the algerian political crisis: origins and prospects for the future of democracy

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The Algerian politicalcrisis: origins andprospects for the future ofdemocracyYahia H. Zoubir aa Associate Professor of International Studies ,American School of International ManagementPublished online: 26 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Yahia H. Zoubir (1998) The Algerian political crisis: originsand prospects for the future of democracy, The Journal of North AfricanStudies, 3:1, 74-100, DOI: 10.1080/13629389808718310

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The Algerian Political Crisis: Origins andProspects for the Future of Democracy

YAHIA H. ZOUBIR

The Maghreb experienced social, political and economic problems in the 1980s. InAlgeria, these problems have fed the growth of a wide-spread and disparate Islamistmovement. The movement resulted in the creation of several formal political partiesafter the riots of 1988. The most important among them was the FIS (Islamic SalvationFront) whose astounding ascent provoked an army-backed coup in January 1992. Theconsequent decline into violence has fragmented the movement and has createdtensions within the governing regime. However, the presidential election of 1995seems to have ushered in an institutional reform process which may lead Algeriatowards a democratic solution despite the persistance of authoritarian patterns.

Since the 1980s, the Maghrib has undergone an unstable transition, whoseconclusion may have important repercussions in the entire North Africanregion and in Europe. The Maghrib region, unquestionably vital to Europe'ssecurity - the concept being defined here in its broader sense, i.e., one thatextends beyond the narrow definition of 'high' politics and thus has amultidimensional meaning - entered an era of change in the late 1970s andearly 1980s. The 1990s too have undoubtedly witnessed additionalconsequential changes.1 Despite the differences that characterise thecountries of the Central Maghrib (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), thepredominant problems remain the same. The countries are characterised byhigh levels of unemployment, demographic explosion, huge internationaldebt, lagging economies, the rise of radical Islamism and urban terrorism,bread riots, corruption, the fossilisation of elites, and marginalisation ofimportant segments of the population, the youth in particular. Thecontention in this article is that in response to the multifarious crisesexperienced by these societies, radical Islamism has emerged as the majorforce of contestation, and has thus represented the major challenge to theexisting regimes. The states in this region are fragile and are suffering froma serious deficit of legitimacy. This can be explained by the traditionalaversion of the Maghribi states, in the name of national unity, toparticularisms and to genuine opposition. This partly accounts for the

Yahia H. Zoubir is Associate Professor of International Studies at the American School ofInternational Management

The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (Spring 1998) pp.74-100PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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THE ALGERIAN POLITICAL CRISIS 75

prominent role authoritarianism played in the institutionalisation of thestate. The erection of huge bureaucratic systems in these countries has hadthe double effect of providing for the needs of many sectors due to familysolidarity, while at the same time facilitating the widespread corruption,which has helped discredit the state.2 The post-independence state in theMaghrib appropriated competence in countless areas, although thechallenges to which it has been confronted are formidable in light of theincredible demographic explosion, rural exodus, mass education, andeconomic development. But, corruption, incompetence, dependence onexternal forces and other domestic and international factors have had thedouble effect of preventing the state not only from accomplishing thedevelopmental goals it has set for itself in the socio-economic and politicalrealms, but have also resulted in its quasi total de-legitimisation. The mostobvious consequence of this across the board failure has been the rise andgrowing importance of radical Islamism.

Social, Political and Economic Roots of Political Islam

In common with to other countries in the Middle East and Africa, thecurrent crisis in Algeria has resulted from the evolution of the authoritariandevelopmentalist regime.3 By the close of the 1980s, the regime had notonly failed in its modernising tasks, but, its rule had indubitably resulted inthe impoverishment of the middle class and to the pauperisation of themasses regardless of some significant accomplishments in industrialisationand education. Generalised corruption, injustice, arbitrary power, nepotism,and the clientelist networks, which have pervaded the state sinceindependence, could not but backfire. The consequences have been dreadfulbecause, in addition to the severe economic setbacks (inflation,astronomical international debts, and high unemployment), the authoritarianregime in Algeria has been confronted since the late 1980s with an acutecrisis of credibility, legitimacy, and identity. The centralisation of powerunder the leadership of authoritarian elites failed to preserve the state'sinitial mobilising capacity due to the state's inability to satisfy the ever-increasing demands of the population. The successful nationalist Islamo-populist discourse of the past lost all credibility in face of the gloomysocio-economic realities. By the mid-1980s, the presumed social contract,which had been established between the masses and the leadershipfollowing independence from colonial rule, had lost whatever legitimacy itmight have had heretofore.4 Clearly, the Algerian elite failed to perform thetasks either of capitalist economic development or revolutionary socialtransformation.5 Today, neither the middle nor the lower classes could assentto the authoritarianism of a state that has failed to fulfill its promises. By the

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76 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

mid-1980s and early 1990s, the internal fragility ('state at war with its ownsociety') and external vulnerability6 (especially the international debt) of theauthoritarian state in Algeria has neared its apex. This weakness wasdemonstrated by the forceful new opposition to the single-party system bya multitude of social groups, radical Islamist organisations, in particular,and by the inability of the regime to find a viable political formula toovercome the multifarious crisis. The legitimacy of the regime has beenchallenged in an irreversible way. The promising, albeit limited,liberalisation and democratisation7 introduced by the regime following theOctober 1988 riots has proved unsuccessful and has opened a Pandora'sbox. The chaotic character of democratisation in Algeria in 1989-91 deeplyaccounts for today's ordeal. The absence of a negotiated pact between theauthoritarian rulers and the opposition forces before the legislative electionsof December 1991 aggravated the already deep suspicious among all thegroups.

Although many other factors account for its emergence, radicalIslamism developed as a response to the marginalisation of huge segmentsof society and to the chaotic socio-economic policies, including economicliberalisation, pursued by the regime. The absence of real politicalparticipation has unavoidably made the political discourse and message ofthe Islamist groups, including their most radical factions, more legitimate tosizable segments of the population. The success of this Islamist discourse isdue partly to the delegitimising influence on the ruling elites.

Radical Islamism in Algeria

The state in Algeria has always resorted to Islamic symbols to establish andreproduce its legitimacy, whereas certain social movements have used Islamas an ideological weapon to wage their struggle against the successiveregimes. Nowadays, radical Islamism, or even Islamism tout court, hasappeared as the most effective protest movement. Although Islamism indifferent forms was present in the nationalist movement and becameanchored in the post-independent state, its most extreme and violent variantdeveloped only since the late 1970s. The phenomenon took its importancein the wake of what has been defined as the 'disenchantment of the world'8

provoked by modernisation. The real detonator of Islamism in Algeria wasthe disenchantment subsequent to the first twenty years of independence.9 Inmany ways, an Islamist is someone who has become conscious of the acuteinequalities, but who is also convinced that the current strategies ofdevelopment will not succeed in alleviating them, for he will never benefitfrom the fruits of development. In this case, then, the frustrations are evengreater because the expectations are very high.10 In other words, Islamism is

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the direct and most evident consequence of anarchic modernity. Thetransition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft proceeded without the stateoffering the newly urbanised, anonymous citizen, any structures that couldadequately replace the old, communitarian ones. Charitable Islamistassociations, fulfilling the function of spiritual communities, provided suchstructures,11 thus supplanting - and simultaneously discrediting - the stateand undermining its populist discourse. In Islamism, the alienatedindividual is able to regain a global image of the self within a community ofbelievers who share a similar Weltanschauung. This situation is especiallytrue in the Maghrib region, which is dominated by youth and where thestates have increasingly been incapable of feeding, clothing, educating,housing, and employing their continuously growing populations. Worsestill, in Algeria, where the state has established almost total domination overthe public sphere, thus hindering the blossoming of the private domain, onlythe mosque could offer an existential refuge and a moral substitute foralcohol, drugs and violence which had constituted the main pursuit hitherto.The state ceased to be seen as the provider; instead, society, especially itsyouth, felt betrayed. Not only has the youth since resorted to violence as away of communicating with the state,12 expressed in the form of cyclicalriots, especially under Chadli Bendjedid's rule, but it has also rejected allthe founding myths and symbols of the Algerian nation. In other words, thestate has been totally de-legitimised and has totally lost its raison d'etre inthe eyes of this disenchanted population. The rejection of the nation'ssymbols has exhausted the legitimacy upon which the state built itsauthority. Worse still, important segments of the youth no longer believe inauthority and often confound freedom with anarchy.

The recent phenomenon of Islamism as a radical protest movement is,thus, first and foremost the result of the almost total failure of social,economic, and cultural modernisation. It is also the result of the painfulcolonial history, which continues to have its effects on the evolution ofAlgerian society. Modernisation in Algeria has often been understood in itsmaterial sense and failed to take into account the necessity for a process ofsecularisation, which, despite Islamist claims to the contrary, is notnecessarily antithetical to Islamic values.13 Further, the post-independenceFront de Liberation Nationale (FLN)-state's ineffective developmentalpolicies and the obstinate refusal of the party's and the state's personnel toopenly acknowledge the shortcomings of the overall developmentalprogram has led to a complete loss of legitimacy and credibility. Successiveregimes failed miserably in their attempt to apply the Western model ofmodernisation to their traditional, patriarchal society which, in many ways,they have helped perpetuate as a neopatriarchy,14 because of theirdemagogic and equivocal position on religious and cultural issues. They

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have sought modernisation without democratisation. The total corruptionand inefficiency of the regime, whose patronage networks inhibited anygenuine development, led to an intolerable stagnancy. However, the blamefor the failure of the developmentalist strategy cannot be put solely on thestate, for the demographic explosion contributed a great deal to aggravatingthe socio-economic problems. Worse still, the trauma which followed thechaotic urbanisation resulting from the dislocation of traditional societydebilitated the indecisive modernisation program, especially in the socio-cultural realm, thus leading to an identity crisis with disastrousconsequences.

By the time the most organised and most potent opposition party, theIslamic Salvation Front (FIS) made its appearance on the political scene in1989, this Islamist organisation was already in control of practically all themosques in the country. Unquestionably those mosques became the politicalforums of the Islamists and the place where they prepared their assault onthe state. The mosques constituted the embryo of a counter-power to thestate and, had it not been the totalitarian conception of the Islamists, couldhave become the basis of a credible counter-hegemony, in the Gramsciansense.15 Indeed, the totalitarian conception propagated by some FIS leadersprevented other organisations in civil society to join forces and formcoalitions with the Islamists against the regime.

The successive regimes in Algeria all used Islam as part of the state'sideology in order to legitimise their rule. But, the anticipated synthesisbetween Islam and socialism sought by 'PEtat- FLN' proved its limitationsbecause the political system continued to generate inequalities, especiallyunder Bendjedid's rule, rather than the discursive egalitarianism trumpetedby the authorities. In many ways, the Islamists were the orphans ofBoumediene; unlike his successor who lacked any vision, Boumedienesucceeded in at least mobilising the youth around a strategy of development.That strategy had the advantage of being essentially egalitarian in arelatively triumphant era in which corruption and clientelism never reachedthe proportions which developed under Bendjedid's reign.

The Islamist movement, which for a time seemed to be part of theemergence of a new type of civil society, was in fact the consequence of theabandonment of the welfare state policies. It was also the result of thepursuit of accelerated economic liberalisation, thus indicating the economicdisengagement of the state from many sectors, and the emphasis on profit.This chaotic liberalisation, coupled with corruption, injustice, andinequalities, led many to seek moralisation of state and society through areturn to conservative Islamic values and, unfortunately, to archaic socialconceptions.

The FIS, a catch-all movement, was able to bolster what Jowitt has so

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aptly called 'movements of rage', i.e., 'violent nativist responses to failure,frustration, and perplexity'.16 The absence of peaceful means to fulfill theirmaterial and social aspirations partly explains the resort to violence, for asput by Gurr, 'only men who are enraged are likely to prefer violence despitethe availability of effective nonviolent means for satisfying theirexpectations."7 This analysis applies to the realities of youth-dominatedsocieties, such as Algeria. Such societies are subdued by failure and crushedby frustration and despair. Religion in those societies has been dangerouslyideologised. The tension, which has prevailed in Algeria, will certainlycontinue worsening unless the roots of the frustrations are tackledeffectively, i.e., through a radical change of the system and at least thepartial replacement of the old elite and state personnel.

Algerian Islamists' Ideologies

Although there is some continuity between Islahism (reformism of thesalajyia movement born in the 1920s) and Islamism in Algeria, thedifferences are much greater. Islahism was essentially reformist,intellectualist, and non-violent. The 'ulama, whose patrician socialbackgrounds differed considerably from those of the plebeians that make upthe bulk of the radical Islamist wave today, led the movement. WhereasIslahism rallies relatively small groups of religious scholars concerned withthe moral values of their societies and intent on reforming them, Islamismis a social phenomenon resulting from modernity. Even if the movementseeks to implement the shari'a (Islamic Law), it is not interested in a returnto an archaic past. Rather, Islamism is a revolutionary movement, at least atits initial stages - before turning into mere 'neo-fundamentalism' - thatstrives to re-appropriate society and modern technology through politicalmeans, - seizing power in order to re-Islamise a society allegedly corruptedby Western values.18 The movement is, therefore, not theological, butessentially sociological. There ensues, at least for important sections ofIslamism, an ideologisation of Islam, whereby '"Islam" is not only a systemof religious beliefs, but also a set of principles which should guide thegeneral organisation of the community."9

The difficulty in studying the Islamist movement in Algeria, especiallyits revolutionary component incarnated by the FIS, stems from itscomposite membership and structures. Indeed, since its creation in February1989 until its ban in March 1992, the FIS comprised a variety of groups andideological currents. The heterogeneous leadership of the FIS, combiningradicalised salafists and new activist militants20 never really agreed on themeans to achieve power - their principal preoccupation - in order toestablish a vaguely defined Islamist state. The aspirations of the different

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groups included in the FIS diverged greatly. Some upheld a millenarianvision, in which recourse to violence is an intrinsic part, and whose majoraim is the dismantling of the nation-state as it currently exists. For others,the objective is limited to a mere substitution of the Islamist elite for the onein charge of the state. They perceive the state elite as having failed in bothits modernising tasks and in preserving Islamic values. Still others have noclear strategy whatsoever and have resorted to a nihilistic strategy which hascost the lives of thousands of innocent civilians. What is certain, however,is that the main objective of most Islamists is the appropriation of the stateby legal (electoral) means for some or through violence for others. Thisexplains the contradictory statements in 1991 of FIS leaders concerning thenecessity or refusal of participating in the electoral process.

Despite its heterogeneous nature, the FIS developed a dominantideological discourse regarding important political and social issues. Onemust insist, though, that because of the ideologisation of Islam which hasinevitably shifted the core of the debate from theological concerns to normsand values of the socio-political domain, the core beliefs of Islam haveeither retrograded or been entirely cloaked.21 Furthermore, a reading of theFIS leaders' pronouncements demonstrates very clearly the influence ofEgyptian and Indo-Pakistani Islamists (Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb,Abu Ala' Al-Mawdudi, Muhammad Ghazali).

The main commentaries concentrated on the 'evils' that have plaguedmodern society and are leading to its 'decadence.' Those evils are AIDS,sexually transmitted diseases, degeneration of morals, prostitution, mixingof the sexes in education in schools, universities and workplaces, andcontemporary ideologies (liberalism, socialism, communism, andfeminism), which have, according to FIS leaders, replaced religion andcorrupted societies. All of the evils of the jahilyia, that is, those aspects thatcharacterised pre-Islamic society, are said to be present in the Western worldand have allegedly been blindly emulated in Islamic societies. Only Islamcan provide a solution to all those problems.22 The Islamist view is that thestate in Islamic societies has not performed its duties; it has deviated fromthe divine commandments, and has, in fact, contributed to the jahilyia. Theregimes in those societies may also be considered as infidels and should,consequently, be fought through a jihad; their killing (qital) is halal(lawful). The other forces which have contributed to the decadence ofMuslim societies, according to Islamists, such as Ali Benhadj, are:journalists, writers, artists, state 'ulama (religious functionaries), secularistparties which 'militate with unequaled impudence for the separation ofState and religion: they are the creatures of colonialism in our country.'23

These groups must be fought because they are opposed to the jihad; in fact,'democracy is against the jihad, which democracy views as a manifestation

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of violence and interference in public liberties.'24 Such pronouncementslargely explain the staunch opposition to the Islamists not only by the so-called democrats, but also by other important segments of Algerian society.This is why it is safe to assert that the FIS electoral victories in June 1990and December 1991 were the result of a vote-sanction against the FLNrather than an overwhelming support for the FIS and its ideology. Backingfor the FIS had dwindled between the two elections of 1990 and 1991; theviolence carried out by Islamist groups since 1992 has further eroded theinfluence of the Islamists, especially the radical factions. Undoubtedly, theregime has hoped for such a result, without conceding, however, that thepopulation's dwindling support for the Islamists has not led to anyendorsement of the regime.

The Algerian State's Perception of Radical Islamism

The Algerian state, which held a quasi-monopoly over religious affairs,used Islam not only as a source of legitimacy, but also as an instrument tode-legitimise its political opponents. This was done through the elimination,marginalisation or integration of the 'ulama.25 Under Bendjedid's rule, theregime was quite tolerant of the rise of radical Islam, whose members it wasable - as was done in Bourguiba's Tunisia - to turn against the regimee'sleftist and Boumedienist opponents. Radical Islam became an instrument inthe struggle among the various clans in the political system. This explainsthe ambivalent attitude that the regime adopted at various times vis-a-vis theIslamists. Owing to the weakness of the democratic forces - which did nothave the capacity or the space to create a democratic front-Islamism inAlgeria emerged as the most potent force against the regime. Following theriots in October 1988, the Bendjedid regime sought to appease the Islamistsby finding a formula, which would divide not only the democratic forces,but the Islamist movement itself. Regardless, the FIS became increasinglydangerous to the regime mainly because its leadership astutely appropriatedthe FLN's own populist discourse, thus delegitimising the FLN's elites andtheir raison d'etre.

In the 1980s, the Islamist movement was already atomised and spannedfrom very peaceful fundamentalists to quite extremist groups. Yet, exceptfor the Mustapha Bouyali episode (1982-87), the regime worried very littleabout the growth of radical Islamism. The regime continued to eitherdisregard the movement's grievances or, as has often been the case, to makedemagogic concessions (such as the promulgation of the discriminatoryFamily Law of 1984) at the expense of important segments of society andeven to the type of modernity the state itself stood for. The regime madecompromises by increasing religious programs, organising international

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symposia on Islam, and even 'importing' in 1982 an Egyptianfundamentalist from the prestigious Al-Azhar Mosque, Mohammed al-Ghazali, to give televised sermons, and to head from 1984 onwards theDepartment of Islamic Studies at the University of Constantine (easternAlgeria). This highly visible super Imam, held in very high esteem byChadli Bendjedid himself, served as an ideological cushion to the religiouspretensions of the regime, but, through his ambiguous discourse, he also didmuch to encourage the growth of Islamism in the country.26 His influencewas immense, especially because Algeria suffers from culturalschizophrenia - due to 132 years of French brutal colonial rule - and lackswell trained native theologians. But, the influence of Ghazali and otherIslamist figures in Algeria cannot account for the massive Islamistexpansion after the events of October 1988. Well before the riots, theIslamists had already begun to 're-appropriate' Islam, to take it away fromthe state, in other words. That re-appropriation of Islam by the Islamistsfurther undermined the regime's legitimacy.

Following the 1988 riots and the subsequent liberalisation campaigninitiated by the regime, some forces within the regime thought that the FIScould play a functional role. That functional role would consist ofcontrolling the youth and at the same time frightening the democratic forceswhich would have no choice but to rally to the regime which otherwise istheir principal enemy. For a time, the regime's priority was to prevent theconstitution of a common opposition front. This is the reason whyBendjedid, for instance, cajoled the FIS before the return of Ahmed BenBella from exile in September 1990. Given that the authority of AbbassiMadani over the FIS was uncertain at that time, the regime feared aneventual decision by the FIS to put a charismatic and historic figure as headof the most powerful Islamist party. Another tactic was to exploit thedivisions within the Islamist movement itself by cooperating with the socalled moderate factions which eventually constituted themselves intoparties, such as Shaikh Mahfoud Nahnah's HAMAS (MSP - Movement forSociety and Peace since March 1997) or Shaikh Abdallah Djaballah's An-Nahda. The FIS's stubborn opposition to any alliance or reunification withthe other Islamist factions considerably facilitated the tactic pursued by theregime.27 The FIS was opposed to alliances not only because of its perceivedand actual popular strength, but also because unification with the otherIslamist parties would have greatly reduced the influence of Abassi Madani,a charismatic leader with presidential ambitions.

The regime used yet another tactic, one that consisted of manipulatingthe Islamists to neutralise the old guard and the crypto-Islamists within theFLN party itself and to prevent their victory at the polls. The hope was toconvince public opinion of the bipolarisation of Algerian society and to

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prove to public opinion, especially the democratic parties, that a renovatedFLN, under the leadership of the reformers (the so called 'soft-liners), wasthe only force capable of stopping the threat posed by the FIS However,important factions within the bureaucracy and the military refused theintegration of the FIS within the system for fear that the party wouldestablish its own hegemony at the expense of the old rulers. Further, the FISuncompromising position vis-a-vis the old rulers left no room for genuinenegotiation in order to set up a platform before the legislative electionscould be held. The absence of such a platform or negotiated pact greatlyaccounts for the violence and the political stalemate in the country since theinterruption of the electoral process in January 1992.28 Only since theNovember 1995 presidential election and the subsequent institutionalisationprocess aimed at breaking the political stalemate has there been a politicalevolution, albeit in the midst of continued violence.

For the regime's old guard, Islam remains a 'constant' of the system, butIslam must be of the kind that does not threaten the system's enduring elite.This is the reason why the MSP, the An-Nahda, and other smaller moderateIslamist parties have become much more acceptable to the regime. Thoseparties do not constitute a real threat to the hegemony of the FLN-producedelite, many of whose members have joined the newly created presidentialparty, Rassemblement National Democratique (National Democratic Rally).Unlike the FIS, the MSP and An-Nahda have accepted integration withinthe system and the incremental reform of that system without calling for itstotal, immediate replacement. Further, the regime had called, at least for awhile, upon the leaders of those two parties, especially Abdallah Djaballah,to mediate with the more radical FIS, a role which Djaballah had been eagerto play since the interruption of the electoral process in January 1992. Thesplintering of the FIS, the divisions within the old ruling party FLN, thecollapse of the Sant' Egidio coalition,29 and, more importantly, theincreasing conviction of the regime that it would eventually come to termswith and annihilate the armed Islamist groups rendered the mediation ofDjaballah unnecessary. In fact, high-ranking officers, even LiamineZeroual, had entered discussions with FIS leaders, including Madani andBenhadj.

The Algerian State and the West

Since the suspension of the electoral process in January 1992, thesuccessive regimes in Algeria have had to justify the reasons why theysuddenly decided to halt what seemed to be a promising democraticevolution. The principal explanation the rulers have given was that thecoming to office of a FIS-dominated government would have represented an

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end to the democratic experiment in Algeria. Although this may carry somevalidity, the regime has failed to provide a convincing reason why the FISwas recognised in the first place and what accounts for the regime becomingsuddenly more 'democratic' after decades of authoritarianism.

The pouvoir in Algeria continues to depict radical Islamism, in its FISversion, as a serious threat not only to Algeria's internal stability, but to thecountry's neighbors as well. The idea of a domino theory has become aconstant in the regime's political discourse, especially, when dealing withWestern creditors. The philosophy expounded by the regime has consisted ofpresenting radical Islamism as essentially the product of socio-economicdifficulties, thus, suggesting that the infusion of foreign capital - in the formof foreign aid and investments - would constitute the best means to containthe Islamist wave. From the regime's perspective, failure to do so would leadto instability not only in the Maghrib, but would also spread to the rest ofNorth Africa and Southern Europe. The pouvoir has, albeit painfully,succeeded in eliciting the support of other governments in its struggle againstthe Islamists. Thus, at the Fifth UMA Summit held in Nouakchott in 1992,the five Maghribi states condemned terrorism, the 'product of religiousfundamentalism,' and pledged to join their efforts to contain it and toeliminate it. In fact, the five declared that 'terrorism and extremismconstitute the main menace for society and democracy in the Maghrib.'30

Clearly, the regimes in the region have had no other choice than to mend theirdifferences in order to contain their internal opposition, that is, the radicalIslamists. The radical Islamists use a populist language which tends todiscredit those regimes and which has a strong appeal among the populationsat large, tired of their old rulers. Undoubtedly, the Islamist movement is nowperceived not as an internal problem, but as a regional predicament as well.31

Indeed, the fear of a spread of the radical Islamist wave and the subsequentneed to find allies in the struggle against the common enemy are the realmotives behind Egypt's wish to join the UMA, as well as the closecooperation between Algeria and Tunisia. This situation is different from thelate 1980s, when relations between Algeria and Tunisia were strainedbecause the Algerian regime had broken the promise it made to the Tunisianauthorities not to legalize the FIS for fear that it would strengthen the RashidAl-Ghanushi's Islamist party, Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique, knownas Ennahda, in Tunisia. Tunisia's handling of the Islamists today impressesAlgerian leaders - even though Algerians fear that the all-out repression,including moderate, non-violent Islamists, may backfire.

In recent years, Egypt has supplied special materiel to Algeria and hasshared a great deal of intelligence with the security forces. Similarly to theirallies in Tunisia and Egypt, Algerian leaders have accused Iran and theSudan of being the main supporters of the local Islamists.32 Therefore, they

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have collaborated with their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts on how tobest counter the alleged Iranian-Sudanese plan to destabilise the Maghriband other Arab states.33 The Algerian government has made tremendousefforts to convince its Maghribi partners that the stability and security ofeach state is contingent upon the security and stability of the others.Therefore, from the Algerian leaders' perspective, the five Maghribi statesmust coordinate their efforts in order to guarantee security and stability.34

The Algerian regime is still suspicious of Morocco and Libya's attitudestowards the Islamists in Algeria. Algerian officials are convinced that bothLibya and Morocco, although to a lesser degree than Iran or the Sudan, haveallowed the Algerian and Tunisian Islamists to destabilize their countries bypermitting the transit of weapons into the two countries.35 However, thereare those who argue that the closing of the Algerian border with Morocco inAugust 1994 was a ploy orchestrated by the two regimes to break theIslamist connection, whose implantation in the Kingdom had become all tooobvious after the terrorist attack in Marrakech.36 In view of Algerian-Moroccan relations since 1992, this scenario is dubious, at best.

Algeria has not limited its cooperation to Maghribi governments andother Arab governments. Indeed, serious cooperation between the Algeriansecurity services with their European counterparts has beeninstitutionalised. There is evidence that the Algerian Securite Militaire hasprovided valuable information to the French on Islamist activities and hasestablished close ties with the Italian security forces.37 The Algerian securityservices continue to provide their French counterparts with most of theinformation concerning the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).38 The relationshipbetween the Algerians Securite Militaire and the French Direction de laSecurite du Territoire had allegedly strengthened as 6f 1993.39

Algerians have been relatively successful in convincing their Europeancounterparts on the dangers that Islamism may represent for the continentand that destabilisation of North Africa would have dire consequences forEurope, whose concern with Maghribi immigration has grown steadily.Further, the threat, perceived or real, of an Islamist take-over in severalNorth African countries has brought the European governments' positioncloser to Algeria's and Tunisia's. Algerian officials have also been relativelysuccessful in convincing their Western counterparts that they are betterinterlocutors, that is less anti-Western, than the Islamists. Many Westerngovernments have come to agree with the view propagated by Algiers thatthe solution to Algeria's political crisis is fundamentally economic.Following Liamine Zeroual's election in November 1995, most Westerncountries, including the United States, have granted a degree of legitimacyto the Algerian regime, have become convinced of its durability in power,and have supported Zeroual's political strategy.

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In the period 1993-95, the United States gave the impression that itwould not oppose the coming to power of the FIS in Algeria. The UnitedStates was convinced in that period that it was a matter of time before theregime in Algeria would collapse. The United States differed with itsEuropean allies over the danger of an Islamist threat in the region anddownplayed the possibility of an Islamist domino effect. The position theUnited States took in 1993-95 put it at loggerheads with its European allies,especially France, which feared a spillover of the Algerian crisis not onlyinto Tunisia and Morocco, but into France and other southern Europeancountries, as well.40 The United States had sought a compromise betweenthe regime and the Islamists, hoping that this would restore stability in thecountry. However, the survival of the regime, Zeroual's willingness to finda political solution, and the continuation of the economic and politicalreforms, led to a change of policy toward Algeria. Since spring 1996, USsupport for Zeroual has escalated dramatically.

Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen has expressed one of thepredominant positions in the US government in April 1995 during a HouseAfrica Subcommittee hearing on Islamic extremism. Her view and that ofmany in the government is that 'Islamic militancy has emerged as one of themost serious threats to Western security,' although she stressed that 'Islamand legitimate Moslem fundamentalists are not the cause of our concern.'41

At least two main approaches toward Islamism have emerged in the UnitedStates. Those who subscribe to the notion of accommodation with moderateIslamists - not opposed to US interests and those who do not threaten theexistence of friendly regimes in the region. The accommodationists believethat the United States could marginalise Islamist extremists by favoringdialogue and cooperation between moderate Islamist parties andsecular/democratic political groups, regardless of whether this may lead tothe coming to power - via a legal road - of Islamist parties. This, of course,runs counter to the argument presented by those like Samuel Huntingtonwho argue that the clash between Islam and the West is inevitable ('clash ofcivilisations') and that the US government must oppose and prevent bywhatever instruments the possibility of the Islamists ever achieving power.Those who subscribe to this view, the so-called 'confrontationists,' have notolerance for Islamists of any type and believe that secular, authoritarianregimes are a lesser evil for US interests.

The US government exhorted publicly, until 1996, the Algeriangovernment to seek a negotiated settlement with the moderate elements of thebanned FIS, the main contender to the regime in place. This, of course, wasdifferent from the policy in Egypt, where the United States basically endorsedthe government's repression against the Islamists. In the autumn 1997, USpolicy showed much less ambivalence toward Algeria than in the period

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leading up to Zeroual's election. In September 1997, the US expressed itssupport for Zeroual, although American policymakers continued to encouragehim to pursue economic and political reforms, and to integrate all groups,including Islamists, opposed to violence.42

This combination of events has resulted in the agreement of Westerncreditors to re-schedule Algeria's public debt of $7.5 billion, withoutapparently any political strings attached.43 In other words, the regime has, inthe end, succeeded in impelling the West to support its durability in power.Undoubtedly, the terrorist wave that shook Europe in the summer of 1995,a terror attributed to the GIA and other armed Islamist factions, coupledwith the assassination in Algeria of seven French monks in May 1996, hasstrengthened the support for the Algerian regime. Moreover, in order tocontinue receiving foreign aid, the regime has pursued religiously thepainful economic reforms imposed by the international financialinstitutions, but also by the regime's decision to opt for economicliberalisation. There is no doubt that this liberalisation, which has not shownany benefits for the youth and other poor segments of society, hascontributed to the prolongation of the crisis. Indeed, the GIA draws much ofits desperados from the distressed neighborhoods.44

'Eradicateurs vs. Dialoguistes'

There are conflicting views within the government and the military - andamong opposition groups, such as the RCD (pro Berberist) Ettahadi(communist), and various women's organisations - regarding radicalIslamism and how to best deal with it. Some see it as a natural consequenceof the deficient policies pursued by the previous regimes and hold that thechaotic liberalisation as it was concocted by Chadli Bendjedid had failedand is to blame for Algeria's current impasse. They argue that a radicalbreak with the past is essential and that dialogue with the Islamists isnecessary if civil peace is to be re-established in the country. Aware of thenegative consequences of economic liberalisation on the underprivilegedsegments of society - the main base of support for the FIS - they maintainthat reaching a compromise with the FIS leadership and giving it a share ofpower may help put an end to the existing violence.45 The people who holdsuch a view are gathered around President Liamine Zeroual. Those are thepeople behind the decision to free Abassi Madani in July 1997; they felt thatMadani, no longer seen as a threat, could help in the creation of yet anotherlegalist Islamist party, thus widening the atomisation of the Islamistmovement. They hoped that his liberation would be interpreted as a sign ofappeasement on the part of the government and that it would alienate theextremist groups even further. However, it would be a mistake to see the

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'dialoguistes', or 'conciliators', as a homogeneous group. Even some so-called 'eradicators' share, at least partially, some similar views. But, thehard-core of the eradicators believe that radical Islamists are fundamentallydangerous to Algerian society, to the republican constitution, and tomodernity. Of course, they perceive radical Islamism as a direct threat totheir own lives, privileges, and to the Western values they share. Therefore,they believe that radical Islamists, especially their most extremist factions,must be eradicated without any respite and that any sort of compromise withthe Islamists would be futile. The activities of the extremist Islamist factionshave strengthened the position of those who hold such a view and havemade it difficult for those favorable to continued dialogue and negotiationswith the FIS to implement their policies more freely. Many observersbelieve, erroneously, that the eradicators represent a small faction within themilitary and the high administration. The reality is that eradicators representa wide spectrum within civil society.

The barbaric acts and the economic sabotage committed by variousIslamist armed groups, especially the GIA, have given the upper hand to thepartisans of 7e tout securitaire.' That policy has been condemned not onlyby the opposition parties, especially the signatories of the Sant'Egidioplatform, but also by those inside the regime who feel that the banning ofthe FIS should be offset by an opening of the political space. In other words,they advocate an opening of the political system in which a reformed FIS(with perhaps a different designation), led by 'moderates', such as AbbassiMadani, would be allowed to participate. This was in fact the most likelyreason for the liberation of Madani, whose release was predicated uponZeroual's team's wish to see a participation of independent FIS members inthe municipal elections scheduled for 23 October 1997. This approach wasthe result of pressure from the United States, but also from the relativefailure of 7e tout securitaire' policy; that policy has been ineffective incompletely eradicating the armed groups - although the major maquis of1993-95 have been largely wiped out. On the other hand, the proponents ofthe 'tout securitaire'' argued for quite some time that it was the ambivalent,dialoguiste policy adopted vis-a-vis the Islamists which has weakened thestate authority and has led to a prolonging of the stalemate. The signatoriesof the Rome platform, especially Hocine Ait Ahmed, leader of the Front desForces Socialists (FFS), believe, for their part, that integrating the Islamistsin the political arena would force them to play the political game and thatshould they decide to renege on their commitments they would be totallydiscredited. Thus, such integration would be the best way to contain theiradvance and demonstrate the Islamists' political limitations.46

Whatever each other's respective position, the proliferation ofautonomous armed groups be them Islamist, state para-military factions, or

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obscure anti-Islamist organisations has complicated matters and hasprolonged the unbearable standoff. More importantly, the multiplication ofautonomous Islamist armed groups (who turned to banditry and lack anyideological goals whatsoever) and their brutality has provided thejustification for the regime to settle the crisis on its own terms. Thegovernment, with the support of the military, decided to impose its ownagenda upon the opposition, thus leaving the opposition no choice but toeither participate or be forever excluded from the process.

The Proliferation of Islamist Armed Groups

There is much confusion about the exact nature of the armed groupscommitting acts of violence. However, the interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992, the ensuing repression, and the lack of a coherentstate strategy compelled many Islamists to join the ranks of those inside theFIS who had already decided that the armed struggle was the only path toseising state power. As indicated earlier, the Islamist movement in Algeriais not limited to the FIS, An-Nahda, and the MSP. It also includes a wholecollection of smaller groupings with views ranging from the most peacefulto the most fanatic. Although some of them were little known before theOctober 1988 events, many have existed since the 1970s. The participationof some young Algerians alongside the Afghan mujahidins in their waragainst the Soviets bolstered the prestige of these daring groups whosereputation is equaled only by their ruthlessness. They seem to act asautonomous bands, owing unconditional allegiance to an 'Emir' andobeying no other logic but their own. In the 1970s and 1980s, Al-Muwahiddun, Ansar Allah, Junud al-Allah, Da'wa of Sidi Bel Abbes(western city in Algeria), AM al-Da 'wa of Laghouat (a southern city), al-Hijra wa al-Takfyir, and others, targeted bars, breweries, police stations, andforeign citizens and interests in Algeria.47 Although further research isneeded to determine the exact nature of the relationship they haveestablished with the Islamic Salvation Front's Islamic Salvation Army(AIS), it is known that up to 1995, at least, the GIA and the FIS maintainedsolid links despite differences as to their tactics and targets.48 This entente,however, should not obscure the major tactical differences between the twogroups and their political objectives. There is good reason to believe that themajor objective of the AIS tactic has been to induce the regime to makeconcessions and to allow the FIS to re-enter the political arena. For the GIA,the principal goal, if there is really one, is to overthrow the regime and toallegedly establish some mystical 'Islamic state' whose main inspirationstems from the writings and recorded speeches of the FIS's fiery leader, AliBelhadj, imprisoned since July 1991. Undoubtedly, the differences, which

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since 1995 have divided the FIS leadership over negotiations with theregime, elections, and tactics, have affected the FIS relationship with theGIA, too. One can hypothesise that the brutal attacks, which followedMadani's liberation in July 1997, may have been the work of extremistIslamist groups opposed to any negotiation with the pouvoir. This scenariois plausible in view of the countless sect-like groups that have emerged in1996-97. The Ghadibun a'la Allah - 'Those upset with God' - a sect whosebrutality defies any sociological or anthropological analysis, appeared in theMitidja area near Algiers; its existence tends to support the hypothesisconcerning increased violence after Madanii's liberation more than onewhich attributes such acts to the security services. Regardless of whethernegotiations between the regime and the FIS are successful, extremistIslamist organisations would have much to lose from a positive outcome.

The Path Toward Democratisation?

The contention in this article is that neither the 'conciliators' nor the'eradicators' have had any clear vision or policy beyond seeking to preservetheir prerogatives and those of the groups they represent. Despite therhetoric regarding the republican beliefs, references to Arab-Islamic values,and the new talk about democracy, all seem to continue to cling toantiquated populist policies. However, the Islamists' lack of politicalrealism, with perhaps the exception of the MSP, and their recourse to forcecomplicated the situation and helped intensify the cycle of violence. Theabsence of a democratic political culture, the lack of genuine democrats, andthe non-existence of a sense of compromise have hampered any movetowards a political solution. The state could not control some sections of thesecurity forces, which often resorted to harsh repressive and highlyquestionable measures (torture, assassinations, and disappearances). Thestated objective of the government has allegedly been the desire to establishthe foundations of a democratic system and break with the old one. Untilrecently, the holders of power in Algeria continued to believe that they stillwere the legitimate rulers and that the hold they had over power wasjustified. They continuously refused to open up the political arena forgenuine pluralism and political competition because they feared to beoverturned by the Islamists, moderate or not, and by more democraticforces. The pouvoir was fully aware that the democrats did not (and still donot) constitute a credible force and that only the Islamists have themobilising capacity. Yet, despite its evident organisational and ideologicalweaknesses the opposition was not allowed much room to maneuver to helpthis very same pouvoir offset the influence of the radical Islamists. Instead,the rulers believed, quite mistakenly, that mere cosmetic change in the

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political field could promote democratisation of the Algerian politicalsystem and society. The regime's considerable efforts to revive nationalistfeelings among Algerians were futile. For their part, the Islamists remainedtorn between those who sought a compromise with the regime in order tohave access to power and to have a share in the national rent and those whostubbornly rejected any type of compromise with the regime. The mostradical continue to believe that only the total elimination of the old elitewould bring about a vague 'Islamic state' in which they would play theleading role. In spite of all their attempts, neither the Islamists nor the oldruling elite succeeded in swaying the majority of the population.

The democrats, for their part, have failed to erect a common front toneutralize the power of the most conservative segments of the regime andthat of the Islamists in order to provide an attractive pole for the 'majoritesilencieuse'. Although Algerians wish for the creation of a democraticorder, the country lacks genuine democrats to build that order. However, thecontention in this article is that the strategy pursued by the authorities sincethe presidential election of November 1995 has much potential to resolvethe crisis and to put democratisation back on track. The existence of a'political pact' and the institutionalisation process, their imperfectionsnotwithstanding, may carry the seeds of democratisation.

The Presidential Election

Liamine Zeroual was popularly elected as president of the AlgerianRepublic on 16 November 1995. When he announced that election on 31October 1994, in a speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of thebeginning of the War of National Liberation, both the Algerian oppositionand the international community were skeptical as to its pertinence.Skepticism stemmed from the fact that Zeroual had admitted in the samespeech the failure of the discussions with the FIS leadership. As it turnedout, that election augured a process, which has helped break the politicalstalemate that had paralysed political life in 1993-95.49 The presidentialelection was followed by the building of relatively legitimate institutionsand the institutionalisation of a pluralist political system, whatever itsshortcomings.

The political stalemate that resulted from the failed conference betweenthe government and the opposition, on the other hand, and between thegovernment and the FIS leadership in summer 1994,50 led Liamine Zeroualand his collaborators, including high-ranking officers in the military, to optfor presidential elections. Most observers were skeptical; the majoropposition parties called for a boycott of the election, arguing that thesecurity situation would not permit an adequate electoral process. In

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addition to Liamine Zeroual three presidential candidates competed foroffice. Mahfoud Nahnah, Sai'd Sadi, leader of the RCD, and NourredineBoukrouh, leader of the Party for the Algerian Renewal (PRA) competedfor office. Only Nahnah had the potential of forcing Zeroual to a run-off inthe event no candidate obtained the majority in the first round.

Even though many were convinced that Zeroual's victory was assured,some analysts believed that Nahnah was well poised to win because the FISsympathizers could conceivably cast their vote in his favor. However, themain concern before the presidential election was not who would win, butwhether the vote would take place at all and whether anyone would vote inview of the death threats issued by radical Islamists against any one whowould go to the polls. The state deployed tens of thousands of troops andreserves to secure the electoral process, while the Armed Islamic Groupintensified its campaign of assassinations and car bombs against innocentcivilians.

Against this backdrop, the turnout at the polls was much higher thananticipated. At least 60 per cent of the 16 million registered voters showedup at the polls; Zeroual won with 61 per cent of the votes. The vote provedthat the opposition leaders had miscalculated. Zeroual's victory not onlyforced them to recognise his legitimacy, but it also deepened the divisionswithin the Islamist movement, which seemed to undergo a process ofdisintegration. The old-ruling party, FLN, suffered an internal crisis; itschief, Abdelhamid Mehri, was forced to resign in January 1996. Divisionswithin the party between conservatives and reformists widened even further.The opposition parties lost credibility among a population weary of fouryears of near chaos and desirous to see a rapid end to the crisis, whosehuman toll had reached intolerable proportions.

The presidential election produced a number of positive results. First,this was the first pluralist presidential election in Algeria sinceindependence. Second, the overall electoral process was fair although manyin the opposition questioned the regularity of the election. Third, theAlgerian military remained intact; the prediction made by many analyststhat the military was on the brink of splitting apart proved groundless.Undoubtedly, the targeting of the military by the Islamists helped weld themilitary's cohesion and strengthen its esprit de corps, an event unforeseenby its armed opponents. Fourth, the population went to the polls despite thedeath threats issued by the radical Islamists. The population clearly rejectedviolence as a path to political power. Clearly, Algerians cast a vote againstIslamist extremism and for the re-establishment of peace and security.Zeroual was chosen primarily because he promised to negotiate with theopposition parties, which openly rejected violence. As head of the onlyorganised state force, the National Popular Army, Zeroual was the only

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candidate with the wherewithal to deliver his promise. Fifth, the number ofvotes obtained by the moderate Islamist candidate Mahfoud Nahnah (26 percent), indicated the attachment of many Algerians to some of the principlesbrought forth by the FIS, such as social justice, morality in politics, andattachment to Islamic values.

The expectation was that this vote would provide Zeroual with moreleverage because it would free him from the eradicators within the regime.His newly acquired domestic and international legitimacy could beundermined only by way of a violent act on the part of his opponents. Suchact was, however, inconceivable in view of international public opinion and,more importantly, because Algeria could lose the support of theinternational financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, Paris Club, and theLondon Club), which had endorsed Zeroual's policies. The United Statesand Europe had also accepted Zeroual's newly earned legitimacy.Paradoxically enough, part of the FIS leadership acknowledged Zeroual'slegitimacy and offered an 'olive branch' to him in the hope that this wouldbring a resolution of the crisis.51

By the summer of 1996, following a mysterious period of silence,President Zeroual engaged a series of consultations with most politicalparties and associations, explicitly excluding the FIS and any radicalIslamist faction. The GIA, which claimed to be the only legitimate Islamistmovement in the country, intensified its bloody attacks against the regime,against members of HAMAS, the leaders of secular parties, and against thecivilian population. Apparently, the GIA also launched bloody attacksagainst the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Army,52 which the GIAaccused of treason because the AIS had allegedly favored negotiationsrather than the armed struggle.

On 14 and 15 September, a conference on 'national entente' wasconvened by Zeroual to which all political parties were invited, except thebanned FIS While it brought together 1,000 representatives of 38 politicalformations (parties, unions, and associations), three opposition partiesboycotted it: the FFS, the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratic(RCD), and the Mouvement pour la Democratie en Algerie (MDA). Theleaders of those parties accused the regime of seeking a stamp of approvalfrom the opposition for the continuation of an authoritarian regime, ratherthan for a genuine political opening. The RCD accused Zeroual of havingreneged on a promise to give the Berber language a national status. Theconference adopted the Platform of National Entente submitted to them inMay 1996, which reaffirmed Islam as the religion of the state whileprohibiting any party from being founded on or making claims in the nameof religion, ethnicity or regionalism. President Zeroual announced that newconstitutional reforms inspired by this platform would be introduced by way

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of a popular referendum scheduled for the end of 1996. He also announcedthat new parliamentary and local elections would be held in 1997. Mostcitizens received the conference and the announcements that followed itwith indifference as no tangible results occurred following the presidentialelection in spite of the many promises.

The main aspect of Zeroual's strategy was the forging, albeit in anauthoritarian fashion, of a political pact with the opposition. The strategyconsisted of moving slowly in establishing the rules of the political game.The plan consisted of establishing rules, which would not allow theemergence of an overwhelming majority, as had happened in December1991. Zeroual's team believed that such a majority would threaten the veto-power of a privileged, military-backed minority. The framers of Zeroual'sstrategy sought to create a body of rules, which would confer upon thatminority the power to block potential initiatives antithetical to the nation'sinterests as perceived by that minority. Unlike what happened in the chaotictransition in 1989-91, Zeroual and his collaborators made sure that onlythose political parties acceptable to them would be allowed to participate inthe political process. In other words, while the process was undemocratic,the final goal would be the establishment of a democratic order. Thepresidential team's objective was to avoid a reiteration of the allegedmistakes made by the Chadli Bendjedid regime in 1989, whose recognitionof the FIS had fateful consequences.

The first step in the strategy was a revision of the 1989 Constitution. Theproposed revisions were contained in the May 1996 PresidentialMemorandum," which Zeroual submitted to the opposition parties. Therevisions affected three areas: the 1989 Constitution, the July 1989 Law onPolitical Associations, and the Electoral Law. Among the major revisionswas the limit set by the Constitution on the president's tenure in office totwo five-year terms. Another major constitutional revision was the creationof a two-house Parliament. The Parliament would be made up of thePopular National Assembly, whose members are popularly electedrepresentatives and a Council of the Nation, one-third of whose membershipwould be appointed by the President of the Republic. The other two-thirdsof the Council of the Nation would be composed of indirectly electedmembers from the municipalities and the departments. Whilst the 1989Constitution permitted the existence of political associations, the newconstitution, adopted in the November 1996 referendum, was more explicitin allowing the formation of political parties. Indeed, Article 42 states that,'The right to create political parties is recognised and guaranteed.'54

Consequential revisions also affected the Law on Political Associations.The reforms insisted that though the 'right to establish associations has beenenshrined in the Constitution since 23 Februaryl989, that right should not

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be invoked to undermine basic freedoms, national unity, territorial integrity,the independence of the country, and the people's sovereignty.'55 Throughthese revisions, the framers of the new constitution sought to prevent thelegal existence of any party whose program would be based on Islam, Arabidentity, or Berber singularity. The obvious objective was to prevent theemergence of a party similar to the FIS in 1989. Further, the new law issueda series of stringent rules to prevent the multiplication of small parties, suchas happened in the period 1989-91.

With respect to the electoral law, the major revision was the adoption ofthe system of proportional elections, which, according to the text, wouldallow greater participation in the political system and a more equitablerepresentation in the legislature.

The referendum on the Constitution held in November 1996 had muchto be desired and the results were undoubtedly inflated for psychologicalreasons - due to the disappointment following Zeroual's election, theauthorities feared that low results in the referendum would be greatlyembarrassing. In Algiers and other major cities, the turnout was low becausethe population believed that Zeroual had not capitalised on his promisingvictory in November 1995. Undoubtedly, Zeroual's inaction derivedprimarily from the power struggle inside the regime; he had yet toconsolidate his position as president.

The Law on Political Parties compelled some political parties to changetheir names. Thus, HAMAS changed its name to Movement for Society andPeace, whereas the Islamic Nahda Party dropped the term 'Islamic'

In order to consolidate his position and to implement his politicalprogram, Zeroual's team needed the support of a strong party. AbdelhakBenhamouda, head of the powerful Union Generate des TravailleursAlgeriens (UGTA), was preparing to head a party that would be composedof workers, peasants, war veterans, and other important mass organisations.However, soon after he announced his decision to step down from thechairmanship of the UGTA in order to head the new party, Benhamouda wasassassinated on the steps of the union's headquarters. He was allegedlykilled by an Islamist organisation, the FIDA, which specializes in theassassination of public figures.

A new political party, Rassemblement National Democratic (RND),referred to as the president's party, was born in March 1997, just a merethree months before the legislative elections scheduled for 5 June 1997.Those elections were part of the institutionalisation process and therehabilitation of the state. All the legal parties participated in the elections.Unlike the referendum on the Constitution, the turnout was important. TheRND won most of the votes (156 seats), but not an absolute majority.Nahnah's party, the MSP, came second (69 seats), followed by the former

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ruling party, FLN (64 seats), the Nahda (34 seats), the FFS (20 seats), theRCD (19 seats), and a few minor parties, including the Trotskyite workers'party, Partides Travailleurs (PT )(4 seats). The RND, the MSP, and the FLNformed a coalition in order to set up a government. As representative of themajority party, Ahmed Ouyahia maintained his position as Prime Minister.The MSP obtained seven ministerial posts and so did the FLN. As a result,the National Popular Assembly is dominated by a conservative coalitionmade up of nationalists and moderate Islamists.

This step in the rehabilitation of the state was such that the Zeroual'sadministration decided in June to free from jail the third most important FISleader, Abdelkader Hachani. Soon afterwards, in July, Abassi Madani wasalso freed on parole, six years before the expiration of his term in prison.Undoubtedly, that liberation was a gesture of appeasement on Zeroual'spart; however, it also indicated a certain degree of assurance, for despitecontinued violence, the authorities have gained the upper hand in the fightagainst the armed groups. The most extremist groups have since late 1996resorted to indescribable violence against defenseless villagers and againstthe families of rival groups. While some may have hoped that the liberationof the two FIS leaders would help re-establish peace in the country, closeobservers of the Algerian scene knew violence would continue becausethose leaders had long lost any control over the armed groups. Althoughthose extremist groups are still referred to as 'Islamists', the term 'bandits'would be much more appropriate.

The legislative elections of June 199756 have inaugurated the birth of agenuinely pluralistic parliament. The free debates in the parliamentarysessions show promising signs of an institutionalisation of pluralism andparliamentarism. The televised debates around the government programsubmitted by Ahmed Ouyahia in August 1997 demonstrate thatauthoritarianism in Algeria may be living its last years.

The municipal and departmental elections scheduled for 23 October1997 and the formation of the Council of the Nation in December 1997were, according to the Algerian authorities, the 'last brick' in theinstitutional edifice. This institutionalisation was professedly aimed at therehabilitation of the state and the establishment of a democratic order.However, the widespread rigging of the October 1997 elections led to hugeprotest and further discredited the democratic credentials of the men inpower. But, it remains to be seen how the Council of the Nation will operate.It also remains to be seen how the new Algerian political system willfunction given its strong presidentialism and the nascent parliamentarism.What is important, however, is that the authoritarian rulers have openedenough breaches in the system to allow a process of democratisation to takeits roots. Although democratisation was stalled between 1992 and 1995, it

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is quite possible that the completion of the 'democratisation from above'may break the status quo and allow democratic forces to emerge.Authoritarian rulers often dig their own political graves. They openbreaches in the political system, which, if exploited astutely by democraticforces, could lead to genuine democratisation. In the absence of genuinedemocratic forces, moderate Islamists, such as Nahnah's Movement forSociety and Peace, whose members appear attached to democratic valuescould conceivably provide an embryo for that type of alternative. This, ofcourse, implies that the institutions are strong enough to sustain ofrepublican values and that the parties and the government enter a genuinepolitical pact and keep their commitment to a democratic process.

Conclusion

A solution to the Algerian crisis will undoubtedly have beneficial domestic,regional, and international repercussions. A political solution will send themessage to the region that extremism is not inherent to the culture of thepeople living in that region, but that people will resort to radical means tobring down unpopular regimes only if there exist no political channels. Apositive evolution of the Algerian situation may generate shock waves in theregion because it would demonstrate how futile the efforts of extremistscould be. Extremists, no matter the human toll, could not subdue an entirenation. The authoritarian rulers have hopefully understood how precariousthe legitimacy of their rule is and that no economic reforms or developmentcan take place without the participation of their citizens in that process.

NOTES

1. Two good studies are Bassma Kodmany-Darwish (ed.) Le Maghreb: Les Annees deTransition (Paris: Masson, 1990) and Claire Spencer, 'The Maghreb in the 1990s', AdelphiPaper No.274 (February 1993).

2. A good treatment of this question can be found in Remy Leveau. Le Sabre et le turban-I'avenir du Maghreb (Paris: Francois Bourin 1993).

3. These regimes are characterised by their capacity - at least in the past - to promote growthand welfare. 'The government is reform oriented and enjoys a high degree of autonomy fromvested elite interests. It controls a state apparatus with the bureaucratic, organisationalcapacity for promoting development and is run by a state elite that is ideologically committedtoward boosting economic development in terms of growth as well as welfare.' GeorgSorensen. Democracy and Democratisation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1993), pp.75-6.Overall, Houari Boumediene's regime in the late 1960s and in the 1970s fits this definition.

4. On this point, see the excellent discussion in Robert Fatten, Jr., 'Liberal Democracy inAfrica', Political Science Quarterly 105/3 (1990) esp. p.459.

5. For a similar point, see Hisham Sharabi. Neopatriarchy — A Theory of Distorted Change inArab Society (NY: Oxford University Press 1988) p.9.

6. For a good treatment of these concepts, see Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen, TheMany Faces of National Security in the Arab World (London: MacMillan 1993) pp. 11 ff.

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7. For a definition of these concepts, see Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter,Transitions from Authoritarian Rule-Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies(Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986) pp.7ff.

8. Max Weber, 'Science as a Vocation,' in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press 1978) esp. pp.l29ff. For astimulating discussion of this concept, see 'Rationalisation, modernite et avenir de la religionchez Max Weber', Archives des Sciences sociales des Religions 61/1 (January-March 1986)pp.127-38.

9. Bruno Etienne, L 'Islam radical (Paris: Hachette 1987) p.134.10. Jean-Francois Clement, 'Pour une comprehension des mouvements islamistes', Esprit 1

(January 1980): p.46.11. Etienne (note 9), p.135.12. For an excellent, more detailed sociological analysis of the espousal of Islamism by the youth

in Algeria in the 1980s, see Omar Carlier, 'De l'islahisme a l'islamisme: la therapie politico-religieuse du FIS', Cahiers d'etudes africaines 32/2, No.126 (1992) pp.185-219. See also,R£my Leveau, 'La culture des jeunes et la montee des mouvements islamistes', Paperpresented at the Conference on The Political Role of Islamist Movements in theContemporary World: Domestic, Regional, and International Dimensions', The BolognaCenter, Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy, 26-27 November 1993.

13. The most serious attempts to study this question, in my opinion, are those undertaken by theEgyptian Fouad Zakariya. Lal'cite ou islamisme-les Arabes a Vheure du choix (Paris andCairo: La decouverte/ Al Fiqr 1989); the Tunisian Mohamed-Cherif Ferjani, Islamisme,laicite et droits de I'homme (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan 1992); and the French, OlivierCarre', L'lslam laique ou le retour a la grande tradition (Paris: Armand Colin 1993). Seealso, Yadh Ben Achour, 'Islam et lai'cite-Propos sur la recomposition d'un systeme denormativite', Pouvoirs 62 (1992) pp.16-30.

14. This concept is used in the sense given to it by Hisam Sharabi, i.e., modernised patriarchy inwhich 'material modernisation...only served to remodel and reorganize patriarchal structuresand relations and to reinforce them by giving them 'modern' forms and appearances.'Sharabi (note 5) p.4.

15. See Gwyn Williams, 'The Concept of'Egemonia' in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: SomeNotes on Interpretation', Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960) p.593.

16. Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Los Angeles, CA: University ofCalifornia Press 1992) pp.275-7.

17. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univesrity Press 1970) p.317.18. An outstanding discussion of the phenomenon can be found in Olivier Roy, L'Echec de

l'lslampolitique (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1992).19. Ali Merad, 'The Ideologisation of Islam in the Contemporary Muslim World', Alexander S.

Cudsi and Ali H. Dessouki (eds) Islam and Power (Baltimore, MD and London: The JohnsHopkins Press 1981) p.38.

20. A very good study of the historical, generational and political differentiation within the F.I.S.is S^verine Labat's, 'Islamismes et islamistes en Alge'rie-Un nouveau militantisme', in GillesKepel (ed.) Exils et Royaumes: les appartenances au monde arabo-islamique aujourd'hui.Etudes reuniespour Remy Leveau (Paris: Presses de la FNSP.1994) pp.41-67. The Englishversion, 'Islamism and Islamists: The Emergence of New Types of Politico-ReligiousMilitants', can be found in John Ruedy (ed.) Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (NewYork: St Martin's Press 1994) pp. 103-21. The more detailed study is, Severine Labat, LesIslamistes algeriens-Entre les urnes et le maquis (Paris: Seuil 1995).

21. Merad, 'Ideologisation...' (note 19) p.37.22. These points are drawn from Abbassi Madani's, Azmat al-fiqr al hadith wa mubarryrat al-

hal al islamyi (Algiers: Impr. Meziane 1989); commentaries on this book can be found in Al-Ahnaf, op. cit., pp.77ff.; Sheikh Abu a'bd al-Fatah Ali Bel Hadj (Ali Belhadj), Fasl al kalamfi muwajahat zul al hukkam (np: aljabha al-islamyia HI inkkad [FIS], n.d.), 310 pages. Thebook is a gold mine for scholars interested in Belhadj's views. The influence of Qutb andMawdudi, to whom he refers very frequently, is unmistakable.

23. Ali Benhadj, 'Qui est responsable de la violence?' El-Mounqid [FIS's newspaper], No.9,

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repr. in Al-Ahnaf, et a!., L'Algeriepar ses islamistes, p.136.24. Ibid., p.140.25. Mohammed Tozy, 'Les tendances de l'islamisme en Algerie', Confluences, No.12 (Fall

1994) p.53.26. For a detailed discussion of Imam Ghazali's role in the rise of Islamism in Algeria, see

Ahmed Rouadjia. Les Freres et la Mosque'e-Enquete sur le mouvement islamiste en Algerie(Paris: Karthala 1990) esp. pp. 197-208.

27. On this point, see Ai'ssa Khelladi. Les Islamistes algeriens face au pouvoir (Alger: Alfa1992)p.l78.

28. For an elaboration of this argument, see Yahia H. Zoubir, 'Stalled Democratisation of AnAuthoritarian Regime: The Case of Algeria', Democratisation 2/2 (Summer 1995) (London)pp.109—39.

29. On the Sant'Edigio episode and a critique of the regime's policy, see Robert Mortimer,'Algeria: The Dialectic of Violence', Current History 96/610 (May 1996) pp.231-5.

30. See the report published in El Watan (Algeria), 12 November 1992.31. An interesting discussion can be found in Fernanda Feria. Politique de securite au Maghreb-

Les imperatifs de la stabilite interieure (Lisbon: Institute de Estudios EstrategicosInternacionais 1994) pp.36-8.

32. See, Jeune Afrique, No.1850, 19-26 June 1996, pp.20-3.33. See ibid., p.20; El Moudjahid(Algeria) 8 December 1992.34. See the report on the meeting of the U.M.A.'s ministers of the interior in El Watan, 19 July

1994.35. Interviews granted by high-ranking civilian and military officials to the author in March

1993 in Algeria and in 1994-95 in Europe. See also, Jeune Afrique (note 32) p.21.36. This was communicated to the author in the summer 1995 by a reliable Moroccan source

close to the regime. Apparently, Driss Basri, Moroccan Minister of the Interior, said,'inevitably, some of the weapons going to Algeria will remain in the kingdom.' Although forobvious reasons King Hassan II does not wish to see the establishment of an Islamist state inAlgeria, weakening the Algerian state serves his goals regarding the Western Sahara, animportant domestic issue in Morocco.

37. See 'Operation Salim', Jeune Afrique, No.1799,29 June-5 July 1995.38. See, Financial Times, 9-10 September 1995.39. See, interview of Yves Bonnet, former chief of the French DST, in Jeune Afrique, No.1861,

4-10 September 1996, pp.28-32.40. Yahia H. Zoubir and Stephen Zunes, 'The United States and the Maghreb', in Yahia H.

Zoubir (ed.) North Africa in Transition: State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the1990s (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, forthcoming).

41. Cited in Africa Policy Report, No.3 (30 September 1995) p.4.42. See Agence France Presse (AFP), 10 September 1997.43. Le Monde, 23-24 July 1995.44. This is based on research conducted by the author in Algeria in May and June 1997.45. An interesting discussion, can be found in Hugh Roberts, 'Algeria between Eradicators and

Conciliators,' Middle East Report, (July-August 1994) pp.24-7.46. Author's interview with Ait Ahmed, Lausanne, May 1995.47. For a summary on these groups, see Khelladi, pp. 117—21.48. See Nouvel Observateur, No.1608, International Edition, 31 August-6 September 1995.49. This section draws from Yahia H. Zoubir, 'Ballots not Bullets', Jane's Defence Weekly, 7

February 1996. A good analysis of the presidential election can also be found in, YoucefBouandel, 'Algeria's First Free Presidential Election, November 1995', Representation,Vol.34, Nos 3 and 4 (Autumn/Winter 1997) pp. 173-9

50. For details, see Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria-A Political History (NewYork: New York University Press 1996) esp. pp.320ff.

51. Ibid. pp.366ff52. Financial Times, 12 January 1996, p.5.53. The Ml text can be found in La Nation (Algiers), No.148, 21-27 May 1996, pp.12-13.54. Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire. Texte du Projet de Revision de la

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Constitution, Referendum du 28 Novembre 1996 (Text provided by the Algerian Embassy inthe United States).

55. La Nation (note 53) (My translation).56. This section is based on direct observation of the elections in Algeria. This is a summary of

the press reports that appeared in Algeria after the elections.

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the algerian political crisis: origins and prospects for the future of democracy

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