The

CUJPSE

Concordia Undergraduate Journal of Political Science Essays

The Pioneer Edition (2012)

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The

CUJPSE

Concordia Undergraduate Journal of Political Science Essays

The Pioneer Edition 2012 ©

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The Concordia Undergraduate Journal of Political Science Essays

CUJPSE

Edition I

By the Political Science Students’ Association of Concordia University

Concordia University Montreal (Quebec) Canada

2011-2012

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The CUJPSE Pioneer Edition ©

Editor-in-Chief Eric-Moses Gashirabake, Sr.

Editors

Charles Ikiel Ptito-Echeverria Marvin Hichem Coleby

Reviewer Prof. Christopher Thomson

This pioneer publication was made possible by: The 2011-2012 Political Science Students’ Association of Concordia University - Office of

Internal Affairs mandate.

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Contents Editor-in-Chief’s Foreword ………………………………………………... v The Editorial Team ……………………………………………………….... vi The Contributors …………………………………………………………… viii 1. Language, Culture, Identity… Freedom: Caribbean Creole and Independence Movements, Language as a Causal Factor By Marvin Hichem Coleby (Page 1-34) 2. Understanding Civil War By Aida Benbarka (Page 35-47) 3. Life, Slavery and the Pursuit of Happiness By Alexandra Johnson (Page 48-59) 4. The Bittersweet Results of China’s Role in Six-Party Talks By Charles Ikiel Ptito-Echeverria (Page 60-74) 5. The Tragedy of Plato’s Commons By Trevor Smith (Page 75-85) 6. Is Post-National Citizenship Possible? The EU Model of Citizenship and Ethnic Nationalism in Yugoslavia By Katrina Tarondo (Page 86-98) 7. Canada and Quebec’s Multicultural Odyssey: From Citizenship to Multiculturalism... By Giuliano Caccese (Page 99-125) 8. The Political Roots of Barristers and Solicitors By Athena Tacet (Page 126-142) 9. Explaining the Financial Crisis: Information, Understanding, Risk Assessment and Moral Hazards By Patrick Wallis (Page 143-164) 10. Our House: Creating Space in Canada through Self-Expression By Aimee Louw (Page 165-182) *** Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in the essays belong exclusively to the authors.

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Foreword It is with great pleasure that the Political Science Students’ Association (PSSA) of Concordia University presents to you the Pioneer Edition of the Concordia Undergraduate Journal of Political Science Essays (The CUJPSE). With the aim of showcasing exemplary essays written by undergraduate students in the department of Political Science at Concordia University, this pioneer journal brings together a collection essays on diverse topics from the different subfields of Political Science. The PSSA’s office of Internal Affairs is committed to bringing undergraduates in our department together through knowledge sharing and the promotion of academic achievement. Through the CUJPSE, students have a unique chance to get published, while at the same time disseminating invaluable knowledge and ideas with their peers. As the founder and editor-in-chief of the CUJPSE this year, I had the unique opportunity of reading excellent papers. It was very tough for our editorial team to decide the final picks for publication. The pioneer edition which you have at your disposal presents analyses of issues ranging from the Canadian/Quebec multiculturalism, immigration, North Korea, Caribbean language and identity politics, slavery and American conception of Freedom, ‘Plato’s Tragedy of the commons’ to a well written comparative politics essay (en Français), on understanding the problem of civil war. This publication would not have been possible without the support of a great contingent of people. Special thanks go to my team of editors as well as the professor(s) who assisted in the final review. This publication would also not be possible without the wonderful members of the PSSA who submitted their papers for publication. Last but not least, many thanks go to my co-executives in the PSSA who were of great support throughout this process. Finally, accolades to you all for allowing us the opportunity to bring to you the First Edition of the CUJPSE.

Eric-Moses Gashirabake, Sr., Editor-in-Chief and PSSA VP Internal, 2011-12

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THE EDITORIAL TEAM

Eric-Moses Gashirabake, Sr. – Editor-in-Chief A native of Rwanda, and a 1994 Genocide survivor, Eric-Moses is a final year undergraduate student in the Honours Political Science program and the 2012 Editor-in-Chief of The Concordia Undergraduate Journal of Political Science Essays (The CUJPSE). His main interests include law, international relations and human rights. While he served as the Vice President (Internal Affairs, 2011-12) of the Political Science Students’ Association of Concordia University, Moses founded and initiated the first edition of The CUJPSE. At the same time, he also co-founded and served as the Vice President of World Universities Service of Canada (WUSC), Concordia chapter, a human rights club that creates awareness on refugees, gender equality and fair trade issues on campus. Moses also served as the Vice President (Communications, 2011-12) of the Concordia Pre-Law Society and the African Students’ Association of Concordia. He was recently elected as Vice President (Academic and Loyola Affairs) for the Concordia Arts and Science Federation of Associations where he will represent over 18, 000 in the faculty for the 2012-13 academic year. In May 2012, Moses was named member of the Garnet Key Society, Concordia’s official honour society. He will serve as Ambassador and External Chairperson of the 55th Garnet Key Society, 2012-13. Moses is very passionate about reading, writing and leadership; aspects which he considers to have been instrumental in his healing from the ordeals of 1994. His curiosity in the power of the written word led him to spearhead this student Journal whose main goal is promoting exemplary undergraduate essay/research paper-writing in the department of political science at Concordia University. He envisions the same project can be replicated at the Concordia Faculty of Arts and Science level, and eventually across the University. After completing his bachelor’s degree in arts and science, he hopes to proceed to study international and human rights law. Moses’ ultimate future dream is to work in different countries in the area of human rights and to eventually teach law in his native Rwanda, and other developing countries in East and Central Africa. Charles Ikiel Ptito-Echeverria – Editor Ikiel recently completed his undergraduate B.A. in Political Science at an accelerated rate. He also has a Minor in Mandarin, which he completed as an exchange student at the Communication University of China. As of fall 2012, he will proceed to Science Po (Paris) and Fudan Universities, where he has been accepted to pursue a dual degree Masters program in Europe, Asia and Global Affairs.

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Ikiel is also a passionate entrepreneur. While pursuing his undergraduate degree at Concordia, he co-founded a business named iRepair MTL, which he currently co-owns with his friend and partner. Also keen on other issues of health and well-being, Ikiel spent 3 years working at the University of Montreal on a private research project that examined the Fatal Alcohol Syndrome. Ikiel is well-known for regularly organizing sold-out beginning-of-semester and end-of-semester parties for undergraduate students in the faculty of arts and science at Concordia University. Marvin Hichem Coleby – Editor Marvin recently completed his B.A. (Honours) in Political Science at Concordia University in spring 2012. Alongside editing for The CUJPSE, Marvin served as the Chairman of the International Ethic Associations Council (2011-12) and President of the Concordia Caribbean Student Union (2010-11). In 2010-11, Marvin won the Best Club Executive Award as president of the Concordia Caribbean Student Union. The organization received the Montreal Community Cares award for its positive impact on the local Caribbean community. During the same year, Marvin founded the Unifying Concordia: Inter-Association Charity Soccer Tournament. In 2011-12, he served as chair of the International and Ethnic Associations Council, through which he launched Concordia's inaugural Cultural Diversity Week. Marvin was also VP Events for the sports fan club SWARM, editor-in-chief for the Concordia Pre-Law Society and president of Colors of Concordia. Previously, he completed an internship at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, where worked with the president of the General Conference. Professor Christopher Thomson – Reviewer Christopher Thomson has a BA in Government from Cornell University and a MA in Political Studies from Queen's University (Kingston). He was a career public servant with the Québec Government from 1978 to 2005, notably spending nine years on the China Desk of the ministère des Affaires Internationales and seven years on secondment to the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada as Director of the Québec regional office in Montréal. He taught Japanese politics for three years at the Université de Montréal and since 2003, various courses on Asian politics and international relations at Concordia. AREAS OF EXPERTISE Northeast Asian Politics (China, Korea, Japan) International Relations within Asia

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

Aida Benbarka Aida is a second year major in the Political Science program at Concordia University. She has participated actively in debates organized by the Political Science Students’ Association. She plans to pursue her studies in international law once she finishes her undergraduate degree. Alexandra Johnson Always busy, Alexandra is the Vice-President of the 54th

Trevor was also a very active figure throughout the ongoing student strike within the GPE department, and has pushed for a renewed culture of accountability and representation among the student associations. He plans to continue his studies at Concordia in the Master of Science

Garnet Key Society, VP Academics of the Loyola College Student Association (2011-12), and the President of the Concordia chapter of the Golden Key International Honour Society (2011-12). She is honoured to have been selected valedictorian for the June 2012 convocation. An avid traveler, she recently studied abroad in Singapore for a semester and traveled through South East Asia. Back home, when she's not working or volunteering at the Montreal Children's Hospital or participating in various student organizations, you can find her trying to get cupcake icing out of her hair. Alas, as soon as the cupcakes are up on her baking blog, she's already finding a new recipe or planning her next fundraiser. She argues for the power of thought and the peace of cake. She also believes in direction rather than in goals because it leaves room for mistakes. Opinionated and passionate, Alexandra is very much looking forward to pursuing her graduate studies in political theory at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland next year.

Trevor Smith Born and raised in Montreal, Trevor just completed his Bsc. (Honours) Environmental Science program with a minor in Political Science. His fourth-year honours thesis developed an alternative greenhouse gas metric to Global Warming Potential. His concentrations were in Geomorphology, Climate Science, Environmental Policy and International Relations. In the past year, he was significantly involved within the social spheres of Concordia as the 2011-12 Vice President Finance of the Geography Undergraduate Student Society (GUSS), a representative for ASFA on the Arts and Science Faculty Council, a member of ASFA’s Sustainability Committee and as the Editor-in-Chief and Founder of the Geography, Planning and Environment Undergraduate Journal, Sphere.

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program, examining climate change mitigation with a focus on economic development and modeling. Katrina Tarondo Katrina is in her third year History major with a minor in Law and Society. Her interdisciplinary minor has a Political science component. Since the early age of 12, she dreamed of becoming a lawyer and working either for international organizations or for the Parliament of Canada. Human rights and international law interest her the most.

Her involvement at Concordia includes being the current VP Communications of Students of History Association at Concordia (SHAC) and she was also a volunteer On-Site Coordinator at Frontier College at Concordia, an organization that promotes literacy skills. Katrina is the President-elect of SHAC for 2012-13. At the same time, she is the VP Internal-elect of the Concordia Pre-law Society (CPLS). She looks forward to her new positions at Concordia and hopes to serve students well.

Giuliano Caccese Giuliano is a 23-year-old Political Science major, graduating in the upcoming fall semester of 2012. His interests lie in Quebec, Canadian and United States political discourse. He hopes to use his degree as a bridge for future studies at the Master's Level, or work in the public or private sector once he completes his undergraduate studies at Concordia. He aspires to become a politician or hopefully work in government or somewhere in the realm where politics can become his life's work. He wishes to thank his fellow students who helped by critiquing his previous drafts presented from late September to December of 2011. He also extends his acknowledgment to Professor Rick Bisaillon who constantly guided, encouraged, and most importantly always believed his paper would be outstanding once completed. Athena Tacet Born and raised in Paris, France, Athena came to Canada six years ago. Alongside French and Modern Greek, which are her mother tongues, she is fluent in English, Italian and Spanish. She also studied Russian as well as Modern Standard Arabic and the Levantine colloquial. Athena’s need to understand the Middle East led her to undertake a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science (2009) and a Certificate in Modern Arabic Language and Culture (2011) at Concordia University. She also recently finished Concordia’s Graduate Diploma in Journalism (2012).

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During her years at Concordia, she interned as a Media Monitor for Kenya at the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, and became a regular contributor for Journalists for Human Rights (Concordia Chapter).

She aspires to become a political journalist and a foreign correspondent specialised in international politics and Middle Eastern studies.

Patrick Wallis Patrick is a second-year Political Science Major. He intends to pursue his graduate degree in Policy Analysis. Although he states that ‘‘the majority of his interests and pursuits should not be elaborated upon in a scholarly journal’’, it is worthy to note that he is the author of a current events blog, alcarlin.blogspot.com, which discusses (with occasional seriousness) politics, sports and, entertainment. His blog’s persona, Al Carlin, is also a regular contributor to the hockey fan site, themontrealbias.com.

Aimee Louw Aimee is in her final year of her Honours degree in Political Science, and is currently working on her Undergraduate Honours Thesis, which looks at persuasion and countering apathy in contemporary social movements.

Throughout her time at Concordia, Aimee has found it equally as important to study the philosophies and rhetoric that inform politics, as to act on that knowledge and take part in politics. She has been active in various political and social justice campaigns, taking special interest in Indigenous solidarity movements, and working on finding her role as a non-Indigenous treaty person living in Canada. She has recently become involved in radio production, and in her usual style has thrown herself in full force. Her first interview was with an MP on Parliament Hill. She loves radio production and is considering a career in news media.

Aimee is honoured to be a contributor to the Pioneer CUJPSE Journal.

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Language, Culture, Identity… Freedom: Caribbean Creole and Independence Movements, Language as a Causal Factor

By

“Dis how we dis talk, dis who we dis b, n dis who we ga be”

Marvin Hichem Coleby

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Language is continually evolving and reinventing itself. This living and growing

organism, plays a paramount role in the formation of one’s culture, although it can be perceived

as either a product or a constituting factor. Language represents the communication of signifiers,

images and experiences that constitute one’s reality and therefore becomes part of one’s identity.

It therefore becomes the fortifying bond that pulls people who share a same reality together, most

significantly when those sharing these experiences are already grasping for a strong unifying

bond, anything that will hold them together and give them a collective identity. For a given

group, identification with fellow oppressed individuals is therefore established through language.

More specifically, the English-speaking Caribbean context with its history of colonialism and its

rich linguistic, cultural and political heritage provides an excellent context in which to study the

relationship between language and politics. With a history whose legacy, among other things,

was a deeply rooted, cultural oppression, the people of this region became desperately in need of

such a bond among themselves. Transformative nationalist leaders such as Sir Lynden Pindling

(The Bahamas) and Dr. Eric Williams (Trinidad and Tobago) were some of the first to realize the

Introduction

1 This is how we speak, this is who we are, and this is who we are going to be”

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power of language to be this uniting bond. However, they were not merely political leaders, but

also political educators, that more importantly realized the political power of Caribbean

language. With this context in mind, the aim of this paper will be to demonstrate how the

linguistic oppression that accompanied colonialism and slavery, and the subsequent development

of new dialects through Creolization, resulted in Caribbean language being a causal factor for

independence movements in the region. To explain this I will establish a theoretical

understanding of language as comprising three aspects: communication, image expression, and

identification to demonstrate how Caribbean Creole was formed, became a constituting factor of

Caribbean culture and eventually was a causal factor for political and economic independence.

There are two bodies of analysis of Caribbean postcolonial thought at play throughout the

course of this argument. Firstly, there is the wide body of literature concerning the Caribbean

within the field of linguistic anthropology, which attempts to create an “understanding of the

crucial role played by language in the constitution of society and its cultural representations”2

2Alesandro Duranti, Linguistic Anthropology: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001, 5

.

Within this field, many anthropologists and linguists attempt to analyze language (and in this

case Caribbean Creole) as an expression of ethnic and cultural identity. However, focus on

Creoles and Caribbean Creole specifically, only began by speakers of Caribbean Creole during

the 1970s (previously it was written by colonialists). Though it has expanded into a reputable

body of literature, there are many gaps and components still left to fill, possibly because of the

ever-changing nature of Caribbean Creoles, or the oppressive institutions that have thus far

impeded the ability for Caribbean people to consider their language a respected language.

3

Secondly, there is the arguably even wider field of self-determination and independence

movements. Following Christopher Columbus’ ‘discovery’ 3 of the Bahamas in 1492, the

Caribbean has faced genocide, brutal subjugation and intellectual oppression. Independence

movements of the 1970s and 80s represented triumph over this painful history. Such movements,

though partially racially motivated 4

What seems to be common to these two different, but not mutually exclusive bodies of

literature is the analysis that Caribbean culture results from a history of slavery, colonialism,

brutal marginalization and oppression faced by both Indigenous peoples and Africans

, were also cultural movements, attempts by Caribbean

people to reassert a collective identity which resulted from the oppression and dehumanization

tactics of their colonizers during the practice of colonialism, and its close relative, slavery.

Independence movements were therefore not only out born of a need for immediate political and

economic freedom, but also motivated by a symbolic desire to become disassociated from

centuries of oppression. It is through such an interpretation of Caribbean independence

movements that we can better understand Caribbean culture as a result of this oppressive past, a

result of cultural resistance of Africans and Amerindians in the face of self-interested European

nations.

Language and Culture

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3Of course, acknowledging that nothing was in fact ‘discovered’ by Columbus, but that he merely landed on already inhabited land. 4 Both the African-American Civil Rights Movement and the Sir George Williams Computer Riots in Montreal, Canada, had a profound effect on mobilizing Afro-Caribbean people. 5Brathwaite, Kamau, Roots. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993, 261

. In spite

of this, there does not seem to be a great deal of literature that specifically links Caribbean

linguistic anthropology to independence movements within the region. It seems altogether

surprising that such an attempt is yet to be made. For the purposes of this paper, I will adopt a

definition of culture defined as “people [who] grow up together in families, communities,

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denominations,” and share “common beliefs, values, and practices”6. However, it seems that

culture is something more than this, a more abstract phenomenon, an “inward condition of the

mind and spirit”7

Given this definition of culture, in this paper, I put forth a new way of conceiving the

relationship between language and culture, in order to later explain the role of language in

Caribbean independence movements. Caribbean Creole and language in general is often

explained as being a result of culture. However, I propose it should instead be seen as both a

cause or determinant factor and a result of culture. The traditional interpretation limits one’s

ability to understand the power of language as a political and cultural force to lead to greater

movements. If language is only considered a result of culture, then for the purpose of this paper,

culture becomes the real causal factor of Caribbean independence movements. So, for the

purpose of this paper, language will be looked at as the building block for cultural expression: it

was historically the system which gave power to a voiceless, oppressed people who were

formerly engaging in nameless practices and experiences. Furthermore, culture, an admittedly

abstract notion, involves a people’s ways of acting, thinking, believing, and interpreting being. It

would be impossible to truly understand, share and celebrate one’s culture without

communicating with others of that similar culture. Language therefore does not only serve the

function of “[expressing] cultural reality,”

and deeply rooted in one’s identity. Any sort of external, undesired influence

on this ‘inward condition’ can therefore affect the connection between the mind and spirit,

disturbing one’s cultural identity and by extension, the collective cultural identity

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6K. Anthony Appiah “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections” presented at The Tanner Lectures on Human Values at the University of California at San Diego, October 27/28, 1994, 117 7Appiah 120 – according to Appiah, this quote was taken from Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy, 119 8Claire Kramsch, Eds. H.G Widdowson, Language and Culture: Oxford Introductions to Language Study, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 3

, but it is also needed to embody it, symbolize it, and

form it, and form the inward harmonious condition between mind, spirit, and identity. We must

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therefore aim to paradoxically understand language and culture as separate, but inextricably

connected aspects of identity and society.

Language: Communication, Image Expression, Identification

One of the more obvious functions of language involves the ability of individuals to

interact with one another, a function that “is always present to some degree, and this is as true of

accent, vocabulary, or grammar”9. Most notably, oral communication has the ability to establish

powerful bonds between individuals: satisfying the arguably natural human craves for social

interaction, while cultivating the potential for creation of bonds, breaking of old bonds, and the

tightening of existing ones10. However, for such communication, ‘social knowledge’ is required,

where an individual is aware of the meanings and definitions of words, grammar, tones, pitches,

and all other specifically associated aspects to their linguistic community. In other words, the

ideas that an individual creates and attempts to communicate must necessarily be attached to

words, and converted into language and communication. Such communicative practices therefore

require, at the very least, some conception and understanding of one’s contextual existence

within one’s society, and within one’s own body11. Communication is therefore not simply a

conversation with an individual, but it is self-expression, the materialization of ideas, and the use

of words to convey subjectively created (but still socially influenced) ideas and beliefs. This

shared knowledge, coupled with communicative abilities “permit individuals to establish a

reciprocity of perspectives or definition” 12

9Philip Riley, Language, Culture, and Identity: An Ethnolinguistic Perspective. London: Continuum, 2007, 92 10Kramsch 42 11Kramsch 40 12Philip Riley, Language, Culture, and Identity: An Ethnolinguistic Perspective. London: Continuum, 2007, 18

of their respective situations, allowing for their

expression and beliefs to be communicated, which in turn forges their identities. In other words,

communication is a necessary, but not sufficient function of language.

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Image expression, another function of language, is arguably the most abstract of the non-

exhaustive list of functions of language. In order to fully understand its role within language, we

must understand and define its two constitutive concepts independently. Images are those

abstract thoughts that Marlene Philip believes are similar to the “DNA molecules at the heart of

life”13. In other words, images are almost indescribable abstract experiential snippets that spur

the need for expression. For example, imagine that I want my bedroom color painted green – in

my own subjective thoughts I will immediately create an image of a particular shade of green,

largely informed by my own experiences and interactions with this color that have, for the

purpose of this argument, impacted my other experiences (e.g. my understanding of green lights,

the concept of ‘having a green light’). This particular shade of green would be incredibly

difficult for me to express, as it is an abstract image. Instead, I must use real-world examples and

justifications that come closest to my particular shade image and in doing so; I will need to use

words like traffic light, a particularly green book cover, grass, or St. Patrick’s Day paraphernalia,

in order to communicate the closest match to the shade I have imagined. In expressing my

experiential encounters with the color green (a stereotypically beer-filled holiday, a traffic light

from last week, grass on my front lawn, etc.), I am attempting to convey my image (particular

shade of green) in order to communicate what it is I am thinking, and subsequently, who it is I

am. Interestingly, this complex process gives rise to another ‘‘[function] of language [that has]

been neglected by most theorists”14

For the purposes of developing a relationship between these three functions, and to

understand the role of language in identification, let us stick with the example of the color green.

: identification.

13Marlene Nourbese Philip, “The Absence of Writing or How I Almost Became a Spy,” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, eds Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Savory Fido, Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. (1990), 272 14Philip Riley,Language, Culture, and Identity: An Ethnolinguistic Perspective. London: Continuum, 2007, 93-94

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The expression of my experiential contact with the shade green and the way it has informed my

particular shade, are all a result of my identity, and a constituting factor of it. For example, the

grass on my front lawn might mean that I own a home (imagine a particularly expensive one),

which could also possibly hint at my racial, cultural, or economic status (context dependent). In

short, any interaction I had with the color green that influenced my particular shade, was, at least

in some part, influenced by my identity. Further, this particular shade I am attempting to

communicate reflects these experiences, allowing for the person with whom I am communicating

with to make value judgments based on theirs and my use of words and images. The images I

possess, and the way I communicate them, therefore result in my identity being “negotiated

within the macro sociolinguistic structure of the society” 15 in which I attempt to contextualize

myself. Quite simply, through the communication of images, I am expressing my identity to

others based on their own interpretation of these images that are largely informed by my

experiences. As noted in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, language has the

“capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities”16. In an

oppressive situation, this can develop and produce “Creoles who consciously [redefine]…

populations as fellow-nationals”17

In essence, communication, and language, must be conceptualized as an expression of

identity. If this identity is largely, as is usually the case, influenced and formed by a specific

, facilitating the bonds and nationalistic sentiments necessary

for liberation. It is through these imagined communities, where individuals may feel a bond with

others that they may have not necessarily even met which created a necessarily strong collective

identity.

15Philip Riley, Language, Culture, and Identity: An Ethnolinguistic Perspective. London: Continuum, 2007, 117 16Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New York: Verso, 2006, 133 17Anderson 50

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culture in which one is born and raised, then communication is an expression of cultural

identity18

When one refuses “to accept the identity or role being attributed to them”

(Kramsch 2009, 3). With such a framework in mind, we are now in a better position to

understand how cultural identity, when influenced by external factors such as cultural (identity)

oppression, can influence the expression of one’s identity through communication.

Oppression and Cultural Identity

19, we can

expect that they will seek alternative methods of expressing it. Under oppression, individual

members are denied voice as a collective, resulting in a lack of genuine communication of their

experiential lives and “with the withering of the word… not only [do] images die, but the

capacity to create in one’s own image [dies] also”20

18Claire Kramsch, Eds. H.G Widdowson, Language and Culture: Oxford Introductions to Language Study, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 3 19Riley 124 20Marlene Nourbese Philip, “The Absence of Writing or How I Almost Became a Spy,” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, eds Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Savory Fido, Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. (1990), 277

; individual and collective identities are

threatened and negatively altered. If we can therefore take oppression into account as a factor

that can alter identities, and thus, linguistic communication (communicative image expression),

through a suppression of culture and the inward condition of mind and spirit, we can create a

conceptual link between ethnicity and language. Oppression provokes a re-ordering of identity,

and with it, language. Within this context, we can now turn to the fact that Caribbean history is a

history of oppression. Though there exists no real regional Caribbean ‘culture’, per se, each

nation has a colonial past, and their cultures reflect it accordingly, and so do their languages even

though there are many similarities between language structures and practices. If we consider the

aforementioned relationship between language, ethnicity and culture when affected by

oppression, and the attempt at individuals being ascribed a foreign identity to seek alternative

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methods to express themselves, we can better understand the process of creolization21

Patrick Colmhogan seems to share this view, claiming that “colonialism is one of the

purest forms of cultural destruction”

, of which

Caribbean cultures are a result.

Now, an understanding of Caribbean culture and creolization requires an understanding

of not only Caribbean history, but particular dimensions of colonialism. Usually understood in a

political and economic sense, for the purposes of this paper, we must attempt to understand

colonialism from a cultural perspective. No form of colonial oppression could be sustained

without the cultural oppression of the colonized: the assimilation and internalization of beliefs of

inferiority, allowing sustained and uncontested domination.

Colonialism and Cultural Oppression

22. The pattern of Caribbean colonialism, more specifically,

was one through which oppression “did not develop slowly out of internal conditions,” 23

21Though to be later defined, creolization is the fusion of different practices and beliefs that produces a new one in a Caribbean context (traditionally understood) as the forced marriage between European and African culture – in a linguistic sense, this means the fusion of African and European languages, but the more complicated relationship involved will be defined during the course of this paper 22Patrick Colmhogan, Colonialism and Cultural Identity: Crises of Tradition in the Anglophone Literatures of India, Africa, and the Caribbean. New York: State University of New York Press, 2000, 85 23Ibid 2

but

was instead imposed suddenly and forcefully, resulting in an extreme disruption of cultural

practices, and creating what is referred to as ‘contact cultures’. The forced contact between

European, African and Amerindian cultures, essentially a conflict between indigenous and

foreign practices, created a situation where the Europeans justified their cultural and racial

superiority on the claim that the indigenous cultures were ‘backwards’, and necessitated civility

and progress, in other words, they needed European culture to be considered civil. Colonialism

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therefore “requires cultural oppression”24

Following the genocide of the indigenous Taino and Carib populations that inhabited the

region when Christopher Columbus ‘discovered’ the Bahamas, European business owners were

in search of new forms of cheap labor, resulting in the need for the slave trade and the

displacement of Africans. These slaves were forcefully brought to the Caribbean, where they

formed the majority in the colony despite “[having] been displaced from their ancestral region,”

and “drawn from a number of different ancestral regions with distinct indigenous

traditions”

and the internalized belief of cultural inferiority by the

indigenous peoples.

25.This contact with a foreign culture “[led] to widespread modification or even loss of

basic culture”26

If we conceptualize colonialism in cultural terms, then, as Amilcar Cabral argues, we can

understand national liberation movements as cultural movements: the attempt of the oppressed to

– and the necessary, and desperate, attempts at cultural retention by oppressed

(Africans) during slavery, and on the indigenous majority populations during colonialism. Such

cultural retention has therefore persisted throughout the Caribbean region, inevitably influencing

contemporary social and political structures. It was this cultural retention that created a situation

where the oppressed were forced to develop their identities within an oppressive framework

(creolization). They developed a sense of community among themselves as slaves, but did so

within a society that was not theirs, a society that was built based on their supposed inferiority.

They essentially created a culture born out of oppression, a culture that is, as a result, inherently

self-deterministic, a culture that is European, African, and Amerindian, but Caribbean in every

way.

24Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral. London: Monthly Review Press, 1979, 142 25Patrick Colmhogan, Colonialism and Cultural Identity: Crises of Tradition in the Anglophone Literatures of India, Africa, and the Caribbean. New York: State University of New York Press, 2000, 317 26Colmhogan 6

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assert their identities. Cabral, a revolutionary nationalist leader in Central Africa, held the firm

belief that national liberation movements were indeed cultural, and that “the value of culture as a

factor of resistance to foreign domination” 27is an often-underestimated tool. Cabral, one of the

few authors on colonial and postcolonial literature to conceptualize national liberation

movements as culturally motivated, interprets culture as “the fruit of history, [reflecting] at all

times the material and spiritual reality of the society”28, a continually evolving phenomenon

entrenched in a people’s history, present, and future. Since foreign domination necessitates

cultural oppression and destruction, and since culture, as Cabral conceives it, is the

materialization of the historical reality of society, then the oppressed people’s culture develops in

response to colonialism, and therefore as an anti-thesis of foreign domination. In his view, the

“liberation struggle is above all a struggle as much for the conservation and survival of the

cultural values”29

Though I do not wish to downplay the fact that national liberation movements are the

need for unhindered development of political and economic institutions, they are also the need

for a people to politically govern themselves according to their own culture, beliefs and values –

similarly, their need for economic liberation comes out of a need for the people to engage in

work according to their own culture and values. It would therefore seem that national liberation

movements are also cultural movements. Since Africans were so far displaced from home, and

ignorantly grouped together, the culture shock (admittedly difficult to measure) must have been

inconceivably severe. With such a history in mind, it can be reasonably held that considering the

as it is for their economic, racial, or political freedom.

27Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral. London: Monthly Review Press, 1979, 139 28Ibid 149 29Ibid 147

12

specific nature of Caribbean colonization, the attempt to resist through “national liberation

movements [was] necessarily an act of culture”30

Traditionally, Caribbean culture is thought of as the survival of African traditions,

making little to no allowance for the effect of European influence. However, the relatively recent

field of creolization attempts to take into account such a complex relationship, by acknowledging

Caribbean culture as a “product, which is the result of a mixture or blending of various

ingredients.”

.

Creolization

31 Creolization therefore acknowledges that African cultural traditions persist, but

also attempts to understand how these same practices have been affected, and evolved, due to

contact with European cultures. It is the unconscious and unintentional practice by which there

was a “process of interaction and mutual adjustment between the major cultural traditions of

Europe and Africa.”32 Creolization was therefore the attempt at the oppressed to work within a

repressive (European) framework to find ways to express their identity, which inevitably latched

on to European culture. Creolization, in this respect, can be seen as the product of Africans

“smuggling in their hidden agendas, infiltrating their own innovations”33

30Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral. London: Monthly Review Press, 1979, 143 31Nigel O. Bolland, Struggles for Freedom: Essays on Slavery, Colonialism, and Culture in the Caribbean and Central America. New York: Angelus Press Limited, 1997, 3 32Bolland 11 33Bolland 20

within a European-

structured society in order to find a compromise between being accepted (and shedding

‘backwardness’ view) by the Europeans and expressing their true cultural identity. If we are to

take such a view of creolization as the materialization of oppression, and the attempts at the

oppressed to navigate it, then we can best see how contemporary Caribbean culture (and pre-

independent) creolization, is itself a dormant tool for self-determination, containing blatant signs

13

of anti-colonialist sentiments: a cry for freedom. This cry is what we can label Caribbean Creole

language, the oral manifestation of Caribbean creolization, and thus, of historic oppression. It is

the illustration of attempts at an oppressed people to work within an oppressive society (English

language) to communicate and express their identity and their experiential images (as oppressed

Africans). Creolization could therefore be considered “the anti-thesis of [imperialism]”34

If we recall the aforementioned claim that language and culture are separate but

inextricably concatenated, then it can be reasonable to claim that Caribbean Creole language is

also a product of creolization, as it embodies a history of oppression. In the same way that

Africans and Amerindians resisted cultural assimilation by their colonialists, who “generally

insisted on their cultural superiority to the indigenized African populations”

, since it

inherently carries a history of oppression, and thus, the need for collective- and self-cultural-

determination. It is with this argument set up that we may now return to Caribbean Creole,

possibly the clearest and most easily recognizable result of creolization.

35

Slave masters engaged in the “systematic separation of slaves of the same tribal origin in

factories, aboard ship, and in the New World, so as to minimize the possibility of revolt.”

they also resisted

linguistic domination in an attempt to seek a way to articulate their genuine experiences that

could not be captured by the superimposed European language.

36

34Nigel O. Bolland, Struggles for Freedom: Essays on Slavery, Colonialism, and Culture in the Caribbean and Central America. New York: Angelus Press Limited, 1997, 6 35Nair, Supriya, “Creolization, Orality, and Nation Language in the Caribbean,” in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Inc. (2000), 240 36MervynAlleyne “Acculturation and the Cultural Matrix of Creolization” in Pidginization and Creolization of Languages, eds Dell Hymes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1971), 184

Regardless, slaves persisted in finding a way to communicate with the only people with whom

they could identify: other slaves. As a result, they were forced to develop an oral method of

communication (as they could mostly not write) which was a fusion of their own particular

14

methods of speech, of a particular “plantation society culture”37, where this new communication

was only spoken by other slaves: “the major participants in the process of culture and language

creation were West African slaves.”38 Further, the slaves borrowed words and interpretations

from the imposed European language which heavily discriminated against African language,

resulting in what we may refer to as pidgin language; a bridging gap between African and

European speech that is non-native – the first step in the formation of a Creole language, and

later, its development: creolization39. This new ‘language’, was therefore created through an

attempt by Africans to find a way to speak a “language that approximates more precisely and

passionately the experience of the Caribbean” 40

Now, this development of Caribbean Creole through contact culture therefore reserved

this particular method of speech to lower-class individuals: indentured laborers, indigenous

minorities, and slaves. In the colonial era, and even today, Creole was only spoken by the lower

class or working populations, while ‘standard English’, the “so-called dominant version, [was]

only spoken by a minority”

, which was not possible through European

language.

Caribbean Creole Language

41

37Alleyne 10 38Alleyne10 39The biggest difference here is that pidgin speech has no native speakers – it grows among those who do not have a common language (different African slaves and with Europeans), but wish to communicate, there are therefore no ‘native’ pidgin speakers. Creole, however, is the development of pidgin, which became the native mother tongue of an entire society, which has its roots in the pidgin language that preceded it. 40Supriya Nair, “Creolization, Orality, and Nation Language in the Caribbean,” in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Inc. (2000), 246 41Nair 246

. Regardless, documents, political institutions, language of

instruction, and formal communications became the language of the oppressor, and the

15

Caribbean Creole outcast as “bad English, broken English”42, as it still is today. This creates a

situation where the majority of the individuals in the colony speak a certain type of language

considered inferior, or an offshoot of the ‘standard’ European language’ (equally offensive).

Individuals in the colony were forced to speak the European language, mostly through the use of

educational curricula designed to repress their linguistic (and cultural) identity. These

educational curricula which are still are today, only reinforced and “[maintained] the language of

the conquistador”43, in the form of forced writing and reading44. This presents another interesting

dimension to Caribbean Creole: its oral nature. Quite simply, Caribbean Creole is a language that

“[is] African in every way except its vocabulary.”45

The European languages, “was subverted, turned upside down, inside out and sometimes

even erased”

46

42Marlene Nourbese Philip, “The Absence of Writing or How I Almost Became a Spy,” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, eds Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Savory Fido, Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. (1990), 275 43Kamau BrathwaiteRoots. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993, 262 44It can be reasonably held here that European languages were relatively more dependent on written than oral forms of communication, the use of ‘written English’, for example, is just another sign of cultural oppression 45Hubert Devonish, “The Language Heritage of the Caribbean: Linguistic Genocide and Resistance,” in Glossa 5(1) pp.: 1-26 (2010), 9 46Marlene Nourbese Philip, “The Absence of Writing or How I Almost Became a Spy,” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, eds Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Savory Fido, Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. (1990), 275

in order for members of the oppressed community to communicate with each

other. In this sense, every word, every sentence, every interpretation, metaphor, meaning, or

tonal variation in Caribbean Creole communication, is an expression of this history. It is the

physical and oral manifestation of a past of cultural retention under repression, and the success of

the oppressed to fight against internalized images of themselves and their identity in order to

create an avenue for the expression of their collective identity: creolized language. The

“evidence of this resistances survives in the language situation and the languages which currently

16

exist within the Caribbean”47; therefore Caribbean Creole is the expression of culture (image

expression). Since this culture and language was formed through oppression and subsequent

resistance, our 48Creole, our way of interaction and identification is, and always has been,

inherently self-deterministic. It is the clearest example of our ancestors’ struggle to retain their

most obvious method of identification (here keeping in mind our theoretical interpretation of

language for the purposes of this paper), through language. Caribbean identity is inextricably

intertwined with linguistic communication, which is the result of resistance and desperate hope

for liberation and freedom of expression49. Under colonialism, the colonized certainly wished to

“participate in the European way”50, due to the false ‘superiority’ it claimed (learning English as

a prestige language), but the insatiable desire to express one’s true identity was under fulfilled

through the use of this language. In other words, in being denied expression by claims of

inferiority of ‘bad’ or ‘broken’ English, Afro-Caribbean peoples lost the “power to make and

simultaneously express [their] images”51

It is therefore with this understanding of Caribbean culture and language that we can

establish an understanding of Caribbean Creole as a causal factor for nationalist sentiments in a

colonized region. However, up to now, though we have better understood Creole as inherently

self-deterministic due to its heavy African roots as an expression of cultural retention, there is

, these images being their experiences as an oppressed

people.

47Devonish 3 48Here switching to the use of ‘our’ due to my own identification with the particular dimensions of Caribbean English Creole 49 Another interesting example is Bahamian Junkanoo, an inextricable aspect of Bahamian culture. Junkanoo is a parade that developed historically when slaves (who were not allowed much freedom) could hide and play drums and instruments with costumes, in order to retain a part of their culture (music) that they could not maintain when forced to labor for their masters 50Mervyn Alleyne, “Acculturation and the Cultural Matrix of Creolization” in Pidginization and Creolization of Languages, eds Dell Hymes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1971), 180 51Marlene Nourbese Philip, “The Absence of Writing or How I Almost Became a Spy,” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, eds Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Savory Fido, Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. (1990), 274

17

one more aspect that must be explored in order to make a more reliable causal connection: the

oral nature of Caribbean Creole.

Caribbean Creole as Oral

There is no universally accepted written Caribbean English Creole. Where I write the

word ‘bey’52

Kamau Brathwaite, most particularly, takes into account the importance of the oral nature

of Caribbean language Creole, going so far as to suggest, “when it is written, you lose the sound

or the noise, and therefore you lose part of the meaning”

, another of my friends may write it as ‘bui’, ‘boi’, ‘buy’, ‘bay’, or ‘biuy’. Our

language has simply yet to be ‘standardized’ and written, preventing any reputable international

sociopolitical recognition. This may have contributed to its ‘inferiority’ during colonial times,

particularly since competence was interpreted as being able to write and speak ‘proper English’

or ‘Standard English’. Further, the oral nature of Caribbean Creole may be one of the reasons

why English Language exams within Caribbean countries (administered in Standard English)

tend to be abnormally lower than all other fields of educational discipline. It therefore comes as

no surprise that the oral nature of Caribbean Creole may be the reason for its inferiority.

Regardless, this oral nature is an inextricable part of communication among Caribbean speakers,

without understanding the oral character and accents of Caribbean Creole; one cannot understand

its true meanings.

53. This orality is also an expression of

oppression, a manifestation of the inability of Caribbean people to have access to reading

materials. Orality is a feature of Creole that is the example of a people who had to “rely on their

own breath patterns rather than paraphernalia like books and museums” 54

52 A word used for reference – can be applied to anyone irrespective of gender, race, age 53Kamau Brathwaite, Roots. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993 – “History of Voice 1979”, 271 54Ibid 273

in order to express

their identity. Their dependence on this orality was a respect for “the power within themselves,

18

rather than the technology outside of themselves” 55 – and a heavy reliance on the speech

community, gossip, folklore, and story-telling (a significant aspect of African culture) instead of

written literature, books, or plays (an aspect of European culture). Quite simply, the “African

element most clearly reveals itself… in the rich oral traditions of the Caribbean”56

If we recall our three understandings of language: communication, image expression, and

identification, it can be plausibly held that the destruction and repression of the culture of

, and failing to

interpret the particular tonal fluctuations, accentual shifts, and rarely duplicable methods of

verbal expression, is also a failure to understand the true sense of image expression being

conveyed by a native Caribbean Creole speaker. Further, failure to identify the particular

dimensions of the spoken Creole is the ability almost exclusively reserved for individuals within

that specific community. In spoken Bahamian Creole, for example, there are oral shifts and

particular changes that only another Bahamian may notice, the way a Bahamian understands

another Bahamian is an indescribable experience. This is due to the acknowledgement of the

common Creole, which immediately denotes a common history, culture, and therefore cultural

identity that members of a community understand on a level that others may not, which is best

communicated orally. This strong reliance on an exclusive speech community therefore

reinforces the need for a particular expression of image (experience), through distinct

communicative channels (Creole), which results in a strong sense of identification (self-

deterministic sentiments) with other native speakers. It is this oral nature of Caribbean Creole

(along with distinct vocabularies), that is most ‘African’, and the most tangible example of

resistance to oppression; it provokes a heightened sense of identification in face-to-face Creole

speech.

55Ibid 273 56Supriya Nair, “Creolization, Orality, and Nation Language in the Caribbean,” in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Inc. (2000), 243

19

Caribbean natives, and the replacement of their language with a foreign one, resulted in the loss

of their capability to communicate their image expression (experiences and memories of

oppression and cultural identity). It would seem nonsensical for the oppressed Caribbean to

attempt to articulate their experiences and being through a language that clearly denies that

identity. Philip, for example, writes “that at the heart of the [language] lies the image”57, and that

since descendants of the Caribbean peoples, Africans, had a strong affinity for words and orality

as the “fulcrum of societal forces”58, the reclaiming of this lost image was of utmost importance

for the development of a collective cultural identity. Language is meant to provide an avenue for

the individual to “give voice to the experience and image and so house the being”59

With this heightened sense of identification with the process of creolization, Caribbean

people were able to “become [wordsmiths], forging new and different words”

, as opposed

to serving as a tool to suppress that it. Furthermore, the particularly oral nature of Caribbean

Creole forces a strong reliance on the speech community, and therefore, necessitates a higher

level of image expression through communication, and identification.

Caribbean Creole and Identification

60

57Marlene Nourbese, “The Absence of Writing or How I Almost Became a Spy,” in Out of the Kumbla: Caribbean Women and Literature, eds Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Savory Fido, Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. (1990), 276 58Philip 277 59Philip 276 60Philip 275

, in order to

communicate their experiences and identity to others, in this case, to other Caribbean individuals.

Through this process, though the ability for image expression was severely shaken, it was not

lost. If we are to recall the particular relationship between image expression, communication and

identification, it seems that each of these three aspects of language necessitate the use of the

other. However, such a base understanding of these three aspects can be applied to written

20

language, a sort of communication that Caribbean Creole has thus far not reached. Caribbean

Creole, therefore, is an attempt to communicate expression through necessary tones and aural

fluctuations that cannot be captured through writing, and is only attributable to individuals with

‘true accents’61. Since it is a communication of a history of oppression and can only be truly62

understood by other members of that same speech community: self-identification based on

language (as a defining characteristic of one’s cultural identity) with other Caribbean peoples is

heavily relied upon as a determinant of friendship, understanding and trust; sometimes developed

from the very first word exchanged between two members of the same Creole community.

Communication between Caribbean peoples is therefore a perpetual communication of their

history of oppression and therefore of solidarity, and their consistent (unconscious) attempts at

linguistic (and cultural) retention. Further, since oral communication is an everyday

phenomenon, and independence movements (mostly rooted in intellectual writings in the

beginning of the 20th century) were largely dependent on nationalistic and self-deterministic

sentiments, Caribbean Creole can be identified as a causal factor. However, we must take into

account the identification fact or, particularly when we consider nationalist leaders, or ‘Nation

Fathers’, as we call them, and the ways in which they were able to use Caribbean Creole to

solidify nationalistic sentiments 63

61 In my community, as in other Caribbean societies it is incredibly easy to tell the difference between a native Creole speaker and someone that learnt the language 62 The irony of writing this paper in ‘Standard English’, makes it difficult to truly convey the meaning and feelings behind Caribbean Creole – the use of the term ‘truly’ is an attempt at mitigating this difficulty 63In contemporary Caribbean politics most people rely on what political leaders say and how they say it (their identity) instead of on their platforms

. Considering the relative non-violent attempts at

independence, Caribbean populations depended on educated political leaders to negotiate and

win elections, hence regard for them as ‘Fathers of the Nation’.

Caribbean Creole and Independence Leaders

21

Here, we will briefly touch upon two nationalist leaders, The Right Honorable Sir

Lynden Pindling, and Dr. Eric Williams from Trinidad and Tobago. These two leaders, and their

countries, are chosen for their geographical significance. The Bahamas is the closest

(independent) Caribbean country to the (English-Speaking) United States of America, and

therefore shares a significant history with Americans. Further, The Bahamas relies almost solely

on American tourism, and since tourism involves the commoditization of culture and reliance on

the service sector, Bahamians are forced to switch more frequently between Bahamian Creoles

and ‘American/Standard’ English in order to be understood; inevitably affecting the authenticity

of their Creole. Trinidad, on the other hand, is not only the furthest Caribbean country from

America, and therefore furthest away from any direct external Anglophone affect on their

English Creole.

However, before proceeding, we must address concerns about alternate causal factors that

are popular in discussions concerning Caribbean independence movements: labor and race. Since

colonial society often took a racial dichotomy, where “to be white was to be superior, to be black

inferior”64, the colonized were racially and economically disadvantaged. With such realities,

leaders such as Pindling and Williams rode on the teachings and workings of intellectuals such

as Marcus Garvey and Edward W. Blyden 65

64Richard Hart, From Occupation to Independence: A Short History of the Peoples of the English-Speaking Caribbean Region, London: Pluto Press, 1998, 93 65Ibid 96

, who were attempting to animate black

consciousness in both Africa and the Caribbean. Also, due to economic inferiority and situations

of poverty and lack of opportunity, nationalistic sentiments could also have spurred out of

financial need, as a Marxist might claim. Though labor and race as separate but connected causal

factors are certainly plausible causal factors, we must draw attention to the fact that regardless of

one’s skin color or economic status, they all were dependent on communication, and therefore,

22

on Caribbean language. Their creolized culture stretched across identities, black or poor, their

true common link was the necessary ability to communicate through language. We must

therefore reject any notion that the “unifying cultural factors, which served to strengthen national

opposition to colonialism among the subject peoples of Asia and Africa, [were] absent in the

West Indian colonies”66

Regardless, Kwame Appiah directly challenges this notion of racial identity being a

subset of cultural identity. Kwame claims that we must argue “against substitution for an

understanding of racial identity…as a species of cultural identity”

. Cultural self-determination, through language, was certainly a factor

that contributed to the liberation of Caribbean, this view encompasses labor and anti-racial

movements within it – in essence, linguistic cultural communication is an overarching casual

factor that embodies alternative causal factors, without losing its own importance. Here, we are

resting on the assumption that racial identity can be perceived as a subset of cultural identity: the

creolization process began out of slavery, where slaves were biologically discriminated against –

Caribbean culture therefore reflects necessary attention to racial identity as inextricable parts of

one whole.

67

66Ibid 91 67K. Anthony Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections” presented at The Tanner Lectures on Human Values at the University of California at San Diego, October 27/28, 1994, 111

. Our conception of language

encompassing racial movements is also a hint at culture taking into account racial movements.

Challenging this counter-argument is important for the purposes of this paper, as it can

potentially weaken the credibility of portraying Caribbean Creole language as a causal factor;

instead, it would (as most mainstream thought has maintained) simply reinstate racial identity as

a causal factor. However, if we consider the particular dimensions of colonialism, it would seem

plausible to argue that colonial masters equated culture with race: both were considered equally

23

primitive/underdeveloped. In this sense, the oppressed were, in the eyes of the colonialist, both

racially and culturally inferior, the former deserving just as much significance as the latter.

Though there was certainly an attempt to reaffirm racial identity, this was also encompassed in

the more abstract, non-biological, notion of culture. Affirming the power of racial identity can

therefore be seen as synonymous, or part of the reaffirmation of cultural identity, most visible

through Caribbean Creole. It is to this notion that we must briefly turn: the efforts of nationalist

leaders such as Pindling and Williams in reaffirming cultural identity through use of their

respective Creoles.

The Bahamas – Sir Lynden Pindling and Bahamian Creole

Bahamian Creole, a “legacy of oppression”68 has a special significance in The Bahamas.

Considering the geographical proximity to the United States, many Bahamians claim “that they

speak nothing but ‘the Queen’s English’ or merely a dialect of English”69

Many Bahamians passionately “distance themselves from anything ‘Creole’ as that word

is associated with Haitians”

, significantly hindering

any attempts at critical analysis of the language, and therefore limiting the resources with which

we can use for this paper. For the purposes of this brief case study, I may have to rely on

anecdotes and personal experiences, as a Bahamian Creole native speaker.

70, due partly to high levels of Haitian immigration, and the wider

issue of linguistic divide in the Caribbean. As a result, Bahamian Creole is perceived as ‘bad

English’, regardless, it is still perceived as a “vital aspect of the Bahamas’ heritage and national

identity” 71

68Stephanie Hackert, Urban Bahamian Creole: System and Variation. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004, 216 69Hackert 55 70Hackert 55 71Hackert 56

, and therefore an inextricable part of their identity. Even under conditions of

contemporary and historic oppression of their Creole, Bahamians have still reaffirmed their faith

24

in their Creole as an aspect of their identity. One of the only times a ban was attempted on

Bahamian Creole, it was overwhelmingly rejected, as it was seen as “an attack on Bahamian

culture and identity”72

This stubborn clutch to Creole, even in less-than-favorable conditions, is a testament to

the rigidity and powerfulness of Caribbean Creole in exhibiting cultural identity. With the claim

in mind that “national politics play a much larger role in the Bahamas than elsewhere”

.

73, since

the government is the largest employer, Bahamians have consistently placed particular

importance on election speeches and rallies, as opposed to documents, specific platforms, or

written party communications. In this respect, one important attribute of Bahamian Creole, or

any other Caribbean Creole, is ‘code-switching’. This involves switching between the socially

accepted formal language, English, in order to seem educationally qualified to lead, and the

Creole, to identify as still a ‘common’ person, a Bahamian, with the people. It is also commonly

held, that Lynden Pindling, the black majority independence leader and ‘Father of the Nation’,

was “particularly well known” for his “skill at code switching between [Bahamian Creole] and

[Standard English]”74. Pindling would describe his and his party’s achievements and plans using

‘standard English’, but would switch to Creole English whenever he sought to identify with the

crowd, or slander his opponents through “sloganeering, telling jokes, abuse, and as an emotional

rhetorical device” 75

72Hackert 56 73Hackert 56 74Stephanie Hackert, Urban Bahamian Creole: System and Variation. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004, 56 75Hackert 57

. In other words, Pindling’s use of Bahamian Creole during nationalist

movements was an attempt at identification with his own people: the use of his own image

expression to communicate his identification. His use of the Creole therefore denounced foreign

occupation, while inherently articulating the need for self-determination and bonding among the

25

people. In advocating to the needs and wants exhibited in every day language and Bahamian

society, he was able to outwardly express his own qualities and identities as a Bahamian, in an

effort to “empathetically [comprehend] the wants of followers and [respond] to them as

legitimate needs, articulating them as values” 76.In other words, Pindling (and Williams) was a

transformative leader, not only did he bring about tangible change in institutions, governing, and

the economy, but also qualitative ones as well, where Bahamians began to reevaluate their

identities in the hopes of developing nationalistic sentiments 77. It was this type of “vigorous

interaction between transforming leaders and their followers” 78 , using Creole, that spurred

lasting change through the creation of a lasting collective identity. Bahamians therefore closely

identified with him, based on the recognition of the authenticity of his oral Creole, and his

strategic use of an inherently self-deterministic aspect of Bahamian-Caribbean identity to

articulate nationalistic sentiments. In this way, Pindling was able to further solidify unity

between Bahamians based on their own cultural and linguistic identification, which also involved

a necessary racial identification as well79

Conversely, though the Trinidadian, Dr. Eric Williams, has a similar reputation as the

‘father’ of independent Trinidad and Tobago. One of his most recognized pre-Independence

speeches directly exhibits the causal link between Caribbean Creole and independence

movements: “Massa day done”

.

Massa Day Done – Eric Williams

80

76James MacGregor Burns, Transforming Leadership, New York: Grove Press, 2003, 143 77Burns 24-25 78Burns 25 79 If we recall the development of Creole from slavery, we can see that many of the individuals that spoke Creole were part of the masses, i.e. the racially discriminated – linguistic cultural identification therefore encompasses and necessitate(d) some type of racial identification 80 Trinidad and Tobago became independent in 1962, a year after the speech – the literal ‘standard’ English translation of Massa Day Done: “The (Slave) Master’s Day is Done”

. In the struggle for independence, forming a collective identity

was important, spurring the need to “manipulate language [to] set the stage for the modern

26

nationalist movement”81 by intellectuals and social activists of the middle class. In an attempt to

capitalize on such a rich resource, Eric Williams, and his party, the People’s National Movement

(PNM) began engaging in open-air lectures, where over fifty-two lectures were performed.

Naturally, these lectures were taken quite seriously, if we recall the particularly oral nature of

Caribbean Creole; the PNM’s “mode of discourse emerged directly from [this] oral culture of the

society”82. It was an attempt to not only harness and better understand Trinidadian Creole, but

also the “people’s understanding of themselves as generated by and through that language”83

“Massa Day Done”, a speech given by Williams a year before Trinidad and Tobago’s

independence, was “one of the strongest indictments of the psychological impact of colonialism

ever made by a head of government”

, a

skill at which Williams became particularly skilled.

84. It is in this speech, that we can see one of the best

examples of the use of Caribbean Creole (in this case Trinidadian Creole) being used for the

development of solidarity among an oppressed people. Though the original source being used for

the purposes of this paper is written in ‘Standard English’, we must keep in mind that Williams

was a Trinidadian native, and therefore had a strong accent, that manifests itself whether he

spoke in Trinidadian Creole, or ‘standard’ English – a speech that is better heard than read.

Regardless, Williams’ controversial use of the term “Massa” and subsequently, of “Massa Day

Done, Sahib Day Done, Yes Suh Boss Day Done” 85

81Selwyn R. Cudjoe, “Eric Williams and the Politics of Language” in Callalo: Eric Williams and the Postcolonial Caribbean: A Special Issue, 20(4): pp.753-763, 1997, 756 82Ibid 757 83Ibid 757 84Williams, Eric, Eds. Colin Palmer, Inward Hunger. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006, 5 85Williams, Eric Eustace, Massa Day Done: A Masterpiece of Political and Sociological Analysis. Trinidad and Tobago: People’s National Movement Publishing Company, 1961, 11

was a direct appeal to Trinidadian Creole.

27

The use of the term Massa, denoting the white colonial slave master who “was always

opposed to independence”86, struck an almost indescribable chord with supporters: it was a

Creole word, describing the “common sentiment of a society as a collectivity that had been

scorned by the colonial master”87. In other words, Williams’ use of Massa (appeal to Afro-

Trinidadians), Sahib (appeal to Indo-Trinidadians) and Yes Suh (appeal to Trinidadian Creole

speakers in general) was an intentional manipulation of language that was, even if taken out of

this context, inherently self-deterministic. Massa is not simply a word, but a declaration of an

indescribable significance, a hint at something that runs much deeper than what may be written

on paper: one must hear it, understand it, and be part of a culture that produced the word to feel

it. It is an expression, a direct hint at a past of oppression, through the use of a creolized word,

for the use of identifying with an oppressed people through a direct appeal to their identity.

Williams was essentially providing “his people a mirror through which they could see

themselves and participate in a discourse with and about themselves”88, something they were

previously unable to with white political elites. In fact, ‘Massa Day Done’, has become a

common phrase in Trinidadian Creole (based on the popularity of Williams’ 1961 speech) to

denote any unfairness or hint of oppression – defiance of the master’s language, was a defiance

of its control89

86Williams, Eric, “Massa Day Done: (Public Lecture at Woodford Square, 22 March 1961),” in Callalo: Eric Williams and the Postcolonial Caribbean: A Special Issue, 20(4): pp. 724-730 (1997), 728 87Selwyn R. Cudjoe, “Eric Williams and the Politics of Language” in Callalo: Eric Williams and the Postcolonial Caribbean: A Special Issue, 20(4): pp.753-763, 1997, 759 88Selwyn R. Cudjoe, “Eric Williams and the Politics of Language” in Callalo: Eric Williams and the Postcolonial Caribbean: A Special Issue, 20(4): pp.753-763, 1997, 762 89Rastafarian ‘dread talk’ in Jamaica, is an example of a language that was created specifically as direct defiance of the superimposed English language (Pollard 1982, 17)

. This illustrates the inseparability between politics and language within Trinidad,

and the special place that Caribbean Creole plays in our societies: it has no limits. It is a

powerful tool that is the “result of historical phenomena determining certain social

28

necessities” 90

Both of these transformative leaders used their Creole in an attempt to reinstate a sense of

collective identity. Considering, again, the oral nature of Creole, charisma played a paramount

role in their leadership strategies, as opposed to being a “confusing and undemocratic form of

leadership”

, that can be used to articulate contemporary needs, whether during the

independence movements of 1804 in Haiti, 1962 in Trinidad and Tobago, 1966 in Barbados,

1973 in The Bahamas, or 1981 in Belize and Antigua and Bermuda, or even today, in 2012.

91

90Velma Pollard, “Cultural Connections: The Verbalization of Recall in some Creole-Speaking Communities”(1982) in Caribbean Language Issues: Papers in honor of Professor Mervyn Alleyne on the occasion of his 60th Birthday, eds, Pauline Christine, Jamaica: The Press University of the West Indies (1996), 17 91Burns, James MacGregor, Transforming Leadership, New York: Grove Press, 2003, 27

, and therefore established Caribbean nationalist leaders as revered and powerful

figures. Such an analysis, however, runs the risk of identifying leadership as a causal factor for

independence. Though these leaders certainly played a large role, in the same way that language

cuts across race and class, it also cuts across political identity, and subsequently, leadership. Had

Pindling and Williams not had their Creole at their disposal (as a component of their own

cultural identity), they might not have led the successful movements that they did. In other

words, language can still be held as a primary causal factor. They were dependent on a highly

exclusive component of their cultural identity in order to create a relationship with their people,

where they all understood each other on a level that cut across ideologies, race, class, or social

positions, an understanding of freedom.

29

Bahamian Creole and Identification – A Personal Anecdote

A personal anecdote can explain this sense of linguistic exclusivity. For example, after

studying in North America for a few years or ‘gern foreign’92, upon returning home to the

Bahamas, I am immediately outcast as ‘white’, due to the change in my Bahamian Creole. What

has happened is my Creole has become mixed with more of a Standard English, and a ‘proper

grammar’93, and my new speech is interpreted as being educated or white, in other words, I am

outcast as a ‘traitor’ for speaking ‘educated’… like the colonialist used to. This anecdote is

another reality that further highlights the rigidity of Caribbean linguistic identity. The fact that I

am outcast or socially avoided due to my more ‘educated’ or ‘white’ grammar and accent, means

that my Bahamian Creole is a sign of my integration with the people, my unconscious

identification with a common peoples’ history, instead of my linguistic, and hence cultural,

identification with the oppressors of that history94

92“Gern foreign” in Bahamian Creole refers to the act of leaving the country for studies, ‘going into foreign land’ 93 Speaking ‘proper’ entails speaking the colonists’ English: ‘Standard English’ 94 “Fresh-Water Yankee: A person who recently migrated to the U.S.A and back home for a visit, and now speaks with an affected American accent,” Côté ci Côté la: Trinidad and Tobago Dictionary

. It is through this sense of identification that I

wish to highlight its potential for bringing about lasting political change in the form of

independence. Based on reliance on political leaders (that were once part of the masses),

Caribbean Creole has, does, and will always serve as a unifying aspect of unshakeable national

identity. The strong identification felt with a person of the same Caribbean linguistic community

is almost indescribable, at least on paper. Though there are some movements for the

‘legitimization’ of Caribbean Creole, such attempts have so far been unsuccessful, mostly due to

the necessary oral nature of Caribbean Creole. Some may claim that this presents a dangerous

aspect to Caribbean Creole, making it vulnerable to language loss. However, such an argument

would seem nonsensical in this context, Caribbean Creole is no longer an indigenous language

30

(which tends to be more vulnerable to linguistic death), it is a language now spoken by blacks,

whites, children, men, businessmen, janitors: it is a widely spread form of communication that

cannot be erased without an entire erasure of the individuals that speak it, the entirety of

society95

Though I have here argued for Caribbean Creole as a causal factor for great political

change in the form of independence, if we are to consider regional cooperation, another approach

might need to be adopted. Caribbean countries will be unable to truly correct the many

postcolonial socioeconomic issues they all commonly face. Crime, one of the most prevalent

regional issues, has been slowly spiraling out of control, with one of the relatively safer

countries, the Bahamas, recording “four murder records… in the last five years – 2007, 2009,

.

Caribbean Creole in a broader, contemporary context

Speakers of any type of Caribbean Creole are therefore left in a paralyzing dilemma.

Their Creoles serve(d) as a unifying factor that can only be spoken, putting a strain on the ability

for ‘standardization’, in the form of writing. However, for cultural and linguistic preservation, as

some might argue, it necessarily needs to be written down. These concerns aside, this oral nature

(which provides insoluble bonds) has also had a negative effect on regional identification: it has

separated Caribbean nations according to the languages on which their Creoles are modeled.

There exists a dangerous linguistic (and cultural) divide between Caribbean nations, most

notably between the French and English Creole Caribbean communities. This has obliterated any

true regional unity, most evidenced by the constantly disappointing failures of the Caribbean

Community and Common Market (CARICOM) at regional organization.

95 Of course, this acknowledges Christopher Columbus’ success in doing so, and therefore rests on the assumption that our morals have developed to the point where something of this sort will no longer occur

31

2011, and 2012” 96

. Due to the relatively small nature of the Caribbean region, regional

cooperation is possible, regardless of the many cultural, linguistic, and religious differences

between many of the countries. Regardless, a possible unifying factor can be the fact that

Caribbean culture is contact culture. In other words, we all have a similar history of oppression.

Caribbean people and leaders must seek to use this fact to transform their strong national

identities into an appreciation for regional integration and identification, despite clear obstacles.

Conclusion

Within a Caribbean context, language has united but separated us, and we are now left in

a situation where leaders and their people, inextricably involved in their national identities, must

be willing to forgo their national interests in the admittedly idealistic goal of realizing that

whether French, Dutch, Spanish, or English Creole, we are all Caribbean. The lack of

sociopolitical and economic weight that results from a lack of regional unity has also resulted in

significant brain drain, and therefore the urgency to reaffirm our respective national identities,

but to also realize the common bond we all share, as Caribbean brothers and sisters. Our Creoles

once spurred great political change, but the broader implications of such a reality would require

us to now acknowledge such a past, recognize our present condition, and envision a future

where, as masters of our own fates, we can control our cultural and linguistic trajectory at will.

Language, race, class, or not, people, are the causal factor, and as soon as Caribbean people are

able to truly understand and assimilate this, the closer we will be to developing a strong, and

necessary, regional identity.

96Thompson, Taneka, “Rape and Murder Spiked in 2011: Increases most notable on New Providence”. Nassau Guardian, January 5, 2012

32

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35

Understanding Civil War

By Aida Benbarka

Cet essai tend à exposer dans un premier temps les faiblesses de certains arguments

présentés par les trois textes en comparaison avec le sujet étudié. Puis, à l’aide des arguments

valides additionnés à des sources externes, nous montrerons que ce sont les rivalités ethniques

et religieuses qui sont à l’origine du conflit, et qu’à cela s’ajoutent des facteurs qui le

Introduction

Le 13 avril 1975, le parti social nationaliste syrien (PSNS) fait une tentative d’assassinat

contre Pierre Gemayel, leader du parti phalangiste libanais. Quelques heures plus tard, des

milices phalangistes tuent vingt-sept passagers d’un autobus, pour la plupart palestiniens. Cet

évènement marque le début de la guerre civile au Liban qui dure jusqu’en 1990.

Le but de cet essai est de comprendre comment l’ont peut expliquer ces évènements

passés au Liban, en se basant notamment sur les écrits de trois auteurs, qui eux se penchent

sur le phénomène de la guerre civile au sens large.

Le premier, Paul Collier, estime que tout affrontement civil éclate une fois que les

groupes rebelles parviennent à atteindre un niveau de ressources financières suffisant afin de

mener le combat. Jeffrey Herbst pense quant à lui, que la cause d’un conflit de ce genre est la

décolonisation, avec tous les changements que celle-ci implique au sein des nations, une idée

que l’on retrouve également chez Robert D. Kaplan. A cela, ce dernier ajoute néanmoins

d’autres facteurs : l’insécurité, le déclin d’un gouvernement central, l’augmentation de

domaines régionaux, de la maladie, et de la dégradation de l’environnement.

36

favorisent, à savoir le déclin d’un gouvernement central (Kaplan), et les interventions

étrangères.

I- Faiblesses des arguments présentés par les trois auteurs

a)

Collier affirme que la cause de toute guerre civile est de nature économique, à savoir la

capacité des organisations rebelles à se financer. Selon lui, les leaders rebelles n’ont de

considérations que matérielles et les revendications ne sont qu’un prétexte. Le raisonnement

n’a aucune faille en termes de logique, c’est plutôt la syntaxe utilisée qui dérange, dans la

mesure où celle-ci implique une hiérarchie incorrecte. Car la capacité financière des dissidents

n’est pas une

Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy”

cause, mais plutôt un moyen.

Dans un second temps, Collier estime que la dépendance aux exportations de matières

premières représente un risque de conflit civil. Le cas libanais ne permet pas de vérifier cet

argument puisque l’on ne connaissait à l’époque, aucune source de gisement de matières

premières, son économie reposant essentiellement sur l’agriculture, et le tertiaire. A cela,

l’auteur ajoute que la géographie peut aussi constituer une cause. Il écrit: “if the population is

highly geographically dispersed, then the country is harder for the government to control than

Il est vrai que sans ressources matérielles, les

contestataires peuvent difficilement accomplir leur tâche, et il est donc juste de dire que le

capital permet la guerre. Toutefois, celui-ci ne constitue pas la cause de leurs actions, qui est

en réalité la revendication, peu importe sa nature (politique, économique ou social).

Autrement dit, c’est la volonté de révolte permise par des moyens financiers qui est à l’origine

d’un conflit civil, et non les ressources financières que se sont procurés les révoltés.

L’exemple du Liban le prouve: c’est l’insurrection contre l’injustice induite par le meurtre et

la torture de prisonniers du PSNS sous la responsabilité de Gemayel, qui a poussé les

dissidents à enclencher le conflit avec les phalangistes, grâce à l’appui financier de Damas.

37

if everyone lives in the same small area”1. Mais qu’entend-t-il par ce phénomène de

dispersion? Quels sont les éléments de comparaison qui nous permettent de savoir si un

territoire est petit ou s’il ne l’est pas? Bien des questions sont laissées en suspens; toutefois si

le Congo représente une menace avec 2 345 410 km2

, le Liban est environ trente fois moins

large, ce qui réduit de trente fois le risque d’un éventuel conflit.

Enfin, la dernière hypothèse qui ne fonctionne pas pour le Liban fait référence à la

combinaison d’un faible taux d’alphabétisation, une croissance démographique trop rapide

ainsi qu’une mauvaise situation économique. Premièrement, le Liban d’avant-guerre disposait

d’un des meilleurs systèmes d’enseignement au Moyen Orient et en Afrique du Nord, et des

taux les plus élevés d’alphabétisation chez les libanais à partir de quinze ans. C’en est de

même pour la croissance économique. Sur les vingt pays de la région allant du Maroc

jusqu’en Iran, le Liban arrive en quatrième position avec la démographie la plus

modérée (voir Tableau 1 en annexe). Enfin, le Liban d’avant-guerre était en bonne santé

économique, malgré certaines disparités régionales, avec une croissance positive, un faible

taux d’inflation, et beaucoup d’investissements. Pour finir, l’argument selon lequel

l’homogénéité ethnique est à l’origine de la guerre n’est pas recevable. La seconde partie de

cet essai montrera pourquoi c’est justement la diversité ethnique et religieuse qui se trouve

être à l’origine du conflit au Liban.

1 Collier, Paul (2006), “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy”. Washington DC: World Bank. (p.5) 2 Statistiques Mondiales. Congo Kinshasa : statistiques, [En ligne]. http://www.statistiques-mondiales.com/congo_kinshasa.htm (Page consultée le 07 novembre 2011)

38

b)

Herbst se penche particulièrement sur la dynamique de la décolonisation et les

changements que celle-ci implique dans la structure politique des Etats africains, qui sont

pour lui les causes de la guerre civile. Un des arguments avancés par l’auteur réfère à

l’imposition coloniale de l’

Jeffrey Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa”

Etat-nation aux entités occupées. A savoir au sens large, la

juxtaposition d’un Etat, en tant qu’organisation politique souveraine, à une nation; c’est-à-dire

à un groupe d’individus qui partagent une identité commune. Selon lui, l’imposition et la

préservation de ce modèle représente d’emblée un risque de conflit, dans la mesure où celui-ci

ne concorde pas avec le passé politique des entités en question. Dans notre cas, le Grand-

Liban est effectivement décrété « Etat indépendant sous mandat français » en 1920, ce qui

marque un changement avec le statut d’autrefois, caractérisé par l’autonomie provinciale du

Mont-Liban. Toutefois, cela ne nous permet pas de qualifier le Grand-Liban d’Etat-Nation,

car bien qu’il ne soit pas déclaré officiellement en tant que tel, il s’agit d’un Etat

multiethnique, c’est-à-dire d’un Etat composé de plusieurs groupes ethniques. Pour

comprendre cette évolution il est nécessaire d’expliquer le régime précédant, celui d’Al-

Mutasarrifya. Celui-ci s’est formé en 1861 suite aux massacres des maronites chrétiens, sous

la pression exercée par les puissances européennes, notamment la France. Il s’agit d’un

conseil consultatif sous les ordres d’un gouverneur chrétien, lui-même sous la surveillance de

consuls européens. Le conseil est élu au scrutin direct sur une base communautaire

proportionnelle assurant une domination chrétienne. Suite à la proclamation du protectorat

français, le général Gouraud crée le territoire du Grand-Liban qui annexe au Mont-Liban des

régions majoritairement musulmanes, ce qui implique une population devenue à moitié

chrétienne et moitié musulmane, comparativement à l’ancienne Mutasarrifya qui comptait au

39

moins deux tiers de chrétiens. La constitution de 1926 établit les principes du partage

confessionnel des institutions publiques :

« Ces fonctions seront réparties à égalité entre les chrétiens et les musulmans sans réserver une quelconque fonction à une communauté déterminée tout en respectant les principes de spécialisation et de compétence. »3

Dans un second temps, l’auteur blâme la communauté internationale pour avoir déclaré les

pays nouvellement indépendants de souverains alors que selon lui, ils n’étaient politiquement

et économiquement pas suffisamment fiables pour être considérés comme tel. Cet argument

n’est pas recevable compte tenu de la santé politique et économique du Liban au lendemain de

la décolonisation. En effet, selon les statistiques, le PNB croît de 6.5% par année entre 1950 et

1956

Ainsi, la colonisation aura certes conféré à la province autonome du Mont-Liban le statut

d’Etat, tout en modifiant ses frontières. Toutefois, elle n’aura rien changé à son caractère

multiethnique, écartant alors l’hypothèse selon laquelle elle aurait imposé son modèle d’Etat-

Nation.

4

3 « Constitution du 23 mai 1926 », Article 95, Titre IV. 4 Issawi, Charles (1964), “Economic Development and Liberalism in Lebanon”, Middle East Journal 18:3, p. 279-292.

. Au niveau politique, suite aux élections de novembre 1943, Béchara El-Khoury

(maronite chrétien) est élu Président de la République, et nomme un musulman sunnite, Riad

El-Solh, à la tête du gouvernement. Un premier signe de la fiabilité du nouvel Etat

indépendant réfère déjà à la capacité des autorités mises en place à acquérir la légitimité du

peuple libanais au travers d’élections démocratiques. Puis, les deux leaders instaurent un

accord non-écrit faisant guise de constitution, le Pacte National, qui définit le partage du

pouvoir entre les différentes communautés. De manière générale, on dit que son but est de

libaniser les musulmans, et arabiser les chrétiens. Enfin, le pays s’est rapidement intégré à la

communauté internationale, notamment grâce à son adhésion à la Ligue Arabe en 1945. Ainsi,

40

on peut en conclure que le Liban a rapidement construit sa souveraineté, dès la proclamation

de son indépendance.

c)

En se penchant particulièrement sur l’Afrique de l’Ouest, Kaplan contrairement aux

auteurs précédents, ne formule pas de thèse a proprement dite, mais énumère les différents

facteurs entraînant selon lui, un risque de combat civil. Ceux qui ne fonctionnent pas dans

l’histoire du Liban sont : la hausse de la maladie et la dégradation de l’environnement. Par la

maladie, l’auteur entend un accroissement de la propagation du paludisme. Cependant, il

s’agit d’un phénomène que l’on retrouve principalement en Afrique sub-saharienne, le Liban

n’est donc pas touché par ce cas. Le constat est le même pour l’environnement : on ne note

aucun affrontement au sujet du partage des ressources naturelles durant la période 75-90.

Après avoir mis au clair les faiblesses de certains des arguments proposés par Collier,

Herbst et Kaplan, il s’agit à présent d’étayer ceux qui permettent d’expliquer en partie, la

guerre civile au Liban. A cela s’ajouteront des alternatives qui ne sont pas mentionnées dans

leurs écrits. Mais d’abord, il est nécessaire, pour formuler une analyse des faits pertinente, de

bien distinguer la

Robert D. Kaplan, “The coming anarchy”

cause du conflit, des facteurs

II- Une cause, plusieurs facteurs

qui l’ont favorisé. C’est dans cet esprit que

nous allons mener notre argumentation : une cause, des facteurs.

a)

L’origine du conflit libanais est la rivalité entre les communautés chrétiennes et arabo-

musulmanes. Sa manifestation la plus claire est la tentative d’assassinat de Gemayel par le

L’hostilité entre chrétiens pro-occidentaux et musulmans arabes comme la cause de la

guerre civile libanaise

41

PSNS et la riposte du côté phalangiste, évènements marquant le premier jour de la guerre.

L’argument de Lake et Rothchild nous donne une base d’explication:

“by itself, ethnicity if not a cause of violent conflict (…). But when ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict, and, indeed fears of what the future might bring, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which societies fracture.”5

Sous le régime d’Al-Mutassarifya, les musulmans représentaient à peine un quart de

la population. L’arrivée des français change la donne puisqu’ils transforment le Mont-Liban,

en annexant de nouveaux territoires où la communauté musulmane domine. Cette redéfinition

des frontières telle qu’invoquée par Herbst et Kaplan est maintenue après l’indépendance.

Celle-ci implique alors une hétérogénéité ethnique et religieuse où l’on estime que les groupes

sont alors égalitaires en représentation. Ce changement conduit les nouveaux leaders à

l’établissement du Pacte National, « Ni Orient, ni Occident », comme un idéal régulateur de la

politique à mener au Liban. Il est cependant bafoué à plusieurs reprises par Chamoun, qui

adopte une politique étrangère pro-occidentale. En effet, suite au conflit de Suez en 1956,

l’Egypte fait appelle à la solidarité arabe en invitant le Liban à couper court à ses relations

En considérant le cas du Liban, il est nécessaire de reformuler cette théorie. Il

s’emblerait que ce soient les conséquences d’un passé conflictuel ancré dans les mémoires,

qui provoque un climat de méfiance et induit par conséquent un malaise social qui se reflète

sur la scène politique. Les conséquences de ce passé résident dans l’argument formulé par

Herbst, à savoir l’échec dans la tentative d’intégration des différentes communautés. Celui-ci

est le produit de la colonisation française (à partir de 1920), et fut maintenu après

l’indépendance, notamment sous la présidence de Camille Chamoun et jusqu’à l’éclatement

du conflit en 1975.

5Lake, David A. & Rothchild, Donald (1998), “The international spread of ethnic conflict: fear, diffusion, and escalation”. Princeton: Princeton University Press, (p.7).

42

avec la France et la Grande-Bretagne, ce que le Président refuse de faire. S’en suit alors une

série de troubles dans le pays du Cèdre (attentats, violence, manifestations…), que les

autorités parviennent à mater grâce à l’aide américaine menée sous la doctrine Eisenhower.

L’adhésion à celle-ci renforce l’attitude pro-occidentale du chef politique, que la communauté

musulmane perçoit comme le signe d’un système politique favorisant largement les maronites

chrétiens. Un retournement de situation se produit néanmoins en 1970, après la défaite arabe

face à Israël, avec l’arrivée massive de réfugiés palestiniens. On assiste alors à un

basculement dans les donnés démographiques de la population libanaise : les musulmans

forment à présent une majorité. Ces derniers réclament un recensement officiel que l’Etat

refuse, car le régime de représentation proportionnel mis en place après l’indépendance

favorisait à l’époque une population majoritairement chrétienne. Etablir un recensement met

les autorités maronites en danger face aux leaders musulmans.

Ainsi, le changement dans le paysage confessionnel libanais dû au tracé colonial de

nouvelles frontières et l’échec du Pacte National, témoignent d’une histoire conflictuelle

résultant sur une mauvaise intégration communautaire, elle-même à l’origine des hostilités qui

ont conduit à la guerre de 75-90.

b)

Comme nous l’avons mentionné plus haut, il existe au conflit libanais une cause, et

une multitude de facteurs dont le but est de mettre en place le cadre dans lequel va s’opérer le

conflit. Nous allons les considérer selon deux catégories : le déclin d’un gouvernement central

(Kaplan), et les interventions externes.

Les facteurs qui ont favorisé le contexte de la guerre civile

A l’aube de l’éclatement du conflit, le gouvernement central mené à l’époque par

Soleimane Frangié dépourvu de sa légitimité, se retrouve rapidement désagrégé. Cela remonte

au processus de multiplication des partis politiques dès 1964, surtout du côté maronite. Mais

43

l’évidence se voit dès le début des années 1970 avec le démantèlement des forces militaires de

l’Etat suite à la désertion des soldats musulmans qui refusaient d’obéir aux ordres de leurs

supérieurs chrétiens. Se forment alors des milices maronites proches du gouvernement,

notamment pour contrer les milices du mouvement national libanais (MNL) qui regroupe des

clans de la Gauche et des pro-palestiniens musulmans. A la veille de la guerre, le MNL

regroupait 25 000 miliciens, contre 18 000 miliciens de droite. En 1976, soit seulement un an

après le déclenchement des affrontements, le MNL contrôle déjà 80% du territoire libanais,

laissant le reste sous le commandement des milices chrétiennes. Enfin, l’installation des bases

de l’OLP au Sud-Liban en 1970 fait penser à un Etat dans l’Etat. Ceci n’est bien entendu

qu’une expression, dans le sens où l’organisation n’est en aucun cas une autorité politique,

mais plutôt une présence militaire face à Israël. Jacques Seguin explique : « Les institutions

palestiniennes y remplaçaient dans les domaines de la santé et de l’éducation les services

déficients ou inexistants de l’Etat libanais »6

Les interventions étrangères ont également joué un rôle dans le conflit. La spécificité

de la guerre du Liban réfère à son caractère international, dans le sens où elle implique non

seulement des affrontements entre des fractions à l’intérieur du pays, mais aussi entre le Liban

et ses pays limitrophes tels que la Syrie et Israël. En effet, en 1976, voulant s’imposer comme

une puissance protectrice du Liban, la Syrie pénètre le pays en réponse à la demande du

Président Frangié. Damas envoie donc des forces militaires dans le but de secourir les

maronites et écarte alors la résistance du MNL et des pro-palestiniens. Mais à vouloir trop

bien faire, cette intervention provoque le massacre de près de 2000 palestiniens dans le Sud

suite à un trop grand ravitaillement en armes des milices chrétiennes. Toutefois c’est

principalement l’intervention israélienne qui envenime le conflit.

.

6 Seguin, Jacques (1989), « Le Liban-Sud: espace périphérique, espace convoité ». Paris : L’Harmattan, (p.79).

44

En 1978, une violente attaque de l’OLP en Israël engendre une réaction d’autant plus

violente : quatre jours plus tard, les forces israéliennes envahissent le Liban, c’est l’opération

Litani. Elles provoquent la mort d’au moins 2000 civiles. Suivant cet évènement, l’ONU

invoque leur retrait immédiat, mais celles-ci garde cependant le contrôle du Sud du pays en

mettant en place une zone de sécurité ainsi qu’une armée sud-libanaise sous ses ordres.

Jusqu’à la fin de la guerre, des attaques fréquentes entre les deux fractions ont lieu. Ainsi, la

présence effective des forces armées de la Syrie et surtout d’Israël favorisent et entretiennent

les combats.

Mais une intervention d’un autre genre se présente, précédant le déclenchement des

conflits. Il s’agit d’aides économiques et en armements octroyées aux différentes milices et

provenant du monde entier. Pour Collier, ces aides proviennent généralement de la diaspora,

c’est-à-dire des citoyens du pays en guerre résidents à l’étranger. Dans notre cas, il s’agit de

pays se référant à une identité plutôt occidentale, ou alors arabo-musulmane. Les milices

chrétiennes sont aidées par la RFA et la Belgique tandis que les fractions musulmanes sont

soutenues par les pays arabes hostiles à Israël (tels que la Syrie et l’Irak). Les druzes et les

groupes non-religieux (en minorité) sont quant à eux armés par l’URSS. Il parait crucial de

rappeler le contexte historique de la guerre froide, qui place le conflit libanais au centre

d’affrontements plus généraux, à savoir ceux qui opposent le bloc occidental, représenté par

les Etats-Unis et le clan soviétique mené par l’URSS.

On l’a vu, il s’agit d’un conflit dominé par la rivalité entre deux groupes distincts, les

chrétiens maronites et les arabes musulmans. Celle-ci s’explique par un passé lourd : les

Conclusion

Comment explique-t-on la guerre civile au Liban de 1975 à 1990 ?

45

changements invoqués par la colonisation, et la politique menée après l’indépendance

précipitent les tensions. Très vite, le gouvernement perd toute autorité, et les ingérences

étrangères des pays voisins font durer les affrontements sur le long terme.

Mais ces interventions externes montrent aussi que la guerre du Liban est le reflet d’un climat

de tensions général au Moyen-Orient. L’ouverture à l’Occident et la volonté de maintenir une

identité arabe fondée sur les principes de l’islam est un dilemme auquel les pays du monde

arabe doivent faire face, aujourd’hui encore.

46

Annexe

Tableau 1 : Evolution du taux de croissance de la population de 1970 à 1974, dans la région de l’Afrique du Nord et du Moyen-Orient.7

7 Tabutin, Dominique (2005), « La démographie du monde arabe et du Moyen-Orient des années 1950 aux années 2000 », Population 60:5, p. 611-724.

47

References

Collier, Paul (2006), “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy”. Washington DC: World Bank.

Herbst, Jeffrey (1996-1997), “Responding to State Failure in Africa”, International Security 21:3.

Issawi, Charles (1964), “Economic Development and Liberalism in Lebanon”, Middle East Journal 18:3.

Kaplan, Robert D. (1994), “The Coming Anarchy”, The Atlantic Monthly, 273:2.

Lake, David A. & Rothchild, Donald (1998), “

The international spread of ethnic conflict: fear, diffusion, and escalation”. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Seguin, Jacques (1989), « Le Liban-Sud: espace périphérique, espace convoité ». Paris : L’Harmattan.

Tabutin, Dominique (2005), « La démographie du monde arabe et du Moyen-Orient des années 1950 aux années 2000 », Population 60:5.

« Constitution du 23 mai 1926 », Article 95, Titre IV.

Statistiques Mondiales. Congo Kinshasa : statistiques, [En ligne]. http://www.statistiques-mondiales.com/congo_kinshasa.htm

48

Life, Slavery, and the Pursuit of Happiness

A short essay on what the arguments over slavery tell us about the American conception of freedom

By

The idea of slavery in America is one that the present Western world seems to have

accepted as abolished in every possible way. As a developed and advanced society, we have

embraced freedom and have labeled slavery as a mistake made by our predecessors. The

argument that slavery is an important and positive part of the development of the United States is

silenced by our conception of freedom. There are not many who dare argue that the vindication

of slavery played a crucial role in the evolution of American freedom. Subsequently, the

following will attempt to appreciate slavery in early American political tradition as beneficial to

its nation and the pillars it was founded on. In each section I will help the respective arguments

made by Calhoun, Fitzhugh, Dew, and Hughes to argue the advantage of slavery in the

development of a hegemon. Slavery provided the foundation of one of the world’s strongest

economies and societies through moral and religious justification. Beyond commercial and

societal freedom, the abolition of slavery reinforced the American idea of personal freedom.

Alexandra Johnson

1

To even begin fathoming the idea that slavery was a positive part of American tradition,

we need to throw away our society’s understandable bias. For the sake of the argument presented

In

this paper, I will also turn the page back and use pro-slavery arguments to explore the idea that

slavery was never truly abolished, just rebranded as our modern conception of liberty.

Master Dew

1 Frederick Douglas, William L. Andrews, and William S. McFeely. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

49

in this paper, the context the discussed authors are writing about needs to be considered. Thomas

R. Dew provides a strong introductory argument for the vindication of slavery in his Review of

the Debate in the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832. Dew states:

“We hope we have said enough upon this branch to shew that slavery is inevitable

in the progress of society, from its first and most savage state to the last and most

refined”2

I will attempt a similar task and later suggest that society is still refining slavery. Before I do so,

Dew’s arguments pertaining to the progress of society must be further explored. By assuming

that slavery is a “necessary and inevitable consequence of the principles of human nature and the

state of property”, we can concentrate on its advantages

.

3. It is inevitable that slavery has

propelled the American civilization much like it has civilizations that came before4. In the

progress of a civilization, Dew argues that slavery replaces a tribal state of hunting and war and

prevents it from reoccurring5. Here, the critic can refute this argument by suggesting that a tribal

state does not necessarily mean one of hunting and war. However, Dew continues his notion by

explaining that slavery introduces the concept of agriculture and a sedentary peaceful life. In his

words, Dew explains that slavery is the first step of the savage human’s evolution by converting

him from an “idler and wauderer into the man of business and the agriculturist”6

2 Thomas R. Dew. Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislature on the Abolition of Slavery. (Massachusetts: Aplewood Books, 1832) 28. 3 Ibid 28. 4 Ibid 28. 5 Ibid 29. 6 Ibid 29.

. Rather than

used as an excuse for slavery, the argument explains the due process of all men and all

civilizations.

50

While the aforementioned argument helps vindicate the practice of slavery, other

arguments made by Dew do not. However, these failed arguments help us argue why we do not

realize we are still slaves today. Another advantage presented by Dew is that of the “taming of

the beast”7. He explains that in the savage man, the “animal part” of man controls the “moral

part”8. Thus, slavery is a way of broking a beast from its primitive state into a more evolved

state. By arguing that slavery is a due process of the evolution of mankind and comparing man to

beast, we can assume that Dew reflects the idea that all we ever are is a controlled animal.

Perhaps the argument that can be applied to both the vindication of slavery as well as the

explanation of slavery today is the superiority of slave labor over free labor9

Another author that gives arguments for the vindication of slavery as well as its evolution

is John C. Calhoun. In his Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions, Calhoun expands on

the idea of the process and evolution of civilizations made by Dew. The argument here focuses

on the moral and economic prosperity of a society as a whole necessitating one part of the

society gaining from the other

. It can be argued

that this was only the case because we had not yet developed ways in which to enslave man

regardless of his skin colour so as to make him as productive as the black slave of the early

nineteenth century.

Master Calhoun

10. Thus, the coexistence of whites and blacks is not only expected,

it is viewed as “good” because it is the coexistence of masters and slaves. Since a division of

class and labour is inevitable, it is more favourable to be part of those who are profiting11

7 Ibid 30. 8 Ibid 92. 9 Ibid 88. 10 John C. Calhoun. "Speech On the Reception of Abolition Petitions Revised Report." Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun. Ed. Ross M. Lence. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992). 11 Ibid.

.

51

In his Speech on the Importance of Domestic Slavery, Calhoun shows in what ways he

believes the constitution supports the right to slavery. Since the foundation of the state supports

the freedom and equality of all citizens, any decision made should support all states12. Half the

states support slavery while half are against it. Therefore, making either of them conform to the

other would create a divide that would rupture the “union of the United States”. In this way,

Calhoun argues that the constitution ensures that every state can enjoy their own advantages,

“natural and acquired”, in peace. In other words, the constitution ensures the preservation of

whatever promotes the overall well-being of a state, even slavery13

The argument made by Calhoun that pertains to the prevalence of some members of

society over others can also be used to argue that slavery has been rebranded as liberty

.

14. If this

separation is present in all societies, then the abolition of slavery is impossible. We might have

claimed to abolish the slavery of African Americans, but according to Calhoun, we could not and

will never be able to avoid swapping one set of chains for another15

Many of the arguments visited above are reiterated and expanded on by George Fitzhugh

in Sociology for the South or the Failure of Free Society and Cannibals All Or, Slaves without

Masters. Quite like Dew and Calhoun, he acknowledges the history and importance of slaves in

“states of antiquity”

.

Master Fitzhugh

16. Fitzhugh also expands on Calhoun’s argument that society always divides

itself in dominant and submissive classes17

12 John C. Calhoun. "Speech on the Importance of Domestic Slavery." Speech. Calhoun's Resolutions. 19 Feb. 1847. (The Claremount Institute, 2002). 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 George Fitzhugh, and Kenneth Thompson. "Slavery Justified." Sociology for the South or the Failure of Free Society. (London: Routledge, 2005) 226. 17 Ibid 227.

. The individuals that rise to “higher places in society”

52

achieve so by suppressing or removing others from that given opportunity18. He uses a lens

similar to Darwin’s and evokes notions of survival of the fittest. He argues that “Nature

perfecting her own work” has led to natural oppression and the very existence of government 19.

He reminds us that the father will teach his child the same lesson, whether he be good or bad, to

“push his way into the world”20. The idea of “FREE COMPETITION” arises from this and is

meant to lead to liberty and equality21

The idea of free competition embraces the battle of the classes

. Here, the Darwinist argument vindicating slavery can

serve to explain the evolution of slavery into our modern liberty.

22. It is argued that because

the state allows this competition, it provides us with liberty and equality23

“The bestowing upon men equality of rights, is but giving license to the strong to

oppress the weak”

. The idea of equality

here is not so much that all human beings are equal as it is that all human beings have equal

opportunity. Since Fitzhugh suggests that slavery is a manifestation of free competition, and free

competition leads to liberty, than we can argue that slavery and liberty are codependent and even

interchangeable. Fitzhugh rephrases this intent again when he writes the following:

24

At this point in his argument, Fitzhugh expresses that liberty and equality as we idealize them are

destructive to the “happiness of society”

.

25

18 Ibid 230. 19 Ibid 228. 20 Ibid 229. 21 Ibid 228. 22 Ibid 227. 23 Ibid 228. 24 Ibid 223. 25 Ibid 236.

. In being destructive to the well-being of society as a

whole, they are not congruent with the constitution and the definition of the principles upon

which the nation of the United States was founded.

53

Fitzhugh paints slavery as the only possible scenario in which “the war of competition

ceases”26

“The slaves are all well fed, well clad, have plenty of fuel, and are happy. They

have no dread of the future – no fear of want”

. With the abolition of slavery, it can be assumed that this competition-free scenario

was also abolished. However, since his description of the relationship between master and slave

is supposed to be the solution to competition and war, let us compare it to the situation of the

modern free man.

27

The chains we speak of here can be materialized as wages. Wages are necessary in order

to live

.

We can easily remove the nineteenth century African American slave from his context and use

this definition to describe the average middle-class American of the twenty-first century. The

critic here would argue that we are overstepping our argument because the difference with the

modern version of slavery is that we have equality and liberty of opportunity. The problem is

that the opportunity has not changed much over the past two centuries. Instead of being assigned

chains, all modern slaves have the equal right to choose their chains and the liberty to change

from one set to another as they will.

28. The average individual is a slave to his or her wages and therefore to his or her

employer. Fitzhugh’s free competition is exchanged for a competition-free environment. This is

exampled in the relationship between employer and employee, and even more so in the

relationship between citizen and government. To further expand on this example, we refer again

to Fitzhugh. The definition of “free laborer” promised by state-sustained rights is compromised

when the willing worker is unable to find an employer and is stuck “without a home or wages”29

26 Ibid 246. 27 Ibid 246. 28 Ibid 250. 29 Ibid 251.

.

54

Much like our covenant to the state, without which we would be less than citizens, bodies

without belonging.

In Cannibals All, Or Slaves without Masters, Fitzhugh reinforces the abovementioned

argument. The author introduces the term “White Slave Labour” to define the working man30. He

begins by denouncing that the White Slave Labour that both the South and North are involved in

is “more cruel” than Black Slave Labour31. This is argued because the labourer is freed at the end

of the day only to go back to a home he must pay for and a family he must feed, instead of being

provided with both by a full-time master32. This example still holds true today. The average

citizen of the modern Western world can be compared to the “white slave” Fitzhugh is

describing. He also mentions the presence of the highest masters, those of the white slaves, who

are the least part slave33. Today, we can see the high masters of Western civilization as the

corporations and the corrupt governments that infiltrate politics. Fitzhugh attacks the cause of

slavery as the existence and evolution of private property34. As modern slaves, perhaps we

should have listened sometime in the past 200 years and realized Fitzhugh’s warning that “all

places are appropriated” and even “water is private property”, therefore we are never completely

free35

The last opinion we look to in this paper is part of Henry Hughes’ in his Treatise on

Sociology, Theoretical and Practical. In the observed section, Hughes promotes the idea of

.

Master Hughes

30 George Fitzhugh. "The Universal Trade." Cannibals All Or, Slaves without Masters. (Richmond, VA: A. Morris, 1857) 25. 31 Ibid 25. 32 Ibid 26. 33 Ibid 28. 34 Ibid 31. 35 Ibid 31.

55

warranteeism as a means to the most productive, and therefore best, society possible36. By giving

arguments as to why warranteeism is more beneficial than free-labour, slavery makes sense in

the text37. Without an abundance of labour, individuals are prone to “idleness”38. Hughes

mentions that this not only hurts society’s economy, it leads to an increase in crime and actions

that go against the preservation of peace39

Hughes recalls the basic aim of a nation, and more specifically, of a society

. This makes sense contextually for Hughes but it is

justifiable in any other context as well. Individuals providing output of some sort in the economy

is rational because it goes on to increase the input of the larger community, society, or nation that

the labourer belongs to. If the aim is utilitarian, society needs slaves rather than free-labourers

because the later are not always productive. In other words, freedom is not progress.

40

“Society is an organization, or an adaptation of means to ends. The first end is the

existence of all. The second is the progress of all”

.

41

If warranteeism is the best system for progress in society then slavery is the best system for a

society. The idea in Hughes’ introductory chapter is that warranteeism is just another term for

slavery. In my own analysis, it seems that changing the actual term is not only a way to defend

slavery; it is the first step in accepting it as progress rather than regression. By being one of the

first to blatantly rename the system of slavery, Hughes helps make it even clearer that all we

have ever kept doing is changing the name rather than the design. In the conclusion of his book,

Hughes finally mentions the term “slavery” once, even though it was one of the main topics

.

36 Henry Hughes. "Civil Expediancy of Warranteeism." Treatise on Sociology, Theoretical and Practical. (Philadelphia, 1968) 269. 37 Ibid 283. 38 Ibid 285. 39 Ibid 285. 40 Ibid 286. 41 Ibid 286.

56

discussed42. What proves the argument above is that he immediately replaces slavery with

“liberty-labor”43.As if to counter the negative connotation that comes with the idea of slavery, he

successfully renames it using its antithesis. Hughes demonstrates how changing one word can

shift the attention of the reader, at least for a while. Freedom is slavery’s latest title because we

have kept renewing the cycle in a Hughes-instilled hope of reaching what “may well be deemed

divine”44

Now that we have allowed some pro-slavery arguments to resurface without so much

negative life, critics will agree that it is appropriate to investigate arguments for freedom from a

freed slave. In his Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by

Himself, Douglass celebrates the emancipation of the United States from Britain as the first step

towards freedom in his Fourth of July Address

.

Slave

45. The beginning the speech celebrates this step

and the courage of the seemingly holy fathers that founded the United States46. Douglass

mentions that their bravery and freedom-fight rest in the “corner-stone” of the nation’s

foundation47

42 Ibid 291. 43 Ibid 291. 44 Ibid 292. 45 Douglass 129. 46 Ibid 121. 47 Ibid 122.

. It is here that one can first disagree with the former slave, even if this was uttered

from his given circumstance. By freeing themselves from Britain, the founding fathers gave the

illusion of freedom. However, we can see that they replaced the British rule with a new rule that

they got to draft up themselves, with their own interests at hand. In acquiring citizens, the

founding fathers were the very first American masters, and their citizens were the first American

57

slaves. Of course, this is simply an argument, but it holds weight given the light with which we

explore freedom in this paper.

It is important to note that Douglass’ speech is not all-encompassing to the progress of

the American people towards freedom. He fights against “American Slavery” and argues that

Independence Day cannot be celebrated by those who are still afflicted by slavery48. Here,

Douglass’ rhetoric stands as the greatest critic against our pro-slavery advocators. The same

rhetoric proves a greater point; that that the concept of American freedom is perverted. He

accuses the nation’s sense of liberty and accuses America of being “false to the present, past, and

future”49. Those last words prove to be his truest, as we have explored how the future he speaks

of still seems to commit the same mistakes. More importantly, the attention given to Frederick

Douglass needs to be questioned. With a single example of the freed slave, the notion of freedom

is further romanticized in American morality. We embrace the happy ending but soon forget the

details of the story. In the end, the pursuit of property is prostituted into the pursuit of the

American dream and slavery is simply rebranded as liberty. We hold on to the thought that we

are all freed slaves. In reality, we can only reiterate Douglass’ hope that “there is consolation in

the thought that America is young”50

“The Negro slaves of the South are the happiest, and, in some sense, the freest

people in the world. The children and the aged and infirm work not at all, and yet

have all the comforts and necessaries of life provided for them. They enjoy

liberty, because they are oppressed neither by care nor labor”

.

Conclusion

51

48 Ibid 124. 49 Ibid 125. 50 Ibid 118. 51 Calhoun, Cannibals 29.

.

58

Perhaps the most frightening argument in this paper is that all we have done to slavery is

rebranded it to sell it to ourselves as liberty. Western society had turned freedom into the “fatal

freedom whose blessings he does not comprehend”52. When it comes to its role in American

tradition, slavery played a crucial role in propelling the nation as well as its morals. By looking

at Calhoun, Dew, Hughes, and Fitzhugh, we have argued that slavery was always justified and

still is today, hidden in what we know as freedom. Our concept of freedom is the product of, like

Fitzhugh remarked, “modern liberty substituting a thousand wolves for a few lions”53

52 Dew 101. 53 Fitzhugh 234.

. Now we

cannot help but wonder, if all we did was rebrand slavery, what have we done to death and the

pursuit of property if not rebranded them as life and the pursuit of happiness?

59

Works Cited

Calhoun, John C. "Speech On the Reception of Abolition Petitions Revised Report." Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun. Ed. Ross M. Lence. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992. Print.

Calhoun, John C. "Speech on the Importance of Domestic Slavery." Speech. Calhoun's Resolutions. 19 Feb. 1847. Founding.com. The Claremount Institute, 2002. Web. 25 Mar. 2011.

Douglass, Frederick, William L. Andrews, and William S. McFeely. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Print.

Dew, Thomas R. Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislature on the Abolition of Slavery. Massachusetts: Aplewood Books, 1832. Print.

Fitzhugh, George. "The Universal Trade." Cannibals All Or, Slaves without Masters. Richmond, VA: A. Morris, 1857. 25-32. Print.

Fitzhugh, George, and Kenneth Thompson. "Slavery Justified." Sociology for the South or the Failure of Free Society. London [u.a.: Routledge, 2005. 226-58. Print.

Hughes, Henry. "Civil Expediancy of Warranteeism." Treatise on Sociology, Theoretical and Practical. Philadelphia, 1968. 261-92. Print.

60

The Bittersweet Results of China’s Role in Six-Party Talks

By

Charles Ikiel Ptito-Echeverria

North Korea’s recent nuclear ambitions have been a source of great tension and concern

within the international community. This fear has been exacerbated by the despotic state’s

provocative and recalcitrant behaviour facing widespread demands that it immediately halt the

development of its nuclear weapons program. At the forefront of the effort to denuclearize the

DPRK are two unlikely allies: China and the United States. Through the framework of the Six-

Party Talks, Japan, Russia, South Korea, China, the United States, and North Korea have tried to

peacefully and multilaterally negotiate the cessation of North Korea’s nuclear ventures.

Interestingly, this context has served to sow the seeds of a rapprochement between China and the

United States, two nations whose relations in the past could only be described as uneasy. In

addition, China has displayed a novel diplomatic prowess by taking on the role of mediator and

leader of the Six-Party Talks, often acting as the driving force behind the regional organization.

This is no small feat considering the nation’s ardent adherence to the guidelines laid down by

Deng Xiaoping, which call for maintaining a low diplomatic profile. However, while initially,

the Talks showed much promise, they have since grown to be characterized by disagreement,

deceit, mistrust, and abstinence, leaving them in a state of indefinite hiatus. To make matters

worse, this lack of progress, coupled with North Korea’s seemingly unremitting determination to

become a nuclear-weapon state, risks undermining the burgeoning relationship that China has

Introduction: Six-Party Talks

61

enjoyed with the United States since the onset of the Six-Party Talks. Today, the PRC finds itself

at a point where it must decide if it will continue to support the reckless behaviour of its long-

time ally North Korea or if it will join the United States in its fight against nuclear proliferation.

The backdrop to the events leading to the North Korean nuclear conflict as it exists today

within the framework of the Six-Party Talks features a rocky relationship between the United

States and China, hostility between Washington and Pyongyang, and a PRC supportive of North

Korea both in terms of aid and regime validation. April 1, 2001, the onset of the Bush

administration, witnessed a crisis wherein a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S.

reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and

the U.S. aircrew being detained for 11 days.1 This occurred at a time when Washington’s views

towards China consisted of interpreting the latter’s rapid economic growth as a national threat.

Likewise, the PRC was highly suspicious of the Bush administration, feeling that it wished to

curtail China’s rise to great-power status. The United States’ strong relations with Japan and

South Korea and the joint military operations that it conducted with both states caused China to

feel that Washington was employing a strategy of “containment” or “encirclement”.2 At the same

time, US-DPRK relations had suffered a renewed downturn since the signing of the Agreed

Framework in 1994. George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address at the beginning of 2002,

during which he declared North Korea a part of the “axis of evil” along with Iran and Iraq,

followed by the disclosure of the DPRK’s highly enriched uranium program in October 2002,

served to severely antagonize tensions between Washington and Pyongyang. 3

1 Bonnie S. Glaser and Liang Wang, "North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?", The Washington Quarterly, 2008 (165-180). 2 Glaser and Wang, 166. 3 Cheng Qian and Xiaohui Wu, "The Art of China’s Mediation during the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula.", Asian Affairs, 2009 (79-96).

Bush’s

inflammatory speech was followed by the refusal of direct communication with Pyongyang and

62

the suspension of the heavy oil supply that was stipulated in the Agreed Framework.4Fear of

succumbing to the same fate as Iraq served as the impetus for North Korea to pursue its nuclear

ambitions with increased zeal and disregard for international condemnation. By the beginning of

2003, North Korea had already begun to expel IAEA inspectors, had reactivated its 5-megawatt

graphite reactor, and declared its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.5 The increased

threat posed by North Korea in conjunction with Beijing’s favourable relations with Pyongyang

and the previous failure of a bilateral US-DPRK approach, rendered China an attractive

candidate for the mediating role in a multilateral strategy for North Korean nuclear disarmament.

However, this put China in a tight spot given its friendly relationship with North Korea. At that

time, and still today, China was one of North Korea’s closest allies as well as one of its leading

trading partners. Furthermore, Feng Zhu argues that “politically, the Sino-North Korean

‘traditional friendship’, as a component of Beijing’s official ideology [had] remained strong

through different generations of leadership in both countries”.6

One of the most prominent aspects of the power dynamic that exists today between the

United States, China and North Korea is the way in which Washington has been able to coax

China into assuming the leading role in the Six-Party Talks. Initially, Beijing was highly

reluctant to participate in Washington’s mission to disarm Pyongyang and insisted that the issue

be resolved bilaterally between the two parties. The PRC’s reticence can be explained by a

Clearly, China would have a hard

time balancing its desire to please the United States by playing an active role in the pursuit of

North Korean denuclearisation and honouring its historically friendly relationship with the

DPRK.

4 Feng Zhu, "Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission: Chinese Diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks to Denuclearise North Korea.", East Asia, 2011 (191-218). 5 Zhu, 195. 6 Ibid.

63

variety of cultural and political factors. Culturally, Asian states hold a strong belief in the

concept of state sovereignty and non-interference. This ideology is expressed in the Five

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which emphasize peaceful coexistence and mutual non-

interference in a state’s internal affairs, and serve as guidelines for international relations. 7

Furthermore, as Qian and Wu write, “many Asians interpret mediator in the sense of the Farsi

definition of the word, which suggests a ‘meddler’, someone who is ‘barging in

uninvited’”. 8 Therefore, in Asia the concept of mediation is presupposed by a negative

connotation implying unwarranted interference. Politically, China had many reasons to avoid

becoming involved in a multilateral appeal for North Korean denuclearisation. Glaser and Liang

highlight the possible motives behind China’s reluctance in arguing that Beijing was uncertain as

to the validity of the United States’ claims of North Korea’s intention to produce highly enriched

uranium. Moreover, the PRC suspected that the DPRK was simply using its nuclear programs as

a ploy to gain concessions from the US, a scenario which would support a bilateral rather than

multilateral resolution. The Bush administration’s openly voiced disdain towards North Korea

also suggested the possibility that Washington possessed an ulterior motive to overthrow the

Kim regime with or without the use of force, something to which China wanted to avoid being

officially associated. Lastly, assuming an active diplomatic role ran contrary to the guidelines

laid down by Deng Xiaoping.9

7 Qian and Wu:,81. 8 Ibid. 9 Glaser and Wang.

However, mounting pressure from Washington combined with

increasingly provocative behaviour from North Korea in the beginning of 2003 proved to be

sufficient motive for China to reconsider its non-involvement in the North Korean nuclear crisis.

64

The starting point for cooperation between Beijing and Washington occurred in October

2002 when President Bush invited Chinese president Jiang Zemin to his ranch in Crawford,

Texas.10 During the visit President Bush voiced his belief in the need to peacefully put a stop to

North Korea’s development of nuclear capabilities and the crucial role that China should play by

using its leverage over the DPRK to achieve this purpose. However, Jiang was unconvinced and

simply stated that “China does not associate itself with North Korea’s nuclear program”.11 The

two were able to come to an agreement, however, regarding the necessity of action and at a joint

press conference following the Crawford summit, declared that “we agreed that peace and

stability in Northeast Asia must be maintained. Both sides will continue to work towards a

nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula and a peaceful resolution of this issue”.12 This minor

breakthrough would later be referred to as the Crawford Consensus. However, despite the good

intentions towards cooperation that were voiced at the Crawford ranch, the Consensus did not lay

out any concrete steps towards achieving a peaceful North Korean nuclear disarmament. The

turning point occurred following Pyongyang’s provocative actions at the start of 2003. China

realized that a bilateral solution between the US and North Korea was highly unlikely and that

the situation was nearing a boiling point. An armed attack against the DPRK on behalf of the

United States could prove to be catastrophic for China. This was primarily due to the mutual

assistance clause from the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and

Mutual Assistance, which stated that China should defend North Korea in the event of an

unprovoked attack.13

10 Ibid. 11 Glaser and Wang, 167. 12 Glaser and Wang, 168. 13 Ibid.

This meant that China could get dragged into a war against the United

States, Japan, and South Korea, were Washington to choose to attack North Korea, a nightmarish

65

and unthinkable scenario for Beijing. Furthermore, the toppling of the Kim regime could spark

an influx of North Korean refugees in China, which represented another unfavourable possibility.

Beijing’s fear of armed conflict between the U.S. and DPRK was further exacerbated by the fact

that Washington had already invaded Iraq, which increased the possibility of the same occurring

in North Korea.14Moreover, Washington’s attempt to increase its military presence in the Pacific

by deploying 24 B-1 and B-52 bombers to Guam also served to intensify Beijing’s fear of US-

DPRK strife. 15 The desire to avoid undermining the hard-won progress that was made in

developing the Sino-US relationship also factored into China’s decision to comply with

Washington’s demands. It is in this context that President Jiang allowed himself to be persuaded

to actively participate in a multilateral effort to denuclearise the DPRK by Secretary of State

Colin Powell during his visit to Beijing in February 2003.16

Following Powell’s visit, Beijing sent vice Premier Qian Qichen to Pyongyang in the

hopes of persuading Kim to participate in multilateral talks. However, this visit alone was not

enough to compel North Korea to participate in multilateral talks aimed at shutting down its

nuclear programs. In fact, it was not even enough to prevent Pyongyang from test-firing a missile

into waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula. China responded to this act of provocation

by shutting down its pipeline from Daqing oil field to North Korea for three days under the

pretence of ‘technical maintenance’.

17

14 Ibid. 15 Glaser and Wang. 16 Glaser and Wang. 17 Glaser and Wang.

Beijing’s sobering reminder of the leverage it possessed

over Pyongyang, coupled with its diplomatic efforts were enough to persuade North Korea to

participate in a trilateral meeting held in Beijing April 23-25, 2003. Despite the eventual failure

of the Three-Party Talks, brought on by Washington’s refusal to engage Pyongyang in direct

66

bilateral communication, the meeting served as the foundation for the Six-Party Talks, which

were launched on August 27 of that same year and grew to include Japan, Russia, and South

Korea.18The goal of these talks, as Evans Revere writes, was “the complete, verifiable, and

irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea”.19

Unfortunately, the modest success that was enjoyed in the first round of negotiations was

not felt throughout the following sessions. As Zhu Feng recounts, “on the eve of the second

round of talks, North Korea demanded a priori implementation of America’s ‘written assurance

of security’” (2011, 201). This type of intransigent manoeuvre later came to define the

negotiation technique employed by Washington and Pyongyang throughout the duration of the

Six-Party Talks. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the declaration made to the DPRK on

China’s success in engaging North Korea in the

Six-Party Talks served to greatly improve its relations with the United States. In fact, in early

September, Colin Powell voiced the Bush administration’s content with China by describing the

two countries’ relations as “the best they have been since President Nixon’s first visit” to China

in 1972 and by welcoming the emergence of a “strong, peaceful, and prosperous China” (Glaser

and Wang 2008, 170). This comment was inspired by what was perceived to be a successful

performance by China during the first round of talks, in which China persuaded the US and

DPRK to engage in two informal bilateral discussions (Glaser and Wang 2008). However, this

small accomplishment was rendered bittersweet by the DPRK’s warning that it reserved the right

to declare itself a nuclear-weapons state and to test nuclear weapons (Australian Government

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.).

18 Zhu. 19 Evans J. R. Revere, "The North Korea Nuclear Problem: Sailing into Uncharted Waters.", American Foreign Policy Interests, 2010 (7-11): 7.

67

behalf of the Talk’s members, emphasising a united goal to achieve “the complete, irreversible

and verifiable dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear program”, fell on deaf ears (Australian

Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.). The third round of talks featured a

similar stunt, but this time, on behalf of the United States, who demanded that the DPRK confess

to having a secret stock of enriched uranium in its possession as a precondition to participation.20

Washington’s untimely accusation served to aggravate Beijing, whose role as intermediary

between the US and DPRK was proving to be increasingly difficult. China found itself having to

repeatedly urge Washington to assume a more reasonable and flexible approach when dealing

with Pyongyang in terms of concessions during negotiations. Chinese frustration with the US

grew to a point where Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, head of the Chinese negotiating team,

declared that “US policy [was] the ‘main obstacle’ to reaching a breakthrough in negotiations”.21

The situation took a turn for the worse when on February 10, 2005 the DPRK Ministry of

Foreign Affairs issued a statement announcing its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks. In the

true spirit of North Korean defiance and provocation, the DPRK took this opportunity to also

announce that it had manufactured nuclear weapons.22This brazen show of recalcitrance served

as the response to comments made by secretary of state Condoleezza Rice where in she

described the DPRK as an “outpost of tyranny”, and was followed by the demand for an

apology. 23

20 Zhu. 21 Glaser and Wang, 170.

Once again exemplifying its commitment to pushing the Six-Party Talks forward,

22 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Democratic People's Republic of Korea - Country brief: Timeline of Events relating to the DPRK Nuclear Issue. n.d., http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:sF46I-rDcsoJ:www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/dprk/chronology_nuclear_issue.html+six-party+talks+timeline&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca, Accessed December 10, 2011. 23 Qiang and Wu.

68

China sent President Hu Jintao’s special envoys Wang Jiarui and Tang Jiaxuan to Pyongyang in

an effort to ease tension and continue negotiations.24

During the DPRK’s boycott of the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang’s behaviour served to

gravely strain its already faltering relationship with the United States. North Korea declared itself

a “fully-fledged nuclear weapons state” and demanded to be treated as an equal partner in the

negotiation of what was now to be its ‘disarmament’, as opposed to the previous goal of full

denuclearization. Furthermore, it test fired a short-range missile into the sea of Japan and

declared that, as part of its plan to increase its nuclear arsenal, it had completed extracting spent

fuel rods from Yongbyon.

25 However, the situation enjoyed a short-lived upswing with

Washington issuing an apology to Pyongyang for its inflammatory remarks and China attempting

to reinvigorate the talks by drafting the Joint Statement in September 2005. The Joint Statement

called for the denuclearisation of North Korea through a series of steps. It emphasised the DPRK

standing by its commitment to discontinue its nuclear weapons program and surrendering its

nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and normalisation of relations. 26

Pyongyang would return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the

adherence of IAEA regulations.27The United States was required to assure North Korea that it

had no intention of launching an attack against Pyongyang. Furthermore, China, Japan, Russia,

South Korea, and the US agreed to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The issue of the

light-water reactors previously stipulated in the 1994 Agreed Framework was shelved and was

agreed to be discussed at an appropriate time.28

24 Ibid.

25 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d. 26 Zhu. 27 Qian and Wu. 28 Glaser and Wang.

China had to exert a significant amount of

69

pressure over both Washington and Pyongyang to ensure both parties’ compliance. The Joint

Statement was presented to the USA in a take-it-or-leave-it manner, threatening that if

Washington did not agree it would be responsible for the breakdown in the talks.29Nevertheless,

obtaining an agreement from both Pyongyang and Washington proved to be an arduous task for

China. China’s efforts were nearly rendered futile when less than twenty four hours after the

issuing of the statement, Pyongyang announced that the US transfer of light-water reactors would

serve as a necessary precondition to the DPRK dismantling its nuclear capabilities.30

What was widely perceived to be nothing more than another instance of North Korean

self-serving deceit, served to infuriate an already impatient United States. Shortly after

Pyongyang’s request for the transferral of light-water reactors, Washington announced that it

would be imposing financial sanctions at the end of the year and proceeded to freeze $24 million

in North Korean funds being held in Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, under the accusation of

money laundering.

This move

represents North Korea’s willingness to abuse its favourable relations with China, believing that

Beijing’s desire to avoid yet another setback to the Talks would cause it to lobby Washington in

the favour of Pyongyang’s interests.

31 Washington’s efforts to strong-arm Pyongyang into complying with terms

agreed upon in the Joint Statement were met with obstinate resistance and a defiant show of

provocation. On July 4th 2006 – North Korea test fired seven ballistic missiles.32 However,

Pyongyang escalated its provocative behaviour by testing its first nuclear device on October 9

under the pretext of self-defence.33

29 Qian and Wu. 30 Qian and Wu. 31 Zhu. 32 Glaser and Wang. 33 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.

The effects that the DPRK’s actions had on relations between

Washington, Beijing, and itself were surprisingly mixed. The obvious result was a further

70

strengthening of Sino-US relations and cooperation as sympathy for Pyongyang was becoming

increasingly difficult to justify. This caused Beijing to stray from its usual tactic of cajoling

Pyongyang and to openly condemn its actions. China’s Foreign Ministry voiced its discontent in

a strongly worded statement declaring that Pyongyang had “defied the universal opposition of

international society and flagrantly conducted the nuclear test”, a heated reaction reminiscent to

that resulting from Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni

Shrine. 34 Furthermore, on July 15, 2006 China chose to cooperate with its fellow Security

Council members by voting in favour of adopting resolution 1695, which would forbid the

buying or selling of missiles or any related materials to the DPRK.35Later in October, the PRC

once again displayed a willingness to pursue the nuclear disarmament of North Korea by

endorsing resolution 1718, which imposed “an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to

[the DPRK’s] nuclear-weapon programme” and called for all nations to “take cooperative action,

including through inspection of cargo” originating from or destined to North Korea.36 China’s

support of the UN Security Council’s resolutions demonstrated a clear shift in the way it viewed

its relations with the DPRK. The UN’s harsh reprimand of North Korea’s actions proved to be

sufficient to bring Pyongyang back to the Six-Party Talks for a fifth round of negotiations in

February of 2007. The third phase of this round of talks yielded a small victory when the DPRK

agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid, the unfreezing of the Banco

Delta Asia funds, North Korea’s removal from the black list of terrorism sponsorship states, and

steps towards the normalization of relations with the US and Japan.37

34 Glaser and Wang, 172.

Furthermore, North Korea

35 United Nations Security Council Department of Public Information, Security Council Condemns Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Missile Launched, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695 (2006), July 15, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm, Accessed December 11, 2011. 36 United Nations Security Council Department of Public Information. 37 Qian an Wu.

71

agreed to explode its Yeonbyon cooling tower, a promise which it surprisingly honoured.38 This

was part of the action plan for the implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement that was produced

during the talks.39 However, following Kim Jong Il’s refusal of full verification, the Six-Party

Talks suffered an immediate breakdown and have yet to recommence.

The perceived failure of the Six-Party Talks has served to tarnish China’s image as a

prominent international diplomatic player. Furthermore, the hard-won advancements made

towards the development of a strong Sino-US relationship are currently in a state of jeopardy due

to North Korea’s continued acts of provocation and China’s seemingly muted responses. Since

the breakdown of the Talks, the DPRK has launched a satellite, shot missiles, and conducted a

second nuclear test.

Conclusion

40Beijing’s reaction to Pyongyang’s acts of blaring provocation has consisted

of urging the fellow Six-Party members “to exert restraint, stay calm, take caution, and avoid any

action that could further complicate the situation and impede the resumption of the Six-Party

Talks”. 41

38 Zhu. 39 Glaser and Wang. 40 Dingli Shen, "Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea.", The Washington Quarterly, 2009 (175-188). 41 Qian and Wu, 84.

From Washington’s perspective, the PRC’s reluctance to wholly condemn North

Korea’s actions places a serious strain on Sino-US relations. China’s timid handling of North

Korea is interpreted by many as resulting from self-serving motives. Beijing is highly reluctant

to rattle the regime in Pyongyang as its collapse could severely hamper China’s domestic

interests. For example, the failure of the North Korean government would cause a large influx of

refugees across Chinese borders. Similarly, Beijing is content with the current Kim regime as it

allows North Korea to act as a wedge between China and the ROK. Due to the friendly relations

72

and military presence that the US enjoys with Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, China sees North

Korea as a way to balance against US presence in the region. This is particularly important due

to the tensions that exist between Beijing and Taiwan, to whom the United States routinely sells

weapons. Furthermore, the perpetuation of the North Korean Nuclear crisis and the hostile Kim

regime may serve the purpose of distracting the United States from China’s rise to global super-

power status. Currently, North Korea’s unpredictable behaviour, coupled with its possession of

nuclear weapons, has caused China to adopt a strategy of ‘wilful blindness” towards

Pyongyang.42 The desire to establish itself as a prominent international player aside China’s

interests are served through the preservation of the Kim Jong Il regime. This attitude has endured

despite the DPRK’s sinking of the South Korean warship ‘Cheonan’ and its subsequent shelling

of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. China’s continued diplomatic and economic support of the

DPRK and its efforts to prevent international efforts to punish Pyongyang have served to place a

serious strain on relations between Beijing and Washington and have brought the legitimacy of

the PRC’s role in negotiating the denuclearisation of North Korea into serious question.43 This

Sino-US friction has been further exacerbated by the recent uncovering of a new North Korean

uranium enrichment plant.44

The progress that China has made in nurturing a strong and friendly relationship with

Washington appears to be deteriorating as North Korea’s provocative behaviour displays little

prospect of amelioration. The importance of maintaining friendly Sino-US relations is evident

given Washington’s strong presence in the region and China’s rapid economic development.

Furthermore, if China wishes to legitimize its undemocratic leadership, it must disassociate itself

42 Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, "Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North Korea's Provocations.", The Rusi Journal, 2011 (74-81). 43 Snyder and Byun. 44 Ibid.

73

from what many consider to be a villainous North Korea. The past decade has shown that China

has the potential to play a positive role in the international arena. It is up to Beijing to preserve

the image that it has worked so hard to create for itself. This can only be made possible by

working alongside its neighbours to bring peace, stability, and prosperity both to Asia and the

rest of the world.

74

Works Cited

Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Democratic People's Republic of Korea - Country brief: Timeline of Events relating to the DPRK Nuclear Issue. n.d. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:sF46I-rDcsoJ:www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/dprk/chronology_nuclear_issue.html+six-party+talks+timeline&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca (accessed December 10, 2011).

Glaser, Bonnie S. and Liang Wang. "North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?" The Washington Quarterly, 2008: 165-180.

Qian, Cheng and Xiaohui Wu. "The Art of China’s Mediation during the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula." Asian Affairs, 2009: 79-96.

Revere, Evans J. R. "The North Korea Nuclear Problem: Sailing into Uncharted Waters." American Foreign Policy Interests, 2010: 7-11.

Shen, Dingli. "Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea." The Washington Quarterly, 2009: 175-188.

Snyder, Scott and See-Won Byun. "Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North Korea's Provocations." The Rusi Journal, 2011: 74-81.

United Nations Security Council Department of Public Information. Security Council Condemns Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Missile Launched, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695(2006). July 15, 2006. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm (accessed December 11, 2011).

—. Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718. October 14, 2006. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm (accessed December 11, 2011).

Zhu, Feng. "Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission: Chinese Diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks to Denuclearise North Korea." East Asia, 2011: 191-218.

75

The Tragedy of Plato’s Commons

By Trevor Smith

Among the problems that arise from this communalism is a phenomenon referred

to as Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”

Introduction

The theory of the collective family, as described by Plato in the fifth book of his

Republic, is an outline of the family unit among the guardians and auxiliaries of his

‘Callipolis’. In his dialogue, Socrates implores the ruling classes of Callipolis to share in

common their dining halls, wives and most significantly, their children. Plato’s Socrates

theorized that in the passing of these laws, the difficult matter of unifying Callipolis and

mitigating the selfish desires created through exclusive family would then be quelled. In

defense of the atomic family, Aristotle develops a critique to this facet of life within the

‘Just’ city in his Politics, attacking Plato’s logic that supports the communal life, while

insisting that Plato’s ideology would create many new problems for the city.

1

1 Hardin, 1968.

, the tendency of human nature to misuse

common and finite resources. The commonality of things in Callipolis raised by Plato in

The Republic can thus be examined from the view of the “Tragedy” in order to determine

if such laws would benefit the ‘Just’ polis. This essay will explore the commons from the

perspective of Hardin, arguing that in unifying the guardians, Plato would not have been

able to avert a ‘tragedy’ for the citizens of Callipolis.

76

In order to begin this investigation, the dynamics Plato’s communalism must be

clarified. Among the greatest of concerns for Callipolis is the unity of the city. The root

of this belief is found in Socrates in his claim that people who are naturally suited to one

task should apply themselves in that way and, through this action “… each may become a

single person rather than many people, and in this way the entire city may grow to be a

single city rather than many cities”

Plato’s Communal Family

2

Socrates revisits this concept after Adeimantus accuses him of not providing an

adequate explanation of “friends will hold things in common”

. Socrates reasons that by specializing the population

in the profession that suits them best, they will foster strength in the communal ties that

make up the city.

3

That all these women shall be wives in common for all these men. That none of them shall live as individuals with any of the men. That children in turn shall belong to all of them. That no parent shall know its own child, no child its own parent

. In his elaboration of this

ideal, the construct of the collective family is presented just after his deliberation of the

equality of women. Socrates proclaims to Glaucon:

4

With these laws in place, the children of these collective marriages are then taken

away, with those of good parents being fostered and nurtured, while the children of

mediocre parents or physically unfit are abandoned

.

5

2 Plato, Republic, 423d. 3 Plato, Republic, 449c; Nielsen, 2012. 4 Plato, Republic, 457d. 5 Ibid, 460b.

. Socrates holds his belief in these

customs as a means of abolishing preferential treatment among the citizens of Callipolis

through “double blind” procreation as means of invoking collectivism of sons and

77

daughters6

The theme of the commons and its disagreements with individual ownership is a

well-explored topic of debate within environmental literature. One of the most famous

enquiries as to what can be done to solve these difficulties is presented to us in Garrett

Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”

. The negative aspects of the family, which would otherwise create

competition among the citizens and fuel the individualist desires associated with

exclusive family, are quelled in this way: with the creation of the shared family.

7. In unifying the citizens of Callipolis by creating a

common family, was Socrates fully aware of the consequences of his actions? What

follows next is an inquiry as to whether the communal family would serve as a model that

would be able to solve problems that we currently face in another ‘commons’ of society;

environmental resources.

The Tragedy of the Commons as proposed by Hardin

The Tragedy

8 is an examination of the

issues facing current policies in the fields of population control, environmental conditions

and natural resources. In his explanation, Hardin acknowledges the self-interested nature

of mankind and the need to maximize personal gain, however as people act in their best

interests, their aggregated effect collapses limited resources9

The parallel between Plato’s Callipolis and the environment is strikingly similar.

On this comparison, Taverna finds “an ideal democratic society (not necessarily meaning

. In applying this commons

problem to the political community, it is evident that Plato’s Callipolis also suffers from

this phenomenon as well.

6 Nielsen, 2012. 7 Hardin, 1968. 8 Ibid. 9 Johnson, 2003.

78

full democracy) is like an ideally managed or utilized environmental resource”10. The

sustainability of a political structure, such as a city, is not unlike the sustainability of a

shared natural resource. While Plato’s society was not so much democratic according to

our definition, it required the will of all citizens, both the labourers and the rulers, in

order to function as a whole for the common goal; that is self-sustenance and the “good

life”11. For Socrates, the goal of self-sustenance for Callipolis was to be found the

collective unity of its citizens12

Natural resources, by extension, are a facet of this self-sustenance in the city:

Hardin argues that only through population and affluence controls can a society not over-

extend itself, requiring more resources than it has at its disposal

.

13

Plato illustrates what an unsustainable city of his period might look like in the

early pages of Plato’s Republic: In his deliberation with Adeimantus, Socrates is

interrupted by Glaucon, urging him they explore the luxurious and inflamed city

. The difficulty with the

case of self-sustenance of a state and the sustainability of its resources are then

unsurprisingly found not only in the legislation that concerns them but also in the

individual actions of people. The challenges that Plato then faces are that of the

sustenance of its social order and the sustainability of its consumption.

14

10 Taverna, 2004, p4. 11 Ibid, p5. 12 Plato, Republic, 423c. 13 Hardin, 1968. 14 Plato, Republic, 372e.

. As

this city grew with the number of professionals needed to provide for its luxurious nature,

it required more and more resources to sustain itself, leading to expand its territorial

borders. In his assumption that neighbouring cities would need to do this as well,

Socrates theorized that this would lead to war over the claim of limited resources.

79

The fate of the luxurious city can therefore be attributed the misuse of shared

environmental resources. The appetite of the luxurious city (and its neighbours who we

can assume would have done much the same) lead to the excessive needs for resources

and ultimately, to competition and war. The origin of this outcome can be traced to

“…the commonest causes of evil in cities…”15 with these evil being the greedy and

appetitive desires that destabilize the souls of citizens16

The communal nature of Callipolis then is Plato’s answer to this problem of self-

sustainability. By keeping desires in check with legislation in his ‘Just’ city, the citizens

(specifically, the guardians) would then not succumb to the evils of greed and wealth

.

17.

The question of whether or not Plato was able to satisfy these dynamics with his

legislation forms the basis of the next inquiry.

• Population Control. The Sustainable Callipolis?

In the founding of the laws of Callipolis, Socrates suggests a solution to the issue

of population control. He declares “We shall leave the number of marriages to the rulers,

so they can keep the number of men as nearly as possible at the same level, taking war,

disease and things like that into account”18

The onus of population control then rests with the rulers, however as “the

difficulty of defining the optimum [population] is enormous … [and] will surely require

. His belief in this legislation was rooted in

trust that rulers would know best what size would be best to sustain Callipolis, rather than

leave the citizens in charge of this aspect of Callipolis.

15 Ibid, 373e. 16 Nielsen, 2012. 17 Ibid. 18 Plato, Republic, 460a.

80

more than one generation of hard analytical work—and much persuasion”19. To this,

Plato believes the calculations needed in order to determine this aspect of Callipolis’

society would be daunting, but not impossible, for the guardians, while the issue of

“much persuasion” would technically be solved by Plato’s communal family ideology.

The collective nature of offspring would imply that all couples would have all their

children in common20

• The Boundaries of the City.

, the exact number would not matter; those children born in excess

would be abandoned and the remaining who would be raised would then belong to all. It

would seem as though Plato’s methods of controlling the generational population of

Callipolis would not be met with any outcry from among the parents in this particular

scenario.

Plato also addresses the issue of the size of Callipolis while determining the roles

of the guardians. The city limit should be determined, Socrates states, “as long as any

increase in size is unlikely to stop the city remaining united, they should let it go on

increasing. But not beyond that point … [The city] should be adequate in size and

united”21

Hardin’s ‘Tragedy’ would initially agree with this as the goal of most systems, as

“a finite world can support only a finite population; therefore, population growth must

. The surrounding territory is therefore also deemed to be a limiting agent for

this city, as no more what is adequate to sustain its unity should be claimed for Callipolis.

In limiting the borders of his city, Socrates would be imposing the sustainable use of its

territories, as the prolific consumption of resources would lead to the luxurious and

inflamed city.

19 Hardin, 1968, p1244. 20 Plato, Republic, 457d. 21 Ibid, 423b.

81

equal zero”22. The finite region of Callipolis, imposed by its own rulers rather than its

proximal neighbours, would reinforce the idea that its resources would be finite as well.

The first inherent problem that presents itself is that in a finite world (or territory, as is

the case of Callipolis), the per capita share of natural resources will decrease with time

and generations. However, assuming Callipolis and its surrounding territories were

fortunate enough to rely solely on renewable resources and harvest them only in amounts

that are not in excess (unlike societies of today), this challenge would also have been met.

Plato’s foresight in the enactment of his legislations, unifying the citizens of

Callipolis in a common family, would appear to satisfy the physical dynamics of

population and its need of resources. By maintaining a population demographic that was

within the carrying capacity of the city through population control and the common

family, Plato has tackled these issues from above and below. If only more cities could

resemble the aforementioned model, there might arguably be fewer problems within them

today. Sadly, things that seem too good to be true often are, and Aristotle brings to light

many of the shortfalls of the communal family ideology in Book II of his Politics.

Aristotle’s criticism of the Socrates’ common family forces us to reexamine the

model entirely. In it, his most striking counter to the ideology of the commons is his

claim that “[w]hat belongs in common to the most people is accorded the least care: they

take thought for their own things above all and less about things common, or only so

much as fall to each individually”

Aristotle’s Criticisms

23

22 Hardin, 1968, p1243. 23 Aristotle, Politics, 1261b31-34.

. Unsurprisingly, the similarities between Aristotle’s

ideology and that of Garrett Hardin’s are strongly in agreement with each other; The core

82

of Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”24

Individuals, for both Hardin and Aristotle, are most naturally concerned about their individual interests; common things are less cared for both because individuals are preoccupied with personal things and because they assume others will be mindful of the common things.

rests with the nature of the individual in his

share of common responsibility. This aspect of human nature is explained:

25

Specifically on the topic of the family, Aristotle predicts that “each of the citizens

comes to have a thousand sons, though not as an individual, but each is in similar fashion

the son of any of them; hence all will slight them in similar fashion”

26. His claim holds

that the family members among the rulers will not value their children as they will not

exclusively belong to each of them and accordingly, will not know each and every one of

them as a father or mother. If this is to be an expected outcome, then by undermining the

exclusiveness in family, the parental figures of the communal family will not be

motivated to care for their children27

If we were to imagine the children of these uncaring generations becoming

parents themselves, emotional distance with the communal family would amplify within

generations. Affection, which, according to Aristotle, is “… the greatest of good things

for cities, for in this way they would least of all engage in factional conflict”

.

28

It is fine in principle to want to treat every man as a brother in the metaphorical sense, but what allows the special relationships to have value in the first place is precisely the fact that your brother or son is not just any old citizen. If every man is your brother, then no man is”

, would be

a missing dynamic between parents and children. Nielsen elaborates further that this

would extend as well between siblings:

29

24 Hardin, 1968. 25 Taverna, 2004, p8. 26 Aristotle, Politics, 1261b37 – 1262a1. 27 Taverna, 2004. 28 Aristotle, Politics, 1262b7; Taverna, 2004. 29 Nielsen, 2012, p12.

83

Aristotle’s emphasis on these special relationships as the basis of his ‘household’

is crucial as, at the core, “every city is composed of households”30. Through the unifying

of the citizens of Callipolis into a single household, Plato has undermined his goal by

weakening the bonds that unite them31. Seeing with these criticisms in mind, the possible

‘tragedy’ facing Callipolis is worth revisiting.

Hardin’s classic example used to illustrate the “Tragedy of the Commons” used a

common pasture and several herdsmen, each with their cattle herd

The Tragedy of Callipolis

32

In Plato’s society, where the communal family of the guardians would be relied

upon to act in the collective and common good of Callipolis, the weakness of the

communal ideology would have drastic consequences. The foundation of Callipolis – the

affection among the members of the communal family would be lacking and, by

. Each of the

herdsmen, in trying to maximize their personal gains, would add cattle beyond the

capacity of the pasture, reasoning that any damages that would result would be

distributed among all the herdsmen. From Plato’s angle, if every herdsman were a

member of a collective family, there would be nothing to gain from these actions; the

collective damages of a ruined pasture would far outweigh the communal gains of a few

head of cattle. If, however, they held no special relationship with their fellow herdsmen,

the allure of the individual gains would appear stronger than the collective bonds between

herdsmen. As each herder attempted to make use of this, the ‘tragedy’ would ensue and

the common pasture would then collapse.

30 Aristotle, Politics, 1253b2. 31 Nielsen, 2012. 32 Hardin, 1968, p1244.

84

extension, this lack of affection would be felt between the individual and the city. As the

individual lost his claim to his city and his family, he would no longer view himself as a

citizen, dismantling the unity that would sustain the political society of the polis. In this

way, the principles of Callipolis would lead to tragedy because of the commons.

Aristotle confides to his readers “[i]n general, to live together and be partners in

any human matter is difficult”

Conclusion

33. Indeed, the issue of the partnership of the commons is of

the greatest importance, especially when applied to more contemporary problems, such as

global population and environmental resource management. Hardin’s “Tragedy”34

33 Aristotle, Politics, 1263a15. 34 Hardin, 1968.

is the

unfortunate result of the individual’s human nature placing greater importance on the

personal, rather than the communal. It would appear that not even Socrates’ utopia of

Callipolis could have escaped the Tragedy of the Commons, as the communal ideology

would have ultimately destroyed itself. This is not to say there is no hope of finding a

solution to this problem; we just may need to look elsewhere.

85

References

Aristotle. Politics. Trans: Carnes Lord. Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1984. Hardin, G. (1968).“The Tragedy of the Commons”. Science, 162, 1243-1248.

Johnson, B.L. (2003). Ethical Obligations in a Tragedy of the Commons”. Environmental

Values, 10, 271 – 287 Nielsen, K.M. “Good Housekeeping: Aristotle on Economy and Private Property”. Draft in

progress to be published in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Eds: Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destree. Cambridge University Press: 2012. Cited with permission.

Plato. Republic. Ed: G. R. F. Ferrari. Trans: Tom Griffith. New York, Cambridge University Press: 2009.

Taverna, J. “Common Problems: Lessons from the Political for the Environmental”. Manuscript presented at The Western Political Science Association Annual Conference. March 11, 2004. Cited with permission.

86

Is Post-National Citizenship Possible? The EU Model of Citizenship and Ethnic Nationalism in Yugoslavia

By Katrina Tarondo

Post-National Citizenship in the Coming Era

“I believe that nationalism is a very strong force, but there are other forces operating;

there are tendencies pushing towards a larger picture, especially in Europe, I think; but I still

think nationalism is real”.

Introduction

1

1 Peter Singer Quotes, Brainy Quote, 2012, Retrieved From

Nationalism, before it had been termed into a concept, had its

presence in the Roman Empire. Nationalism involves a strong identification of a group of

individuals with political entity defined in national terms. Most of the time, nationalism involves

the formation of state territorially. The nation-state is seen throughout the world. Nationalism

and citizenship are interlinked. When a nation forms a state, it usually outlines rights to the

individuals of the state. Citizenship gives a sense of belonging to the state and the nation. In

recent decades, globalization has affected nations greatly with the coming of international

organizations and economic trade amongst countries. It has challenged the need for nationalism

and the benefits of a state. Post-nationalism describes the process or trends by which nation-

states and national identities lose their importance relative to supranational and global entities.

Post-nationalism has gained momentum due to its link to human rights. International human

rights laws and norms have been implemented to protect the rights of individuals under

‘personhood’ and not just their citizenship. Is post-national citizenship possible? It is this essay’s

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/p/peter_singer.html.

87

contention that it is, but mainly in a bureaucratic sense and for international human rights. It is

indeed possible, but it will never be able to reduce nationalism; people have fought for years for

the protection of their national identities.

Theoretical Framework

The European Union has for years enlarged and accepted more member-states. They have

established some form of Union citizenship, which took years to negotiate. They are prime

examples of a possible post-nationalist state. In 2001, there were debates related to the forming

of a constitution for full EU Citizenship. EU citizenship would work, because there are already

established policies under the EU’s jurisdiction, which include free labour, free movement, and

human rights policies such as the anti-racism policy. These major factors contribute to the

fashioning of a European citizenship, however, member-states cannot agree on having

community social programs, which would cause nations to become irrelevant. This paper will

look at how globalization promotes post-nationalism. It will also demonstrate the benefits of

post-nationalism and how it would work within the European Union model. Furthermore, the

paper will examine how nationalism will remain relevant by using the case study of ethnic

nationalism and Yugoslavia’s disintegration into smaller nation-states. The only way post-

nationalism will work is if individuals have the option of dual-citizenship, which will eventually

prevail: nation-state citizenship and citizenship of the world.

Globalization is the exchange of goods, services and culture throughout the international

sphere. Globalization developed in the West. Moreover, human rights are a characteristic of the

Description of Globalization and its Link to Post-nationalism

88

West and conflicts with the eastern ideology of a well-ordered society.2 Human rights are linked

to the right of the person to behave or misbehave as one chooses which conflicts with the east’s

ideology to maintain an ordered society. Moreover, people do not feel connected to the global

sphere because there are no duties for human rights and so on. If there was a global tax to sustain

an institution for human rights, it would recreate a global civil society.3

Even though, globalization interconnects nation-states and feeds the international

spectrum, which creates international institutions, it does not dissolve the need for nation-states.

Globalization would not work without the intervention of nation-states to support a world crisis

such as the 2008 financial recession through international institutions such as the World Bank.

4

For international institutions to be less reliant on states, they would have to establish a global tax

on economic relief. This is unlikely to happen as states would want to protect their authorities,

while some countries might disagree with some policies, which tend to be western-based.

Globalization has expanded the idea of citizenship to its modern form of entitlements.

Globalization and Citizenship

5

Nationalism and nation-states stemmed from citizenship.6 It would be hard to detach nationalism

from citizenship. Social rights are created by states and with citizenship; inhabitants of the state

can enjoy these rights. As it has been observed, there is a decline of national protection and

citizenship, but according to Turner and Khondker7

2 B.S. Turner, & H.H. Khondker, Globalization: East and West, (Los Angeles California: Sage Publications: 2010). 3 Turner & Khondker. 4 Turner & Khondker. 5 Turner & Khondker. 6 Turner & Khondker. 7 Turner & Khondker.

, the state and citizenship remain important in

the enforcement of social and human rights. Despite the disagreement, the more globalization

89

grows, the more likely it is that it will lead to nationalist feelings. 8 Migration, free-market

economy and human rights are the basis of globalization and of the coming of post-nationalism.

A supranational system seems to be emerging in the European Union due to their policies on free

movement, economics and anti-racism and their history as a union.

Post-nationalist citizenship is possible in the European Union because of its history as a union of

member states and its policies. The policies are conducted without the supremacy of states and

are supposed to be enforced by member-states.

The Beginning of EU Citizenship

9 The European Union began its supranational

position starting with the implementations of rights and obligations at the end of the Second

World War.10 The European Union was the first of its kind to challenge the traditional definition

of citizenship, being that of the relationship between individuals and states.11 The EU’s major

policy, which changes the original concept of citizenship, was the removal of a states’ ability to

discriminate between their own citizens and those of other states within the union.12 The road to

a more formal citizenship came with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC).13 The first member-states that organized the ECSC were France, Germany,

Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.14

8 M. Kuhn ed., Who is the European? - A New Global Player?, (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.: 2007). 9 D. Kostakopoulou, “The Evolution of European Union Citizenship”, European Political Science, 7.3, 2008: (285-295). 10 W. Maas, Creating Europeans Citizens, (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.: 2007). 11 Maas. 12 Maas. 13 Maas. 14 Maas.

90

Labour opportunities within the EU began with the ECSC, but worker mobility rights

took years to execute because free movement rights took precedence.

Labour

15 As it has already been

mentioned, the idea of European Unity is old, but rights of some kind of citizenship came after.

This is why the ECSC is significant because it was the first community organization to enforce

European integration.16 When forming the ECSC, member-states were more interested in the

benefits of cheap goods being transported throughout the union, but for Italy, the free movement

of workers was the major selling point because of Italy’s long history of workers immigrating to

other European states to find work.17 The ECSC was the first of many polices, which made

labour a component under the jurisdiction of the Union. Furthermore, The Charter on the

Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (which would eventually conflict with the state’s

jurisdiction of social rights) guaranteed worker’s protection and access to the single market.18 In

addition, this created a labour tribunal, in front of which any European could stand if they were,

for example, refused employment insurance after being laid off in the country he or she resided

due to the fact he or she is not a native of the state of residence.19 Multinational enterprises

consist of legal and other professional practices, labour law and the protection of human rights

with “the increasing role of non-state actors.”20

15 Maas, (2007). 16 Maas, (2007). 17 Maas, (2007). 18 Maas, (2007). 19 Kostakopoulou, (2008). 20 Jo Shaw, “Postnational Constitution in the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, 6.4, 1999: (579-597).

91

Free movement provisions are another bureau under the jurisdiction of the European

Union and created the sense of citizenship in Europe. Movement of people amongst member-

states is what gave the EU its distinction. Rights of free movement had undergone revisions

under the three prominent treaties: Treaty of Paris, Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of

Maastricht.

Free Movement in the EU

21 The Maastricht Treaty formed dual citizenship: “that of the state and that of the

Union.” 22

“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a

Member state shall be a citizen of the Union” – Maastricht Treaty

Decrees on free movement and labour needed to be in place to have a sense of

citizenship in the Union.

23

The treaty granted all member-states four sets of rights: “free movement rights, political

rights, the right to common diplomatic and consular protection abroad and the right to petition

Parliament [...].”

24 Free movement loosened the boundaries of states, which was an important

factor in sustaining a sovereign state.25 In addition, free movement benefits labour migrants and

also allows one to have rights in their place of residence.26 Moreover, free movement had to be

implemented and enforced in order to ensure the common market.27 Free movement amongst

states is a post-national ideology because it creates multiculturalism.28

21 Maas. 22 Maas, 1. 23 Maas, 45. 24 Maas, 50. 25 Maas. 26 Maas. 27 Maas. 28 Kuhn.

It also creates a home for

disperse people such as the Roma, who are an ethnic minority in Europe whom for over five

92

centuries have not had a state of their own.29 However, European citizenship is seen “as a purely

decorative and symbolic institution and a mirror image of pre-Maastricht ‘market system’ by

many scholars and policy-makers.”30 Human rights policies such as the anti-racism acts in the

1990s are another component in the forming of Europe into a post-nationalistic state.

Firstly, under the European Council, every individual of the EU had the right to residence

even if they were not in their native land.

Human Rights in the EU

31 Many member-states disagreed over enforcing the

right to residence because it became costly for member states with more welfare rights, so it was

amended for just students, seniors and unemployed citizens. This is another issue, which shows

the EU gaining sovereignty.32 Moreover, in 1990, when member states met for a conference on

economic and monetary union (EMU), they also discussed human rights and the need to

incorporate fundamental rights, which created the European Convention on Human Rights

(ECHR).33 This initiated further negotiations for anti-discrimination policies. Only in late 1990s

was the European action against Racism out in effect. In 1997, a ban against discrimination

based on someone’s race or ethnic background was introduced during the conciliations of the

Amsterdam Treaty. 34 The treaty gave the EU legal basis to take legislative action if a

discriminatory act had been committed.35

29 Kuhn. 30 Kostakopoulou, 286. 31 Maas. 32 Maas. 33 Maas. 34 C. Bee & E. Bozzini eds., Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media, and Civil Society, (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing ltd., 2010). 35 Bee & Bozzini.

Furthermore, Article Thirteen of the treaty outlines that

the EU “protects racial, ethnic, people with disabilities, the elderly and marginalized groups from

93

discrimination.”36 In addition, 1997 “was named the European Year against Racism.”37 This was

important and gave relevance to the European Union because human rights were under no state

jurisdiction. The EU brought an international policy into the Union who wishes to create a

constitution.

The coming of a constitution, which would establish post-national citizenship, came

when the heads of state stated that the EU institutions must be brought closer to citizenship

because residents of the EU do not see a connection between the EU aims and the Union’s

everyday tasks.

The Hope of a Constitution

38 There needed to be more of a democracy within the European Union.39 The

low outcome of votes supporting the constitution treaty left the EU in a middle position between

institutional citizenship and supranational citizenship, which would leave nationalistic identity

out of the equation.40 Due to the low turnout, the European Council made 2005 the European

Year of Citizenship through Education.41 They targeted youth in order to promote the need for a

constitution, which eventually formed into the Youth Convention.42 The EU saw the youth of the

Union as the future of Europe; they would hopefully eventually bring constitutional

citizenship.43 Also, a Union passport would create even easier access amongst member states,

which is one of the incentives to full citizenship.44

36 Bee & Bozzini. 37 Bee & Bozzini. 38 Mass. 39 Mass. 40 Mass. 41 Kuhn. 42 Kuhn. 43 Kuhn. 44 Kuhn.

However, there are reasons why member-

states would not agree to sole citizenship.

94

The constitution would bring social rights and social programs under the jurisdiction of

the EU and this would decrease the state’s authority over social rights and would eliminate

welfare states.

Reasons against EU Constitution

45 The states would not give all their power for a full sovereign European State. It

would not happen in the near future. The EU is seen to solve common problems, but will not be

able to achieve solutions in small areas of the Union.46 Also, every state has its way of running

the government and it would be a challenge for many to oblige by one universal way of

government. Nationalists fear that the EU will forget about national identity and try to assimilate

everyone to one culture: the European.47 Some feel there is no need for a constitution at all

because the state has already been” ‘Europeanized’ through all levels by membership and its

legal, political and socio-economic consequences.”48 Moreover, post-nationalism is not a fixed

concept in academic writing or an empirically observable method.49 Dual-citizenship is more

accommodating than a single citizenship.50 Individuals would be more willing to agree with

dual-citizenship, as many want to retain their national identity.51 Post-nationalism would work

well in a bureaucratic sense because it would be more efficient with regards to passports,

establishing human rights duties and so on. However, it would not work in the sense of

belonging to a nation, the procedures of warfare and internal affairs. Also, economic markets

work better with multiple states as mentioned above.52

45 Maas. 46 Maas. 47 Kuhn. 48 Shaw, 585. 49 Shaw. 50 D. Kalekin-Fishman & P.Pitkanen eds., An Emerging Institution?: Multiple Citizenship in Europe-View of Officials, (New York, NY: Peter Lang, AG., 2008). 51 Kalekin-Fishman & Pitkanen. 52 Turner & Khondker.

95

Throughout history, there have been conflicts relating to nation-state establishments.

Yugoslavia is a state that disintegrated mostly due to nationalism. The Socialist Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia (SFRY: 1945-1991) was created as a multinational federation, which sought to

establish equality among its nations and national minorities.

Nationalism Prevails: Yugoslavia

53 It was made of six republics:

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. When

Yugoslavia formed with the first union, the “state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, the Serbs were

the dominate power.”54 Serbs made up the majority of Yugoslavia as being the largest ethnic

nation.55 The Serbs seem to want to make a larger Serbian state than a united Yugoslavia.56 As a

result, tension had risen. Croats and Slovenes questioned “why they should have less under the

Yugoslavian state than when they were under Austrian-Hungarian rule?”57

The South Slav states of the federation felt they did not have fair representation in the

lower status, which was one of the causes of the outbreak against the Yugoslavian state.

Disintegration of Yugoslavia

58 Ethnic

nationalism was a crucial factor in the conflict, which eventually broke out into the Balkan wars

starting in 1991.59 Religion was also a factor in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. There was a

split between Christians and Muslims. 60

53 D. Ljubisic, A Politics of Sorrow: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, (Montreal, QC: Black Rose Books, 2004). 54 N.M. Naimark & H. Case eds., Yugoslavia and its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars, (Stanford, California: University Press, 2003):116. 55 Ljusbisic. 56 Naimark & Case. 57 Naimark & Case, 126. 58 Naimark & Case. 59 Ljubisic. 60 D. I Armour, “Nationalism vs. Yugoslavia”, History Today, 42.10, 1992: (11-13).

Muslims suffered the most because Christians

96

dominated Yugoslavia.61 In addition, Serbia has been under rule for five centuries and this is

another reason why they wanted to protect their nation under Yugoslavia by dominating affairs.62

Furthermore, the citizenship laws of the federal state affected significant numbers of individuals

in the different nation-states.63 Even though there existed and still exists mixed societies and

families, only about 5.5 percent considered themselves Yugoslavs.64 According to Armour, “The

things that divide one people from another have proved stronger than the things that used to unite

them.”65

After the fall of Yugoslavia, states split and formed their own state governments and

some such as Slovenia have joined the EU. Dual-citizenship seems to be preferable in the sense

that it retains historical cultures, each member-state’s authority, creates security, free movement

and makes states and individuals feel that they have a sense of duty to the international sphere.

66

In addition, dual citizenship is a shield against radical nationalism, which leads to discriminatory

acts against minorities. States are becoming so multicultural and internationally conscious that

there will be no need for post-nationalism to occur globally.

Post-nationalism is possible on a certain level as seen in the European Union. It is shown

to work at the bureaucratic level of the present union. It is displayed through policies such as

Conclusion

61 Armour. 62 Armour. 63 I. Stiks, “Nationality and Citizenship in the Former Yugoslavia: From Disintegration to European Integration”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 6.4, 2006: (283-500). 64 Ljusbisic. 65 Amour, 11. 66 Stiks.

97

labour, free movement and human rights, which applies to all member-states. However, the EU

council has only certain authorities, which is legitimatized by the member-states. States would

not be willing to lose other authorities unless it can benefit the nation-state. Also, one system of

government under a European constitution would lead to conflict as seen in Yugoslavia. The

post-nationalist departments of the EU are there for efficiency and to make sure basic human

rights are not infringed upon. Nationalism will prevail, as seen in the case study of Yugoslavia.

The Balkan states formed a federal state. The majority, the Serbs, lead the state, which

undermined the Muslims, Albanians and Croats. Ethnic nationalism eventually leads to its

downfall. Nationalistic conflicts still exist today such as that of Kosovo, which was under the

United Nations protection until the EU took over. They want to form their own nation because

they see themselves linked to Serbia due to its large population of Albanians. Moreover, there

have been other nationalistic conflicts such as the unity of Germany, Mongolia’s quest for a

nation-state from China, Italy’s unity conflicts of the north and south and Quebec nationalism

under a federal state to name a few. Post-nationalism is still a new concept and time will only tell

if other post-nationalistic themes will occur globally. Whatever happens globally, humans will be

more likely to choose dual citizenship or multiple citizenships, one being a citizen of the world,

but they will not lose their national identity.

98

References

Armour, I. D. Nationalism vs.Yugoslavism. History Today, 42.10 (2007): 11-13. Bee, C., & Bozzini, E. eds. Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media, and Civil Society. Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2010. Drapac, V. Constructing Yugoslavia: A Transnational History. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Kalekin-Fishman, D., & Pitkanen, P. eds. An Emerging Institution?: Multiple Citizenship in Europe- Views of Officials. New York, NY: Peter Lang, AG., 2008. Kostakopoulou, D. The Evolution of European Union Citizenship. European Political

Kuhn, M. ed. Who is the European?-a New Global Player? New York, NY: Peter

Science, 7.3, (2008): 285-295.

Lang Publishing, Inc., 2007. Ljubisic, D. A Politics of Sorrow: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. Montreal, Qc: Black Rose Books, 2004. Maas, W. Creating European Citizens. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007. Naimark, N. M., &Case, H. eds. Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the

Balkan Wars. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003. Peter Singer Quotes (2012). Briany Quote. Retrieved From http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/p/peter_singer.html. Shaw, J. Postnational Constitution in the European Union, Journal of European Public

Policy. 6.4 (1999): 579-597. Stiks, I. European Integration. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 6.4, (2006): 283-500.

Nationality and Citizenship in the Former Yugoslavia: From Disintegration to

Turner, B.S., & Khondker, H.H. Globalization: East and West. Los Angeles,

California: Sage Publications, 2010.

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Canada and Quebec’s Multicultural Odyssey: From Citizenship to Multiculturalism...

By Giuliano Caccese

The primary question asked by my research; is whether Canadian society can overcome

the barrier of multiculturalism in accommodating individual rights, or if we are still bound to

guaranteeing the social elements of rights; the rights of economic welfare, security and right of

sharing our social heritages and the moral obligations of living in the prevailing dominant

Canada and Quebec’s Multicultural Odyssey: Introduction to Topic

The rights of an individual, in regards to his or her standing in society have been a

constant struggle throughout history. Rights and freedoms which we enjoy today as individuals

were first developed in the context of wars, declarations, legislation and policies from our

government. It is within this historical context, that we have been given rights as citizens today

in Canada. But what does it mean to be a citizen if as a country Canada is built on the ideals of

multiculturalism since 1971? Does the ever changing meaning of citizenship have an effect on

our standing as a multicultural society as it has evolved over time? Since both citizenship and

multiculturalism are very broad in terms of their policies and meanings, have these ideals

conflicted with one another throughout our history? Should each culture have different rights

from one another as multiculturalism emphasizes this claim? Should we as a multicultural

society accommodate various types of people(s) because they claim to have natural rights in

society that cannot or should not be taken away?

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standards set by society’s norms?1

1 T.H. Marshall, “The Development of Citizenship to the End of the Nineteenth Century,” Citizenship and Social Class, 1950, 149.

Has multiculturalism as a policy eroded our sense of

citizenship? Have we become stalled at the stage of social rights recognition in our development?

By standing by the argument that multiculturalism has eroded our sense of citizenship, the

research will answer all irrelevant questions that have been debated since the evolution of our

Canadian society. In understanding our multicultural Canadian society today, we must first look

at what constituted citizenship historically. We must analyze its historical origins, to the different

meanings and forms it has taken throughout history. This research will also analyze the

effectiveness of the multicultural policies implemented by the federal government since 1971

and provide a judgment to its effect as both policy and practice since this period. Along with the

literature on citizenship and multiculturalism, I will debate the issue of reasonable

accommodation in Quebec from the events of Herouxville in 2007, in context of the Bouchard-

Taylor Commission that took place in Quebec during this period. The study of this research will

conclude that the interplay of citizenship and the policies of multiculturalism clash, and that they

also fail to accommodate the needs of individuals in a society as a whole. Our citizenship rights,

along with our multicultural label as a society, have both failed to successfully reasonably

accommodate the majority of the population in Canada in terms of equality, immigration and

social status among Canadian society. The consensus will reveal that since multiculturalism is

broad by meaning, it ultimately fails to please and accommodate minority groups in the

Canadian society. In this sense, multiculturalism by virtue of policy has made great progress for

inclusion of all in society, but overtime its broad meaning has done much to tarnish nationalism,

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minority groups and clash with the very ideals that citizenship has produced. The policy model

that multiculturalism presents fails to produce both social and economic equality in Canadian

society.

The meaning in the word citizen or citizenship have constantly changed and evolved

throughout the history of civilization. In our post World War II period, sociologist T.H. Marshall

was the first scholar to explain the ideals and concept to the meaning(s) of modern day

citizenship in societies. Marshall stated that the citizenship as dictated by history encompasses

three elements: civil, political and social.

Citizenship: Its Origins and Association with the Rights of the Individual in Society

2 The civil element was composed of the rights

necessary for the concept of “individual freedom as liberty, speech, thought, property, justice and

due process of the law”. The political element meant the right of political participation in society

“as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such

body.”3 The final element of citizenship is the social element of rights. The social element of

rights is in direct comparison to what multiculturalism has attempted to achieve since 1971.

These social element is composed of the “right to a modicum of economic welfare and

security… right to share the full in social heritage and to live the life of a civil being according to

the standards prevailing in society,” as in modern day education or social services.4

2 T.H. Marshall, “The Development of Citizenship to the End of the Nineteenth Century,” Citizenship and Social Class, 1950, 148. 3 Marshall, 148-149. 4 Ibid., 148-149.

As citizens

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throughout history, we have successfully fought for these “civil, political and social spheres of

liberal capitalist societies,” in order to better ourselves as members of society.5

From Marshall’s meaning of citizenship, we can come to the understanding that

citizenship is a collection of rights, and these rights form the fundamental basis of what

citizenship entails. Citizenship in itself originated from history, and as Marshall states; a

“principle of equality,” from its foundation in which “all men were free and in theory capable of

enjoying rights.

6 By incorporating these elements of rights, we can see the common

characteristics citizenship entails to multiculturalism. Professor Enoch Padolsky for example,

notes how multiculturalism “has always been linked with larger aspects of national policy as

citizenship, linguistic integration, heritage, and women’s issues and so on.”7

Marshall’s third aspect of social citizenship, over many years has been modified to

include its meaning as a “bundle of rights and obligations," that defines the identity of members

of a political community,” in summary it is the sense of “the right to have rights.”

8

5Linda, Bosniak. “Universal Citizenship and the problem of Alienage,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol.94, 1999-2000, 967. 6 Marshall, 150. 7 Enoch Padolsky, “Multiculturalism at the Millennium,” Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 35, no 1. 2000,142. 8 Turner, Bryan S. "T.H. Marshall, social rights and English national identity," Citizenship Studies Vol.13, no.9, 2009, 66.

Although

some authors may agree or disagree with Marshall’s notion of citizenship, it is clear that in the

sixty years that have passed, Marshall may not have predicted societies such as Canada’s

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becoming multicultural and ethnically diverse, but his ideals of citizenship go hand-hand to the

meaning of multiculturalism in both scope and policy.9

Authors such as Bryan Turner, Janine Brodie, Linda Bosniak, Iris Marion Young and

Will Kymlica have modernized Marshall’s original meanings of citizenship to cope with

concepts such as multiculturalism and issues of rights in our 21

st century. In quoting Turner,

citizenship is understood as a “set of principles; judicial, political, economic and cultural, which

define a person as a competent member of society and which, as a consequence, shape the flow

of resources to persons and social groups.”10 Similarly, Bosniak categorizes citizenship into four

perspectives as: legal status, rights, participation, identity and solidarity.11 Turner and Bosniak

broaden the perspectives of citizenship itself; and as a consequence, more meaning and

importance is given to citizenship. Individuals will always gain to seek more from society if they

are entitled to various rights that are being claimed. Consequently, citizenship can be labeled as

“an ongoing process, rather than as a static framework of rights and obligations.”12

This ongoing process for rights as mentioned above, sets the wrong precedent for

individuals, as the state is deemed not only responsible for the citizen, but must collectively meet

his or hers needs.

13

9 Turner, 71. 10 Janine Brodie, “Citizenship and Solidarity: Reflections on the Canadian Way.” Citizenship Studies Vol.4, no.2, 2002, 379. 11 Brodie, 379. 12 David Stasiulis, “Introduction: Reconfiguring Canadian Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies Vol 6. no. 4, 2002, pp. 366 13 Brodie, 384.

Brodie introduces a Universalist approach concept, that we as citizens were

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“framed from the outset in the language of universalism rather than selectivity.”14 A“neo-liberal

policy” of Canadian citizenship has in turn, “disenfranchised the social citizen,” because the gap

between the rich and the poor has been widened in terms of economic standing and social

standing.15 The universality of citizenship is now the new normality, as multicultural societies as

Canada as taken such approaches. Universalism is known as a “core tenet of liberal citizenship

theory,” in which “all persons in the political community are regarded as entitled to recognition

as citizens.”16 This approach to citizenship puts forward a claim of universality, and most

importantly all are entitled to fundamental rights, as no citizen will be denigrated from society or

receive anything less than to what universal citizenship consists of.17

Certainly, for all to be included in aspects of society, is seen as a great advantage for the

minority groups and newly arrived immigrants who come to this land. But, as in the view of Iris

Marion Young, since universalism includes all, “some groups still find themselves treated as

second-class citizens,” still having to fight over social justice and equality.

18 Hence, this

“principal of equal treatment… requires the articulation of special rights that attend to group

differences in order to undermine oppression and disadvantage.”19

14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., 378 16 Bosniak, 967-968. 17 Ibid., 968. 18 Iris Marion Young,“Policy and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Ethics Vol.99, no.2 Jan.1989, 250-251 19 Young, 251.

Can those who have “special

rights,” conflict with governmental policies, or the sentiment of the majority populations across

Canada? The answer to this question is yes, but should a person(s) “leave behind their particular

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affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view’?20 This fundamental question has

proven to be the toughest for many citizens in our great nation.

In 1971, Pierre Elliot Trudeau created Canada’s multiculturalism policy, which states it

will “support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality

to our society.”

Multiculturalism: A Benefit or Double-Edged Sword for Canadian Society

21 Furthermore in 1988, The Canadian Multiculturalism Act considered

multiculturalism as a “fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity that applies

to all Canadians, whatever group they belong to… [as] it recognizes the diversity of Canadians

as regard race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion.”22 From this sense, we see the

similarities of how Trudeau’s multiculturalism policy is developed through citizenship and its

claim for rights recognition. Author V. Seymour Wilson states that multiculturalism “provides a

vision for a strategy policy designed to shape, redefine and manage Canada’s racial and ethnic

diversity.”23 In addition, critic Neil Bissondath has argued that as a policy has failed, because “it

was born of and maintained by political opportunism rather than from a vision or long term goals

for Canada.”24

20 Ibid., 257. 21 Julie Bauer, “Multiculturalism, cultural community: Is it about culture or ethnicity? The Canadian approach,” International Journal of Cultural Policy Vol. 7, no.1, 2009, 83. 22 Bauer, 83. 23 V. Seymour Wilson, “The Tapestry Vision of Canadian Multiculturalism,” Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.26, no.4, Dec. 1993, 654 24 Patricia Wood and Liette Gilbert. “Multiculturalism in Canada: Accidental Discourse, Alternative Vision, Urban Practice,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research Vol.29, no. 3, September 2005, 683.

Will Kymlicka, offers a similar notion, that multiculturalism was introduced

“without any real idea of what it would mean, or any long-term strategy for its

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implementation.”25 For Bissondath, in acceptance of the idea of accepting multiculturalism we

also accept marginalization, and in doing so we are not doing ourselves a favor but a

“devaluation” in trying to be accepted by others and “not quite belonging” under any

circumstances.26

But as Julien Bauer and V. Seymour Wilson signify, the aim of this policy was for the “others”

or “ethnics,” for those of “non-French” and “non-English” and “Aboriginals” ancestry were not

meant for the government’s notion of multiculturalism because they have long been included in

Canadian society.

27 In terms of a multiculturalism Canada, was this policy enacted to please the

significant others in society? Since, both the English and French share the majority in terms of

language and population, was this policy meant to shift or change the direction of society away

from the majority rule of Canadians? As the future of Canadian culture lies in “polyethnicity…

we are destined to be more, not less ethnically and racially diverse than we are now are.”28

Wilson’s concept of “polyethnicity,” although written in 1993, has become a norm in society

today, where recent statistics from a Canadian wide 2006 census reveal that foreign born

Canadians make up 19.8%, and this number will continue to rise in the distant future.29

25 Wood & Gilbert, 684. 26 Wood & Gilbert, 683. 27 Bauer, 83. 28 Wilson, 649 29 Keith Banting and Will Kymlica. “Canadian Multiculturalism: Global anxieties and local debates,” British Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol.23, no1. 2010, 49.

One

cannot argue that since 1971; it (Canadian multiculturalism) has attracted a diverse immigrant

society and certainly opened the doors for immigration and inclusion of minorities in Canada.

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But, when analyses of the effects of multiculturalism have been presented, it has done more bad

than good for Canadians.

For critics of multiculturalism, the authors believe that it has been more of a “political

framework,” or “doctrine,” for the “official promotion of social quality and cultural differences

as an integral component of the social order.”30 The problem of multiculturalism is that the

transition from rhetoric to result is what hinders its success for individuals in a society.31 Others,

such as Wilson see multiculturalism in itself as a problem for social change, as its broad policies,

produces a framework of “racist policy,” as it results in “assimilation at best [and] exclusionist at

worst.”32 Similarly, multiculturalism has lead to ethnic marginalization and stratification (as it

emphasizes differences and social cohesion) in the development of a Canadian identity; the result

has been an accumulation of these differences that has led to a clash of cultures in Canada.33

From multiculturalism, as Reginald Bibby points out, ethnic separation and ethnic solidarity is

established, whereas a hindrance of broader social participation takes place.34 Thus, these themes

associated with the problems multiculturalism; do not lead us to an equal distribution of power,

in terms of social, political and economic inequalities.35

Since its conception has the policies of multiculturalism, helped those of ethnic cultures

and immigrants? The research shows that foreign-born citizen in terms of income, do not make

30 Wilson, 654. 31 Padolsky, 146. 32 Wilson, 656. 33 Lloyd Wong, "Multiculturalism and Ethnic Pluralism in Sociology: An Analysis of the Fragmentation Position Discourse." Canadian Ethnic Studies Vol. 40, no. 1 January 2008, 16. 34 Wong, 20. 35 Ibid., 16

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as much as those who are born in Canada. From a 2001 Census report, since the 1980s incomes

of immigrants are much lower than those born within Canada, furthermore, foreign-born

individuals that arrived in Canada before 1970 earned more than those coming after.36 In

relation, immigrants who have the status of professionals complain that “educational agencies

and organizations do not fairly recognize the credentials of foreign-trained professionals.”37

According to Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, in terms of skilled occupations, 40% of skilled

immigrant workers with university degrees, were working in professions that typically require a

high school diploma.38 Foreign born professionals state that the provincial and federal

governments have done very little or not enough to assist these individuals in society.39 A belief

is still held that discrimination is at the forefront in not reaching equally levels in the workforce,

as factors such as “skin color, ethnic origins, English as a second language" are attributed for

their non-equal status.”40

In an elaborate study on racism in Canada, Sociologists Sean Weir and Kevin Walby

reveal that “neo-racism,” can be manifested by low income standards and the devaluation of

foreign credentials.

41

36 M.R. (Reza) Nakhaie, “Contemporary Realities and Future Visions: Enhancing Multiculturalism in Canada,” Canadian Ethical Studies Vol.38, no.1, 2006, 150. 37 Nakhaie, 150. 38 Banting & Kymlicka, 53. 39 Nakhaie, 150. 40 Ibid., 150. 41 Sean P. Hier and Kevin Walby “Competing analytical paradigms in the sociological study of racism in Canada,” Canadian Ethnic Studies Vol.38, no.1. 2006, 93.

Heir and Walby find that when immigration status was accessed,

significant wage differences were found in foreign born men, especially black-foreign men who

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see the greatest differentials.42 From their analysis, the authors conclude that the “politicalization

of ethnicity/race is counter-productive to the realization of socio-economic integration for ethno-

racial groups in Canada.”43 Multiculturalism cannot be fully held responsible for any of these

statistics, but the government must make every effort in lessening the gap between the visible

minorities and finding ways to successfully integrate those who have foreign credentials. It is

from this understanding that we can root out the old Nineteenth century concept of “scientific

racism,” where certain types of individualism, especially minorities were “unsuited” to a

democratic value and their inclusion in society would ruin democratic values to all.44 If a society

as Canada’s pushes for the benefits that multiculturalism, it ought to provide its structure and

policy. A major problem of multiculturalism is that it fails to account for the distribution in terms

of “real power [in] economic power and political power.”45 Multiculturalism, as Padlosky

signifies “makes the Canadian population thinks they’re doing really nice things,” but social

inequalities and racism are a reminder of the darker, dimmer side that multiculturalism can

encompass.46

One cannot argue with the intentions of the Multiculturalism Acts of 1971 and 1988, but

it can be said that there is a fundamental “gap between rhetoric and reality,” as previously

stated.

47

42 Hier & Walby, 95. 43 Ibid., 99. 44 Wilson, 665. 45 Padolsky, 145 46 Ibid. 47 Padolsky, 146

This gap can be explained by the shifting policies from its first enactment in 1971 to the

changes in its scope and outreach from the act of 1988. At first, focus was on “cultural

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retention,” to now a focus is on “racial equality [and the] fight again racism”48 Without a doubt,

multiculturalism has assumed much more responsibility than in 1971, as immigrants will

continue to grow, and we as a society will further diversify. (Banting & Kymlicka 2010, 49)

Clearly, the federal and provincial governments must do more in order to lessen the gap of the

majority and minority populations. Patricia Wood and Liette Gilbert, summarize the limitations

of multiculturalism as policy, when they state that “cultures are not changed or maintained by

legislation only; they are sustained or transformed by socio-spatial practices.”49

There is simply much more than just the need to provide and help all cultures and

ethnicities, but a political duty in pleasing these minority groups. In implementing

multiculturalism and the scope of its policies, Robert Latham notes we have lost our sense of

identity.

50 We have lost this sense of identity or nationalism, because it “does not answer the

question of what Canada is.”51 Since we have been portrayed by a label as a multicultural

society, we in turn have sprung new forms of cultures; Latham argues that from multiculturalism,

we are now: multiracial, multiclass, multipolitical, multirelgious, multilingual, multigenerational,

and multistatus.52

48 Ibid. 49 Wood & Gilbert, 688. 50 Robert Latham, “What Are We? From a Multicultural to a Multiversal Canada,” International Journal, Vol. 63, no. 1, Winter, 2007/2008, 24. 51 Latham, 24. 52 Latham, 26

Of the same manner, Michael Wieviorka has illustrated that multiculturalism

has been not only out-dated, but out of touch to Canadians, for Wieviorka believes that issues in

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relation to citizens, should be seen from a multiculturalism to “post-multiculturalism” point of

view.53

As we see from Latham’s study, we are a society that transitioned to from a multicultural

to a now multiverse society, made up of many identities and perspectives that multiculturalism

encourages.

54 Latham argues that in the context of national identity, we should be seen as “what

we are,” rather than “who we are.”55 Multiculturalism is a view of the past for Latham and

Wieviorka, as the Canada of the 21st century is a multiversal, post-multiculturalized society.56 In

summary, Robert Latham believes that a multiverse society can move “beyond concepts as

reasonable accommodation that assumes minority/majority duality.”57 In any case, the issue of

reasonable accommodation in the context of Herouxville, Quebec in 2007 can be helped by

Latham’s suggestion of a multiversal Canada.

In understanding the events take took place in the province of Quebec in 2007, we must

look back to the ideas of citizenship as stated before, and the multiculturalism model

implemented by Canadian society. At the very onset, Quebec and Canada had different views on

what multiculturalism amounted to for individuals. While Canada followed a model of a “liberal

conception of citizenship, emphasizing individual rights in a pluralist context,” Quebec on the

Reasonable Accommodation & the Failure of Multicultural Society in Quebec: Its

Origins to the events of Herouxville, and beyond

53 Wong, 22. 54 Latham, 26. 55 Ibid., 24. 56 Ibid., 31. 57 Ibid., 34.

112

contrary, used a “republican model, stressing integration to a common culture.”58 Since the early

1980s, Quebec became more involved of in the process of immigration, putting much power,

money and involvement into this program.59 In having assumed control over immigration and

policies of citizenship, Quebec established a policy known as “interculturalism,” in the “need to

perpetuate the French-language culture, which is itself a minority identity within Canada as a

whole.”60 In this policy of “interculturalism,” the promotion was on the citoyennete Quebecois,

where as “a moral contract between the host society and immigrants [is created] in order to

create a common public culture.”61

As we are aware with the idea of universal citizenship, author Iris Marion Young’s

definition of the rights of a citizen, is vital in understanding what may have triggered the actions

those individuals in Herouxville, Quebec and beyond. Young states firstly that “different social

groups have different needs, cultures, histories, experiences and perceptions of social

relations.”

62 Secondly from these carious needs, in a society certain groups are “privileged [,]

and while others are oppressed… their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general

point of view serves only to reinforce that privilege.”63

58 Danielle Juteau, “The Citizen Makes an Entrée: Redefining the National Community in Quebec.” Citizenship Studies Vol. 6, no.4, 2010, 445. 59 Juteau, 335. 60 Gada Mahrouse, “Reasonable accommodation’ in Québec: the limits of participation and dialogue,” Race & Class, Vol. 52, no.1, July 2010, 86. 61 Mahrouse, 86. 62 Young, 257. 63 Ibid.

Professor Danielle Juteau points out that

“under the cover of universalism”, many other cultures and ethnic groups produced sentiments of

establishing “their” own set of languages, cultures, etc. rather than partaking in Quebec’s

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differentiating elements.64 Therefore citizenship is much different in Quebec than the rest of

others, as it is “envisioned here mainly as heritage and a set of political rights, the fundamental

one being the right to self determination… to sovereignty… to nationality.”65

Since we have put the differences in culture and citizenship from Quebec and Canada in

its appropriate context, we can now look at the events that took place from 2006 to 2007. What

was being debated in Herouxville during this period, were indeed, the very essence to what

Young portrays in the study of citizenship. The question raised from Herouxville was whether

citizens left behind their cultures, religions and customs in order to adapt to Canadian or Quebec

culture? Events of a Sikh boy who wanted to wear a Kirpan (ceremonial dagger) to school, an 11

year old being told she cannot wear Hijab during a soccer game, and members of the Montreal’s

Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) having been asked to “install frosted windows,” in

their gymnasium by members of a Montreal synagogue in “order to blur their view of people

exercising” especially “women in tight-fitting gym clothes,” show multiculturalism being played

out in our 21

st century.66 The final draw that sparked this debate occurred in 2007, appeared in

Herouxville, Quebec. In Herouxville, the town adopted a set of “controversial standards

outlining appropriate ways of living in this municipality.”67

As the events of reasonable accommodation occurred, questions were raised as to why

and how these individuals in a multicultural society in Canada, were withheld from their

64 Juteau, 449. 65 Ibid., 450. 66 Mahrouse, 86. 67 Tim Nieguth and Aurelie Lacassagne. “Contesting the Nation: Reasonable Accommodation in Rural Quebec,” Canadian Political Science Review Vol.3, no.1 March 2009, 1.

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citizenship rights as Young outlined. The claims of social rights were at the forefront, as our

multicultural policies were inclined to those who wish to partake in expressing their cultures by

wearing religious objects. Ultimately, what was at stake in these debates were in regard to both

the virtues of citizenship and multiculturalism. What citizenship rights and multiculturalism gave

the individual(s) in society, were completely different to what was their approach to the very

same concepts in this small Quebec town. Herouxville represented a “culture clash between the

host culture and certain immigrants,” which amount to the rights and claims of the majority

versus the rights and claims of the minority, where the minority culture is always at lose.68

As Tim Nieguth and Aurellie Lacassagne note, the events of Herouxville brought a

notion of “us” versus “them.” Whereas, “us” meant a “white, male, adult, and secular identity,”

“them” meant “women, children, and especially “immigrants,”

69 The Herouxvillian Standards

document was set out to “inform immigrants” to Herouxville of what was its norms and customs

in this town, and how an immigrant had to adjust to the Standards for successful integration.70

Consequently, in this Standard, immigrants are singled out and categorized whereas citizens of

Quebec are unchanged and not mentioned.71

68 Nieguth & Lacassagne, 12. 69 Nieguth & Lacassagne, 1. 70 ibid., 3. 71 ibid.

Immigrants are treated as problematic for

integration in Herouxville, and put into the same notions and stereotypes as extremist and radical

Muslims in our post- September 11 world, as they are seen as a “potential threats to the way of

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life in Herouxville,” and as being “unwilling to accept the dominant forms of Herouxville’s

inhabitants.”72

To contextualize these claims, the mere thought of a presumed Muslim or other minority

religious outsider immigrating to Herouxville, Quebec was the very reason for establishing such

legislation as the Herouxville standards. To illustrate this point, in taking from one of its many

outrageous views of citizenship, an example for the Standard; “we consider that killing women

in public beatings, or burning them alive are not part of our standards of life.”

73 It is to say with

utmost certainty, that killing any living being is not illustrated in any Quebec or Canadian act of

immigration or citizenship. The Muslim municipal councilor in Quebec went as far as to “declare

a state of emergency in order to protect Quebec culture from the practice of accommodating non-

Christian beliefs and practices.”74 These issues were of vital importance to both Gerard

Bouchard and Charles Taylor, co-chairs of the Bouchard Taylor Commission. The Commission

looked at the various events that took place in 2006-2007 in Quebec, in brining these issues that

deal with reasonable accommodation, in which Pierre Antil argued brought “clarity” and

“meaning” to the issues of religion, immigration and accommodation at the forefront to the

people of Quebec.75

Herouxville’s intentions by this Standard must be looked at in a broader sense. The

definition of “us” in Herouxville derived from this concept of pure laine French ancestry, pure

72 ibid. 73 Ibid., 4. 74 Mahrouse, 86. 75 Howard Adelman and Pierre Anctil, editors. Religion, Culture, and State: Reflections on the Bouchard-Taylor Report. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011. 32.

116

laine meaning “white, catholic individuals.”76 This pure laine concept and “us” versus “them”

mentality can be meant to further “illustrate the existence of a populist and exclusive strand of

nationalism in Quebec.”77 The discourse that Herouxville portrays is that Quebec’s culture in

forms of its mainly secular, religious, French majority popular was being threatened by these

immigrants who had other religious and cultures.78

Herouxville’s oldest resident Solange Fernet-Gervais, used a similar notion in explaining

his thought on immigration. In speaking freely, he explained “In Quebec we didn’t resist the

English and fight our history to defend our identity, just to have Muslims dictate to us how we

ought to live.”

Yet, it is these very immigrants that give

Canada its multicultural identity. In the Herouxvillian mentality, it (society) cannot be

compromised and must be held on to, and legislation that directly or indirectly does so will

continue to help keep the pure laine notion safe and secure.

79 A Leger Marketing poll of Quebecers as a whole (not citizens of Herouxville) in

December of 2006 and January of 2007 revealed that 50% of Quebecers viewed Muslims in a

negative context and Jews took 36%. In the same poll, when asked if Quebecers thought they

were racist, 43% felt they were slightly racist, 15% felt fairly racist, 1% as strongly as racist and

39% anti-racist.80

76 Nieguth & Lacassagne, 4. 77 Ibid., 5. 78 Ibid., 7. 79 Nieguth & Lacassagne, 10. 80 Ibid., 9.

From these statistics, low to moderate racism consists of almost 60%, clearly

an indication that Quebecers hold dear to their culture, their religion, their mentality, than others,

117

this is what Adelman and Antil called a “feeling of discontent that has arisen among

Quebecers.”81

From these opinion polls, we can suggest that Quebecers still hold this concept of a pure

laine, and quite a portion of the population would prefer to keep this society Catholic, filled

within Quebecers if we take into account the events of Herouxville and the Leger Marketing

Poll. Shouldn’t we as Quebecers be open to a society that is rooted in multiculturalism? It is in

this regard that our authors reveal that multicultural has “led to a culture clash between the host

culture [as in Herouxville] and certain immigrant cultures,” as the Standards “emphasized that

the community should not have to renounce our values.”

82 In other words, Herouxville does not

want to be included in a multiculturalism society that the rest of Canada adheres to. It is within

this sense the Quebec majority is losing the respect of Muslims and others, because the

accommodation of immigrants are “not reasonable at all, but unfair and a challenge to Quebec

and Canadian identity.”83 Hence, both multiculturalism and reasonable accommodation raise

questions about finding the “balance between the rights of the majority and minority, as well as

the coexistence of individual rights.”84

A reporter from the Montreal Gazette summarized the debate on reasonable

accommodating in the simplest of terms. These events, put minorities and immigrants on the

“defensive, having to justify their presence, and commitment to Quebec values.”

85

81 Adelman & Anctil, 31. 82Nieguth & Lacassagne, 12. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid., 13 85 Mahrouse, 89.

To the

118

contrary, French-Canadian Quebecers were in a position of “granting validation and approval, in

effect acting as judges of what was tolerable and what was not.”86 This notion can be traced to

the ideals of Edward Said’s Orientalism, as the dominant group is the “spectator, the judge and

jury,” and from Said’s words to the comments made in the Montreal Gazette, the notion of “us

verse them,” is produced, and made clearer and clearer by the dominant groups in society.87

For those Quebecers in Herouxville, “the history of Anglo hegemony” in Canada meant

that a policy of minority and immigrant assimilation, rather than multiculturalism, was a

necessity in Quebec.

88 The values of Quebecers were in direct conflict with the values of

multiculturalism, thus as Samuel Huntington stated famously years ago, the atmosphere of a

“clash of civilizations,” was occurring, in the same regards multiculturalism was promoting

ethnic diversity.89 As a result, a conclusion can be made that the Quebec state attempts to “define

a universal national identity that would subordinate all others.”90

86 Ibid. 87 Mahrouse, 90. 88 Ibid., 91. 89 Ibid., 92. 90 Juteau, 441.

When analyzing the issues

brought up by reasonable accommodation, we see a similarity to the critics of multiculturalism as

a whole. Although Quebec is certainly distinct from the rest of Canada in status, and other

profound factors, the authors of multiculturalism presented throughout this research, have stated

that it has not successfully worked. I say so because problems such as those in Quebec should

not be taking place, if multiculturalism were to be embraced by all Canadians. Immigrants

119

should not be as Junteau previously states “subordinated,” but we have yet to reach full equality

standards in not only Quebec but Canada as a whole.91

For the most part my research has revealed the inadequacies and problems associated

with multiculturalism, which has affected Canadians as a whole. But, important achievements

can also be accredited to its conception since 1971. In its forty years since its existence,

multiculturalism has acted for immigrants as the citizenship, identity, heritage, of the great nation

of Canada.

The Future of Multiculturalism: Concluding Statements, Limitations and Suggestions

92 Contrary to Robert Latham, multiculturalism can become the primary identity for

Canadians, as it prides itself in providing “a need for the people to feel a sense of strength in

belongingness.”93 This common basis provides for all Canadians, as it “enhances cultural

exchanges, widens and enriches the general Canadian cultural.94 For the many immigrants and

minorities in this province, the multicultural identity is taken with pride, as they may feel more

inclined in calling themselves Canadians, due to this multicultural identity.95/96 Banting and

Kymlicka, from their study on multiculturalism in a worldwide context worldview, find that

immigrants feel secure in Canadian and are supportive of multicultural policies, compared with

other western countries; Canada is in the highest percentile of support basis.97

91 Ibid., 441. 92 Padolsky, 142. 93 Ibid., 144. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid., 144. 96 Banting & Kymlicka, 60. 97 Ibid., 57.

Furthermore, in

regards to other countries as the United States of America, Canadians have rarely felt the need to

120

“withdraw from many forms of community life.”98 The reason for the overall wellness that

multiculturalism gives for Canadians, is that it “serves as link for native-born citizens from

national identity to solidarity with immigrants… there is a convergence on high levels of pride

and identification with a multicultural conception of Canadian nationhood.”99

As the literature has show throughout, since multiculturalism is very broad and elaborate,

the consensus among authors is that “more work needs to be done,” in order to attain better

results for all individuals.

100

As Reza Nakahie situates this research, “the future of multiculturalism is unclear. It

depends on the operation of capitalism as well as Canadian’s attitudes and beliefs toward ethno-

racial minorities and immigrants.”

To an extent, more scholarly work on how citizenship and

multiculturalism interact in a society and government intervention at both the provincial and

federally level must be addressed and worked by the problems that arise from both aspects. As

we have seen from this research, citizenship and multiculturalism have changed dramatically,

some will argue for the better, but most in this research have argued that multiculturalism

although good in its intentions has not led to the equality in which all strive for. In relation to

income, and events in Quebec during 2006-2007, we have gone past the days of racism into a

more prosperous Canada, but we have not yet reached the society in which we can live in

harmony in equality of economic and social standards.

101

98 Banting & Kymlicka, 57. 99 Ibid., 60. 100 Ibid., 64. 101 Nakahie, 154.

We have made a tremendous amount of process as society,

121

but when equality has not been fully reached we often find ourselves back in time, still fighting

over social rights and the rights of the individual. We must face multiculturalism as it will only

continue to grow and grow, as immigration will increase, where as previously stated it has

already encompassed 19.8% of the Canadian population presently (as of 2010). Yet, events such

as those over reasonable accommodation in Quebec should never have to occur in Canada. The

only positive aspect we can take from Hervouxville is the importance of education, in

understanding why these events have occurred, and how to make sure similar events never occur

again in both Quebec, but Canada as a whole.

I will conclude with seven key suggestions outlined by Reza Nakahie that will help

multiculturalism in the 21st century and a number of recommendations by Bouchard and Taylor

on reasonable accommodation. Firstly, immigration policies should be directed to the size of

different immigration populations, the analysis of demographics is key. Secondly, dominant

associations and organizations should develop outreach programs to increase minority

participation and welcoming. Thirdly, increases in agencies and programs for the accreditation of

foreign credentials. Fourthly, increases in education and the understanding of multiculturalism

and the issues that surround this policy. Fifthly, targeting problems that minorities may face, and

understand what it taking place in communities all over Canada. Sixthly, we should push for the

integration of minorities and immigrants to participate in civil society. Finally and of most

importance, since multiculturalism adheres to so many of Canadians population, funds should be

122

more readily available and allocated as immigration will continue to rise in all parts of

Canada.102/103

Bouchard and Taylor presented 37 specific recommendations in regards to reasonable

accommodation practices in Quebec. Some of the most important abbreviated recommendations

include: the promotion of a interculturalism as means of legislation, the publication of a policy

statement pertaining to diversity and openness, setting up programs aimed at fostering the

accountability of interveners in social and governmental milieus, the intensification of the fight

against discrimination and racism, recognition of immigrants’ skills and diplomas and improved

francization of immigrants.

104

From the recommendations of both multiculturalism and reasonable accommodation we

see vast similarities. These similarities are both close in both intent and purposes for societies to

flourish and better themselves. These key suggestions, if attained can certainly limit some

problems and issues associated with the research I have presented. I would like to end this

analysis with the idea the duties of a responsible citizen. I add this idea of a responsible citizen,

because I believe we should assume responsibility and if we act accordingly as individuals’

equality for all can be reached, as multiculturalism is largely a Canadian phenomenon, but also

present worldwide. The responsibility for problems that arise can be countered by a collaboration

of both responsible citizens and governments. But if individuals act as responsible citizens, we

can easily overcome any problems faced by our wonderful and diverse collection of all religions,

102 Nazahie, 154-156. 103 Banting & Kymlicka, 60. 104 Adelman & Anctil, 33.

123

races and cultures in Canada… The responsible citizen “is concerned not merely with interests

but with justice, with acknowledging that each other person’s interest and point of view is as

good as his or her own, and that the needs and interests of everyone must be voiced and be heard

by the others, who must acknowledge, respect, and address those needs and interests.”105

105Young, 262.

124

References

Adelman, Howard and Pierre Anctil, editors. Religion, Culture, and State: Reflections on the Bouchard-Taylor Report. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011.

Banting, Keith and Will Kymlica. “Canadian Multiculturalism: Global anxieties and local debates,” British Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol.23, no1. 2010, pp.43-72

Bauer, Julien, “Multiculturalism, cultural community: Is it about culture or ethnicity? The Canadian approach,” International Journal of Cultural Policy Vol. 7, no.1, 2009, pp. 77-95.

Bosniak, Linda. “Universal Citizenship and the problem of Alienage,” Northwestern University Law Review Vol.94, 1999-2000, pp.963-982.

Brodie, Janine. “Citizenship and Solidarity: Reflections on the Canadian Way.” Citizenship Studies Vol.4, no.2, 2002, pp.377-94.

Hier, Sean P and Kevin Walby “Competing analytical paradigms in the sociological study of racism in Canada,” Canadian Ethnic Studies Vol.38, no.1. 2006, pp.83-104.

Juteau, Danielle, “The Citizen Makes an Entrée: Redefining the National Community in Quebec.” Citizenship Studies Vol. 6, no.4, 2010, pp. 441-458 Latham, Robert. “What Are We? From a Multicultural to a Multiversal Canada,” International Journal, Vol. 63, no. 1, Winter, 2007/2008, pp. 23-41 Mahrouse, Gada. “Reasonable accommodation’ in Québec: the limits of participation and dialogue,” Race & Class, Vol. 52, no.1, July 2010, pp. 85-96. Marshall, T.H. “The Development of Citizenship to the End of the Nineteenth Century,” Citizenship and Social Class, 1950, pp.148-154. Nakhaie, M.R. (Reza) “Contemporary Realities and Future Visions: Enhancing Multiculturalism in Canada,” Canadian Ethical Studies Vol.38, no.1, 2006, pp.149-158. Nieguth, Tim and Aurelie Lacassagne. “Contesting the Nation: Reasonable Accommodation in Rural Quebec,” Canadian Political Science Review Vol.3, no.1 March 2009, pp.1-16 Padolsky, Enoch. “Multiculturalism at the Millennium,” Journal of Canadian Studies Vol.35, no 1. 2000, pp.138-160

125

Stasiulis, David. “Introduction: Reconfiguring Canadian Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies Vol 6. no. 4, 2002, pp. 365-375 Turner, Bryan S. "T.H. Marshall, social rights and English national identity," Citizenship Studies Vol.13, no.9, 2009, pp.65-73 Wilson, V. Seymour. “The Tapestry Vision of Canadian Multiculturalism,” Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.26, no.4, Dec. 1993, pp.645-669 Wong, Lloyd. "Multiculturalism and Ethnic Pluralism in Sociology: An Analysis of the Fragmentation Position Discourse." Canadian Ethnic Studies Vol. 40, no. 1 January 2008, pp. 11-32. Wood, Patricia K. and Liette Gilbert. “Multiculturalism in Canada: Accidental Discourse, Alternative Vision, Urban Practice,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research Vol.29, no. 3, September 2005, pp.679-691 Young, Iris Marion. “Policy and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Ethics Vol.99, no.2 Jan.1989, pp.250-274

126

The Political Roots of Barristers and Solicitors

By

Athena Tacet

‘‘The Law is the true embodiment

Of everything that’s excellent. It has no kind of fault or flaw.

And I, my Lords, embody the Law.’’

- Lord Chancellor, in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe

The legal profession represents one of the oldest professions, and its evolution throughout

history has always been closely related to the societal and political evolution of mankind. From

the ancient times to the current globalized and changing world, the legal profession has

developed, institutionalized and acquired a socio-political and economic status. Also, it has

become more of a complete and complex profession. Indeed, depending on the different systems

of law which were created in several empires and countries such as France and Great Britain,

various and diverse definitions of the term “lawyer” were elaborated. These definitions have

suggested different approaches on how lawyers should practice their profession, what role –

social, political, economic - they should play, and what their duties should consist of. Therefore,

modern and current references to lawyers as “barristers” or “solicitors” carry a particularly

historical and political dimension, and this will be the major theme of our study. How did the

legal profession evolve throughout history? What are the origins of the professions of “barrister”

and “solicitor”? For a better understanding of the topic, it is important to start with a brief

definition, which will be later on elaborated in more depth. The legal profession in England as

well as in Wales is made up of barristers and solicitors, two distinct types of lawyers, who carry

out slightly different functions and duties, and have based their practice on the Common Law.

Introduction

127

Thus, our study will focus on the origins of the establishment of these two professions and on the

evolution of their status up until today. From the roots of the legal profession in Ancient Athens

to the creation of the two distinct professions of barrister and solicitor, legal history has always

been closely tied to politics. The two worlds have intermingled and had a mutual influence on

each other, for lawyers have participated in building political institutions and shaping the world

of politics; as politics and politicians have had a major impact on the legal profession and its

evolution notably through key reforms.

Our study will start with an overview of the legal profession’s first steps through the

emergence of the early advocates and orators in Ancient Greece and Rome; then, we will

examine the professions of barrister and solicitor in England and their increasingly central role in

politics, especially the one they played in France before the 1789 Revolution. Finally, we will

explore how these two professions and their respective statuses and social standings have

evolved; while highlighting some ambiguities and issues related to the legal profession.

The early judicial history of Athens and Rome is particularly important for a proper

appreciation of the many features of subsequent legal history. For this reason, we will begin our

study with an overview of how the legal profession emerged and started to be acknowledged in

the ancient times, first in Athens, and then in Ancient Rome.

I. Creation and Acknowledgement of the Legal Profession: The Birth of Rhetoric

In Ancient Athens, approximately in the fifth and sixth centuries BC, several thinkers

started to develop theories and ideas on the way socio-political and legal institutions would

become the foundations of a democracy. Indeed, as an Athenian orator emphasizes: “The three

A. Emergence of Orators in Ancient Athens

128

most important provisions for guarding and preserving democracy and the welfare of the state

are the established laws, the legal processes, and the verdicts of the courts”.1From that time on,

law would become one of the most fundamental cornerstones of politics. One of the Ancient

thinkers, Solon - a famous Athenian poet, statesman and lawmaker- suggested constitutional,

economic and social reforms, which would also shape the first draft of a legal system. Since that

legal system was only at its first stages, it presented some failures, such as a clear lack of

organization.2 Moreover, under the system that Solon instituted, Athenian trials were in the

hands of people who did not have legal or judicial experience, to the point where some would

even use to term “amateurs” to define them.3

However, little by little, as Athenians started to seek ways to regulate problems of theft,

robbery, murder and other crimes, those people who had a natural ease in expressing themselves

developed speeches in order to defend citizens who had been accused of committing these

prohibited acts. Nevertheless, these speakers were not allowed to be regarded as advocates unless

they had a personal interest in the cause they were defending. This was the case of Demosthenes,

a prominent Athenian statesman and orator, who was said to find some personal interest in the

cases he chose to defend.

4 Oddly enough, although the oratory technique started to develop, the

first people who practiced a profession that might have corresponded to our modern notion of

“advocate” were not speakers in the court. They were actually the ones preparing the speeches

that clients would address to the court.5

1 Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens: the Genesis of the Legal Profession (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969), 59. 2 William Forsyth, Hortensius, or the Advocate: a Historical Essay (London: John Murray, 1849), 35. 3 Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens: the Genesis of the Legal Profession (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969), 60. 4 Forsyth, 23. 5 Forsyth, 25.

Indeed, when the forensic oratory started to emerge,

every citizen - an idea was strongly approved by Ancient philosopher Aristotle- was to take his

129

personal case to the court.6

Oratory gradually overcame its status of faculty and slowly became an art, the art of

rhetoric.The political oratory had developed during the fifth century in Sicily by Corax of

Syracuse, a prominent politician who had made the oratory an art, before it started to gain

success in Athens.

Consequently, the technique of oratory acquired an increasingly

important status in Athenian courts and some realized that if they wanted their speeches to have

thrust and to convince other citizens, they needed to develop skills, experience and technique.

Schools of oratory were thus created and forensic oratory started to be studied.

7 Lawyers and statesmen, as well as philosophers –who had already, since

Socrates, regarded rhetoric as one of the most interesting forms of expression- became part of the

development of rhetoric. As a case in point, a prominent group of philosophers called the

Sophists participated in the creation of schools of rhetoric in Athens.8 Through their commitment

in the establishment of an organized political and legal system and the development of

philosophy, philosophers also played a major role in the foundation of democracy. Thus, it

appearsthat from its early stages the profession of lawyer would share some close ties with

political institutions and, to another extent, with philosophy.At the time, the Attic orators

developed extremely virulent speeches, as Forsyth puts it: “language is employed of the most

insulting kind, and disgraceful epithets are scattered with a lavish hand”.9

6 Bonner, 135. 7 Bonner, 136. 8 Bonner, 138. 9 Forsyth, 51.

Additionally, as

forensic oratory was developed, some prominent speakers emerged in Athens. One of them,

Sophist thinker Antiphon, became the first renowned Athenian lawyer and one of the ten

principal Attic orators. With Lysias, Demades, Isocrates, Dinarchus and Israeus, Antiphon

belonged to a distinguished class of men who embodied the concept of law. What is particularly

130

relevant about Antiphon is that he and his fellow Attic orators were the first who actually

received revenue for the function they practiced in court and, consequently, the first to establish

the concept of “legal profession”.10 In short, Greece and particularly Athens saw the emergence

of a new profession- the profession of lawyer- which, similarly to the political profession, was

based on the talent of rhetoric. Similarly to a prominent political leader, a great lawyer needed to

always combine theoretical and practical skills. In other words, as Bonner quotes, he had to be “a

speaker of words and doer of deeds”.11

When the Roman Empire emerged in 27 BC, Greek teaching strongly influenced what

became the Roman law. Initially, there was not a professional legal class per se in the Roman

Empire. Indeed, the right and knowledge necessary to analyze and interpret Roman laws, such as

the ones presented in the Papirian Code and the Twelve Tables, were reserved to the collegiums

pontificum, or college of priests, whose order gave them the privilege to know the legis actiones,

or the process to act according to the law. This, as Forsyth emphasizes, had to remain private.

Yet, Gnaeus Flavius, a Roman law scholar and jurist, helped Roman citizens to get acquainted

with these legis actiones by making them public through the publication of a book which had

previously been written by Appius Claudius, the jurist he was assisting. The book he then

published was made of jus civile Flavianumor jus Aelianum

B. First Lawyers in Ancient Rome

12

10 Forsyth, 26. 11 Bonner, 136. 12 Forsyth, 65.

. Since some crucial information

about the legal system and its roots had become public, the legal profession, although not yet

recognized, started to develop especially in what was called the Forum. At the beginning of the

Republic, the litigant parties had to represent themselves in court, but they soon started to be

131

represented by advocates, under the name of Patroni Causarum in some cases and Juris Consulti

in others. The term “advocate” did not have the meaning it has today. In fact, in the early ages of

the Roman Empire, and until the time of Cicero, this notion referred not to the lawyer who was

to plead in court, but to the friend of the accused who was present to support him. It is only after

Cicero that the term “advocate” adopted its modern meaning.13The first lawyers, the Patroni

Causarum, developed a mutual relationship of duties and respect with their Clientes, so that in

exchange fordefending his rights, the client ought to pay and honour the patron.14 One should not

forget that in Ancient Rome, there was no clear distinction between the profession of lawyer and

the statesman, meaning that one could be an advocate and simultaneously be actively present in

the public life. A good example of a lawyer who also played a crucial role in the Roman political

and philosophical life is Cicero. Often regarded as the “sole monarch of the forum,” Cicero was a

successful and well-known orator.15 He is the one who in fact started to refer to Roman

advocates as Oratores,16 Indeed, as in Ancient Athens, the lawyers’ speeches had a particularly

significant status in Ancient Rome and the “most glorious triumphs of oratory” were actually

taking place in the Forum.17 There, Roman orators had the opportunity to display their skills by

using beautiful figures of rhetoric which illustrated their love for the “poetry of action”.18 As

David J. Brewer (1837-1910), a prominent American jurist would later say, “oratory is the

masterful art. Poetry, painting, music, sculpture, architecture, please, thrill, inspire but oratory

rules. The orator dominates those who hear him, convinces their reason, controls their

judgement, and compels their action”.19

13 Forsyth, 97. 14 Forsyth, 95-96. 15 Forsyth, 161. 16 Forsyth, 94. 17 Forsyth, 76. 18 Forsyth, 104. 19 Brewer in Forsyth, 100.

132

Furthermore, the admission to the forum, or what in modern times would correspond to

the “calling to the bar”, represented one of the most crucial moments in a Roman lawyer’s life.

At the age of seventeen, the young student of law had to undergo a formal process through which

he ought to put aside his pro etexta, or youthful student’s clothes, and wear the toga virilis, or

dress of maturity or manhood.20

Nevertheless, the Roman judicial system presented some failures, such as the fact that in

courts, judges and the jury had the same functions. This was also the case in Ancient Greece,

where it was a significant drawback. As expounded by Forsyth: “the maxim of the English law

that ‘as quoestiones juris respondent judices, ad quoestiones facti juratores’ was unknown to the

tribunals of Greece and Rome”.

Considered a major step in a lawyer’s life, this tradition kept its

significant and symbolic dimension in modern times. Therefore, it is under the Roman Empire

that the legal profession acquired a more formal status.

21 Therefore, although the legal system created and developed

under Greeks and Romans presented some defects, it also planted the seeds for the emergence of

the legal profession. However, the subsequent decline and downfall of the Roman Empire had a

serious impact on the political and legal institutions. Indeed, forensic oratory started to decline.22

From that time on, the legal profession would undergo profound modifications.

II. Evolution and Institutionalization of the Legal Profession in England and France

Since the fall of the Roman Empire, the legal system passed through several phases,

including the Dark Ages and the middle Ages. Yet, it is only during the thirteenth century that,

A. Emergence of Barristers and Solicitors and Stratification of the Legal Profession in England

20 Forsyth, 100. 21 Forsyth, 103. 22 Forsyth, 199.

133

based on another system of law referred to as Common Law, another type of legal profession

emerged in England. Initially, under Henri I and Henri III, lawyers did not play much of a

significant role since the legal system was developed by administrators and based on two major

sources: “the Church and the gentlemen who counselled the magnates”.23 Then, England saw the

emergence of two different types of lawyers: the barrister and the solicitor. At that time, the legal

profession was considered honourable and men who aspired to become lawyers were

intellectuals, cultured and experienced. They soon established schools of law where apprentices

were given an appropriate education.24 The law school, which was located mainly in London and

Westminster, was divided into four main colleges called the Inns of Court, which were supported

by a great number of societies called the Inns of Chancery. The Inns of Court had a particularly

important status until the 1642 Civil War. Not only were they providing a complete, strict and

extremely rigorous education, but they were also dealing with the process of admission to the

bar.25 The students at the Inns of Court who wanted to become serjeants-at-law, needed to follow

a long and strict education, during which they remained “apprentices” and were trained by

judges and sergeants.26 The term “barrister” appeared in these Inns of Court and referred to the

senior apprentices, or “advocates who were not sergeants”.27

23 Alan Harding, A Social History of English Law (London: Penguin Books, 1966), 167. 24 Harding, 168. 25 John Hamilton Baker, “Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished,” Cambridge Law Journal, 59.1 (March 2000), 81. 26 Harding, 173-174. 27 Harding, 175.

Moreover, the term “utter-barrister”

when it was first quoted in the mid-fifteenth century record of Lincoln’s Inn –one of the four

Inns of Court in London- was not particularly significant, as Prest underlines. One needs to wait

134

until 1532 for the barristers to be officially recognized as “men learned in the law”.28

Some elements, nonetheless, prompted the growth and the expansion of the profession of

barrister. First, barristers started to work for the Crown at the expense of the solicitors and

attorney. Particularly from the middle of the sixteenth century and afterwards, barristers were

regularly engaged and promoted.

However,

the profession lacked social standing and acknowledgement, especially until the Civil War.

29They therefore emerged as a more recognized and distinctive

class of lawyers. The second element which fuelled the development of barristers as advocates

was the fact that in the sixteenth century, legal qualification and expertise were needed but

serjeants were unable to satisfy the increasing demand. As a result, barristers-also called

advocates- started to plead in Westminster Hall.30The profession of barrister and particularly

utter-barristerthen continued evolving and spreading throughout England. This expansion of

barristers “as advocates and councelors,” as Prest underlines, even gave birth to a system of

competition between the various legal professions.31 Indeed, as barristers were emerging and

acquiring an increasingly recognized status, solicitors were also rising. Their functions were

similar to those of attorneys, particularly so in the Court of Chancery. The distinction between

solicitors and barristers was in fact primordially social. Indeed, barristers were not specialized

and their work tended to overlap with that of solicitors, but also laymen, attorneys and

scriveners.32 They were in fact polyvalent and handled multiple tasks over their fellow

colleagues.33

28 Wilfried Prest, The Rise of the Barristers: a Social History of the English Bar, 1590-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 5. 29 Harding, 174. 30 Prest, 6. 31 Prest, 8. 32 Prest, 18. 33 Prest, 9.

They could even, after ten years of practice at the Bar apply to the Lord Chancellor

135

and be prompted as one of the King’s Counsels, regarded as the “leaders” of the profession.34

Thus, from the middle of the seventeenth century, the barristers who were well established as a

profession had a particularly significant amount of work, especially outside of the court.

Although they had acquired a superior social standing, barristers remained present and accessible

for their clients, providing them with “a wide variety of out-of-court counselling”.35However,

this new status, based on the claim that barristers’ knowledge of law was not only practical but

also theoretical, led to the creation of a legal hierarchy and stratification of the legal profession.36

Indeed, this stratification had remained important in modern times and, as Darbyshire points out,

barristers and solicitors developed a competitive relationship characterized by a certain disdain

on the part of the barristers, who because of their superior social standing and place in hierarchy,

have tended to irritate solicitors.37

For a better understanding of the similarities and especially the differences between the

professions of barrister and solicitor, one needs to compare in more depth the functions, duties

and roles, which characterized these two distinct but sometimes complementary and overlapping

professions. First, when a student aimed at becoming a lawyer, he was either called to the Bar

and became barrister or admitted as a solicitor. After being called, the former was entitled to

practice in any court of the kingdom, whereas the latter, when admitted, was able to practice in

County and Petty Sessional Courts.

38

34 Eugene and Gerhart, ed., The Lawyer’s Treasury (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1957), 125. 35 Prest, 12. 36 Prest, 19. 37 Penny Darbyshire, “Where do English and Welsh Judges Comes From?” Cambridge Law Journal 66.2 (July 2007), 286. 38 Eugene and Gerhart, 123.

Furthermore, barristers and solicitors were bound by strict

regulations and duties. Barristers ought to abide by the “inviolate lex non scripta” of the

profession which consisted in many different rules. For instance, they could not interview a

136

client alone or discuss fees with him, nor could they belong to a firm, or have their name written

in an “alphabetical list of barristers in a trade directory.” Indeed, from the very beginning, the

English law made sure that the profession of barrister would not be corruptible.39Nonetheless, if

he was accused and convicted of not respecting or violating one of these rules, he could lose the

dignity, honour and respect from the Bar, which could in turn expulse him.40 Similarly, solicitors

had to abide by strict rules such as the interdiction of advertising. They were however allowed to

sell their practice and were authorized to draft conveyances and to have their name written in

alphabetical lists and directories.41

It is in France that the profession of barrister –which based its rules and practice on the

Civil Law system-, gained a visible political status. Indeed, as Forsyth explains: “nowhere has

the profession of the law achieved for itself a prouder position than in France in former times”.

B. Establishment of the Legal Profession and Development of a Political Status in France

42

The thirteenthcentury saw the emergence of an order of men known as the noblesse de la robe,

also called noblesse de robe. Two of the most prominent individuals who were part of this order

were Gui Foucault –an advocate who later on became Pope Clement IV- and Ives de Kaermartin-

who thereafter was canonized as a saint.43 It is important to notice that the term noblesse de la

robe was employed more or less superficially and figuratively, for the bar had to wait until the

beginning of the fourteenth century before being finally regarded as an order of nobility.44

39 Eugene and Gerhart, 124. 40 Eugene and Gerhart, 125. 41 Eugene and Gerhart, 126. 42 Forsyth, 190. 43 Forsyth, 225. 44 Forsyth, 250.

One

could suggest that the political status that the legal profession acquired was also due to the fact

that in France, the government and the judiciary had always been much more closely connected

137

to each other than in England. As Bonner specifies, from the middle of the eighth century, it

became common that the chief judicial tribunal sat in council with the French sovereign.45 Thus,

the chief judicial body, also called the Parliament of Paris, played a crucial political role under

the Ancient Regime. It was composed of conseillers who had first to be approved by the

Crown.46 These advocates who composed the parliament were referred to as an “Order,” a term

which was in use until the 1789 Revolution. Like in the Common Law system in place in

England, French advocates had to go through particularly strict and rigorous processes in order

to be able to practice their profession. In fact, they first ought to take an “oath of advocacy” –or

serment d’advocacerie- before being avocaté coutant, meaning that they had to study several

years in the Court before being eligible for officially inscribing their name on the roll of

advocates.47 With the development of this judicial body in the societal and political sphere, the

French society saw the establishment of schools of rhetoric.48 These schools were strongly

inspired by the Ancients’ methods; the speeches that lawyers delivered were primordially

composed of quotations from Latin and Greek authors. At that time –between the sixteenth and

the seventeenth centuries- two eloquent speakers emerged: Pierre Séguier and Augustin De

Thou, who became President of the Parliament of Paris.49 Consequently, the French barrister –

whose origins had gone back to the Middle Ages - became a well established profession defined

by a specific education in schools and universities and a distinct vocational identity.50

45 Bonner, 28. 46 Forsyth, 236. 47 Forsyth, 252-253. 48 Forsyth, 226. 49 Forsyth, 270. 50 David A. Bell, Lawyers and Citizens: The Making of a Political Elite in the Old Regime France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 41.

From that

time until the eve of the 1789 Revolution, the profession did not cease to develop as well as to

ascend to the political sphere. Many thinkers argued that French lawyers played indirectly in the

138

long run a critical role in shaping the Revolution. As mentioned by Alexis de Tocqueville in his

The Old Regime and the Revolution: “the practice of the law courts had entered in many ways

into the pattern of French life. Thus the courts were largely responsible for the notion that every

matter of public and private interest was subject to debate and every decision could be appealed

from.”51

Thus, the Parisian Order of Barristers appeared as an opposition force in response to

some elements that represented a threat to the legal profession and were subject to undermine its

status and cause its decline. One of these elements was the increasing stratification of the

profession, characterized by the fact that sovereign court judges started to reach a superior and

nobler stratum in the French society. This in turn transformed the barristers into a “second-class

citizens in the world of law”.

52 The Order, which originally was a professional association,

increasingly turned into an organisation de combat with political claims.53Nonetheless, it is

important to point out that, although it developed politically, the Order did not actually approve

of the French Revolution whichlater took place in 1789 and shattered not only the socio-political

order but also the whole system of legal institutions.

III. Evolution of the Legal Profession from the Ancient Times to the Current Politics: a Brief Analysis

The professions of barrister and solicitor evolved dramatically throughout history and so

did the multiple meanings of the legal profession, under these two functions. When comparing

the current British, American and Canadian modern legal systems, and one cannot help but

notice the extreme variety of definitions given respectively to the terms “barrister” and

A. One Profession: Different and Multiple Meanings

51 Tocqueville in Bell, 21. 52 Bell, 42. 53 Bell, 68.

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“solicitor” as well as the ambiguity these multiple meanings have caused. In England, the

professions of barrister and solicitor are well separated from each other, for “the same person

cannot be both barrister and solicitor” and similarlya barrister cannot be attorney. Conversely, in

most American states, the distinction between the two professions is unclear. As far as the

Canadian legal system is concerned, it seems to follow neither one of the two systems previously

mentioned.54The Canadian case is quite particular. When Canada was a French possession, there

was actually no distinction between the two professions.55 It is only in 1797 that Upper Canada

passed an Act which was to introduce some differences. This Act was the Act 37 Geo. III., c.13

(Upper Canada).56The separation remained, however particularly unclear, until another important

Act was passed, the Act of 1882, which suggested a clear separation between the functions of

barrister and solicitor and their respective duties.57

These elements help us understand how the lawyer has always been closely tied to the

society he belongs to. Indeed, as Handler mentions, “the profession must adapt to economic and

social changes or lose its claim to distinctiveness and its right to exclusive use of its skill”.

58The

legal profession played an essential role in shaping and constructing politics and society. Yet,

politics and societal dynamics soon reversed the trend and started to have a major influence on

the evolution of law and the status of lawyers. Today, as many “old” professions, the legal one

finds itself torn between tradition and modernity, “professional values and societal

pressures”.59

54 William R. Riddell, Legal Profession in Upper Canada and its Early Periods (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1916), 4. 55 Riddell, 5. 56 Riddell, 9-10. 57 Riddell, 16. 58 Joel F. Handler, The Lawyer and His Community (London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 3. 59 Ibid

Similarly, the lawyer has evolved, and particularly so during the twentieth century.

In fact, in the early years of the profession, English lawyers were polyvalent. As we mentioned

140

earlier, not only did barristers’ tasks tend to overlap the solicitors’ functions, but lawyers could,

and most of the time did, practice in other fields. Thus, early lawyers were also sociologists,

theoretical financiers and political economists, as the last profession was only officially

developed by Adam Smith in his 1776 Wealth of Nations.

With time, lawyers have unfortunately tended to specialize in their own professional

field, consequently losing the openness and polyvalence which used to represent the principle

characteristics of the early members of the Bar.

B. The Modern Lawyer: a Socio-Political Figure who Shapes History

60 Nevertheless, the legal profession started to

develop a new facet –or one might rather say a facet - inherited from the old traditions. This was

particularly the case in the United States where American lawyers realized after the 1930s

economic and social crisis that in a constantly evolving world, they should not underestimatethe

degree to which legal issues are interrelated with political, social and economic problems.61 As a

result, the middle of twentieth century saw a major transformation in the image of the

practitioner. Not only did he become a litigating lawyer, but he also became a prominent social

and political figure whose role was crucial in shaping History.One man who embodied all these

qualities was Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth President of the United States.62 Not only was he a

renowned member of the Bar, but he also played a major role in the socio-political arena,

especially through the abolition of slavery. Although deeply-rooted in tradition, the legal

profession is therefore extremely dynamic. The influence exerted by the lawyer is now visible in

all the different levels of our societies. From the influence of one man, it has turned into the

influence of a well-established and developed profession.63

60 Handler, 57. 61 Eugene and Gerhart, 306. 62 Handler, 4. 63 Eugene and Gerhart, 468.

As the legal profession is evolving

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and undergoing some major changes and reforms, practitioners, such as politicians, play a crucial

role in shaping the world we live in.

Conclusion

Overall, the study of the origins of barristers and solicitors and their political dimensions

is particularly important for a more thorough understanding of the evolution of politics and

modern socio-political systems. From the ancient times and the birth of law to current politics,

history has shown that law and politics have been tightly interwoven and have had a

complementary and mutual relationship. It is through legal institutions that Ancient Greeks

established democracy; similarly, the modern lawyer has been playing an undeniably crucial

political role in shaping and influencing our Western societies.

142

References

Baker, John Hamilton. “Why the History of English Law Has Not Been Finished.” Cambridge Law Journal 59.1 (March 2000): 62-84.

Bell, David A. Lawyers and Citizens: The Making of a Political Elite in the Old Regime France.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Bonner, Robert J. Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens: the Genesis of the Legal Profession.

New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969. Darbyshire, Penny. “Where do English and Welsh Judges Come From?” Cambridge Law

Journal 66.2 (July 2007): 365-388. Eugene and Gerhart, ed. The Lawyer’s Treasury. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1957. Forsyth, William. Hortensius, or the Advocate: a Historical Essay. London: John Murray, 1849. Handler, Joel F. The Lawyer and His Community. London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. Harding, Alan. A Social History of English Law. London: Penguin Books, 1966. Prest, Wilfrid. The Rise of the Barristers: a Social History of the English Bar, 1590-1640.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Riddell, William R. Legal Profession in Upper Canada and its Early Periods. Toronto: Law

Society of Upper Canada, 1916.

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Explaining the Financial Crisis: Information, Understanding, Risk Assessment and Moral Hazards

By Patrick Wallis

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was created in 2009 in order to better

understand what caused the financial crisis in the United States.

Introduction

1

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report was published on February 1st, 2011 and was the culmination

of 18 months of research, interviews, public hearings, and case studies conducted by the Financial

Crisis Inquiry Commission.

This essay shares the same objectives

as the FCIC in that it will try to provide an explanation for this crisis. Specifically, this essay will argue

that most of the causes of the financial crisis are attributable to human error, as evidenced by multiple

cases of weak economic understanding or lack of complete information, poor risk management and

numerous moral hazards. This argument will be defended through performing a comparison between

the current crisis and other economic crashes and panics throughout history as a means of further

revealing the errors that contributed to the crisis. In addition, there will be a discussion of the causes of

the financial crisis in the United States with specific attention being paid to deregulation and laissez-

faire policies.

2

1 FCIR: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, Washington, DC: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, Print, xi.

2 FCIR xxviii.

The report makes nine major conclusions based on this investigation: 1)

The government had not only been unprepared for the crisis but had also failed to respond to it

adequately, thus intensifying panic in the markets; 2) a lack of regulation or supervision caused

144

instability in financial markets; 3) the lowering of standards for mortgage lending and securitization

practices contributed to contagion; 4) a lack of corporate self-governance and adequate risk assessment

were key factors in creating the crisis; 5) the existence of too much borrowing, unwise investing, and

lack of transparency were central in causing the crisis; 6) Over The Counter investment products

(OTCs) were a big factor in the crisis; 7) if the credit rating agencies had done their job the crisis would

not have occurred; 8) the crisis was avoidable; 9) there had been a systematic breakdown in

accountability and ethics.3

There is no better way to begin a discussion of the history of economic panics and crashes than

by citing Charles Poor Kindleberger, the economist viewed to be the modern authority on the topic.

1. History of Economic Panics and Crashes

4 In

the book “Manias, Panics, and Crashes: a History of Financial Crises”, Kindleberger and Aliber outline

the similarities shared among various financial crises,5

In a nutshell, the current crisis was centred on a housing bubble wherein real estate prices

skyrocketed. The eventual decline in real estate prices and an excessive number of sub-prime

mortgages triggered a crash in the housing market. People and firms who had been investing in

mortgage-related investment products abandoned them “en masse” in a state of panic. The sudden

disappearance of investment in these mortgage-related investment products caused banks to suffer a

capital shortfall. The response was to de-leverage, and among other things, this meant a significant

decrease in lending. This overreaction also hindered legitimate or safe borrowers from getting loans

including, as we shall see, the current crisis.

3 FCIR xvii-xxv. 4 For example see; The Economist, "Economics Focus: Of Manias, Panics and Crashes | The Economist," The Economist - World News, Politics, Economics, Business & Finance. The Economist, 17 July 2003, Web. 1 Nov. 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/1923462>; or Barnes, Paul, Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse, Farnham, England: Gower, 2009, Google Books, Google, Web. 2 Nov. 2011, 64; or Buthe, Tim, The Dynamics of Principals and Agents: Institutional Persistence and Change in U.S. Financial Regulation, 1934-2003 (March 1, 2010), 21. 5 Kindleberger, Charles Poor, and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: a History of Financial Crises, 5th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005, Print, 10.

145

and the economy as a whole reflected this prudence. Consequently, this lead to contagion, in which

worry and poor growth spread beyond the real estate market.6

From a broad perspective, economic history over the past 400 years shows a discernible trend and

the phases of an economic crisis can be identified. First, there is a period of growth that makes credit

more readily available to everyone. Second, as funds are easy to acquire, people look to make more

money fast and so they invest in things that pay off immediately rather than analyze the true

performance of their investment. Third, a boom occurs in which capital is copiously available and

overall spending is very high. Fourth, this results in the creation of a bubble in a particular market.

7

These four phases are easily recognizable in the current financial crisis. The FCIR corroborates this

argument by concluding that the housing bubble was intensified by low interest rates, easily acquired

and massive amounts of credit, under-regulation, and toxic mortgages.8 Furthermore, even proponents

of deregulation and financial liberalization concede that in the last 35 years deregulation, along with

globalization; have been central in the emergence of hundreds of currency and banking crises in both

developed and developing economies.9

When looking at market bubbles specifically, there have been several incidents in the past 100

years in which the economy grew incredibly fast and imploded. This lead to poor or even negative

economic growth and there was usually a period of time before it would normalize. Of course, the first

and most drastic example of this is was the stock market crash of 1929, which had been preceded by a

real estate bubble. However, economic bubbles were also created in the 1970’s as developing

countries’ demand for loans increased quickly. Stock market and real estate bubbles were observed in

6 Santor, Eric, and Lawrence Schembri, "The Case for Financial Liberation." Introducing Macroeconomic Analysis: Issues, Questions and Competing View,. Ed. Hassan Bougrine and Mario Seccareccia, Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publication, 2010, 271-82, Print, 276. 7 Kindleberger & Aliber 276. 8Kindleberger & Aliber xvi. 9 Santor & Schembri 273.

146

the 1980’s in Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Japan. There were also real estate and stock market

bubbles in many Asian countries throughout the 1990’s. In addition, Mexico experienced a bubble

during the same period due to marked increases in foreign investment.10

The shadow banking system refers to the emergence of financial institutions and services that

were created outside of the scope of the existing regulatory framework. This development permitted the

creation of many new innovative banking products including securities and derivatives.

2. Financial Crisis Origins: The Banks

The easiest point of entry into a debate on the United States housing bubble which triggered the

financial crisis is to look at the actions of the banks. Several practices undertaken by or omitted by the

banking industry worsened the housing bubble and thus exacerbated the crisis.

11 Derivatives

do not hold worth but are rather a speculative assessment of an asset’s value. This is an agreement

between two parties in which a seller receives cash for an asset, i.e. an investment product, from an

investor. After a set period of time the seller will pay back the investor at the current value of the asset.

It is essentially gambling on price fluctuation - the investors win if the value increases and the sellers

win if it decreases. Firms used the derivatives market to offset losses in other areas of investment.

However, a bank could be making reckless investment decisions but recouping those losses through

derivatives. This makes it difficult to judge whether they’ve made money through sound decision-

making or simply by being lucky gamblers.12

10 Kindleberger & Aliber 10. 11 Huertas, Thomas F, Crisis: Cause, Containment and Cure, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, Print, 19. 12 FCIR 46.

147

Derivatives were not the sole contributors to this lack of transparency. Many other investment

products had become so complex that even the creators of the products were unsure of the risk level.13

Securities, derivatives, commercial paper and repos had all been convenient ways for banks to raise

capital.14 They often needed little collateral and it was much quicker than a conventional loan.

However, each one of these products were dubiously concealing how leveraged these firms actually

were.15 Investors knew even less about this mix of understated leverage and risk obviously than the

banks. This ignorance allowed them to invest confidently but the moment the public became aware of

the true risks, investors dropped these products with equal and opposite urgency.16

As the housing market began to unravel, banks knew even if they had no clue as to the quality of

their own products, they knew even less about the other banks. They reacted by tightening their lending

policies by either asking for higher interest rates or by simply refusing loan applications. This practice

became pervasive and the global credit market was paralyzed.

17 Reduction in lending was lethal to

most firms’ day to day operations. Buying and selling of mortgage securities was sustained through

short-term borrowing of billions of dollars every night.18

The financial sector has become less averse to risk over time. Alarmingly, this is perhaps the most

common characteristics within the industry. Prior to securitization, any mortgage a bank approved

would stay on the books for better or for worse. This gave banks an incentive to be prudent about who

they lent money to. Securitization diversified the risk of underwriting mortgages by bundling several

mortgages together. In addition, the full term of a mortgage wouldn’t necessarily be contained in the

13 Stiglitz, Joseph E, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, New York: W.W. Norton &, 2010, Print, 8. 14 FCIR 31-48. 15 Paulson, Henry M., and Dan Woren, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System, Hachette Digital, 2009, Print, 72. 16 Paulson and Woren 72. 17 Stiglitz 28. 18 FCIR xx.

148

same bundle. This meant that banks could approve a loan that never got repaid and the loss would be

minimal. The assumption was that multiple mortgages would never fail at the same time. This error in

risk assessment created further impetus for banks to underwrite bad mortgages.19

There are indications that many people in the financial sector were cognizant of the pitfalls of

their actions. As early as 2004 some bank executives knew that they were approving many high-risk

loans. They even acknowledged that the consequences of pursuing this strategy included damaging the

entire financial sector’s reputation.

20 It was examples like these that caused the Financial Crisis Inquiry

Report to conclude that many banks had acted in way that was counter intuitive and contradicted their

own instincts for self-preservation.21

Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE’s) like Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac were meant to

stabilize housing market by purchasing mortgages from their originators and either administrating them

or securitizing them. The goal was to encourage lenders to use the capital they receive to offer more

mortgages and to also give more stable return on mortgage backed investments.

22 Unfortunately, these

institutions were as overleveraged as their independent counterparts. They were exempt from state and

local tax and they also had access to an emergency credit line from the Treasury. This gave investors

the impression that these were government backed products. This lack of understanding made investors

overestimate the reliability of these to GSE’s.23

Homebuyers were certainly significant role-players in the housing boom and the crisis it

triggered. Unfortunately, many borrowers were ignorant of what they were signing up for. This also

2. Financial Crisis Origins: Homebuyers

19 Stiglitz 90-1. 20 FCIR xii. 21 FCIR xix. 22 FCIR 41. 23 Paulson and Woren 56.

149

meant that they were incapable of negotiating better terms for themselves. They would often accept

mortgages with less favourable conditions than they deserved. Mortgage originators, whose incentive

programs encouraged the sale of whichever products generated the most fees, took advantage of this

situation. The net result was the creation of a large number of homeowners who were more vulnerable

to foreclosure.24

Levels of indebtedness were high among homeowners. This should not come as a shock given

that the level of consumption for the average American has been increasing quicker than their wages

for the past 10 years.

25 Leading up to the housing market crash, there was an unprecedented number of

mortgage holders that were using residential equity to fund non-essential consumption.26

The errors of the credit rating agencies have received a large amount of attention in the aftermath

of the housing market crash and the ensuing crisis. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that

the crisis would not have occurred if not for the rating agencies. They gave overly optimistic ratings to

Overall these

types of actions worsened the financial crisis because it gave people who should not have had a

mortgage the opportunity to further indebt themselves. Many people had been relying on debt to live

beyond their means and the crash of the housing market led to a decrease in their level of consumption.

As a result the entire economy and not just the housing market suffered.

2. Financial Crisis Origins: Credit Rating Agencies

24 FCIR 90. 25 FCIR xxi. 26 Phillips, Kevin, Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism; [with a New Preface and a New Afterword, Illustrated ed, New York, NY [u.a.: Penguin, 2009, Google Books, Web, 31 Oct. 2011, 10-1. <http://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZLSka4fcmSMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=79QtPu8mdz&sig=DggRt1sTzWm-9iiL84tcqyy6ibQ#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

150

ramp up the housing bubble and when their ratings became more realistic in 2007 and 2008 the market

panicked in response to the abrupt change.27

The rating agencies’ central role in the securities market made their mistakes all the more glaring.

Their assessment of the quality of an investment determined the level of capital banks were required to

keep on hand.

28 In addition, the common investor was incapable of judging the merits of such complex

products and so they were dependant on the findings of these agencies.29 This enviable niche meant

that when they gave the highest possible ratings to unbelievably poor quality products as the entire

market paid attention.30

In retrospect there have been some incomprehensible examples of neglect to due diligence with

these rating agencies. They failed to introduce new rating criteria reflecting the higher risk of these new

innovative mortgage-backed securities and continued to make the same verifications they had made on

traditional investment products.

31 Furthermore, they became gradually less diligent in verifying

mortgage documents. They essentially took for granted that the mortgage approval procedures

employed by originator of the loan were infallible.32

When assessing risk, the rating agencies failed to recognize a potential landslide of mortgage

defaults. Their assessment of these mortgage-backed products therefore neglected to grasp how these

mortgages could be correlated.

33

27 FCIR xxv. 28 FCIR 100. 29 Huertas 33. 30 Stiglitz 7. 31 Huertas 30. 32 Huertas 32. 33 Huertas 31.

A large part of this interrelatedness and correlation shared between

many mortgages was due to the severe restriction on lending that banks implemented in response to the

increase in subprime defaults that were prompted by the decline in real estate prices. The amount of

151

capital being made available had been significantly reduced. This means that existing loans could not

be kept afloat, causing even more mortgage to defaults - effectively worsening the crisis.34

The bumbling manner in which the government of the United States handled the housing bubble

caused isolated market problems to contaminate not only the country’s economy but indeed the

stability of the world economy. As warning bells began to go off, announcing that real estate prices

were unsustainable, politicians had four strong motives for not responding. First, a housing bubble was

popular with voters. Second, it was creating jobs. Third, regulators in government wanted to stay

friendly with the financial industry because they hoped to have a job waiting for them after they left

office. Fourth, many people believed that there was no bubble and even if a bubble existed they felt that

the economy would not be affected if it were to burst.

2. Financial Crisis Origins: Government Policy

35

The government’s policies promoting homeownership were well received and were not

fundamentally bad ideas. However, they aided in the creation of the real estate bubble but were not the

source of the problem. The real issue with these policies (e.g. the Community Reinvestment Act) was

that they encouraged people to buy houses in an environment rife with risks. They offered constant

reassurance as unwitting homebuyers waded into the murky waters of the real estate market.

36

The government’s response to the real estate market crash caused the most damage. In an

atmosphere of panic and uncertainty, the government’s inconsistency aggravated the problem. They

rescued Bear Stearns and AIG, placed Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac under conservatorship and let the

Lehman Brothers fail.

37

34 Santor & Schembri 276. 35 FCIR 9. 36 FCIR xxvi. 37 FCIR xi.

Whatever the supposed motivation and rationale behind these decisions, the

152

fact that financial climate on got worse reveals how little confidence the financial sector had in their

decisions. It is also clear that they lacked sufficient criteria or theory to explain the government’s

actions as a whole.

Other governmental institutions also faced scrutiny in the wake of the financial crisis. In their

report, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal

Reserve Bank of New York were completely unprepared for the crisis and once they decided to react; it

was poorly planned. The commission also suggested that some people were blatantly ignorant to the

realities of the financial system. Policy makers showed to be inept at foreseeing and curbing contagion

of the subprime market to the real estate market and then to the entire economy. Furthermore, as the

situation intensified these policy makers were reactionary and offered very little in way of a strategy

that appeared to acknowledge the needs of the financial system as a whole.38

One example of a moral hazard that contributed to the financial crisis involves real estate

appraisers, essential role players in the housing industry. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

concluded that these appraisers felt pressure to inflate their estimation of a property’s value so that a

2. Financial Crisis Origins: Moral Hazards

When investigating the causes of the financial crisis it becomes apparent very quickly that it

took many people making many different types of mistakes for things to go so wrong. Failures in

judgement alone cannot attribute for such widespread neglect; indeed, in many cases these errors are

caused by situations involving moral hazards. A moral hazard exists when an individual is influenced

to act in a way that contradicts their moral judgment but for which they will not suffer personal

consequences.

38 FCIR xxi.

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sale could be finalized. In 2006, an astounding 90% of real estate appraisers claimed to be feeling

pressure to overestimate the value of properties. The consequence of giving an accurate estimate was

that real estate brokers would simply seek out another appraiser willing to exaggerate prices.39

The absence of a down payment requirement in order to be approved for a mortgage created a

moral hazard for homebuyers as well. Homebuyers knew that if housing prices increased they stood to

make a profit. In contrast, if housing prices decreased to the point where the amount owing exceeded

the value of the house, borrowers could simply let the bank foreclose.

Understandably, this practice caused housing prices to be much higher than their true value and further

inflated the housing bubble.

40 To homebuyers the worst-case

scenario was losing their house.41

The mortgage bubble and the financial crisis were both also intensified by the proliferation of

innovative investment products through the financial system. The major appeal of these products was

that they mitigated risk. This served to make all parties involved feel overly secure. However, when

risk is shared among too many parties the detrimental effects of a moral hazard will outweigh the

advantages of decreased risk.

The obvious danger, and what eventually happened, was that many

people adopted this mindset. When housing prices decreased it triggered a cascade of mortgage

foreclosures.

42

Does the government’s frequent and practically automatic predisposition to offer bail-outs to

financial institutions on the brink of collapse constitute a moral hazard? Historical evidence says yes:

Indeed, this moral hazard caused many to underestimate risk and made

them engage in even riskier transactions.

39 FCIR 91. 40 Ashcraft, Adam, and Til Schuermann, 2008, “The Seven Deadly Frictions of Subprime Mortgage Credit Securitization”, Mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 8. 41 Stiglitz 82. 42 Lee, Wondon, and James A. Ligon, "Moral Hazard in Risk Pooling Arrangements," The Journal of Risk and Insurance 68.1 (2001): 175-90, Web, 1 Nov. 2011, 175.

154

the more bail-outs the government gives, the riskier banks’ activities become.43 Ironically, this creates

a situation where bail-outs beget more bail-outs.44

Prior to the collapse of the housing market, the banks’ principle preoccupation was to generate

quarterly growth to sustain share prices. This was achieved through the creation of new mortgage fees

and increasing the rates of existing fees.

Evidently, this leads to nonchalance towards

warnings of economic disaster within the banking industry. Institutions know that they will be saved if

things ever get too bad and they get to keep the profits if things go well.

45 Often a bank’s employee incentive program rewarded those

who sold the most mortgages without considering any other elements of the sale. Seemingly obvious

and basic verifications were neglected, including an assessment of the lender’s solvency.46 The

decision to maintain these flawed incentives encouraged the underwriting of an excessively large

amount of bad mortgages.47

Finally, rating agencies have received some of the harshest criticism for their role in triggering

the collapse of the housing market. Since the individual firms which hired these rating agencies would

simply seek out a higher rating from the competitor if mortgage-related investment products were rated

poorly, there was incentive to give better ratings to these products than they deserved, thus leading to a

clear moral hazard for these agencies.

Those incentives lead to a moral hazard on the part of individual mortgage

underwriters who had very little to lose by continuing to introduce toxic mortgages into the system.

48 The pressure to skew ratings exists only because rating

agencies are hired on a contractual basis rather than providing non-solicited, public ratings.49

43 Stiglitz 135. 44 Stiglitz 132. 45 Stiglitz 90. 46 FCIR xix. 47 Stiglitz 90. 48 Huertas 33. 49 Božović, Miloš, Branko Urošević, and Boško Živković, "Credit Rating Agencies and Moral Hazard." Panoeconomicus 58.2 (2011): 219-27, DoiSerbia, National Library of Serbia, Web, 2 Nov. 2011, 220-1. <http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-595X/2011/1452-595X1102219B.pdf>.

Rating

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agencies were also slow to revise their ratings once they were made aware of the true level of risk

because they feared the effect that this about-face would have on their reputation.50

The laissez-faire credo is an undoubtedly sacred rule of thumb that is ingrained in the United

States’ corporate culture. As chairman of the Federal Reserve, Allan Greenspan was an ardent

proponent of deregulation and laissez-faire principles.

3. Role of Deregulation and Laissez-faire Principles

51 It was his opinion that a commitment to

reputation should have kept banks in line. In addition, quality risk management would ensure that firms

would self-regulate.52 However, he was at a loss when trying to explain why free market principles

failed to promote self-regulation and why banks neglected to safely manage risk exposure in the

derivatives market.53

Politicians have been subject to over 30 years of persistent pressure from private interests to

reduce regulations.

54 From 1999 to 2008 the financial sector reported $2.8 billion in lobbying expenses

while individuals or committees representing the financial industry spent more than $1 billion on

campaign contributions.55

There are numerous rules that have been made more lenient or have been altogether eliminated.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report emphasized that the financial crisis was exacerbated by numerous

practices that were the result of deregulation. The consequences of deregulation included reduced

This small sample helps demonstrate the degree to which pressure to

deregulate was felt.

50 Huertas 33. 51 FCIR xviii. 52 FCIR 35. 53 Chorney, Harold, "After the Crash: Rediscovering Keynes and the Origins of Quantitative Easing (2nd Posting) |

Haroldchorneyeconomist." Haroldchorneyeconomist, Web, 02 Nov. 2011. <http://haroldchorneyeconomist.com/2011/06/03/after-the-crashrediscovering-keynes-and-the-origins-of-quantitative-easing-2nd-posting/>.

54 FCIR xviii. 55 FCIR xviii.

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oversight on commodities,56 pressure on banks to overinvest in securities,57 letting conventional banks

pay out more interest on deposits thus compelling them to invest in riskier products,58 and allowing

softer down payment requirements for mortgages.59

However, the most significant example of deregulation in the context of this crisis relates to the

rules imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act and their subsequent abolition. The Glass-Steagall Act served

to keep depository institutions from wading into the highly volatile securities market.

60 The Gramm-

Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 effectively removed all of the Glass-Steagall Act’s regulations.61

The removal of the Glass-Steagall Act had several consequences, including a rash of mergers

between depository and investment banks,

62 these hybrid institutions’ operations spanning several

sectors at once,63 conventional banks becoming implicated in the shadow banking system,64 depository

banks becoming more leveraged and being subject to higher risk,65 and regulators’ mandates

overlapping one another, making it impossible to collect all data and make an informed decision.66

When evaluating the role that deregulation and laissez-faire principles played in causing the

crisis it is difficult to argue with empirical observations. Historical evidence shows that the majority of

banking crises, regardless of whether they are combined with other problems (e.g. currency crisis), are

56 FCIR 48. 57 FCIR 99-100. 58 FCIR 29, 34. 59 FCIR 109. 60 Paulson & Woren 95. 61 FCIR 55. 62 Paulson & Woren 95. 63 Paulson & Woren 125. 64 Huertas 19. 65 Paulson & Woren 95. 66 FCIR 55.

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triggered by trade liberalization measures or any other action creating a sudden increase in capital

available to everyone.67

It is undeniable that the urge to remove regulations in the United States coincided with an equal

disdain for new regulations.

68 The essence of the “under-regulation, not deregulation” argument is that

removing the old regulations was only bad because they were not replaced with newer, better

regulations. This opinion is perhaps one of the few things that most analysts have agreed upon.69 To

view the problem as being one of under-regulation as opposed to deregulation implies that the scrutiny

should be diverted from corporate lobbying and pressure tactics and should instead be focused on

politicians and government officials who failed to set up new regulations. The rebuttal to this argument

is that it was reckless to push for deregulation and it is hypocritical for the very same people to now say

there should have been new regulations.70

Another point that must not be neglected is the fact that reducing regulations created more

opportunities for fraud in the financial industry.

71 This was particularly the case with the subprime

mortgage market in which a large number of mortgages were underwritten fraudulently.72 The

Financial Crimes Network, the Treasury Department’s bureau responsible for financial crime, saw

claims of mortgage fraud explode by 2000% from 1996 to 2005. What is most startling is that these

figures could even be higher because many cases have not been reported and the majority of mortgage

brokers are not subject to these regulations.73

67 Kaminsky, Graciela L., and Carmen M. Reinhart, "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems." American Economic Review 89.3 (1999): 473-500, Print, 491.

68 FCIR 53. 69 For example see Santor & Schembri 273-4; Huertas 33; FCIR 255; Paulson & Woren 56. 70 Stiglitz 162. 71 FCIR 187. 72 Santor & Schembri 276. 73 FCIR 9.

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Conclusion

This paper argues that the financial crisis was attributable to weak economic understanding or

lack of complete information, poor risk management, and numerous moral hazards. This concluding

section will discuss each element of this paper’s central argument by synthesizing the evidence that has

been presented thus far. Words alone would be inadequate to demonstrate the degree of interrelatedness

of the specific concepts associated with each element, therefore each element is also illustrated in a

concept map that can be found in the Appendices. Each concept discussed will be described as being

either a factor or an outcome. Factors will be further classified as being either Primary or Secondary

factors while outcomes will be classified as being Principal, Critical or Dangerous outcomes.

As illustrated in Appendix I,74

As illustrated in Appendix III,

there were four primary causes of the financial crisis relating to

weak economic understanding or lack of complete information: governmental neglect of historical

evidence, governmental unpreparedness and failure to adequately respond to the unfolding crisis,

uninformed homebuyers, and uninformed investors. Three secondary factors were all results of

governmental neglect of historical evidence: deregulation with lack of new regulations or under-

regulation, a decrease in regulatory oversight in mortgage or mortgage-related investments, and the

introduction of homeownership policies in a deregulated mortgage market. These factors ultimately

either caused the real estate bubble to intensify or they increased the likelihood of a subprime mortgage

default cascade.

75

74 Appendix I is visible online at the following URL:

there were two primary causes of the financial crisis relating to

failures in risk-assessment: a lack of corporate self-governance and credit rating agencies’ risk-

assessment failures. These primary causes led to four secondary causes: ignorance of the danger in

www.gliffy.com/pubdoc/3060083/L.png . The legend for the symbols used can be found in Appendix II of this paper or at the following URL: www.gliffy.com/pubdoc/3063161/L.png .

75 Appendix III is also visible online at the following URL: www.gliffy.com/pubdoc/3063464/L.png.

159

underwriting an excessive number of toxic mortgages, credit rating agencies’ progressive carelessness

with regards to background investigation of mortgages, credit rating agencies’ failure to modify their

criteria in response to the introduction of new riskier mortgage-related investment products, and credit

rating agencies’ failure to incorporate the possibility of a subprime mortgage cascade in their risk

assessment metrics.

These primary and secondary factors meant that there were high ratings for real estate

investment products that were very low in quality. They also led to four critical outcomes: rating

agencies became unaware of the true number of subprime mortgages in the real estate market, firms

became pervasively overleveraged, there was an increased potential for fraud or for the falsifying of

mortgage documents, and there was greater investment in mortgage-related investment products than

warranted. As was the case with weak economic understanding, ultimately these factors either caused

the real estate bubble to intensify or they increased the likelihood of a subprime mortgage default

cascade.

As illustrated in Appendix IV,76

76 3. Appendix IV is also visible online at the following URL:

there were six primary moral hazards that contributed to

causing the financial crisis: real estate appraisers were pressured to overestimate property values,

homebuyers had nothing to lose when buying a home, firms’ incentive programs encouraged individual

employees to sell whichever mortgage generated the most fees, firm managers ignored the danger in

underwriting too many subprime mortgages, an unrealistic sense of security compelled market role-

players to act in an even riskier manner, and rating agencies were pressured to give high ratings to poor

products.

www.gliffy.com/pubdoc/3061619/L.png.

160

These six primary factors led to three principal outcomes: an increase in the number of

homebuyers who realistically should not have been approved for a mortgage, an increase in the overall

number of mortgages in the market, and high ratings for real estate investment products that were very

low in quality. These primary factors also led to four critical outcomes: firms became pervasively

overleveraged, there was an overall increase in the number of subprime mortgages in the real estate

market, there was an increased potential for fraud or of the falsifying of mortgage documents, and there

was greater investment in mortgage-related investment products than warranted. Once again these

factors ultimately either caused the real estate bubble to intensify or they increased the likelihood of a

subprime mortgage default cascade.

It is observed that all three categories of causes ultimately converge to either cause the real

estate bubble to intensify or to increase the likelihood of a subprime mortgage default cascade. It is

important to reiterate that once real estate prices decreased, the factors discussed above led to high

interdependence among subprime mortgages. This in turn caused the subprime market to crash. The

housing bubble, being a source of over-consumption and over-representing growth, was no longer

expanding. This caused the entire real estate mortgage market to crash and facilitated the contagion of

the economy as whole.

By discussing the history of market crashes and panics, each economic role-player’s

contribution to the crisis, and the particular impact of deregulation and laissez-faire principles, the

origins of the financial crisis have been made clear. A crisis of this magnitude required many mistakes

from many sources. In addition, each mistake compounded the other. This confluence of errors is

admittedly much easier to identify in hindsight, however their commission and consequences were not

unforeseeable. The ideal reaction to this crisis would be for all role-players to question their theories

161

that they treat as theologies77

77 Stiglitz 244.

and allow some room for honest debate. Perhaps then it can be hoped that

a more stable and prosperous economy can be permitted to emerge.

162

Works Cited

Ashcraft, Adam, and Til Schuermann, 2008, “The Seven Deadly Frictions of Subprime Mortgage Credit Securitization”, Mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Barnes, Paul. Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse. Farnham, England: Gower,

2009. Google Books. Google. Web. 2 Nov. 2011. Božović, Miloš, Branko Urošević, and Boško Živković. "Credit Rating Agencies and Moral Hazard."

Panoeconomicus 58.2 (2011): 219-27. DoiSerbia. National Library of Serbia. Web. 2 Nov. 2011. <http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-595X/2011/1452-595X1102219B.pdf>.

Buthe, Tim, The Dynamics of Principals and Agents: Institutional Persistence and Change in U.S.

Financial Regulation, 1934-2003 (March 1, 2010). Chorney, Harold. "After the Crash:Rediscovering Keynes and the Origins of Quantitative Easing (2nd

Posting) | Haroldchorneyeconomist." Haroldchorneyeconomist. Web. 02 Nov. 2011. <http://haroldchorneyeconomist.com/2011/06/03/after-the-crashrediscovering-keynes-and-the-origins-of-quantitative-easing-2nd-posting/>.

FCIR: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis

in the United States. Washington, DC: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011. Print. Huertas, Thomas F. Crisis: Cause, Containment and Cure. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print. Kaminsky, Graciela L., and Carmen M. Reinhart. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and

Balance-of-Payments Problems." American Economic Review 89.3 (1999): 473-500. Print. Kindleberger, Charles Poor, and Robert Z. Aliber. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: a History of Financial

Crises. 5th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005. Print. Lee, Wondon, and James A. Ligon. "Moral Hazard in Risk Pooling Arrangements." The Journal of

Risk and Insurance 68.1 (2001): 175-90. Web. 1 Nov. 2011. Paulson, Henry M., and Dan Woren. On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global

Financial System. Hachette Digital, 2009. Print. Phillips, Kevin. Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American

Capitalism ; [with a New Preface and a New Afterword]. Illustrated ed. New York, NY [u.a.: Penguin, 2009. Google Books. Web. 31 Oct. 2011. <http://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZLSka4fcmSMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=79QtPu8mdz&sig=DggRt1sTzWm-9iiL84tcqyy6ibQ#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

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Santor, Eric, and Lawrence Schembri. "The Case for Financial Liberation." Introducing Macroeconomic Analysis: Issues, Questions and Competing Views. Ed. Hassan Bougrine and Mario Seccareccia. Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publication, 2010. 271-82. Print.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2010. Print.

The Economist. "Economics Focus: Of Manias, Panics and Crashes | The Economist." The Economist -

World News, Politics, Economics, Business & Finance. The Economist, 17 July 2003. Web. 1 Nov. 2011. <http://www.economist.com/node/1923462>.

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The

CUJPSE

Concordia Undergraduate Journal of Political Science Essays (2012) Next: Final Essay

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Our House: Creating Space in Canada through Self-Expression

By

Aimee Louw

I live in a house without windows.

I just moved in.

The doors are always locked and the floor creaks every time I move.

It’s cramped in here, not much space to move around.

We’re all just trying to fit.

My room’s on the second floor next to an old lady with a walker.

The guys above me stomp around a lot; no respect for anyone below them.

I don’t know my neighbors and when we see each other in the hallway we raise our chins and

avert our eyes.

I’m not allowed to paint the walls.

If Canada were a house, the builders forgot a lot of things, a lot of people:

windows, sit-down toilets, a smudge hall, a ramp leading to the front door, and space

inside for most of the population. It is a hegemonic house; it was built by only some

people, it was not defined by everyone. Canada was created with a citizen in mind: an

able-bodied and minded man of British descent. People are here but not present, looked at

but not seen, heard but not listened to; their stories are not included in the mainstream

historical discourse. Given Canada’s unequal founding, I wonder if it is possible to

remedy this; can an egalitarian Canada come from an exclusionary past? In other words,

can an even house be built on an uneven foundation? In this essay I will explore the

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concept of space: who is given space freely in Canada and how those who are not might

claim some. I argue that narrative art has the ability to make people look at things from a

different perspective. 1 I propose that it is possible for Canada to become more egalitarian

despite its exclusionary past. But in order for this to happen, non-traditional citizens need

to engage in creative expression of their realities in order to be seen and to make space

for themselves in the public narrative.2 3 This will be shown with reference to Virginia

Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own. First, I will explore the idea of the dominant narrative

and the ways in which Canada’s dominant history is exclusionary, with particular

attention to education as an indicator. The dominant narrative will be shown to actually

represent the reality of a numerical minority. Following this, the possibility of self-

expressive art as a means to create space for oneself will be explored and the most

effective means by which expression can take form will be considered. I argue that

excluded narratives can break into the dominant narrative in Canada with what Marshall

McLuhan terms ‘cold media’ expressions of people’s truths, thereby creating space for

non-traditional citizens in the narrative of the land. Dispersed throughout the essay, I will

use personal poetic expression to illustrate or state things that I feel are best articulated in

this way, rather than in academic prose.4

In the woods, evergreens all around.

She is on guarded territory.

1 For the purposes of this paper, I define narrative art as any creative expression that tells a story. 2 The term, non-traditional citizen refers to those whose realities are not reflected in early legislation, such as the BNA Act, 1867. 3 Reality: the experiences of someone’s daily life; interactions, conversations, relationships, sights and sounds in environment, and the feelings brought about by all of the above. 4 I have chosen not to focus on one social group in particular because I feel that would reiterate the definitions of people that are part of the dominant narrative. For example, focusing only on native people, repeating the differences that are posed in mainstream media, academia and conversation, would further solidify their external definition. Dividing people along race, gender or any other lines has an automatic defining effect that is not conducive to self definition.

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This is not her land.

A hunter; orange vest, gun.

It is not his land either.

He’s a poacher, and so she stays.

He’s a hijacker and so she stays.

Nature is a cautious idea.

(Louw, 2011)

Canada is based on an exclusionary ideological and historical foundation. The

dominant narrative has its foundation in the original legal terms laid out in the formation

of the Dominion of Canada in 1867 and has been maintained by and through subsequent

laws and education. The laws and sentiments that informed those laws and formed

Canada as a state were inegalitarian and have embedded in them recognition of existence

and granting of rights for some and not others. The British North America (BNA) Act,

which is the founding document of Canada, outlines who is a legal person and thereby

who is entitled to vote. Women were not considered persons, nor were later immigrants,5

such as the Chinese who built the national railway, and Ukrainian farmers who began

many of the farms in the Prairie Provinces. As such, they were not legally entitled to have

their voices heard in public spaces or political discussions.6

5 Immigrants who came to the country after the wave of exploration by Europeans in the 16th Century. 6 This is not to say that all those not considered legitimate citizens were silent, however, legally, non-traditional citizens did not have political sway.

The Indian Act, the piece of

legislation that outlines the terms by which Aboriginal people are to be assimilated, and

the responsibilities of the Canadian state as the ‘protectorate’ of Native people, was made

official in the terms of the BNA Act as well. Until 1982, and the passing of the Canadian

Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the BNA Act was fundamental law, meaning that all

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federal and provincial/ territorial laws passed had to come in alignment with the terms set

out in the BNA Act. Due to the precedent based nature of Canadian federal law, the

normative BNA Act set the tone for legislation and decisions that were to follow.

It was only following a long legal battle and the passing of the Person’s Case in

1929 that women were recognized as legal persons and therefore given the right to have

their legal voices heard. Native women were the last people in Canada to get the

franchise. Legal immigrants now have legitimate status, however; who is allowed in the

country as an immigrant is largely restricted based on economic need of the country and

the value a person can add to the economy. And to this day the Indian Act remains in

legislation; there have been a few amendments, however, the majority of the Act has

stayed the same, including the recognition of the state as protectorate of all Native people

and the impossibility of Native people to own land on reserve. This signifies a crooked

foundation: one that was created in the favour of Euro-Canadian men, and one that has

informed the building of an uneven country on top of it.7

The concept of personhood is not only a measure of legal citizenship, but also of

who fits the norm; it is a symbol of the legitimate Canadian. Metaphorically, it

determines who fits in or can get into the house. Citizenship,

8

7 It is important to note the time period in which the BNA Act was passed and the Dominion of Canada was formed. At the time, it may not have been seen as unfair, by those passing the laws, to recognize certain people as citizens and others not. However, with the passing of time and changing of the public consciousness, the fact remains that these laws have been and are adamantly maintained. That some people do not want to adapt and let others into the house of Canada will be explored later in the essay. 8 A term I use to signify perceived legitimate identities in Canada.

in this way, defines what is

acceptable and unacceptable, what are desired and undesired traits and behaviours in a

person. It determines the criteria for normality and abnormality. ‘Citizen’ fits into the

hegemonic house. His is the identity that de facto defines all others’ by virtue of

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comparison. His is the image of the original Canadian, the statue in the middle of the

square, at which spectators look up in reverence. He has the power from the outside, to

give others their formal identities; the identities they are known by but not necessarily the

identities they know as true for themselves. Citizen’s self definition is exclusionary and

necessitates the degradation of others. There is not enough room in the house for

everyone, the way that its frame is built now, so the “preservation [of Citizen’s place in

it], […] require[s] contempt [and] disrespect for other[s].” (Chavez, 2008) The traditional

citizen has the power to grant legitimacy and to delegitimize based on the above grounds.

This has ramifications for anyone who does not fit in the traditional citizen frame.

I will provide a few examples of individual cases of who does not fit. Immigration is a

clear way of gauging legitimacy in potential Canadians. Single women from Africa with

HIV/ AIDS have a hard time gaining landed immigrant status. Their illness, along with

the assumption that they will be a burden on the economy, and racial prejudice culminate

and lead to a refusal of entry. People with handicaps, formerly known as ‘the infirm’ do

not fit in the frame either. They belong in their own, special houses. In the past, and today

to a lesser degree and depending on their condition, people with handicaps live in

alternative institutions, go to alternative schools, are separated, if not alienated from

Citizen’s children. Historically, mentally handicapped people were sterilized en masse,

removing the possibility of making autonomous decisions about having children

themselves. Women are marketed to in a disrespectful way, reinforcing stereotypes that

degrade confidence and encourage dependence on others for feelings of worth. The

Algonquin children in Barriere Lake, Quebec reserve play in and around a dangerous

hydro-electric dam, yet the community’s power supply comes from a diesel generator,

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often failing on the coldest days of winter. Filipino grandmothers take the toddlers of

working Euro-Canadians to the park in the morning, working for less than they would

make at Tim Horton’s. The Arabic speaking cab driver on his handless cell phone I will

undoubtedly encounter as I rush to hand this paper in was a wonderful and beloved

teacher in Yemen, but does not have the qualifications to teach in Canada.

“Heaven,

Is there a chance that you could come down and open?

Doors to hurtin’ people like me?

People like me,

People like me.”

(K’naan, 2009)

We encounter people struggling daily in part due to restrictive cultural barriers, yet we do

not hear their stories, as they would tell them. We do not share our stories. We do not

know their truths and they do not know ours. Instead, our identities are articulated by the

dominant narrative, allowing little space for our own public articulations of self.

The dominant narrative is maintained, largely, by education. Virginia Woolf, in A

Room of One’s Own, written in 1929, the same year that Euro Canadian women were

officially recognized as ‘persons’ by the Privy Council in England, looks for the truth

about women and why they are “so poor.” 9

9 The narrator of A Room of One’s Own is assumed to be Woolf herself, as the work was originally a speech given at a women and literature conference. It may well have been a fictional story or have been embellished by her imagination.

(924) She enters into the reading room at the

British Museum and “there [she stands] under the vast dome, as if [she] were a thought in

the huge bald forehead which is so splendidly encircled by a band of famous names”

(925).These are the names of the major literary authorities of her time and of today:

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“Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Pope […].” (Ibid) The image of being in the

head of a bald man implies that ‘woman’ has been created through description by these

male authors; her identity has been conjured up by these famous authors. And it has been

maintained by subsequent scholars, as is shown in A Room of One’s Own, by the

presence of a young male student next to Woolf in the reading room who has found truth

in the books. The student restates the knowledge of others, thinking that he has found

unshakable truth. Compared to her neighbour, Woolf is unable to find truth in the books

she is looking in. Whereas the “young gentleman” next to her, grunting and satisfied,

“extract[s] pure nuggets of the essential ore [of truth] every ten minutes or so,” Woolf

does not recognize what she reads as truth; it is not representative of her own reality or of

those around her. (Woolf, 926)

Woolf’s character, the ‘Angry Professor’ plays a large role in the creation and

maintenance of the dominant narrative in education. Literally, the character is a sketch of

a professor that Woolf made in the margin of her notebook unconsciously, while reading

books about women written by men. He is used to represent the auctorial force of male

academics that have defined women, past and present. She illustrates him as ugly and

angry at women for an unknown reason; Woolf ponders the reason that discourse about

women has been and is, so negative. “Could it be his wife, [or] had he been laughed at

[…] in the cradle by a pretty girl?” (928). It is implied that the Angry Professor has a

personal, emotional reason for degrading women. If true, it could be extended, that the

dominant narrative today has emotional motivations behind it as well. If the Angry

Professor makes ignorant and hateful claims about women, involving our “mental, moral

and physical inferiority,” based on personal anger and unresolved issues with the women

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in his life, academia is not an unprejudiced, rationality-based realm, but rather one that is

driven by personal motivations (Ibid). This suggests that the history and narrative we are

taught in school is not unbiased, and that there are personal motivations and emotions

behind every printed word, every statement, every decision made on what to include in

curriculums and what to ignore. The dominant narrative is a narrative, but not the

narrative, meaning, the narrative can change, if other voices and motivations enter the

discourse.

Woolf calls for equality of education in A Room of One’s Own, something that

was cited as a prerequisite for equality for women in 1920s England. Today in Canada,

the opportunity to obtain up to the highest level of education is a formal right that women

and non-traditional citizens experience.10 In fact, women, and particularly First Nations

students are encouraged through affirmative action and federal funding programs to

partake in post secondary education. Yet, for those of us in school, the things we learn do

not come from a variety of sources; our history classes are not diverse in their

perspectives. The stories of non-traditional citizens are largely not part of the discourse.

A classroom full of students of all backgrounds and identities11

10 I write ‘formal’ because we have the legal right to education but there are many barriers in many people’s way for example, financial – not being able to afford it, logistic, such as not living near a university in Northern Canada. 11 Identities are comprised of those characteristic both physical and mental that contribute to someone’s definition of self including heritage, language, religion, gender, friendships, nationality, cultural norms, as well as personal philosophies.

can sit in class and

discuss history and politics from a British or French (depending on the province) male

colonial perspective and not discuss the histories of their heritages or identities. We do

not have equality of content. We are taught the narrative of the Angry Professor; an

exogenous truth, imposed from above, not a truth originating within ourselves. We are in

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school; we are here, but often not heard, present but not accounted for in the discourse.

And we may participate, but our stories are largely not told or heard. Like students in

Woolf’s time, we still get our truths from those names listed around the dome in the

British Museum.12

12 I do not advocate the abolishment of these works by any means. The foundation cannot be broken, as it is in the past. However, the addition of newer works, pieces that represent different perspectives and statuses would open wider discussion and allow for more people’s histories to be shared.

Focusing specifically on gender, the language that is used in academia is largely

exclusionary as well. The use of the word ‘man’ to represent all of humanity is a daily

part of the narrative that reminds me of women’s exclusion. It is a constant reminder that

women are not, linguistically at least, considered an important enough category to add

when talking about the species. Our presence is implied in the category, ‘man,’ however,

that inference is hard to draw. I have no reason to believe that I am being considered as

part of man when someone uses the word in this way. The following poem illustrates an

immediate emotional reaction I had after reading about progressive inclusion in George

Lakoff’s essay, More on Traditional Views, (Lakoff & Turner, 118) only to encounter my

assumption into the identity ‘man’:

Why do I read you if you’re just going to slap me in the parts that most men distinctly do not

have?

I’m here, you know, part of the discourse.

You are a self-proclaimed progressive, the linguist, yet you exclude me in your carefully thought

out language of change.

What framework is that?

(Louw, 2011)

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The exclusionary dominant narrative in Canada was founded on early legislation

and has been maintained more or less for over one hundred and fifty years to today

through legislation, literature, historical discourse and through education. Surely, then,

‘Citizen’ is the majority in Canada for his identity to have remained the one that is used

as a measure of all others’ identities. Paradoxically, although the narrative of the

Citizen13

13 that which stems from the original sentiments and founding documents of Canada, and which has been maintained largely until today

remains in our consciousness, most people fall outside the realm of Citizen. The

over half the population of women in Canada is enough to show this. Along with the

increasing of visible minorities in urban settings, members of minorities together actually

form a majority. Perhaps it is because we live in a majority rules, first past the post,

everyone raise your hand if you want recess early system that we are conditioned to go

with the decision of the narrated majority. The majority is a fallacy – an idea in our

heads, maintained and self-perpetuated. It is a tautology: it exists in narrative form

because the narrative says it does. The hegemonic house and the citizenship guidelines

for that house represent the identities and realities of a numerical minority. The will of

the Citizen minority does not represent that of most people in Canada. Some support it as

the truth despite their own realities. Some have been deliberately forced to do so, through

assimilationist policies and education. For all those non-traditional citizens who support

and live by the notion that there is a big, real, powerful majority out there, which we need

to emulate, it is time we broke out of this narrative, and broke in with our own diverse

truths. “If truth is not to be found on the shelves of the British Museum, where, I [ask]

myself, picking up a notebook and a pencil, is truth?” (Woolf, 925)

Recognize your worth.

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Hold it, like water, cupped, in hands upturned.

Be careful. It slips through.

(Louw, 2011)

At the point in her story when she is standing in the British Museum, with the

acclaimed truth all around her, Woolf’s message emerges. She tells a room full of women

writers in her original presentation of A Room of One’s Own, that they hold the means to

discovering their own truths. This discovery, once expressed, will allow not just middle-

class British women to whom Woolf spoke but all non-traditional citizens to move

beyond the history books written by the Angry Professor and into an inclusive narrative,

a more egalitarian frame. Truth is, after all, “a mobile army of metaphors […] which

become poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, […] and after long usage

seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding”. (Nietzsche in Lakoff and Turner, 218)

Truth is not static, nor is it universal.

I will now turn the discussion to an exploration of rhetoric, and the methods in

which personal narratives can be told so as to effectively break in to the dominant

narrative, thereby delegitimizing it as the only truth. I wrote the poem below in response

to a line in a quotation by Prince Modupe in Understanding Media that explains what the

narrator’s father told him when he set out to map a region that had never been mapped

before: “Maps are liars. […] The things that hurt one do not show up on a map.” (Ibid)

I cannot map my pain.

It can only be revealed, after being concealed

for so long.

There is no map with a you are here spot: fat red arrow pointing to a black dot.

I cannot map my body.

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There are things missing; little bits taken out, these things I miss.

They are gone, down a river, unmapped.

Maybe remembered by an x-ray somewhere.

They were disposed of, served no purpose but to hinder me. These thoughts bewilder me, like

where are the parts?

On a trail there are arrows, signs to follow.

On a trail there are signs of life.

When something is cut out of your body, is it still alive? When does it die? When the stitches came

out I had to hide my eyes.

This is not a freeway. It is an old city; ruelles turning this way and that.

Little streets don’t belong on a map.

Don’t storm your army down the street, I’m trying to find the missing parts of my feet.

(Louw, 2011)

Maps are not expressions of self; they are rationalized approximations of space. They

cannot express home, they are drawn after a community is built or a new territory is

encountered. Similarly, rational, logical discourse may not serve the expression of one’s

identity as well as creative and freer media. In order for another person to see a glimpse

of one’s own truth, one has to be very persuasive. People’s conceptions of truth deal with

often inflexible, axiomatic beliefs. This is why artistic expression has a powerful role to

play: it has the ability to touch people on an emotional level, to ease away their

rationalized, determined ideas, and to cause temporary abandonment of axioms in order

for spectator to identify on an emotional level with expresser.14

14 I use the word expresser rather than artist because I am advocating for everyone to partake in self-expression, however they see fit; not only those with arts training or who consider themselves artists.

In this scenario, all the

things blocking someone’s recognition of the “white light of truth” are pushed aside, and

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people can identify with one another and momentarily see the other’s position and reality.

(Woolf, 931) All of this happens without the spectator knowing it cerebrally, because it is

done through the vehicle of emotion. “[It] is in our idleness, in our dreams, that the

submerged truth sometimes comes to the top.” (Ibid, 928)

McLuhan writes of the 20th century artistic “technique of starting with the thing to

be discovered and working back, step by step […] to the desired object.” (62) According

to this paradigm, artists, poets, composers developed an idea and then took the creative

steps necessary to create this effect. This logical creativity, this “suspended judgment,”

cannot achieve the personal expression for the purposes of self-definition that I am

advocating. (Ibid) In fact, it is possible that the opposite could occur. It suggests that a

preconceived idea of one’s identity would essentially be supported through creative

endeavour. And due to the presence of the dominant narrative in the numerical majority’s

minds, a reiteration of that narrative could result. I argue that the expression of one’s

truth requires accessing first the “red light of emotion” in order for the person to be aware

of their truth and express it honestly.15

15 This makes the person aware of their needs as well, and enables them to analyze whether they are being met by the frame that they are operating in.

(Woolf, 929)

McLuhan identifies the purpose of media as to “store and expedite information.”

(158) He goes on to say that “to store is to expedite” because storing information in

media makes it more accessible than in its pre-gathering form. (Ibid, emphasis added) In

terms of stating and sharing information about one’s personal truth, if expressed,

according to McLuhan, it has a better chance of being seen and understood by others,

thereby being more likely to enter into the narrative.

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The tone of a song can sometimes tell the listener more about the emotion of the

song than the lyrics, and the tone is an immediately internalized element of the song.

(McLuhan, 20) It is not the content of art that holds the bulk of the message, but rather

the medium itself, proposes McLuhan. He tells his reader that the “content of a medium

is like the juicy piece of meat carried by the burglar to distract the watch-dog of the

mind.” (18) In this way, more importance is placed on the medium chosen for a specific

message than the content of the message; the way something is told not what is told. This

weight on rhetoric is also emphasized by linguist George Lakoff when he writes about

how Democrats are to gain space in the public’s consciousness. It is not to be gained with

the use of statistics and fact but rather with a rhetorical approach that employs the most

unavoidable media as extensions of people’s identities. (Lakoff, 40-104) This is why an

honest expression is vital.

“Hybrid media”, which involves the creation of art with more than one media, is

proposed to have the strongest effect on people, as it breaks us out of the monotony of

predictable and common media forms. It provides “a moment of freedom and release

from the ordinary trance and numbness imposed on [us] by [our] senses.” (McLuhan, 55)

While ideal for persuasive purposes, art cannot always be expressed the way a person

wants. I feel that the most important thing is for the expression to be honest rather than

manipulated into the most effective medium. The ‘temperature’ (whether ‘hot’ or ‘cold’

as defined by McLuhan) should have attention paid to it, provided that the emotional

truth has been expressed.16

16 Hot Media: washes over the spectator requiring no involvement on their part. An example is a high definition movie. Cold Media: requires involvement of the spectator, their imagination. For example, reading a poem requires an active reading, or engagement with the text.

The expression of one’s truth being stored in ‘cold’ forms that

demand involvement by the spectator offers the opportunity for the spectator to be part of

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the expresser’s reality (or the aspect of it that is shown) for a short time. Having others

see one’s reality as that person sees it breaks down the ascriptions placed by the dominant

narrative. It lowers the statue of ‘Citizen’ in the square, and momentarily removes the

identities given by virtue of comparison to him. The participation necessitated by cold

media, therefore, is where a major possibility lies for formerly excluded narratives to

enter the discourse.

“We become what we behold”

(McLuhan, 19)

The Angry Professor’s words in textbooks and the canonic texts are expressions

of a truth, not a record of the truth. Perhaps they provide the reader with a glimpse of his

emotional truth as well; the motivation present in the media, not just his message, is

important. Similarly to the Citizen’s need to protect his limited space in the house

perhaps, so too, does the professor need to protect his elevated position. Maybe he is

“concerned not with [non-traditional citizens’] inferiority, but with his own superiority.”

(Woolf, 930) Perhaps he feels insecure with his position, perhaps he feels that if others

are let in his narrative, his existence will be drowned, and he will loose his identity, his

history. Perhaps he fears that all the things that have been done to non-Citizens will

happen to him if others gain space. The door slammed and locked, forced assimilation, a

silencing of lived realities and the adoption of the dominant one, the desire to fit in to

someone else’s identity.17

17 The major focus in Republican campaigns in the United States, writes Lakoff in Don’t Think of an Elephant is on rhetoric. Republicans need to maintain a ‘we are the majority’ mentality in order to maintain support. They know that if they loose their strong identity: the nuclear family, strict father narrative that they will be left with little powerful material to campaign with.

Perhaps Citizen and the Angry Professor share the belief that

there is a limited amount of space in the narrative; only a limited number of voices can be

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heard. This could explain why the Professor is angry: he sees the fragility of his situation,

that at any moment his identity could begin to whither from the consciousness of the

numerical majority of people.

The Professor’s anger, the desire for Citizen to maintain his house the way it is,

and the strength of the dominant narrative combine to make a compelling case for non-

traditional Citizens to break into the narrative. If a person’s story is present, they are

present.18

I have an image of a house in my head with doors that are always unlocked, with a ramp

leading up to the front door, with a door that is light and easy to open, with huge

windows to let the force of life and nature in. There is no garbage lining the city streets,

and everyone has a room of their own. For the Mohawk family there is a longhouse

room, for the Mongolian, a yurt room, the family from Mazatlan has a strong solar lamp

for the winter, for the British family the white picket fence remains, however it does not

If people do not express their truths, if they do not share these expressions, they

will either form part of the dominant narrative, bolstering the hegemonic house, or run

the risk of being defined inaccurately by those who do. For those of us who want to be

seen, who do not want to live ascribed realities, we must make our truths present.

Virginia Woolf was a thought in the head of a male author signified by the reading room

in the British Museum. Our house will not have an author but each will be their own

author; definitions of self and reality will not be conjured up and ascribed by those with

the authority to do so, rather everyone will define themselves as they see fit.

18 Similarly, if people engage in criticism of the dominant narrative but do not provide an alternative, namely one stemmed in one’s own identity, they end up reiterating the dominant narrative. Constant repetition of the same concepts over and over seems to lend to a bolstering of those concepts. This is Lakoff’s thesis regarding the phrase ‘don’t think of an elephant’: even if one says ‘don’t’ before, as if to say it is a negative thing, the word ‘elephant’ still gets repeated, and that is what is retained in the end. (Lakoff, 1-5)

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symbolize the inevitability of the nuclear family, two kids one dog one goldfish. There are

some gender-neutral bathrooms and some with low sinks so that the man in the

wheelchair can reach. The house is solid but not static, grounded but not stubborn in its

constitution. It is a work in progress. It has space for more people, more identities to be

added. Its frame does not define others in its own shape, but rather provides the space for

people to do this themselves.

“The highly developed situation is, by definition, low in opportunities of

participation.” (McLuhan, 29) A house that people participate in forming, then, does not

have a ‘highly developed’ or ‘hot’ frame, one that determines everything that comes in

and the shape of the things that come in. Rather, it has space to shift in order to allow

people the opportunity to live their own realities, according to their own definitions of

self. The telling of one’s story, in an engaging and honest way, can make others see one’s

reality. This is not a new idea - artists through the generations seem to have known this,

however, I feel it is worth restating. This is how I propose non-Citizens break into the

dominant narrative in Canada; it is the way that we can make space for ourselves in the

currently hegemonic house.

I have explored the exclusionary foundation and maintenance of Canadian

identity through laws and education, and provided an analysis of the ways in which

people’s truths can be expressed. Through this I hope to have shown that ‘cold’ personal

expression is the most likely way for non-traditional citizens to make space for

themselves in the narrative. We can create a more even house, even given the imbalanced

foundation it rests on, but it is going to involve a lot of paper, pencils, guitars,

paintbrushes.

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References Chavez, C., Stavens, I. (2008). An Organizer’s Tale: Speeches. Penguin Books. Grant, G. (1997). Lament for a Nation. McGill-Queens University Press. K’naan. (2009). People Like Me. In Troubadour. A&M/ Octone Records. Lakoff, G., Dean, H., & Hazen, D. (2004). Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your

Values and Frame the Debate--The Essential Guide for Progressives (1st ed.). Chelsea Green.

Lakoff, G., & Turner, M, (1989). More than Cool Reason: a Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor. University of Chicago Press.

Louw, A. (2011). Selected Poems. www.aimeelouw.blogspot.com. Retrieved on April 20, 2011.

McLuhan, M., & Lapham, L. H. (1994). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. The MIT Press.

Woolf, V. (1929). A Room of One’s Own. In J. W. Clinton et al., The Norton Anthology of World Literature (Shorter Second Edition) (pp. 924-943). W. W. Norton & Company.

Pioneer Edition - Spring 2012 A Political Science Students’ Association of Concordia University Initiative