POLICY TOWARD THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY: A

FOCUSED COMPARISON OF CASES REGARDING SIERRA

LEONE, CROATIA, AND IRAQ.

Taylor B. Clausen Political Science Honors Thesis, Pepperdine University

March 30, 2015

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On October 2, 2007, the world was introduced to Erik Prince, the CEO of what

would be described as the “worlds most powerful mercenary army” Blackwater USA.1 In

front of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Chairmen Henry

Waxmen (D-CA) began what would be hours of intensive questioning by members of

Congress regarding the most basic questions of private security contracting.2 Why were

they hired? What purpose were they serving? Why were these contractors being used in

place of U.S. soldiers? Not only were these questions being asked by members of

Congress, they reflected questions in the minds of every American and citizen around the

world. This hearing was the coming out party of the private military industry, and the

conversation about conflict, government responsibility, and twenty-first century warfare

would never be the same. The presence of private military firms involved in the process

of twenty-first century conflict effectively ends the long-held theory that states hold a

monopoly of force.3 In the world’s current state of affairs, private military firms are

challenging long held beliefs on how states and non-state actors are able to employ

military force. Today’s current climate of security challenges presents the ideal time to

study this topic. Experts in the field such as P. W. Singer,4 Alan Axelrod,5 and

Christopher Kinsey6 have focused their study by examining one particular firm at time,

drawing from a firm’s operations in multiple states. I seek to re-focus the study of the

1 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, (New York, New York: Nation Books, 2007). 2 Nancy Pelosi’s YouTube Channel, “Blackwater Hearing: Waxman’s Opening,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KseYmZNuE7Y (Oct. 2, 2007). 3 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 1918 http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/ethos/Weber-vocation.pdf 4 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007). 5 Alan Axelrod, Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies, (Los Angeles, California: Sage Publications, 2014). 6 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (New York, New York: Routledge, 2006).

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private military industry by placing the states and their respective conflicts at the center

of study in order to address policy implications.

Specifically, I seek to address the question of how the U.S. Government should

initiate policy toward the private military industry. The organization of this paper is split

into five sections, which include a literature review, research design, cases studies,

findings, and policy implications and recommendations. The literature review

summarizes the existing literature on the resurgence of private military firms by

addressing the key concepts of stereotypes and definitions, the effect of PMF’s on states,

and the regulation of the industry. This summarization provides the necessary

understanding for questions, included in the research design, that are based on the three

issue areas of effectiveness, private networks, and “foreign policy by proxy” powers of

PMFs that future policy can affect. The research design details the process in which I

conduct a focused comparison of cases that consists of Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Iraq.

Based upon the results of the comparisons, I draw several context-dependent

generalizations that serve as the evidence and support for policy directions regarding

future legislation. This method is superior for assessing policy directions because the

evidence generated is from three separate cases that differ in time and regional area.

Other methods only examine one specific situation within the areas of effectiveness,

private networks, and “foreign policy by proxy”. This study is needed because the

context-dependent generalizations that come from the focused comparison of cases have

not been produced by other existing studies.

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Literature Review

Stereotypes and Defining Private Military Firms

Private military firms challenge the basic assumption that warfare is only

conducted by public militaries. In reality, the market for warfare in today’s conflict is a

mixed batch between public and private entities. Private military firms are an essential

part of many developed nations defense infrastructures including the United States,

Britain, and Australia.7 This is because contractors are understood by policy makers to be

both cost-efficient and effective at the jobs they are contracted to perform. However, the

common stereotype exists that all private military contractors are “mercenaries” with the

negative connotation that they cannot fight for just causes.8 In reality, a mercenary is

defined in Article 1 of the UN Mercenary Convention as any person who 1 (a) is

specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict (b) is motivated

to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is

promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict material compensation… (C) is

neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party

to the conflict (d) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict and (e)

has not been sent by a state which not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member

of its armed forces.9 The highly corporatized structure of the private military industry

goes beyond this traditional understanding of mercenaries in that many of the employees

of private military firms are nationals of a party to conflicts and private gain is redefined

7 Thomas K. Adams, “The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict,” Parameters 29:2 (Summer 1999): 103-116. 8 James L. Taulbee, “Reflections on the Mercenary Option,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 9:2 (1998): 145-163. 9 United Nations, International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, A/RES/44/34 (December 1989): Article 1.

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into corporate profit.10 This is not to say that there have been criticisms in the way private

military firms have attempted to legitimize themselves outside this definition of

“mercenaries.” Dr. Abdel-Fatsu Musah of King’s College in London is one such critic

who claims, “Private military companies are nothing but the old poison of vagabond

mercenaries in new designer bottles.”11 While Musah and Fayemi’s criticisms may hold

merit, criticism of the private military industry is not a new phenomenon. The rise of

nationalism as the predominant organization of states began in the 1700’s, which added a

negative connotation to the term “mercenary”.12 These individuals were largely viewed as

disloyal whereas civic soldiers were upheld as patriotic.13

In regards to the academic study of private military firms, researchers have found

it necessary to have clear operational definitions of private military firms. While many

researchers have provided their own definitions, Peter W. Singer provides the most robust

and clear reasoning.14 He breaks the industry down into three distinct types of firms with

the distinguishing factor being the distance of the firm’s activity from the battlefield.15

These three categories are military provider firms, military consultant firms, and military

support firms. Military provider firms administer services at the forefront of battle and

actively engage in conflict, which military consultant and provider firms do not

participate in. Military consultant firms help to train and advise existing armies, but do

not imbed their own employees with these forces on the battlefield as a military provider

firm would. The final type of private military firm is the military support firm. These

10 Singer, 13. 11 Abdel-Fatau Musah, Kayode J. Fayemi, Mercenaries : An African Security Dilemma, (London, United Kingdom: Pluto Press, 2000), 264. 12 Axelrod, 105. 13 Singer, 31. 14 Singer, 91. 15 Singer, 92.

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companies look to specialize in the logistical aspect of war such as transportation, food,

and construction projects. These firms are farthest removed from the trigger-pulling

aspects of warfare. All three of these definitions help to distinguish the industry into parts

that will help to clarify the roles different firms have had in the states chosen for the

focused comparison of cases.

The Effect of PMF’s on States

Dr. Anna Leander, a scholar who has written extensively on the implications of

private military firms, details the influence PMF’s have in lobbying power. She uses the

claim that the dimensions of power lie in the agenda-setting capacity before and after

formal decision-making.16 While governments drove the ascension of private military

firms by their need to reduce budgets and focus on “core functions,”17 she now claims

private military firms have the ability to shape the security agenda. Through their

influence of lobbying and network of powerful key actors, they can influence states

through their “epistemic power.”18 This power can be used to manipulate the

understanding of security into more militaristic terms that empowers private military

firms as legitimate security experts.19 P.W. Singer’s explanations appear to assume

private military firms only react to conditions created by the international system, while

Leander asserts that private military firms have the ability to create employment

16 Peter Bacharach, Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). 17 Christopher Coker, “Outsourcing War,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 13:1 (1998): 95-113, 111. 18 Anna Leander, “The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 33 (Summer 2005): 803-825, 811. 19 Leander, 821.

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opportunities through their structural power in the system as security experts.20 This

possibility is examined by the questions of private networks in this study.

Private military firms, as corporate entities, also enjoy the benefits of possessing

the ability to subcontract, “spin-off”, and form shell companies.21 The ability to

subcontract can reduce costs as well as hide the extent to which the firm is involved in

the state. “Spin-off” capability is when a firm can create another company that is

operating within legal boundaries of the client state following the termination of a

contract. The formation of shell companies is similar to subcontracting, except that the

companies that are contracted are still owned by the private military firm in which the

client state formed a contract with. These are all powerful tools that can work both to the

benefit and detriment of the state’s agendas when contracting PMF’s.

While the available tools give PMF’s the ability to influence states, PMF’s can

also be a tool of the state. “Foreign policy by proxy” is a term that refers to a situation in

which a state may choose to employ a PMF to avoid oversight and/or legal parameters.22

Such was the case during the Clinton administration and “Plan Colombia,” where

DynCorp was hired to combat the drug cartels in Colombia due to signals from Congress

there were to be no U.S. troops on the ground for this purpose.23 The tools available to

PMF’s provide a number of interesting implications and options for states as they engage

with the private military industry.

20 Ibid. 21 “Bullets for Hire,” The Economist, November 17, 2012. http://www.economist.com/news/international/21566625-business-private-armies-not-only-growing-changing-shape-bullets-hire 22 Anna Leander, “Privatizing Military Training,” Foreign Policy In Focus 7:6 (May 2002): 3. 23 Jim Rochlin, “Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC,” Review of International Studies 37:02 (April 2011): 715-740, 725.

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Regulation of Private Military Firms The responsibility of regulating private military firms is ultimately placed in the

hands of states.24 However, many countries that have private military firms headquartered

within their borders have failed to legislate appropriate law allowing for effective

regulation of the industry. In order to fill the gap created by the lack of regulation at the

national level, the international system has attempted to better understand how

accountability can be attained within the industry. The United Nations in 2008

established the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Mercenaries.25 Their stated

objective is to investigate the relationship between human rights and the activities of

private military firms. Since the group’s inception, they have come to four main

conclusions about the industries impact on human rights.26 The first finding indicates that

the expansion of the private military industry has increased the amount of contact

between contractors and civilian populations. Second, there currently is no meaningful

regulation of the industry at the national level. Third, there are no vetting standards for

the personnel private military firms sent into conflict zones. The final conclusion reached

by the group was that private military firms are transnational in nature, and international

law does not fill the gap left by the lack of national legislation. One realistic scenario

within the private military industry could be a firm that is contracted by the United

Kingdom, which recruits employees from Malta to work on a vessel flagged in Liberia,

24 Carsten Hoppe, “Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Military Companies,” The European Journal of International Law 19:5 (2008): 989-1014, 1012. 25 Human Rights Council, Mandate of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Resolution 7/21 (March 28, 2008). 26Fazia Patel, “Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: A Comprehensive Solution,” American Society of International Law 107 (April 2013): 201-203, 201.

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which in turn protects a crew from Somali pirates in international waters.27 The problem

still exists that even if meaningful regulation were put into place at the national level,

private military firms have a keen ability to work around legislation. Private military

firms have the ability to place their headquarters in any part of the globe. In addition,

some firms are digital in nature, which allows the entire operation to be conducted by a

few employees and a computer. Arms, equipment, and additional personnel can be

summoned in a mere matter of weeks, further complicating the regulatory system toward

the private military industry.28

In the United States, the regulatory framework that applies to private military

firms is a patchwork of different initiatives. While government activities are generally

open to examination under laws such as the Freedom of Information Act, private military

contracts are protected under proprietary law, often making their activities completely

deniable.29 The State Department claims that they cannot provide the information to the

public on private military contracts due to the need to protect proprietary information.

Private military firms claim they cannot disclose details of contracts due to government

restrictions. The end result is a paradox where both parties claim they cannot disclose

information due to the other party, which shields contract work from civilian scrutiny and

congressional oversight.30 This existing regulatory framework allows the private military

industry to be a secret option for the Executive Branch, which is reminiscent of previous

occasions in history where private options allowed for politically expedient policy.31

27 Patel, 202. 28 Singer, 75. 29 Singer, preface. 30 Singer, 214. 31 Deborah C. Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies: Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 12,” Combat Studies Institute Press (2005): 3.

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The lack of national and international regulation toward private military firms

often leaves the check on power in individual hands. One such example occurred when a

whistleblower working for DynCorp accused fellow employees of sex crimes with girls

as young as twelve years old while operating under a contract in the Balkans.32 DynCorp

fired the whistleblower and whisked the employees back to the United States, out of the

reach of local authorities. DynCorp was later sued for this under the Racketeer Influenced

Corrupt Organization Act33, However, this example demonstrates the lengths to which

private military firms will go to protect their reputation. Often times the reputation of a

firm is the only guarantee of continued contracts from states, which creates an incentive

to avoid legal situations with regulatory systems.34

Due to the extensive use of private military firms to support the U.S. led coalition

troops in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade, then Secretary of Defense Robert

Gates and Congress worked to advance a regulatory framework that applied in this

operational situation.35 The first adjustment to existing U.S. law was that private military

contractors were subjected to court-martial jurisdiction under an amendment to the

Uniform Code of Military Justice.36 The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was

also amended to apply to certain non-Department of Defense contractors working within

the military overseas.37 However, both of these improvements in the legal framework of

the United States still allows for contractors to remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S.

32 David Isenberg, “It's Déjà Vu for DynCorp All Over Again,” The Huffington Post, Dec. 6, 2010 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/its-dj-vu-for-dyncorp-all_b_792394.html?). 33 Robert Capps, “Outside the Law,” Salon, Jun. 26, 2002 (http://www.salon.com/2002/06/26/bosnia_4/). 34 Singer, 74. 35 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Challenges Facing the Department of Defense, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 7, 2009. 36 Jennifer K. Elsea, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues,” Congressional Research Service (January 7, 2010): 29. 37 Elsea, 29.

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courts, civil or military, for improper conduct in Iraq or Afghanistan.38 Recently, four

former guards of the military provider firm Blackwater USA were prosecuted by the U.S.

Justice Department for their role in the Nisour Square shootings that took place in Iraq in

2007.39 The conviction confirmed the possibility of enforcement and regulation of private

military contractors; however, the seven years it took to reach this conviction affirmed

the tedious and difficult process of doing so.40

Following the 2007 Nisour Square shooting in Iraq, the international community

started a drafting process of standards that could be applied internally by Executive

Branch agencies as well as private military firms. The process resulted in the

International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC).41 This

standard is applied voluntarily and is an alternative to passing legislation through national

bodies or through international assemblies. More information on these standards is

provided in the policy implications section.

The topics of the literature summarized above provide the necessary basis for

further understanding the selected issue areas of effectiveness, private networks, and

“foreign policy by proxy”. These three selected topics are all areas where policy has the

ability to affect the private military industry and are inquired further by the respective

research questions.

38 Elsea, 29. 39 Matt Apuzza, “Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings.” The New York Times, Oct. 22, 2014 (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html). 40 Spencer S. Hsu, "After Seven Years, American Jury to Decide Blackwater Guards' Role in Iraqi Deaths," The Washington Post, Aug. 27, 2014 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/after-seven-years-american-jury-to-decide-blackwater-guards-role-in-iraqi-deaths/2014/08/27/db714136-2d55-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html). 41 ICoC Timeline, International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. (http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoC_Timeline.html).

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Research Design

In this paper, I conducted a focused comparison of cases to better understand how

to initiate policy toward the private military industry.42 The issue areas chosen were

effectiveness, private networks, and “foreign policy by proxy.” The focused comparison

of cases methodology is a systematic comparison of case studies where sets of general,

standardized research questions are applied to the study of each case. In this paper, I

have listed the set of research questions employed in table 1. This research design

produced context-dependent generalizations that proved useful in formulating future

policy toward private military firms.

Table 1

Effectiveness Private Networks Foreign Policy by Proxy

What type of firm(s) was involved in the state?

Did the firm(s) have spin-off capabilities?

Was there a previous military engagement to

provide security by a state or colonial power?

Why was the firm(s) hired? If so, does the firm(s) have any role in the state today?

During the conflict, was there any U.N. law

regulating intervention or engagement?

To what extent was the firm successful?

Is/was the firm(s) involved in any other network of

private firms or individuals?

Is there evidence of the country, in which the PMF

was based, assisting the work of the PMF?

I defined the term “success” in the issue area of effectiveness by using the same

criteria private military firms market their services to states. This included the claims of

reduction in costs, overall skill and professionalism, and completion of the contract

agreed to between the firm and state. Effectiveness was determined by the reasons for

42 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), Ch. 3.

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which the firm was hired. Private investments were examined by the ability to “spin-off”

using shell companies and subcontractors, the level of involvement the firms have in the

state presently, and the networks that made up these firms. Lastly, “foreign policy by

proxy” was examined using the questions listed to get a better understanding of how

these firms might have been used to extend conflicts beyond oversight and legal

boundaries. The data used to evaluate this came from a multitude of sources including

existing case studies, scholarly articles, pieces from investigative journalists, press

releases from private military firms, and existing literature on the operations of these

firms. Each case study is organized in the manner of a brief description of the conflict,

followed by an in-depth look at each selected private military firm that was involved in

the state selected. Next, there is an analysis that covers the overarching themes that each

conflict presented to all international actors involved in the conflict. The conclusion

systematically answers the case study questions, using evidence provided by the in-depth

activities of the firms and the analysis presented.

The three states I compared are Iraq, Croatia, and Sierra Leone. In all three of

these states, private military firms had a significant impact on the formation or

sustainment of the states sovereignty and continuing development. These three states

contain contrasting similarities and differences, which allowed them to be prime

candidates for study. The first difference is that each state is located in a different

regional area of study in the world. Iraq is in the Middle East, Croatia in Eastern Europe,

and Sierra Leone in West Africa. The focused comparison of cases results allowed for the

findings to transcend regional areas of focused research. The second difference is that

private military firms affected each state during different time periods. Private military

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contractors began operating in Iraq from 2003 through the present day while in Croatia

and Sierra Leone they were active in the mid 1990’s. The three states selected cover over

twenty years of recent history. This allows the analysis of the study to go beyond any one

particular time period.

While the states chosen do differ in both time of conflict and geographical

locations, there is one similarity that deserves mention. All three of the states were

significantly impacted by the role of private military firms within their borders. In Iraq,

private military firms were essential in providing logistical support to coalition troops

while also embedding into troop regiments engaged in combat. In Croatia, private

military firms educated Croatian officers and helped to change the tide of war in their

favor. In Sierra Leone, private military firms were able to stop the advance of RUF rebels

threatening the capital Freetown. It is safe to assume that these countries would not be the

same today without the involvement of private military firms.

The results of the focused comparison of cases provided the conclusions

necessary to answer the question how the United States will initiate policy toward the

private military industry. In all three of the core issue areas, future policy has the ability

to vastly change the capability of the industry. Overall, this study was needed because it

generated context-dependent generalizations through the examination of three case

studies. Governments, when formulating future policy toward the private military

industry, will use these generalizations as evidence to support their actions or inactions.

The evidence produced by the focused comparison of cases method is inherently superior

when formulating policy. This is because the generalization that is being used as evidence

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is drawn from multiple cases instead of one specific instance involving a state and a

private military firm.

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Case Studies

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone was engaged in a brutal civil war from 1991 to 2002 that gravely

threatened the stability and sovereignty of the country. The conflict displaced over two

million people with a death toll in the tens of thousands.43 Early in the conflict, the

government of Sierra Leone struggled to combat the rebel Revolutionary United Front

(RUF). In the early part of 1994, the civil war escalated to a point of desperation for the

National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) of Sierra Leone. The RUF had captured the

country’s diamond, titanium oxide, and bauxite mines and was threatening to overrun the

capital city of Freetown. The NPRC sought outside intervention from private military

firms in order to save the country and its fragile economy. A motivating factor for this

decision was that in 1994, forty percent of GDP was represented by the mining industry

that was no longer contributing revenue to the country.44 In examining the roles of private

military firms that operated in Sierra Leone, it is critical to understand that the political

economy of the country largely rests on the desire of individuals and groups to profit

from the resources at the expense of national development.45 While other resource-rich

developing states have this problem as well, it became increasingly difficult for Sierra

Leone to manage the individuals and groups as the civil war progressed.

A curse and blessing throughout the civil war, the Kono diamond fields are

estimated to be worth billions of dollars and rests eight kilometers from neighboring

43 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, Sierra Leone, (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html). 44 World DataBank, “Sierra Leone Industry, Value Added (%GDP),” The World Bank, databank.worldbank.org (February 2015). 45 Paul Williams, “Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone” Contemporary Security Policy 22:3 (September 2010): 141.

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Liberia.46 A classic example of the resource curse, it was a primary source of revenue for

the government and also the lynchpin that could lead to the country’s collapse if

compromised.47 Charles Taylor, a Liberian warlord who would eventually become

president through barbaric and heinous war crimes, sought to cripple Sierra Leone for its

support of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

(ECOMOG). This primarily Nigerian-led force tried and failed to prevent Charles Taylor

from winning the Liberian Civil war. Taylor’s response was to assist the RUF with arms,

training, and financial assistance.48 Weapons were able to flow freely across the border

and training was conducted in Benghazi, Libya, where the Commander of the RUF

(Forday Sanko) and Charles Taylor originally met before he became president of

Liberia.49 Taylor was able to provide financial intermediation through the purchase of

looted diamonds, acting as a legitimate threshold into the market and solving the complex

issue of generating revenue from an illegally seized commodity. Evidence of this

relationship appeared during the civil war when Liberia’s diamond exports were greater

then domestic production.50

With limited number of options and an ineffective military, the National

Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) of Sierra Leone contracted J&S Franklin, a British

defense security firm and manufacturer of weapon systems to assist in training its

military officers. J&S Franklin subcontracted this job to Gurkha Security Guards

46 Ian Douglas, “Fighting for Diamonds – Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone,” Institute for Security Studies Africa (1999): 175-197, 175. 47 J. Andrew Grant, “Diamonds, Foreign Aid and the Uncertain Prospects for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 94:381 (2005): 443-457, 452. 48 Douglas, 177. 49 Leslie Hough, “A Study of Peacekeeping, Peace-Enforcement and Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone,” African Security Review 16:4 (2007): 7-21, 10. 50 Williams, 144.

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(GSG).51 In February of 1994, GSG arrived with fifty-eight Gurkhas and three European

managers to begin training Sierra Leone Special Forces and later infantry officer cadets.

GSG was also responsible for securing the crucial “Camp Charlie” military base and had

early success in pacifying the surrounding rebel-held areas. However, this early success

was marred when the three European managers were scouting a region with Gurkhas and

infantry troops when they stumbled upon a RUF base. All three of the European

managers were killed along with many of the troops.52 At this point, the British

Government feared it would be linked to the activities of GSG and that several of the

British hostages held by the RUF would be executed.53 When deployed in warfare, their

adversaries saw Gurkhas as a proxy of the British Government, despite in this case being

employed by a private firm. In order to respond to the situation, the British Government

released a statement saying:

We have not been giving any military assistance to the government of Sierra Leone. We have made this perfectly clear to the RUF, but if people who are no longer in the British Army decide to sell their services elsewhere we cannot stop them. They can do what they like with their specialist knowledge as long as they don’t break British laws.54

The RUF advances, despite GSG’s services, greatly concerned the NPRC.

Wanting to take greater offensive action, they lobbied GSG to pursue offensive

capabilities in combating the RUF. The NPRC specifically wanted Gurkhas to imbed and

fight alongside Sierra Leone forces (RSLMF) as a military provider firm would be able to

offer. Anthony Husher, the co-director of GSG in an interview with Alex Vines, stated

51 Alex Vines, “Gurkhas and the Private Security Business in Africa,” Institute for Security Studies Africa (1999): 123-136, 128. 52 Charles Dokumbo, “An Army for Rent, Private Military Corporations and Civil Conflicts in Africa: The Case of Sierra Leone,” Civil Wars 3:2 (Summer 2000): 51-64, 57. 53 Vines, 131. 54 Dokumbo, 58.

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that in addition to the firm’s intolerance of offensive capability, Executive Outcomes, a

rival firm bidding for its contract, did not offer their employees comprehensive insurance

cover or demand an upfront fee from the government.55 GSG refused to lower costs and

have Gurkhas fight alongside the Sierra Leone forces, which ultimately resulted in the

NPRC ending their contract and replacing them with Executive Outcomes.

GSG’s loss of senior leadership and refusal to take on offensive warfare

capabilities allowed Executive Outcomes to take over security operations for the NPRC.

Executive Outcomes was classified as a military provider firm that worked in close

concert with a number of different firms that shared a close network of founders and

majority shareholders. In fact, Strategic Resources Corporation was the parent

multinational firm that owned Executive Outcomes as well as Branch Energy (oil

company), DiamondWorks (mining company), and Sandline International (military

consultant firm). All of these firms held significant investments in Sierra Leone.56 This

close network can be largely attributed to one individual, Tony Buckingham, who either

founded or held significant shareholdings in each of the companies as a director at

Strategic Resource Corporation. In addition, he was a former SAS officer in the British

military. His service is believed to have assisted him in developing personal relationships

with influential people in Sierra Leone, as well as in the British Government. GSG, in an

attempt to salvage its position in the country, attempted to form a joint venture with

Sandline, a military consulting firm like itself. However, Sandline rejected its offer,

instead deferring the contract to Executive Outcomes.57 Tony Buckingham represented

55 Antony Husher, as quoted in Vines, 132. 56 David J. Francis, “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?” Third World Quarterly 20:2 (April 1999): 319-338, 323. 57 Vines, 132

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Executive Outcomes in negotiations between the company and the NPRC, a meeting that

he personally arranged.58 Executive Outcomes, as a military provider firm, was able to

fulfill the NPRC’s request of highly skilled offensive capabilities against the RUF.

The contract between Executive Outcomes and Sierra Leone cost the NPRC

$1.225 million a month as well as large mining concessions in the Kono diamond field,

which were allocated to Branch Energy.59 Upon acceptance of the contract, Executive

Outcomes conducted an internal military analysis of the security situation and

recommended a three-prong approach.60 The first objective was to reverse the RUF

advances toward the surrounding capitol city of Freetown. The second was to stabilize

the mining fields, while the final objective was to locate and destroy the RUF

headquarters. These three mission objectives were seemingly ordinary and predictable.

What was un-predictable and shocking to international observers was the speed and

ruthless efficiency that Executive Outcomes was able to accomplish all three. In two

weeks, the RUF was driven from the outskirts of Freetown. In two months, all three

stated objectives had been accomplished. Executive Outcome operators described

fighting the RUF as “child’s play.”61 For the first time in twenty-three years, Sierra Leone

held free democratic elections. The outcome resulted in Ahmed Tejan Kabbah ascending

to the presidency.62 The RUF had been severely beaten back and was forced to the

negotiating table.

58 Douglas, 179. 59 Dokumbo, 58. 60 Francis, 327. 61 William Reno, “Foreign Firms, Natural Resources and Violent Political Economies,” University of Leipzig Papers on Africa: Politics and Economics Series 46:46 (2001): 1-23. 62 Francis, 327

Clausen 20

On November 30, 1996, the newly elected President Kabbah and Commander

Sanko of the RUF signed a peace accord in Abijan.63 One of the signing conditions for

the RUF was the removal of Executive Outcomes from the country and the establishment

of the RUF as a political party.64 A UN peacekeeping group was assigned to Sierra

Leone, which helped to reassure President Kabbah of the looming security gap caused by

Executive Outcome’s ensuing departure. The International Monetary Fund also played a

role in the peace process and may have also encouraged the termination of Executive

Outcomes from the country. It is known that the IMF pressured Sierra Leone to reduce its

deficit.65 People close to the IMF say they did not specify how, while others claim they

pushed for the expensive contract with Executive Outcomes to be terminated. A famous

declaration as to the confidence and knowledge that Executive Outcomes possessed, the

firm declared that if the contract were terminated, Kabbah would be overthrown by a

coup in less than 100 days.66 On January 31, 1997, Sierra Leone terminated the contract

with Executive Outcomes. The coup took place on May 25, 1997, the eighty-fifth day

after the firm’s withdrawal.67

The decision to expel Executive Outcomes proved disastrous. President Kabbah

was exiled to the Republic of Guinea where he desperately pleaded with the Nigerian

Government to intervene.68 Toward the end of May, a Nigerian led operation attempted

to secure Freetown, but failed miserably, killing hundreds of civilians in the process.69

Seeking other options, Kabbah reached out to Sandline International, the firm tied to

63 Douglas, 186 64 Hough, 9. 65 Douglas, 187 66 Hough, 10. 67 Douglas, 189. 68 Douglas, 189. 69 Douglas, 189.

Clausen 21

Executive Outcomes and DiamondWorks. Executive Outcomes remained present by

protecting the mining fields owned by DiamondWorks and Branch Energy through their

spin off firm Lifeguard, which was essentially Executive Outcomes operating under a

different name.70 Sandline later acquired Lifeguard from Executive Outcomes.

During President Kabbah’s exile, the RUF and a military junta formed the Armed

Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which ruled the country with devastating

brutality. The ousted government of President Kabbah hired Sandline International for

the purpose of reinstating the civilian led government. The British Foreign Office

covertly approved this action, which was illegal due to United Nations Security

Resolution 1132, which prohibited arms shipments to Sierra Leone.71 Documents later

released by Sandline’s lawyers showed that British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone,

Peter Penfold, was the one who suggested Sandline’s services to Kabbah.72 Financing for

the contract came again from DiamondWorks and Branch Energy. As before, diamond

mine concessions were made as a form of payment for the restoration of the civilian

government. Sandline shipped approximately up to thirty-five tons of Bulgarian arms and

ammunition into the region supporting both the Kabbah administration and ECOMOG

forces fighting in Liberia.73 Sandline’s operational role in the country was limited to that

of a military consulting firm in which it provided arms, advice on air strikes, intelligence,

medical supplies, and transportation of troops.74 Sandline was successful and the civilian

government was restored in February 1998. Despite its military success in reinstating a

70 Francis, 234. 71 UN Security Resolution 1132, S/RES/1132, October 8, 1997 (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/267/13/PDF/N9726713.pdf?OpenElement). 72 Dokubo, 12. 73 Francis, 328. 74 Ibid.

Clausen 22

civilian ran government in Sierra Leone, diplomatic negotiations between the RUF and

the Kabbah administration placed the country in peril. The Lome Peace Accord was

signed in 1999, which gave the RUF commander Foday Sankoh the vice presidency and

control of the remaining, un-appropriated, diamond mines.75 As part of the peace accord,

Sandline’s contract with Sierra Leone was terminated.

In addition, Sandline’s reputation of causing political controversy did not escape

its involvement in Sierra Leone. Previously, the firm’s reputation was scarred as its

actions in Pupae New Guinea and Bougainville caused a political scandal that became

commonly referred to as the “Sandline affair.”76 Once again, British Customs and Excise

officers found Sandline in violation of supplying illicit weaponry to Sierra Leone. Such

actions were illegal under the UN-imposed arms embargo.77 While Sandline came under

investigation as the firm that was conducting arms shipments, the firm’s legal team

retorted stating it had covert approval from the British Foreign Office.78 This contradicted

the actions of Prime Minister Blair against oversight authorities of the British

Government and compliance with international law. Once Sandline provided legitimate

evidence to support its claim of having the blessing of the British Government, all

charges against Sandline were dropped; proving an embarrassing moment for the Blair

Government which had pledged an “ethical foreign policy” in Africa, meaning full

compliance with United Nations law. Going further, Sandline’s lawyers also released

statements saying that they had informed the Clinton administration, the Department of

Defense and the State Department of its activities and that the U.S. gave its tacit approval

75 Douglas, 186. 76 Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair, (Edinburgh, Great Britain: Mainstream Publishing, 1999). 203-223. 77 Douglas, 194. 78 Francis, 334.

Clausen 23

to the arms shipments and training.79 It became clear that both Britain and the United

States had circumnavigated a United Nations arms embargo to illegally advance the goal

of re-establishing President Kabbah as the leader of Sierra Leone.80 Both governments

defended their actions of assisting Kabbah, through Sandline, as an ethical foreign policy

objective despite being illegal.

After Sandline’s departure from Sierra Leone, the RUF once again was advancing

upon Freetown. This time Britain, along with the United Nations, decided to intervene

militarily. There were several reasons as to why Britain was now willing to intervene

when it had been previously insistent on keeping ground troops out of Sierra Leone. At

this point, British nationals lives were at risk, the United Kingdom was Sierra Leone’s

former colonial power, there was a great deal of embarrassment due to the failure of the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1998 to prevent arms shipments in breach of UN

Sanctions, criticism that the UK was slow to react to the Mozambique floods of 2000,

and finally the fact that UN forces were now present in Sierra Leone.81 This list of

reasons combined with the seemingly undeniable fact that Sierra Leone would fail

without intervention convinced Britain to deploy troops. In 2000, the United Kingdom

launched Operation Palliser along with a United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, which

consequently eliminated the RUF and established President Kabbah as the leader of

Sierra Leone in 2002.82 Shortly after reclaiming the government, President Kabbah

declared the civil war over.

79 Raymond Bonner, “U.S. Reportedly Backed British Mercenary Group in Africa,” New York Times, May 13, 1998 (http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/us-reportedly-backed-british-mercenary-group-in-africa.html). 80 Douglas, 194. 81 Richard Connaughton, “The Mechanics and Nature of British Interventions into Sierra Leone (2000) and Afghanistan (2001-2002),” Civil Wars 5:2 (September 2007): 77-95, 83. 82 Connaughton, p. 83.

Clausen 24

Throughout the civil war in Sierra Leone, two of the three types of private

military firms were active in the state. GSG and Sandline’s operations can be defined

under the definition of a military consulting firm. The firm’s actions fell within the

parameters of training, equipping, and providing tactical logistical support to the existing

state’s forces. Neither firm imbedded its employees into the force that was conducting

combat operations. The NPRC’s security needs changed, which initiated the contract with

military provider firm Executive Outcomes. Its employees conducted full-scale combat

operations in place of Sierra Leone forces, resting it firmly in the military provider

category. GSG was hired for the reason that its services would yield two results. The first

was the belief that its training program would allow Sierra Leone forces to have the

capability and effectiveness to recapture the mining fields. The second was the

subsequent removal of the RUF from Sierra Leone territory. Executive Outcomes was

hired for more desperate reasons. The first was the need for an effective fighting force to

combat the RUF. The assessment by the NPRC of its security situation suggests that they

did not believe there was enough time for the Sierra Leone forces to become this

effective fighting force. The second reason Executive Outcomes was hired was due to the

legitimacy and interpersonal relationships of Tony Buckingham, as evidenced through his

personal negotiation of the Executive Outcomes contract with the NPRC. Due to the

civilian-led governments exile from Sierra Leone as a result of the security vacuum left

by Executive Outcome’s exit, the suggestion of contracting Sandline was the result of a

comment made by the British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold.

Sandline was hired to regain lost territory and restore the Kabbah administration to

power. All three firms effectiveness varies depending upon the criterion used to evaluate

Clausen 25

the services that were employed. GSG was effective until its leadership was killed, the

end result of this peculiar event being that it was not able to meet the needs of the client

and therefore, not successful. Executive Outcomes was able to fulfill every request that

was asked of it and is therefore determined successful. Sandline was able to restore the

Kabbah administration as well as force the RUF to the negotiating table. However, their

actions caused a political firestorm in Britain and exposed its illegal involvement in

Sierra Leone’s civil war. In the end, Sandline did everything that was asked of it despite

causing a number of problems for the host country, and can therefore be deemed

successful.

Strategic Resource Corporation, the parent company of Executive Outcomes and

Sandline with ties to Tony Buckingham, displayed spin-off capabilities with the creation

of Lifeguard. When the Kabbah administration was exiled and Executive Outcomes was

banned from the state, Strategic Resource Corportation needed a way to protect its

remaining diamond resources. Lifeguard was simply Executive Outcomes operating

under a different name, although tasked only with the security of Strategic Resource

Corporations portion of the Kono Diamond fields. When Sandline was contracted by the

exiled Kabbah administration, Sandline acquired Lifeguard. For these reasons, Executive

Outcomes and Sandline international, under Strategic Resource Corporation, both had the

ability to operate in the country after its contract was terminated, which therefore, gave

them spin-off capability. Strategic Resource Corporation was a highly sophisticated

network of private firms and individuals having the ability to triangulate profit on

contracts. However; GSG, Executive Outcomes, and Sandline are no longer in operation.

Clausen 26

Sierra Leone was formally under the colonial control of the Britain. This helps to

explain the level of involvement from firms that were based in South Africa and Britain.

There was little doubt that by the launch of Operation Palliser, Britain’s reasoning for

intervention was that it felt some level of responsibility and was not willing to watch

Sierra Leone become a failed state. During the conflict, there was a United Nations law

that prevented intervention by outside forces in the civil war of Sierra Leone. UN

Security Resolution 1132 specifically prevented arms shipments, which Britain

circumnavigated through the use of Sandline. In addition, it was the British High

Commissioner to Sierra Leone that first suggested the use of Sandline to reinstate the

Kabbah administration. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Britain used Sandline as a

proxy for their foreign policy goals in Sierra Leone. In conclusion, the use of private

military firms in Sierra Leone significantly impacted all three areas of effectiveness,

private investment, and intervention.

Clausen 27

Croatia

On March 24, 1994, Gorjko Susak, the Croatian Defense Minister, wrote to the

U.S. Department of Defense. His request was for the guided transition of the Croatian

military “to one which follows the model of the United States.”83 The reason for such a

request becomes clear when examining the short military history of Croatia. In the early

1990’s the former Soviet state of Yugoslavia began to break apart, as different regions of

the former country, which represented different ethnic and religious demographics,

sought independence. When these different ethnic groups resorted to armed conflict with

one another, Croatia’s army was not prepared. It had suffered major losses to Serbian

forces in 1991. This consequently resulted in over thirty percent of Croatia’s territory

occupied with enemy troops.84 The United States saw Susak’s request as an opportunity

to forge a partnership with a moderate ally in the region. This would be accomplished by

strengthening Croatian forces into a regional enforcer and ally them with the Bosnians.

This would then act as a counter to Serbian power.85 However, United Nations Security

Council Resolution 743 prohibited any government from militarily intervening in the

conflict in former Yugoslavia.86 Pentagon officials passed along Susak’s request to a

Virginia-based private military firm called Military Professionals Resources Incorporated

(MPRI).

83 Roger Cohen, “U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia After Winking at Its Buildup,” The New York Times, October 28, 1995 (http://www.nytimes.com/1995/ 10/28/world/us-cooling-ties-to-croatia-after-winking-at-its-buildup.html?pagewanted=print). 84 Mathew J. Gaul, “Regulating the New Privateers: Private Military Service Contracting and the Modern Marque and Reprisal Clause.” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 31:4 (June 1998): 1489-1522, 1489. 85 Robert F. Miller, “Tudjman's victory: Croatia, the U.N., NATO and the U.S.,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 25:3 (1997): 501-514, 505. 86 United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, S/Res/798, December 18, 1992, (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/798(1992)).

Clausen 28

MPRI is a private military firm that has a long history of working closely with the

Department of Defense and hiring high-ranking former U.S. military leaders. In fact,

Fmr. Gen. Harry E. Soyster and MPRI executive stated “We’ve [MPRI] got more

generals per square foot here than in the Pentagon.”87 Its actions are limited to consulting

while the firm goes out of its way to distinguish itself as a company that does not provide

force for its clients. Soyster frankly stated, “ If you want Executive Outcomes then you

don't want MPRI.”88 The firm has an extraordinary relationship with the United States

that is characterized by a deep level of trust. One such example of this relationship was

during the budget cuts the Department of Defense faced after the conclusion of the Cold

War. As a result, MPRI took over management and conduct of ROTC programs in June

of 1998.89 This level of trust, coupled with its exclusive employment of senior level U.S.

military personnel, allow it to advance U.S. foreign policy goals as a private firm that is

looked upon with preferential treatment by the U.S. defense community.90

In response to the Croatian Defense Minister’s request for military assistance,

MPRI organized a five-person survey team, which visited Croatia and completed an

analysis of the security situation. 91 The conclusive action taken from this survey was to

employ a democracy transition assistance program (DTAP), which consisted of educating

military officers, non-commissioned officers, and civilian officials of the Ministry of

Defense in the areas of leadership, management, and civil-military operations.92 MPRI

was limited from taking any additional action by the United Nations Arms embargo as 87 Singer, 119. 88 Gen. Harry E. Soyster, as quoted in Jakkie Cilliers and Ian Douglas, The Military as Business – Military Professional Resources, Incorporated” Institute for Security Studies (October, 15, 1997): 11-121, 114. 89 Jakkie Cilliers and Ian Douglas, “The Military as Business – Military Professional Resources, Incorporated,” Institute for Security Studies Africa, (October 15, 1999): 111-121, 112. 90 Miller, 513. 91 Cilliers and Douglas, 115. 92 Ibid.

Clausen 29

defined by direct military planning, intelligence services, strategy advice, and tactics to

Croatia or any other party in former Yugoslavia.93

Despite these limitations, MPRI is credited with revamping the Croatian military

into a formidable fighting force whose competence was proved in Operation Ulja.94 In a

matter of months after MPRI entered into a contract with the Croatian Government, the

Croatian army repelled much of the enemy from its territory. Battle tactics were

employed that previously had not been witnessed on the battlefield including integrated

airpower, artillery, and quick infantry movements that targeted Serb command and

control networks.95 The overarching consequence of Operation Ulja was a complete

reversal in the tide of warfare in favor of Croatia. This popular narrative tells how MPRI,

by providing minimal instruction, was able to turn the course of events in favor of an

outcome that supported U.S. foreign policy goals in the region.96

Given our understanding of the knowledge Croatian forces learned through

DTAP, there seems to be an obvious gap between the level of instruction that was

presented to the Croatian army officers and the flawless implementation of this

instruction on the battlefield in only a mere couple of months. MPRI’s contract went

through the State Department and did not violate the terms of the United Nations Arms

embargo.97 However, the tactics employed by the Croatian military evidently appear to be

from instruction or guidance that could only come from a violation of the embargo. It

seems highly unlikely that MPRI could have trained the Croatian officers to this level of

93 Gaul, 1489. 94 Michael Lee Lanning, Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to Todays Private Military Companies, (New York, New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 300. 95 Gaul, 1490 96 Miller, 505. 97 Cilliers and Douglas, 122.

Clausen 30

effectiveness while only using the methods outlined in DTAP.98 As one analyst notes,

“That's not something you learn while being instructed about democratic values.”99

Despite much speculation that MPRI violated the arms embargo, the company did not

face any legal repercussions or formal investigations. In fact, their reputation was

bolstered by the events that transpired and the firm was hired by numerous other entities

including the Macedonian military and the Kosovo Liberation Army.100 The closest legal

ramification for the company came in 2010 when a group of Serbs brought a suit against

MPRI, accusing them of participating in genocide.101 However, the U.S. Supreme Court

ruled in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum that the Alien Tort Claims Act does not apply

beyond U.S. borders, which is the act in which the Serbian group founded their claim

upon.102 The end result of events that were initiated through DTAP was a resounding

success for U.S. interests in the region.103 The extent of MPRI’s involvement is unknown

other then the details of DTAP, however, there is consensus from researchers that

additional actions were taken beyond what DTAP consisted of.104

MPRI’s involvement in Croatia and the lack of investigation or consequence into

how the UN arms embargo was violated, presents a fundamental change in the way

private military firms can be used to formulate foreign policy. Ironically, the United

States voted for the UN arms embargo. It is possible that the embargo became a nuisance

after the opportunity presented itself to from a moderate ally in the region. For example,

Senator Bob Dole was a vocal proponent of lifting the UN regulations and increasing 98 Cilliers and Douglas, 116. 99 Singer, 126. 100 Axelrod, 261. 101 David Isenberg, “MPRI Couldn’t Read Minds: Let’s Sue Them,” The Huffington Post, Aug. 19, 2010 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/mpri-couldnt-read-minds-l_b_688000.html). 102 Axelrod, 261. 103 Miller, 507. 104 Axelrod; Cilliers; Douglas; Singer.

Clausen 31

military assistance to Croatia.105 However, it is difficult to ignore the clear benefit of

having the arms embargo because it prevented other international actors from

intervening. MPRI’s DTAP program was specifically designed to make certain it would

not violate the embargo, and was cleared by the State Department. DTAP was not even

news worthy until Operation Ulja occurred and it was clear something more had taken

place other than instruction.106 There are several plausible scenarios that could explain

what occurred.

The first explanation is that MPRI went beyond DTAP and violated international

law. This does not seem out of the realm of possibility, since after the operation took

place, local news reported the CEO of MPRI, retired Army Chief of Staff, General

Vuono, was seen meeting with the Croatian General Varimer Cervenko, the architect of

Operation Ulja. This was believed to have occurred more then ten times in secret on

Brioni Island.107 MPRI’s involvement is almost certainly greater then what was detailed

under the guidelines of DTAP. The second explanation is the reality of U.S. covert

activity in trying to effect events on the ground in favor of U.S. interests.108 Evidence of

covert activity in Croatia was uncovered when journalist Jeremy Scahill was looking into

the past of four Blackwater security guards who were killed in an infamous 2004 ambush

in Fallujah, Iraq. One of the guards killed was a Croatian-American by the name of Jerry

Zovko, whose parents in an interview with Mr. Scahill, claimed that he was deployed to

Yugoslavia as a member of U.S. Special Forces during the civil war in the mid 1990’s.109

In this case, DTAP was able to provide a public and legal explanation for the outcomes

105 Miller, 507. 106 Axelrod, 260. 107 Ibid. 108 Cilliers and Douglas, 116. 109 Scahill, 160..

Clausen 32

that were yielded as a result of clandestine operations and further actions taken by MPRI.

These two explanations most likely occurred congruently with each other and provide a

plausible reason as to how the Croatian army was able to become a capable fighting force

in such a short amount of time.

In the case of Croatia, MPRI can be defined as a military consultant firm. Of all

the evidence presented, never were MPRI employees engaged directly in combat

operations as a military provider firm would. MPRI was hired as a result of the request by

the Croatian defense minister, in which the United States directed this request to MPRI.

The extent to which MPRI was effective can be determined through the success of its

Democracy Transition Assistance Program for Croatia. MPRI’s effectiveness can also be

measured by the increase in global reputation the firm gathered and future contracts that

were initiated as a result of its work in Croatia. It is safe to say that MPRI was extremely

effective and successful in its effort to influence events in the region toward U.S.

interests.

MPRI does not possess the ability to “spin-off” into other firms. It is not managed

by a parent company and does not seek financing outside of securing contracts with

governments, as seen in firms that do have an incentive to continue operation in a country

once its contract has been terminated. It is uncertain if MPRI maintains contracts in the

Balkans today, however Croatia has 264 private military firms operating within the

country as of 2011.110 As a company, it is not a part of any network of private

individuals, however, its close relationship with the Department of the Defense could

certainly count as a close network. It often is referred to as a retirement club for U.S.

110 “Private Security Services In Europe: CoESS Facts & Figures 2011,” Confederation of European Security Services, (2011): 29.

Clausen 33

generals leaving the Pentagon.111 However, for the sake of this study, the firm does not

exist as part of a group of other private entities. The close relationship with the

Department of Defense is not enough to be labeled as existing in the framework of a

network.

Croatia was formally a part of Yugoslavia, which was under heavy Soviet

influence at the time. There is little doubt the Croatians wanted to partner with the U.S.

because of its opposition to Soviet influence and military superiority. The United States

pushed for a UN arms embargo in the region that eventually came to fruition. This had

the net effect of preventing outside actors from interfering with the conflict; yet, there is

much evidence to suggest the United States was actually the one interfering. The U.S.

was the one that helped to assist the agreement of services between Croatia and MPRI.

This certainly would not have occurred if MPRI’s action were not to benefit the United

States in some capacity. At minimum, it can be shown that MPRI worked as a proxy for

U.S. interests in the breakup of Yugoslavia.

111 Singer, 121.

Clausen 34

Iraq

The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent invasion of Iraq set into

motion a gold rush for private military firms that would become unprecedented in

modern warfare from several perspectives. The first would be the scale to which the

United States would become dependent on these companies for combat essential services.

In 2008, the U.S. was eighty-three percent contractor-dependent for logistical services.112

In addition, there was a 1:1 ratio of contractor to military personnel at the height of the

Iraq war, where at times, the number of contractors even eclipsed the number of active

duty U.S. service members. The second perspective was the amount of funds that were

attributed to the private defense industry for the Iraq war with a shocking lack of

oversight. The federal funds appropriated to private military firms during Operation Iraqi

Freedom were at least $138 billion.113 A final report to Congress by the bipartisan

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan estimates up to sixty

billion dollars was wasted through ill-conceived projects, poor planning and oversight,

and criminal behavior and blatant corruption.114 While there has yet to be a definitive

legacy determined by the U.S. actions in Iraq, it is certain that there has never, in the

history of modern conflict, been a greater experiment in combining military and

contractor services.

112 Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Contingency Contracting throughout U.S. History, (http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/history.html). 113 Anna Fifield, “Contractors Reap $138bn from Iraq war,” Financial Times, March 18, 2013 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f435f048c05-11e2-b001-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Uhd9wngy). 114 “Final Report to Congress,” Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, August 2011, (http://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/08/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf).

Clausen 35

It is said that where the U.S. military goes, so does Kellogg, Brown, and Root

(KBR),115 which received more money than any other company during the Iraq war, with

a total of $39.5 billion from 2003 to 2011.116 In 2010, the company was awarded a no-bid

$568 million contract renewal for housing, meals, water, and bathroom services for

soldiers. KBR is the quintessential military support firm. While it does not have the

excitement and allure of a military provider or consulting firm, its involvement with U.S.

operations in Iraq is staggering. Under a LOGCAP III (Logistics Civil Augmentation

Program) contract with the U.S. Government, the company has provided over one billion

meals, twenty-five billion gallons of drinking water, eight billion gallons of fuel, hosted

more than 170 million patrons at morale, welfare, and recreation facilities, logged more

than 701 million miles transporting supplies and equipment, and laundered seventy-eight

million bundles of laundry.117 These numbers reflect the business model KBR, which

entered the private military industry in the 1990’s. The company has focused on the

market of logistical support, an area that is often the center of attention for cutting costs

in defense budgets. The issues that arose with KBR’s effectiveness were not those that

occurred by the dangers of operating in the battle space, but by mostly self-inflicted

activities.

As KBR continued to provide services throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, the

firm ran into a number of allegations against it that brought into question its

effectiveness. In November of 2013, the firm was found guilty of negligence in the

115 Singer, 136. 116 Angelo Young. “And The Winner For The Most Iraq War Contracts Is . . . KBR, With $39.5 Billion In A Decade,” International Business Times, March 19 2013 (http://www.ibtimes.com/winner-most-iraq-war-contracts-kbr-395-billion-decade-1135905). 117 “KBR to Continue LOGCAP III Work Supporting Army as LOGCAP IV Solicitation is Cancelled,” KBR Press Release, May 6, 2010 (http://www.kbr.com/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2010/05/06/KBR-to-Continue-LOGCAP-III-Work-Supporting-Army-as-LOGCAP-IV-Solicitation-is-Cancelled/).

Clausen 36

poisoning of a dozen soldiers in an incident regarding a water treatment facility in

2001.118 830 soldiers instructed to secure the facility were told by KBR that sodium

dichromate was no worse than a mild irritant. In reality, the substance is an extreme

carcinogen and may have resulted in the death of Lt. Col. James Gentry, whose death, as

a result of cancer, was ruled by the Veterans Administration as service-related. A jury

ruled that KBR was aware of both the presence and toxicity of the chemical.119 Other

allegations against KBR have surfaced as well. In 2009, KBR’s contracts made up a

majority of the thirty-two recommended for criminal investigation to the Inspector

General from the Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency.120 Further investigation

would produce the realization that internal mechanisms both within KBR and the federal

government lacked appropriate oversight for KBR’s subcontracting. In 2014, The U.S.

Government sued KBR for defrauding it’s military in Iraq through inflating costs to

subcontractors.121 The suit alleges that KBR had arranged an agreement with a

subcontractor to supply fuel tankers at triple their value, while the subcontractor gave

kickbacks to KBR employees. The firm also allegedly continued paying for leases on

trucks that had been paid off and then applied for reimbursement. The more macabre of

allegations also claims that KBR used refrigerated trucks as morgues and then did not

sanitize them before hauling ice to be consumed by troops.122 The Congressional

Research Service declares that no one federal agency has the responsibility to audit,

118 Ryan J. Reilly, “KBR, Guilty In Iraq Negligence, Wants Taxpayers To Foot The Bill,” The Huffington Post, January 9, 2013 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/09/kbr-guilty-iraq-negligence_n_2436115.html). 119 Ibid. 120 Ellen Nakashima, “KBR Connected to Alleged Fraud, Pentagon Auditor Says,” The Washington Post, May 5, 2009 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/04/AR2009050403283.html). 121 David Ingram, “U.S. sues KBR for defrauding its army in Iraq,” Reuters, January 23, 2014 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-kbr-fraud-idUSBREA0M1UY20140123). 122 Ibid.

Clausen 37

investigate, or oversee DOD-appropriated funds for troop support services under

LOGCAP.123 The responsibility is fragmented between the Defense Contract Audit

Agency (DCAA), the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the Army Audit

Agency (AAA), and the DOD Inspector General.124 This lack of a central federal

oversight, combined with the lack of KBR’s internal audits, allowed for there to be

serious abuses that impacted its overall effectiveness for the U.S. mission in Iraq. Other

accusations centered on the closeness of the firm to administration officials, including its

former CEO Vice President Dick Cheney, and the amount of no-bid contracts the firm

was able to procure.125

No firm, in the history of the private military industry, has gained the notoriety

that Blackwater did from 2003 to 2009 in Iraq. The firm was founded by Erik Prince and

operated under the parent company bearing his name, The Prince Group. During the Iraq

war, Prince enjoyed a close relationship to the GOP due to his fundraising activities.126

The firm’s first public contract, which led to a rapid acquisition of other contracts, was a

$27.7 million sole-source no bid contract to provide personal security for the

Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq Paul Bremer III.127

Blackwater created a personal security detail (PSD) program from the ground-up,

consisting of thirty-six personnel protection specialists, two K-9 teams, and three MD-

123 Valerie Bailey Grasso, “Defense Logistical Support Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, (September 10, 2010): 18. 124 Ibid 125 John Soloman, “Halliburton's no-bid contracts for work in Iraq get FBI scrutiny,” Associated Press, October 29, 2004 (http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041029/news_1n29halli.html). 126 Evan Thomas, “Profile: Blackwater’s Erik Prince,” Newsmax, October 13, 2007 (http://www.newsweek.com/profile-blackwaters-erik-prince-103877). 127 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction July 2004 Quarterly Report, October 30, 2004 (http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_research_and_oversight/sigir/quarterly_reports_eng/us_sigir__report_to_congress_october_2004.pdf).

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530 helicopters for transporting the ambassador around the country.128 This PSD program

would become the industry standard in protecting high-ranking officials. Blackwater’s

security-first mentality was a paradox in the counter-insurgency warzone of Iraq. Col.

Thomas X. Hammes reflects that “(Blackwater) was doing their job, exactly what they

were paid to do in the way they were paid to do it, and they were making enemies on

every single pass out of town.”129 Blackwater took minimal chances as to the security of

Paul Bremer due to the sky-high stakes for the company. The worst-case scenario for

Blackwater would have been the death of Bremer, in which case, the firm most likely

would have ceased to exist. This assertion is backed by a study that compared the military

cultures of Blackwater to that of DynCorp, another private security firm that was

contracted to provide PSD services in Iraq. The study concluded that Blackwater fired

upon suspected threats more quickly, at greater distances, with a greater quantity of

bullets, and were also more likely to abandon the people fired upon when compared to

DynCorp.130 Due to the legal immunity for the actions of private military contractors at

the time, Blackwater was able to operate with a security-at-any-cost mentality. The

effectiveness of Blackwater’s PSD program reflected a “the end justifies the means”

mentality, as the firm never lost a principal they were in charge of. A key to this

effectiveness was the ability for Blackwater to attract top-level talent through short-term

contracts. Retired Special Forces members could make a considerable amount of money

128 Scahill, 134. 129 Tim Shorrock, “Contractor’s Arrogance Contributed to Iraqi Rebellion, Marine Colonel Says,” January, 31, 2005 (http://timshorrock.blogspot.com/2005/01/contractors-arrogance-contributed-to.html). 130 Scott Fitzsimmons, “Wheeled Warriors: Explaining Variations in the Use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq,” Security Studies 22:4 (November 2013): 707-739.

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through short-term contracts lasting as little as two months, paying anywhere for $600 to

$800 a day.131

The events that occurred on March 31, 2004, marked a turning point in the war on

terror as well as for the private defense industry. On this fateful day, four Blackwater

security guards were delivering kitchen equipment when they were brutally murdered and

hung from a bridge over the Euphrates River in Fallujah. The guards were in Fallujah that

day because Blackwater had recently formed a partnership with Kuwait-based Regency

Hotel and Hospital Company and won a contract with Eurest Support Services, a

subcontractor of Halliburton and KBR. The contract agreed to by Blackwater, Regency,

and ESS on March 8, 2004 required that at least three men were in each vehicle on

security missions, with a minimum of two armored vehicles to support ESS missions.132

However, on March 12, 2004, Blackwater and Regency signed a subcontract that

removed the word “armored”, saving Blackwater $1.5 million.133 In addition to being a

reason why the U.S. subsequently invaded Fallujah, this incident would also serve as the

basis for future legal precedence regarding private military firms.

Less than a week after the infamous ambush and slaughter of the four guards in

Fallujah, Blackwater would be involved in another historic precedent. On the morning of

April 4, 2004, Blackwater guards engaged Iraqi insurgents at the U.S. Occupation

headquarters in Najaf. That day, U.S. Marine Cpl. Lonnie Young was installing

communication equipment. When he heard the sound of Ak-47 fire, he grabbed his

weapon and headed to the roof where Blackwater guards were engaging the enemy. He

131 Scahill, 146. 132 Ibid. 133 “Slain U.S. Security Agents Once Served with Navy Seals, Special Forces,” Agence France-Presse, April 2, 2004 (http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040402173107.qibo9rqg.html).

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quickly acquired a target in his sights and called out for permission to engage the enemy.

As the only active duty U.S. soldier on that rooftop, he sought and was given permission

to engage an enemy combatant by a private security contractor.134 This was the first time

in the history of U.S. military operations that a U.S. soldier took direct orders from a

private security contractor. During the four-hour battle that ensued, Blackwater claimed it

made several attempts to contact U.S. command but was unsuccessful. Apart from

clandestine activities the firm was involved in, this situation represented the height of the

power and influence of Blackwater in Iraq. No other firm during the Iraq war, or likely in

the future, will be able to say it commanded a U.S. Marine in battle.

Separate from the public contracts that Blackwater had to protect senior level

personnel and bases, the firm enjoyed a close relationship to the CIA and its clandestine

activities. From 2001 to 2010, officials estimate Blackwater was awarded up to $600

million in clandestine contracts through the creation of over thirty different shell

companies.135 In 2007, the Iraqi Government banned Blackwater from operating in the

country as a direct consequence of the Nisour Square incident, which resulted in the

death of seventeen Iraqi civilians and wounded twenty.136 However, the firm continued to

operate until the 2009 status of forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraq took affect.

The creation of these shell companies essentially hid the activities of Blackwater when it

became politically potent, showing a powerful spin-off capability. While Blackwater was

working with the CIA in clandestine activities, several former Blackwater employees

134 Scahill, 186. 135 James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, “30 False Fronts Won Contracts for Blackwater,” The New York Times, September 3, 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/middleeast/04blackwater.html?_r=0). 136 David Johnston, John M. Broder, “F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause,” The New York Times, November 14, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html?_r=0).

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claim that the line between the CIA and Blackwater was blurred. The most infamous of

covert actions taken by the U.S. in Iraq were referred to as “night raids” or “snatch and

grab” operations, which the local populations loathed.137 Blackwater guards routinely

operated alongside CIA forces in these operations, detaining persons suspected of

possesing valuable intelligence.138

Another one of the subsidiaries owned by Blackwater was Presidential Airways,

which has long been suspected of being a partner in the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition”

program. Flight records have shown that Presidential Airways flights landed at the same

airports used by the rendition program, as well as the firm’s assertions that it holds a U.S.

DOD Secret Facility Clearance, which would give the firm access to black sites.139 The

level of involvement Blackwater had with covert activities stems from the acquisition of

several former high-ranking CIA officers. One such CIA officer was Cofer J. Black, who

joined Blackwater in early 2005 and was the former director of the CIA’s counter-

terrorism unit.140 He is also accredited with creating the “extraordinary rendition”

program under President Bush. It is important to note that the first contract Blackwater

had with the U.S. Government was a “black” contract.141 As noted above, Blackwater

was known in the public sphere as primarily the provider of personnel security for high-

ranking U.S. officials and providing base security, but the firm’s clandestine activities

came before its public contracts.

137 Michael Hirsh, “Hirsh: How U.S. Makes Enemies,” Newsweek, July 25, 2006 (http://www.newsweek.com/hirsh-how-us-makes-enemies-112791). 138 James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, “Blackwater Guards Tied to Secret C.I.A Raids,” The New York Times, December 10, 2009 (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/us/politics/11blackwater.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0). 139 Scahill, 307. 140 Scahill, 327. 141 Ken Silverstein, “Revolving Door to Blackwater Causes Alarm at CIA,” Harpers Magazine, September 12, 2006 (http://www.informationliberation.com/test.php?id=15764).

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Eventually, notoriety of the firm and the reputation it earned through its

operations in Iraq and the war on terror caused too much controversy and political

polarization for the firm to remain effective in the future. The Prince Group sold

Blackwater to a group of private investors, which was then acquired by The Constellis

Group, ending Prince’s role in the company.142 The firm is still in existence under the

name Academi, however, much of the senior leadership who guided the firm during the

Iraq war are no longer with the firm.

During the Iraq war, there were a number of private military firms that were

contracted to oversee and operate interrogation programs alongside the U.S. military and

the CIA. The public first became aware of these programs in 2004, when images of U.S.

soldiers were broadcast to the American public showing gross mistreatment and

humiliation of detainees.143 While this incident did not reflect the intended detainee

policy, the investigation into who was responsible led to the revelation that two private

firms, CACI and Titan Corporation, had provided interrogators and translators to the Abu

Ghraib prison. An Army investigative report by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba found that the

private interrogators and translators were either directly or indirectly responsible for the

abuses at Abu Ghraib.144 Furthermore, CACI’s contract was through the Interior

Department’s National Business Center.145 One possible explanation for this would be to

142 Gopal Ratnam, “Blackwater Founder Sells Company to Private Equity Investors,” Bloomberg Business, December 17, 2010 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-17/blackwater-founder-sells-company-to-private-equity-investors) 143 CBS “Abuse of Iraqi POW’s by GIs Probed,” 60 Minutes II, April 12 2004 (http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-of-iraqi-pows-by-gis-probed/). 144 Deborah Hastings, “Military Reports Match Some Lawsuit Details,” Associated Press, October 24 2004, (http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2004/oct/25/military-reports-match-some-lawsuit-details/). 145 Roxanne Tiron, “Contracting Faulted in Abu Ghraib Abuse,” The Hill, September 28 2005 (http://thehill.com/business--lobby/contracting-faulted-in-abu-ghraib-abuse-2005--09-28.html.).

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hide the CIA’s involvement in the interrogation programs.146 It would also make it very

difficult for anyone trying to find information about contractors or the types of

clandestine programs for detainees. Once details of the mistreatment were made public, it

was not long before human rights abuse allegations came from the international

community. John Pace, the human rights chief for the United Nations Assistance

Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) at the time, claimed that the U.S. had violated UN Security

Council Resolution 1546 due to widespread mistreatment of prisoners.147 This particular

Untied Nations resolution recognized the Iraq Government post-invasion and determined

the status of the multi-national force.

Recently, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence declassified a report

on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program. The findings of this report also

disclose the use of private military contracting to conduct and oversee interrogation of

detained individuals during the war on terror. The CIA’s contract with an unnamed

company that provided interrogation services was in excess of $180 million at the end of

2006.148 The actual number of interrogators this company provided to the CIA is still

classified, however, the report states that contractors made up eighty-five percent of the

workforce for detention and interrogation operations.149 In addition, the CIA provided a

multi-year indemnification agreement to protect the contractors from legal liability, of

which more than one million dollars has been exercised.150 These two events provide

evidence to support the assertion that private contractors were an essential part to the 146 Deborah Avant and Lee Sigleman, “Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq,” Security Studies 19:2 (May 28, 2010): 230-265, 245. 147 “US Detentions Abuse Iraq Mandate: UN” Global Policy Forum, December 5 2005 (https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168-general/37471.html). 148 United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, (April 3, 2014): 3. 149 Ibid, 12. 150 Ibid.

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United States policy regarding the detention and intelligence gathering of detained

individuals.

The war on terror in Iraq was the catalyst for a national conversation regarding

legal policy toward the private military industry. This conversation is still ongoing, as a

web of lawsuits and countersuits moves it way through the U.S. justice system. At first,

the right to sue an employee or private defense firm for illicit actions was in question.

Paul Bremer’s final order, as his year in Iraq concluded, was immunity from legal

repercussions for private military contractors in Iraq.151 The legal basis for this assertion

was that private security contractors should be included in the “total force” numbers of

the U.S. military, making them immune from tort claims.152 The families of the four

deceased Blackwater guards would eventually sue the firm for negligence on the basis of

such a tort claim. Blackwater countersued, and the case was eventually dismissed in 2011

due to the failure of court-ordered arbitration.153 The families then appealed this ruling,

and in 2012, a federal appeals court ended the case with the families reaching a

confidential settlement with the company.154 The only repercussion to Blackwater’s

activities in Iraq was the successful prosecution of the four guards that were involved in

the Nisour Square killings. The four guards were convicted under the legal pretense that

federal law applies to private security contractors that were working for the Defense

151 Scahill, 143. 152 David Isenberg, “Thinking of Suing a Private Military Contractor? There May Be a Way…,” Time, January 7, 2013 (http://nation.time.com/2013/01/07/thinking-of-suing-a-private-military-contractor-there-may-be-a-way/). 153 Mike Baker, “Iraq Security Contractor Countersues,” Associated Press, January 19, 2007 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/19/AR2007011901673.html). 154 Mike Baker, “Blackwater Deaths Suit Tossed After Six Years,” Associated Press, January 26, 2011 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/25/AR2011012507031.html).

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Department.155 However, Blackwater’s contract was through the State Department, a fact

that the jurors seemed to overlook. The guard’s lawyers are currently appealing the case.

Apart from lawsuits, the lack of a central authority to conduct audits of contracts with

private military contractors led to an environment where “creative accounting” was

common. KBR, Blackwater, and a large number of subcontractors all faced allegations of

fraud. These issues remain largely unsolved and will be an important part of future policy

debate regarding military contractors.

The use of private military firms in Iraq offered several benefits to the executive

branch. The first was that the widespread use of contractors was essentially able to mask

the size and scale of the operation in Iraq, which made the conflict appear much smaller

then it actually was. If an individual had looked only at the size of the military force

during the height of the Iraq war, the actual number of the total force would have been

double. In addition, Congress is able to control the size of the public force and not the

size of the contract force. Thus, contracting allows the executive branch to increase the

scale of conflict without congressional approval. A second benefit of contracting was the

ability to push the conflict beyond what would have been legally or politically possible

with an all-public force. It affords the executive branch the ability to not call up reserves

or institute a draft. The use of contractors, with legal immunity, also allowed for

clandestine operations to circumnavigate oversight from Congress and negate the rules of

engagement that public forces were tied to. When clandestine operations are combined

with private contractors, the impact of each is multiplied.156 The ability of the executive

branch to formulate contracts with any branch of the bureaucracy held under its power

155 Matt Apuzzo, “Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings,” New York Times, October 22, 2014 (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html). 156 Avant and Sigelman, 262.

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effectively hid these contracts from government oversight authorities. Contractors were

also not included in troop causalities, essentially acting as force that did not exist and was

legally immune from repercussions. Essentially, the use of private contractors in Iraq,

coupled with public forces, allowed for the legal barriers to be pushed beyond what

would have been possible if contractors were not involved. It is not a coincidence that

contractors were involved in most aspects of the Iraq war that came under legal scrutiny.

All three types of private military firms were involved in Iraq. Blackwater was a

military provider firm, as it actively engaged in combat both in the role of security guards

and operating in clandestine operations. KBR was the quintessential military support

firm. Outside of actual combat operations, KBR and its subcontractors were essentially

the logistical side of the U.S. operation. CACI and Titan can be categorized as military

consultant firms through proclaimed specialization in interrogation and translating

services. There are several reasons as to why private military firms were hired in Iraq.

The obvious reason was the belief they were highly effective and helped to reduce costs.

While this is true, it is hard to ignore the other effects of using private military

contractors on the scale that the U.S. did. Contracting was able to make the commitment

of U.S. forces to Iraq seem much smaller then it was. The decision to use private security

guards to protect the most senior level U.S. officials implies that they would be able to do

the job more effectively than U.S. military personnel. Given the overwhelming amount of

evidence that these contractors were essentially immune from prosecution, its

effectiveness may have been tied to the ability to engage suspected enemies without a

threat of recourse and disregard for the rules of engagement. The prevalence of

contractors used throughout interrogation and detention programs also implies there was

Clausen 47

a benefit to this, which can most likely to be attributed to secrecy and legal immunity. In

determining the success of the private military contractors examined in this case study, all

firms were able to accomplish what they were hired for despite several accusations of

hurting the overall mission. Blackwater never had someone killed while under their

protection, while KBR was able to provide critical logistical support. While both firms

did come under investigation for fraud, the U.S. Government continued to renew their

contracts. Logically, this would not have occurred if they were deemed ineffective.

The private investment aspects of the firms involved in Iraq are inherently

different than in other cases because the firms were acting in concert with a country’s

military force. The spin off capabilities of these firms was principally defined by their

ability to subcontract, in which both Blackwater and KBR were able to do on a large

scale. Subcontracting allowed these firms to compete for a greater number of contracts,

hid their involvement in Iraq and from oversight authorities, and increased legal

protection to the parent company. Since all of the funds for these contracts came from a

government, outside financing was not necessary. However, Blackwater, as well as KBR,

had a network of private individuals that helped it to secure contracts.

The aspect of intervention for these firms was largely negated due to the reality

that they were assisting a multi-national force in Iraq and were not contracted by the state

in which they were operating. Private military firms were used in conjunction, not in

place of, public forces. This negates the suspicion that Iraq, having once been under a

previous military engagement, motivated a state to use contractors to achieve some

objective in place of using public forces. The widespread use of private contractors in the

interrogation and detention programs raises the suspicion that there was a legal benefit to

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doing so. Once these programs were made public, it seems plausible that there was an

attempt to at least work around domestic and international legal requirements for the

treatment of detained individuals. Finally, the use of no bid contracts and continued

renewal, despite fraud allegations, showed that there was either a questionable reliance on

these firms for mission essential roles or the network of individuals these firms had were

extremely effective in securing future employment.

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Findings

This study produced a number of context-dependent findings based upon the case

studies of Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Iraq. The tables below give a visual representation

of the conclusions found across the three cases regarding the issue areas probed.

Effectiveness

Question Sierra Leone Croatia Iraq What type of firm(s) was employed in the

conflict?

Military Provider, Military Consultant

Military Consultant Military Provider, Military Consultant,

Military Support Why was the firm(s)

hired? Lobbying Power,

Effectiveness Government

Network, Effectiveness

Lobbying Power, Effectiveness

Was the firm(s) successful

2 Successful/1 Not 1 Successful 3 Successful

In examining the types of firms that were employed in the three cases, only the

military consultant firm was used in all. This can be attributed to this type of firm’s

flexibility and usefulness to the states that chose to utilize it. In Sierra Leone, these

contractors provided arms and training to forces, in Croatia they provided specialized

knowledge to military officers, and in Iraq they provided consulting knowledge in

interrogations and translating services. The more controversial military provider firms

were used in Sierra Leone and Iraq. In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes provided a full

military apparatus to combat the RUF on behalf of the NPRC. In Iraq, Blackwater

provided PSD programs, base security, and assistance with clandestine operations. Both

military provider firms were pushed out of the country it operated in through the process

of political negotiations, a phenomena that did not occur with the other types of firms.

In the three cases examined, private military firms were hired for a variety of

reasons. However, they were always hired under the belief that they would be the most

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effective option given the reality of the situation each country was facing. The second

most utilized reason for the initiation of a contract was the lobbying powers these firms

possessed. In Sierra Leone and Iraq, the leaders of the private military firms held

numerous documented connections to either private interests affected by the conflict or

government officials who held influence regarding the conflict. The case of Croatia

differs from the other two cases due to the request of Croatia’s defense minister to mirror

the military apparatus of the United States. MPRI was selected due to the closeness of the

firm to the Pentagon and the ability for it to represent desired U.S. foreign policy

outcomes through its DTAP program. This case reflects an inverted lobbying power,

where the U.S. Government suggested Croatia employ MPRI.

There was only one instance in which a private military firm, employed

throughout the three cases, was deemed ineffective. GSG’s contract with Sierra Leone

failed primarily because the firm refused to increase its offensive capability and its senior

leadership was killed. In all other instances, the firms contracted were able to fulfill the

reasons for their employment.

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Private Networks Question Sierra Leone Croatia Iraq

Did the firm(s) employed have

spin-off capabilities

Yes No Yes

Does the firm(s) have any role in the

country it was employed in today?

No Yes No*

Was the firm(s) employed a part of a parent company or

larger network?

Yes No Yes

*Contractors are still active in Iraq; however, the firms included in this study that operated in Iraq from 2003-2010 have changed dramatically in corporate structure that they hardly resemble the same firms that existed pre-drawdown. Firms that operated in Sierra Leone and Iraq presented a number of spin-off

capabilities. Executive Outcomes and Sandline were both apart of Strategic Resource

Corporation that was able to create Lifeguard in order to protect the parent company’s

mining investments in Sierra Leone after its contract was terminated. Blackwater, while

operating in Iraq, was able to create over thirty shell companies to hide its operations

when the firm became a political issue in Iraq. Croatia was the only case where the firm

employed did not possess spin-off capabilities. In examining the current role of PMF’s in

the states that employed their services, there is not a lot of evidence to suggest the firms

have continuing roles post-conflict. The conflict in Sierra Leone essentially destroyed the

reputations of the firms that were employed. KBR had significant public relations

problems that were mostly caused by their own actions, and Blackwater became so

politically volatile it ended their ability to gain future employment. The role of parent

companies and highly influential networks of individuals played a large part in the

conflicts in Sierra Leone and Iraq. Tony Buckingham was able to procure contracts and

negotiate them with Sierra Leone through his involvement in the private interests and

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associations in the British Government. Firms that routinely operated in Iraq had

influential alumni of the organizations. KBR’s former CEO was Vice President Dick

Cheney, and Erik Prince was highly influential in Republican circles as a fundraiser. In

regards to Croatia, MPRI was not apart of a parent company until Level 3 acquired them

in 2000, long after the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Foreign Policy by Proxy

Question Sierra Leone Croatia Iraq

Was there a previous military engagement to provide security by a country or colonial power?

Yes No Yes

During the conflict, was there any UN law regulating intervention or engagement?

Yes Yes Yes

Was there evidence of the country, in which the PMF was based, assisting the work of the PMF?

Yes Yes N/A

Sierra Leone and Iraq had histories of previous military engagements conducted

by the host countries of the PMF’s that operated in the conflicts examined. This reality

provides evidence that the host countries, which held previous and continuing interests in

the countries examined, would use PMF’s to further their own foreign policy objectives.

During the conflict in Sierra Leone, UN Resolution 1132 prevented arms shipments

which resulted in accusations of the British Government and Sandline violating

international law. In Croatia, there are many accusations that MPRI violated a UN arms

Clausen 53

embargo that prevented intervention from foreign entities in the region. In Iraq, the use of

private contractors in interrogation and detention programs have coincided with the use

of enhanced interrogation tactics and methods that have pushed the boundaries set by

international law regarding detainees. In all three cases, contractors were involved in

actions that circumnavigated legal measures set forth by the international community.

Another unanimous finding throughout all three cases was that the host countries assisted

the firm’s activities in the conflicts they operated in. This works against the simple PMF

model where countries, in which the firm is not based in, can hire firms and provide

services without interference from the host country.

The following are context-dependent generalizations that were concluded from

the case studies of Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Iraq.

Context-Dependent Generalizations

Military provider firms are controversial and may be forced out of the battle space due to unintended consequences of its operations. States hire PMF’s because it is effective, however, PMF’s can create future employment

through lobbying powers and government networks. Rarely is a PMF unable to fulfill what it is contracted to do.

When the opportunity arises, PMF’s will take advantage of spin-off capabilities.

PMF’s often use parent companies.

Past military engagements by states can provide incentives to use PMF’s for “foreign policy by proxy.”

PMF’s are often used to circumnavigate international and domestic legal requirements

States often assist PMF’s when its operations align with foreign policy objectives

Policy Implications and Recommendations

Clausen 54

United States policy toward the private military industry will be vastly different

depending on the political party that has control of the executive branch. Specifically, the

tools and powers private military firms give the office of the president are inherently

political and partisan. Democrats and Republicans feel very differently about the ways in

which themselves and the opposing party have used and will use these firms in the future.

They may also feel differently according to which party is in power, and what the

president is trying to accomplish. There is no question that private military firms are here

to stay and that both parties will utilize them. However, how the United States will

develop policy toward these firms is found in the ideological differences between liberal

and conservative views of government.

Liberal policy toward private military firms is grounded in the belief that the use

of these firms erodes checks and balances of the federal government, as well as

congressional oversight.157 Essentially, it usurps power away from Congress and places it

in the hands of the executive branch. Mainstream liberal views toward the private

military industry were lionized by the experience of the Iraq war. While Republicans

controlled the executive branch, Democrats in Congress were essentially hopeless in

trying to reign in the scale of the Iraq war. Congress can only limit the number of troops

through appropriations. If they attempt to limit the contract force, private military firms

can simply employ third party nationals.158 It is also extremely difficult to assess the

contracts of these firms with executive branch agencies, as well as determine the

performance of these companies. Lastly, foreign policy by proxy is another tool that the

executive branch can hold over Congress. Such was the case in Croatia, where the

157 Deborah Avant, “Private Security Contracting Undermines Democratic Control of U.S. Foreign Policy,” The American Interest (Summer 2009): 32-36, 34. 158 Avant, 34.

Clausen 55

executive branch arranged for a contract with MPRI, leaving nothing for Congress to

have oversight over. Democracts’ outlook for government requires that it be efficiently

regulated, and the current state of private military firms reflects anything but this outlook.

It is no shock that then Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), Senator Jim Webb (D-VA),

Representative David E. Price (D-NC), Jan Schakowski (D-IL), and Henry Waxman (D-

CA) have all initiated proposals to increase the transparency and accountability of private

military firms.159

The conservative or even neo-conservative policies toward the private military

industry are much different then what a liberal would advocate for. Many, but not all,

conservatives adhere to a trustee model of government.160 They see the duty of elected

leaders in office to carry out the national interest and not necessarily the mainstream

beliefs of constituents. If constituents are unhappy with the results of actions taken, they

can be voted out of office. Thus, the issues that liberals have with the lack of regulation,

foreign policy by proxy, and oversight are seen as potentially useful benefits to

conservatives.161 For instance, they can continue to operate in Iraq by reducing troop

levels while boosting the contracting force, thereby reducing political pressure to end the

war. They have also been shown to be powerful tools when Democrats have controlled

the White House. Conservative and neo-conservative policy will look to preserve the

powerful tool that private military companies have shown to be capable of. This however,

does not mean that they will not want changes to be made. Conservatives will focus on

getting better value out of the use of these companies, whereas, the liberal focus will tend

159 Ibid. 160 Douglas Foyle, Counting the Public In, (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 161 Eliot Cohen, “Defending America in the Twenty-First Century,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000): 40-56.

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to restrict the capability of the firms. The fraud that many contractors were found guilty

of during the Iraq war gathered bi-partisan anger and frustration, as well as excess abuses

of power such as the Nisour Square incident and Abu Ghraib.

Liberal and Conservative attitudes have roughly aligned in this manner. However,

it is impossible to know if these positions are rooted in ideology or simply over the Iraq

war. It is also extremely difficult to strip power away from one branch of government.

Each party, when in control of the White House, would think twice before limiting this

powerful foreign policy tool. This partisanship, coupled with hesitation, is why

international bodies are far more advanced in promoting effective regulation of the

private military industry.

Shortly after the Nisour Square shooting in Iraq, the international community

initiated efforts to provide effective regulation. The “Swiss Initiative” led by the

International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Law Division of

the Swiss Foreign Ministry created the Montreux Document on Pertinent International

Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military

and Security Companies during Armed Conflict.162 Seventeen states, including the U.S.,

ratified this document on September 17, 2008, which contains twenty-seven paragraphs

restating international legal obligations toward private military firms and an additional

seventy-three paragraphs detailing “good practices” for states.163 After the initial

ratification, The European Union, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Office

for Security and Cooperation in Europe have endorsed the Montreux Document, making

162 Ian Ralby, “Accountability For Armed Contractors,” Fletcher Security Review 2:1 (January 12, 2015): 2. 163 United Nations, The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, A/63/467-S/2008/636 (2008). www.eda.admin.ch/psc

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it the most important international standard concerning the private military industry.164 It

is important to note that this document is not an enforcement mechanism against the

actions that may be taken on behalf of states, but rather a set of standards that the

international community wishes to be incorporated into each member state’s system of

government. The goal is that if states conform to the principals outlined in the document,

over time they will become obligatory rather than voluntary.165

While the Montreux document is focused on the standards that states need to

implement, experts and officials also recognized the need for there to be standards

regarding contractors as well.166 Apart from the ICRC, the Human Rights Division of the

Swiss Foreign Ministry led a process from 2009 to 2010 that developed a code of conduct

for private military firms. The resulting International Code of Conduct for Private

Security Service Providers (ICOC) was signed into existence on November 9, 2010

including an initial fifty-eight PMF’s as sponsors.167 This led to the creation of the

International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association, which

gathers together the private military firms that subscribes to the ICOC.168 The incentive

for PMF’s is the procurement of future contracts, as adhering to these standards

voluntarily shows that they are responsible and will not cause human rights issues to the

countries that choose to employ them.

Following the international communities lead, the U.S. Department of Defense

contracted ASIS International, the premier security-related standards drafting

organization, to synchronize internal regulations with the formal standards set forth by

164 Ralby, 2. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (2010), http://icoc-psp.org 168 Ralby, 3.

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ICOC.169 The process that ASIS recommended that standards be developed by the rules

of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and then converted to international

standards under the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).170 The two

standards that apply to the present analyses are ANSI PSC.1 and ANSI PSC. 2. The first

essentially commits signatories to adhering to human right principals regardless of

whether it is necessitated by law. The latter is an auditing standard that is specifically

attuned to the private military industry.171

Given the significant steps the international community has taken to implement

these standards, there are still many issues that could be addressed. The ability for the

international community to enforce these mechanisms is shaky at best. None of these

initiatives address the core issue of regulation in the United States, which is any

executive branch agency, can hire private security firms even when the operations of that

firm do not fit within the confines of that agency’s purpose. Such was the case with

CACI and Titan Corporation in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. While it may be seen by

some people in the policy realm that the Department of Defense adhering to these

standards is a positive development, the capability for private defense contractors to

operate essentially outside of oversight still exists. One such example of this was in May

of 2012, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor could not answer in the affirmative when asked whether the State Department

would try and implement the standards set forth by the international community.172 Since

169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Ralby, 4. 172 Ralby, 5.

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that statement, the agency has said they would begin doing so but have not yet taken the

steps necessary to do so.

The current legal status, both within the Untied States and in the international

community, leaves open a wide spectrum of options to what the regulatory status of the

private defense industry could become. In reality, there are only two paths that future

policy can follow.

The first option for future policy initiations is to resist increased regulations of the

industry. This view of the private military industry favors the tools it gives the executive

branch over human rights abuses and proper oversight. Certainly at a point during the

Iraq war this choice was made, and it is not unreasonable to conclude that both

Democrats and Republicans could see the potential benefits of having an unregulated

private security industry at their disposal. Such an industry would be able to provide a

means to pursue foreign policy objectives that are unpopular at home but may be, in the

view of the executive branch, vital to U.S. interests and national security. Britain was

able to take advantage of this by utilizing Sandline, while the U.S. was able to provide a

higher level of security to its diplomats in Iraq by utilizing security guards that were

practically immune from legal ramifications for a time. There are also obvious benefits to

clandestine operations if you are pursing programs that are outside the realm of legality

by international standards. The use of private military contractors alongside clandestine

operations escalates the impact of both. While this view of the private military industry

certainly fits within the neo-conservative political view more easily than a liberal view, it

is a powerful tool none-the-less where policy makers may be hesistant to remove it from

the powers of the executive branch.

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The second option is for the effective regulation of the industry. This view places

a higher value on the human rights and oversight of the industry over any tools it may

give the Executive Branch in conducting foreign policy. Advocates of this approach will

look to standardize the regulations set forth by the international community across all

Executive Branch agencies. This view will also advocate a number of policy changes that

could be initiated through Congress. Currently proprietary information protects many of

the contracts with the federal government from freedom of information requests. Forced

transparency through legislation passed by Congress could end this. In addition, the

Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act could

be applied to all contractors, regardless of the federal agency they are working for.

Another policy option could be the designation of a sole auditing power of private

military contracts, regardless of federal agency. Congress could also strip the power of

the Executive Branch to hire private military firms that do not adhere to the ICOC

standards of operations, or that do not have internal review boards that have

consequences for abuses committed by their respective employees. These are just some

of the options that will be needed to taken if an effective regulation of the industry is to

come to fruition.

However, a central problem still exists if the private military industry is to be

regulated to the same level as public forces. The two central reasons why private military

firms are employed are because they are cost effective and highly capable. Increased

regulations pass on costs to the firms, which will then pass on costs to the governments

that employ them. The most effective way to overcome this paradox is to eliminate the

patchworks that exist within the regulatory system and to remove uncertainty. There is a

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strong possibility that national legislation could be passed that does not worked in synch

with the international standards that are being put into place by the Department of

Defense. This would be the worse case scenario, where PMF’s would have to adhere to a

number of standards, without any one of these standards having authority over the other.

This would eliminate the very reasons why the United States have become so dependent

on private defense contractors. This is not to say that an effective regulation of the

industry could not be accomplished, however, it does have to be standardized with the

international regulations already being put into place.

Based upon the context-dependent generalizations found in this study, the

following recommendations are made regardless of which option the policy making

community chooses to follow.

Recommendation #1

In the issue area of effectiveness, it was found that military provider firms were

controversial and forced out of the battle space due to the unintended consequences of

their operations. While it was rare that any firm was not successful in its contractual

obligations, the military provider firm provided more risk to the client when compared to

the other types of private military firms. Therefore, military provider firms should only

be used when deemed absolutely necessary and mission essential. It was also found that

states hired PMF’s because they find them effective. In addition, this study concluded

that private military firms work to maintain important personal connections to states in

order to assist its ability to gain contracts in the future. The United States should end its

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practice of no-bid contracts in order to maintain the cost effectiveness of the firms and to

reduce the risk that personal connections can guarantee future contracts.

Recommendation #2

In the issue area of private networks, this study found that private military firms

used spin-off capabilities and were often under a parent company. The acquisition of new

firms by the parent company can radically alter the capability of the firm regarding spin-

off capability, subcontracting, and the formation of shell companies. When making the

decision to contract out a specific job, the United States should use a review process that

ensures that the Executive Branch is aware of all capabilities regarding the firm it is

awarding a contract to. That review process should be conducting in each renewal of the

contract as well, given the ability of private companies to alter corporate structure

quickly. This would eliminate the risk of the United States being held accountable for the

actions of a firm in a foreign country after its contract with the United States had been

terminated.

Recommendation #3

The policy recommendations for the last issue area, “foreign policy by proxy”,

largely rest on whether the direction of policy toward the private military industry

follows option one or two. Regardless, private military firms provide the Executive

Branch with extraordinary capability and power. This study found that past military

engagements could provide incentives for intervention with PMF’s. In all cases, there

was at least one domestic or international legal requirement that was circumnavigated

using PMF’s. Lastly, states were found to have a tendency to assist PMF’s that are based

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within its borders when the firms operations aligned with the states foreign policy

interests. Whether or not these powers are put to use is in the hands of the President, who

is ultimately held responsible by the American people. Any national legislation to

regulate the industry would have to be approved with the President’s signature unless

passed with a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress. The recommendation

toward this issue area is that policy makers should use their power to increase awareness

about this tool the Office of the President can exercise during conflicts.