the compatibility between governance and sustainable development in south korea: the case of the...

This article was downloaded by: [Umeå University Library]On: 22 November 2014, At: 11:31Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Review of PublicAdministrationPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrpa20

The Compatibility betweenGovernance and SustainableDevelopment in South Korea: TheCase of the Presidential Commissionon Sustainable DevelopmentTaewook Huha

a Dankook University, South KoreaPublished online: 25 Mar 2014.

To cite this article: Taewook Huh (2011) The Compatibility between Governance andSustainable Development in South Korea: The Case of the Presidential Commission onSustainable Development, International Review of Public Administration, 16:3, 113-132, DOI:10.1080/12294659.2011.10805210

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2011.10805210

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrpa20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/12294659.2011.10805210

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2011.10805210

& Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

THE LATENT CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND SD

The volume of research, either empirical, normative, or a combination of the two, onthe two terms, governance and sustainable development (SD), has burgeoned in the lastten years (Jordan, 2008). In the context of SD, the concept of governance—defined in

© International Review of Public Administration2011, Vol. 16, No. 3

113

THE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN GOVERNANCE ANDSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA:

THE CASE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ONSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

TAEWOOK HUHDankook University, South Korea

This article aims to look at the extent to which the practices ofgovernance are compatible with the substance of sustainable development(SD) in terms of governance for SD (GoSD) in South Korea. In accordancewith the primary principles and criteria for GoSD, this paper explores thecontradiction between the “procedure-orientation” and “substance-orientation” that appear to have been embedded in the formulationprocesses of the National Strategy for SD and the Framework Act on SD.This study found that one of the underlying causes that brought about thecontradiction was the lack of consensus on the authority of governance asfar as the extent of power or authority that should be given to governance.In short, it reveals that accepted conventions regarding the nature of therelationship between governance and SD are ill-founded and that theprocess is in fact imbued with contradictions and tensions.

Key Words: governance, sustainable development, compatibility,procedure-orientation, substance-orientation D

ownl

oade

d by

[U

meå

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ry]

at 1

1:31

22

Nov

embe

r 20

14

this study as an “alternative government operating system” or “cooperative managementsystem” (Jessop, 1997; Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1997)—has been characteristic ofdealing with SD, as demands for a more sustainable form of political and institutionalarrangement are increasing. From the viewpoint of governance, SD has two corecomponents: substantive and procedural. The former highlights “the need for anintegrative approach” to economic growth, social equity, environmental protection, and,additionally, democratization, and the latter focuses on broader participation in decision-making, capacity building, public access to information (Hass et al., 2004: 265).

According to Farrell et al.’s (2005) view of governance, governance for SD does notsignify unitary “construction and control” of the sustainable future but “the deliberateadjustment of practices of governance” for development along a sustainable trajectory.Sustainable development requires governance as an essential partner because governancecan transcend “parochial, short-term focused, partisan politics,” and through it the socialand ecological goals of SD can be realized in a democratic, transparent, and participatoryway (Farrell et al., 2005: 132–3). As a result, governance has salience for the multi-dimensional concept of SD.

There appears to be agreement among commentators that governance is a good matchfor SD, and there are also numerous examples of programs and projects in place inrelation to governance for SD (Lafferty, 2004; Lafferty & Meadowcroft, 2000;O’Riordan, 1998). However, as Lafferty (2004) has argued, there is much more tensionbetween dominant democratic norms and the essential demands of SD than is normallyassumed. Governance principles are tightly associated with democratic norms andprocedures. For example, according to Sørensen and Torfing’s (2005: 211) argument,governance provides “a way of increasing the quality of policy output and thus of theoutcome legitimacy of liberal democracies” (Scharpf, 2000), and “the development ofdemocratic empowerment, reasoned deliberation and new forms of narrativeaccountability” (March & Olsen, 1995). Democracy, including transparency andaccountability, does not always meet but often restricts the demands of SD (Lafferty,2004). This is because the nature of SD goes beyond the existing market-liberalism andtherefore does not find itself in harmony with democratic forms and norms, which aredependent on the wishes of citizens. In short, it can be argued that democratic norms andprocedures do not always guarantee the substance or aims of SD, creating what will bereferred to as the “substance and procedure divide” (Goodin, 1992; Dryzek, 2000).

In relation to this, there are latent problems and contradictions in putting governancefor SD into practice. This paper assumes that one of the underlying causes of thecontradiction (or the divide) may be a lack of consensus on the authority of governanceand a lack of agreement as to the extent of power or authority that should be given togovernance. This point can be clarified in terms of the relationship between governanceand representative democracy. Klijn and Skelcher (2007, 589–601) suggested that thisrelationship can be characterized by four assumptions: “incompatible,” “instrumental,”

114 The Compatibility between Governance and Sustainable Development in Vol. 16, No. 3South Korea: The Case of the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

“complementary,” and “transitional.” These characteristics are relevant to, and embeddedin, the contradictory views of governance actors, as described in Table 1 and the text thatfollows.

December 2011 Taewook Huh 115

Table 1. Four conjectures on the relationship of governance and representative democracy

View ofdecision-making

Features Incompatible

Conjectures

Instrumental Complementary Transitional

Decision makingtakes place in closednetworks

Decision making iscomplex, but takesplace under the“shadow ofhierarchy”

The increasingcomplexity ofdecision makingrequires governancenetworks

Modern societyinherently ischaracterised bynetworks andcomplex decisionmaking withinterdependencies

View ofaccount-ability

Primaryaccountability lieswith the electedpolitical officials(classicalaccountability)

Accountability issecured by thedominant role ofelected politicians(instrumentalaccountability)

Accountability isshared betweenpolitical officeholders and otheractors (sharedaccountability)

Accountability is inthe first placeachieved by checksand balances in thedecision-makingprocess (constructedaccountability)

Source: Based on Klijn and Skelcher, 2007: 592

First, the “incompatible” assumption regards governance as a threat or challenge torepresentative democracy (the primary means of societal decision making). Thisassumption focuses on the model of “classical accountability” with which political officeholders are invested, and on decision making, which happens “in closed networks.” The“instrumental” conjecture views governance as a means to improve the authority ofrepresentative democratic institutions “in the face of societal complexity,” andcharacterizes representative democracy as working through procedures with less weighton public scrutiny and paying attention to agreement over outputs. It considers, inaddition, that elected politicians secure accountability and use other forms of it in orderto manage other actors as well as the decision-making process. This assumption arguesthat “instrumental accountability” and its process of decision making is under the“shadow of hierarchy” (political authority), although it is still a very sophisticatedsystem.

On the other hand, the “complementary” assumption regards governance as

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

“additional links to society,” arguing that it can, on the basis of deliberative andparticipative democracy, co-exist with representative democracy (which always haspolitical primacy) for decision making. This conjecture considers accountability to be aresponsibility shared between elected political officials and other actors, attending tomultiple forms of accountability. It also emphasizes the context of requiring governanceto bring relevant actors into the process of the increasing complex decision making.Finally, the “transitional” conjecture considers governance with “greater flexibility andefficiency” as the “primary mode of societal decision making,” often at the expense ofrepresentative democracy, which can be substituted by other modes of social decisionmaking. With a focus on the openness and transparency of decision making,accountability is accomplished by “checks and balances,” and by “constructedaccountability.” This assumption has a focus on complex decision making, includinginterdependencies among the condition of the information revolution and globalization inmodern society.

CASE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODS

In order to look at the compatibility between governance and SD, this paper exploresthe case of the Korean Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD)—established in 2000 and ended in 2008 (from 1st term to 4th term)—and its mainobjectives and performance in relation to the realization of SD, particularly theformulation of the National Strategy for SD (NSSD) and the legislation of theFramework Act on SD (FASD). The Presidential Commission set the direction of majorpolicies and formulated plans to promote SD issues based on governance principles andpractices for SD. The National Strategy, which has been implemented around the worldas part of global efforts for SD, was formulated in 2006, and the Framework Act wasenacted in 2007 as the legal basis for SD by PCSD. Throughout the formulation ofNSSD and FASD, various actors from the public, private, and voluntary sectors gotinvolved in the committees of PCSD, and reviewed and revised tasks and plans bysharing ideas and views. The institutional basis for SD—NSSD and FASD—was built onthe premise of broad stakeholder involvement and partnership in terms of the decision-making process, which has salience for governance for SD.

Multiple methods (e.g., data and methodological triangulation) and semi-structuredinterviews (with 27 respondents, four-stranded members of PCSD: academics, civicgroup members, PCSD staff, and department civil servants on secondment) were used inthis study. For the anonymity of the respondents, this paper utilized a numbering systemin relation to participants’ responses, e.g., A(academic)1, A2, CGM(civic groupmember)1, CGM2, PS(PCSD staff)1, PS2, DCSS(civil servants on secondment)1,DCSS2, etc.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

Narrative, content, and thematic analysis were performed on the data drawn from thesnowball (chain) sampling and stratified purposeful sampling method. An institutionalanalysis approach was also used so as to elucidate the social (institutional) processaround PCSD, NSSD, and FASD. In particular, through the thematic analysis,respondents’ accounts as a resource for understanding the reality or experiences to whichthey refer were treated, and related data were dealt with by means of a coding scheme(Gibson and Brown, 2009). Regarding the coding, which categorizes the data, this studytried to clarify and group commonalities and differences of the data under a set ofumbrella terms.

HOW TO EXAMINE THE CONTRADICTIONS?: PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA

The lack of conviction with regard to the compatibility of governance and SD in thecontext of governance for SD (GoSD) originates from potential problems related to thedisharmony between the practices of governance and the objectives of SD. Given thispoint, this article underlines that a set of essential principles and criteria for GoSD mustbe outlined, through which any disharmony, tension, or contradiction can be exploredand rectified. There has not been much research conducted on the evaluation ofgovernance (or GoSD). For example, Petts (2001: 213–224) has focused on theevaluative criteria of the performance of the governance process, including“representativeness,” “procedural fairness,” “deliberation,” “engagement of dissent,”“ensuring a consensus,” “transparency and openness.” Also, Frame et al. (2004: 79–81)have looked at both sides: the process criteria, including “voluntary participation andcommitment,” “equal opportunity and resources,” “high quality information,” “effectiveprocess management”; and the outcome criteria, including “perceived as successful,”“knowledge, understanding and skills,” “relationships and social capital.”

Looking at the various governance criteria, this study defines the primary principlesto examine the compatibility under the following four titles: “institutional mobilization,”“power and resource distribution,” “interactive empowerment,” and “understandingassimilation.” Based on these principles, as shown in Figure 1 below, the main criteriaconsist of three elements: “the structure of GoSD,” “the process of GoSD,” and“consensus on substantial values for GoSD” (Huh, 2011).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

Figure 1. Framework of Principles and Criteria

Principle 1: Institutional Mobilization

The first principle, institutional mobilization, refers to the mobilization of institutionalcapital, which includes, according to Innes et al. (1994) and Putnam (1993), social,political, and intellectual capital; relational resources; and mobilization potential. In otherwords, institutional mobilization as a principle for GoSD refers to using the institutionalcapital or making it available for use in relation to GoSD. This points to the importanceof pursuing institutional capital for governance practices and arrangements to deal withSD issues. Institutional capital comprises strategies, organizational forms, and collectiveaction repertoires that encourage both the government and civil society to engage withone other and to make use of each others’ resources and expertise on the basis of civicparticipation (Brunell, 2005).

Given the significance of institutions in the context of GoSD, an institution needs tobe established in order to tackle SD issues as “wicked” problems, strengthen the settingfor sustainability initiatives, and include a variety of participants in sustainability policymaking. Consequently, it should be the driving force behind increased stakeholderparticipation and also provide the legitimacy and accountability of all policy. As a result,the mobilization of institutional capital is needed in terms of developing governancepractices and arrangements for the realization of SD (or sustainability).

Principle 2: Power and Resource Distribution

The principle of power and resource distribution should be based on methods of


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

GoSD practices in which various actors, including government, private enterprise, andcivil society, join together for the common purpose of tackling SD issues by sharingexperience, knowledge, and resources. As Kjaer (2004; cited in Pierre, 2009: 600) hasargued, governance has a problem in that it may only serve some interests, not commongoals, contributing only to the interests of some participants who have privilegedpositions. In particular, there is an asymmetric power relationship between actors, whichis produced by the existing institutional framework, or political, economic, and socialorder (Atkinson, 1999). It is, therefore, important both to raise the question of thelegitimacy of the existing power structure in which GoSD works (Hukkinen, 1999), andalso to seek to realign power relationships—eliminate power and structural inequality—or redistribute power, authority, and resources to actors in the field of GoSD (Sørensenand Torfing, 2005: 214). This redistribution is a vital precondition for enlarging the spaceof governance in which various stakeholders are able to take part, and, in addition, is away of accessing different resources provided by the public, private, and voluntarysectors. Based on the condition in which power and resources are shared, deliberativedecision making (and problem solving) can be enhanced (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005).

Criteria 1: Structure of Governance for SD (GoSD)

The first two principles, institutional mobilization and power and resourcedistribution, provide the basis for the first main criterion, the structure of governance forSD (GoSD). This can be defined as the structural aspect of governing interactions thatpoints to “the material, social-structural, and cultural frames and contexts” whereinteraction takes place (Kooiman, 2000: 143). The structure of GoSD also refers tosecond-order governing in both action and structural levels of governing. This focuses onthe structural conditions under which first-order governing (action level), as the problem-solving and the creation of opportunity, comes about (Kooiman, 2000). In fact, second-order governing is recognized as dealing with “the diversity, dynamics, and complexityof modern societies” with regard to institution building and institutional settings(Kooiman, 2000: 156). Such institutions are extremely important inasmuch as theyinfluence the behavior and interactions of actors, for good or for bad, and they alsoemphasize rights and obligations—normative aspects of governing institutions exist atthe “borderline” between, for example, public, private, and voluntary sectors (Kooiman,2000: 158).

Principle 3: Interactive CooperationCriteria 2: Process of GoSD

The third principle of interactive cooperation is linked to governance focus oncooperation, coordination, and partnership with various participants—the multi-


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

dimensional interaction between public and private actors (Jessop, 2000; Kooiman,1993; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). It is derived from the rationale of democraticpluralism in relation to managing the different preferences and interests of actors throughcooperation and coordination. In the decision-making process of governance,participants’ preferences can be changed during the discussion process (based on thenegotiation rationality), which creates trust and obligation between participants(Sørensen & Torfing, 2005) and ultimately gives legitimacy to the decisions formed.Institutional patterns of governance are based on the interaction and interrelationshipsfound in partnerships among actors from the public, private, and voluntary sectors. In thisregard, cooperation refers to the process of working in harmony or acting together,whereas partnership—often used with terms like “network”—means the form thatgovernments, companies, and civil society groups (NGOs) adopt in order to co-operateor compete according to certain needs and objectives in the decision-making process(Bok, 2005). Such interaction and cooperation in the governance process areprerequisites for dealing with SD issues, in particular, the integration of SD policies(Hyden, 2001).

The principle of interactive cooperation has a close connection to the main criterion,the process of governance for SD. This, a type of first-order governing, refers to theaction aspect in action-structure governing interactions, in which processes are seen as“the outcome of the capacity” of actors to act (Kooiman, 2000: 143). It seeks not only tosolve collective problems directly at a particular level but also to create collectiveopportunities in “complex, dynamic, and diverse situations” (Kooiman, 2000: 155). Bothaspects should be pursued through a process of interactive cooperation among public,private, and voluntary sectors. According to Kooiman’s explanation (2000: 155–6),problem solving can comprise different stages (including “recognizing diversity ofinterests and aspects” and “deciding on the complexity of the relationship” betweenvarious problems and tensions), and the setting to create opportunities can be producedfrom interactive dynamics within a certain situation—not just from diverse participationin a situation.

Principle 4: Understanding Assimilation Criteria 3: Consensus on Substantial Values for GoSD

Finally, the fourth principle, understanding assimilation, stresses the need for acommon understanding among participants, in which the procedural process ofgovernance can guarantee the substantial values of SD (or sustainability). As Rhodes(2007: 1259) has argued, governance patterns are also characterized by the actors’ owninterpretations of their beliefs (and understanding). Through governance networks, a“discursive framework” of common perceptions and identification (of SD) can beproduced (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 227), which contributes to creation of SD policies.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

For instance, the governance mechanism, with its focus on participant involvement,cooperation, and partnership, needs to be cautious of degrading the considerable value ofsustainability as an object of trade and negotiation (Jung, 2002). An understanding of theassimilation of participants is demanded in the context of recognizing SD as adiscursively created concept rather than a unitary or tangible one, and in acknowledgingSD as a concept calling for social consensus. This logic implies that the way toward therealization of SD is through a process of communication. This leads a process ofconsensus building to sustainable ways by making grounds for “ecologicalresponsibility,” where each participant reflects on his or her own value system (Jung,2002). As a result, the principle of understanding assimilation is linked to the finalcriterion, consensus on substantial values for GoSD. This criterion examines the mainideas and values shared by participants in the formulation of the National Strategy forSustainable Development (NSSD) and the Framework Act on Sustainable Development(FASD) and if there is a common understanding between them.

THE CONTRADICTION OF “PROCEDURE-ORIENTATION” AND“SUBSTANCE-ORIENTATION” IN THE NSSD AND FASD

FORMULATION

Through the three criteria for GoSD, this article analyzed the structural feature ofPCSD, the procedural aspect of NSSD and FASD, and the characteristics of participants’understanding of the substantial values. It looked at problematic and controversialaspects that are likely linked to the sense of incompatibility between the practices ofgovernance and the substance of SD in the context of GoSD.

Regarding the structure of PCSD, with a rise in status while PCSD was empowered toestablish both NSSD and FASD, it was shown among respondents that PCSD wasencompassed by the institutional and political framework. This point ultimately operatedas a structure to support or frame participants, i.e., it encouraged or discontinued theiractivities and interaction in the NSSD and FASD formulation process (as shown in theinterviews with PS 1, 4, and DCSS 1, 2, 3, 5). Meanwhile, the participation was fairlydiverse and balanced, and there were no particularly clear obstacles or structuralinequalities in the relationships among the members (as revealed in the interviews of PS1, 2, 4, 6). However, the relationship between the Commission and the governmentdepartments was relatively problematic. This arose out of the problem of the extent towhich governance was accepted by each actor.

In respect to the formulation processes of NSSD and FASD, looking at the findings,two opposite viewpoints of participants came to the fore: justification and criticism. Eventhough governance practices, such as collection, review and coordination, were carriedout through the NSSD establishment process, that process had attracted much criticism in


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

light of the collaborative decision making, lack of transformative creation, and lack ofcollecting and reflecting various opinions of stakeholders (as demonstrated in theinterviews with A 4, 5, and CGM 1, 7, 8). These problems were linked to the FASDlegislative process but there were additional aspects. In other words, although theenactment process was symbolic of the governance features, considerable criticism wasraised about the facts, including the huge gap between initial and final draft, because ofcivil servants’ intervention (as said by A 4, 5, and CMG 4). Concerning the differentroles of participants, this study found that the role of agenda setter was carried out by thePCSD staff, including the chairpersons, the role of co-producer mostly by civic groupsand academics (partly by the department civil servants on secondment), and the role ofsimple participant mainly by businessmen.

With regard to the participants’ understanding of the substantial values of SD, it wasfound through content and thematic analysis that, using Dryzek’s (2005) ideas, the civicgroup members (CGM) and academics (A) had “integrated” and “holistic” perspectiveson the idea of SD; PCSD staff (PS) placed emphasis on it as an “integrated” and“pragmatic” concept; the department civil servants on secondment (DCSS) regarded it asa “fragmentary” and “pragmatic” conception. As found in the interviews with almost allCGM and A, SD was accepted as a superior concept that accommodated the three goalsof SD: environmental conservation, economic growth, and social integration. However,as DCSS 1, 2, 4, and PS 1, 3, 6 said, DCSS looked down on SD as an environmentalissue, paying attention to the economic aspect of SD, and PS had a considerable concernabout restraints on the realization of SD.

In terms of the understanding of the role of GoSD and of the meanings and objectivesof NSSD and FASD, the civic groups and academics considered governance as a“dynamic” concept and had a “new-paradigm-driven step” on NSSD and FASD. Asmentioned by A 1, 2, 4, 5, and CGM 1, 3, 4, 7, governance was recognized to produce anew, overarching design and framework by building social consensus among variousstakeholders in relation to realizing SD. The civic groups and academics had afundamental and radical view on the meanings and objectives of NSSD and FASD (asdemonstrated in the interviews with A 4, 5, 8, and CGM 1, 4, 6). On the other hand,PCSD staff with a “dynamic” awareness took both the “incremental step” and “new-paradigm-driven step,” and the department civil servants on secondment regarded therole of GoSD in a “static” way and had an “incremental step.” As mentioned by DCSS 1,4, 5, civil servants had doubts around the question of governance, considering thatresources of budget and implementation were subject to government. The PCSD staffhad a general understanding of the governance for SD—the “dynamic” feature, sincethey were comparatively more familiar with it through their personal, academic, orvoluntary backgrounds (as found in the interviews of PS 1, 2, 3, 5).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

Figure 2. Contradiction between the different perspectives

Consequently, this difference of understanding was intertwined with not only theNSSD and FASD process but also with the structure of PCSD. This, in the end, broughtabout a certain tension or contradiction in the procedural and structural aspects.

This study found that the three sections (the structure of PCSD, the formulationprocesses of NSSD/FASD, and the participants’ understanding) are connected andinteract with each other. In other words, the themes discussed are not independent buttightly interlinked—many respondents agreed with this argument, particularly almost allacademics and civic group members, and most PCSD staff and some department civilservants on secondment. This paper names this interconnectivity of issues the “triangularlink of recognition-structure-process.” It is symbolic of general coding as an overarchingterm, according to the thematic analysis method. This sense is shown differently, whichcan be characterized by two opposing aspects: “procedure-orientation” and “substance-orientation,” through the three spheres: recognition (consensus), structure, and process.In particular, the former perspective, held by most of the PCSD staff and the departmentcivil servants on secondment, consists of the incremental approach and the position ofjustification, but, on the other side, the latter perspective, shared by the civic groupmembers and academics, is characterized by the progressive (radical) approach and thecritical stance.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

Tension of Opposite Orientations and Its Implications

Contradiction between the Two Perspective Links

This article has created the coding that categorizes the finding data, and madeoverarching terms that embrace (and represent) the same or similar features of findings,contrasting with the different characteristics (see Figure 2). In respect to the (value)recognition of SD, governance for SD, and the National Strategy and the FrameworkAct, the procedure-oriented actors took the status quo stance and the gradual approach.Against this tendency, the substance-oriented actors adopted an innovation-orientedstandpoint and a radical (progressive) approach. With regard to the structure of GoSD,the perspective of procedure-orientation focused on institutional improvement (orempowerment). On the contrary, the substance-oriented perspective emphasized that theprinciples of governance would be undermined. In terms of the process of GoSD—suchas the decision-making process, partnership, and interaction—the procedure-orientedviewpoint was a vindication of the unprecedented step forward to GoSD; it put stress onthe soft landing process required. On the contrary, the substance-oriented viewpoint wascritical to the compromise in the formulation process of the NSSD and the FASD,regarding the process as that of “political horse trading.” Meanwhile, it was seen thatsome procedure-oriented actors among PCSD staff took an approach of substance-orientation on a particular issue. On the other hand, a few substance-oriented actorsamong academics had the perspective of procedure-orientation by emphasizing a numberof limitations on the realization of SD in Korean society.

Figure 3. Contradiction of the two perspective links


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

Given this contradiction and tension between the opposite orientations, this papernotes that there was a fundamental reason for the contradiction. First of all, there was noconsensus on the authority of governance; in other words, there were differentunderstandings as to how much power and authority could be given to governance. Forexample, civil servants accepted governance as being advice and guidance from thevoluntary sector. On the other hand, however, governance was regarded among civicgroups as a way of empowering them to fully participate in the decision (policy)-makingprocess. Concerning the issue of responsibility, moreover, governmental actorsconsidered that they were only in charge of an outcome of (policies through) governancein the end, such as the NSSD and the FASD formulation. Thus, the extent and limit ofgovernance recognized by each participant varied substantially. This very difference wasarguably the source of disagreement among the participants, including governmental andnon-governmental actors in both spheres of the GoSD structure and process. This createda dispute in relation to the power and resource symmetry in the participant relationship;voluntary actors believed that they were entitled to take part in (and have a greatinfluence on) the formulation process, especially in terms of the NSSD and the FASDestablishment. However (as demonstrated in the findings and agreed upon by the manyrespondents), in reality, the formulation process was carried out and controlled by thechairpersons of the PCSD, key staff such as secretaries, and the department civil servantsand/or MPs. In fact, the Presidential Commission placed more weight on agreementwithin the government departments than on the reflection of voluntary actors’ opinions inthe decision-making process, which attracted enormous criticism and caused a dispute. Inthe end, these contrasting ways of relating to the power and authority of governance (andgovernance actors) produced the contradiction and the tension of the polar oppositeperspectives.

This article clarifies and analyzes this result in terms of the relationship of governanceand representative democracy. As explained in the previous section, according to theideas of Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 589–601), this relationship can be symbolized by fourassumptions: “incompatible,” “instrumental,” “complementary,” and “transitional.”These themes are relevant to, and embedded in, the contradictory views of the participantgroups. This paper argues that the two former models, incompatible and instrumentalassumptions, correspond to the recognition basis of procedure-oriented actors such ascivil servants on secondment and the PCSD staff. Civil servants on secondment are moreinclined to fit the incompatibility model, and the PCSD staff is closer to the instrumentalcategory (although some of them seem to have the complementary viewpoint). On theother hand, the two latter models, complementary and transitional conjectures, arerelevant to the perspective of substance-oriented actors, including academics, who can bealigned with the complementary stance, and civic group members, who tend towards thetransitional position.

Given the conflicts of these fundamentally opposed models, the question naturally


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

arises: Where does power (or authority) lie? Procedure-orientation, in line with theincompatible and instrumental standpoints, holds the view that power is possessed byelected politicians and civil servants (subordinate to the politicians) in the name of theirauthority to make decisions. This exerts a crucial influence on other governance actors,e.g., “consequential lower-order decisions” for them, and also produces (and alters) thestructure of governance on the basis of the authoritative capacity (Klijn & Skelcher,2007: 602). Contrary to this point, substance-orientation, in line with the complementaryand transitional perspectives, emphasizes that “the ultimate decision authority” of electedofficials and/or civil servants is required to be shared with various other governanceactors, which reinforces civic engagement and “the plurality of the system” (Klijn &Skelcher, 2007: 602–3). Moreover, granting veto power to different actors in order tooppose decisions considers the elected officials to be one of the governance actors whoare subject to cooperation and resource-sharing with other actors, which is legitimated interms of the transition (or relocation) of power (op. cit.).

Consequences and Implications from the Emerging Tension

Despite that several positive outcomes have been achieved from the formulation ofthe NSSD and the FASD (such as improved political commitment and the advancementof the understanding of SD among government departments and civil servants), there isstill a tension between these opposite orientations (procedure- and substance-orientation).This has revealed a number of highly problematic aspects. In particular, since thecompletion of the NSSD and the FASD, while institutional capacity was strengthened asa result, the principles (and characteristics) of governance—power and resourcedistribution, interactive cooperation, and understanding assimilation—for SD were, to acertain extent, violated. For instance, the civic groups, one of the essential participants ofthe voluntary sector, had little trust for the PCSD; in particular, they had little trust forgovernmental actors, and they did not have any great expectations of the NationalStrategy and the Framework Act. In fact, as CGM 1, 4, 6 mentioned, most of the civicgroups did not and could not actively take part in the formulation process since the end ofthe third term of the PCSD when the compromise process actually began to be carriedout with the government departments. As a result, they did not lay much weight on thePresidential Commission in relation to GoSD, because they considered that the PCSDdeparted from the way of GoSD. These circumstances might be viewed as the “pitfall ofinstitutionalization,” which is the result of the law- and institution-centered view thatfocuses on legal and institutional alternatives, and which does not establish the basis oftrust with non-governmental groups and actors.

In the end, with these shortcomings in the governance practices and arrangements forthe NSSD and FASD formulation processes, the genuine status and capacity of thePresidential Commission in relation to realizing SD was not substantially enhanced after


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

working through the institutionalization for SD. This was particularly manifested sincethe National Commission on SD (NCSD) launched in early 2008, on the basis ofenforcement of the Framework Act. It was legally transformed from PCSD in the periodof the new Lee Myung-Bak (MB) government. However, after the change ofgovernment, the Framework Act (and the National Strategy) stood on the brink of aprecipice as soon as it came into force because the new government placed a greatemphasis on its own “low carbon green growth” project, which altered the entire policydirection in relation to SD. This included a massive transformation of the organizationalcomposition and human constitution, putting much weight on experts, regarding specificissues related to low carbon green growth.

For example, on the basis of FASD, the roadmap for local SD was created but notcarried out after the inception of the MB government. On the other side, the institutionalfoundation for the low carbon green growth project was completed with lightning speedby the MB government. The Presidential Committee on Green Growth was establishedby integrating three national bodies, including PCSD, in late 2008, and the FrameworkAct on Low Carbon Green Growth that was proclaimed together with the launch of theCommittee was finally enacted, with the approval of Parliament, in late 2009. Thistremendous drive was carried out under the direct control of the president for theimplementation of the National Low Carbon Green Growth project, although it faced abacklash and encountered criticism from certain sectors of civil society. Consequently,with the enactment of the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth, PCSD wasterminated (and merged). FASD has been downgraded to a subordinate position, and haslost the position of the Framework Act, and NSSD has been transferred to (and is nowmanaged by) the Ministry of Environment. Even though FASD and NSSD wereconsidered to be established on the basis of the social agreement through the principlesand practices of governance, they have become “good for nothing” in the end.

To synthesize the above results, in relation to the hypothesis on the compatibilitybetween the practices of governance and the objectives of SD, this article highlights thatthere is considerable inconsistency in both the NSSD and FASD formulation in PCSD. Interms of the substance of SD, it can be broadly defined and categorized into threeaspects, based on Zeijl-Rozema et al.’s (2008: 411) explanation. In terms of the content,there is the recognition of SD issues as crucial problems requiring an institutionalchange. This in turn is related to the process, the main goal of which involves a pluralityof actors (stakeholders) in SD policies so as to tackle social complexity. Finally, there isthe context, which in this case means strengthening the institutional setting (orframework) for SD initiatives. These three factors—content, process, and context—correspond to the features of the substance-oriented perspective revealed through themain triangular criteria for GoSD: a consensus about substantial values, the process ofGoSD, and the structure of GoSD.

To summarize, there is a deep contradiction and tension between these polar opposite


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

orientations: procedure-orientation and substance-orientation. These two positionsclearly illuminate the problem of compatibility between governance and SD in light ofGoSD, in that substance-orientation takes a critical stance and raises crucial questionsthroughout the triangular spheres: (value) recognition, the structure of GoSD, and theprocess of GoSD. In short, looking at the features of governance practices found in theformulation processes of the NSSD and the FASD through the criteria for GoSD, thepractice of governance did not and could not actually secure the substance of SD.

CONCLUSION

The contradiction between procedure-orientation and substance-orientation displays(and manifests) the inconsistency in terms of governance for SD in relation to the case ofNSSD and FASD. In particular, the governance practices did not do enough to build upan agreement and consensus on the recognition of SD, governance for SD, and so on.Although there was an attempt to create a consensus by means of the governanceprocess, it consisted only of superficial content, which was likely derived from the“dilemma of participation.” As a result, the participants did not have a substantial basisof understanding. In addition, even though the decision-making process on the basis ofgovernance practices and arrangements was carried out by a multitude of stakeholders, itresulted in a lack of openness to participants and robust interaction and partnership.Finally, it can be argued, in terms of the structure (institutional setting), that theformulation of the NSSD and the FASD presented a valuable and unprecedentedexample for the realization of SD in South Korea, which was set up through prolongedefforts based on the principles of governance. However, this was under threat by the newgovernment because PCSD was treated as one of other national (presidential)committees. The distinctive international and national context and importance in relationto establishing PCSD was overlooked in the end. With no vigorous support from civilsociety (both national and local) that could bring a robust resistance to the drive of thenew government, the Presidential Commission on SD as the representative organizationof governance completed its time span.

This article has explored the relationship between governance (practices) and SD(objectives) in South Korea. It reveals that accepted conventions regarding the nature ofthis relationship are ill-founded and that the process is in fact imbued with contradictionsand tensions. It is particularly shown that there is a contradiction between procedure-orientation and substance-orientation embedded in governance for SD and theformulation of the NSSD and the FASD. In fact, the PCSD failed to bring suchcomponents of practical rationality (communicative or deliberative rationality) to itsinstitutions; instead, it was caught in a “trap of institutionalization,” being inclined toadopt a problem-solving (first-order) approach under the control and direction of the


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

main procedure-oriented actors (and the president). With this in mind, this paper argues that it is instructive to first take a critical look at

this failure and the necessity to create or renew a public system (sphere) of GoSD, whichhas “grey zones and interstices” within existing orders (Rip, 2006). Governance practiceswith a problem-solving (first-order) approach—referring to dealing with the implicationsand side-effects of modernity, particularly the mechanisms related to instrumentalrationality, for example, focusing on legitimacy and the effectiveness of democracy (Voss& Kemp 2005: 7)—have fundamental limitations in achieving the objectives of SD,requiring institutional and structural transformation. The first-order approach is in linewith the incompatible and instrumental perspectives on the relationship betweengovernance and representative democracy. Governance arrangements from the twoviewpoints are subject to (and influenced by) existing orders (authorities), e.g., thegovernment. This article reveals that there are such limitations in the case of PCSDincluding NSSD and FASD. In this context, this shows that the system of GoSD needs tobe based on deliberative rationality and second-order principles—focusing more on “theapplication of modern rational analysis” to problems, its own working conditions andeffects, with a critical stand on modern problem solving (Voss & Kemp 2005: 7)—beyond the first-order problem-solving principle.

REFERENCES

Atkinson, R. 1999. Discourses of Partnership and Empowerment in ContemporaryBritish Urban Regeneration, Urban Studies, 36(1): 59–72.

Brunell, L. 2005. Institutional capital: building post-communist governmentperformance, Lanham and Oxford: University Press of America.

Dean, M. 1999. Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society, London: SagePublications.

Dryzek, J. 2000. Deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, contestations,Oxford: Oxford University Press.

______. 2005. Politics of the earth: Environmental discourses (2nd ed.), Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Farrel, K. N., Kemp, R., Hinterberger F., Rammel, C. and Ziegler, R. 2005. From *for*to governance for sustainable development in Europe: what is at stake for furtherresearch?, International Journal of Sustainable Development, 8(1/2).

Frame, T. M. and Gunton, T. and Day, J. D. 2004. The Role of Collaboration in


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

Environmental Management: An Evaluation of Land and Resource Planning inBritish Columbia, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 47(1): 59-82.

Gibson W. J. and Brown A. 2009. Working with qualitative data, Los Angeles andLondon: SAGE.

Goodin, R. E. 1992. Green Political Theory, Cambridge: Polity.

Hass, P. M., Kanie, N. and Murphy, C. N. 2004. Conclusion: Institutional design andinstitutional reform for sustainable development in N. Kanie and P. M. Haas (eds.),Emerging forces in environmental governance, Tokyo, New York, and Paris: UnitedNations University Press.

Huh, Taewook. 2011. Exploring the Principles and Criteria for Governance forSustainable Development. International Review of Public Administration, 15(3):67–78.

Hukkinen, J. 1999. Institutions of Environmental Management: Constructing MentalModels and Sustainability, London: Routledge.

Hyden, G. 2001. Operationalizing Governance for Sustainable Development, Journal ofDevelopment Studies, 17(2): 13–31.

Innes, J., Gruber, J., Thompson, R. and Neuman, M. 1994. Co-ordinating growth andenvironmental management through consensus-building, report to the CaliforniaPolicy Seminar, University of California, Berkeley, CA.

Jessop, B. 1997. The Governance of Complexity and the Complexity of Governance:preliminary remarks on some problems and limits of economic guidance in A.Amin, and J. Hausner (ed.), Beyond Market and Hierarchy, Cheltenham: EdwardElgar.

______. 2000. The Dynamics of Partnership and Governance Failure in Stoker, G. (ed.),The New Politics of Local Governance in Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jordan, A. 2008. The governance of sustainable development: taking stock and lookingforwards, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 26(1): 17–33.

Jung, Gyu-Ho. 2002. What is Green Governance?, Environment and Life, 31: 23–37.

Kjaer, A. M. (2004) Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Klijn, E. H. and Skelcher, C. 2007. Democracy and Governance Networks: Compatibleor not?, Public Administration, 85(3): 587–608.

Kooiman, J. 1993. Governance and Governability: Using Complexity, Dynamics and


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

Diversity in J. Kooiman, Modern Governance: New Government-SocietyInteractions, London: Sage Publications.

______. 2000. Societal Governance: Levels, Models, and Orders of Societal-PoliticalInteraction in J. Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, andDemocracy, USA: Oxford University Press.

______. 2003. Governing as Governance, Sage Publications, London.

Lafferty, W. M. 2004. Introduction: form and function in governance for sustainabledevelopment in W. M. Lafferty (ed.), Governance for Sustainable Developmaent:the challenge of adapting form to function, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar PublishingLimited.

Lafferty, W. M. and Meadowcroft, J. (eds) 2000. Implementing SustainableDevelopment, Oxford: Oxford University.

March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. 1995. Democratic governance, New York: The Free Press.

O’Riordan, T. (ed.) 1998. Transition to Sustainability: The Politics of Agenda 21 inEurope, London: Earthscan.

PCSD 2002. Activities of Sustainable Development, Presidential Commission onSustainable Development Republic of Korea.

PCSD 2005. Activities of the Third term of the Presidential Commission on SustainableDevelopment, Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development Republic ofKorea.

PCSD 2006. Vision for Sustainable Development in the Republic of Korea, PresidentialCommission on Sustainable Development Republic of Korea.

PCSD 2007a. National Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Republic of Korea,Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development Republic of Korea.

PCSD 2007b. The Enactment of the Framework Act on Sustainable Development andthe Construction of the System of Local Implementation, Workshop of the GreenGwangJu Association, 11 November 2007.

Pierre, J. 2000. Introduction: Understanding Governance in J. Pierre (ed.), DebatingGovernance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, USA: Oxford University Press.

______. 2009. Reinventing governance: reinventing democracy? Policy & Politics,37(4): 591–609.

Petts, J. 2001. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Deliberative Processes: WasteManagement Case-Studies, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management,


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

44(2): 207–226.

Rhodes, R. A. W. 1997. Understanding governance: policy networks, governance,reflexivity and accountability, Buckingham: Open University Press.

______. 2007. Understanding governance: Ten years on, Organization Studies, 28(08):1243–1264.

Rip, A. 2006. A co-evolutionary approach to reflexive modernization – and its ironies inVoss, J-P., Bauknecht, D. and Kemp, R. (eds) Reflexive Governance for SustainableDevelopment, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Scharpf, F. 2000. Interdependence and democratic legitimation in S. J. Pharr and R.Putnam (eds.), Disaffected democracies: What’s troubling the trilateral countries?(pp., Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J. 2005. Network governance and post-liberal democracy,Administrative theory and praxis 27(2): 197–237.

Voss J-P. and Kemp, R. 2005. Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development –Incorporating feedback in social problem solving, Paper presented at the ESEE(European Society for Ecological Economics) conference, Lisbon, 14–17 June2005.

Zeijl-Rozema, A., Cörvers R. and Kemp R. 2008. Governance for SustainableDevelopment: A Framework, Sustainable Development 16: 410–421.

Taewook Huh has a PhD in Social Policy from University of Bristol, U.K. Currently, heis a lecturer in public administration at Dankook University and an associated-researcherof the Kyung Hee Institute for Human Society. He worked as a researcher in the SeoulDevelopment Institute and the Presidential Committee on Balanced NationalDevelopment, and was awarded a Chevening Scholarship by the British Foreign andCommonwealth Office.

Received: July 26, 2011

Revised: October 17, 2011

Accepted: October 21, 2011


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

11:

31 2

2 N

ovem

ber

2014

the compatibility between governance and sustainable development in south korea: the case of the...

Documents