ORIGINAL PAPER

The Art of Becoming Human: Morality in Kantand Confucius

Katrin Froese

Published online: 19 July 2008# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract Kant and Confucius maintain that the art of becoming human is synonymouswith the unending process of becoming moral. According to Kant, I must imagine a worldin which the universality of my maxims were possible, while realizing that if such a worldexisted, then morality would disappear. Morality is an impossible possibility because italways meets resistance in our encounter with nature. According to Confucius, humanbeings become moral by integrating themselves into the already meaningful natural orderthat is tian 天. Like Kant, he upholds the dignity of human beings. For Kant this dignityrests on the autonomy of each human being’s reason, while for Confucius it is dependentupon our interconnection with each other, demanding ongoing self-extension. Despite thesedifferences, the two thinkers would concur that our efforts at humanization are unceasingand that we may never fully live up to our human potential.

Keywords Kant . Confucius . Ethics . Humanization

1 Introduction

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Confucius (Kongzi 孔子) (551–479 BCE) are twothinkers from very different philosophical traditions who make ethics the fulcrum of theirthought, for they consider it to be inextricably interwoven with what it means to be a humanbeing. Morality is not necessarily the outgrowth of civilization; in fact, as Jean-JacquesRousseau has famously argued, it is often the case that the more civilized we become, themore likely it is that ethical conduct slips by the wayside. Philosophers of almost every agebemoan the deplorable state of morality in their own era and believe that they are witness tomoral depravity that is the result of years of decline and neglect. Kant notes that culture andrefinement do not go hand and hand with morality: “to a high degree, we are, through artand science, cultured. We are civilized—perhaps too much for our own good—in all sorts

Dao (2008) 7:257–268DOI 10.1007/s11712-008-9070-0

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Katrin Froese (*)Department of Religious Studies, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr. N.W.,Calgary, AB, Canada, T2N 1N4e-mail: froese@ucalgary.ca

of social grace and decorum. But to consider ourselves as having reached morality—forthat, much is lacking” (Kant 1988b: 422). In words that ring eerily true, he wonderswhether or not we will find ourselves in a “hell of evils” which will eventuate in theannihilation of civilization “through a barbarous devastation” (Kant 1988b: 423). Confuciusalso laments a precipitous decline in moral standards and reflects back with longing onprevious eras where virtuous leaders such as the Duke of Zhou and the sage-kings Yao andShun acted as moral inspiration for their people.

While Kant and Confucius would concur that morality is the highest expression ofhumanity, they have very different understandings of how our relationship with the world ischaracterized as a result. For Kant, morality necessarily establishes a dividing line betweenhuman beings and nature, for ethics is always constructed against the natural world. For Kant,if this division were to disappear, morality would cease to exist. Confucius would agree thathuman beings occupy a unique position within the cosmos, but only because they have tolearn to be moral, participating consciously and skilfully in the act of constant harmonization.Neither thinker believes that morality comes naturally, but while Kant portrays nature as anenduring impediment to morality, Confucius believes that human beings must learn to drawupon the immanent potential of nature. Part of this process for Confucius involves acontinuous extension of the self to include others. Conversely, the Kantian moral self standsalone, relating to others indirectly through the medium of his or her reason.

2 Morality and Nature

Kantian moral philosophy, with its emphasis on the universalization of the moral law,appears to be characterized by a profound moral purism. His categorical imperativestipulates that “I ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maximshould be universal law” (Kant 1998b: 254). Focusing on the act of universalization, BrianSullivan notes that Kantian thought is fuelled by the “demand for consistency and non-contradiction” that makes reciprocity possible (Sullivan 1994: 46). However, I would arguethat, if one acknowledges the central role that Kant imputes to willing within hisphilosophy, one develops a slightly different image of his ethics. Willing in Kant is an actof overcoming empirical and natural inclinations. When Kant opens Foundations of theMetaphysics of Morals with the suggestion that nothing “could be called good withoutqualification except a GOOD WILL” (Kant 1998b: 248), he is not arguing that moral puritybe held in the utmost esteem, but rather acknowledges that morality is based upon anenduring tension with the empirical and natural world. When acting morally, I mustimagine a world in which the universality of my maxims were possible and act on thisbasis, but at the same time realize that if such a world existed, then morality woulddisappear. Kant’s ethical philosophy is based not on contempt for but rather on a love ofcontradiction. Morality can never be perfectly realized, for if it could, it would not exist.This is why, in framing our maxims, we must think as though we could universalize them,all the while recognizing that we will never be completely successful in our efforts becausenature will remain an enduring impediment to our success.

Indeed, because we are divided beings, whose empirical inclinations and desires threatento tarnish the moral law, we will never acquire what Kant refers to as the pure holy will, forit is a will upon which empirical elements have no sway:

“This holiness of will is, however, a practical ideal which must necessarily serve as amodel which all finite rational beings must strive toward even though they cannot

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reach it.... The utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is to make sure of theunending progress of its maxims towards this model.... This is virtue, and as anaturally acquired faculty, it can never be perfect, because assurance in such a casenever becomes apodictic certainty and as a mere opinion it is very dangerous” (Kant1964: 33). As Paul Saurette points out, “we must recognize the distance between theperfection of the law and our fallibility,” which then imbues us with the humility thatis central to Kant’s moral theory (Saurette 2002: 61). Kant’s emphasis on humilitymay seem somewhat surprising given the high premium he places on autonomy andreason. However, it is the very awareness of the distance between our ownimperfection and the moral law that in Kant’s view can provide the impetus toimprove upon the world rather than merely being satisfied with the status quo.Furthermore, humility also can help to rein in the selfishness which for Kant is thegreatest obstacle to morality. As Richard Kroner suggests, morality “is meaningfulonly as long as we are imperfect” (Kroner 1956: 24).

Kantian philosophy is characterized by a very ambivalent attitude toward nature. Kantasserts that moral law is necessarily distinct from natural causality, which he describes asthe “direct opposite of freedom” (Kant 1964: 29). Nonetheless, he exhorts us to design a“second nature” which imitates the physical laws of “first nature”: “Ask yourself whether, ifthe action which you propose should take place by a law of nature of which you yourselfwere a part, and could regard it as possible through your will” (Kant 1964: 72, 70).According to Kant, we must manifest our independence from nature by authoring our ownlaws, rather than by succumbing to those which are forced upon us: “for as an end inhimself, he is destined to be a lawgiver in the realm of ends, free from all laws of nature andobedient only to those laws which he himself gives” (Kant 1988b: 278). As Kronersuggests, because it is not given to us but rather created, this is not a world which can beunderstood by theoretical means (Kroner 1956: 3). We must imagine a parallel moraluniverse which is like nature, but at the same time is distinct from it. Because morality isdefined in opposition to the causal world of nature, moral worth depends upon theimpossibility of creating the perfect moral world. Nature will always interfere with ourefforts. If the perfect world already existed, it would not have to be made, and thereforewould not be an expression of our freedom. If the realm of the “ought” could be collapsedinto the world of the “is” then the “ought” would cease to exist.

Because Kant’s philosophy is predicated on a division within the self which impelsus to overcome our heteronomous drives, he delights in the notion of mastery over theself. This is reflected in the effusive odes to duty that are sprinkled throughout histexts:

Thus the first proposition of morality is that to have genuine moral worth an actionmust be done from duty. The second proposition is: an action done from duty does nothave its moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in themaxim whereby it is determined. The third principle, as a consequence of the twopreceding I would express as follows: Duty is the necessity to do an action fromrespect for the law. (Kant 1988b: 253)

Duty represents the triumph over nature within ourselves. We act as though reason couldstand on its own. Nonetheless, we can never know if duty alone is indeed the impetusbehind our actions and thus our efforts are endless. As H. J. Paton points out, “a completelygood and perfect will would never act for the sake of duty; for in the very idea of duty thereis the thought of desires and inclination to be overcome” (Paton 1967: 46). Perfect beings

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can have no moral worth because they do not undergo moral struggle. Without the potentialfor evil, there is no potential for good.

Kant’s moral legalism is a conscious fantasy wherein we imagine a world in which weare completely autonomous and self-originating agents. It is the impossible possibility thatencourages us to mould ourselves into moral beings. However, this drive may also springfrom a profound frustration regarding our inability to really know the noumenal world. Inhis Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously remarked that our alleged “knowledge” of theworld arises out of the manner in which the mind structures our experiences and thus theworld as it is, or the thing-in-itself, always eludes us. This limitation, in Kant’s view, is alsothe wellspring of our freedom which enables us to create a moral universe independently ofempirical constraints. While apriori structures of the mind help us to wade through anoverabundance of shifting empirical data, they are nevertheless dependent upon externalphenomena. Through morality, we set up a refuge from the world of nature wherein webecome self-originating with an unadulterated rationality as its own precondition. However,we never have direct access to the noumenal sphere, for this would spell the end of humanfreedom. If we were to gain such access, Kant remarks that

instead of conflict which now the moral disposition has to wage with inclinations, andin which, after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually won, God andeternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes. . . . Theconduct of man, so long as his nature remained as it is now, would be changed intomere mechanism, where as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but nolife would be found in the figures. (Kant 1964: 152)

Freedom is not absolute, but rather arises out of the position we occupy straddleduncomfortably between the noumenal and phenomenal aspects of our being. In spite of this,if morality is to survive, we must imagine the possibility of complete noumenal freedom,even if it remains eternally beyond our grasp. The Kantian moral universe depends uponimagination as much as it does on reason.

Some of Kant’s ethical writings suggest that reason must constantly do battle with themuddied world of nature, which is the source of our moral woes. However, when onedelves more widely into Kant’s corpus, including the Critique of Judgment, the possibilityis raised that reason in interaction with nature can have disturbing effects. Kant implies thatreason infuses chaos into the world of nature because of its totalizing tendencies: “But nowthe mind listens to the voice of reason which, for every given magnitude—even for thosethat can never be entirely apprehended... requires totality” (Kant 1968: 93). This taste fortotality can generate the impulse to carve out the world in our image. Kant notes that humanbeings find “natural things of advantage for their own designs,” which he remarks are oftenfoolish, “for his reason knows how to give things a conformity with his own arbitraryfancies for which he was not at all predestined by nature” (Kant 1968: 214). This passage isinteresting for it suggests that reason can be responsible for excess and imbalance. Nature,in turn, is infused with a kind of purposiveness which is reflected in the harmonious orderof the whole: “For a thing to be a natural purpose, in the first place it is requisite that itsparts are only possible through their reference to the whole” (Kant 1968: 220). Reasonawakens the desire on the part of human beings to be whole unto themselves.

The Critique of Judgment raises the spectre of a somewhat different relationship betweennature and reason than Kant describes in his ethical writings. Reason synthesizes whatmight otherwise be inchoate experiences. However, in so doing, reason comes up against itsown limits, and its desire to operate unobstructed in its quest for totality can unleash adesire for freedom. Kant exposes the destructive underbelly of our lust for freedom, which

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is unique to human beings: “The love of freedom is naturally so strong in man that whenonce he has grown accustomed to freedom, he will sacrifice everything for its sake...owingto his natural love of freedom it is necessary that man should have his natural roughnesssmoothed down; with animals, their instinct renders this unnecessary” (Kant 1897: 3).

When we act in accordance with moral maxims, we imagine a world in which the purity ofreason prevails and it encounters no resistance. In this way, we are able to tame our owndestructive impulses because reason in the moral realm can assert its sovereignty in a mannerthat is impossible in the empirical realm. In fact, Kant notes that “without the development ofmoral ideals, that which we are prepared by culture call sublime” would present itself “to theuneducated man as merely terrible” (Kant 1968: 105). Thus, morality assures us of thesuperiority of reason and mitigates our fears in the face of something larger than the self. Byclaiming in morality a domain for itself and upholding it as the height of human dignity, weare able to diminish the frustration that emerges through reason’s encounter with the world.Because we keep acting as though reason were a self-enclosed sphere, and as though it werealready independent of nature, we can then begin to resist the impulse to use others and natureto further our own ends. The imaginary “purity” of reason is not only to protect ourselvesfrom natural desires and impulses but to protect the world from our reason.

The ingenuity of Kantian philosophy inheres in the fact that he recognizes the need forcontradiction that sustains morality. It is always in the making, because it will always meetresistance. Kant undermines the “realist” position that the empirical world is amoral andtherefore we should adapt to the way the world is rather than engaging in a futile pursuit ofwhat should be. Kant recognizes that only human beings can be moral as a result of theuneasy position they occupy ensconced in the world of nature and yet imbued with aninsatiable desire to overcome it. However, it is not just nature that is to be overcome. Theinteraction of reason within the world of nature also poses a grave threat to morality.

Confucius, like Kant, refuses to ground morality in any cosmology: “We can learn fromthe Master’s cultural refinements, but do not hear him discourse on subjects such as our‘natural disposition’ and ‘the way of tian 天 (heaven)’” (Analects 5.13). Tian comes closestto the Western conception of nature, although it cannot simply be equated with it, since tiandoes not connote the same kind of division between nature and culture that is characteristicof Western thought. It is often translated as heaven, although this translation is somewhatmisleading. As Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont point out, tian is often used inconjunction with di 地 (earth) to indicate that it is not independent of this world (Ames andRosemont 1998: 46–47). Tian is both transcendent and immanent at the same time. There isneither differentiation between creator and created, nor the is tian somehow separate fromhuman beings. Tian creates all things not through the wilful act of an omnipotent being butrather through constant generation, which imbues us with a sense of pattern, order, andharmony.

Like Kant, Confucius asserts that cosmology cannot be known. However, this does notyield the same kind of metaphysical frustration that surfaces in Kant’s writings. There is noexpectation that we can know tian, for we are merely one part of a process that is dynamicand thus infinite. Furthermore, nature operates spontaneously; human beings do not. Byrefusing to discourse on matters of tian, Confucius is not implying that we neglect it.Indeed he draws upon it repeatedly for metaphors that point to its harmonious patterns.Human beings participate in the meaningful order of tian. There is no lamenting itsinaccessibility, nor is there a desire to manifest independence from it. In fact, one prominentcosmological assumption that undergirds Confucian philosophy is that there is a harmonyin nature that emerges spontaneously: “Does tian speak? And yet the four seasons turn andthe myriad things are born and grow within it. Does tian speak?” (Analects 17.19). Even

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though tian does not speak, this does not mean that it is bereft of meaning. Confuciusremarks that “tian has given life to and nourished excellence in me” (Analects 7.23).

We are a part of tian as one of the ten-thousand things which are not simply created bytian but constitute it. We participate in the agency of tian rather than being, as in Kantianthought, the lone champions of freedom. Julia Ching points out that, while freedom andautonomy are preoccupations of Western thinkers such as Kant, they do not figureprominently in the Chinese tradition (Ching 1978: 2). For this reason, in Confucianthinking, there is no need to construct an imaginary parallel universe which is self-contained. Yet, according to Confucius, human beings must harmonize with the way of tianin their unique way which sets them apart from other beings. Distinctively human agency isno less important for Confucian ethics than it is for Kantian ethics. However, rather thanimagining a moral universe where our rationality is insulated from the vicissitudes of nature,Confucius’ objective is to find particularly human ways of cultivating harmonious relation-ships within the world. He remarks that “exemplary persons seek harmony not sameness;petty persons are the opposite” (Analects 13.23). Like Kant, Confucius would balk atadvocating simple adaptation to existing circumstances. However, he advises human beingsto draw upon immanent harmonious potential and extend it. Our efforts at harmonization arenever-ending because the world is dynamic. However, the spontaneous harmony of naturecan come late in life, after years of practice and attunement: “from seventy I could give myheart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the boundaries” (Analects 2.4).

It is not enough to simply create harmony, but rather the harmony must take on aspecifically human form, and for Confucius this involves ritual or li 禮: “Achieving harmonyis the most valuable function of observing ritual propriety. But when things are not goingwell, to realize harmony just for its own sake without regulating the situation throughobserving ritual propriety will not work” (Analects 1.12). According to Confucius, humanbeings who do not heed ritual are forsaking the particularly human way of integrating intotian. Ritual is a means of strengthening the sense of social and spiritual integration and also amethod of ensuring continuity with the past. If Kantian philosophy depends upon tensionand the often Herculean efforts of the will, Confucian philosophy endeavours to ensure anenduring sense of continuity and integration. Each person in the ritualistic ceremonycoordinates actions harmoniously with another, and if it is well carried out, no force orcompulsion is necessary. It is like learning a piece of music in such a way that eventually itappears effortless. In fact, music is a central part of the Confucian tradition.

David Hall and Roger Ames point out that the term for culture, namely wen 文, means toinscribe and pattern (Ames and Hall 1998: 33). Music is perhaps the best example of howcultural rituals function because it depends upon tradition and yet at the same time demandsthe creative interaction of unique particulars. If music reverts to simple mimesis, then itrings hollow: “In referring time and again to making music, how could I just be talkingabout bells and drums” (Analects 17.11). Music depends upon the uniqueness of each notein relation to others. There is no universal that subsumes the particular but rather aconfluence of particulars that form a whole through the enunciation of patterns that emergeout of a multitude of unique voices. Nevertheless there are already pre-existing harmoniesthat we must creatively appropriate in order to create new sounds. Through music thedynamic and creative nature of human beings is brought to fruition, signifying theimportance of innovation in transmitting and performing ritual: “Much can be realized withmusic if one begins by playing in unison, and then goes on to improvise with purity of toneand distinctness of flow, thereby bringing all to completion” (Analects 3.23). It is in musicthat the delicate balance between familiarity and newness that leads to completeness isexpressed: “I find inspiration by intoning the songs, I learn where to stand from observing

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ritual propriety, and I find fulfillment in playing music” (Analects 8:7). The creation ofculture as exemplified in music is an expression of togetherness, and therefore in Confuciusit cannot be excluded from moral consideration.

The problem with such an approach is that it risks eventuating in a narrowparochialism, where the development of virtue is very much dependent upon entrenchedsocial roles. This would be anathema to Kant, for whom morality is universal and cannotbe dependent upon local customs. Confucius would vociferously disagree, for accordingto him, the extension of the self within one’s locality provides the groundwork whichmakes it possible to enter unfamiliar terrain and treat others with a similar sort ofdecorum and respect. One cannot learn what it means to treat others as human unless oneis part of a human community oneself. Evidently, this emphasis on ritual is alsoproblematic, because it not only can lead to hypocrisy but is dependent on hierarchies andconformity to appropriate roles.

Confucius does not exhort us to manifest our independence from nature but rather insiststhat we become more integrated into it. In Kant, morality becomes a parallel world tonature, whose distinctness must be preserved in order to satisfy reason’s appetite for totality.The aim of Confucius is to integrate ourselves into the world of tian, which always alreadyincludes human beings. However, this begs the question why human beings require ritual todo what nature does spontaneously. Does this not suggest that human beings are also apartfrom nature, even if this is not experienced as acutely as it is in Kant? Confucius remarksthat human beings have the ability to stray from the way of tian, and this is what makesmorality and ritual so necessary: “Having gone astray, to fail to get right back on track is tostray indeed” (Analects 15.30).

Confucius bemoans the state of society, where human beings depart from the way(Analects 5.7). If in the Kantian system there is an overriding need on the part of humanbeings to structure experiences and know the world, in the Confucian understanding it isnecessary to accord with the way or the dynamic process of things: “If at dawn you learn ofand tread the way, you can face death at dusk” (Analects 4.8). Indeed, things that onecannot know do not generate any resentment or frustration: “The master had nothing to sayabout strange happenings, the use of force, disorder or the spirits” (Analects 7.21). Thesage, or exemplary person, experiences no antipathy or tension in relation to the worldaround him/her: “Exemplary persons in making their way in the world are neither bent onnor against anything; rather they go with what is appropriate” (Analects 4.10). The sagestrides through the world calmly: “The exemplary person is calm and unperturbed; the pettyperson is always agitated and anxious” (Analects 7.37).

Yet, even according to Confucian philosophy, acting in harmony with the way of tian is noeasy task. Although Confucius himself does not offer an explicit account of why this may bethe case, a possible answer can be pieced together from some of his sayings. The primaryobstacle that Confucius confronts in his environment is the pursuit of personal advantage or li利, which causes not only internal imbalance but continued warfare and political strife. Thetrue sage pays no attention to li, which is why Confucius insists he is unconcerned withpoverty and wealth. Why do human beings become selfish? Perhaps the answer lies in therole of speech. It is highly significant that tian does not speak. Tian connotes the harmoniouscontinuity of the whole, while speech separates things out from the whole, allowing one toidentify oneself as a self in the first place. Because it demarcates things in this fashion, itmakes deception possible. Confucius’ emphasis on the rectification of names indicates that heis all too cognizant of the danger of speech. This is why he repeatedly reminds us of the needto live up to one’s word. Confucius remarks that the “ancients were loath to speak becausethey would be ashamed if they personally did not live up to what they said” (Analects 4.22).

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Because language separates and categorizes, we must actively work to reintegrate intothe world that we are already a part of. Perhaps this is why Confucius insists that “it is theperson who is able to broaden the way, not the way that broadens the person” (Analects15.29). Thus, both Kant and Confucius would agree that there is something about humanbeings that sets them apart. Confucius treats this sense of separateness as an imbalance thatnecessitates a more profound reintegration into the cosmos. Human beings must workharder at being part of nature than other creatures, but they cannot part ways with tian. ForKant, the schism between human beings and nature is not only irreparable but also enableshuman beings to be moral in the first place.

3 Becoming Human

The moral universe which Kant envisions presupposes that one must bestow upon humanbeings a respect and dignity based solely on their humanity. This humanity is defined by thecapacity to reason. To be moral, “it is required that reason only presuppose itself” (Kant1964: 19). Reason differentiates human beings from nature and confers on them a specialstatus which is central to Kant’s moral worldview. By virtue of an individual’s reason, eachperson is a representative of humanity as a whole and must be treated as such. We musttreat human beings as though they were a complete world unto themselves and not a meansto another’s end. Morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an endin himself, because only through it is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the realm ofends (see Kant 1988b: 277). Kantian morality is based on common rather than sharedground. The respect owed to each human being is based on her or his potential qua rationalbeing. This is the case even if they refuse to exercise their rationality, falling short of theideal of humanity. One must treat others as though the perfect moral universe alreadyexisted, while recognizing that it does not.

Kant prevails upon us to act in accordance with duty alone, and while this soundsaustere, it is intended to safeguard human beings from selfish motives. Undoubtedly thereare problems with this approach, for it does not necessitate care for another human being.For example, according to Kant’s code of ethics, it would not be morally acceptable to lie toa person, even if he or she is an assassin who is preparing to kill another, and my falsehoodcould prevent this tragedy. I could not will that lying be universalized because this wouldconstitute an affront to the dignity of humanity, which is represented in the assassin.However, in this case, out of respect for the universal law, I may not be respecting thevictim as an end in himself or herself. Treating a person as an end in herself or himself mayrequire attentiveness to their particular situation. Yet, for Kant, taking another’s particularityinto account is tantamount to succumbing to the heteronomy of nature: “Thus all materialprinciples, which place the determining ground of choice in the pleasure or displeasure tobe received from the reality of any object whatsoever, are entirely of one kind. Withoutexception they belong under the principle of self-love or one’s own happiness” (Kant 1964:20–21). For Kant, morality cannot be based on how another is connected to me, but rathermust be based on the common humanity that we all share. Catherine Chalier notes that it isthe universality and humanity in an abstract sense that is respected rather than the“singularity of every human person” (Chalier 2002: 30). Therefore, it is possible to actmorally toward someone, even while holding them in utter contempt, provided my actionsare based on moral duty alone.

Kant is often criticized for his relative silence on questions of substance by thinkers suchas Charles Taylor, who attributes his proceduralism to a reluctance to speak of substantive

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notions of the good (Taylor 1989: 86). Kant himself makes no attempt to conceal thisformalism: “If a rational being can think of its maxims as practical universal laws, he cando so only by considering them as principles which contain the determining grounds of thewill because of their form and not because of their matter” (Kant 1964: 26). There areseveral reasons for the Kantian position. Kant has hinted in the Critique of Judgment thatselfishness can arise out of the encounter between reason and matter, since this can generatethe desire to recast the world in one’s own image. Even if form cannot be completelyisolated from matter, actions which attempt to preserve the purity of form provide at least apartial check against the often totalizing tendencies of reason to sculpt the world accordingto our own selfish ends: “He must concede that the ground of obligation here must not besought in the nature of man or in the circumstances in which he is placed but a priori solelyin the concepts of pure reason... all moral philosophy rests solely on its pure part” (Kant1988a: 245–246). Furthermore, if Kant were to lay out a blueprint for moral behavior for usto follow, we would not be acting as autonomous agents. Thus, Kant’s commitment to formserves two main purposes. On the one hand, it provides a check against the slide into moralopportunism that arises when I try to tailor an action to suit my needs. On the other hand, itupholds the autonomy of the individual by allowing scope for individual judgment.

In the kingdom of ends, each person constitutes a whole unto him/herself. The virtue ofsuch a position is that no individual can legitimately be sacrificed for another, because indenying one individual her status as an end, we dismantle the entire moral edifice. We areconnected to one another through the universal reason which we all share. Morality isderived from a relationship that one has with reason. The disadvantage of this position isthat the social dimension of Kantian philosophy is introduced surreptitiously and arisesfrom common judgements independently arrived at. At the same time, the dignity of theindividual is a dignity imputed to her as a rational being, who is apart from the world she isin. Kantian morality will always rest on a profound tension between the world as it ought tobe and the world as it is. This is intended to protect us from a sinister pragmatism thatsimply adapts to existing circumstances. Kant provides a justification for moral idealismthat ought to be pursued even if the world as it is always falls far short of our moral vision.If the universe were already a moral one, we would not have the freedom to make it so.This deflates the kind of Machiavellian argument which insists that the only realisticapproach is to adapt to the world as it already is.

Confucius also makes his morality contingent upon locating human beings at the centreof the cosmos. However, rather than viewing each individual as a representative of thewhole, for Confucius, the whole is the social order of which each person is a part. JuliaChing points out that Chinese ethics is relational while Kantian ethics always refers back tothe self (Ching 1978: 169). While Kantian ethics is based on the virtue of respect,Confucian ethics is based on the virtue of care. Confucius advocates the extension of theself, to include an increasingly broad spectrum of people, and in his view it is appropriatethat their fate be experienced as intertwined with one’s own. In order to accomplish this onemust start by attempting to broaden the immediate concern one has for members of one’sfamily or circles of friends, so that one can eventually include even the stranger. ForConfucius, personal concern for another is the central node from which morality has thepotential to radiate, and therefore one must maintain this center if further extension of one’smoral horizons is possible. When Confucius is told about a man who turns in his own fatherfor stealing a sheep, he insists that such an action would not be laudable in his own stateand that a son should cover for his father (Analects 13.18). However, Confucius is notpretending to provide moral counsel for any state but specifically emphasizes that such anaction would be considered inappropriate in his own. The ethical son would help his father

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to escape. If one allows the root of the family to wither, then one’s entire moral fibre maybe weakened. For Kant, this would be a highly unethical act, for I should envision a worldin which such actions were sanctioned by universal law. According to Kantian logic, Iwould surely not want to legitimize through universal law the protection of criminals inone’s family. However, the Confucian thinker would take a very different approach. Hewould argue that no one can take the place of the son’s relationship to his father, for the roleof every person within the family is unique. Therefore, the son may be the only individualwith the duty to shield his father from the force of the law in this case. Consequently, froma Confucian perspective, it would not be inconsistent to claim that while it is the duty of theson to facilitate the father’s escape, it would be the duty of the minister to have the manarrested. Chad Hansen points out that the prescriptive legalistic approach of Kant is alien tothe Confucian thinker and argues that, because of this, there is no Confucian idea of moralresponsibility because it “does not need one” (Hansen 1972: 172). While it is clear thatlegalism is alien to the Confucian tradition, this does not mean that there is no sense ofmoral responsibility because Confucius clearly stipulates that certain actions are appropriateunder certain conditions.

Kant does not advocate indifference to others. Indeed, he suggests that if human beingsare ends in themselves, they must contribute to the happiness of others, for only in this waycan they uphold the dignity and autonomy of human beings. Each human being is arepresentative of humanity, and as such, has a responsibility to all others:

Humanity might indeed exist if no one contributed to the happiness of others,provided he did not intentionally detract from it, but this harmony with humanity as anend in itself is only negative, not positive, if everyone does not also endeavour as faras he can, to further the purposes of others. For the ends of any person, who is an endin himself, must as far as possible be also my ends, if that conception of an end initself is to have its full effect on me. (Kant 1988b: 274)

Nevertheless, the reasoning in use here is not entirely devoid of self-interest. If theconception of an end in itself is to have its full impact on me, then I must further thehappiness of others. Kantian philosophy is predicated on the necessity for each humanbeing to represent the universal. There is no such assumption in Confucian philosophy,which assumes that each person is a part of an infinite web of relationships. Theserelationships must be affirmed on an ongoing basis.

The virtue associated with this process of perpetual extension is ren 仁. If rationality istantamount to humanization in Kantian moral terms, then ren epitomizes what it means tobe a human being in Confucian understanding. The interconnectedness of human beings isthe Confucian counterweight to selfishness. The purpose of morality is to extend the self sothat it is not defined by its separateness from others but rather includes them as part of theself. In Chinese, the character ji 已 is often used to describe a self which regards itselfprimarily through its separateness. To be a moral person according to Kant, I must imagineany other in my place, whereas for Confucius my place includes others. TU Weiming 杜維明

points out that “a characteristic Confucian selfhood entails the participation of the other andthat the reason for this desirable and necessary symbiosis of selfhood and otherness is theConfucian conception of the self as a dynamic process of spiritual development” (Tu 1985:231).

The term ren 仁 encompasses all other virtues and refers to the art of becoming human. Itis not easy to render it into English and is sometimes translated as love, sometimes asbenevolence, and Confucius himself is claimed to have said that it means to “love others”(Analects 12.22). The word is composed of the characters for person and for two,

266 Katrin Froese

suggesting that one cannot be a person in isolation and pointing to the indelibly socialaspect of our being. The self must include others, and extending one’s horizons in this wayis an endless project of self development. It is impossible to provide one all-encompassingdefinition for ren, since it is multi-dimensional and incorporates physical, aesthetic,spiritual, and social aspects of one’s comportment. SHUN Kwong-Loi suggests that in theAnalects it is used both more narrowly to refer to one desirable quality among others andmore broadly to refer to an ethical ideal that includes all desirable qualities (Shun 2002:53). Like Kant, Confucius suggests that one must work hard at developing the mostfundamental human virtues, but in Confucius this involves an element of social integration.

While in Kantian philosophy, I would imagine putting another in my place in order todetermine how to act, in Confucian ethics, one already experiences the other as part ofoneself. Kant would be wary of such a position, for it leaves one open to the possibility ofpursuing one’s personal interest. Ren is not so much a perfected state of being as it is acontinuous extension of the self, so that who I am is constantly being developed in relationto another. It means that I begin to take the concerns of another as my own. The fact that Imay not be the same person two years from now that I am today is not something that isresented but rather expected.

Because Confucius regards such self-extension as the essence of human activity, themoral domain in Confucius is much more far-reaching than in Kant. While Kant insists onseparating custom from morality, in Confucius, virtually all of our actions fall into theethical domain since at every moment we are members of a larger society which needs to benot only affirmed but revitalized on an ongoing basis through cultural, social, and politicalmeans. At times, Confucian judgment shows an extraordinary degree of rigidity: “If the Jiclan’s use of the imperial eight rows of eight dancers in the courtyard of their estate can becondoned, what cannot be?” (Analects 3.1). Thus, in Confucius we are engaged in ethicalbehavior when we are engaged in the customs and rituals of a community, including theperformance of dance or the practice of archery. We must determine and act out our specificroles in order to be genuine parts of the whole. Undoubtedly, for Confucius, socialintegration is dependent upon hierarchy. Each person has an appropriate role within thesocial context, and the duties associated with these roles must be followed: “Indeed, if theruler does not rule, the minister not minister, the father not father, and the son not son, evenif there were grain, would I get to eat of it?” (Analects 12.11). This constitutes one of themost profound differences between Kant and Confucius, for this emphasis on specificitywould be anathema to Kant. Confucius would be uncomfortable with the individualisminherent in Kantian philosophy and place more emphasis on what the community doestogether rather than on the individual’s decision.

4 Conclusion

The centrality of the human beings is common to both Confucian and Kantian philosophy.However, for Kant this centrality is based on rationality and the assumption that eachindividual is a representative of humanity as a whole, while for Confucius, our humanity ismore closely associated with our interconnectedness. This means that for Kant where onestands in relation to others should not be a deciding factor when making a moral decision,while for Confucius one’s particular relationship to others will closely determine how weshould act toward them. Kant would consider the contextual nature which is a necessarypart of developing one’s ren as highly problematic, while Confucius would argue that theabstract recognition of human worth that is prevalent in Kantian philosophy is too distant

The Art of Becoming Human: Morality in Kant and Confucius 267

and unlikely to develop genuine concern for others. Nonetheless, despite their disagree-ments, Kant and Confucius share an understanding that the humanization of human beingsis a perpetual process which we cannot afford to neglect, even for a moment. We mustcontinuously engage in a process of becoming what we are, while realizing that we willnever completely live up to our human potential.

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