The Context of Militarisation in The Context of Militarisation in Colombia Colombia

(ACOOC) Collective Action by Conscientious

Objectors 2010

Colombia has experienced one of the longest armed conflicts of modern history. More than 40 years of military action has had wide-ranging consequences for the civilian population.

Some of the consequences of this

conflict that continue to be felt today:

In the past 20 years, this conflict has cost the lives of at least 70,000 people. (1)

50,000 Colombians are still missing; an average of two disappearances every day. (2)

In the past 10 years, 24,000 Colombians have been kidnapped, 1,269 have died in captivity, and 1,625 remain in captivity. (3)

So far, more than 800 mass graves have been found in Colombia (more than were found in both Chile and Argentina combined after the dictatorships in those countries). Among these mass graves is one recently discovered (2009) in La Macarena, Meta, with the remains of almost 2,000 bodies. (4)

Colombia has the world’s fourth-highest number of children in armed conflict; there are roughly 14,000 minors involved, aged between 8 and 17. (5)

Colombia has the world’s second-highest number of people displaced as a result of war, with more than 4.3 million. (6) Bogotá receives most of these people—it is calculated that 22 displaced families arrive in the city every day. (7)

Currently 62% of Colombians (20 million approximately) live in poverty (less than US$2 a day) and of these 32% (approximately 8 million) are homeless or live in extreme poverty (less than US$1 a day). (8)

Colombia has the worst unemployment in Latin America (roughly 3,128,000 people or 14.6% of the population). (9)

In the most recent ranking of the 10 most dangerous cities in the world, Colombia is the only country with two cities on the list. Cali (5th position), with 73 murders for every 100,000 inhabitants, and Medellín (9th position), with 62 for every 100,000. (10)

The question that can now be asked is:

With this profound social and humanitarian

crisis produced by the armed conflict and its

violence, what is the response from the

state?

MORE MILITARISATION

AND MORE WAR!

That is the response. Although clearly ignoring the

dictates of common sense, the state’s answer to the

humanitarian crisis is a historically unprecedented

increase in militarisation and war-focused investment.

This can be demonstrated by the following figures:

Colombia’s investment of between 4.7% and 6.5% of its GDP in war is the third highest in the world. Only Burundi (6.3%) and Israel (8.7%) invest more. (11)

Colombia is the world’s second-largest beneficiary of US military support (after Israel). During the government of President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) alone, Colombia received more than US$4,000 million - principally in military assistance. (12)

In 2008, Colombia invested $20.1 billion Colombian pesos (CP) in defence and only $19.3 billion CP in the education and health sectors. (13)

For the first time in history, the budget for Defence was greater than the budgets for both Education and Health combined.

Indeed, while the country delays its socialdevelopment, the militarisation of society continuesgrowing without precedent:

In 2002 Colombia had 3.8 soldiers for every 1,000 inhabitants. There are currently 5.4 soldiers for every 1,000 (14); simultaneously, there is just one doctor FOR EVERY 3,870 INHABITANTS.

In 2001, Colombia had 148,000 troops; today there are 431,253. (15)

In 2008, of the 556,000 positions that depended directly on the national government, 460,000, or 81% of those posts, were occupied by people involved in tasks connected to defence, security, and policing. (16)

Compulsory military service plays a key role in the

overall picture of militarisation. Every year, thousands of youths are quickly recruited irrespective of irregularities and the violation of fundamental rights.

One of the biggest recruitment operations in history was carried out in February 2008 . More than 30,606 youths were recruited, of these 21,460 were recruited as “regular soldiers” and 10,080 as “peasant soldiers”. (17)

Over three days in December 2009, 90,000 young Colombians were recruited in the largest recruitment operation in recent history. Of these 90,000, only some 7,000 were put in the category of “graduate soldiers”. (18)

A worrying reality is that these operations are carried out under conditions that contain wide-spread irregularities.

These irregularities are demonstrated with the “sweep” strategy (which is illegal because it contains all of the

characteristics of arbitrary detention). These types of recruitment operations directly violate fundamental rights, taking advantage of the fact that almost all of these thousands of youngsters do not know their rights - importantly, the right to conscientious objection.

The ultimate objective of these recruitment operations is to be able to recruit as many youngsters as possible without worrying about the means used.

This is demonstrated in the following statement, taken directly from the Army’s website, referring to the recruitment operation carried out on the 17th February 2010:

“During three days, 52,700 youngsters were asked to explain their military status and with the simple act of presenting their identification and signing themselves into the system, they were then given a medical, psychological, and physical evaluation, deciding within just a few hours if they were suitable or not to begin military service in the next few days.” (19)

Deciding Within Just a Few Hours if They Were

Suitable or Not?

Let's try to do a calculation: If there were 52,700 youths in three days, that means that they reviewed approximately 17,600 youngsters every day.

Now the question is: How the hell can you check the physical and psychological state of this number of people in just one day?

 Answer: Every examination must

have lasted a maximum of 8 seconds!

After describing the increase in the recruitment of

soldiers and the increase in the investment focused on security and defence, many justify the situation

saying: “It is necessary to defeat the guerrillas and put

an end to the drug trafficking.”

However, the question is...

Is this “strategy” really working?

THE ANSWER IS:

NO!

In fact, Colombia has one of the most expensive

and ineffective strategies for combating subversion

and drug trafficking in the world.

 

We only have to look at the evidence:

After 10 years fighting against drug trafficking and investing more than US$4,000 million, Colombia now produces 6,000 tons of cocaine, this is the same amount as in 2009. (20)

The economic, medical, ecological, and even political (Ecuador has made a legal claim against Colombia, through the United Nations, for contaminating its sources of drinking water in border areas) costs of using glyphosate are exponentially greater than the minimal results it achieves.

 At the end of 2009, Colombia continued to be the

world leader in the production and exportation of cocaine. (21)

In the battle against subversion, the results also

generate significant doubts:

For every 100 subversives removed from the conflict between 2002 and 2007, the guerrillas managed to recruit 84 new combatants. (22)

 According to figures from the Ministry of Defence,

between August 2002 and September 2006, 8,104 “presumed” guerrillas were killed in combat; (23) in 2009, CCEEU published a report denouncing the 955 cases of extra-judicial executions (“false-positives”) that were recorded between July 2002 and June 2007. State forces are held responsible for these cases and 670 cases are still being investigated.

Taking into account the same statistics, between 2002 and 2006 the cost of killing, capturing, or demobilising one guerrilla fighter was $616 million Colombian pesos. (24)

(Captured + killed + demobilised = 9,565 (/) 30% of the budget for the

armed forces = 1.9% of GDP = $5 .9 billion Colombian pesos)

Now, if we carry out the analysis registering the actual total of guerrillas taken out of service, the figure that the state has paid for each insurgent is $5,662 million Colombian pesos. (25)

(2002 – 2006 = 9,565 guerrillas taken out of service / 8,523 newly

recruited = 1,042 actually removed from service)

According to international military standards, the optimum soldier-to-insurgent ratio in order to defeat one guerrilla fighter is 9 soldiers for every insurgent. In 2008 in Colombia, the ratio was 19.5 soldiers for every insurgent. (26)

According to the Office of the Comptroller General, it is estimated that claims could pass $15 billion Colombian pesos during the next two years as a result of judicial sentences for excesses committed by state forces. (27)

If it has not worked against drug-trafficking or counter-insurgency, one would assume that the “democratic security” policy, that all presidential candidates said must be continued, would at least have increased security...

or not...?According to reports from the National Police, in

2000, 8,285 complaints of burglary were reported. In 2008, the figure had risen to 13,425. (28)

The same report notes that 18,329 cases of personal robbery were reported in 2000 by 2008, the figure had risen to 47,450. (29)

FOR THESE AND MANY OTHER REASONS, WE

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS OPPOSE THIS

ABSURD MILITARISATION OF SOCIETY

 

WITH THIS WAR, MOST OF COLOMBIA LOSES OUT

 

LIVES ARE LOST, LAND IS LOST, MONEY IS LOST,

THE FUTURE IS PUT AT RISK...

 

THE ONLY PEOPLE TO GAIN ARE A VERY SMALL

NUMBER OF COLOMBIANS AND FOREIGNERS

WHO WANT TO CONVINCE US THAT this war is

necessary

DON'T BE FOOLED ANYMORE

 

THINK, OBJECT, QUESTION,

RESIST... 

 

Produced by:

Collective Action by Conscientious Objectors

 

Bibliography

1-Amnistía Internacional. Publicado en revista Futuros No. 14 2006 Vol. VI. http/ www.revistafuturos.info

2-www.codhes.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=506

3-www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-3619567 , www.semana.com/noticias-opinion/

cuantos-secuestrados-desplazados/123519.aspx

4-perspectivainternacional.blogspot.com/2010/04/colombia-fosas-comunes-la-estrategia.html

5-Informe Save The Children internacional2009

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8-www.elpais.com.co/paisonline/notas/Mayo012010/1pobreza.html

9-www.portafolio.com.co/economia/economiahoy/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR_PORTA-7301260.html

10-Ranking establecido por el CCSPJP (Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal) y

Movimiento Blanco. Informe febrero 2010

11-www.portafolio.com.co/economia/economiahoy/2008-04-15/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR_PORTA-4099044.html

12-www.resdal.org/boletines/flacso-obs2.pdf, www.eltiempo.com/colombia/politica/espana-y-ue-no-son-contundentes-ante-estado-de-ddhh-en-colombia-afirma-amnistia-internacional_4629554-1

13-En el 2008 se invirtieron para el “Fortalecimiento de la seguridad democrática” (sector defensa) 15.6 billones de pesos para gastos de funcionamiento y 4.5 billones para la inversión en el sector. Fuente, PRESUPUESTO GENERAL DE LA NACION 2008, Seguridad y confianza para el desarrollo social. Mensaje presidencial

14-Algunas consideraciones cuantitativas sobre la evolución reciente del conflicto en Colombia. DELGADO IZASA José Fernando. Bogotá. 1 de diciembre del 2007

15-www.eltiempo.com/colombia/justicia/pie-de-fuerza-militar-llego-a-su-techo_4785562-1

16-Revista ENCUENTRO-CEPALC. Revista de comunicación popular, Edición No. 118. Abril Junio del 2008

17-Datos entregados por el Coronel Marcelo Vargas, Director de reclutamiento del Ejército en entrevista a Radio Santafe, www.radiosantafe.com/2008/02/14/concluye-la-mas-grande-jornada-de-reclutamiento-en-el-pais/

18-Entrevista al Coronel Carlos Gordillo, Director Nacional de Reclutamiento, Nota presentada por LilyMontes, CMI, Jueves 10 de Diciembre de 2009

19-www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=239773

20-www.elespectador.com/opinion/columnistasdelimpreso/armando-montenegro/columna131608-el-fracaso-del-plan-colombia

21-www.stopthedrugwar.org/es/cronica/552/EEUU_publica_lista_grandes_productores

22-Algunas consideraciones cuantitativas sobre la evolución reciente del conflicto en Colombia. DELGADO IZASA José Fernando. Bogotá. 1 de diciembre del 2007

23-Coronel Manuel José Santos Pico “Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia”, Volumen II Biblioteca Histórica Militar de Colombia, 2007

24-Algunas consideraciones cuantitativas sobre la evolución reciente del conflicto en Colombia. DELGADO IZASA José Fernando. Bogotá. 1 de diciembre del 2007

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26-www.elespectador.com/columna-hablar-de-plata-que-pena

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destinan_a_gastos_de_funcionamiento-id-3422.htm

28-www.portafolio.com.co/opinion/columnistas/juancamilorestrepo/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR_PORTA-6448247.html

29-IBID