the buddhist sangha and the state
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This work examines the ideal relationship between the Buddhist monastery and the state. I used the word "state" intentionally rather than "kingdom" because there are ancient ideas regarding republicanism in Buddhist texts.TRANSCRIPT
The Sangha and the State: The Ideal Relationship according to Buddhist Monks in
Classical India
Ancient Buddhist Thought: Final Exam Spring 2010
Scott Abel
The two most preeminent institutions of the Classical Era in India ideally
coordinated in the hopes of creating a harmonious society so that people may seek
enlightenment. The institutions described are the Classical Indian state and the Buddhist
monastery as described by the Buddhist monastery’s ideal church-state relationship. In
early Theravada Buddhist doctrine, the king or the state primarily dealt with secular
doctrine, whereas the monastic orders preserved the Dhamma and promoted deeds of
merit. The structure of this essay will include an examination the ideal characteristics of
a Buddhist king, observations about the ideal church-state relationship, and
interpretations of anecdotes involving Buddhist kings and ecclesiastical figures. This
essay will argue that during the Classical Era of India, Buddhist ideals required the
monastic order, or the Sangha, to maintain a balanced relationship with the state in which
both institutions remained separate but mutually dependent for support. This essay will
also argue that each institution possessed specific obligations that include the
preservation of the Buddhist society and keep to Theravada Buddhism pure. Although
the Buddhist doctrine that is about the relationship between the Sangha and the state is
ancient, its relevance remains important in the modern era.
In modern Burma, Buddhism and the Sangha continue to play an important role in
state affairs. Many of the ideals promoted in the post-colonial era recall similar concepts
and ideas established in early Buddhism. Prime Minister U Nu, a pious Burmese
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Buddhist, expanded the importance of Buddhism through various measures during his
tenure as the prime minister of an independent Burma after the final of British colonial
government departed. He promoted Buddhism through various means by convening the
sixth Buddhist Council in 1954, supporting institutions such as the Ecclesiastical Courts,
and Pali-language universities to translate Buddhist texts. U Nu brought the Sangha
closer to state functions by paying for the restoration and building of Buddhist structures
and establishing Buddhism as the state religion in 1962 with much support from the
Sangha.1 During military junta rule over Myanmar, Buddhist monks marched against the
rise in fuel prices in August 2007 in the Sapphron Revolution. Three hundred monks
defied the state by marching in the town Sittwe, Myanmar.2 The protesters, led by monks
and democratic supporters, throughout the country in total amounted to the tens of
thousands. The junta, however, quashed the protests, leaving thirteen dead and countless
people arrested.3 The protest symbolizes the monks’ ability to object to the legitimacy of
the government, but without being overly involved in politics. The ideal relationship
established in the ancient Buddhist texts remains relevant in modern times as monks can
be influential to fellow Buddhists.
The ideal Buddhist king and state needed to possess certain characteristics that
embodied the virtues of the Buddhist Dhamma, in other words, the ideal king followed a
strict code of conduct established by Buddhist thought. The ideal king concept arose
from a series of legendary kings who became known as the Cakkavatti king, which
1 Melford Spiro, Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 379, 385.2 The Associated Press, “Captive Nation: A token release from a growing gulag,” The Economist, Feb. 18, 2010, print edition.3 Central Intelligence Agency, “Burma,” CIA World Factbook, April 7, 2010, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (accessed April 2010).
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translates into English as the “wheel-turning” king.4 According to the Buddha, an ideal
king must have certain characteristics that allow him to rule his kingdom in a manner that
preserves order and promotes prosperity. The Buddha proclaimed that people in the
beginning chose the first kings to rule over and protect them in return for a proportion of
the people’s rice. The king instituted justice to maintain a fair and civil society, while
remaining competent, congenial, and even good-looking. Ideally, the king possessed the
thirty-two characteristics that are also signs of a buddha, as the king was essentially a
buddha’s secular counterpart.5 According to the Buddha, the ideal king should possess a
personality of kindness, responsibility, and a strong sense of justice.
Other sources explained what the virtues of the ideal king were and what the
punishments were for a king who neglected his duties, which sometimes embodied the
more Vedic concepts in Buddhist ideology. The anecdotes from the Jataka gave the king
ten specific obligations demanded from the Bodhisattva. The obligations included
generosity to those in need, remaining morally upright, and to be unselfish in his capacity
as king. In his work, the king had to maintain his integrity, truthfulness, and remain
gentle with the population by implanting policy without causing injury. He must also
maintain self-control, calmness, patience, and virtue.6 The Jataka required that the ideal
king, in summation, follow the Buddhist concept of Dhamma. Should a king stray from
it, Brahmin priests and Buddhist monks could help the king find the proper path.7 As
there was no single Buddhist ideal for the king, each region with a Buddhist influence
developed their own ideologies.
4 Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, (New York: Cambridge UP, 2000), 114. 5 Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 114.6 Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 115.7 Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 115.
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Another source, the Mahavastu, depicted the ideals of kingship with dire
consequences should a king become unrighteous. The Mahavastu focused more on the
role of the king as the arbiter of justice and an effective ruler. A king should remain calm
and impartial in his judgment while refusing sensual indulgences. An ideal king had just
social policies that allow immigrants into his lands and supports the impoverished, while
protecting the wealthy. In his domestic affairs, the king should act responsibly in regard
to his treasury and granary and while in his foreign affairs remain friendly to other kings.
The kingdom and the universe will fall into chaos if the king should stray from his
obligations, resulting in the suffering of his people.8 In the case of the Mahavastu, the
king’s obligations combined the governmental and the spiritual, as the Vedic tradition
mentioned in the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. The Vedic Dharma placed the king
as Dharma’s regent and enforcer, which adds a divine aspect to his rule.9 The
intertwining of the divine and the regal speaks of Vedic influences in this particular case,
as the king must rule properly or the world may suffer because of his ineptitude.
The other aspects of ancient Theravada Buddhist traditions perspective of an ideal
king focused less on divinity and more upon the practice of the rule of morality or
Dhamma. Symbolism in the ordination ceremony for monks ritualistically places all
people equally in front of Dhamma, which united the political and religious aspects of
society. Kamma treats all people equally and punishes unwholesome deeds and rewards
meritorious deeds to perpetrators regardless of their status in society. Kamma vindicates
all inequality in the physical realm through previous actions as punishments or rewards.10
8 Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 115.9 Ainslie Embree, Sources of Indian Tradition: From the Beginning to 1800, (New York: Columbia U. P., 1988), 210.10 Russell Sizemore and Donald Swearer eds, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics, (Columbia, SC: U. of South Carolina P, 1990), 20-21.
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All people, including the king, must eventually answer to Kamma, which justifies and
legitimizes the Buddhist social structure. Should a king violate the rules of the Dhamma,
he could expect a punishment in time, therefore, he should rule within the Dhamma.
The ideal Classical Buddhist society rested on stability provided by the
institutions of church and state through mutual support and a balance of influences. In a
triangle of balances between the state with the king as its head, the Sangha, and the
general public, each entity had specific obligations to the other. Dana, an important ideal
of Buddhism, requires Buddhists to give material goods such as clothes or food.11 Two
texts, the Mahavamsa and Culavansa explain how a king granted titles of rank and gold
to monks who made the Sangha prosper. The ideal state required the king to offer
donations to the Sangha including material goods, favors, gold, and people right up to the
king. Even the state itself could be donated to the Sangha in a symbolic manner. The
king or his ministers would purchase people and the state back from the Sangha. The
state, often represented as an umbrella, was the only donation that could be given back
from the Sangha without being purchase.12 The king also had watch over the monasteries
of the Sangha to ensure they did not collapse by bringing in more monks and giving them
more land whenever necessary.13 The Dhamma obliged Buddhist kings to maintain the
balance of society by donating wealth to the Buddhist monastery and preserving the
Sangha.
11 John Strong, “Rich Man, Poor Man, Bhikku, King: Quinquennial Festival and the Nature of Dana,” Russell Sizemore and Donald Swearer eds, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics, (Columbia, SC: U. of South Carolina P, 1990), 108.12 Steven Kemper, “Wealth and Reformation in Sinhalese Buddhist Monasticism,” Russell Sizemore and Donald Swearer eds, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics, (Columbia, SC: U. of South Carolina P, 1990), 155-156.13 Kemper, “Wealth and Reformation,” 158.
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In return for the king’s gifts to the Sangha, he received certain rights that gave
him extensive power over the monasteries. The king had the power to reform the
monasteries to his liking when less than five monks lived in the Order. Although this
may entail giving the monks more land, he had the right to unify the monks and
command them to obey Buddhist principles. When necessary, the king expelled laymen
from the monastery. The most important thing the king received in return for all his
obligations to the Sangha was its support for his regime. By accepting the king’s
donations, the Sangha legitimized the king as the ruler of the territory. If monastery
disfavored the king excessively, he simply could forego his obligation to recognize the
monastery’s boundaries and refuse to protect it. To refuse the king’s gifts by inverting
their bowls was the most harm the monks and nuns could legally inflict.14 By inverting
their bowls, the monks and nuns questioned the legitimacy of the king’s reign, which
might lead the Buddhist population to do the same. The king would ideally seek the
advice of the monks if they refuse his donations or even if the Sangha itself needed
purification.15 The idealized relationship between Sangha and the king gave the state
specific duties in return for the prize of legitimacy. The relationship also required a
balance of power between the Sangha and the state so that the Sangha does not neglect its
duties and the king may know when he has gone astray in his rule.
A monarchy was not the only government system that the Buddha considered to
preserve his ideals. Ultimately, the ideal society was free of poverty and peaceful, along
with a Buddhist as its leader, who did not have to be a monarch. The Buddha approved
of the republic government system during his lifetime and even made suggestions to 14 Kemper, “Wealth and Reformation,” 158, 159.15 Robin Lovin, “Ethics, Wealth, and Eschatology: Buddhist and Christian Strategies for Change,” Russell Sizemore and Donald Swearer eds, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics, (Columbia, SC: U. of South Carolina P, 1990), 197-198.
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preserve the Vajjian Republic. He mentioned that people should assemble often
peacefully, maintain proceedings according to tradition, and allow the elders the right to
speak at the assemblies, along with actually respecting their opinions. Even when the
Buddha could see the republic disappearing to the power of the kingdoms, he spoke of
preserving the ideals of mutual respect and assembly-based decision making. In regard to
religion, the Buddha encouraged the reverence of the Vijjian shrines, while maintaining
their ancestor’s support for the shrines.16 Although the Buddha made no specific mention
of the relationship between the Sangha and the republic, his principles suggest that
individuals donate their wealth to religious figures and institutions so that they may be
preserved.
An ideal Buddhist society could not exist if chaos ruled and therefore people
needed a government to ensure order. In order to achieve nibbana or enlightenment, a
person needed to depend on the rest of society. To advance this cause, each person
needed to help maintain a wholesome community because a secure and tranquil society
permitted monks and laymen alike to focus on bringing nibbana. In times of anarchy and
chaos, people became distracted from their goal of achieving nibbana. Monks may only
bring about security through tolerance and without the use of violence.17 Political leaders
and government administrators may assist people in need, but this did not necessarily
reflect the ideal situation. The government must, however, enforce the laws of Dhamma
to prevent people from going astray.18 Governments must ensure order in the state so that
the Sangha and the rest of society may continue to pursue enlightenment.
16 Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 113-114.17 Phra Rajavaramuni, “Foundation of Buddhist Ethics,” Russell Sizemore and Donald Swearer eds, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics, (Columbia, SC: U. of South Carolina P, 1990), 36-37.18 Rajavaramuni, “Foundation of Buddhist Ethics,” 38.
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The Sangha also has obligations toward the state and its people, which bring
monks and nuns into interdependence with the rest of society. The Sangha was not to
dominate the king or his policies, rather, in the best of circumstances a monk may speak
for the king or the king may allow for a monk sit upon the throne for an ordination
ceremony. In general, the Sangha remained detached from the state by refusing to
intervene in daily politics.19 Rather, monks and nuns preserved the Dhamma and spread
it to those who have not accepted it.20 While the secular world maintained its routines,
the monks and nuns reminded society of the ultimate goal of people’s existence. The
Sangha gave the Dhamma to society as a gift because it led to the ultimate salvation and
solved the problems of physical existence.21 Essentially, the ecclesiastical Sangha had
the duty to explain Dhamma and ideally did not involve itself in politics, which it left to
the king. In return for salvation for the masses and legitimacy for the king, the Sangha
required their material support.
Monks and nuns have other obligations to the Sangha and the state that are more
difficult to define, but still important. Monks and nuns must not become attached to their
wealth or misuse it because their misconduct damages the Sangha and even the state.
Disruptions caused by misconduct within the Sangha may result in social disorder.22 If
monks and nuns ceased to be pious, failed to exemplify Dhamma, and corrupted the
Sangha, society may follow their example. Without the purity of the Sangha and the
maintenance of the Dhamma, the Sangha might fracture and nibbana may be lost to all.
Therefore, the Sangha needed the king to step in when necessary to keep the Sangha pure
to preserve the Dhamma and legitimize the king’s occasional role in ecclesiastical affairs. 19 Lovin, “Ethics, Wealth, and Eschatology,” 197.20 Lovin, “Ethics, Wealth, and Eschatology,” 198.21 Lovin, “Ethics, Wealth, and Eschatology,” 206.22 Sizemore and Swearer, Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation, 17.
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Even in times of unity, the Sangha needed the state to maintain its possessions
and position in society. In one instance, probably replicated other times, a wealthy
layman wanted to bequeath his estate to the Sangha through a written will just before he
died, which the state permitted. As part of an informal agreement during instances such
as these, the monastic community admitted the childless man on the verge of death as
part of their order to care for him until he died. The donor or “shaven-head householder”
could remain at his estate until his death, upon which the Sangha anticipated it would
receive his estate. The state officially sanctioned the transactions where the Sangha
acquired estates bequeathed by dying wealthy men.23 The state allowed monasteries to
obtain estates from heirless men, which the state could have determined belonged to it.
Rather, the state allowed the Sangha to gain much from the legacy of the wealthy,
perhaps out of respect for the wishes of the deceased and the Sangha.
The interaction regarding inheritance between the Sangha and the state
exemplified the significance of the contradictions between Buddhist and Vedic laws and
the established of legal precedent as established by the king. One important precedent
regarding inheritance between the laws of the Buddha and the Vedic laws involved a
dispute between the king’s ministers and the Buddha. With the death of a monk owning
a large estate named Upananda, government ministers sought to seize his estate while
monks closed his chamber with the royal seal. The Buddha, cognizant of the situation,
dispatched Ananda to speak with the king regarding the inheritance of Upananda.
Ananda questioned the king on the existence of a relationship with Upananda, which the
king did not. After his questioning, Ananda convinced the king to agree that the
23 Gregory Schopen, Buddhist Monks and Business Matters: Still More Papers on Monastic Buddhism in India, (Ann Arbor, MI: The Institute of Buddhist Traditions, 2004), 11.
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deceased monk’s possessions belonged to the monastic community. Furthermore, the
two established the legal separation of the king’s secular affairs and the affairs of the
monastic community.24 The Upananda incident showed the influence of the Buddha and
his disciples in allowing for the Sangha to establish its legal independence from the
government.
The system of inheritance did not always work exactly to the interests of the state
and ultimately the king decided what would be confiscated when a man without heirs
died. In one case, a householder wanted to join a monastery and started the training
required for ordination. When the householder fell ill, his training stopped as monastic
rules prohibited the ordination of the ill. The would-be monk returned home to recover
with attendants from the monastery, but his condition worsened and he willed his estate
to the monastery. When he died, the state became interested in collecting his estate as he
was a sonless man, which according to Indian law, permitted the king to seize the estate.
The king declared, however, that the Buddha’s law permitted the Sangha to take the
estate as secular laws did not apply in this situation.25 The instances involving the deaths
of the householders showed the clear legal distinction between the state and the Sangha
as separate institutions. The latter account also suggests that ecclesiastical law held
precedence over secular law according to the early Buddhist ideal, but ultimately the king
mediated between the interests of the Sangha and the state.
The monks’ and nuns’ legal claim to the properties of householders had limits
because they lacked any legitimate claim to properties in certain circumstances. A
vihara, or house,26 may be donated to a monastery by a secular layperson without 24 Schopen, Buddhist Monks and Business Matters, 311-312.25 Schopen, Buddhist Monks and Business Matters, 103-104.26 Stanley Wolpert, “Krishnamurti, Jiddu,” ? Stanley Wolpert ed., Encylcopedia of India, Vol. 3., (Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Son, 2006), 42-43.
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formally handing the ownership of the property to the monastery. In one instance, the
king confiscated a vihara owned by a layperson and inhabited by monks. Despite the
pleas of the owners to do something about the seizure, the monks remained silent to the
owner and requested instructions from the monastery in regard to procedures for
abandoning the site.27 This instance clearly shows the king had the to right to seize the
property even when the owners remained alive and with monks residing on the property.
Even if the monks had legal recourse, perhaps a direct appeal to the king, they remained
silent. Ultimately, according to the Buddhist ideals, the king interpretted and enforced
inheritance and property laws, but the ideal king would remain faithful to the Buddhist
tradition.
The king had proper recourse if monks acted to his disliking by working with the
Sangha to establish new rules. In one anecdote, a monk meditated in the forest while
securing his legs closed to avoid any personal indiscretions with a goddess in the forest.
Having discovered the monk with his legs closed, the goddess angered by his gesture,
threw him into the air. Unfortunately, the monk, with legs still secured, landed on top of
the king sleeping on his palace roof. The king voiced his displeasure to the Buddha about
the monk’s nighttime behavior, resulting in the prohibition against forest meditation.28
Although the story may seem fanciful, it reveals a significant part of the relationship
between the Sangha and the state. The monk, although if his story is to believed did
nothing wrong, offended the king in the middle of the night at his own palace, which
required a measure to ensure such an incident never happened again. The king, rather
than directly reforming the monk’s rules, requested the Buddha address the situation.
27 Schopen, Buddhist Monks and Business Matters, 181.28 Schopen, Buddhist Monks and Business Matters, 26.
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Such actions show a clear separation between the king’s authority and the Sangha, while
showing that neither the state nor the Sangha possessed immediate authority over the
other.
A king may decide to remove the influence of the Buddha from his kingdom, but
in doing so he risks isolating himself from his people. According to the Pancavarsika,
the mischievous Devadatta convinced King Ajatasattu of Rajagaha to forbid his people
from listening to the Buddha or his monks and Devadatta also convinced the king not to
allow his people to give any alms or donations to the Buddha and his monks. The king’s
people become distressed at losing their opportunity to learn about the Dhamma and
complained that the Buddha, along with his disciples, would have to leave to request alms
elsewhere. Hearing such pleas, the god Indra left heaven to console the king’s subjects
and to support the Buddha, along with the Sangha. Although the god vowed to feed them
for five years, the Buddha reduced it to five days for ritual reasons. Indra’s divine
powers turn the town of Venuvana, where the Buddha stayed, into a palace where
spiritual entities served the Sangha. The king enticed by the divinity and good treatment
of the monks, permits himself and his people to enter the divine palace, where gods and
men listen to the Buddha and his Dhamma.29 This incident shows the relationship
between the populace, the king, and the Sangha with a few other characters involved.
Even though the king unjustly cuts off his kingdom’s relationship with the Sangha, the
Buddha made no attempt to force the king to accept the Dhamma and did not attempt to
supersede the king’s authority. Even when faced with the prospect starvation, the Sangha
remains in Venuvana. The upset populace remained peaceful and obedient to the king’s
29 Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 113.
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wishes. The situation resolved itself when divine forces sway the king from Devadatta to
listen to the Dhamma.
The previously mentioned incident in Venuvana is not the only instance of Vedic
influences as another king erred in his judgment in regard to the Dhamma. According to
some Buddhist traditions, the violation of Dhamma created dire circumstances for the
kingdom. In one such case, King Kanakavarna, ruler of a vast kingdom called
Jambudvipa, meditated on the subject of taxation, duties, and customs. Concluding from
his meditation that they were unwarranted, the king decreed an end to all forms of
taxation and government fees. The results were disastrous as the cosmos misaligned,
causing a twelve-year drought in Jambudvipa. The king, concerned over the possibility
of famine, confiscated his kingdoms food and distributed it evenly for eleven years. By
the twelfth year, the king only possessed one unit of food left and his kingdom remained
on the brink of starvation. Fortunately, a bodhisattva mystically flew to the palace and
received an audience with the king. The bodhisattva requested the last unit of food and
the king complied. As a result, the sky rained, releasing the kingdom from poverty and
the specter of starvation.30 The story of King Kanakavarna informs the reader about the
roles of the state and the Sangha.
King Kanakavarna administered his kingdom improperly, nearly resulting in the
death of his people. The king strayed from his obligations to his kingdom by meditating,
a task that should be left to others. The king’s actions of no taxes and complete
redistribution of wealth caused discord as it distorted merit and the market economy. The
king’s duty is to permit others to achieve enlightenment.31 The king’s distribution of
30 Andy Rotman, “Marketing Morality: The Economy of Faith in Early Buddhism,” 200, www.smith.edu/religion/documents/rotman-marketingmorality.pdf, 4-5.31 Rotman, “Marketing Morality,” 7-9.
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wealth failed to accumulate merit as it is the goal of the Sangha to help society gain
merit. Merit only accrued once the king gave food to the bodhisattva, which saved the
kingdom. The king should offer dana to spiritual people such as a bodhisattva or a
monastery. The story clearly distinguished the roles of the political figures and the
spiritual figures, who both contribute to a Buddhist society. The state collects taxes and
administers order, whereas the Sangha deals with spiritual matters such as the collection
of merit.
One historical king, Asoka, also appears in Buddhist texts as a legendary king
who donated generously to the Sangha. The legendary Asoka became an ideal Buddhist
king through his acts of generosity to the Sangha. In one particular incident, Asoka’s son
obligated Asoka to outbid his donation to the Sangha. Asoka tripled his son’s donation
by giving the Sangha his family, ministers, himself, and kingship, leaving only the royal
treasury. Using finance from the state treasury, the ministers bought back the king’s
donations for 400,000 pieces of gold, which allowed the king to recover the throne and
renewed him spiritually. The incident reinforced the distinction between the state and the
Sangha.32 Asoka’s generosity and willingness to hand the kingdom over to the Sangha
also showed an ideal balance between the Sangha and the state. The Sangha cannot
intervene in secular affairs and therefore cannot rule, whereas the legendary Asoka
cannot directly move the people toward enlightenment.
The ideal relationship between the Sangha and the state remained one of balance,
as neither could directly nor permanently dominate the other. Robin Lovin claims that
the ideal Buddhist king possessed authority over both the Sangha and the secular realm.33
32 Strong, “Rich Man, Poor Man, Bhikku, King,” 110-112.33 Lovin, “Ethics, Wealth, and Eschatology,” 205.
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His analysis of the Buddhist ideal, however, requires that the Sangha always submit to
the will of the king and integrates with the state at some level. Neither is the case, as the
Buddhist monks ideally submit to the king when their order is clearly in need of reform.
Furthermore, many anecdotes clearly separate secular law and the law of the Sangha,
leaving king to deal with the material world and usually not in the affairs of the Sangha.
An ideal or Cakkavatti king could not violate precedent established by Buddhist tradition,
therefore limiting his rule to the secular realm. The ancient Buddhist texts simply do not
support the placement of the king as leader of the Sangha and the secular kingdom in
classical India.
The ideal relationship between the Sangha and the state in Classical India required
that the two entities remain separate, along with instituting a system of balances to ensure
that neither could meddle in the affairs of the other. Ultimately, the ideal king ruled by
the Dhamma, whereas the Buddhist monks and nuns instructed and preserved the
Dhamma for the public. Both institutions supported each other to ensure the preservation
of the Dhamma and the maintenance of the status quo. The king received advice and
legitimacy from the Sangha, while the Sangha received dana and purification from the
king. Should the ideal relationship exist between the Cakkavatti king and the Sangha, the
general population may reach nibbana much sooner.
15
Works Cited
Central Intelligence Agency. “Burma.” CIA World Factbook, April 7, 2010. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (accessed April
2010).
Embree, Ainslie ed. Sources of Indian Tradition: From the Beginning to 1800.
New York: Columbia U. Press, 1988.
Harvey, Peter. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. New York: Cambridge UP,
2000.
Rotman, Andy. “Marketing Morality: The Economy of Faith in Early Buddhism.”
2009. www.smith.edu/religion/documents/rotman-marketingmorality.pdf.
Schopen, Gregory. Buddhist Monks and Business Matters: Still More Papers on
Monastic Buddhism in India. Ann Arbor: The Institute for the Study of Buddhist
Traditions, 2004.
Sizemore, Russell and Swearer, Donald ed. Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A
Study in Buddhist Social Ethics. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990.
Spiro, Melford. Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese
Vicissitudes. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
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