 has been

challenged, in particular the aspect of practitioner detachment and independence.

Polanyi (1958) argued that scientists work with passion in a quest for beauty within

a fiduciary framework (i.e. with faith in their theories). Kuhn (1970) has suggested

that nature can be known only through the lens of a paradigm, which is a set of

shared commitments by a group of scientists. Harding (2004) argues that

perspectives from which science is done can actually change the content of

scientific knowledge. This makes it not dissimilar to history.

Second, although we have highlighted the distinction between science on the one

hand, and history and engineering on the other, all these disciplines can also be seen

as forming a spectrum, with physics (the science most relevant to engineering) at

one end and history close to the other. In this sense it could be argued that all

disciplines seek generalization of some sort, because the presence of theory (another

word for generalization) within a discipline is the prerequisite for its admission to

the academy. However, the theories of physics are much less context dependent, and

often described in the parsimonious language of mathematics, with prediction and

repeatability being clearly possible; whereas those of history are much more context

dependent, with greater emphasis on the particularities of situations, making

prediction and repeatability much more difficult, if not impossible. Engineering has

been assumed to be closer to science, because of the great emphasis on engineering

science in engineering curricula. However, we have tried to show that engineering

practice is much closer to the history end of the spectrum. Note that this tension

between engineering education and practice has been articulated before (e.g. Simon

1996; Dias and Blockley 1995).

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Implications for Engineering Education and Practice

We see from the above section that in many ways engineering has more in common

with history than with science. The relationship of (engineering) science to

engineering is that of a part to a whole (Dias 2013), and so engineering science will

rightly continue to dominate engineering curricula. This however often has the

effect of engineers seeing themselves purely as scientists and results in their

generating purely theoretical solutions to essentially practical problems, without

accounting for the unique set of constraints, opportunities and idiosyncracies of the

particular problem they have to solve. History on the other hand, with its emphasis

on diverse particulars combining into a unique story, and dependence on context

and practitioner, is a much more parallel discipline to engineering. As such,

engineering students and practitioners probably need good doses of history, because

an appreciation of a parallel discipline will give greater insights into the way one’s

own discipline should operate.

Opportunities for this are already available. For example, many accrediting

bodies worldwide require humanities courses to be part of engineering programs.

History is a good candidate for such courses. History of engineering and/or

technology may be more palatable or even desirable for some students. But whether

the subject is general history or a more focused one, it must be taught in a way that

students appreciate the multiplicity of causes and effects, all at varying levels, that

are involved in the discipline. It must also arouse in students a curiosity for asking

why something did or did not happen. They should also not fight shy of knowledge

that is created from a given perspective; but rather be encouraged to have

perspectives of their own. This is very similar to a large part of engineering,

precisely because it is ‘unscientific’.

The other opportunity is the case history, which can be incorporated in various

engineering subjects for students, and also in continuing professional development

for engineers, whether presented at learned societies or written up in journals. Here

too, the style of presentation could change from a ‘scientific’ mode to a more

‘historical’ one. Science writing involves the ‘erasure of history’, meaning that

articles are set out in a logical manner, as if all methodological decisions were taken

at the outset of an inquiry. This makes for a very crisp description. But if case

histories are written that way, the great richness of experience will be lost to the

reader. In any real life project (or even in a laboratory investigation) there would be

many changes of direction midstream due to constraints, afterthoughts or even

mistakes. The literature on the history of technology is a good way to model the

writing and presenting of engineering case histories.

Conclusions

1. History is not ‘scientific’ in the sense that history’s main objective is not to seek

context free generalizations or accurate predictions.

2. The strength of history as a discipline is precisely these context dependent and

perspective laden descriptions of particular events and situations.

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3. More specialized branches of history, such as history of technology, are more

amenable to generalizations of some sort.

4. History has significant common ground with engineering, because the latter too

is very context oriented and practitioner dependent.

5. Since (engineering) science is a part of engineering, it will and should continue

to receive significant space in engineering curricula; however, greater exposure

to history is desirable in such education, because history can be portrayed as a

parallel discipline to engineering.

6. Apart from promoting case studies in engineering education, history can be

taught in undergraduate curricula as part of the humanities requirements in such

programs.

Acknowledgments This paper was written when the author was on vacation leave from the University

of Moratuwa at the University Melbourne on an Endeavour Fellowship administered by the Australian

Government’s Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education.

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