the difference of man and the difference it makesby mortimer j. adler
TRANSCRIPT
THE DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES by Mortimer J. AdlerReview by: Andrew W. ParnellAmerican Bar Association Journal, Vol. 54, No. 6 (JUNE 1968), pp. 593-594Published by: American Bar AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25724442 .
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Books
for
Lawyers
Privacy and freedom. by Alan F. Westin. Atheneum Publishers, 122 East 42d Street, New York, New York 10017. 1967. $10.00. Pages 487. Reviewed by Robert F. Drinan, S./., dean of Boston College Law School.
The ever-increasing invasion of pri
vacy by electronic devices makes this
study one of the most significant books of the century on the meaning of the First and Fourth Amendments. Its au
thor, a lawyer and a distinguished pro fessor of political science at Columbia
University, has taken a meticulously balanced position which, he argues with cogency, protects freedom and
privacy.
Privacy is defined by Professor Wes tin as "the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for them selves when, how and to what extent information about them is communi
cated to others". The intrusions on this claim to privacy come from various
types of surveillance by which informa tion about a person's inner psychology is recorded and disseminated without his knowledge or consent. The forms of this type of surveillance, employed by government and by industry, involve
listening and watching devices, poly graphs, "truth serums", computerized data and several other techniques by which the walls and doors of personal privacy have been pierced.
What legal and constitutional protec tion exists or should exist to protect both the legitimate needs of privacy and the requirements of disclosure? Professor Westin feels that an amend ment to the Federal Constitution is not
required because the First Amend ment's guarantees of free speech and
assembly were intended to secure what
Justice Joseph Story described as the
rights of "private judgment". He in cludes an analysis of the protections of
privacy in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Bill of Rights in his study but seems to feel that the First Amendment has more potential as a guarantee against an invasion of pri vacy than do the other amendments.
The author is not, however, content to wait for litigation in the United States Supreme Court to define the metes of the right to privacy. He pro poses a federal statute (which could be enacted at the state level with appropri ate modifications) which would seek to achieve four basic purposes: (1) pro hibition by government officials of un
reasonable surveillance by technologi cal devices; (2) the establishment of
legal norms for legitimate private use of eavesdropping devices; (3) a sys tem of court-controlled use of listening or recording instruments by law-en
forcement officials in limited cases; and (4) various remedies available to those whose private lives have been in vaded because of noncompliance with the pertinent statutes. This proposed federal and state law is necessary be
cause in Professor Westin's language, "The right to speak, to publish, to wor
ship and to associate cannot survive in the modern age of scientific penetra tion of house, auto, office and meeting room unless the courts and public mores install a curtain of law and prac tice to replace the walls and doors that have been swept away by the new in struments of surveillance."
Other legislation proposed by Pro fessor Westin includes the establish
ment of a Public Employees Right of
Privacy Act which would forbid the use of personality and polygraph tests as techniques for the selection or pro motion of personnel, and the develop ment of legislative standards and ad ministrative codes to protect the pri vacy of personal information in gov ernment files.
Professor Westin's position in this
truly splendid study cannot be catego rized as either "conservative" or "lib
eral". The fact is that on the issue of
privacy there is no one who does not see the ongoing erosion of the islands of privacy as a threat to contemporary man. One of the many virtues of Pro fessor Westin's book is that it furnishes
practical and philosophical reasons
why liberals and conservatives should work together to draw precise lines over which the snoopers, public or
private, should not be allowed to pass. While Privacy and Freedom is the
work of Professor Westin, the volume was sponsored by the Special Commit tee on Science and Law of The Associa tion of the Bar of the City of New
York. This farsighted committee, under the chairmanship of Oscar M.
Ruebhausen, surely deserves commen
dation for a study which is a model of
creative scholarship on a legal-moral
dilemma of incalculable significance. ?Robert F. Drinan, S.J.
The DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND the DIFFERENCE it MAKES. By Mortimer J. Adler. Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10017. 1967.
$7.95. Pages 394. Reviewed by Andrew
June, 1968 Volume 54 593
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Books for Lawyers
W. Parnell, Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Wisconsin (Appleton) and member of the Advisory Board of the
Journal.
A philosopher takes a fresh look at two of man's age-old questions?what are human beings and where did they come from?
The approach is a careful examina tion and interpretation of ancient and modern viewpoints on the subject of human origin in the light of the most recent scientific and historical re
search. New knowledge is thrown into fresh combinations and subjected to the critical assessments of philosophi cal argument. Seventy pages of notes attest to the thoroughness of the au thor's research.
Mr. Adler recognizes that he is ask
ing questions in a manner to which
many a reader may not have been ex
posed since his undergraduate days. To
sharpen differential sensitivity, he takes the reader through a refresher course in logic on the subject of differ ences. There are differences in degree and differences in kind, and if in kind, superficial differences in kind and radi cal differences in kind.
Speech is the pivotal faculty that
distinguishes man from other animals, and language and thought are the piv otal issues. But are these differences in
degree, superficial differences in kind, or radical differences in kind? Argu ments advanced through the ages are
reappraised and reapplied. The philos ophers with their logic, the naturalists with their plants and animals, the biol
ogists with their species, the paleoan thropologists with their fossils and ar
tifacts, the psychologists with their be havior and the theologians with faith all are lined up according to their simi larities and differences.
The subject is timely in the year of human rights, for it bears on basic
legal concepts. If lower forms differ
only in degree, should they be afforded certain rights which are now denied them? Are our notions of property, na tionalism and war instinctive or ac
quired? How do these notions square with the notion of "inherent" rights?
The book is an exercise in problem solving, in the technique of analyzing disagreements and in making compari sons. By subjecting conclusions to crit
ical examination, the author squeezes the water out of some of the claims, re conciles others where reconciliation
seems impossible, and illustrates how classification and subclassification be come material. The distinction makes the difference which makes the divi sion.
So far, the scholars have not tucked under all of the loose ends. Nor does the author himself attempt to provide the answers. His claims are limited to
providing a basis for understanding and criticizing, for sifting the evidence.
The scientific evidence is far from all in, and it may never be all in. Theo ries long accepted as axiomatic have
recently been shaken by new scientific discoveries. Research notwithstanding,
however, the metaphysicists seem to be
holding their own, even though they have no laboratory. In the words of Dr. Adler's contemporary, Bertrand
Russell, "No matter how eloquent a
dog may bark, he cannot tell you that his parents were poor but honest."
?Andrew W. Parnell
HE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. By Mauro Cappellette, John Henry Merryman and Joseph M. Perillo. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 94305. 1967. $10.00. Pages 462. Reviewed by Gerald L. Sbarboro
of the Illinois Bar (Chicago). "This is the first book in any lan
guage to provide a basis for under
standing the essential features of Ital ian law", claims the book jacket. The claim is justified. Moreover, the vol ume is uncommonly interesting techni
cally, historically and as a comparative analysis of a civil law, as opposed to common law, system. It covers the more than twenty-four centuries during which the Italian civil law system has
developed to its present state. The book has chapters devoted to
government, civil procedures and evi
dence, and to the Italian style as to
doctrine, law and interpretation. But
perhaps the most enjoyable and benefi cial reading for the American lawyer is contained in Chapter 3, which is de voted to the Italian professionals. The reader will discover that in Italy the
concepts of the profession are quite distinct from ours. These concepts are
best typified by the fact that the title of
professor is more coveted and prestig
ious than that of judge. It is a profes sion in which partnerships are not per
mitted, contingent fees are forbidden and it is a violation of professional eth ics to charge less than the accredited fee as set by the profession.
Judicial candidates must be between the ages of 21 and 30, engage in com
petitive examinations and serve an ap
prenticeship of two years in a prosecu tor's office prior to admission to the Bench. There is an independent Bench and an independent Bar, both removed from politics and so strictly regulated that lawyers and judges are not permit ted to be members of the same profes sional associations. The lawyer's role
in the courtroom is limited, and the
judge rather than the advocate con
ducts the examination of witnesses.
Though it is a profession in many ways enigmatic to the American practi tioner, it is highly revered and re
spected within its borders. The book, though crowded with in
formation, permits one to leap back and forth across the Atlantic with ef fortless ease. It reveals to the reader the succeeding influences upon the civil law of important events, movements,
institutions and persons generally thought to be extraneous to the com
mon law. It is a volume which will fur ther "bridge the gulf between two halves of the legal world"?perhaps the major task of the present genera tion of lawyers.
?Gerald L. Sbarboro
Private international law (General Part). By Albert A. Ehren
zweig. Oceana Publications, Inc.,
Dobbs Ferry, New York 10522. 1967.
$14.00. Pages 293. Reviewed by Harry H. Almond, Jr., of the New York Bar and of Gray's Inn, London, barrister at-law.
The question foremost in my mind when I read through this book was to whom is the book addressed?law stu
dents, practicing lawyers or the "com
munity of scholars"? This is a treatise that draws upon great learning and as
such is a delight for the scholar, but
perhaps the main reason for a limited
readership lies in the highly condensed
594 American Bar Association Journal
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