International African Institute

The Abyssinian Crisis by Frank HardieReview by: Kenneth KirkwoodAfrica: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1976), pp. 304-305Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International African InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1159417 .

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Professor LeVine has used the voluminous series of enquiries into corruption in Ghana as the basis for a general discussion of the problem. It is more serious in the third world, he concludes, not because there is less honesty there but because there is less room for the diversion of public funds without serious damage to the economy. In the new states he sees the

'private use of public resources' as the political style of men who have not adjusted to the transition from opposition to power, and who 'view political and governmental position as no more than their just due, and political resources as theirs to dispose of as they see fit'.

LUCY MAIR

The Abyssinian Crisis. By FRANK HARDIE. London: Batsford, 1974. PP. 294, bibl., index. ?6.oo.

THIS is a most valuable study of one of the more significant events of the Twentieth Century. It merits close attention from all students of Africa and international relations.

The crisis, which in its entirety spanned the period between 5 December 1934, the date of the Wal-Wal incident near the Ethiopian-Somalia frontier, and 15 July 1936, when the sanctions of the League of Nations were lifted, brought about not only the temporary conquest of one of Africa's great states but the effective destruction of the League of Nations, mankind's first

major organized essay towards world-wide international peace and security. Dr. Hardie divides his work into three main parts: (i) the background in Abyssinia, Italy,

Britain, France, other Great Powers, and the League of Nations; (2) the operations of the

League of Nations organization and the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Great Powers during three phases between December I934 and December I935; (3) the defeat of Abyssinia-the actual Italo-Abyssinian War lasted from 3 October 93 5 to 5 May 1936-and the defeat of the

League. There is also a perceptive introduction, epilogue and inquest. Dr. Hardie makes plain that the explicit object of his book is to examine British policy. This deliberate emphasis of the author, and his reasons, should be kept in mind by readers. He readily acknowledges that there are several other important viewpoints, notably those from inside Africa, and he looks forward to their early publication. But, as he writes in his Introduction:

"For all the tragic events which are to be chronicled it is Britain ... which bears more

responsibility than any other State. For this reason all chronicles of the Abyssinian crisis should revolve round British policy."

He does not minimize the culpability of France, and of Pierre Laval in particular, and he allows no doubt as to the primary guilt of Fascist Italy, expecially Benito Mussolini, but his focus is upon the shortcomings of Britain, and upon responsible Ministers of the Crown, of whom Samuel Hoare is the most notable. As he remarks, Britain was a senior 'Great Power', a founder-member of the League, the principal member of the Commonwealth, and the ruler of a vast Empire.

This frank exercise in 'self-criticism' by a senior British historian is to be welcomed for its

refreshing and heartening quality. Dr. Hardie belongs to a confident generation of scholars, and participants in public affairs, who saw no point in mincing their words of blame or praise. He also makes the important point that for someone of his age and inclinations the new 'thirty years rule' under the Public Records Act, I967, has resulted in a 'treble' advantage: first, as someone who was then deeply interested in public events he can remember their flavour; second, he has been able to add knowledge of secret diplomatic despatches and the like to his own and other contemporary written records; and third, he personally observed and

participated in those movements of British public opinion during the mid-thirties which are an essential part of the story of the Abyssinian crisis.

Dr. Hardie modestly and rightly insists that he is no specialist on Africa and, indeed, given the European background of 'the Abyssinian crisis' and its consequences for the League of Nations, he reminds us that the whole affair itself might well be re-named. Yet his study, despite its emphasis on Western diplomatic history, has obvious significance for all students of Africa,

Professor LeVine has used the voluminous series of enquiries into corruption in Ghana as the basis for a general discussion of the problem. It is more serious in the third world, he concludes, not because there is less honesty there but because there is less room for the diversion of public funds without serious damage to the economy. In the new states he sees the

'private use of public resources' as the political style of men who have not adjusted to the transition from opposition to power, and who 'view political and governmental position as no more than their just due, and political resources as theirs to dispose of as they see fit'.

LUCY MAIR

The Abyssinian Crisis. By FRANK HARDIE. London: Batsford, 1974. PP. 294, bibl., index. ?6.oo.

THIS is a most valuable study of one of the more significant events of the Twentieth Century. It merits close attention from all students of Africa and international relations.

The crisis, which in its entirety spanned the period between 5 December 1934, the date of the Wal-Wal incident near the Ethiopian-Somalia frontier, and 15 July 1936, when the sanctions of the League of Nations were lifted, brought about not only the temporary conquest of one of Africa's great states but the effective destruction of the League of Nations, mankind's first

major organized essay towards world-wide international peace and security. Dr. Hardie divides his work into three main parts: (i) the background in Abyssinia, Italy,

Britain, France, other Great Powers, and the League of Nations; (2) the operations of the

League of Nations organization and the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Great Powers during three phases between December I934 and December I935; (3) the defeat of Abyssinia-the actual Italo-Abyssinian War lasted from 3 October 93 5 to 5 May 1936-and the defeat of the

League. There is also a perceptive introduction, epilogue and inquest. Dr. Hardie makes plain that the explicit object of his book is to examine British policy. This deliberate emphasis of the author, and his reasons, should be kept in mind by readers. He readily acknowledges that there are several other important viewpoints, notably those from inside Africa, and he looks forward to their early publication. But, as he writes in his Introduction:

"For all the tragic events which are to be chronicled it is Britain ... which bears more

responsibility than any other State. For this reason all chronicles of the Abyssinian crisis should revolve round British policy."

He does not minimize the culpability of France, and of Pierre Laval in particular, and he allows no doubt as to the primary guilt of Fascist Italy, expecially Benito Mussolini, but his focus is upon the shortcomings of Britain, and upon responsible Ministers of the Crown, of whom Samuel Hoare is the most notable. As he remarks, Britain was a senior 'Great Power', a founder-member of the League, the principal member of the Commonwealth, and the ruler of a vast Empire.

This frank exercise in 'self-criticism' by a senior British historian is to be welcomed for its

refreshing and heartening quality. Dr. Hardie belongs to a confident generation of scholars, and participants in public affairs, who saw no point in mincing their words of blame or praise. He also makes the important point that for someone of his age and inclinations the new 'thirty years rule' under the Public Records Act, I967, has resulted in a 'treble' advantage: first, as someone who was then deeply interested in public events he can remember their flavour; second, he has been able to add knowledge of secret diplomatic despatches and the like to his own and other contemporary written records; and third, he personally observed and

participated in those movements of British public opinion during the mid-thirties which are an essential part of the story of the Abyssinian crisis.

Dr. Hardie modestly and rightly insists that he is no specialist on Africa and, indeed, given the European background of 'the Abyssinian crisis' and its consequences for the League of Nations, he reminds us that the whole affair itself might well be re-named. Yet his study, despite its emphasis on Western diplomatic history, has obvious significance for all students of Africa,

REVIEWS OF BOOKS REVIEWS OF BOOKS 304 304

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS 305

and among other things it drives home the importance of leaders of independent Africa playing their full and vigilant part in world affairs. However, even allowing for the author's own

qualifications and terms of reference, I believe he could with advantage have given more attention to certain crucial matters which he only touches upon, for example, the attitudes towards non-western cultures and the 'race' attitudes to be found among leaders and groupings among all the Imperial powers. And, given the not unimportant positions and concerns of Lord Lugard, Dr. Oldham and others in the International African Institute, the International Missionary Council and comparable bodies, I would have welcomed some assessment of the roles of these organizations and men in awakening public opinion. KENNETH KIRKWOOD

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NUMBER

JOHN BEATTIE. Lately Professor of African Studies, Leiden University. Author of Bunyoro: An

African Kingdom, The Nyoro State, and various papers on Nyoro society and culture. RODNEY NEEDHAM. Fellow of Merton College and University Lecturer in Social Anthro-

pology, Oxford. Field research in Southeast Asia. Publications in Africa since 1960. M. C. JEDREJ. Lecturer in Social Anthropology, University of Aberdeen. Previously Lecturer at Khartoum University. Field research in Sierra Leone and the Sudan. JEAN-CLAUDE MULLER. Associate Professor, Department d'Anthropologie, Universite de Montreal. Author of several papers on the Rukuba and Parente et mariage cher les Rukuba. HARRIET NGUBANE (SIBISI). Ford Foundation Research Fellow, Centre of International and Area Studies, University of London. Papers on 'How the Zulus see their Diseases' and 'Abortion and Zulu Culture'. Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine now in the press.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.86 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 06:51:33 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions