THE ATLANTIC WALL (2) Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway

ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATOR

STEVEN J ZALOGA received his BA in history from Union College and his MA from Columbia University. He has worked as an analyst in the aerospace industry for over two decades, covering missile systems and the international arms trade, and has served with the Institute for Defense Analyses, a federal think-tank. He is the author of numerous books on military technology and military history, with an accent on the US Army in World War II as well as Russia and the former Soviet Union.

ADAM HOOK studied graphic design, and began his work as an illustrator in 1983. He specializes in detailed historical reconstructions, and has illustrated Osprey titles on the Aztecs, the Greeks, the American Civil War and the American Revolution. His work features in exhibitions and publications throughout the world. He lives in East Sussex, UK.

FORTRESS 89

THE ATLANTIC WALL (2) Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway

STEVEN J ZALOGA ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK Series editors Marcus C o w p e r and N iko la i B o g d a n o v i c

First published in 2009 by Osprey Publishing Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford 0X2 OPH, UK 443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, USA E-mail: info@ospreypublishing.com

2009 Osprey Publishing Limited

All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.

ISBN: 978-1-84603-393-3 E-book ISBN: 978-1 -84908-125-2

Editorial by llios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com) Cartography: Map Studio, Romsey, UK Page layout by Ken Vail Graphic Design, Cambridge, UK (kvgd.com) Typeset in Myriad and Sabon Index by Michael Forder Originated by PPS Grasmere Printed in China through Bookbuilders

09 10 11 12 13 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

AUTHOR'S NOTE The author would like to thank Alain Chazette for the use of photos from his extensive archive. Rob Plas and Marc van Etten provided indispensable help in helping to track down bunkers in the Hoek van Holland area. Thanks also go to Wachtmeester Alex van Riezen and to the Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie for help in obtaining photos and other information on the coastal bunkers taking part in the Walcheren battles. David Keough at the US Army's Military History Institute was also most helpful in pointing out resources for this study.

ARTIST'S NOTE Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the color plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. All reproduction copyright whatsoever is retained by the Publishers. All enquiries should be addressed to:

Scorpio Gallery, PO Box 475, Hailsham, East Sussex BN27 2SL, UK

The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.

THE FORTRESS STUDY GROUP (FSG) The object of the FSG is to advance the education of the public in the study of all aspects of fortifications and their armaments, especially works constructed to mount or resist artillery. The FSG holds an annual conference in September over a long weekend with visits and evening lectures, an annual tour abroad lasting about eight days, and an annual Members' Day.

The FSG journal FORTls published annually, and its newsletter Casemate is published three times a year. Membership is international. For further details, please contact:

The Secretary, c/o 6 Lanark Place, London W9 1BS, UK

Website: www.fsgfort.com

THE WOODLAND TRUST Osprey Publishing are supporting the Woodland Trust, the UK's leading woodland conservation charity, by funding the dedication of trees.

FOR A CATALOG OF ALL BOOKS PUBLISHED BY OSPREY MILITARY AND AVIATION PLEASE CONTACT:

Osprey Direct, c/o Random House Distribution Center, 400 Hahn Road, Westminster, MD 21157 E-mail: uscustomerservice@ospreypublishing.com

Osprey Direct, The Book Service Ltd, Distribution Centre, Colchester Road, Frating Green, Colchester, Essex, C07 7DW E-mail: customerservice@ospreypublishing.com

www.ospreypublishing.com

CONTENTS

I N T R O D U C T I O N 4

DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 5 Defense sectors . Coastal artillery . Coastal obstacles . Coastal artillery radar Controlled submarine minefields - The midget submarine threat Coastal commando units

A T O U R OF T H E SITES 24 Belgium . The Netherlands - Norway . Denmark

T H E SITES IN C O M B A T 52 The Scheldt campaign . K-Verbande in the Netherlands . Combat in Norway The last battle

T H E SITES TODAY 60

FURTHER READING 61

GLOSSARY 63

INDEX 64

THE ATLANTIC WALL (2) BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK AND NORWAY

INTRODUCTION T h e At lant ic Wall w a s the larges t a n d m o s t extens ive fort i f icat ion p r o g r a m in m o d e r n E u r o p e a n history, far o u t s t r i p p i n g the M a g i n o t L ine in length, mater i a l , a n d cos t . T h i s is the s e c o n d b o o k in this series , fo l lowing Fortress 6 3 on the Atlantikwall on the French Atlant ic coa s t . Th i s v o l u m e extends the c o v e r a g e f r o m the Be lg ian c o a s t e a s t w a r d to the N e t h e r l a n d s a n d D e n m a r k , a n d n o r t h to N o r w a y . T h e p r e v i o u s b o o k f o c u s e d on the At lant ic Wall 's p r i m a r y role in repul s ing the inevitable All ied invas ion of F rance . In the case of the c o u n t r i e s c o v e r e d in this v o l u m e , the m i s s i o n w a s m o r e c o m p l e x . C o a s t a l defenses in B e l g i u m w e r e the s a m e as those in ne ighbor ing France a n d p a r t of the s a m e ant i - invas ion scheme . But for the rest o f this reg ion, the Atlantikwall w a s a re sponse to m o r e diverse threats p o s e d by the R o y a l Navy . T h e Brit ish art of w a r h a d long f avored coa s t a l ra id ing ; the n a m e s of m a n y o f the fort i f ied s ites m e n t i o n e d in this b o o k elicit echoes of p a s t batt les f r o m the N a p o l e o n i c age a n d before . T o a v o i d repeat ing the s a m e subjects c o v e r e d in the ear l ier F o r t r e s s v o l u m e , this b o o k shifts the focus a w a y f r o m ant i - invas ion defenses such a s coa s t a l obs t ac l e s , a n d prov ides greater coverage to other coas ta l defenses such as radar , control led mines , and coasta l defense smal l craft .

N o r w a y w a s the first c o u n t r y to see extens ive d e p l o y m e n t of coas ta l artillery, p r o v o k e d in large m e a s u r e by early British c o m m a n d o ra ids . Allied decept ion opera t ions through the w a r a t tempted to convince the G e r m a n s that a n invas ion of N o r w a y w a s p a r t of All ied strategy, in hopes of tying d o w n G e r m a n forces . There w a s a revival of N o r w e g i a n defenses in the late summer of 1 9 4 4 . T h e loss of critical U - b o a t bases in France forced the Kr iegsmar ine to d e p l o y its surv iv ing force to N o r w e g i a n h a r b o r s such a s T r o n d h e i m , inv igora t ing R o y a l N a v y ac t ions to these nor thern w a t e r s a n d p r o v o k i n g renewed defense efforts . W h e n the R e d A r m y p u s h e d the Wehrmacht out of F i n l a n d via the arct ic F i n n m a r k reg ion of N o r w a y , c o a s t a l defenses were re inforced to protect the t r o o p c o n v o y s s t reaming d o w n a long the coa s t f rom arctic wa te r s .

A l t h o u g h the threat of a m p h i b i o u s invas ion on the D u t c h coa s t w a s slight d u e to the terra in , the i m p o r t a n t p o r t s of R o t t e r d a m a n d A m s t e r d a m a n d their acce s s to the key r ivers l ead ing into the G e r m a n industr ia l hear t land g u a r a n t e e d se r ious for t i f ica t ion ef forts . D e n m a r k presents a different ca se altogether, wi th its defenses or iented pr imar i ly to keeping the British fleet out of the Bal t ic , wi th s t rong g u n pos i t i ons to cover the n a r r o w strai ts .

4

Of the regions covered in this b o o k , only the N e t h e r l a n d s s a w extensive combat . The Atlantikwall a long the Dutch coas t became involved in the a u t u m n 1 9 4 4 fighting to open the approaches to Antwerp . T h e fiercest of these battles took place on Walcheren, where British amphib ious forces pa id a heavy price to overcome a concentrat ion of fortified guns . N o r w a y remained a backwater for mos t of the war, the arctic north seeing s o m e c o m b a t in the a u t u m n of 1 9 4 4 during the wi thdrawal of G e r m a n forces f rom Finland. D e n m a r k w a s spared any extensive l and c o m b a t a n d its Atlantikwall defenses were never tested. Curiously, N o r w a y a n d D e n m a r k b e c a m e m o d e l s for the final evolut ion of German coastal defense doctrine, serving as the proving grounds for several new types of w e a p o n including guided torpedoes , underwater acoust ic sensors , a n d infrared detectors.

DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT G e r m a n coa s t a l defenses on the N o r t h Sea da te b a c k m a n y centur ies , a n d during the reforms of Kaiser Wilhelm in the late 1 8 8 0 s , the Kriegsmarine (navy) w a s ass igned this miss ion. These fortif ications were modern ized dur ing World War I, a n d the K r i e g s m a r i n e w a s conf ronted with the need to defend the occupied Belg ian c o a s t aga ins t Brit ish n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s . G e r m a n c o a s t a l fortification in World War I w a s not part icular ly e l abora te , usual ly consis t ing of open " k e t t l e " pos i t ions (Kesselbettungen), which were large circular g u n pits with crew shelters a n d protected recesses for a m m u n i t i o n a n d crew. T h e defense of the Belg ian c o a s t in 1 9 1 4 - 1 8 he lped to s h a p e G e r m a n at t i tudes a b o u t coa s t a l defense w h e n dea l ing wi th the R o y a l N a v y . Brit ish s t ra tegy favored peripheral opera t ions a n d ra iding, especial ly aga ins t vital por t s a n d other coasta l objectives . T h e classic e x a m p l e w a s the British nava l ra id aga ins t Zeebrugge and Os tend on Apri l 2 3 , 1 9 1 8 , which a t tempted to s a b o t a g e both ports by s inking b lockships in key p a s s a g e s . T h e Z e e b r u g g e ra id w a s part ly successful but the G e r m a n coas ta l batteries inflicted frightfully high casual t ies

A B O V E Three views of the Atlantikwall defences. The image on the r ight shows a 75mm anti- tank gun guard ing the shores of Ostend, now part of the Domain Raversijde museum. (Author's photograph)

B E L O W L E F T The crowning glory of German coast defense in Wor ld War I was the repulse of the British naval raid at Zeebrugge in 1918. This pho to was taken in June 1940 fo l lowing the fall of Belgium and shows German t roops operat ing one of the Belgian Vickers 3.7-inch guns near the famous Zeebrugge Mole where the 1918 batt le took place. (NARA)

B E L O W R I G H T The most vivid example of the value of coastal defense occurred on Apri l 9,1940 when Norway's Oscarsborg fortress on the approaches to Oslo sank the German cruiser Blucherwith gun and to rpedo fire. Three 280mm Model 1892/93 guns remained in German service w i th 5./MAA.501, and one is seen here shortly after the war when photographed by a US Army inspection team. (NARA)

"Alarm!" A German rifle section scrambles f rom a Bauform 502 personnel bunker, part of Strongpoint Roon in Middelkerke, Belgium. (A. Chazette)

on the raiding force. T h e Os tend raid w a s a failure due to G e r m a n gunfire, and a repeat ra id on M a y 10 w a s only marginal ly successful. T h e defense of these t w o por t s helped establ ish the mis s ion for the Kr iegsmar ine coasta l artillery. G e r m a n doctr ine did not f avor defenses subs tant ia l e n o u g h to prevent a full-scale invas ion , but rather sufficient to deter R o y a l N a v y ra ids and d i scourage British war sh ip s f rom b o m b a r d i n g the coas t .

W i t h the r i se to p o w e r of Hi t le r a n d the N a z i s in the ear ly 1 9 3 0 s , G e r m a n y e m b a r k e d o n its m o s t e l a b o r a t e fort i f icat ion effort of the m o d e r n era , the Westwal l , better k n o w n to the Allies a s the Siegfried L ine . Thi s linear defens ive line a l o n g G e r m a n y ' s wes te rn frontier h a d little tact ical re levance to the c o a s t a l defense m i s s i o n , but it h a d a subs tant i a l technical i m p a c t on the later Atlantikwall in t w o m a j o r re spect s . T o begin wi th , it he lped usher in a n e w g e n e r a t i o n of fo r t re s s d e s i g n tha t p l a c e d g rea te r e m p h a s i s on she l lp roo f a n d b o m b p r o o f c o n s t r u c t i o n t h r o u g h the use of steel-reinforced concrete . Unl ike the M a g i n o t L ine , these border fort i f icat ions were relatively sma l l b u n k e r s b a s e d on the exper iences of the a r m y in the trench fighting of 1 9 1 7 - 1 8 . Secondly , the Wes twa l l g a v e a d d e d i m p o r t a n c e to O r g a n i z a t i o n T o d t , a p a r a m i l i t a r y c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r m a t i o n u n d e r Dr. Fr i tz T o d t that b e c a m e a s s o c i a t e d wi th all m a j o r G e r m a n s ta te civil eng ineer ing pro jec t s i n c l u d i n g the a u t o b a h n . G i v e n the p e c u l i a r po l i t i ca l d y n a m i c s of N a z i G e r m a n y wi th m a n y l a r g e s t a te o r g a n i z a t i o n s vy ing for the f avor of the Fiihrer, O r g a n i z a t i o n T o d t h a d subs t an t i a l bureaucra t i c incentives to p u s h g r a n d i o s e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s w h e t h e r w a r r a n t e d by mi l i t a ry necess i ty or n o t . H i t l e r w a s e spec i a l ly s u s c e p t i b l e to T o d t ' s b l a n d i s h m e n t s due to his p e r s o n a l e n t h u s i a s m for g r a n d i o s e archi tecture , a s well a s his pe r sona l exper ience a s a n i n f a n t r y m a n in the trenches in Wor ld War I where bunkers w e r e a m a t t e r of life or d e a t h .

T h e bl i tzkrieg victories in the spr ing a n d early s u m m e r of 1 9 4 0 presented the W e h r m a c h t wi th a subs tant i a l new chal lenge of defending an extended coas t l ine f r o m the Arct ic Circle of northern N o r w a y , d o w n the Atlantic coas t to the N o r t h Sea t o w a r d s the S k a g e r r a k , s o m e 3 , 8 0 0 k m ( 2 , 4 0 0 miles ) . T h e four occup ied countr ies in the northern sector - N o r w a y , D e n m a r k , Belg ium, a n d the N e t h e r l a n d s - a l ready h a d m o d e s t coas ta l artillery defenses . T h e only coa s t a l defenses that p l ayed a role in the 1 9 4 0 c a m p a i g n were the N o r w e g i a n defenses in the O s l o F j o r d where the G e r m a n cruiser Bliicber w a s sunk on Apr i l 9 , 1 9 4 0 in a duel w i th t w o fort i f ied ba t ter ie s . A s the W e h r m a c h t d e p l o y e d for o c c u p a t i o n dut ies , these exis t ing coa s t a l defenses fo rmed a thin crust for w h a t w o u l d later emerge a s the Atlantikwall.

G e r m a n y remained on the offensive in 1 9 4 0 -4 1 a n d pa id little attention to defensive concerns . A significant number of large coastal batteries and ra i lway guns were deployed to the Pas-de-Calais on the English Channel , but this w a s an offensive opera t ion intended to provide fire suppor t for the p l a n n e d Seelowe invas ion of Brita in. In 1 9 4 1 , O r g a n i z a t i o n T o d t b e g a n a large construct ion p r o g r a m in several French ports to create mass ive b o m b p r o o f shelters to h a r b o r the U-boa t fleet in o p e r a t i o n s to s t rangle Britain by submar ine b l o c k a d e and c o m m e r c e raiding; smaller schemes were a l so u n d e r w a y on s u b m a r i n e bunkers in N o r w a y a n d S-boat ( torpedo boat ) shelters in the

6

Nether lands . With the g radua l a b a n d o n m e n t of p lans to invade Britain a n d the strategic shift to the R u s s i a n front, there w a s s o m e discuss ion in February 1 9 4 1 of erecting fortifications a long the Channel as an economy-of-force tactic, enabling relatively m o d e s t units to defend very long coast l ines . Hitler rejected these p lans , if for no other rea son than it might tip his h a n d regard ing p lans to invade the Soviet U n i o n in J u n e 1 9 4 1 . T h e only a rea to receive heavy fortification w a s the Channel I s lands , which enjoyed Hitler's special attention as the only British lands in his g r a s p .

The coas ta l defense d i l emma emerged late in 1 9 4 1 with the beginning of British ra ids a long the N o r w e g i a n coa s t . British special forces l anded on the Lofoten is lands on the northern N o r w e g i a n c o a s t on M a r c h 4 , 1 9 4 1 aga ins t minimal o p p o s i t i o n . T h i s p r o m p t e d the W e h r m a c h t to re inforce the s c a n t nava l c o a s t a l batter ies wi th a r m y bat ter ies . In M a r c h 1 9 4 1 , N o r w a y w a s allotted 1 6 0 a r m y coas ta l batteries a n d in J u n e this p r o g r a m w a s ex tended by adding 9 0 batteries to western E u r o p e a n d 10 to D e n m a r k . British c o m m a n d o operat ions cont inued in N o r w a y at Spi tzbergen on A u g u s t 1 7 , 1 9 4 1 , a n d a return raid to the Lo fo ten i s lands on D e c e m b e r 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 . T h e s e ra id s , a s well as s imilar ones on the French coa s t , were m o r e a nu i sance than a s ignif icant threat, but they caused s o m e w o r r y in Berlin. T h e direct result w a s a Fuhrer

T O P L E F T A variety of mun i t ion bunkers were developed to support arti l lery posit ions. This is an Fl 246 mun i t ion bunker, part of WN 82 Flak-Batterie Olmen in IJmuiden which suppor ted the fort i f ied 105mm flak posit ions on the crest of the coastal dune above. (Author's photograph)

T O P R I G H T Tobruks, more formally designated as Ringstande, were the most widely use field fort i f icat ion in the Atlantikwall. They were small, simple structures w i th a characteristic round opening for a machine gun or other weapon. Since they had an open roof and were bui l t to the lower B1 standards, they were not designated "permanent" fort i f ications. This example was part of the IJmuiden fort i f icat ion zone. (Author's photograph)

L E F T This is a superb example of the open-kettle-style gun pits typical of the Atlantikwall in 1940-43, armed in this case w i th a war-booty Cockerill 120mm mle. 1931 Belgian field gun. This is part of the Batterie Saltzwedel neu/Tirpitz of 6. /MAA.204from 1941 unti l April 1944, and now preserved at the Domain Raversijde museum. (Author's photograph)

T O P L E F T The Dieppe raid led to an intensive program to protect coastal batteries w i th steel-reinforced concrete casemates like this Bauform 671 armed w i th a 150mm C/36 destroyer gun and current ly preserved as part of the Domain Raversijde museum. (Author's photograph)

T O P R I G H T This is another example of camouflage, a Schneider 105mm mle. 1913 field gun of 4./HKAA.180 bui l t at Thyboron, Denmark in 1943 w i th the Bauform 671 casemate enclosed in a false wooden structure to look like a civil ian bui ld ing. (NARA)

direct ive o n D e c e m b e r 1 4 , 1 9 4 1 tha t o r d e r e d the cons t ruc t ion of a " N e w Westwal l with as smal l a n u m b e r a s pos s ib le of p e r m a n e n t f ixed t r o o p s . " The directive recognized that G e r m a n occupa t ion forces were stretched very thinly a l o n g the c o a s t , a n d that for t i f ica t ions c o u l d subst i tute for m a n p o w e r in r e m o t e a r e a s . T h e pr ior i ty for the fort i f icat ion p r o g r a m w a s N o r w a y , the French a n d Belg ian Channe l c o a s t , the D u t c h coa s t , a n d the G e r m a n Bight, in that order. T h e e m p h a s i s on N o r w a y in this early directive w a s a recognit ion that N o r w a y presented a n especia l ly difficult defensive chal lenge due to its extens ive coas t l ine , a s well a s the i m p o r t a n c e of the coa s t a l c o n v o y s a long the N o r w e g i a n c o a s t that were br inging vital mater ia l s to the G e r m a n w a r industry f r o m the mines in northern N o r w a y . T h e coas ta l artillery pos i t ions h a d t w o pr inc ipa l m i s s i o n s : p r o t e c t i o n of G e r m a n c o a s t a l sh ipp ing , a n d defense aga ins t enemy ra ids . T h e initial N e w Westwal l construct ion w a s on a very smal l scale a n d focused o n reinforcing the coas ta l artillery pos i t ions by prov id ing select batteries with personnel bunkers for their crews a long with protec ted a m m u n i t i o n bunker s .

O n February 2 7 / 2 8 , 1 9 4 2 , the c o m m a n d o s struck France aga in at Bruneval, spiriting a w a y a secret G e r m a n coas ta l radar. Thi s p r o m p t e d another Fiihrer directive on M a r c h 2 3 , 1 9 4 2 which recognized that wi th the se tbacks in R u s s i a , the Atlantic coas t eventually might be threatened with Anglo-American a t t a c k s . T h e highest pr ior i t ies for fort i f icat ion rema ined N o r w a y and the Channel I s lands . T h e fortif ication construct ion escalated a hundredfold f rom an initial 3 , 0 0 0 cubic meters of reinforced concrete used in October 1 9 4 1 to 3 7 3 , 7 0 0 cubic meters in September 1 9 4 2 .

In sp i te of the s u r g e in c o n s t r u c t i o n , the N e w Wes twa l l p r o g r a m h a d l imited re sources due to the d e m a n d s of the R u s s i a n front. T h e pr imary focus of the cons t ruc t ion w a s a r o u n d m a j o r p o r t s , s ince these were v iewed as the m o s t a t tract ive target s for Brit ish r a id s . T o priorit ize the cons t ruct ion , a few d o z e n key p o r t s w e r e d e s i g n a t e d a s fort i f ied a r e a s (Festungsbereicben). T h e St. N a z a i r e r a id , which occurred on M a r c h 2 8 only a few days after the Fi ihrer d i rect ive , on ly se rved to i l lus trate the c o n t i n u i n g vulnerabi l i ty of the p o r t s . By J u n e 1 9 4 2 , the N e w Westwal l for the first t ime a b s o r b e d m o r e concrete than the U - b o a t bunker p r o g r a m .

O n A u g u s t 1 3 , 1 9 4 2 Hit ler held a meet ing wi th senior officials to outl ine the s t ra teg ic a i m of w h a t he n o w d u b b e d Atlantikwall, the At lant ic Wall . " T h e r e is only one batt le front (the R u s s i a n Front ) . T h e other fronts can only be de fended wi th m o d e s t f o r c e s . . . D u r i n g the winter, with fanat ica l zeal , a for t res s m u s t be bui l t w h i c h will h o l d in all c i r c u m s t a n c e s . . . e x c e p t by an

8

at tack last ing for w e e k s . " F o r the first t ime , Hit ler la id ou t s o m e deta i l s of the s c o p e of the p r o g r a m , ind ica t ing tha t the Atlantikwall w o u l d invo lve 1 5 , 0 0 0 bunker s a n d 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s on the At lant ic c o a s t f r o m S p a i n to the N e t h e r l a n d s to be f inished by M a y 1 9 4 3 , the earl iest t ime a n All ied inva s ion of wes te rn E u r o p e w a s likely. T h i s p r o g r a m d id n o t a d d r e s s the speci f ic requirements for S c a n d i n a v i a , t h o u g h Hit ler cons idered the pro jec t s there to be par t of the overal l Atlantikwall effort. H e re i terated that the focus s h o u l d be the defense of por t s that w e r e v iewed a s the m o s t likely All ied ob ject ives while the o p e n beaches in b e t w e e n p o r t s w e r e a s s i g n e d a l o w e r pr ior i ty . T h e A u g u s t 1 9 4 2 direct ive s u b s t a n t i a l l y shi f ted the f o c u s of Atlantikwall defenses . Whi le pr ior i ty h a d p r e v i o u s l y g o n e to the C h a n n e l I s l a n d s a n d N o r w a y , the focus w a s n o w shifted to the French a n d Belg ian C h a n n e l c o a s t . O f the 1 5 , 0 0 0 bunker s in the p r o g r a m , 1 1 , 0 0 0 were a l loca ted to the A O K . 7 and A O K . 1 5 (Armeeoberkommando, A r m y high c o m m a n d ) , which covered f rom the western Nether l ands through Be lg ium to N o r m a n d y . T h e A O K . l on the At lant ic c o a s t o f F r a n c e w a s a l lo t ted 1 , 5 0 0 to 2 , 0 0 0 b u n k e r s a n d the remaining bunkers were author ized for the N e t h e r l a n d s . T h i s shift in pr ior i ty w a s in par t due to the imminent comple t ion of m u c h of the forti f ication w o r k on the Channe l I s l ands , but m o r e impor tant ly to the g r o w i n g threat of All ied invas ion . O n l y d a y s after this conference , the All ies s t ruck wi th a m a s s i v e raid at D i e p p e , on A u g u s t 1 7 , 1 9 4 2 . T h e D i e p p e ra id only served to reinforce the urgency of the p r o g r a m , t h o u g h it d id not lead to any m a j o r c h a n g e in its s cope . Its one technical effect w a s to focus the need for better p ro tec t ion of the c o a s t a l art i l lery bat ter ie s tha t w e r e v u l n e r a b l e in o p e n g u n p i t s . T h e A u g u s t directive led to the first m a j o r w a v e of Atlantikwall cons t ruc t ion , the Winterbauprogramm (Winter C o n s t r u c t i o n P r o g r a m ) f r o m S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 2 through Apri l 1 9 4 3 . A l t h o u g h the focus r e m a i n e d o n re inforc ing the n u m e r o u s coas ta l batteries a l ready d e p l o y e d a l o n g the c o a s t , the D i e p p e r a id emphas i zed the need to shield the g u n batter ies wi th infantry p o s i t i o n s a n d to establ i sh defenses a l o n g the so-cal led Freie Kuste (open c o a s t ) , the c o a s t a l areas between the port s a n d other defensive zones . Hit ler d rew the conc lus ion that the g u n bat ter ies h a d to be e n c a s e d in s tee l -re inforced c o n c r e t e , a n d insis ted that he pre ferred " 2 0 p r o t e c t e d g u n s to 2 0 0 u n p r o t e c t e d g u n s . " Thi s initiated the Scbartenbauprogramm in the spr ing of 1 9 4 3 .

T h e Atlantikwall cons t ruc t ion p r o g r a m relied o n s t a n d a r d i z e d b u n k e r des igns p r e p a r e d by the a rmy ' s Fort i f ica t ion Engineer C o r p s in Berl in. T h e original Westwall fortifications had been designated in the O B (Offene Bettung, open p la t form) or V f (Verstarkfeldmassig, re inforced field pos i t ion) series . Al though s o m e of these des ignat ions were retained dur ing the construct ion of the Atlantic Wall, a new series of des ignat ions emerged. There is s o m e disparity in h o w these designs are identified, s o , for e x a m p l e , the " 6 1 1 " bunker des ign is variously called B a u f o r m 6 1 1 (construction p lan 6 1 1 ) ; R 6 1 1 (Rege lbau 6 1 1 :

Some units showed considerable ingenui ty in camouf laging bunkers like this example painted to resemble a house in Ostend. (National Archives Canada PA-1744386)

9

construct ion s tandard 6 1 1 ) or H 6 1 1 (Heer 6 1 1 : Army 611) to distinguish army b u n k e r s f r o m air force (L : Luf twaf fe ) a n d navy ( M : Kr iegsmar ine ) bunker des igns . T h e r e were a b o u t 7 0 0 of these s t a n d a r d des igns , of which a b o u t 2 5 0 were used on the Atlantic Wall ; m o s t of the new designs intended for the Atlantikwall were in the new 6 0 0 series . It shou ld be ment ioned that these des igns were often modi f ied in the field to better match local terrain contours . Besides the s tandard ized des igns , there were localized var iat ions of s tandard p lans a s well as entirely new designs , somet imes identified with an S K suffix for Sonderkonstruktion (special des ign) .

In genera l , O r g a n i z a t i o n T o d t d i s t ingui shed between t w o m a i n categor ies of fort i f icat ion: the p e r m a n e n t (stdndige) " b o m b p r o o f " bunker s , which were fully enc losed types , a n d re inforced field fort i f icat ions , which were usual ly o p e n - t o p p e d a n d inc luded such types a s o p e n g u n p i t s a n d the u b i q u i t o u s T o b r u k . T h e latter w a s a smal l defensive p o s i t i o n n a m e d after improv i sed defenses dur ing the fighting a r o u n d T o b r u k in 1 9 4 2 that h a d been created us ing concrete d r a i n a g e p ipes . Official ly cal led Ringstande, the T o b r u k s were typical ly used a s w e a p o n s s t ands fitted with an open ring pos i t ion at one end. M o s t were built for use a s mach ine-gun pos i t i ons , but they were a r m e d with a variety of w e a p o n s including m o r t a r s , pedes t a l -mounted guns a n d obsolete t a n k turrets (Panzerstellungen).

There were five ma in types of permanent , b o m b p r o o f bunkers . The most c o m m o n w a s the Unterstand (bunker) which c a m e in three main varieties: the personnel bunker (Unterstand fur Mannscha)Hen), munit ions s torage bunker (Unterstand fiir Munition) a n d the relatively u n c o m m o n w e a p o n s ga rage (Unterstand fiir Waff en und Gerat). These bunkers m a d e up more than half of all the permanent bunkers . T h e utility bunkers (Versorgungsstande) were very similar in design and included medical , kitchen and other miscel laneous types. T h e second m o s t c o m m o n type of permanent bunker w a s the gun casemate (Schartenstand), which w a s a fully enclosed gun bunker with an open embrasure and these m a d e up a b o u t a third of the permanent bunkers on the Atlantikwall with w i d e s p r e a d cons t ruct ion beginning in the spr ing of 1 9 4 3 . These were supported by dedicated fire-control/observation bunkers (Beobachtungsstande).

T a b l e 1 : Atlantikwall b u n k e r c o n s t r u c t i o n

R e g i o n A O K . 1 5 A O K . 7 A O K . 1 N e t h e r l a n d s D e n m a r k N o r w a y To ta l

Personnel 946 960 554 357 814 3,631

Storage 396 181 149 114 184 213 1,237

HQ 118 68 42 39 95 24 386

Gun casemate 767 876 733 241 432 131 3,180

Observation 54 34 46 6 88 43 271

Utility 72 57 42 13 140 24 348

Tobruks 2,399 3,142 1,338 1,596 7 ?

Total 4,752 5,318 2,904 2,366 7,753 435 17,528

Coastline (km) 708 1,566 818 383 7,314 2,532 13,321

Density/km 6.7 3.4 3.5 6.1 >0.24 >0.17 1.3

Atlantikwall fortifications on the North Sea

Navy Coastal Navy Coastal Artillery Batteries Flak Batteries

14

2./MAA.201 3./MAA.201 4./MAA.201 5./MAA.201 6./MAA.201 7./MAA.201 8./MAA.201 9./MAA.201

9. 1 ./MAA.202 10. 4./MAA.202 11. 5./MAA.202 12. 6./MAA.202 13. 7./MAA.202

./MAA.202 15. 9./MAA.202 16. 2./MAA.203 17. 3./MAA.203 18. 4./MAA.203 19. 1./MAA.204 20. 2./MAA.204 21. 3./MAA.204 22. 4./MAA.204 23. 5./MAA.204 24. 6./MAA.204 25. 7./MAA.204 26. 1./MAA.205 27. 2./MAA.205 28. 3./MAA.205 29. 4./MAA.205 30. 5./MAA.205 31. 6./MAA.205 32. 7./MAA.205 33. 8./MAA.205 34. 1./MAA.607 35. 2./MAA.607 36. 3./MAA.607 37. 4./MAA.607 38. 5./MAA.607 39. 6./MAA.607 40. 7./MAA.607 41. 8./MAA.607 42. 9./MAA.607 43. 10./MAA.607 44. 11./MAA.607

45. 2./MFA.246 46. 3./MFA.246 47. 4./MFA.246 48. 5./MFA.246 49. 1./MFA.808 50. 2./MFA.808 51. 3./MFA.808 52. 5./MFA.808 53. 1./MFA.810 54. 3./MFA.810 55. 1./MFA.813 56. 2./MFA.813 57. 3./MFA.813 58. 4./MFA.813 59. 5./MFA.813 60. 2./MFA.815 61. 3./MFA.815 62. 4./MFA.815 63. 5./MFA.815 64. 1./MFA.816 65. 2./MFA.816 66. 3./MFA.816 67. 4./MFA.816 68. 5./MFA.816

Army Coastal Artillery Batteries A. 1./HKAA.1230 B. 2./HKAA.1230 C. 3./HKAA.1230

4./HKAA.1230 5./HKAA.1230 6./HKAA.1230 1./HKAA.1231 2./HKAA.1231 3./HKAA.1231 4./HKAA.1231 5./HKAA.1231 1./HKAA.1240 4./HKAA.1240 5./HKAA.1240 6./HKAA.1240

StPG V ^ < 5 ? Schiermonnikoog * ^ .

StPG Texel

364

Den Helder 3 8 3 & a 4 5 1

4940y34 5 StPG Callantsoog 4 r 3 9

StPG Petten A |

StPG Schoorl *43

N

A

StPG Castricumj44

Festung V I Jmu iden 6 J A

StPGZandvoor t 6 3 l ^ 2 A 6 3 6Jft A 6 6

Amsterdam ( D C 5

4 7 <

i Groningen

Usselmeer (ZuiderZee)

StPG Katwijk l 6

Festung j f c Hoek van Holland 27 1 ? r

56A^

StPG Oostvoorne ^ 0 ^ 2 9 ^

StPG Goeree l t ^ f % * A K

N E T H E R L A N D S Utrecht

StPG Schouwenj^

VB 1 3 V 5 3 V l i s s ingen 1 4 A A 5 4 4 1 5

StPG Breskens18 16

StPG Zeebrugge^

StPG Oostende204

Coastal defenses in the Low Countries of ten included an addit ional seawall to prevent All ied tanks f rom exi t ing the beach. This is a fairly typical example along the beach nor th of Nieuport. (National Archives Canada PA-174344)

n u m b e r of bunkers relative to the coast l ine w o u l d be smal l c o m p a r e d with the other areas of the Atlantikwall. T h e N o r w e g i a n figures d o not include the numerous fortifications created a long the coas t either by tunneling into the rock or using quarr ied rock for construct ion.

Defense sectors Infantry de fenses a l o n g the Atlantikwall t e n d e d to be thickest where the l ike l ihood of invas ion w a s greates t , so coas ta l infantry pos i t ions were densest in B e l g i u m a n d the N e t h e r l a n d s , whi le re lat ively thin in D e n m a r k a n d N o r w a y . T h e bas ic tact ical e lement of the infantry coa s t a l defenses w a s the re s i s t ance nest (W or W N : Widerstandsnest) w h i c h usua l ly cons i s ted of a smal l n u m b e r of bunker s a n d T o b r u k s , roughly between a s q u a d and p l a toon in s ize. In i m p o r t a n t sec tor s , a res i s tance nest w o u l d be built a r o u n d a gun p o s i t i o n , such a s a 5 0 m m p e d e s t a l - m o u n t e d ant i -a i rcra f t g u n in an o p e n T o b r u k , or a s imi lar w e a p o n in a full g u n c a s e m a t e . Several res i s tance nests f o r m e d a s t r o n g p o i n t (St .R: Stiitzpunkt) which w a s a p la toon-s ized defense at m i n i m u m , a n d s o m e t i m e s u p to a c o m p a n y in size. Several s t rongpoint s f o r m e d a s t r o n g p o i n t g r o u p (St.P.Gr.: Stiitzpunktgruppe) which w a s between a c o m p a n y a n d a ba t ta l ion in size a s s i gned a f rontage of a k i lometer or m o r e . Several s t rongpo in t g r o u p s f o r m e d a defense zone (VB: Verteidigungsbereich) t h o u g h this ca tegory w a s not widely used in France or Belg ium, which instead d e s i g n a t e d the reg imenta l sec tor s a s c o a s t a l defense g r o u p s ( K V G : Kiisten Verteidigung Gruppen), a n d the d iv i s iona l sec tors a s c o a s t defense sectors (KVA: Kiisten Verteidigung Abscbnitte).

T h e l a rge s t a n d m o s t p o w e r f u l c o a s t a l defense sector w a s the fortress (Festung), wh ich w a s not app l i ed to tact ical field f o r m a t i o n s , but rather w a s reserved for s t rategica l ly i m p o r t a n t sites such a s m a j o r p o r t s . T h e Festung d e s i g n a t i o n e n c o m p a s s e d all de fens ive f o r m a t i o n s in the de fended a r e a , a n d a s of ten a s n o t w a s p r i m a r i l y c o m p o s e d o f K r i e g s m a r i n e f o r m a t i o n s re in forced by H e e r ( a rmy) f o r m a t i o n s . A Festung w a s typica l ly centered a r o u n d a core pos i t ion (Kernwerk), which w a s a heavily fortified s trongpoint . T h e Kernwerk contro l led the key e lement in the defense of the site, such as the shou lder s of a p o r t or a n i s l and cover ing a river estuary.

Coastal artillery T h e centerpiece of G e r m a n coa s t a l defense w a s coas ta l artillery. Al though there h a d been s o m e des ign of specific c o a s t a l arti l lery w e a p o n s pr ior to 1 9 4 0 , the e n o r m o u s d e m a n d s of the Atlantikwall a s well a s its relatively low priori ty in G e r m a n industrial p lanning m e a n t that near ly all c o a s t a l artillery w a s a d a p t e d f r o m n a v a l or field artillery. In genera l , the K r i e g s m a r i n e establ i shed the initial por t defenses and these p o s i t i o n s were later ampl i f ied by the d e p l o y m e n t of a r m y coa s t a l batter ies . However , the pat tern varied b o t h by reg ion a n d t ime , a n d these i s sues a re e x a m i n e d in m o r e detail in the country sections of this b o o k .

12

The interior of a Bauform 612 gun casemate armed w i th a 75mm PaK 40 anti- tank. This bunker is part of the Domain Raversijde in Ostend, and the gun is located further back in the casemate than in war t ime since the embrasure is covered to protect the interior f rom the weather. (Author's photograph)

Neither the army nor navy could agree on coastal artillery doctrine or tactical practices. The navy regarded their coasta l artillery as a l and-based version of war sh ip artillery a n d fo l lowed s imilar f ire-control pract ices . K r i e g s m a r i n e coastal artillery batteries were nearly a lways p laced near the shore with direct view to sea so that the guns could engage enemy warsh ips by direct sighting if necessary. N a v a l tactical doctrine stressed the need to engage m o v i n g enemy warsh ips , so nava l fire-control s ta t ions a s s igned to each battery h a d r ange finders and plotting tables to detect, track, and target enemy warsh ips a n d to pas s this da ta to the batteries. Besides the essential fire control po s t (Leitstand), the naval batteries often had a separate angle-measuring pos t (Peilstand) located some distance from the main battery to ensure greater precision of range-finding. The navy preferred to m o u n t their guns on f ixed, traversing m o u n t s , which in practice meant shielded m e d i u m guns and shielded or turreted heavy guns on sockets . In practice, the navy w a s somet imes obl iged to use field guns due to shortages of suitable naval guns .

The Batterie Saltzwedel neu/Tirpitz of 6./M AA.204 on the western side of Ostend was armed w i th p in t le -mounted 105mm SKC/32U submarine guns in Bauform 671 casemates start ing in Apri l 1944. This well-preserved example is part of the Domain Raversijde museum; the embrasure is covered by a w i n d o w to protect it f rom the weather. (Author's photograph)

13

The a rmy preferred to locate its coas ta l batteries s o m e distance f rom shore so that the batteries were not immediate ly evident to enemy warsh ip guns . T h e a r m y s a w its main miss ion as repel invas ions or ra iding part ies , a n d engag ing m o v i n g enemy warships w a s not a high priority. T h e a r m y did not like f ixed artillery for coa s t a l defense, but preferred n o r m a l field g u n s . This w a s based on the experiences of World War I, such as those at Gal l ipol i , where the army drew the conclus ion that it w o u l d be impossible to protect an extended shoreline with sufficient w e a p o n s , and instead opted to keep the coas ta l artillery mobi le so that it cou ld be m o v e d to a threatened sector once the s i tuat ion b e c a m e clearer. T h i s proved to be a very short-s ighted tact ical not ion ; All ied World War II a m p h i b i o u s landings h a d a l so t aken the Gal l ipo l i lessons to heart and favored brief, violent, and overwhelming a t tacks that w o u l d not a l low the W e h r m a c h t t ime to br ing u p addi t iona l artillery to repel the l and ings . In the event, a rmy tactical doctrine resulted

in battery fire-control conf igura t ions that p l a c e d little e m p h a s i s o n m o v i n g target plott ing, and thus h a d little capabi l i ty to engage m o v i n g targets beyond ordinary direct sight engagement . A Swedish coasta l artillery survey of G e r m a n practices after the w a r s trongly f avored the K r i e g s m a r i n e pract ices over the Heer's doctrine.

Coastal obstacles T h e Wehrmacht used v a r i o u s types of c o a s t a l obs tac le to i m p e d e the All ied use of landing craft. Thi s p r o g r a m w a s a par t icular favorite of Erwin R o m m e l when he t o o k over the invas ion front in the a u t u m n of 1 9 4 3 . T h e s e obs tac le s were especial ly dense in B e l g i u m a n d the N e t h e r l a n d s , but qui te s p a r s e in N o r w a y . T h e y are covered in m o r e detai l in the p rev ious b o o k in this series on the Atlant ic Wall in F rance (Fortress 6 3 ) .

-

A quick source of coastal defenses came f rom the use of war-booty tank turrets like this APX-2B turret f rom Belgian armyACG-1 cavalry tanks. A total of 13 of these were used along the Belgian coast, this one at Ostend. (A. Chazette)

Coastal artillery radar Until World War II, c o a s t a l arti l lery w a s m o r e effective in day l ight h o u r s . N i g h t e n g a g e m e n t s d e p e n d e d o n i l l u m i n a t i o n of the t a rge t w i th f lares or

IN COASTAL MOUNTING | | ] RHEINMETALL 150MM C/36 DESTROYER GUN

One of t he mos t c o m m o n naval guns used in Kr iegsmar ine Atlantikwall g u n bat ter ies was t he 15cm T o r p e d o b o o t s Kanone (Tbts K) C/36. This dest royer g u n had been d e v e l o p e d by Rheinmeta l l in t he early 1930s, and these w e a p o n s we re usually d e p l o y e d in t h e no rma l Tbts LC/36 m o u n t w h i c h e m p l o y e d a conven t i ona l a rmor sp l in ter -sh ie ld cove r ing all o f t he g u n except t he rear. The g u n and m o u n t w e i g h e d 18.8 met r ic tons and e m p l o y e d a conven t i ona l socket w h i c h

had a special a d a p t o r t o bo l t it t o t h e f loo r o f t h e casemate . The g u n f i red a 45.3kg pro jec t i le t o a m a x i m u m range o f 23 .5km.

The M272 was par t o f a fam i l y o f s imi lar g u n casemates {Geschutzschartenstande), and t h e f i rst was bu i l t in Apr i l 1943 w i t h 27 be ing cons t ruc ted in No rway (5), D e n m a r k (10), Ne ther lands (4) and France (8). This w e a p o n was also m o u n t e d in o the r types o f g u n casemates, such as t h e Bau fo rm 6 7 1 .

In the age before radar, searchlights and flares were the primary means of n ight i l luminat ion for coastal arti l lery batteries. This is a 60cm Flakscheinwerfer 36 preserved at the Domain Raversijde museum in an anti-aircraft gun pit. (Author's photograph)

searchl ights . T h e s e t rad i t iona l techniques were far f rom sat i s factory in the event of s t rong w i n d s , fog or other weather condi t ions that were a frequent occurrence a l o n g the c o a s t . T h e advent of nava l sur face-search r a d a r opened u p the pos s ib i l i ty of c rea t ing a l l -weather , 2 4 - h o u r c o a s t a l de fenses . T h e K r i e g s m a r i n e h a d been the p ioneers of G e r m a n mil i tary r a d a r and h a d begun to receive the F r e y a ear ly w a r n i n g r a d a r in 1 9 3 8 ; a b o u t a h u n d r e d were c o m p l e t e d pr ior to the o u t b r e a k of the war, but m a n y were requis i t ioned by the Luf twaf fe for air defense .

Freya w a s fo l lowed shortly a f terwards by the Seetakt (sea-tactical) radars , which were the first ded ica ted surface-search nava l r a d a r s . T h e Luftwaffe s p o n s o r e d a s epara te d e v e l o p m e n t t rack , a n d the Wi i rzburg family of f ire-control r a d a r s for direct ing flak batteries w a s ready in 1 9 4 0 . After a p romis ing start , G e r m a n r a d a r development s tagnated until 1 9 4 3 due to 1 9 4 1 decis ions to cut long-term a d v a n c e d research on the presumpt ion that the w a r w o u l d s o o n be over. T h e history of G e r m a n war t ime radar development is too c o m p l i c a t e d to char t here , but the p r o g r a m h a d several effects on G e r m a n coas ta l defenses. Surface search r a d a r s such as Seetakt proved to be well suited

L E F T The most c o m m o n Kriegsmarine coastal radar on the Atlantikwall was the FuMO-215 Wiirzburg-Reise, wh ich was used bo th in the tactical search role, and in some cases as a dedicated artil lery fire contro l radar. (NARA)

R I G H T The FuMO-11 Rennerwas the Kreigsmarine's first a t tempt at a dedicated microwave artil lery fire control radar, but technical problems w i th the design severely curtailed its deployment . (NARA)

16

to the early warn ing role and cou ld prov ide g o o d , all-weather coverage out to the hor izon of enemy shipping , a s long a s the Allies were not employing electronic j a m m i n g . T h e Kriegsmarine created a N a v a l Tactical R a d a r Service and erected a chain of coasta l radars as part of the Atlantikwall effort. By 1 9 4 2 , these early radar s a l lowed G e r m a n coas ta l artillery to engage British shipping in the C h a n n e l . These surface-search radar s were not accurate enough in azimuth even if reasonably accurate in r ange , a n d this led to further interest in dedicated fire-control r adar s .

T h e sma l l n u m b e r of n a v a l r a d a r s ava i l ab le d id n o t p e r m i t e a c h g u n ba t te ry or even each reg iment to h a v e its o w n s ta t ion . T h e K r i e g s m a r i n e e s t a b l i s h e d O Z (Ortungszentralen: n a v a l radar r e p o r t i n g centers) a s the l ink be tween the r a d a r s t a t ions a n d the v a r i o u s other e lements of coa s t defense . Air d a t a w a s e x c h a n g e d with the Luftwaffe ' s F M Z (Flugmelderzentralen: aircraft r epor t ing centers) whi le n a v a l d a t a w a s p a s s e d to the reg ional Seeko . T h e Seeko reg iona l c o m m a n d centers h a d an artillery staff a n d this staff in turn p a s s e d the d a t a d o w n to the arti l lery g r o u p c o m m a n d e r s a n d then o n d o w n to the ind iv idua l g u n ba t ter ie s by te lephone . T h i s w a s n o t a n espec ia l ly efficient m e t h o d for f a s t - m o v i n g e n g a g e m e n t s a n d led to interest in the c o n s t r u c t i o n of s m a l l , i n e x p e n s i v e r a d a r s ta t ions that cou ld be dep loyed at the bat tery level.

D e v e l o p m e n t of tact ical artil lery f ire-direction r a d a r s w a s n o t m a t u r e in G e r m a n y in 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 . G e r m a n y a t t e m p t e d to a d a p t Al l ied m i c r o w a v e technology to the Seetakt with the cent imetr ic F u M O - 1 1 (Renner) r a d a r for m o r e precise a z i m u t h d a t a . H o w e v e r , the Renner suffered ser ious reliabil ity p r o b l e m s a n d w a s never p r o d u c e d in a d e q u a t e quant i t ie s . In the a b s e n c e of this c o m p a c t f ire-control radar , the K r i e g s m a r i n e w a s ob l iged to rely o n the large F u M O - 2 1 4 Wiirzburg-Riese (Giant Wi i rzburg ) , a n excellent a l l -purpose radar original ly des igned for a ircraft detect ion a n d f lak contro l . T h e s e were deployed by the K r i e g s m a r i n e in the c o a s t a l role b o t h for sur face search a n d artillery fire direct ion, but the size of the r a d a r m e a n t that they c o u l d only be employed f rom large f ixed sites , a n d were very vu lnerab le to All ied a t t ack . A derivative of the F u M O - 2 1 4 c o d e n a m e d F u M O - 2 1 4 / - 2 1 5 Scheer w a s a l s o deve loped speci f ical ly for art i l lery fire d i rec t ion a n d it o f fered better n a r r o w - b e a m a c c u r a c y a n d grea ter re s i s t ance to j a m m i n g ; it w a s never avai lable in a d e q u a t e n u m b e r s . A third f ire-control radar , the B a r b a r a , w a s a l so in deve lopment but not widely d e p l o y e d .

The deployment patterns of Kriegsmarine coasta l r adar s varied considerably from country to country. In the Nether lands , the 41 s t R a d a r C o m p a n y deployed 32 naval surveillance radars , with only one at Langerak dedicated to artillery fire control and none in the air search role. In contrast , of the 4 1 coas ta l r adar s in Norway , 2 2 were used for naval surveillance, 10 as dedicated fire control radar s , and 9 as air search radars . T h e significant difference in a l lotment w a s due in part to the large number of Luftwaffe air search r adar s in Nether lands a s par t

Another source of electronic early warn ing of approaching All ied ships and aircraft were passive radar mon i to r ing posts like this FuMB.21/27. These picked up the emissions f rom All ied radars and this data was used to alert the coastal radars. (NARA)

17

of the K a m m h u b e r line shielding Germany, a n d the corresponding lack of need for naval air search radar s . T h e large number of nava l surveil lance r a d a r s in the Nether lands a long such a short coast l ine reduced the need for dedicated fire-control radars . Instead, the 41s t R a d a r C o m p a n y deployed two intermediate O M Z forward r a d a r report ing s tat ions at ' s -Gravenhage (The H a g u e ) a n d Den Helder besides the O Z report ing center in H a a r l e m to m o r e quickly disseminate tracking da ta . In contras t , the g u n batteries in N o r w a y lacked nearby surveillance radar s and so s o m e of the m o r e important batteries were issued their o w n F u M O - 2 1 4 radar. These disparities could be seen in pass ive radar monitoring post s as well with nine pos t s in the Nether lands and only t w o in all of N o r w a y .

In general, G e r m a n coastal defenses had adequate coasta l r adar coverage for normal survei l lance, but the n e t w o r k s s e l d o m h a d the re sources to p r o v i d e much in the w a y of fire-control direction due to a shor tage of m i c r o w a v e sets . Priority in advanced r adar s went to the Luftwaffe 's air defense of the Reich. Furthermore, the G e r m a n naval r adar ne tworks s e ldom h a d the resources or resiliency to survive dedicated Allied anti-radar c a m p a i g n s that preceded m a j o r amphib ious opera t ions . T h e G e r m a n r a d a r s cou ld be s m a s h e d by air a t tack and blinded by electronic countermeasures ; Ang lo-Amer ican r a d a r technology remained years ahead of G e r m a n technology both in terms of the r a d a r s a n d electronic countermeasures .

To make up for the shortage of radars , the Kriegsmarine attempted to develop a variety of other sensors for coastal defense. T h e m o s t important of these were radar interception/direction-finding receivers (FunkmejZbeobacbtungsgerdt) such as the F u M B - 4 S a m o s a n d F u M B - 5 F a n o , which p icked u p the s ignals f r o m Allied aircraft and ship radars . These stations could often detect Allied ships at twice the distance of neighboring radars . However, they were not precise enough for use in fire direction, and were mainly used for early warning. Allied electronic discipline during m a j o r a m p h i b i o u s opera t ions dramat ica l ly reduced their effectiveness, since they had no value if the Allied ships and aircraft were not emitting signals.

A n o t h e r p a s s i v e t a rge t de tec t ion s y s t e m w a s the Z e i s s W P G - Z S t Wdrmepeilgerdt infrared detector. Th i s w a s a forerunner of the c o n t e m p o r a r y thermal imag ing fire-control sy s tem a n d w a s intended to detect enemy ships by the heat s ignature . Thi s set w a s c o m p a c t e n o u g h for use in coa s t a l artillery

HJ M l78 FIRE CONTROL POST, SEEZIELBATTERIE Kriegsmarine coastal g u n bat ter ies i nc luded a f i re con t ro l post {Leitstand) t o ident i fy , t rack, and des igna te ta rgets for t h e bat tery. Three-story posts like th is one had a range f inder post on t he t o p , an observa t ion deck in t h e f ron t , a n d w o r k i n g space on the lower level. The rangef inder post cou ld use a var ie ty o f stereoscopic range f inders, usual ly warsh ip types m o u n t e d o n sockets. The observa t ion deck had var ie ty o f f i xed observa t ion devices for ta rge t t rack ing , usual ly a p e d e s t a l - m o u n t e d op t i ca l s ight for d e t e r m i n i n g bear ing w i t h t he data passed electr ical ly t o t he c o m p u t i n g r o o m be low .

A l t h o u g h t he t w o observa t ion decks we re t h e mos t obv ious features o f such a bunker , t he heart o f t h e o p e r a t i o n was in the chambers located at t he base o f t h e bunker . These c o m p a r t m e n t s m i m i c k e d t he f i re con t ro l on a warsh ip , b u t d u e t o t he f ixed pos i t ion o f t he bat tery , t h e f i r i ng c o m p u t a t i o n s were less e laborate t h a n o n a m o v i n g warsh ip . The c o m p u t i n g

HEERENDUIN, WN 81 , IJMUIDEN, THE NETHERLANDS

r o o m received data f r o m t h e obse rva t i on decks above w h i c h we re en te red i n to t h e f i re d i rec t i on c o m p u t e r (Rechenschieber) a n d t h e n i n teg ra ted w i t h bear ing data f r o m an ad jacen t bear ing c o m p u t e r {Kleingerat) o b t a i n e d f r o m t h e bat tery 's smal l Peilstand bunke r loca ted s o m e d is tance away. The ad jacen t p l o t t i n g r o o m m a i n t a i n e d data o n t h e targets , usual ly w i t h range and de f l ec t i on p l o t t i n g boards . Once t h e target 's range, bear ing , a n d speed w e r e d e t e r m i n e d , a f i r i ng so lu t i on was c o m p u t e d a n d passed t o t h e ind iv idua l guns via a special s w i t c h b o a r d {Scholtkasten). The f i re con t ro l bunke r was t h e bat tery 's c o m m u n i c a t i o n h u b hav ing rad io a n d t e l e p h o n e l inks t o h igher headquar te rs as we l l as t o o the r ba t te ry posts.

The M 1 7 8 con f i gu ra t i on s h o w n here was f irst cons t ruc ted in Apr i l 1943 and was n o t especial ly c o m m o n , w i t h o n e each in No rway a n d t h e Nether lands and t w o in France. However , t h e genera l features we re fair ly t yp ica l .

The Kriegsmarine was not especially enthusiastic about the use of control led mines for harbor defense, but began deploy ing such weapons in 1944. This is the most c o m m o n type, the RMA; the control cables that led back to the shore command post are evident in this view. (NARA)

bat te r i e s , h a d a n a z i m u t h a c c u r a c y of t w o mils a n d c o u l d detect l arge w a r s h i p s to a r a n g e of a b o u t 1 5 - 2 0 k i lometer s . L ike m a n y devices on the " b l e e d i n g e d g e of t e c h n o l o g y " it h a d rel iabi l i ty a n d c o s t i s sues ; the a r m y s h o w e d m o r e e n t h u s i a s m for it than the navy. T h e Vara battery in N o r w a y rece ived a set in ear ly 1 9 4 5 , a n d the a r m y d e p l o y e d four sets in Fe s tung S t a v a n g e r to detect a p p r o a c h i n g l and ing craft . In D e n m a r k , three sets were dep loyed at E sb j e rg in 1 9 4 5 to cover the h a r b o r entrance a n d a single set w a s be ing dep loyed near C o p e n h a g e n at He l l e rup in the spr ing of that year.

Controlled submarine minefields C o n t r o l l e d s u b m a r i n e mines a re o n e of the o ldes t f o r m s of nava l mine . In contras t to the m o r e famil iar f o r m of naval mines that are a r m e d when they are depos i ted at sea , contro l led mines are c o m m a n d ac tuated a n d so remain inact ive for m o s t of their d e p l o y m e n t . T h e y are m o s t c o m m o n l y used for h a r b o r defense a n d they are especial ly va luable in s i tuat ions where other types of naval mines w o u l d p o s e t o o great a threat to commercia l waterborne traffic. T h e U S A r m y w a s one of the m o s t enthus ia s t ic p r o p o n e n t s of contro l led s u b m a r i n e mines a n d h a d e m p l o y e d t h e m in the defense of the A m e r i c a n c o a s t since the 19th century. A l t h o u g h the Kr ieg smar ine employed buoyant control led mines in World War I, during the rea rmament p r o g r a m of the 1930s the navy high c o m m a n d decided aga ins t a modern ized equivalent . T h e British ra ids on Dieppe on A u g u s t 1 9 , 1 9 4 2 a n d St. N a z a i r e on M a r c h 2 8 , 1 9 4 3 m a d e it quite clear that G e r m a n harbor defenses were inadequate and that controlled mines c o u l d prov ide a useful ad junc t to other m e a n s of h a r b o r defense such a s c o a s t a l artillery. T h e K r i e g s m a r i n e h a d been reluctant to p lant extensive minef ie lds b l o c k i n g m a j o r p o r t s d u e to the h a z a r d they p o s e d to n o r m a l fishing a n d c o m m e r c i a l traffic a s well a s their o w n war sh ip s . T h e control led minefields permit ted n o r m a l active minefields to be set up a r o u n d the por t s , with a single clear channel covered by control led s u b m a r i n e mines that could be left d o r m a n t until a n a t tack occurred .

T h e value of control led submar ine mines remained controversial within the Kr ieg smar ine , but a p r o g r a m w a s begun in 1 9 4 3 . Rather than develop a new

mine , four exist ing types of seabed mines were modif ied as contro l led mines by a d d i n g water t ight fittings for

cables to connect them to shore . T h e mines were p lanted on the shore b o t t o m and connected

by u n d e r w a t e r cab le to a shore control s ta t ion . T h e control s ta t ion could

c o m m a n d - d e t o n a t e the mines based on visual t racking of an enemy vessel, or

I b a s e d on the magnet i c s ignature of the enemy vessel f rom the magnetic detector in the mine itself when the ship p a s s e d overhead . T h e mines could a l so be act ivated to operate in

a n o r m a l , a u t o m a t i c m o d e , relying on their magnet ic detector. In total , 2 5

harbor s were fitted with 7 2 9 controlled w

submar ine mines in 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 , with 12 of these p o r t s in F rance . B o t h D e n m a r k and

the Nether l ands h a d five por t s covered , while Be lg ium h a d t w o a n d N o r w a y only one .

2 0

One of the solutions to the threat of British midget submarines was to deploy these Rheinmetall-Borsig R300 rocket-propel led depth charge launchers to Norwegian and Danish ports in 1944-45. (NARA)

The midget submarine threat T h e R o y a l N a v y b e g a n to p r o b e G e r m a n h a r b o r defenses in N o r w a y wi th midget s u b m a r i n e s , s tar t ing wi th a fa i led C h a r i o t a t t a c k on the ba t t l e sh ip Tirpitz in the T r o n d h e i m f jord in O c t o b e r 1 9 4 2 . T h i s a t t ack w a s fo l lowed by a part ia l ly successful a t t ack on Tirpitz on Sep tember 2 2 , 1 9 4 3 by X - C r a f t , a n d a fa i led p e n e t r a t i o n of Bergen h a r b o r by W e l m a n craf t in N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . T h e pr incipal underwater defense to this po in t h a d been an t i - to rpedo b o o m s a n d nets , which were obv ious ly i n a d e q u a t e . T h e K r i e g s m a r i n e b e g a n to invest igate techniques both for the detect ion of the m i d g e t s u b m a r i n e s a s well a s m e a n s to a t tack them once detected. Unl ike the R o y a l N a v y a n d U S Navy , which h a d a l ready dep loyed s e a b e d m a g n e t i c a n o m a l y detec tor s , the Kr iegsmar ine did not use this technique for h a r b o r defense , a l t h o u g h such a system w a s under deve lopment by 1 9 4 5 . T h e K r i e g s m a r i n e did a t t e m p t to deploy acous t i c s ensor s , the E l e k t r o a k u s t i c K H A {Kiistenhorchanlage) a n d the c o m p e t i n g A t l a s Werke K U G - 5 . T h e s e w e r e p a s s i v e a c o u s t i c s t a t i o n s that were a n c h o r e d in h a r b o r s to listen for enemy s u b m a r i n e s , usua l ly wi th mult iple s ta t ions to m a k e it pos s ib le to t r i angula te the source of the s o u n d . O n e of the K H A sys tems w a s d e p l o y e d at H o r n b a e k in D e n m a r k , but the acoust ic sys tems were m o s t widely used in N o r w e g i a n h a r b o r s , wi th s o m e 10 sets dep loyed in 6 h a r b o r s a n d f jords by 1 9 4 5 .

R h e i n m e t a l l - B o r s i g h a d a l r e a d y b e g u n w o r k o n a r o c k e t - p r o p e l l e d a n t i - s u b m a r i n e d e p t h - c h a r g e launcher , the b r e e c h - l o a d e d , s ing le t u b e 3 8 0 m m R a k e t e n w e r f e r 3 0 0 M 4 3 which fired a 3 0 0 k g rocke t pro ject i le w i th a 1 5 8 k g explos ive charge to a r ange of a b o u t 3 k m . A smal l n u m b e r were sent for tr ials wi th M A A . 5 0 6 at A g d e n e s in the T r o n d h e i m f jord in Apr i l 1 9 4 4 where they were j u d g e d to be r e a s o n a b l y success fu l . T h e y w e r e d e p l o y e d in m o d e s t number s with coas ta l artillery batteries to protect h a r b o r s in N o r w a y as well a s with 2 . / M A A . 5 1 8 in D e n m a r k in the E s b j e r g defense sector. S o far a s is k n o w n , they were not u sed in c o m b a t .

Coastal commando units O n e of the m o s t despera te innova t ions in G e r m a n c o a s t a l defense w a s the creat ion of specia l n a v a l c o m m a n d o units in 1 9 4 4 . D e s u l t o r y ef forts to deve lop min ia ture s u b m a r i n e s b e g a n in 1 9 4 3 , s p u r r e d on b o t h by Bri t i sh

21

The K-Verbande submarine units were designed to be mobi le so that they could be moved to invasion sites. This B iber f rom K-Flotilla.261 being towed on its standard transport trailer by a half-track pr ime mover was burned out by an air attack on the Amiens-Bapaume road in early September 1944. (NARA)

e x a m p l e s and by the Ital ian successes in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . T h e s e scat tered efforts were finally conso l idated by Vice Admira l H e l m u t h Heye in April 1 9 4 4 as K o m m a n d o der K l e i n k a m p f v e r b a n d e ( K d K or K-Verbande : Smal l C o m b a t Unit C o m m a n d ) . T h e first midget s u b m a r i n e a t t acks were c o n d u c t e d aga ins t the All ied fleet off A n z i o in late Apr i l 1 9 4 4 . In c o n t r a s t to the J a p a n e s e , Italian and British use of smal l s u b m a r i n e s , which were offensively or iented a n d used for n a v a l r a id ing , the K - V e r b a n d e w a s env i s ioned a s a nove l , low-cost , ant i - invas ion force for c o a s t a l de fense . T o cut t h r o u g h the u s u a l military bureaucracy, this force w a s independent of regional naval c o m m a n d s . The K-Verbande eventually t o o k control of a w i d e range of unconvent iona l w e a p o n s including m a n n e d torpedoes , midget submar ines , shore-based gu ided torpedoes , r o b o t a t tack b o a t s , a n d nava l c o m m a n d o units .

Each of the five K-Divisionen (K-Divisions) included several K-Flotil la, each specializing in a part icular type of craft. T h e initial opera t ions were conducted by manned torpedoes , which were an improv i sed submar ine consis t ing of an unarmed , m a n n e d control t o rpedo on top a n d an a r m e d G 7 e electric t o r p e d o below. The first vers ion, the Neger , w a s used at Anz io a n d w a s fo l lowed by the improved M a r d e r . A tota l of s ix N e g e r / M a r d e r flotil las were d e p l o y e d ; about 2 0 0 N e g e r and 3 0 0 M a r d e r were built. T h e M a r d e r m a n n e d to rpedoes were aga in dep loyed f rom the French c o a s t in J u l y - A u g u s t 1 9 4 4 , a n d were subsequently sent to Belg ium, the Nether l ands , N o r w a y , a n d D e n m a r k . T h e M a r d e r s u b s were later s u p p l e m e n t e d by m o r e sophi s t i ca ted o n e - m a n

Q 105MM SK C/32, MARINE FLAK BATTERIE WEST (3./MFLA.810), STUTZPUNKT EDELWEISS, NOLLEDIJK, VLISSINGEN, THE NETHERLANDS The 1 0 5 m m SK C/32 was one o f t h e mos t c o m m o n Kr iegsmar ine flak weapons , and had or ig ina l ly been des igned by Rhe inmeta l l -Borsig for small warsh ips. The basic warsh ip vers ion was fitted w i t h a shrapnel shie ld, and this t y p e was f r equen t l y used o n land. Dur ing Wor l d War II, w i t h t he increasing use o f th is w e a p o n in the coastal f lak role, an enc losed tu r re t m o u n t was deve loped , p r imar i l y for wea the r p r o t e c t i o n , since these batter ies were located a long t h e Nor th Sea. There w e r e t w o conf igura t ions o f steel cupo la : t h e r o u n d e d t y p e seen here, and a similar des ign bu i l t o f w e l d e d f lat sheet steel. The cupo la was m o u n t e d on a var ie ty o f concre te schwere Flakstand g u n pi ts w i t h cavit ies for a m m u n i t i o n s towage a r o u n d the i r per iphery .

Each ba t te ry had fou r o f these tur re ts , and th is par t icu lar ba t te ry was also s u p p o r t e d by a Fl 246 a m m u n i t i o n bunker-fire d i rec t i on i n f o r m a t i o n came f r o m a nearby W u r z b u r g A radar c o d e n a m e d Wi lma . Three bat ter ies o f th is r e g i m e n t we re loca ted in t h e i m m e d i a t e Festung Vl iss ingen area, MFB No rd , Ost a n d West , all w i t h t h e same w e a p o n s . This ba t te ry was c o m m a n d e d by Lt. K rau tman a n d had a c o m p l e m e n t o f 123 t r oops . One o f its tu r re ts was des t royed a n d o n e l i gh t l y d a m a g e d d u r i n g an RAF raid on Oc tobe r 9. The ba t te ry saw extens ive c o m b a t use b o t h in an ant i -a i rcraf t m o d e a n d against surface ta rge ts d u r i n g t h e fighting a l o n g t h e Scheldt in Oc tobe r 1944.

German coastal defense technology at the end of the war was a curious mix of innovat ion, desperat ion, and improvisat ion. There was no better example than the initial deployments of advanced, wi re-guided T10 Spinne torpedoes by the K-Verbande at Strib in Denmark in early 1945. The torpedoes were housed in a concrete garage and loaded on an improvised wooden cart. To launch the to rpedo, the cart was lowered to the shore by winch, and the to rpedo released and launched off the cart once submerged. (NARA)

s u b m a r i n e s which cou ld carry t w o to rpedoes , n o t a b l y the Biber, a n d 10 Biber flotillas were eventually organized . A b o u t 3 3 0 Biber and 3 9 0 of the later M o l c h were delivered. T h e K-Flotillas were des igned to be m o b i l e , a u t o n o m o u s units that could be held in reserve a w a y from the coast , a n d then rapidly m o v e d into pos i t ion by land to strike at Allied invasion forces. They were carried on a special wheeled trailer that could be rapidly m o v e d by r o a d using a half-track prime-mover, a n d then transferred into the water at a suitable b o a t landing or beach.

T h e K - V e r b a n d e a l s o inc luded the Linse explos ive craft , which were small w o o d e n mo t o r b o a t s opera ted in units consis t ing of a c o m m a n d

b o a t a l o n g with t w o exp los ive b o a t s . T h e explos ive boa t s were opera ted by a s ingle c r e w m a n w h o s teered t h e m c lose to the target , ba i l ing out at an o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t . Contro l of the Linse w a s then taken over by radio-control f r o m the c o m m a n d boa t . O n str iking the enemy vessel , the explos ive charge in the rear of the b o a t s a n k , a n d w a s de tonated a few seconds after impact by a de lay fuze to m a x i m i z e d a m a g e . A to ta l o f 1 ,201 L inse b o a t s were m a n u f a c t u r e d . A L inse flotilla h a d a s t a n d a r d c o m p l e m e n t of 16 c o m m a n d b o a t s a n d 3 2 exp los ive b o a t s a n d 11 L inse flotillas were organized . Besides the s u b m a r i n e s a n d L inse b o a t s , the K-Div i s ionen usual ly included a naval c o m m a n d o p l a t o o n ( M E K : Marine Einsatz Kommando) with 3 0 - 6 0 t roops for demol i t ion a n d ra id ing .

T h e K - V e r b a n d e s a w c o n s i d e r a b l e c o m b a t in the N e t h e r l a n d s dur ing the c a m p a i g n a l o n g the Scheldt f r o m the a u t u m n of 1 9 4 4 through the early winter of 1 9 4 5 , but their m o s t extensive dep loyment w a s in Scandinav ia with four of the five d iv i s ions s t a t ioned in N o r w a y .

A TOUR OF THE SITES Belgium D u r i n g the G r e a t War, the Kr ieg smar ine ' s c o a s t a l artillery force exper ienced its first l a rge- sca le d e p l o y m e n t a w a y f r o m h o m e w a t e r s a l o n g the Belg ian c o a s t . S o m e 2 2 5 g u n s w e r e d e p l o y e d , shielding the cana l exits that led to the U - b o a t h a r b o r in B r u g g e (Bruges ) . T h e success of the U - b o a t s in c o m m e r c e ra id ing a r o u n d Brita in prec ip i ta ted the legendary R o y a l N a v y ra ids of M a r c h 1 9 1 8 aga ins t Z e e b r u g g e a n d O s t e n d . After the war, little of the 1 9 1 8 defenses r e m a i n e d , hav ing been sp iked by the G e r m a n s pr ior to their w i t h d r a w a l and s c r a p p e d after the war. Be lg ium h a d a m o d e s t a r ray of coa s t a l defenses in the interwar years inc luding the excel lent Vickers 9 4 m m (3.7in.) pedesta l gun , a n d these w e r e init ial ly o c c u p i e d by G e r m a n t r o o p s in 1 9 4 0 before m o r e e l a b o r a t e defenses were o r g a n i z e d .

T h e G e r m a n c o a s t a l artil lery forces dep loyed in Be lg ium between 1 9 4 0 a n d 1 9 4 4 w e r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y less t h a n t h o s e be tween 1 9 1 4 a n d 1 9 1 8 . Z e e b r u g g e lost its s t rategic i m p o r t a n c e , a s the longer-ranged U - b o a t s were b a s e d o u t o f h a r b o r s in F r a n c e ra ther t h a n in the m o r e conf ined w a t e r s o f B e l g i u m . T h e Atlantikwall in B e l g i u m w a s large ly an e x t e n s i o n of the C h a n n e l defenses in the n e i g h b o r i n g P a s -de-Ca l a i s reg ion of F rance under A O K . 1 5 cont ro l . A s a resul t , the defense sec tor s here were n u m b e r e d a n d

2 4

T O P L E F T Kettle posit ions were typical of the early Belgian batteries like this camouf laged 155mm GPFof3. /HKAA.1260in Middelkerke. (A. Chazette)

T O P R I G H T Some of the early naval batteries in Belgium had the advantage of shielded guns like this 105mm SKL/40 of 7./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Kursaal. (A. Chazette)

M I D D L E Bunkers were often sheathed in camouf lage nets as seen in this stretch of defenses at Wenduine near Blankenbergh in September 1944, part of a 1 .Marine-Funkmessabtei lung coastal radar post. A Wurzburg Riese radar is evident to the r ight. (National Archives Canada PA-174350)

L E F T The Belgian coast had a relatively heavy concentrat ion of railroad guns for its heavy artil lery. This is the 280mm Kurze Bruno stat ion in Bredene w i th E.696. (A. Chazette)

25

The brains of the naval gun batteries were contained in the p lo t t ing rooms located deep inside the fire control post. These rooms contained a variety of mechanical and electro-mechanical comput ing devices, which converted data f rom the range finders and bearing devices into f i r ing solutions for the battery's guns. (NARA)

T a b l e 2 : W e h r m a c h t coas t a l a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s in B e l g i u m , s u m m e r 1944

N a v y coas t a l b a t t e r i e s B a t t e r y n a m e N o . o f g u n s Ca l ibe r

1./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Hamilton 4 75mm

2./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Hundius 4 105mm

3./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Salzwedel-Alt 4 75mm

4./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Ramien 4 105mm

5./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Schutte 4 105mm

6./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Salzwedel-Neu 4 105mm

7./MAA.204 Seezielbatterie Kursaal 4 105mm

A r m y coas t a l b a t t e r i e s B a t t e r y n a m e N o . of g u n s Ca l i be r

1./HKAA.1240 HKB Vosscheslag 6 155mm

4./HKAA.1240 HKB Groenendijk 6 155mm

5./HKAA.1240 HKB De Panne 6 155mm

6./HKAA.1240 HKB Westende 6 155mm

A r m y r a i l r oad ba t t e r i e s B a t t e r y l o c a t i o n N o . of g u n s Ca l ibe r

E.718 Knokke 3 170mm

E.717 Blankenberghe 3 170mm

E.655 Zeebrugge 4 150mm

E.687 Lisseweghe 2 203mm

E.690 Bredene 4 280mm

2 6

n a m e d in the A O K . 1 5 fa sh ion as K V A . A (Kiisten Verteidigung Abschnitt-A: C o a s t Defense Sector-A) . E a c h K V A r o u g h l y c o r r e s p o n d e d to a d iv i s iona l sector, and w a s further divided into three reg imenta l sectors ( K V A . A 1 to A 3 ) .

T h e navy guns in Be lg ium were a n unusua l ly mot ley selection including Tsarist 3in. field guns rechambered by the Poles in 1 9 2 6 for s t andard French 7 5 m m ammunit ion , as well as m o r e conventional naval guns . T h e predominant a rmy coasta l w e a p o n w a s the K 4 1 8 ( f ) , better k n o w n by its French des ignat ion of 1 5 5 m m GPF. T h e m o s t powerfu l w e a p o n s in Be lg ium were not the fixed batteries , but rather four r a i l road g u n batter ies . T h e m o s t c o m m o n w e a p o n w a s the 1 7 0 m m K ( E ) , which w a s a gun taken f rom the World War I Deutschland class and remounted on rail carr iages , and there w a s a l so a battery with the powerful 2 8 0 m m Kurze Bruno . As in the neighboring A O K . 1 5 sectors in France , the Belgian coas t h a d a denser concentrat ion of infantry pos i t ions than in the neighboring Nether lands because of its role in defending aga ins t a n expected Allied amphib ious invas ion. In the s u m m e r of 1 9 4 4 it w a s occupied by the 712.1nfanterie Divis ion, 89 .Armee K o r p s . Since the Belgian coa s t w a s only 36 miles (58km) long, the Atlantikwall construct ion there c o n s u m e d only 5 1 0 , 4 2 0 cubic meters of concrete - less than five percent of the total .

The Netherlands C o a s t a l de fenses in the N e t h e r l a n d s c o n s t i t u t e d a b o u t a tenth of to ta l Atlantikwall fort i f icat ion activity in 1 9 4 2 - 4 4 . T h e N e t h e r l a n d s w a s never

A B O V E L E F T Coastal s t rongpoints f requent ly had forward arti l lery observat ion bunkers in the dunes like this Bauform 143, part of St.P. Lohengrin in Zoutelande between Westkapelle and Vlissingen. The armored cupola can be seen on the roof on the bunker. Note also that the rear entrance door is wel l protected by a machine-gun posit ion in enfi lade. This particular bunker has been expert ly restored by the Bunkerbehoud foundat ion and has a full interior; the rails on the roof are a safety feature and not part of the original design. (Author's photograph)

A B O V E R I G H T Life in a German coastal bunker was cramped. This is the preserved interior of a Bauform 502 of St.P. Lohengrin in Vlissingen and this small room wou ld have accommodated ten soldiers. (Author's photograph)

L E F T Seezielbatterie Wijk-am-Zee, 2.1 MAA.201, was equ ipped w i th four Bauform 671 gun casemates as seen to the r ight wh ich were armed w i th 150mm TbKC/36 naval guns dur ing the war. Its M473a fire control post can be seen to the left; it was in use as a seaside restaurant when visited by the author in 2008. (Author's photograph)

2 7

A "batt leship of the dunes," the Seezielbatterie Schveningen-Nord of 8./MAA.201 armed w i th 150mm SKC/28 naval guns. In this view, the mult i - t ier S414 fire control post can be seen in the foreground as wel l as three of the Bauform 671 gun casemates beyond. (Author's photograph)

espec ia l ly h igh o n the list o f p r o b a b l e Al l ied i n v a s i o n p o i n t s , s ince the low-lying l and behind the c o a s t a l d ikes cou ld be readi ly f looded a n d m a d e i m p a s s i b l e . T h e D u t c h p o r t s a t R o t t e r d a m a n d A m s t e r d a m a n d their access to key w a t e r w a y s l ead ing into the G e r m a n industr ia l hea r t l and ensured a s igni f icant for t i f ica t ion effort o n the D u t c h c o a s t . A s e c o n d a r y r e a s o n for h e a v y de fense o f the D u t c h p o r t s w a s their ro le in b a s i n g S -boa t t o r p e d o b o a t s , w h i c h w e r e very act ive in the n a v a l c a m p a i g n s in the N o r t h Sea . A n u m b e r of substant ia l S-boat shelters were built in D u t c h harbor s to defend this force aga in s t R A F b o m b e r r a id s .

T h e major i ty of the Dutch coas ta l defenses were subordinate to the W B N (Wehrmachtsbefehl in den Niederlanden: A r m e d Forces C o m m a n d in the Nether lands ) . T h e except ion w a s the Scheldt estuary region a round Breskens and Vlissingen; it w a s subordinate to the neighboring A O K . 1 5 which controlled G e r m a n a r m y units in the Pas-de-Cala i s and Belgian coast .

There were four pr imary defense zones in the Netherlands , two designated at the highest level as Festung (fortress) and the other two as Verteidigungsbereich (defense zone) . T h e single m o s t heavily fortified area w a s the H o e k van Hol land ( H o o k of Hol land) due to its strategic importance. Aside from including the cities of The H a g u e and Rot terdam, this estuary and port area offered access to the two m o s t important rivers in this area of northern Europe , the M a a s (Meuse) and the Rhine . N e a r l y a quar ter of the m a j o r fortif ications built in the Nether lands during the w a r were located in this sector. T h e defense centered around the N e w Waterway, the late 19th-century canal connecting Rot te rdam to the N o r t h Sea. T h e center of the defenses w a s its Kernwerk on the south bank of the canal near the site of today's Europor t .

T h e s e c o n d Festung in the N e t h e r l a n d s w a s I J m u i d e n . While this smal l f ishing p o r t w o u l d hard ly s eem to meri t such a des ignat ion , the fortified area served to cover the entrance of the ne ighbor ing N o r t h Sea C a n a l which led to A m s t e r d a m a n d the I J s se lmeer (Zu ider Z e e ) . T h e Kernwerk w a s b a s e d on For te i l and , a D u t c h fortif ied i s l and at the entrance of the cana l . Th i s Festung a l s o inc luded a heavy concent ra t ion of nava l f lak batter ies for air defense, a l o n g with fortif ied r a d a r s t a t ions .

2 8

T h e nor thernmos t of the m a j o r D u t c h fortified zones w a s V B D e n Helder. T h i s site h a d s t ra teg ic s i gn i f i cance a s a m a j o r p o r t a t the t ip o f N o r t h H o l l a n d , c o n t r o l l i n g n a v a l a c c e s s in to the I J s se lmeer . T h e f o u r t h m a j o r defense sec tor w a s V B V l i s s i n g e n ( F l u s h i n g ) , w h i c h c o n t r o l l e d a c c e s s to the Scheldt E s t u a r y a n d the p o r t of A n t w e r p . T h i s defense sector inc luded a s u b s t a n t i a l a r s e n a l o f n a v a l ba t te r i e s f a c i n g the N o r t h S e a , a s wel l a s a d d i t i o n a l ba t ter ie s to c o n t r o l the Sche ld t . O n the s o u t h e r n b a n k of the Scheldt E s t u a r y w a s S t r o n g p o i n t G r o u p B r e s k e n s , a s u b s t a n t i a l de fens ive p o s i t i o n in its o w n r ight wi th a s i gn i f i cant Landfront. A l t h o u g h these defensive pos i t i ons were or ig inal ly under W B N c o n t r o l , in S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 2 , they were t rans ferred to the n e i g h b o r i n g A O K . 1 5 c o m m a n d a s p a r t of the C h a n n e l C o a s t de fense ef fort . Wi th the a d v a n c e of C a n a d i a n a n d Br i t i sh forces in A u g u s t 1 9 4 4 , the A O K . 1 5 respons ib i l i ty w a s shifted further u p the coa s t , t ak ing contro l of s t r o n g p o i n t s u p to O o s t v o o r n e . With the l ibera t ion of Antwerp in September 1 9 4 4 , the Scheldt E s t u a r y suddenly t o o k o n greater i m p o r t a n c e , s ince w i t h o u t c o n t r o l of the Sche ld t the p o r t w a s v i r tua l ly useless due to the threat of the subs t an t i a l G e r m a n c o a s t a l de fenses . D u e to this c h a n g e in i m p o r t a n c e , this s ec tor w a s r e d e s i g n a t e d a s Festung a n d p layed a s ignif icant role in the bruta l O c t o b e r - N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 4 e n g a g e m e n t s which will be covered in m o r e detai l later.

Besides the usua l coa s t a l artil lery bat ter ies , the N e t h e r l a n d s h a d a n unusually heavy deployment of Kr iegsmar ine flak batteries . These were m o s t often d u a l - p u r p o s e 1 0 5 m m nava l guns that h a d a s e c o n d a r y role of c o a s t defense. T h e w i d e s p r e a d dep loyment w a s in p a r t due to the need to defend Dutch harbors f rom R A F at tacks , but the Nether lands w a s in the pa th of Allied heavy b o m b e r s head ing t o w a r d s Germany . S o the batter ies were used b o t h in harbor defense and aga ins t the b o m b e r s t reams . In 1 9 4 3 a lone , the nava l flak batteries fired 1 3 , 2 5 3 r o u n d s of 1 0 5 m m a n d 2 6 , 9 1 4 r o u n d s of 2 0 m m ammunit ion . T h e flak batteries p layed an impor tan t role in defending D u t c h harbors as they were avai lable in sufficient quant i ty to m a k e air a t tacks costly. For e x a m p l e , on J a n u a r y 17 , 1 9 4 5 a ra id by 3 0 Beaufighters of 16 G r o u p into the Den Helder anchorage led to the loss of s ix aircraft .

Festung harbors in the Netherlands were based around a heavily fort i f ied Kernwerk at the core of the posi t ion. In the case of IJmuiden on the approaches to Amsterdam, the WN 73 Kernwerk was based on the previous Dutch defenses on Fortei land, a small island bisecting the channel. The brick structure in center is the original Dutch Kustfort bui l t in 1880-87 and armed w i th Krupp 240mm guns. On either side, t w o of three Kriegsmarine M l 70 gun casemates are visible; they were armed w i th 150mm SKL/40(h) naval guns. One of a pair of Bauform 631 ant i- tank gun casemates is visible in the lower r ight, largely submerged f rom erosion. This small island, some 680m long and 300m wide, had 26 major bunkers bui l t on it, many of wh ich still survive. (Author's photograph)

2 9

Adjacent to the IJmuiden Kernwerk was WN.81, which included Seezielbatterie Heerenduin of 4. /MAA.201, armed w i th four 170mm SKL/40 naval guns in M272 casemates. The centerpiece was this M178 naval fire control post. (Author's photograph)

The army also deployed some of its divisional f ield guns in casemates like this battery on the outskirts of Bergen-op-Zoom w i th four Bauform 669 casemates for the batteries of Arti l lerie Regiment 1719 of the 719.lnfanterie Division. The battery's casemates are unusual in that several had an addi t ional Tobruk posit ion bui l t on top . (Author's photograph)

WN 73 KERNWERK IJMUIDEN, NORTH SEA CANAL, THE NETHERLANDS The Festung ports on the North Sea were typically based around a core position {Kernwerk) which covered the main port entrance - in this case, the North Sea Canal entrance into Amsterdam. The IJmuiden Kernwerk was built on Forteiland, a Dutch fortified island with the Kustfort built in 1880 -87 and armed with German 2 4 0 m m guns; it was modernized in the 1920s with several more modern small bunkers. The island was substantially rebuilt in the summer of 1943 while manned by 3. /MAA.201. The Dutch Kustfort was reinforced by adding three large M170 casemates for World War I 150mm naval guns with associated personnel bunkers, plus a fire control post. These bunkers were defended by a host of smaller bunkers containing antitank guns and machine guns, and two more artillery batteries were added, armed with war-booty Soviet 1 2 2 m m A-19 field guns. The seaward beach was covered with dragons' teeth to prevent the landing of tanks or vehicles.

This Kernwerk was part of an interlocking defense system with extensive artillery on both shoulders of the canal. Seezielbatterie Heerenduin, located on the IJmuiden coast south of the canal,

had four 170mm SKL/40 naval guns in M272 casemates, while Seezielbatterie Wijk-am-See on the north had a battery of 150mm Tsts.K C/36 guns in Bauform 671 casemates. This Festung was also supported by a heavy concentration of naval flak batteries for air defense along with fortified radar stations. 1 . Bauform 636 SK fire control post 2 - 4 . M l 70 gun casemates for 1 5 0 m m SKL/40 gun with

adjacent Bauform 656 15-man personnel bunker 5 . Bauform 671 SK gun casemate for British 3.7-inch gun 6 - 7 . Bauform 611 gun casemate for Soviet 1 2 2 m m A-19 gun 8 - 1 3 . Bauform 631 antitank gun bunker 1 4 - 1 5 . Bauform 633 Mortar pit 1 6 - 1 9 . Bauform 644 machine-gun casemate 2 0 . Local design decontaminat ion building 2 1 . Bauform 635 Double group (20-man) personnel bunker 2 2 . Water reservoir 2 3 - 2 4 . Depth charge launcher 2 5 . Storage bunker 2 6 . Bauform 668 6-man bunker used as canteen

N o t e s 1 Marko-Stand-

Marineartilleriekommando-stand/stabsbatterie: Naval artillery command post/ staff battery

2 HKB- Heereskiistenbatterie 3 Flagruko=

Flakgruppenkommandostand/ stabsbatterie: Flak group command post/staff battery

T a b l e 3: W e h r m a c h t coas t a l a r t i l l e r y ba t t e r i e s in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , s u m m e r 1944

N a v a l b a t t e r y B a t t e r y n a m e C a s e m a t e N o . o f g u n s Ca l i be r

2./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Wijk-am-Zee 671 4 150mm

3./MAA.201 Kernwerk IJmuiden M l 70,611 3+2 150mm

4./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Heerenduin (Prien) M272 4 170mm

5./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Langerak M153c 4 150mm

6./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Zuidzand M671 4 94mm

7./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Noordwijk 671 4 155mm

8./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Schveningen-Nord 671 4 150mm

9./MAA.201 Seezielbatterie Westduin 671 4 105mm

1./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Dishoek 4 150mm

4./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Oostkapelle 671 3 94mm

5./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Domburg 612 4 220mm

6./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Westkapelle 671 4 94mm

7./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Zoutelande 671SK 6 155mm

8./MAA.202 Seezielbatterie Fidelio 612 4 220mm

9./MAA.202 Kernwerk Vlissingen M170 3 150mm

2./MAA.203 Seezielbatterie Breskens 671 4 76.2mm

3./MAA.203 Seezielbatterie Nieuwe Sluis 612 4 120mm

4./MAA.203 Seezielbatterie Cadzand 671 4 150mm

1./MAA.205 Marko-Stand 1 n/a n/a

2./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Vineta 671 4 150mm

3./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Rozenburg S412 3 280mm

4./MAA.205 Schwere Seezielbatterie Brandenburg SK Bettung 3 240mm

5./MAA.205 Kernwerk Hoek van Holland M170/622 4+2 120mm

6./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Rockanje 671 4 94mm

7./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Renesse Neu 671 4+3 75mm

8./MAA.205 Seezielbatterie Westerschouwen 671 6 94mm

1./MAA.607 Marko-Stand n/a

2./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Eierland M195 4 105mm

3./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Hors 671 4 120mm

4./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Kaaphoofd 612 4 105mm

5./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Duinrand no 4 194mm

6./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Falga 671 4 120mm

7./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Zanddijk M219 4 120mm

8./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Callantsoog 671 4 76.2mm

9./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Camperduin 612/671 4 105mm

10./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Bergen 671 4 120mm

11./MAA.607 Seezielbatterie Egmond am See 671 4 105mm

3 2

A r m y ba t t e r y

A r m y ba t t e r i e s

B a t t e r y n a m e C a s e m a t e N o . o f g u n s Ca l i be r

1./HKAA.1230 HKB2 De Koog 6 105mm

2./HKAA.1230 HKB Petten 612 4 105mm

3./HKAA.1230 HKB Castricum 671 4 105mm

4./HKAA.1230 HKBHillegom 669/671 6 105mm

5./HKAA.1230 HKB Katwijk 688 6 152mm

6./HKAA.1230 HKB Monster Bettung 6 152mm

1./HKAA.1231 HKB Helvoet 4+2 105mm

2./HKAA.1231 HKB Goedereede 671 4 105mm

3./HKAA.1231 HKB Ouddorp 669/671 6 152mm

4./HKAA.1231 HKB Haamstede 671 4 105mm

5./HKAA.1231 HKB Hellevoet 671 4 105mm

N a v a i F l ak b a t t e r y B a t t e r y n a m e

N a v a l coas ta l F l ak ba t t e r i e s

C a s e m a t e N o . o f g u n s Ca l i be r

2./MFA.246 Schw.Flak-Battr. Nansum no 4 105mm

3./MFA.246 Schw.Flak-Battr. Delfzil no 4 105mm

4./MFA.246 Schw.Flak-Battr. Termunten no 4 105mm

5./MFA.246 Marine-Flak-Battr. Terschelling-West FL 243a 4 105mm

1./MFA.808 Flagruko 3 Den Helder n/a n/a n/a

2./MFA.808 Marine-Flak-Battr. Dirksz-Admiral FL243/L 401 4 105mm

3./MFA.808 Marine-Flak-Battr. Vangdam no 4 105mm

5./MFA.808 Marine-Flak-Battr. Erfprinz FL243/L401 4 105mm

1./MFA.810 Flagruko Heldburg n/a n