the buddhist theory of relation between pramā and pramā na

NANDITA BANDYOPADHYAY

T H E B U D D H I S T T H E O R Y OF R E L A T I O N

B E T W E E N PRAM.~ AND PRAM.~,NA

A Comparative Estimate in Relation to the Sdthkhya- Yoga, the Advaita, the M~m~rhsaka and the Jaina Theories

SECTION-I

The Buddhist theory

The Buddhist maintains that pram~na is nothing but the knowledge

itself, and that there is no fundamental difference between a prarn~ and its

pramdn, a. This has been often considered to be a distinguishing feature of the Buddhist epistemology. Here in this article, along with a detailed interpretation of the Buddhist theory, we shall make an attempt to show that this basic identity of pram~ and prarndn, a, on close scrutiny, does not stand as an exclusive feature of the Buddhist theory of cognition alone. The S~rhkhya-

Yoga, the Advaita Ved~ata and some M~m~riasakas also, despite their possible disclaimer, finally cannot dispense with this relation of identity in one way or other.

The generally accepted concept ofpramana is, however, derived from

grammar. Every product requires several means of production. The means of production, the function of which is immediately followed by the effect, is called Kara.na or the instrument of that product (s~dhakatamath kara.nam - yad-vy~p~lanantara~h phalani.spattih.). Our knowledge, also being an effect,

must require some instrument for its production. The product, knowledge, is pramd and the instrument of that knowledge is pramd.na. The derivation of

the word 'pramS.ha' runs thus: - 'pramfyate anena iti pram~nam'. The suffix

'lyu.t' here is in the sense of 'kara.na'. Thus according to the Naiy~yikas and the Bh~.t.ta M~m~msakas the relation of 'pramd" and "pramd.na' is only a type

of the relation of causality, 'prama.na' being the instrumental cause and

'prama' its effect. Since the effect is consequent to the cause, the cause

and the effect must be different from each other. Thus 'pram~.na' the

instrumental cause, differs from the resulting knowledge, 'pramS'. Kum~- rila, the Mfm~r/asaka, accepts this conventional concept of 'prarr~.na"based on grammatical derivation and refutes the theory of identity advanced by the Buddhists:

vi.sayaikatvamiccharhs tu ya.h pram~narh phalarh vadet /

Journal oflndian Philosophy 7 (1979) 43-78. 0022-1791/79/0071-0043503.60. Copyright �9 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

46 NANDITA BANDYOPADHYAY

blue', and thus eliminates the objects other than 'blue' from the ken of per-

ception. The cognition of blue which is thus measured is called paricchedya, and the objective equiformity of that cognition which acts as the measure or

determinant is called pariccheclaka. When one makes a distinct judgment - 'it

is blue', the cognition is at once withdrawn from all that is non-blue and is

fixed to the particular object 'blue' alone. This act of determination or fixa-

tion (to a particular object) is called Vyavasthdpana by the Buddhists. The

cognition which is thus fixed is described as vyavasth~pya. Then the problem

arises - 'which is the vyavasth~paka' or 'which does fix the knowledge to a

particular object'. The sense-organ, say the eye, cannot be the 'vyavasthdpaka', because despite the sameness of the visual organ different cognitions of

different objects (visaya-bhedadhigama) are produced. It is from this angle

that Dharmakfrti repudiates the pramdnatva of sense-organs: -

sarvasffm~nyahetutvffd ak.s~.n~m asti ned~am /

tadbhede' py abhinnasya tasyedam iti tat kutal3 /

Prajfiffkara explains:

sarvasya hi nflapft~divi.sayasya samanyena

hetutvffd ak.salh na bhedakam

: - [When the same sense-organ is the common cause of all the different

cognitions of all the different objects such as blue, yellow, etc., the sense-

organ cannot be called the differentiator of the different cognitions in relation

to the different objects. 'PramR.na' is that which measures or sizes up a cogni-

tion. That means that it should be able to fix or limit a particular cognition to

a particular object so that we can say "this is a blue-cognition; this is a yellow

cognition" and so on. Obviously the sense-organ cannot be credited with this

discriminatory power of limitation. But without this limitation all cognitions

would have been inextricably mixed up so that we could not have said 'this is

the cognition of that' . This loss of identification is as good as the loss of cognition itselL] - (Pv. B. on the same verse p. 345).

The Naiyffyikas appear to argue in this way: - When we say that a sense-

organ is the instrument of some perceptual knowledge we mean that the instrument is only one of the causes of knowledge, but is not the whole cause.

The sense-instrument has a function or operative behaviour which is its

contact with an object. Hence the object itself is as much a cause o f know-

ledge as the instrumental sense-organ or its object-contact. So despite the

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAM.~N.A 47

sameness of the sense-organ (or of the type of contact) cognitions are bound to differ with presentations of different objects. But these cognitive differences accounted for by differences of presented objects in no way compromise the instrumentality of sense-organ or of the sense-object contact.

But this argument, though apparently plausible, leaves the Buddhist contention unanswered. It is assumed that cognitions are different because objects are different. But how do you know that the objects are different? Until and unless you know this difference you canr~.ot talk of it as causing the cognitive difference. To know something to be different is nothing but to feel like something being different figuring in my knowledge. I feel something as blue appearing in my knowledge and likewise I feel something as yellow. My knowledge in the two cases is stamped with two distinctive forms which pronounce

to me the distinction between the two objects. According to the Naiy~yikas there are six different types of sense-object

contact corresponding to different types of objects. But how do you know that the contacts are different before you know that the objects are different? Again how is it that the contact may be of the same type though the objects of knowledge are different? Neither the difference and identity of the contacts, nor the difference and identity of the objects can be known before the objects themselves are identified in knowledge. This identification can be done only through arthasdrf~pya, i.e., objective equiformity or the object- form printed upon knowledge. The sense or the sense-object contact may help the object to imprint its form upon knowledge. But you can feel your way to the object only through this form in knowledge, not through any sense or sense-object contact. This shows that the sense or the sense-object contact in itself does not go to cognitively determine the objective differences appearing in knowledge. Different forms of object-appearance directly felt in knowledge give us the unfailing impression that the objects are different. The sense-organs or their object-contacts may differ in as many ways as you like, but these differences remain epistemically indifferent to the differences in objects which are cognitively determined only by their different presentations in knowledge. This argument is compressed by Dharmakirti in the following

verse of the Pram~.nav~rtika: -

sarv~tman~pi sambaddharia kai~cid evgvagamyate / dharmail3, sa niyamo na sygt sambandhasy~vi~e.satal3//

(Pv. 2/316 Benares)


The object-form presented in knowledge points to the object lying outside knowledge. This form-correspondence between knowledge and object is technically called arthas~pya or equiformity (of knowledge with object). To know an object is to have it manifested in knowledge. This manifestation is done through the equiformity between knowledge and object. Different forms of objects figuring in cognitions lead one to ascertain that there is contact

with blue, or, there is contact with yellow. Prajfigkara thus observes: -

'arthasannikars.o'pi na--k~ram anabhipatya jfi~yate'

Hence this objective equiformity of knowledge is the vyavasthapaka which determines the objective difference of our cognitions. It is in this sense that arthasd~pya or objective equiformity of knowledge is called 'prama.na' which thus identifies the object to which the knowledge gets fixed and limited. So it is the measure of knowledge. Knowledge, thus measured, measures the object. Arthas~pya is thus the measure of both knowledge and object. The relation ofpram~ and praman, a, in the view of the Buddhists, is not a relation of

causality, but a relation between a vyavasthapaka or paricchedaka which measures and a vyavasthapya or paricchedya which is being measured. It is

a relation between the ground and the grounded, the determinant and the determinable.

Dharmottara while commenting on Dharmakirti remarks: -

na c~tra janyajanakabh~vanibandhanal3, s~dhyas~dhakabh~val3., yenaikasmin vastuni virodha.h sy~t, api tu vyavasth~pyavyavasth~- pakabh~vena / rata ekasya vastuna.h kificid rfiparh pram~.narh ki~cit pramS, a- phalam iti na virudhyate / vyavasth~panahetur hi sgrfipyafia tasya jfi~nasya,

vyavasth~pyarh ca n]ladisariwedanarfpam /

(Nb pp. 81-83, K.J.R.I. ed.)

Durveka thus clears the meaning of the relation of 'vyavasth~pyavyavasth~- pakabh~va': -

vyavasthgpyarh vi~e.sarfipe .na niy~myam, vyavasthgpyate vi~i.s.ten~tman~ niyamyate anena iti vyavasthffnimittaria vyavasth~pakam abhipretam.

(niyLrnyam = to be controlled, fixed, limited)

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAM.4N.A 49

Another reason for accepting the objective equiformity of knowledge as the 'pram~.na' or 'vyavasthdpaka' has been provided by the expression 'bh~v~le- vdsya tadbhave' in the following observation of Dharmakfrti in Pramd.nav~rtika:

vi.saySk~rabhed~c ca dhiyo'dhigamabhedata.h bh~v~dev~sya tadbh~ve . . . . . . . . . . 11 (Pv. 1/6 Benares)

Though the eye is open one may not perceive the object 'blue'. Thus the sense- organ is not pervaded by the product, namely, the cognition of blue. But if there is the form of 'blue' imprinted on cognition, the product, i.e., the cognitive determination of a particular cognizable object, is bound to be there, since the objective equiformity being intrinsic to knowledge has no separate existence beyond it. The definition of 'kara.na' as 'phalayogavyavacchinnatva' is sought to be explained by the Naiy~yikas as phal~vyabhicaritva or phalavy~- pyatva, i.e., the characteristic of being pervasible by effect. This pervasibility by effect certainly belongs to the objective equiformity of knowledge, and not to the sense-organ. The Naiy~yikas who choose the definition 'phal~yogavya- vacchinnath kdran, ath kara.nam' mean to say - that which has immediate and invariable connection with the effect is the s&lhakatama kftraka or kara.na. In this sense even the grammatical definition of 'kara.na', i.e., 'sddhakatamath k~rakarh kara.nam' is well-deserved by the objective equiformity of cognition. Utmost immediacy is hardly different from simultaneity and simultaneous determination of knowledge is most apparent in the objective equiformity of cognition which, in final analysis, is identical with the cognition itself. Prajfiiikara thus brings out the implication of Dharmakirti's observation: -

tadbh~ve ~ik~rabh~ve asy~dhigamasya phalasya bh~v~d eva, na khalu caksur~dibh~ve'sya phalasya bh~va eva, ~ikftrasya tu bh~ve bh~va ev~vyatirek~d iti s~dhakatamatvam iti pratip~dayi.syate /

(Pv. B. p. 23, K.J.R.I.)

In absence of this objective equiformity the so-called product, namely, cognition of the object can never be achieved. What the Indian logicians take to be the relations of anvaya and vyatireka, i.e., the positive and contra-positive invariable relations between two terms, can be easily seen prevailing between the cognition and the objective equiformity of cognition. Manorathanandin thus explains Dharmakirti's remark "tat tasya s~dhanarh y~ kriy~ yata.h" (Pv. 2/301 Benares)


y~ kriy~ yata.h pad~rth~d avyavadh~nena bhavati sa tasyg.h karanamucyate, tata~ cendriy~de.h pramitiria pratyavyavahita- s~dhakatva-bh~v~n na pram~nam /

When one says - 'I see colour with eyes (caksu.s~ r~para pagy~mi) the 'pram~.natva' which primarily belongs to the objective equiformity or artha- s~pya is only secondarily imposed on the optical organ as a matter of transferred epithet. Since arthasa~pya of knowledge is caused by the sense-organ, pram~.natva, a property of the effect, is transferred to the cause. Prajfl/ikara thus comments on Dharmakirti: -

katharia tarhi cak.su.s~ pa~yati rSpam iti, k~a.ne k~-yopac~r~d evamucyate

(Pv. B. p. 23, K.I.R.I.)

This point has been made clear by Dharmakirti when he remarks: -

sarve.sLm upayoge'pi k~rakg.n~ria kriy~r prati / yadantyarh bhedakaria tasy~s tat s~dhakatama~ matam//

(Pv. B. 3/312 K.I.R.I.)

: - The s&thakatama k~raka, i.e. the most excellent of all the cases is that which is immediately and invariably related to the effect. Excellence or 'prakar.sa' here stands for immediacy. In spite of the presence of the sense- organ, the perception of an object kept at a very distant place cannot be produced, since in that case the form of the object cannot be stamped upon knowledge. But if it is kept in a nearer spot the form of the object gets impressed upon cognition and at that very moment the object becomes per- ceived. Thus the objective equiformity of knowledge is most immediate to knowledge and hence the definition of kara.natva or instrumentality should be primarily applied to it. It is this most immediate one which Dharmakirti has described as antya bhedaka, the last differentiator. Prajfi~ikara thus brings out the implication of Dharmakirti's remark:

s~dhakatamarb hi kara.nam ity asya ca sarvak~rakopayoge'pi kriy~y~ria katharh prakar.sa? na hi kriyanirvartanam eva, kriy~airvartanabh~ve' pi tatr~nantaryaria yasya kriyffah prati tad eva s~dhakatamam /

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAMANA 51

satsv apFndriy~di.sv adfirade~at~din~ yadi pratiniyat/ik~ratff na

prgtipr~pyeta na tad/ik~r~rthaparicchedavyavasth~ /

tadanantarabh~sinF sff kriyeti tad eva kara.nam /

(Pv. B. p. 344-345, K.J.R.I.)

It is the cognitive object-form that determines knowledge as capturing the

object. This object-form assures me that I know the object. As long as the

form of the object remains confined to the external thing it cannot be looked

upon as given to knowledge. But when the external object confers its form upon cognition it (the form) becomes the cognitive object-form which alone

finally helps in manifesting the object as known to the knower. Properly speaking, this cognitive object-form does not produce knowledge, but serves as the epistemic ground of knowledge. In short, I can know an object only in

so far as I can 'feel' like having the form of the object in my knowledge. This

explains the objective basis of a cognition. In this way the equiformity (having

the same form) between knowledge and its object should be considered as the most immediate ground determining a particular knowledge as having a particular object. In this sense arthasargtpya or objective equiformity should be considered as pramana par excellence. But the objective-form of knowledge

cannot be sundered apart from knowledge itself. It is the most intrinsic and essential property of knowledge. It follows hence that the difference between prama and pramS, a, between knowledge and its instrument, is not real, but

is only an intellectual and analytical construction. The same knowledge when

analytically taken in its object-form, figures as prama.na or instrument to itself, and when the same is taken as a total monolithic unit of internal reality

manifesting an object, it is called prama or valid knowledge. This is really

called vyavasth~pyavyavasthapakabh~a or paricchedyaparicchedakabhftva, i.e., the relation between the fixer and the fixed, between the measure and the

measured. The object-form in knowledge fixes the knowledge as being related to the object. It sizes up title subject-object relation. Hence the relation

between pramana and prama is not a relation of causal sequence between

an antecedent and consequent, but an analytically constructed relation between two aspects of an identical cognitive fact. This Buddhist conception of 'pramS' and 'prama.na' has been succinctly put by Manorathanandin in his commentary on Pram~. av~tika: -

dhFyo'm~ayor/ik~dhigamalaksal?ayo.h s~dhyasffdhana-

samsthitil3, kriy/ikara.navyavasth~; tadvyavasth~ra-


yatven~aravagen~dhigativi~e.savyavasth~n~t n~sty atra k~ya-k~ran~tmaka.h kriy/ikara.nabh~va.h, kintu

vyavasth~pyavyavasth~pakabh~val3., sa ca t~d~tmye' py aviruddhal? /

(Pvt. p. 194 Beneras)

It is undeniable that the difference of sense-organs causes the difference of

cognitions. When one perceives - 'this is hot', the perception of 'hot ' is produced by the tactual sense-organ (spargendriya). Again the perception of

'blue' is produced by the optical sense (cak.surindriya). But suppose one perceives 'blue', and then perceives 'yellow'. Here the sense 'eye' cannot deter-

mine the objective difference of knowledge. That which invariably determines this difference is the objective equiformity of knowledge. It is only through

the forms of objects figuring in knowledge that one can ascertain - 'there is

the contact of eye with blue', or, 'there is the contact of eye with yellow'. Similarly when one says - 'this cognition of blue is due to the contact of eye

with the object 'blue', or, 'this cognition of 'hot ' is due to the contact of the tactual organ with the object 'hot ' , ' he also does so only through the objective equiformity of knowledge. Manoratha observes: -

tath~ hi yady api pratyartharh prati-ndriyarh ca jf i~n~am asti bhedal3., tath~pi vi.sayas~rfipya-bh~ve

sa eva vi~e.so' ~akyanirde~a.h// (Pvt. p. 191)

The form of an object, as appearing in knowledge, is nothing different from knowledge itself. Hence the same knowledge which is called 'prama" is also its 'pramdna' - 'dhrr eva pram~nam'. Thus the Buddhists go to establish the

relation of identity between pramd and prama.na: -

tasm~t pramey~dhigate.h s~dhanarh meyarOpat~ [ s~dhane'nyatra tat k~ryasambandho na prasidhyati// sa ca tasy~tmabhQtaiva tena n~th~ntararh phalam//

(Pv. 2/306-307 Beneras)

: - Since the objective equiformity of knowledge is intrinsic to knowledge, the result (phala), 'pramS', is no other than the 'pram~.na' itself(n~rth~ntararh phalam). It is only from this analytical point of view that one should make a distinction between pramd and pram~.na.

Kum~rila contends: - The result 'cognition' (pramS) is nothing else but the

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAMAN. A 53

cognitive determination of a particular object (pariccheda). So pariccheda is knowledge itself. So pariccheda itself is an effect produced by the senses which hence should be called the real paricchedakas: -

paricchedaphalatvena v.rttasy~nantarasya nab. / pram~.natvarh bhavej, jfi~ne pram~ne tu pararh phalam//

(Sv. Chow. ed. Pratyak.sa p. 118)

If the cognition of blue itself is taken to be the pramana or paricchedaka then some other cognition such as the consequent qualified knowledge of the substratum and its adjective 'blueness' should be regarded as its effect. Obviously here Kum~rila means to say that if nirvikalpa or indeterminate knowledge is taken as 'prama.na', then savikalpa or determinate knowledge should be accepted as 'prarna'. P~rthas~rathi thus explains the import of Kum~rila's observation: -

paricchedasya jfi~nasya phalatven~nantara- vrttasyendriy~de.h pr~rn~.nyam, jfi~nasya tu pramS, atve pararh vi~esy~dijfiLuaria phalam iti.

Anyway, Kum~rila seeks to discover a causal relation between pariccheda and paricchedaka. Kamalagila, while commenting on the Tattvasa~graha of

S~ntaraksita, presents an effective answer to this contention. Difference in the forms of objects appearing in cognitions determines the difference in cognitions. Difference in cognitions in its turn leads one to determine that there are different objects like blue, yellow etc. Thus after ascertaining the object of his intention a person who cognizes a particular object may proceed

to acquire it. The knowledge which impels one to proceed for an object that is capable of producing some effective purposive action (arthakriyasamarthe ca pravartakam) is called 'prama.na' by the Buddhists. But it is only through its objective equiformity that knowledge exercises its impelling power. Thus avisagnv&titva, the definition of pram~.natva in the sense of arthakriyasamarthe pravartakatva, can be successfully applied to the objective equiformity of knowledge. Dharmakirti, while going to establish dhiprama.nata, i.e., the concept of cognition itself being its pramana, argues that it is knowledge or the objective equiformity of knowledge which determines man's leaning or aversion to an object: -


grhRagraha.n~n ne.s.taria s~riav.rtaria, dhfpram~at~ / prav.rttes tat-pradhg.natv~d dheyop~deyavastuni . . / /

(Pv. 1/5 Benares)

Nobody controverts the fact that the cognition of the particular object 'blue' is produced by the eye or its contact with the eye. But that which is directly responsible for the cognitive determination of a particular object is the form of that object impressed upon knowledge. So the distinction of being a pramd.na in the primary sense of the word goes to arthasa~pya, the objective equiformity of knowledge, and this pramanatva involves no causal relation.

However, taking resort to the relation of causality one may impose on the sense-organ the characteristic of being a pramana only in a secondary sense. 1

The grammatical concept of kartr, the nominative cause, or of karana, the

instrumental cause, necessarily entails the concept of vyapara, i.e., the function through which 'karl' and "karana' can operate and produce an effect. This vyapara itself again is to be produced by the nominative or the instrumental cause. The relation of causality implies a notion of sequence. The Buddhists

who consider momentary particulars (svalak.sa.nas) only to be real cannot accept the concept of vy(tpara as intermediating between 'kart.r" or 'kara.na" on the one hand and the 'phala' (result) on the other, because the momentary particular which is supposed to be the kart?', or karana is lost at the time of supposedly producing its vyapara. How is the said particular expected to produce its vyap~ra at a time when it does not exist? So the relation of causality in the classical sense is considered unreal by the Buddhists: - "Kalpital3. karmakartrgdil3, param~rtho na vidyate". Its relative validity is

recognised only as a concession to the popular belief and practical behaviour of man. From the standpoint of ultimate reality every momentary particular is nirvyap~ra. The knowledge being produced and taking the form of its object is said to manifest, determine or size up the object (v~sayar~ paricchindad ira) and thus seems to have a function (savyaparam ira), though really it cannot be so. So the relation ofprama.na, from the final Buddhist view of reality, is only a conceptual construct introduced by the analytical intellect of man. S~ntarak.sita thus goes to establish the prama.natva of arthas~pya: -

na vyavasth~rayatvena s~dhyas~dhanasarhsthitil3. / nir~k~re tu vijfigne s~ sariasth~ na hi yujyate

(Ts. G.O.S.p. 399)

Kamalasl"ila clearly explains: -


n~ffspadafia samvedanarh na pitasyeti visayffvagativyavasth~y~ arthasffrfipyam eva nibandhanaria nffnyad iti

vyavasthffpyavyavasthffpakabhffvena sffdhyasfidhanavyavasthff, notpfidyotp~dakabhffvena; yasm~n na p~ram~rthika.h

kart.r-kara .nffdibhffvo'sti, k.sa.nikatvena nirvy~p~ratv~t sarvadharm~.n~m / jfignarh hi vi.say/ik~- ram utpadyamffnarh visayarh paricchindad iva savyffpffram iva-bhffti

The expression 'savydp~ramivdbh~ti' is, however, borrowed from the following observation of Dharmakirti himself: -

dadh~naria tac ca tam fftmanyarth~dhigamanfftman~ / savyffpffram iva-bhffti vyffpffrena svakarma.ni// tadvagfft tadvyavasthffnffd ak~rakam api svayam /

(Pv. B. p. 342 K.J.R.I.)

: - Suppose a person perceives something blue, and then again he perceives something yellow. One may say - 'his perceptual cognition ranges from blue to yellow'. It may be argued that the knowledge here possesses the function of rejecting one thing and accepting another. But the cognition of 'blue' and that of 'yellow' are two totally different cognitions. The cognition of a particular object 'blue' cannot forsake its own object in favour of taking another object 'yellow'. Knowledge here, though seeming to have a function, has no function at all. The objective equiformity of knowledge is not different from knowledge itself. Thus arthasgo"fipya also possesses no vyapara or function through which it would produce a product. It is, therefore, not a means or cause which is bound to have a vyftpdra. Yet arthas~nT~pya is pram[l.na, since it

fixes knowledge to a particular object. It is only from the pragmatic point of view that a sense-organ is said to produce knowledge through its vy~p~ra. From the ultimate point of reality there cannot be a relation of the product and the productive means , - the relation which is entailed in the concept of vy~p~a~ 2

Kum~rila has expressed his contention in the following verse: -

chedane khadirapr~pte pal~e na chid~ yath~ / tathaiva paragor loke chiday~ saha naikat~//

Sv. p. 117, Chow. ed.

Here in this verse, the word 'chedana', as it has been explained by Kamalagila,


does not mean the act of cutting, but stands for the instrument o f cutting.

Kum~i l a contends: -

When an axe, the instrument of cutting, enters a 'khadira' tree the result 'cutting' occurs in that tree alone and not in a 'pallia' tree. Thus it is established in human experience that the object of the result 'cutting' (i.e. the tree) and the object of the instrument of cutting must be the same. This sameness of object has been referred to as visayaikatva by Kum~rila and the Buddhists. Similarly, it is also established in human experience that the instrument of cutting must be different from the resultant act of cutting. One who identifies 'pram~na' i.e., the instrument of cognition with the result 'pramd' i.e. cognition itself, surely goes against the empirically established view about the relation between 'sddhya', the result, and 'sddhana', the means.

This purport of Kum~rila's contention has been effectively brought out by

Pffrthasffrathi who observes: -

Vi.sayaikatvavat kriyffkffrakayo.h svarOpabhedo'pi

lokasiddha eva /

(Pffrthas~rathi's commentary on Sv. p. 117, Chow. ed.).

An interesting answer to this content ion has been offered by ~ffntarak.sita.

The act of cutting is nothing else than the penetrat ion o f the instrument 'axe '

into the object to be cut. This penetrat ion again, being an essential and

intrinsic proper ty o f the penetrating object, i.e. the instrument of cutting, is

hardly different from it. This means that 'kriya' and 'kara.na', which are

popularly accepted as different, are virtually identical. Then what does go

wrong with the Buddhists when they speak o f the 'prarr~' and the 'prama.na' as being one? Sffntaraksita thus observes: -

vis'li.syamffnasandhau ca dffrvAdau paragug cchidff /

pravigannucyate tena tatraikatvam avas th i tam/ /

(Ts. G.O.S. ed. p. 399)

Kamalasqila explains clearly: -

para~un~ ca v.rk.sffde~c chid~ nirSpyamff.n~

chedyadravy~nuprave ~alak.sa .naiv~vati.s.that e, sa cffnuprave~al3, paragor ~tmagata eva dharma iti

paramffrthatag chidayff sahaikatvam iti nffsti virodhal3. /

This concept o f the ident i ty o f 'kriya' and 'kara.na' however, has been derived

from the following observation of Dharmakir t i who regards the relation

between an act and the means o f that act to be a purely conceptual construct (kalpita): -


kriy/~karaD, ayor aikyavirodha iti ced asat / dharmabheda-bhyupagam~d vastvabhinnam itf.syate//

(Pv. p. 348 K.J.R.I.)

The raising and falling of an axe which are only different contacts of the axe with different parts of space are nothing different from the axe itself. The penetration of the axe also does not exist beyond the axe. Thus, in the final analysis, the result, i.e., the penetration of the axe into the object to be sundered and the said function (vyfrpdra), i.e., the raising and falling of the axe do not really differ from the axe. Yet in deference to the popular belief these characteristics, (dharma) namely, the raising and falling of the axe and its penetration into the object to be cut are supposed to be different from the

axe. So Prajfiffkara observes: -

yadi paramg.rthatal3, kriy~ikarat3, ayor aikyaria na yuktam ity ucyate tad ayuktam / na hi k~rak~tmik~ kriy~ kffrak~tmat~fia viru.naddhi / na hi vy~p~ra.h padffrthato bhidyate / notpatananipatane paraguto vyatiricyate tasyaiv~par~degasariaginy utpattis tath~ vyapadegavat~/na ca sff svarfip~d apar~ . . . . . . atha vyavahgriki-kriyff virodhinf k~rakaikatvena tadetad isyata eva dharmabhed~bhyupagam~d, vikalpa- parini.s.thito hi dharmabhedo' bhyupagamyata eva /

(Pv. B. on Ibid.)

Kumffrila has advanced another significant argument against the Buddhist theory ofpramana. According to the Buddhists every knowledge is self- conscious. They consider self-consciousness or svasar~vedana to be a type of

direct perception. 'Svasathvedana' or self-consciousness, in the opinion of the Buddhists, is nothing but self-manifestation or self-effulgence of knowledge. Kumffrila, the Mim~rhsaka, does not take knowledge to be self-effulgent. He is so unwilling to accept svasa&vedana as a type of cognitive product. Self- consciousness being the manifestation of cognition, has knowledge itself for its object and thus thoroughly belongs to the sphere of knowledge only. The form of object, on the other hand, solely belongs to an external object. How can then the form of an object (vi.sayakara) be the pramana of self- consciousness which according to the Buddhists is a kind of perception? There is no question of v~sayak&a being identified with self-consciousness or

svasa&vedana. Hence Kum~rila observes: -


svasarhvittiphalatvarh tu tanni.sedh~n na yujyate / pram~ne vi.saya--k~re bhinn~rthatvarh prasajyate//

(Sv. Chow. ed. p. 118) 3

Kamalag~a thus brings out the implication of Kum~rila's contention: -

idam aparam uktarh kum~rilenaiva: - svasariwedanasya ni.sedh~t tasya pram~.naphalatvam ayuktam, vi.say/ik~rasya ca pr~m~nye sati pramS, aphalayor bhinnavisayatvarh prasajyate, tath~ hi - visay/ik~ro v/ihyavi.sayal3., svasariavedanan tu jfi~nasvar~pavi.sayam iti /

(Com. on Ts. G.O.S. ed. p. 400)

The answer to this contention is given by S~ntaraksita in the following way: -

sarv~vittiprasa~gena s~'niseddhurh na gakyate / bhinn~a-thatvarh na ceh~sti svavid apy arthavin mats/ /

(Ibid., p. 401)

: - A thing being itself non-manifest cannot manifest others. A light which is self-manifest reveals other objects. Knowledge is described as manifesting its object. If knowledge itself remains unmanifest at the time of manifesting others the very manifestation of its object becomes impossible. If it is so nothing can be known at all. This point has been well brought home by Dharmakirti himself when he observes: -

apratyak.sopalambhasya n~rthad.r.s.til3, prasidhyati /

( Pr am~.navinigcaya )

A cognition while manifesting an object also manifests itself at the same time. It does not depend on any other thing for its own manifestation. Any knowledge of any object is self-effulgent or self-conscious. Thus self-consciousness of the cognition of an object is nothing other than that cognition itself. Here in this sense self-consciousness of the cognition of an object is said to be pro-

duced by the same object: - 'svavidapyarthavin matd'. It is not the form of an object in itself that is called 'prama.na' by the Buddhists. But the form of an object as being impressed upon knowledge is taken to be 'prama.na' by them. The objective equiformity of a cognition is, however, intrinsic to the cognition itself. Then there is no contradiction in the objective equiformity being the 'pram~.na" of self-consciousness or svasafnvedana.4

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAM.4.NA 59

Consciousness and self-consciousness are not two different consciousnesses. Self-consciousness is not really consciousness of consciousness, but is the self- expression of the same consciousness�9 So the object of self-consciousness is the same as the object of consciousness itself�9 Hence arthasdrapya or objective equiformity may easily be accepted as pram~na of self-consciousness�9

Kum~rila again argues: - Any qualified knowledge which is produced (janyavigis.tajfi~na) is to be preceded by the primary knowledge of the adjective (vigesana): - 'vi~is.tajfi~naria vi~e.sa.najfi~napfirvakam'. The knowledge - 'here is a man with a club (da.n~ puru.sa.h)', is a qualified knowledge, the adjective 'club' qualifying the substantive 'man'. The knowledge of the adjective 'club' must precede this qualified knowledge. The cognition in the form of the judgment, 'this is a man' is also a qualified knowledge, since herein the substantive expressed by the word 'this' is qualified by the property of 'manness' or 'rnanu.syatva'. This judgment also being a qualified knowledge must be preceded by a primary knowledge of the adjectival property, though the adjective then may not be ascertained as an adjective - (vi~e.sanarh vi~e.sanatay~ na bh~sate).

An indistinct cognition of pure adjective precedes and produces the distinct knowledge, i.e., the judgment in this case. This indefinite and indistinct pre- ceding knowledge is called ~locanaj~ana (nirvikalpaj~dna) by the Bh~.t.ta Mim~thsakas and is accepted by them to be the 'pram~.na' of the resultant judgment (savikalpa). s

The Buddhists contend: - The term vigesana is a relative one which necessarily implies the relative concept of a vide.sya. The qualificatory term becomes meaningless without the knowledge of it as qualifying the other term. So there cannot be the pure knowledge of a vige.sa.na which is not mixed up with the knowledge of a vige.sya. Again, a qualified knowledge involves both the concepts of an adjective that qualifies and a substantive that is qualified. Then what is the need of recognising an additional knowledge of the pure adjective? Prajfi~ikara comments: -

na hi vi~esyop~rfi.dharQpam antera.na vige.sanatvarh nLma, n~pi tadup~rQ.dhatvagraharh vin~ vi~e.sa.natvagrahanam / tad~ik~ragraha.ne ca vi~e.syam api g.rh~tam eveti katharh tato vigesyadhi'r apar~ s~dhy~ sy~t? 6

Dharmakirti and his commentator Prajfl~ikara advance another significant argument against the above view of the Mim~riasakas. The qualified judgment


'this is a man' has a qualified object, i.e., 'this being qualified by manness' -

(vidis.tajadnam vi~is.tavi.sayam). The so-called indistinct pure knowledge of vige.sana has only the vige.sa.na as its content. Then the object of 'prama.na', the instrument, becomes different from the object of 'prama', the resultant determinate cognition. Praj~a-kara, while going to comment on Dharmakirti's remark - 'nes.to visayacchedo'pi kriy~sgdhanayor dvayo.h', observes thus: -

kifi ca viiesaoabuddhirvi~e.sane, vige.sye tadbuddhir iti vi.sayabheda.h kriy~s~dhanayo.h prffpta.h

(Pv. B. K.J.R.I. 3/315)

One thing must be borne in mind. The objective difference of different cognitions cannot be ascertained at the stage of primary perception (nirvikalpa]~ana). It is only at the stage of distinct judgment (savikalpa/fiana) that one can ascertain 'it is blue' or 'it is yellow'. From this aspect the adhyavasffya or distinct judgment should be taken as vyavasthapaka that determines the objective difference of different cognitions. Dharmottara thus comments on the

Ny~yabindu: -

nigcayapratyayen~vyavasth~pitarfi sad api nflabodharfiparia vijfi~nam asatkalpameva / tasm~n nigcayena nflabodharSparh vyavasth~pitarh vijfi~aarh nflabodh~tman~ sad bhavati / tasm~d adhyavas~yarh kurvad eva pratyak.saria pram~.n.aria bhavati

(Nb. K.J.R.I.p. 84)

Yet the judgment determines the objective difference of cognition only through the particular form of a particular object appearing in knowledge. Thus the objective equiformity stands as the basis of determining the objective difference of knowledge, (i.e. the vyavasth~paka in the sense of vyavastha- panahetu). Thus the arthas~rfipya of knowledge well deserves the status of prama.na. Dharmottara observes: -

janitena tvadhyavas~yena sfirSpyavag~a n~abodharfipe j f i~e ' vasth~pyam~ne s~napyarh vyavasth~panahetutv[t

pram~.narh siddharia bhavati - (Ibid., p. 85).

Prama.na or instrument of knowledge, according to the Buddhists, is not an

ontological category, but a logical and epistemological category. Arthasggftpya,

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAM,4N.A 61

figuring as the determinant of knowledge, as limiting knowledge to a particular

object, as fixing knowledge by identifying the object, can belong only to the stage of judgment (savikalpa), and not to the primary stage of perception (nirvikalpa). Yet this arthasarfipya first emerges in the very primary stage itself, though in an indeterminate way, because there cannot be any knowledge whatsoever without taking the form from the object. When the objective determination is done in the stage of judgment, then arthas~pya, initially emerging in the non-judgment primary stage, is credited afterwards with the character of 'prama.na' by virtue of the objective determination that follows in the next stage of judgment-knowledge. In this way the future is logically credited to the past. Hence the nirvikalpa (or arthas~ftpya emerging first in nirvikalpa) may also be called prama.na. Thus all these talks of 'prarna' and 'prama.na' belong to the field of logical and analytical construction, and not to the range of reality. Here we are considering 'prama.na' from the standpoint of instrumentality, not from the standpoint of validity. Why the Buddhists do not recognize savikalpa or perceptual judgment to be 'prarna.na' or knowledge is a long consideration beyond the scope of the present disserta-

tion. The Buddhist idealists of the Vij~nav~da school who deny the existence

of external world consider momentary consciousness alone to be the ultimate

reality. It is only because of an eternal perverted disposition (an[tdivasana) to take the wrong to be the right that the corresponding form of an object seems to appear in knowledge, though there is no such external object in reality. There is no external thing which is to be grasped in knowledge (grahyavisaya). There is again no sense-organ (grahaka) that grasps an object. In other words there is no difference among the three, namely, the sense (grahaka), knowledge (sathvitti) and its object (grahya), for there is no reality except knowledge or momentary consciousness itself. Hence Dharmakirti concludes: -

avibhggo'pi buddhy~tm~ vipary~sitadar~anail3. / gffahyagr~hakasariwittibhedav~niva lak.syate//

(Pv. 2/354 Benares ed.)

The Sautrgntikas accept the external world to be real; but they also assert that any knowledge of any object is at the same time self-conscious or self-effulgent. Since the cognition of an object is not basically different from its self- consciousness, there is no difficulty in accepting arthasa~pya or the objective


equiformity of knowledge as the 'prama.na' of self-consciousness also. The

idealists, however, do not accept the reality of external world and maintain that self-consciousness or svasathvedana is the only knowledge, since it is nothing but the manifestation of the momentary knowledge which is considered by Vij~nav~dins to be the sole and ultimate reality. It is knowledge

only that can reveal itself. The objects like pitcher etc. cannot reveal themselves. Hence knowledge must possess some capacity to manifest itself, the capacity or yogyata which the things like pitcher etc. do not possess. It is only through this capacity to reveal itself that self-consciousness or self-manifestation of knowledge becomes possible. This yogyata or capacity, being intrinsic to self-conscious knowledge, cannot be a separate entity. Thus when one accepts self-consciousness to be the 'prama' or knowledge and yogyata to be the pramS.ha, the relation of identity between pram~ and pramana can also be easily established. This point has been brought to notice by S~ntarak.sita when he observes: -

visay~dhigatig c~tra pram~naphalam isyate / svavittir v~ pram~naria tu s~rSpyaria yogyatapi v~//

(Ts. 1344 G.O.S.p. 398) 7

SECTION-II

The S~rhkhya theory of prama and pram~.na

The S~rhkhya theory of knowledge is based on the twin concepts of v.rtti and reflection. According to the S~hkhya theory the process of perceptual cognition runs as follows: -

Intelligence or buddhi is the first evolute ofprak.rti, the primordial compo- site matter, which consists of three types of fundamental material particles, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas. Suppose one perceives a pitcher. Here both the visual organ and intelligence (buddhi) come into contact with the object 'pitcher'. The sense-organ acts as a carrier which carries intelligence to the given object. Intelligence is assumed to be an elastic thing which stretches out to the object through the medium of the senses. On reaching the object, intelligence undergoes a transformation or modification appropriating into itself the shape or form of the object. Such a modification of intelligence is technically called v.rtti in S~rhkhya philosophy. Buddhi and its object-shaped


modification, being material in essence, have no power to manifest an object. But to be known is.to be manifested in knowledge; and only consciousness, being self-manifest, has the capacity to manifest an unconscious object. This being so, to make a thing known it is not enough for intelligence to take the shape of the knowable thing. It has got to do something more, to simulate consciousness in some way or other. Buddhi, though a state of matter, is marked with the preponderance of sattvagu.na which lends to it a peculiar property of translucence that enables it to catch the reflection of purus.a, the principle of pure consciousness. When purus.a is reflected in buddhi modified into the shape of the object presented to it, buddhi shines in the reflected glory of purus.a and usurps the role of consciousness. Then the object-shaped modification (v.rtti) of buddhi is illumined by the reflected consciousness.

This illumination or manifestation is called perceptual knowledge which appears in the form of the conscious judgment - 'this is a pitcher'. This empirical judgment does not touch or influence purus.a, the transcendental consciousness, in the least. Puru.sa, the unchanging, unattached, unrelated and unqualified pure consciousness, is not at all charged with any burden of

experience. Yet buddhi simulates paht~a so effectively that its unconscious object-shaped modification appears as conscious judgment; and purus.a being thrown into the unnoticed background, its distinction from buddhi also remains unnoticed. In this way thinking, feeling and willing, indeed the whole range of experience is falsely ascribed to puru.sa who as pure consciousness is never subjected to any subject-object relation. This false ascription is an unwanted favour done to purusa who, however, is completely indifferent to it.

Now the modification of buddhi into the shape of the object (v.rtti) is called pramana or the instrument of knowledge and the false favour done to Puru.sa,

in the form of the unconscious object-shaped modification appearing as conscious judgment (such as 'this is a pitcher') through the reflection of puru.sa, captured by transluc~ent but unconscious buddhi, is called pram~ or

'bodha', the product, the resultant knowledge. V~caspati, no doubt, in this context tries to make a distinction between pramana (the means) and phala (the result, product). The relevant text of V~caspati's Tattvakaumud[ runs

thus: -

Up~ttavi.say~nam indriy~.n~a v.~tau saty~ia buddhes tamo

'bhibhave sati Yal3. sattvasamudrek~, so'dhyavas[ya iti, v.rttir iti ca, jfi~nam iti c~day[yate, idarh tat pram~.nam /


anena yag cetan~gakter anugraha.h, tat phalam, pramS, bodha.h / buddhitattvarh he prgk.rtatvgd acetanam iti tadfyo 'dhyavas~yo'py acetano gha.t~divat / evarh hi buddhitattvasya sukh~dayo'pi parin~nabhed~ acetan~.h / purusas tu sukh~dya- nanua.sangf cetana.h / so'yaria buddhitattvavartin~ jfi~aasu- kh~din~ tatpratibimbitas tacch~y~pattyg jfi~nasukh~dim~n iva bhavatfti cetano'nugrhyate / citicch~y~pattyfi c~cetan~pi buddhis tadadhyavas~yag ca cetana iva bhavatfti

(Stk. Chow. with the comm. of Varhgidhara, pp. 127-33)

But is there any material difference between pram~.na and phala in this theory of knowledge? A real distinction between pramd.na and phala is possible only on the basis of a causal sequence in which pramS.ha is the antecedent and the product the consequent. But it is impossible in this case, since it cannot be assumed that the modification of buddhi is the antecedent and its illumination by the reflection of puru.sa the consequent. Modification and reflection are two parallel processes pertaining to buddhi and both are ceaseless and contin. uous. There cannot be a single moment at which an objectified modification remains uniUumined by Puru.sa's reflection. A modification of buddhi is born with illumination. That means there cannot be any unknown modification of buddhi. This has been clearly stated in the Yogas~tras: -

sad~ jfi~t~g cittawttayas tatprabhoh purusasy~parin., ffmitv~t (Ys. 4/18).

Hence knowledge in this theory cannot be conceived as a product consequent upon vrtti, and vrtti cannot be conceived as an antecedent to knowledge. So in this S~rhkhya theory of knowledge the same buddhi, taken in its aspect of object-shaped modification, is called pramana, and taken in its aspect of illumination by Puru.sa's reflection, is called pramS, the cognition; and these two aspects always stand synchronised with each other.

That this, in final analysis, turns out to be the epistemic thesis of S~rhkhya philosophy is suggested by V~caspati himself in his commentary on Yogabhd.sya. The author of Yogabhd.sya observes: -

indriyapran~likay~ cittasya b~yavastOpar~g~t tadvi.saya samanyavige.s~tmano'rthasya vige.s~vadh~ra- napradh~n~ v.rttil 3 pratyak.saria pram~nam, phalam avifis.t.al 3


pauruseyag citta~ttibodha.h

(Ys. 1/7 Chow. ed. pp. 27-28)

V~caspati comments: -

na hi puru.sagato bodho janyate'pi tu caitanyam eva buddhidarpanapratibimbitafia buddhivrtty~rth~k~raya

tad/ik~rat~m ~pgdyamanaria phalam / tac ca tatha-bhfitaria buddher avifi.s.taria buddy~tmakarh, v.rtti~ ca buddhy~tmiketi s&rn~n~dhikarao, y~d yuktah, pram~.naphalabh~val),

(Ibid. p. 29)

V~caspati takes pauru.seya in the secondary sense of being falsely ascribed to purus.a, and not in the primary sense of belongings to purus.a. Bodha, the

'result' and v.rtti, the means, are really buddhi in essence. Thus samanadhik- ara.nya or co-locativity (belonging to the same substratum) between phala and kara.na is achieved. It has been shown why knowledge, the so-called result, cannot be a consequent in relation to an antecedent v.rtti. The two are the simultaneous and synchronized aspects of the same buddhi. Hence the difference between prarna and prama.na is not material, but merely analytical and conceptual. Vrtti is the ground in which bodha is grounded. The grounded is

not the consequent product of an antecedent ground. Vijfiffnabhik.su, in opposition to V~caspati, subscribes to an ancient theory

of reciprocal reflection on the authority of some Purg.na texts. This theory has been clearly stated even by such an ancient writer as Kamalag~la in his commentary on Sgntarak.sita's Tattvasafngraha -

buddhidarpa0. ~rO .dham arthapratibimbakam dvitFyadarpa.nakalpe pufiasi samkrgrnati

(Ts./V 297 p. 114, G.O.S.)

The real epistemic reason for this hypothesis of double reflection has been explained for the t~trst time by the anonymous author of Yuktidipik~, an earlier commentary on S~iakhyak~rikL In order to evade a very near approach to the Buddhist theory of identity between prama and prama.na he has suggested two different locations for adhyavasaya (v.rtti) and anugraha (i.e., bodha or knowledge of the object ascribed to Puru.sa): -

Buddhy~rayarh hi pram~.nam adhyavas~y/ikhyam,


purus~rayarh phalam anugrahalak.sa.nam / na ca bhinn~dhikaranayor ekatvaria bhavitum arhati

(Yd. Pandey's ed. p. 35).

Needless to say that the object-shaped buddhi can find a location in Puru.sa only in the form of an image. Vijfi~nabhik.su explains that this image appears in the form of a conscious perceptual judgment such as 'this is a pitcher. This image-judgement is the resultant prama and the original vrtti is prama.na. Now the question arises: - ifpuru.sa is the substratum of experience it faces the uneasy prospect of undergoing transformation (vik?gitva, pari.n~nitva). Vijfi~nabhik.su replies that an image being unreal (tuccha) does not cause any change in puru.sa. If we accept this reply a serious consequence emerges. Prama, the so-called product, becomes unreal while pramS.ha is real. The rela-

tion between prama.na, the instrumental cause, and prama, the product, turns out to be a relation between the real and the unreal. To avoid this unwelcome consequence one has to fall back upon the view of the Advaitist author of Pa~cap&tikavivarana that an image, being identical with the original, is not unreal. But that is only another way of accepting the position that prarn~ and prarr~.na are essentially identical. Thus the hypothesis that buddhi is reflected in puru.sa cannot escape the identity proposed by the Buddhists.

Even granting this hypothesis one may question - what is then the need of the second hypothesis that puru.sa is also reflected in buddhi? Vijfi~nabhiksu replies that this second reflection is necessary for the cognition of puru.sa by buddhi in the form of ego (aham). But Puru.sa is here not cognised as an unqualified solitary figure, but as an experiencing subject in the form of introspective judgments such as 'I know', 'I feel happy' and so on. But this is just the form of anugraha, the false ascription of experience to Puru.sa, which

according to Yuktidfpikd is located in Puru.sa itself. According to Vijfi~nabhik.su, however, it is located in buddhi, which means that the non-introspective judgment belongs to puru.sa in the form of the image of buddhiv.rtti, while the introspective judgment belongs to buddhi in the form of the image ofpuru.sa. Even then these two judgments must be simultaneous, because there is no reason why the reflection of puru.sa in l buddhi will be delayed, coming only after the reflection of buddhi in puru.sa. One should not expect that this delay will be done in deference to the need of satisfying the clumsy hypothesis of Vijfi~nabhik.su. If the reciprocal reflections are simultaneous the non- introspective and introspective judgments must be simultaneous. That means

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAM.4NA 67

that these two should be mixed up as one judgment. Hence V~caspati's position in favour of a single reflection and a single perceptual judgment is far more rational. 8

SECTION-III

Pram~ and pramdna in the Advaita theory

The Advaita theory of knowledge bears a good deal of similarity with the

S~rhkhya theory. Here too, intelligence (buddhi or antah, kara.na)is assumed to

be an elastic and translucent material substance which goes out to meet the given object, gets modified into the shape of the object and acts as the instru-

ment (pramd.navrtti) to the manifestation of the object in the form of a

perceptual judgment. Whatever difference is discernible from the S~riakhya theory does not belong to the process of perception itself, but to its peculiar

colouring by the technical niceties of Advaita metaphysics. According to Advaita metaphysics an unreal material world is superimposed

on the One Reality, the principle of pure consciousness, the Brahman. Hence

a material object is nothing but a false projection of that One Consciousness.

In conformity with this basic hypothesis a material object of knowledge is called visayacaitanya or prameyacaitanya (consciousness falsely limited by the superimposed object). Buddhi or anta.hkara.na is looked upon as anta.hkaran- ~acchinnacaitanya (consciousness falsely limited by superimposed anta.h- kara.na). In this aspect it is called the knower (prarn~tr), the empirical self or jTva. In another hypothesis the Jiva is consciousness reflected in buddhi. Jiva is otherwise called pramdt.rcaitanycL Anta.hkara.nav.rtti, i.e., the modification of buddhi in the form of the object, is considered to be anta.hkara'.nav.rttya- vacchinnacaitanya, i.e., consciousness falsely limited by the superimposed anta.hkara.navrtti. Hence it is" called pram~nacaitanya, for this vrtt/is accepted as the instrument of knowledge which is nothing but the manifestation of the

hitherto non-manifest object. Thus the situation settles down to this form: - The knower (pramdt.r), the instrument of knowledge (pramdna) and the object of knowledge (prameya vi.saya) are basically the same consciousness which is

conceptually differentiated into and distributed in three different forms, namely, prarnag, prarnd.na and prameya in accordance with the different

limiting conditions (upOdhi). For a slight modification of this account


involving the process of perception one may refer to MadhusSdana Sarasvati's

Siddhdntabindu (pp. 56 -58 , B.O.R.I.).

The process of perceptual knowledge has been explained in Vedantaparib- hd.sa in the following way: -

: - Just as the water of a tank finding passage through a drain pours into a field and takes a quadrangular or some other shape according to the shape of the field, so also 'antahkarana' stretches out to an external object through the passage of a sense-organ and takes the shape of the same object. In the process the two superimpositional segments of consciousness circumscribed by antah, karana and visaya (object) merge into an insepar- able identity. This merger emerges in the form of a perceptual judgment such as 'this is a pitcher'. This knowledge is nothing but the manifestation of the erstwhile unmanifested object in the personal awareness of ffva, the empirical self. (see Vpari. pp. 47-51. Venkateswar Press, Bombay).

Yet here the object 'pitcher' is not expressed as consciousness, but as a

material object, though from the basic Advaita standpoint the pitcher is an

unreal object superimposed on consciousness, and as such falsely limits the

nonlimitable. Since the object is expressed in awareness as a material thing

and not as the substratum on which it is falsely imposed, it follows hence that

the substratum-consciousness does not stand as the object o f awareness. It is

so because the basic cosmic illusion'(mfdavidya) screening the substratum

consciousness through the false projection of the material object is not

removed by the empirical knowledge. What is removed is only the non-basic

partial nescience (tul~vidya) which has so long screened the knowledge or

consciousness o f the material object. It is the temporary ignorance o f the

object which is removed giving place to the manifestation of the object. This

removal o f temporary ignorance is done by the anta.hkara.nav.rtti which thus

acts as the instrument to the knowledge of the object. Hence this vrtti is

considered to be the prama.na (the instrument o f knowledge).

But the question remains: - Both anta.hkara.nav.rtH and the material object

o f knowledge are material substances. As long as the basic cosmic illusion

persists their materiality also is bound to persist. Now a material object, on

the Advaita hypothesis, can neither manifest itself, nor can manifest some-

thing else. Then how is the manifestation o f the material pitcher helped by

the instrumentality o f the material buddhivr.tti? Here the theory o f reflection

comes to the rescue. Buddhi, though a material substance, possesses a peculiar translucence due to the ascendancy ofsattvagu.na. So it has the capacity to

catch the reflection o f Transcendental Consciousness (Brahmacaitanya). This

Cosmic Consciousness in its aspect o f illumining and manifesting a material


object through conferring its reflection is technically called Witness- consciousness or S~ksicaitanya. Enlightened by the reflection of Witness- consciousness buddhi or antahkarana appears as the conscious fiva, the empirical self. In that case, when buddhi extends up to an external object, this extension also remains enkindled by the same spiritual reflection. Buddhi

in its state of being moulded after the knowable object, i.e., in its stage of vrtti or object-shaped modification, is also enlightened by the same reflection.

Thus this enlightenment of buddhivrtti encompassing the object is the same as knowing the object, which is the same as emergence of the object in the

awareness of fiva.

Madhusfidanasarasvati in his Siddhantabindu raises the question how buddhi

being a material substance can be the substratum of knowledge (i.e., conscious-

ness) and replies by appealing to the theory of reflection: -

tath~pi d.r~yasya gha.t~divajja.datvena kathafa pram~rayatvam iti cen na, darpa.n~divat svacchatvena cit-pratibimbagr~akatv~c citt~-

d~tmy~dhy~s~d vL (Sb. B.O.R.p. 21)

The epistemic situation culminating in the emergence of an object in awareness has been clearly and tersely expressed by Vidy~ra.nya in the following verse of Paaeadagf : -

buddhitatsthacida-bh~sau dv~v api vy~pnuto gha.tam / tatr~jfi~naria dhiy~ nagyed a-bh~sena gha.ta.h sphuret//

(Pd. N.S. 7/91)

The commentator R~nalq..sna explains: -

dhiy~ buddhiv.rtty~ pram~.nabhOtay~ ajfi~nafia na~yati; jfi~n~jfi~nayor virodh~t, a-bh~sena cida-bh~sena gha.tal3

sphuret; ja.datvena svatal3, sphura.n~yog~t /

Both buddhi and the reflection of consciousness in it encompass the same object 'pitcher'. The objectwise modification of buddhi removes the veil of nescience (ignorance) covering the knowledge of the object and so buddhivrtti

is prama.na, the instrument of knowledge. Nescience (ignorance) which screens knowledge, and the knowledge itself,

being two contradictories, cannot stand together. So to facilitate the dawn of


knowledge the veil of ignorance is to be first removed. This removal is done

by buddhivrtti. With this removal of the veil the material object, pitcher,

which has no capacity for self-manifestation, is manifested or illumined by the reflection of consciousness (cidabhasa) captured in buddhiv.rtti. Now

this manifestation of the object is nothing but the illumination of the object-

shaped modification of buddhi. We have already seen that 'v(sayacaitanya' and 'v.rtticaitanya' merge into an identity. This identity is materially achieved in the state of buddhi taking the shape or stamp of the object. So the illumination of the object-shape in buddhi by ciddbhasa and the manifestation of the object by the~ same cid~bhasa are one and the same. It is to be remembered that buddhi and its objectwise modifications do not remain even for a moment unillumined by the reflection of consciousness. In this respect the Advaita thesis tallies with the Yogas~tra quoted before: -

sad~ jfi~t~ cittav.rttayas taprabho.h puru.sasy~pari.n~-nitv~t'

On the basis of this thesis it must be accepted that buddhi's modification into the mould of the object and the illumination of the same by cid~bh~sa are not related as antecedent and consequent, but are the two simultaneous and

synchronised aspects of the same buddhi. It is only another way of admitting that prama and prarn~.na have no material difference. The same buddhi is prarn~na, taken in its aspect of objectwise modification, and is also prama or

knowledge, taken in its aspect of illumination by cidabhasa~

SECTION-IV

The MTmarhsaka view

Kum~rila in Slokavartika on S~barabhasya under the pratyak.sasf~tra' of Jaimini has elaborately discussed the relation between pramS.ha and its result.

In this context, as we have seen before, he has rigidly maintained the distinction between 'phala" and 'kara.na' and assailed the Buddhist theory in this regard. Yet it is very doubtful if he stands squarely by the Ny[ya definition of pramana as pramdkara.na. He does not give separate definitions ofpram~ and

prama.na. No doubt he takes the term pram~na in the instrumental sense; yet

it is not clear whether he rigidly entertains pram~ as a product ofprama.na. It appears that in his own view pramdna is knowledge itself. In the context of svata.hpramanya he observes: -


tasmad d.r.dharia yad utpannafia n~pi sariav~dam rcchati / jfi~n~ntare.na vijfi~nafia tat pram~narh prat iyat~n/ /

(Sv. 2/80 Chow. ed.)

[So let that knowledge be accepted as prama.na which is produced with a sense of certitude (firmness) and which does not seek verification by another know-

ledge.] It should be noted that this verse appears in the discussion on the Mim~ria-

saka theory of svata.hpram~nya according to which validity of knowledge is self-evident and so it is not ascertained by another verificatory knowledge. Hence the expression 'napi sa/nv&lamrcchati' should not be emended as 'na visathvaclam.rcchat~" (f.n. Prakara.napa~cik~, B.H.U., p. 119).

In the text of Prakara.napaacikd on the same page the word 'avisarhv~di' appearing in the Bha.t.ta definition ofprama.na should be taken as meaning ab~tdhita (uncontradicted). 'Avisariav~di' appears in Dharmakirti's definition ofpramana in Pram~.nav~rttika, which suggests that ascertainment of validity depends on conformity with arthakriyakaritva (empirical and objective verification). So P~rthas~rathi has retained the reading 'napi sathv~lam.rcchati' and consistently explains it to bring out the sense of 'svata.hpram~.nya'. All knowledge is taken as valid as long as a contradiction is not found. Contradic- tion proves invalidity. But to prove validity no verification is necessary. This is the theory of 'svata.hpr~manya' or self-validation of knowledge.

Some may argue that the word prama.na in the above-quoted karika of Kum~rila means yath~rtha (valid) and does not convey the technical sense of instrumentality. But this argument does not seem convincing in the face of

the following observation of P~rthas~rathimigra in Sastradrpika: -

s~trak~rena kftranado.sab~dhakajfi~narahitam ag.rh~tagfahi jfi~narh pram~nam iti pram~.nalak.sa.nafil sScitam /

(Sd. Chow. ed. p. 123)

[Here in the autpattikas~tra the author of the sfttras introduces the definition

ofpram-.ana as being that knowledge which does not recapture an already captured object (of another knowledge) and which is free from any fault of the cause and from challenge by any contradictory knowledge.]

Here P~rthas~athi clearly mentions that it is the definition ofpram~.~. He does not say that it is the definition ofpram~ It is clear then that in the f'mal

view of the Kum~rila School the real prama.na is considered to be the


knowledge itself, and not such non-cognitive factors like the sense-organ or the sense-object contact. Thus the prama of the NyAya School turns out to be the pram?ma In the Bh~.t.ta School. If one still insists that in the above-quoted S~stradrpika text also the word prarna.na stands for knowledge and not for the instrumental, the following verse of ~Slokavartika together with P~rthas~rathi's commentary should set the doubt at rest: -

tena janmaiva vi.saye buddher vy~p~ra i.syate / tad eva ca pramgrfiparh tadvat~ kara.nafi ca d h ~

(Sv. 4/56 Chow. ed. p. 113)

P~thas~rathi comments: -

janmaiv~sya kriyeti n~'kriyAtvam, tad eva c~rthaprak~anaphalavi~es~t pramS, tadyog~d d h ~ karanam, ca-gabdAt pram~.naria cocyate.

This has been said in the course of explaining the pratyak.sas~tra of Jaimini -

satsamprayoge puru.sasyendriyAn~ia buddhijanma tatpratyak.samanimittarh vidyamAnopalambhanatvAt

(Md 1 / 1/4)

Buddhi]anma has been explained as ]Syarnana buddhi (knowledge coming into

being). The problem arises here in this way: You say that knowledge in the state of being born is pram~.na and so it is a kara.na. But a kara.na being a k~aka must have a function (vySp~ra) other than its coming into being. But buddhi or knowledge being a momentary phenomenon cannot have any additional moment of function. Moreover knowledge does not possess any activity. A k~aka possesses function because it is an active element. But knowledge being non-active cannot be a k~raka and cannot have any function. Kum~rila replies that this concept of k?traka does not apply to knowledge which is an exception to the rule. In the case of knowledge its very coming into being is its vy~para and no other vy~p~a is possible for it. So it is wrong to say that knowledge is inactive, for its functional activity consists in its being born. It comes into being along with manifesting its object. That means that the manifestation of the object constitutes its action of being born which is the vy~para. Thus this vyap~a (coming into being), conceived as manifesting the object is also conceived as the result of knowledge. This aspect of object-manifestation should be called prama. In that case knowledge itself,


attended with the manifestation of the object, which is nothing but its func-

tion of being born (tadvati dhi.h), should be called the instrument of object-

manifestation and hence also should be called prama.na. It is easy to see how this interpretation of Kum~rila is a very close approach to the Buddhist view

of basic identity between pram~ and prama.na. Manifestation of the object

constitutes the very essence of knowledge. So when it is said that knowledge

itself is conceived as the instrument to the resultant object-manifestation, the

relation between prama and prama.na forsakes the nature of causal sequence.

Thus the difference between prama and prama.na turns out to be a mere

matter of conceptual analysis and not a matter of material distinction. After this interpretation of the view of Jaimini and Sabara Kum~rila pro-

ceeds to state the Ny~ya-Vai~esika view and in this context elaborates the difference between pramana and phala in various ways. The criticism of the Buddhist view also comes in this context. So there is reason to suppose that the elaboration of the difference between pram~.na and phala and the criticism of the Buddhist view of identity between the two have been done by Kum~rila from the Ny~ya-Vaige.sika standpoint. Anyway the verse that we have just quoted above and P~rthas~rathi's explanation thereof unmistakably

point to a fundamental and essential identity between prama and pram~.a. In this context one should not fail to note the following observation in

Nffrayana's M~nameyodaya: -

iha ca pram~gabdena lak.sanay~ tat-kffryabhStasya prffka.tyasy~pi pratip~dan~t prffka.tyarSpapram~-kara-

natvena jfi~nasy~pi pram~natvam ghu.h / et~vat~ ca

vayarh phalaprama.navadina iti giyffrnahe / (Mm. pp. 5 -6 , Adyar ed.)

This seems to bear a reference to Kum~rila's verse that we just discussed above.

Praka.tya means manifestation of the object by knowledge (arthapral~gana acc. to Pffrths~rathi). Since this prakatya is not something essentially different

from knowledge itself we, the Mfm~riasakas, are also called the advocates of the doctrine that pha/a itself is the prama.na (i.e., knowledge itself is an instru-

ment to itself, taken in the aspect of object-manifestation) - this is the

purport of N~r~yana's observation. S~ikan~tha, the most distinguished disciple of Prabhffkara, states in the

following way the def'mition ofprama.na according to Kum,~rila, which he

rejects: -


d.r.dham avisarhv~di ag.rhft~rthagr~hakaria pram~nam (iti pram~na-lak.sanarh nopapadyate)

(Pp. p. 119, B.H.U.)

It is clear that ~ilikan~tha also thinks that knowledge itself is pram~.na according to Kumftrila. The view of the Prabh~kara school is stated by ~ilikan~tha in a very simple definition: -

pram~nam anubhGti.h' (Ibid., p. 124)

'pram~na is knowledge itself. This simple definition is proposed, for according to the Pra-bh~ara School, all knowledge is basically valid.

Meghan~d~risGri, an elder teacher of the R~n~nuja School of Vedanta has given the following definition ofpram~na in his Nayadyuma.ni: -

anyapram~n~napek.sam arthaparicchedakaria jfignarh pram~nam /

He himself explains: -

paricchedal3, sphQrtil3.; vyavah~rayogyat~ iti y~vat / tad~p~dakam arthaparicchedakam /

(Md. p. 181 Madras ed.)

[PramS.ha is that knowledge which does not depend on another prama.na and which manifests the object. 'Pariccheda' is manifestation which is the capacity of an object to be used in practice. An object can be of practical use only in so far as it is determined through its manifestation in knowledge. It is knowledge that ensures this capacity for the object by revealing it to a knower. Hence pram~.na is knowledge itself.]

SECTION-V

The Jaina view

The Jaina logician M~.nikyanandin in his Parrk.s~mukhas~tra defines prama.r~ a s : -

svgpGrv~rthavyavas~y~tmakam jfi~narh pramg.nam iti

The commentator Anantavirya explains: - ,


prakarsena sarhgay~divyavacchedena miyate paricchidyate vastutattvarh yena tat pram~.nam, tasya ca jfi~nam iti vige.sanam / ajnanarupasya sannikar.s~der Naiy~yik~di- parikalpitasya pram~natvavyavacchedartham uktam /

(Pm. ed. S.C. Ghosal text p. 3)

[Pram~na is that knowledge which is of the nature of a determined self- expression and also of a determined expression of an object that was not known before. Pramana is certain knowledge. The sense of certitude is con- veyed by the preposition pra and thus uncertain knowledge like doubt etc. is debarred from the scope of the definition. Knowledge itself is the instrument by which an object is determined or measured. In the det~mition the word ]fiana stands as an adjective to pram~.na. This adjective is meant to assert that what is not of the nature of knowledge such as sense-object contact etc., which the Naiy~yikas and others consider to be the instrument of knowledge, is excluded from the scope ofprama.na. ]

The second s~tra of Parl-ks~nukha runs thus: -

hitLhitapr~ptiparih~rasamartharh hi pram~nam, taro jfignam eva tad iti

The wise and intelligent people do not seek knowledge for any love of knowledge itself, but for achieving something good and avoiding something evil.

Good and evil come from the objects of the world. Knowledge reveals an object in its true nature. It correctly identifies the object. This revelatory identification helps the knower to accept what is good and reject what is bad. Thus the very knowledge of an object should be considered an instrument in

respect of correctly revealing and identifying an object. This long discussion may help the discerning and interested students of

Indian logic and philosophy to see for themselves that the Buddhist theory of

the self-instrumentality of knowledge is not an exclusive peculiarity of Buddhist epistemology, but i's shared by many other schools of Indian philosophy. The Buddhists and the Naiy~yikas, however, stand at two opposite poles of rigidity. The Buddhists are as much uncompromising in their assertion that prarn~ and prama.na areessentially identical as the Naiy~yikas are in their

position that the two are essentially different.

Jadavpur University, Calcutta


NOTES

S~ta~aksita observes:

vyavasthfiyfi .m tu j.~tfiyfirh kalpyatfim anyathfipi hi/ utpfidyotpfidakabhfivena sarhsth~navidhir ucyate//

(Ts. G.O.S., p. 400)

Kamala~ila thus elaborates the idea:

yath~ Kum~rilena paricchedaphalatvetyfidin~ grantheno- tp~dyotp~daka-bhhvena pramS, aphalavyavasth~ krt~, tathfism~kam avirodhiny eva / yathoktam ~c~ye.na - - 'tatr~pi hi pratyaksatvopac~ro'viruddha~ ca- ksurfidisu tatk~ranesy iti / etfivat tu brhma.h - avagyam fidau vyavasth~dvtre.naiva s~dhyasfidhanasafiasthfi kartavyfi, na hyavyavasth~pya sarhvid-bhedam vi.sayabhedena niyamena pravrttir yukt~, samvidbheda-vyavasth~yfi~ ca s~fipyam eva nibandhanam iti sfimarthy~l evfiy~tarh s~fipyasya s~dhakatamatvam, sfir5pyfid eva ca jfi~masya pravartakatvam, pravartakasya ca pram~natvaria prav.rttik~mena nirfipyate, na vyasanitay~, yathoktam - 'arthakriy~tharia hi sarva.h pram~.nam apram~.narh c~nvesate prek~v~n' iti, yato yenaiv~rhgena pravartakatvarh jfi~nasya bhavati sa eva dar~tn~yal3., na cotpfidyotp~dakabhfivena prams, aphala- vyavasthfiyfiria pravartak~rhga.h sSrfipyarh gamyate / tata~ca nisphalam evotp~dadv~rena pram~navyavasth~narh syfit / ata evfic~yenaitaddv~re.na pram~navyavasthLnafia prav.rtty afigam iti matvaivopac~ra ~grita.h / tasmfij j~tfiy~rh tu vyavasthfiyfiria s~nyathfipy utp~dyotpfidakabhfivena kalpyatfifia tath~py ado.sa eveti (Ts. G.O.S.p. 400)

2 tathfi hi caksur vijfi~marh pitam apah~ya yad~. ntq~dau vartate tad~ paxity~gop.~d~malak.sano 'sya vyfip~ra iva lak.syate / yadi nflasarhvedanarh n~ar~pam eva pftarh na yfiyfit, n~nyasya svar~tpam anyasya bhavatiti tena p.rthagbhfitarh yuktyfi vyfivasthfipyate - sa vy.~p~a~ ca s~ c~rthfipattir eva /

(Prajfi~kara, Pv. B. pp. 343-44, K.J.R.I.) 3 vi.sayLkfiro hi pramS, aria te, pramfinarh ca prameyavi.sayam, n~ l ika rh ca prameyam iti vi.say~tk~ro vi.sayavi.sayal3., svasafiwittis tu vijfi~navi.sayeti vi.sayabheda.h /

(P~rthasfirathi's com. on Sv. Chow. ed. p. 118) apratyak.sopalambhasya n~thadrs.ti.h prasidhyati iti sarv~rthfipratyak.satvaparasahg~m na

~akyate svasariwittir ni.seddhum / nfipi bhinnavi.sayatvaprasahgo yuktah, yatal 3 svasamvittir- apy arthasamvittir is.tfi, tatk~yatvfit, na tu tanmayatvena, svasarhvittis tu t~lr~py~d iti na vkodha.h /

(Ibid., Kamalaiila's comm.) vi~esane tu boddhavye yad ~ocanamfitrakam / pras~te ni~cayarh pa~c~t tasya

prfim~nyakalpanfi// (Sv. 4171, p. 117; Chow. ed.)

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF P R A M . 4 N . A 77

P~rthas~rathi comments: -

sarvatraiva ttvad indriy~thasariaprayogS.nantaxam anigcayttmikt buddhir tlocanam~trar~pt jtyate / st ca pa~ctn nigcayafia pras~te / tatrtlocanarh pramtnam, tasya tu ni~caya.h phatam iti /

6 PrajfiLkara's commentary on the following verse: -

etena ~esarh vyfikhy~tafia vi~e.sanadhiytm puna.h attdrfipye na bhedo'pi tadvadanyadhiyo'pi vt

(Pv. B. K.J.R,I. 3/314) 7 Kamala~ila clearly explains the idea: -

vfuhy~the prameye vi.saytdhigamal 3 pramfi0, aphalam, sfirfapyarh tu pramtnam / svasarhvitttv api satyarh yathfikfinasya prathantt / jfianfitmani tu prameye svasarhvitti.h phalam, y o g y a t f l pramt.narh savytpara-pratitat~m uptd.~ya jfifinasyaiva st ttdrgi yogyatt / yena tad evttm~nam vedayate na gha.ttdaya iti yogyatayt karana-bh~tayttmaprakt~akarh laksyate jfifinam iti yogyatty~.h svasafiavedane prtmfu3, yam /

s See Y o g a v h r t t i k a , pp. 21-22, 29-30, Chow. ed. Ys.

A.S. B.H.U. B . O . R . I .

Chow. D.C. G.O.S. K.J.R.I. Md., SB. Mm. Nb.

Nd.

Nm N.S. Pd. Pm.

P.P. Pv, Pv.B. IN'., Pv.t

Sb.

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78 N A N D I T A B A N D Y O P A D H Y A Y

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the buddhist theory of relation between pramā and pramā na

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