taiwan-cyprus-kosovo cases: differences and...

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Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi/Journal of Administrative SciencesCilt / Volume: 15, Sayı / N: 30, ss. / pp.:553-572 , 2017

Taiwan-Cyprus-Kosovo Cases: Differences And Similarities

Kamer KASIM* & Elif EREN KASIM**

AbstractThere are different types of states in the international system and each has its own historical and political development. Taiwan, Cyprus and Kosovo are the three examples of disputes in international relations. The three states are in different geographic locations and their history and content of the disputes that they come through are different. However, there are also similarities among Taiwan-Cyprus-Kosovo examples which makes them valuable to evaluate. This study aims to ana-lyze Taiwan-Cyprus and Kosovo cases in order to illustrate possible solution of disputes. This study will also evaluate each case concerning the developments in international system to shed a light the regional and international implications of these cases.Key words: Taiwan, Cyprus, TRNC, Kosovo, Security, Conflict

Tayvan, Kıbrıs, Kosova Meseleleri: Farklılıklar ve Benzerlikler ÖzetUluslararası sistemde her biri farklı tarihi geçmişi ve politik gelişimi bulunun fark-lı devlet tipleri bulunmaktadır. Tayvan, Kıbrıs ve Kosova uluslararası ilişkilerde sorun olarak adlandırılan örneklerdir. Üç örneğin de birbirinden farklı coğrafi konumları bulunmaktadır. Tayvan, Kıbrıs ve Kosova’nın tarihleri ve yaşadıkları sorunun içerikleri de farklıdır. Bununla birlikte bu üç örnek arasında onları incele-meye değer kılan benzerlikler de mevcuttur. Bu çalışmada Tayvan, Kıbrıs ve Koso-va sorunları analiz edilerek olası çözüm yolları konusuna değinilecektir. Çalışmada ayrıca her üç örnek uluslararası sistemdeki gelişmeler çerçevesinde değerlendirile-rek Tayvan, Kıbrıs ve Kosova sorunlarının bölgesel ve uluslararası etkilerine ışık tutulacaktır.Anahtar Kelimeler: Tayvan, Kıbrıs, KKTC, Kosova, Güvenlik, Çatışma

* Prof.Dr.AbantİzzetBaysalUniversity,DepartmentofInternationalRelations.** Ph.D.Candidate,AbantİzzetBaysalUniversity,DepartmentofInternationalRelations.

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Kamer KASIM & Elif EREN KASIM

INTRODUCTION

Intheinternationalsystemtherearedifferenttypesofstatesandsomeofthemhavelimitedrecognitionand/ornorecognition.However,theyhaveallthecapacityofindependentstates.Thesestatesgenerallyarecreatedaftermajorpoliticalevents.Althoughthesestateswouldalsobeanalyzedaccordingtothe international law,politicsplayamajorrolefortheirevaluationandtheviewoftheinternationalcom-munitytowardsthem.InmanyaspectsthethreeexamplesofTaiwan,CyprusandKosovoareuniquecases.However,intermsofinternationallawandinternationalpoliticsallthesethreecaseshavesomecommonalities.

Analyzing similarities and differences of Taiwan, Cyprus and Kosovo caseswould provide arguments about how to solve disputes involving these entities.Amongthem,TaiwanwithitsofficialnameofRepublicofChina(ROC)wasrepre-sentingChinaintheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilasapermanentmemberuntil1971.AfterthepolicychangeoftheWestandmostofthecountries’“OneChina”policy,People’sRepublicofChina(PRC)hadpermanentseat in theUNSecurityCouncil.However,Taiwan continued its existenceand createdmiracle regardingeconomicdevelopment.Taiwan’srapideconomicgrowthwasasuccessstoryandTaiwanproofedthatitispossibletosurviveandtohaveeconomically,politicallyandsociallystablestatewithoutofficialrecognitionofmajorpowersinworldpoli-tics.TherearestilldiscussionsregardingTaiwanconsidering itspositionvis a vis PRCandtheUSpolicytowardstheregion.

ThemainaimofthisresearchistoanalyzedifferencesandsimilaritiesofTaiwan,CyprusandKosovomodels.Throughthisanalysis,itisexpectedtofindawaytoshedalightofpossiblesolutionsofproblemsconcerningtheseexamples.Taiwan’ssituationvis a visPRC,thetwocommunitiesofCyprusandpositionofTurkishRe-publicofNorthernCyprus(TRNC)regardingtheEU,Kosovo’sproblematicinde-pendenceregardingitspositionvis a visSerbiashouldbesearchedinordertofindsustainablesolutionorformulationofthesecases.Tohaveaconstructiveanalysisofthesemodelswecannotdisregardtheinternationaldimension.InthecaseofTai-wan;cross-straitrelations,inthecaseofsouthandnorthCyprus;theEU,relationsbetweenTurkeyandGreece, in the caseofKosovo; theEU relationswithSerbiadrawsparameterstoimpactonfutureofthesemodels.

GENERAL VIEW ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF STATEHOOD

Despitethefactthatthereisnoconsensusaboutthedefinitionofthestatehood,1933MontevideoConventionontheRightsandDutiesofStatesisbeingconsideredasprimarydocumentabouttheconceptofstatehood.AccordingtotheMontevideoConventionstatesmusthaveadefinedterritory,apermanentpopulation,govern-mentandthecapacitytoenterintorelationswiththeotherstates.Thereisalsoaconceptofquasistates,whichhavecontrolovercertainterritories,haveapermanentpopulationandabilitytogovernthepopulationandterritory.Howeverquasistatesareunabletoachievewidespreadrecognitionoftheirsovereignty.

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Intermsofrecognition,therearedifferencesamongquasistates.Infactthecir-cumstancesandhistoricalbackgroundsoftheexistenceofquasistatesarealsodif-ferentiates.Taiwan,TRNCandKosovoarenotexceptions,whichwillbeexaminedinthisresearch.Itshouldbenotedthat1933MontevideoConventionontheRightsandDutiesofStatesarticle3statedthat“the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.”1

Thisdoesnotmeanthatquasistatesdefinitelywouldgetrecognitionandbeamemberof theUN.Theprincipleof territorial integrity iswidelyemphasized inthismatter.Laterdemocracyandhumanrightsbecamecriteriafortheacceptanceofstatesbytheinternationalcommunity.ThiswaswidelyvoicedduringKosovo’sdeclarationofindependence.

Theexistenceofquasistatesmightbeconsideredbysomeasaproblemforin-ternationalsystem.Thereforehowtohandletheissueandtonormalizethesituationhavebeendiscussed.Internationalorganizations’positionrejectingtoaccommodatequasistatescontributedtoprolongingthecurrentpositions.Thereisargumentthattheoptionofinternationalrecognitionforquasistatesshouldbeopenandiftheymanagetobuildefficientstatestructure,trytopreventcriminalactivities,establishdemocraticregime,theywouldgetrecognitionintheinternationalsystem.2

Differencesinhistoricalbackgroundsandstatestructurerequiredseparatelookateachquasistate.However,theyhavealsosimilaritiesintermsoftheirroleinin-ternationalsystemandargumentsabouttheirexistenceandhowtoapproachthem.

THE CASE OF TAIWAN: FROM INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE TO CURRENT SITUATION

TaiwanwasunderthecontrolofJapanfrom1895to1945.JustbeforetheJapaneseinvasionofTaiwan,itwasdeclaredasanindependentstate.However,untilthede-feat of JapanintheSecondWorldWar,islandwasruledbyJapan.IntheMainlandChinathetwoimportantforcesemerged:KuomintangorNationalistParty(KMT)andChineseCommunistParty(CCP).DespitethetwocooperatedagainsttheJapa-neseoccupation,afterthatcivilwarbrokeoutbetweennationalistsandcommunists.WiththeCairoDeclaration,on1December1943Roosevelt,ChurchillandChiangKai-shekpledged toreturnTaiwan to theRepublicofChina.Thiswasalsomen-tionedinthePotsdamDeclarationon26July1945.InOctober1945ChineseforcestookcontroloverTaiwan.ThecivilwarwaswonbycommunistsandMaoZedongestablishedPRC.NationalistforcesledbyChiangKai-shektookrefugeinTaiwan

1 http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897 (ErişimTarihi:12Ocak2017).

2 Pal Kolstoe, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi States”, Journal of Peace Research,Vol.43,No.6,2006,p.723-740.

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with thehopeof to control allChinaoneday.ThePeaceTreatywith Japanwassignedin1951withtheparticipationofalliedpowers.WiththisTreaty,Japanre-nouncedallrights,titleandclaimtoFormosa(Taiwan)andthePescadores.HoweverwithoutanyChineseparticipation,theTreatydidnotmentionwhichwouldsucceedJapanintermsofcontroloverTaiwan.3However,theRepublicofChina-JapanPeaceTreatysignedinTaipeiin1952andseveralJapanesecourtdecisionssupportedthecaseofROC.4TheTreatyofPeacebetweentheRepublicofChinaandJapanrec-ognizedthatunderArticle2oftheTreatyofPeacewhichJapansignedatthecityofSanFranciscoin1951,Japanhasrenouncedallrights,title,andclaimtoTaiwan(Formosa)andPenghu(thePescadores)aswellastheSpratleyIslandsandParcelIslands.WiththeArticle1oftheTreatyofPeacebetweentheRepublicofChinaandJapan,thestateofwarbetweentheRepublicofChinaandJapanended.5

Taiwanwith23millionpopulationsand36,191kilometersquareterritoryisoneofthemostdenselypopulatedcountriesintheworld.Afterthecivilwarinthemain-landChina,PRCandROCemergedastwoseparategovernments.AlthoughbothsidesagreedthatthereisonlyoneChina,thereisgreatdifferenceregardingwhorepresenttheOneChina.WhileTaipeiconsiderstheROCaslegitimateauthority,BeijingreferstoChinaasPRC.ThedifferencesofregimesreflectedthepoliciesofworldpowersduringtheColdWaranduntil1971WestandmoststatesrecognizedROCassolelegitimategovernmentofallChina.AftertheUSandWesterncoun-tries changed their foreignpolicy towardChina.One important consequencesofthiscameasPRCtooktheseatintheUN.ThisimpactedonTaiwan’spositioninsomeother internationalorganizationsandTaiwan facedeffectiveblockage fromthePRC.DespitethisTaiwanisstillamemberofsomeimportantinternationalor-ganizationlikeWorldTradeOrganizationandAsianDevelopmentBank.Taiwan’sofficialrecognitionprocessasstatewasfurtheraffectedaftertheUSswitchedofficialrecognitionfromROCtoPRC.6SinceROChadapermanentseatintheUNSecurityCouncilandwidelyrecognizedstateuntil1971,Taiwan’sstatusbecomesaspecialcaseininternationallaw.

BASIC PARAMETERS OF THE US POLICY TOWARDS TAIWAN

TheUnitedStates’positionprovidedspecialcaseregardingTaiwan,sincewith-outtheUSsupport,theexistenceandacceptanceofTaiwanintheinternationalarenawouldbedifficult.TaiwanlocatedstrategicplaceinSouthChinaandEastChinaSea

3 HansKuijper,“IsTaiwanaPartofChina?”,Jean-MarieHenckaerts(Ed),The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order, Legal and Political Considerations,(London:TheHagueandBoston:KluwerLawInternationalLtd,1996),p.10-13.

4 HungdahChiu, “The InternationalLegal StatusofTaiwan”, Jean-MarieHenckaerts (Ed),The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order, Legal and Political Considerations,(London:TheHagueandBoston:KluwerLawInternationalLtd,1996),p.7.

5 For the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan see http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm(ErişimTarihi:22Aralık2016).

6 EricTinglunHuang,The Status of Taiwan Under International Law and in a Changing World,2007,p.282-283.

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andtheexistenceofROCbecameimportantfortheUSsecurityduringtheColdWar.AsGeneralDouglasMacArthursdescribedTaiwanin1950asunsinkableaircraftcarrier.7DespiteTaiwan’sstrategicimportanceatthebeginningof1950,theUScameupwithinconsistentstrategies.TrumanfirstwantedtosplitbetweenPRCandtheSovietUnion,preventTaiwantobeundercommunistcontrol.WhiletheUSrecog-nizedROCaslegitimateChinesegovernment,TrumanadministrationopposedChi-angKai-shek’sinitiativetoretakethemainland.8TheUSpolicytowardTaiwanwasimpactedbythewarinKoreanPeninsula.TheUScouldnottoleratePRC’scontroloverTaiwan,whichwouldmeancommunistexpansioninAsia.9

TheUSpolicytowardsTaiwanchangedwiththepingpongdiplomacybetweentheUSandPRC.Americanpingpongteam,whichwasinJapanfor31stWorldTa-bleTennisChampionship,receivedinvitationfromChineseteamtovisitPRC.ThegroupwasthefirstonetoenterPRCaftercommunistcontrolinmainlandChina.After this visit in 1971,HenryKissenger visited PRC,which followed PresidentNixon’svisitinFebruary1972.TheprocessledtotheUSrecognitionofPRCduringCarter’sPresidencyintheUSinJanuary1979.10TheUSdidnotacceptPRC’sclaimoverTaiwan.ConsideringthestatusofTaiwanasunsettled,theUSpolicysupportedthesolutionisbasedonconsentofthepeopleonbothsidesoftheTaiwanStrait.TheUSpolicyisguidedbytheTaiwanRelationsActof1979,PublicLaw96-8withtheabsenceofadiplomaticrelationswithROC.11TheTaiwanRelationsActclearlystatedthat“to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”TheUSalsostatedthatwiththisacttheUSwill“provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character”andtheUSwill“maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”12 TheUSpolicytowardsTaiwancontinuedwiththeparametersdescribedinTaiwanRelationsAct.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE CROSS STRAIT RELATIONS

Considering the fact that unstable relations between the PRC and the SovietUnion,thedisintegrationoftheSovietUnionchangedthePRC’sthreatperceptions

7 PeterKien-hongYu,“TheRepublicofChinaandtheUnitedStates:OfficialRelationsPriorto1979”, inYuSanWang (Ed.),Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan, An Unorthodox Approach,(NewYork:PreagerPublisher,1990),p.10.

8 DeanP.Chen,US Taiwan Strait Policy, The Origins of Strategic Ambuguity,(Boulder&London:FirstForumPress,2012),p.4.

9 SeeRichardC.Bush,Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait,(BrookingsInstitutionPress,2005).

10 ForPingPongDiplomacysee,NicholasGriffin,Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Secret History Behind the Game that Changed the World,(Simon&Schuster,2014).

11 Shirley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrison, US-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues,ConressionalResearchService,CRSReport,18November2013,p.4.SeeDeanP.Chen,US Taiwan Strait Policy, The Origins of Strategic Ambuguity,(Boulder&London:FirstForumPress,2012).

12 ForTheTaiwanRelationsActseeWebsiteofAmerican Institute in Taiwan,http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html,(ErişimTarihi:12Aralık2016).

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andthePRChadopportunity toconcentrate toAsia-Pacificregion. In thatatmo-spherethePRCpublishedthewhitepaper:“TaiwanQuestionandtheReunificationofChina” indicated thePRC’s stance theuseof forceagainstTaiwan.Todefend Taiwan,Taiwanesemilitarystrategybasedoncounteringblockadeoperationsviamaintainingair and sea control around themain island.Anti-landingoperationsandairdefensealso important in that context thePRC forces exercises andmis-silelaunchesin1995and1996werefurtherremindedTaiwanfortheimportanceofstrongdefense.13WiththeDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP)andPresidencyofChenShui-biancross-straitrelationsenteredrathertenseatmospherein2000.Tai-wanesePresidentcalledareferendumonTaiwan’sfutureandhestatedthat““…with Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country.” Headded:“Our Taiwan is not something that belongs to someone else, Our Taiwan is not someone else’s local government. Our Taiwan is not someone else’s province.”14

Regardingcross-straitrelationsthevictoryofKMTandPresidencyofMaYing-jeouin2008openedanewstage.HesupportedtoresumenegotiationswithPRCun-derthe1992consensus.MastatedthathewouldnotsacrificeTaiwan’ssovereigntyandnationalinterests.15HeputlistofprioritiesaspersuadingChinatoloosenitsgripon“Taiwan’sinternationalspace”,ordiplomaticlibertyofaction,across-straitpeaceaccord,initialstepssuchasliberalizedtravelandtrade.16

Thereweresomeactionswhicheasedcross-straitrelationsbeforethenewchapterstartsincross-straitrelations;likeTaiwancitizenswereallowedtovisittheirrelativesinMainlandChinain1987.AssociationforRelationsacrosstheTaiwanStrait(ARATS)officialscametoTaiwanfornegotiationsin1993.17FirstdirectcharterflightsstartedbetweenTaiwanandPRCin2005.Howeverafter2008bothsidesgetcloserthroughbettertransportationlinksandtrade.Directregularflightsstartedin2008,whichboosttourism.EconomicCooperationFrameworkAgreementwassignedin2010.Firstof-ficialtalksheldbetweenTaiwanandPRCinFebruary2014sincethe1949civilwarinMainlandChina.Taiwan’sHeadofMainlandAffairsCouncil,WangYu-chimetwithDirectorofMainland’sTaiwanAffairsOffice,ZhangZhijuninNanjing.18

Among the Taiwanese population particularly university students skepticalabout cross-strait negotiations and they particularly opposed cross-strait servicetradeagreementandorganizeddemonstrationsagainst it andevenoccupied the

13 https://www.fas.org/irp/nic/battilega/taiwan.pdf(ErişimTarihi:16Kasım2016)14 http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/tc102-int.pdf,(ErişimTarihi:14Aralık2016).15 Francis Yi-hua Kan, “Taiwan’s New Foreign Relations and National Security”, http://www.

mcsstw.org/web/content.php?PID=5&Nid=947,30May2012(ErişimTarihi:15Kasım2016).16 JamesR.Holmes,“The2008ElectionsandAsia’sMaritimeFuture:AClausewitzianPrognosis”,

in IYuan(Ed.),Cross-Strait at the Turning Point: Institution, Identity and Democracy, InstituteofInternational Relations English Series No.34, Institute of International Relations, NationalChengchiUniversity,Taipei,2008,p.327-328.

17 SeeSuChi,Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, A Tail Wagging Two Dogs,(London:Routledge,2009),p.1-30.

18 Michael Pizzi, “What is mext for China-Taiwan Relations?”, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/15/what-s-next-for-chinataiwanrelations.html,15February2014(ErişimTarihi:16Kasım2016).

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Parliament.192000protestorslaunchedinsideandoutsidetheLegislativeYuan,theParliamentofTaiwan,andtherewereinjuriesfromprotestorsandpoliceaswell.ThedemonstratorsdemandedthatPresidentMaYing-jeoushouldwithdrawfromthecontroversialtradeagreement.20Taiwan’sdemocraticregimeanditsdifferencewiththemainlandChinainthataspectisthemainreasonfortheskepticismofparticu-larlytheyoungTaiwaneseregardingPRC.

Student demonstrations and their occupation of the Parliament ended threeweeks later.The leaderofprotestingstudents,ChenWei-tingstatedthat“The oc-cupation of the Legislative Yuan has reached its mission for this stage, and made significant progress.”Chenaddedthatendingtheoccupationisnotendthestudentmovement.Parliament’sSpeakerWangJin-pyngpromisedtostudentsanoversightbilltosuper-visetherelationswithPRC.21Ontheotherhand,PRChasnotexpressedanyopinionregardingpossibilityofrenegotiationoftheagreement.Taiwan’sMainlandAffairsCouncilMinisterWangYu-chisaid“if the pact is revised by the Legislature, the adminis-tration will have to either have to scrap it, or renegotiate it with China.”22

Changeofpolitical climate inTaiwan resultedDPP’s electionvictory in2016.DPP’scandidateTsaiIng-wenwonPresidentialelectionson16thJanuary2016.ShesworninasTaiwan’sPresidenton20thMay2016.Questionraisedaboutthefutureofthecross-straitrelations.AlthoughTsai-Ing-wenstatedthatTaiwanmaintainsthe existingmechanismsfordialogueandcommunicationacrosstheTaiwanStrait inherinaugurationspeech,thePRCsuspendedthecross-straitdialogueinJune2016.23 Taiwandemandedtherestartofthecross-straittalks.PresidentTsaiIng-wensaidthatpledgedgivenherinauguralspeechwouldremainunchanged.Sheemphasizedcontinuationof relations in accordancewith theConstitution, theActGoverningRelationsBetweenthePeopleoftheTaiwanAreaandthe Mainland Area and other legislation.24

19 ChrisWang,“Opposition,GroupsProtestsTradePact”,Taipei Times,http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/03/19/2003586009, 19 March 2014 (Erişim Tarihi: 16 Kasım2016).MichelleFlorCruz,“TaiwanStudentProtestsEscalate:EconomicTradeAgreementWithBeijing Reflects Annexation Fears”, International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/taiwan-student-protests-escalate-economic-trade-agreement-beijing-reflects-annexation-fears-photos,24March2014(ErişimTarihi:16Kasım2016).

20 RaySanchez andZoeLi, “TaiwanLegislatureoccupiers’ultimatumpasseswithout responsefromgovernment”,http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/19/world/asia/taiwan-student-protests/,21March2014(ErişimTarihi:16Kasım2016).

21 Lu Chen, “Taiwan Protesters End Occupation of Parliament”, Epoch Times, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/607903-taiwan-protesters-end-occupation-of-parliament/,7April2014(ErişimTarihi:10Aralık2016).

22 “BeijingExertsnoPressureonTradePact:MACChief”,The China Post,http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2014/04/12/405138/Beijing-exerts.htm, 12 April 2014(ErişimTarihi:10Aralık2016).

23 Richard C. Bush, “Taiwan’s Election Results, Explained”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/01/16/taiwans-election-results-explained/, 16 January 2016. (ErişimTarihi:9Mart2017).PrashantKumarSingh,“Cross-StraitRelations:TheLullbeforetheStorm?”,http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/cross-strait-relations_pksingh_231116, 23 November 2016(ErişimTarihi:9Mart2017).

24 “Restart of Cross-Strait Dialogue Possible”,Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/12/04/2003660547,4December2016(ErişimTarihi:9Mart2017).

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Itmightbeargued thatas longas theUScommitment toTaiwancontinues,statusquoregardingthecross-straitrelationswillnotchange.However,thisdoesnotmean that theriskof increased tensioneven thepossibilityofarmedconflictdoesnotexist.TheUSpolicyduringObamaerafocusedonAsia-Pacificdescribedasrebalancing.ObamawantedtostrengthentheUStieswithregionalallies,hesup-portedTransPacificPartnershipasaneconomicdimensionsofthestrategy.TheUSalsosignedmilitaryagreementswithitsalliestostrengthenitsmilitarypresence.25 ThisstrategyrequiredclosetieswithTaiwan.However,unpredictabilityoftheUSpolicywiththeelectionofTrumpraisedquestionsabouttheUScommitmentofitsalliesintheregion.Trump’sideaoftheUSalliesintheregionshouldprovidetheirownsecurityandclaimtowithdrawtheUStroopsfromJapanandSouthKoreawillopenspacetoChinatoincreaseitsregionalinfluence.TheUSlackofcommitmenttoitsallieswouldmaketheUSalliestorethinktheirpositionregardingChinaandthiswouldimpactoncross-straitrelationsandfutureofTaiwan.China’sreactionagainstpowershiftinTaiwanafter2016electionswouldcreatedifficultiesforTaiwan.ForexampleChina’sdiplomaticeffortstowardsthecountrieswhichrecognizedTaiwantopersuade them to change theirdiplomatic recognitionofTaiwanhad resulted China restored diplomatic relationswithGambia inMarch 2016. São Tomé andPríncipe’sreestablishedofdiplomatictieswithMainlandChina26December2016.PanamaalsocutitstieswithTaiwanandswitcheditsdiplomaticrelationsfromTai-wantomainlandChinainJune2017.26

CYPRUS CASE: DIVIDED ISLAND

Cyprusquestionisoneoftheworld’slongstandingdisputes,whichcontinuedthroughchangeinstructureandframework.CypruswasruledbytheOttomanEm-pirefrom1571to1878.De-factoBritishcontrolstartedin1878andBritishEmpireannexedtheislandin1914andthissituationformallyconfirmedwiththeLausanneTreatyin1923.ThediscussionaboutthefutureofCyprusstartedduringthepro-cessofBritain’slosingcolonialterritoriesaftertheSecondWorldWar.ThereweretwomajorcommunitiesinCyprus;GreeksandTurks.GreekswantedtheislandtobeunitedwithGreece.Turksdidnotapprovethat.TurkeyarguingthatifBritainleavesfromCyprus,theislandshouldbecomeapartofTurkeysinceitsveryclosetoTurkeyandCypruswasneverruledbyGreeksinhistory.EOKAwasestablishedasaterroristorganizationaimedtouniteislandwithGreece(ENOSIS)andstartedto attackBritish forces aswell asTurkish community in the island.Britainorga-nizedLondonConferencewithoutsuccess.SuezCanalincidentandBritain’slosinggroundinMediterraneanincreasedCyprus’sstrategicimportanceforBritain.

25 ForObama’srebalancingpolicyseeKamerKasım,“TheImpactoftheUSRebalancingPolicytowardAsiaPacificonInternationalRelations”,LEAM, 12. Lodz East Asia Meeting, Overwelming Contraversies in East Asia,Lodz/Polonya,2-3June2016.

26 SeeKamerKasım,“PowerShiftinTaiwanandItsImplicationsonCross-StraitRelations”,LEAM 13. Lodz East Asia Meeting, Power Shift in East Asia: Prospects for Developing Asian-European Ties,Lodz/Poland,1-2June2017.

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Theterroristattacks towards theTurkishcommunityalarmedTurkish foreignpolicymakers.TurkeystartedtosupportdivisionoftheislandbetweenGreeceandTurkeyagainstGreekargumentofunificationofCypruswithGreece. IncreasingdestabilizationofCyprusanditsimpactonTurkey-GreecerelationsworriedtheUSduetotheColdWaratmosphere.PossibleconflictbetweenTurkeyandGreecebe-causeofCypruswoulddamagethesouthernwingofNATO.TheUSinsistedonso-lutionbasedoncommonstaterepresentingTurksandGreeksinCyprus.Thiseffortresultedwiththeestablishmentof1960CyprusRepublic.TheRepublicwouldhaveparliamentwiththetwochambers.PresidentwouldbeaGreekandVicePresidentwouldbeaTurk.Officialswouldbepartitionaccording to theproportionof thepopulationofeachethnicgroup.However,theCyprusRepublicdefactocollapsedin1963withincreasingattacksagainsttheTurksinordertoeliminatethemtounitetheislandwithGreece.Turmoilcontinueduntil1974whenPresidentofCyprusMa-kariouswasoverthrownbygroupssupportedbymilitarygovernment inGreece.ThisgaverighttoTurkeytointervenesinceconstitutionalstructureofCypruscol-lapsedin1974withthecoup.27

AfterTurkeysenttroopstoCyprususingitsrightsgivenbytheTreatyofGuar-anteeof1960,defactoseparationbecamerealone.In1975FederalRepublicofCy-pruswasestablishedandnegotiationstofindthesolutiondidnotproduceresult.In1983TurkishRepublicofNorthernCyprus(TRNC)wasfounded.TheparametersinCyprusquestionchangedwiththeapplicationoftheSouthernCyprusofGreekAdministration(SCGA)tothemembershipoftheEU.AlthoughapplicationhasveryproblematicsincetheEUconsideredCyprusRepublicasrepresentingallislandandrealitywasquitedifferent.SCGAhasnoauthorityinthenorth.TheEUleadershiphopedthatuntilthemembershipofCyprus,theproblemwouldbesolved.AnotherproblemwasthatTreatyofGuaranteeArticleIandIIandthe1960ConstitutionofCypruscontradictedtheEUmembership.TreatyofGuaranteeArticleI (2)statedthatCyprusundertook“not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or eco-nomic union with any State whatever or partition of the Island”.AccordingtotheArticleII(2)Greece,TurkeyandtheUnitedKingdomagreed“to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island”.TheConstitutionof1960gavePresidentandVice-Presidentseparatelyandconjointlyhasarightofvetoindecisionsconcerning,inter alia,“foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic in international organiza-tions and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both participate”.28

Despitethislegalstructure,theEUcontinuedSCGA’sintegrationprocesswiththeEUandin2004“RepublicofCyprus”becameamemberoftheEU.Itwasobvi-ousthatwithoutTurkey’smembershipoftheEU,thiswouldchangethecharacter

27 ForCyprusquestioninhistoryseeClementH.Dodd,The Cyprus Imbroglio,(Huntingdon:TheEothenPress,1998).NecatiEregün,The Cyprus Dispute,(Nicosia:RüstemandBrother,1984).

28 See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/treaty-concerning-the-establishment-of-the-republic-of-cyprus.en.mfa.ForinternationallawdimensionseeKudretÖzersay,Kıbrıs Sorunu Hukuksal Bir İnceleme,(Ankara:ASAMYayınları,2002).

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ofnegotiationsandwouldbetheviolationof1960ConstitutionofCyprusandtheTreatyofGuarantee.AlthoughthebigpowersintheEUknewthefactthatmember-shipofdividedislandwouldaggravateproblems,duetotheblackmailofGreecetoblockadetheEUenlargementtotheEasternEurope,theydidnotstoptheSCGA’smembershipprocess.29

THE ANNAN PLAN AND AFTERWARDS

TheEUestablishedastrategybasedonfindingsolutionofCyprusquestionbe-forefinalizethemembershipoftheEU.TheEUleadershipworriedthatbeforetheSCGAmembership,theproblemwouldnotbesolved.WiththeEU’sinitiativetheUNSecretaryGeneralAnnanpreparedaplan,whichhassimilaritiesofthepreviousplanswithmorecomprehensivestructure.Afterthesomerevisions,planwasaskedforthepeopleofthebothsideswithreferendumon24thofApril2004.TheGreeksiderejectedwith75.8%novoteandtheTurkishsidesupportedwith64.5%yesvote.

TheAnnanPlanenvisagedfederalandunitedCyprusRepubliccomposedofthetwoconstituentstates,TurkishStateinthenorthandGreekStateinthesouth.Underitsconstitution,theunitedCyprusRepublicisorganizedinaccordancewithpoliticalequality,bi-zonality,andtheequalstatusoftheconstituentstates.Accordingtotheplan,theFederalParliamentcomposedoftwochambers,TheSenateandtheCham-berofDeputies.Whileeachchamberwillhave48members,TurkishandGreekCy-priotswillhaveequallyrepresentedinSenateandproportionalrepresentation intheChamberofDeputies,thenumberofmembersofparliamentforeachsideintheChamberofDeputieswouldbeattributedaminimumofonequarteroftheseats.30 Inordertoprotectthebi-zonalandbi-communalcharacteroftheisland,theAnnanPlanintroducedderogations.However,thesederogationsdidnotbecomeaprimarylawwithintheEUbeforethereferendum.DespitetherejectionoftheplanfromtheGreekside,SCGAenteredtheEU.TheGreekvotersknewthateveniftheysaynotheGreeksidewouldbeamemberoftheEUunderthenameoftheRepublicofCyprus.TheSCGA’sleadershipthoughtthattheywouldgetmuchmorethantheAnnanPlanofferedfortheGreeksidesinceTurkeywantedtobeamemberoftheEUandtheGreeksidehopedthatTurkeywouldcompromiseandchangeitsstandinordertojointheEU.TheSCGAevenblockedtheEUaidpackagetothenorth.TurkeyandTRNCwerealsodisappointedwiththeapproachoftheEU.31

CurrentlyTRNCwasonly recognizedbyTurkey.Turkeyhoped that solutionwouldbefoundinthebaseofbi-communalandbi-zonalfederation.Turkeysup-

29 SeeKamerKasım,“KıbrısSorunuveDoğuAkdeniz’deGüvenlik”,KamerKasımandZerrinA.Bakan(Der.),Uluslararası Güvenlik Sorunları,(Ankara:ASAMYayınları,2004),p.125-140.

30 SeeErtanEfegil,Temel Konular Işığında Annan Belgesi’nin Analizi,(Ankara:GündoğanYayınları,2003).

31 SeeKamerKasım,,“KıbrısSorunuveTürkiye’ninAvrupaBirliği’neÜyelikSüreci”, inHarunArıkanandMuhsinKar(Ed.),Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri, Siyasal, Bülgesel ve Ekonomik Boyutlar,(Ankara:SeçkinYayıncılık,2005),p.259-273.KamerKasım,“SoğukSavaşDönemiSonrasıKıbrısSorunu”,Akademik Bakış,Vol.1,No.1,Winter,2007,p.57-72.

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portedtheAnnanPlanexpectingtheprocessledTurkey’smembershipoftheEU.DespitenegotiationsprocesswithTurkeystartedafterDecember2004BrusselsSum-mit,negotiationsdidnotgowellandCyprusquestionwasputasanobstacle toTurkey.TurkeydidnotrecognizeSCGAandcurrentlySouthernCyprusvehiclescannotuseTurkey’sportsandairports.TheEUdemandedfromTurkeytoaccepttheadditionalprotocolandtoopenitsportsandairportsforthenewmembers.WhileTurkeysignedtheadditionalprotocolsextendingtheAnkaraagreementtothenewmembersoftheEU,itmadea6paragraphdeclarationinwhichTurkeystatedthat:itwillcontinuetocommittofindingapoliticalsettlementoftheCyprusissue.TheRe-publicofCyprusreferredintheprotocolisnottheoriginalpartnershipstatefoundedin1960.TurkeywillcontinuetoconsidertheGreekCypriotasexercisingauthorityandcontrolonlyinthesouthandtheydonotrepresenttheTurkishCypriotpeople.Signature,ratificationandimplementationofthisprotocolneitheramounttoanyformofrecognitionoftheRepublicofCyprusreferredtointheProtocol;norpreju-diceTurkey’srightsandobligationsemanatingfromtheTreatyofGuarantee,theTreatyofAlliance,andtheTreatyofEstablishmentof1960.TurkeyreaffirmedthatitsexistingrelationshipwiththeTRNCremainedunchangedbybecomingapartytotheProtocol.TurkeyalsoexpresseditsreadinesstoestablishrelationswiththenewPartnershipStatewhichwillemergefollowingacomprehensivesettlementinCyprus.TheEUstatedthatrecognizingamembercountryisanindispensablepartofnegotiationprocessandaskedTurkeytoopenitsportsandairports.32

Turkeyhasstillarguedthatsolutionsshouldbefoundthroughnegotiationsandsolutionshouldbebasedonbi-communalityandbi-zonality.Howeverendlessne-gotiationprocesscauseddisappointmentnotonly inTurkeyandTRNCandalsoininternationalcommunity.InternationalenvironmentalsochangedaftertheAn-nanPlan.ThemostimportantdevelopmenttoimpactontheCyprusquestioncamewiththeindependenceofKosovoin2008.Infact,independenceofKosovowasnotthefirstexampleofseparationforitskind.MontenegrowasseparatedfromSerbiathroughthereferendumin2006.TheindependenceofKosovoandtheCyprusques-tionhavebeendiscussedtogetherinmanyplatforms.EvenRussianPresidentPutinstatedthatcountriestorecognizeKosovowhynotrecognizetheTRNC.PutinwasangrywiththepoliciesofWesterncountriestowardsKosovoandRussiawasintheSerbianside.However,mentioningKosovoandCyprustogether,Putinindicatedthesimilaritiesofthebothcases.AnothercasecameafterAugust2008conflictbe-tweenAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiaandbothentitiesdeclarationofindependencechangedtheregionalparameters.33

RejectingtheplantheGreeksiderefusedtohavebi-zonalandbi-communalfed-eration.InfactsomeGreekpoliticianswerearguedthatethnicpartitionwouldbepreferabletoanyformofbi-zonalandbi-communalfederation.ForexampleMarios

32 For the text of the declaration see http//www.mfa.gov.tr/NR!rdonlyres/CFIDE678-FA554B98-9E39 23D34C343EA5/0/DEKLARASYONMETNi.doc. Kamer Kasım, “Soğuk Savaş DönemiSonrasıKıbrısSorunu”,Akademik Bakış,Vol.1,No.1,Winter,2007,p.57-72.

33 “Kosovo Breakaway Illegal Says Putin”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/15/russia.kosovo,15February2008(ErişimTarihi17Eylül2016).

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Matsakisclearlymentionedthathepreferred“the option of a clean, two-state solution than bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that was the Annan Plan”.34InthecaseofCypruseven theproposals arebasedonbi-zonality andbi-communality, theboth sides’understandingofbi-zonalityandbi-communalityisquitedifferent.FortheTurkishside,bi-zonalityandbi-communalityintheAnnanPlanmeantthatthetwoethni-callydefinedconstituentstates.However,fortheGreeksidetheseconstituentstateswillnotbedefinedethnically.35

Negotiations continued during Talat-Christofias in 2008-2010 and later Eroğlu-Christofiaseras.TherecentCyprusnegotiationprocesswasresumedaftertheJointDeclarationon11February2014.Full-fledgednegotiationsstartedon15May2015aftertheelectionofMustafaAkıncıasthePresidentoftheTRNCon25April2015.36 AnimportantpointthatthebothsidesreachedinGenevainJanuary2017.Eachsidepresentedtheirmapsinthenegotiationsandthedifferencesbetweenthebothsidesregardingtheterritorialdemands,securityguaranteesandTurkey’smilitarypresenceintheislandstucktheprocess.However,themostimportantobstacleforthenegotia-tionprocesscamewiththedecisionofGreekCypriotHouseofRepresentativetocom-memoratetheplebisciteforENOSISinGreekCypriotschools.Thedecisiontakenon14February2017indicatedthefactthatGreekCypriotadministrationisstillignoresidentityoftheTurksintheislandandtheGreeksidehasnorespectTurks’rightsinCyprus.InfacttheTRNCLegislativeAssemblycondemnedthedecisiontakenbytheGreekside.37ItmightbearguedthattheGreeksidedoesnotwanttosharepowerwiththeTurkishsideandtheyignoreTurkishside’srightofexistencewithsecurity.

PeopleintheislandidentifiedthemselvesasTurksandGreeks.WithoutenoughnumberofpeopletoidentifythemselvesasCypriot,itwouldbeimpossibletohaveCyprusStatecomposedofthetwoethnicgroups.TurksandGreeksofCyprushavestrongattachmentstotheirmotherlandcountries.38Separationinthiscasepreventsmorecomplicationsandbloodshedbetweentheethnicgroups.NegotiationstofindasolutioninCypruscontinuedandevenifsomekindofplansimilartotheAnnanPlanimposedonbothsidesandifitapprovedduetothepressurefrominternationalcommunity, it isdoubtful thatCypruswouldbemorepeaceful than todaysincetherewasnomajorconflictintheislandafter1974Turkey’sintervention.

34 HarryAnastasiou,The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus, Vol. 1,(Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress,2008),p.189.

35 Mete Hatay and Rebecca Bryant, Negotiating the Cyprus Problem(s), (İstanbul: TESEVPublications,2011),p.16.

36 See Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/cyprus-negotiation-process/recent-developments/

37 See Embassy of TRNC in Turkey, http://ankara.mfa.gov.ct.tr/joint-declaration-by-the-trnc-legislative-assembly-condemning-the-decision-of-the-greek-cypriot-house-of-representatives-to-commemorate-the-plebiscite-for-enosis-in-greek-cypriot-schools/

38 SeeMuzafferErcanYılmaz,“EthnicIdentityandEthnicConflicts”,Akademik Bakış Dergisi,No.21,2010,p.1-22.

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KOSOVO CASE: PROCESS OF DISINTEGRATION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Kosovoisoneoftheplaceswhereregionaldisputesturnedintotheinternationaloneandattheendanindependentstatejoinedtheinternationalcommunity.KosovomaybeconsideredapartoftheprocessofthedisintegrationoftheformerYugosla-via.KosovolocatedintheBalkanregionhasthebaggageofhistory.KosovowasanOttomanEmpire’sterritoryfrom1389to1912.SerbiagotmostpartsofKosovoin1912.AlthoughAlbaniaalsobecameanindependentstate,KosovowaswithintheborderofSerbia.AftertheSecondWorldWar,KosovocameundertheRepublicofSerbiawithinYugoslavia.KosovowasconsideredasautonomousprovincebytheYugoslavConstitutionof1963however,itsconstitutionalstatuswasstilltobedeter-minedbySerbia.InNovember1968KosovoAlbaniansrevoltedagainsttheSerbianrule.Manydemonstratorswereimprisoned.WiththeYugoslavConstitutionof1974KosovobecameconstituentcomponentsoftheFederation.

In1981,students’demonstrationsfollowedwithriotsandtheydemandedKosovotobegivenrepublicstatusandrightsofsecessionandthousandswereimprisoned.With the Presidency of Milosevic, Serbia followed policy of suppression againstKosovoAlbanians.In1989,ParliamentofSerbiapassedconstitutionalamendmentsabolishedKosovo’sautonomy.Serbia closedorpurgedmainKosovonewspapersrunbyKosovoAlbanians andAlbanian cultural symbolswere alsounder attack.KosovoAlbaniansnon-violentresistancestartedin1990undertheleadershipofIbra-himRugovaofDemocraticLeagueofKosovo.Theyorganizedunofficialreferendum.However,continuationofSerbianauthorities’rigidstandandin1995Daytonagree-mentaboutBosniawithwhichsanctionsofSerbialiftedwithoutdiscussionsaboutsituationinKosovodisappointedtheKosovo’sAlbanianpopulation.39

AlbanianarmedresistanceorganizedbyKosovoLiberationArmystartedandSerbia responded itwith comprehensive operation inKosovo.However, humanrightsviolationsanddeportationofAlbanianpopulationofKosovoaggravatedthesituation.AgainstKosovoLiberationArmy’s offensive, Serbian forces conductedoperationsresultedinmasskillingsofAlbanians.40Serbiafacednewinternationalsanctions.AlbaniansandSerbscametogethertofindasolutioninRambouilletin1999.Afterthefailureofthetalks,NATOoperationconductedagainstSerbiastart-ingon24March1999withouttheUNdecision.NATOlaunched78daysofairstrikesagainstSerbia.Afterthis,MilosevicagreedtowithdrawitstroopsandNATOpeace-keepingforcestationedinKosovo.41UnitedNationsMissionsinKosovo(UNMIK)foundedandexercisedalllegislativeandexecutiveauthoritywithrespecttoKosovo,

39 See Robert Bideleux, “Kosovo’s Conflict”, History Today, Vol. 48, Issue. 11, http://www.historytoday.com/robert-bideleux/kosovos-conflict,1998(ErişimTarih:25Eylül2016).

40 Kosovo’shistorysee,NoelMolcolm,Kosovo: A Short History,(NewYork:UniversityPress,1999).41 “Kosovo:Operation‘AlliedForce’”,House of Commons Research Paper99/48,29Nisan1999,http://

www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-048.pdf. Operation Allied Force, http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/,21Haziran1999(ErişimTarihi:25Eylül2016).

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includingtheadministrationofjudiciary.InMay2001certainpowerstobegiventoKosovoAssemblybyConstitutionalFrameworkforProvisionalSelf-Government.42

UnitedNationsSpecialEnvoyAhtisaaripresentedaplantodefinethestatusofKosovo.According to theAhtisaariPlanKosovowouldbeamulti-ethnic societygoverningitselfdemocraticallyandwithfullrespectfortheruleoflaw.Kosovore-spectshumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsandpromotespeacefulandpros-perousexistenceofall itspopulation.Kosovowouldhave right tonegotiateandconcludeinternationalagreements.Kosovowouldberesponsibleforitsownaffairsandforfulfillingitsobligationsunderthesettlement.AhtisaariPlancalledCompre-hensiveProposalfortheKosovoStatusSettlementcreatedbaseforthedeclarationofindependenceforKosovoinFebruary2008.AhtisaariPlanproposedKosovoshouldbegovernaccordingtotheruleoflawandarrangedtheframeworkforitandalsoforthesecurityofKosovo.AccordingtotheplanEUwouldestablishaEuropeanSecurityandDefensePolicy(ESDP)Missioninthefield.TheESDPmissionwouldassistKosovoauthoritiesintheirprogresstowardssustainabilityandaccountabil-ityand in furtherdevelopingandstrengtheningan independent judiciary,policeandcustomsservice,ensuringthattheseinstitutionsarefreefrompoliticalinterfer-ence and in accordancewith internationally recognized standards andEuropeanbestpractices.NATOshallestablishanInternationalMilitaryPresencetosupportimplementationofthissettlement.NATOforceshallhaveoverallresponsibilityforthedevelopmentandtrainingoftheKosovoSecurityForceandNATOshalloverallresponsibilityforthedevelopmentandestablishmentofacivilian-ledorganizationoftheGovernmenttoexerciseciviliancontroloverthisforce.43

InOctober2008SerbiarequestedfromUNGeneralAssemblytoaskadvisoryopinionoftheInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)aboutthelegalityunderinterna-tional lawofthedeclarationof independenceofKosovoin20February2008.Al-thoughICJcannotcancelthedeclarationofindependence,itwouldhavepoliticalimpact.44ICJhaditsadvisoryopinionon22July2010andstatedthatKosovo’sdecla-rationofindependencewasnotinviolationofinternationallaw.AlthoughICJtalkedaboutspecificanduniquecircumstancesofKosovo,itiscertainlywouldimpactonterritorialstrugglesinotherpartsoftheworld.ManyEuropeanstatesthoughtthatthepeacefulreintegrationofKosovointoSerbiawasimpossibleandindependentKosovoistheonlysolution.45OneimpactofICJopinionwasincreasethenumberofcountriesrecognizedKosovo,whichiscurrentlyreached114.46

42 Demola Okeowo, “Statehood, Effectiveness and the Kosovo Declaration of Independence”,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1316445,3November2008(ErişimTarihi:25Eylül2016).

43 For theAhtisaariPlan seehttp://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf

44 Demola Okeowo, “Statehood, Effectiveness and the Kosovo Declaration of Independence”,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1316445,3November2008(Erişimtarihi:25Eylül2016).

45 RichardCaplan,“ICT’sAdvisoryOpiniononKosovo”,http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB55%20The%20ICJs%20Advisory%20Opinion%20on%20Kosovo.pdf, 17 September 2010(ErişimTarihi:25Eylül2016).

46 http://www.kosovothanksyou.com,(ErişimTarihi:17Haziran2017).

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Kosovobefore thedeclarationof its independencehad some special arrange-mentsbackedbyUNSecurityCouncildecisions.TheUNSecurityCouncilresolu-tion1244authorizedtheUNSecretaryGeneralwiththeassistanceofrelevantinter-nationalorganizations,toestablishaninternationalcivilpresenceinKosovoinorder toprovidean interimadministration forKosovo.KosovoProvisional InstitutionsofSelfGovernmentwasestablishedandgainedmoreresponsibilitiesbythetime.Kosovoismoreintegratedintheinternationalsystemandreachedacertainstagebythetime.KosovoisnotapartytotheChicagoConvention.However,Pristinainternationalairporthandledmillionsofpassengers.47

COMPARISON

Intheinternationalsystemeachcasehasitsownspecificfeatures.Howevertheyhavealsosimilarities,whichmakethemcomparable.Taiwan,CyprusandKosovolocatedindifferentgeographiesandaswediscussedabovetheyhavequitediffer-enthistoricalandpoliticalbackgrounds.TaiwanisintheAsia-Pacificregionanditshistorical,culturalandpoliticalenvironmentdevelopedaccordingly.Taiwanwith23 millionpopulationsand986billionUSDollarGDPhavean importantplayerinworldeconomy.TaiwanasRepublicofChinahadalsoseatintheUNSecurity Counciluntil1971.ThisinformationanduniquehistoricalbackgroundmakeTaiwanasspecialcase.

Taiwanisalsoanexampleofintheabsenceoftheprospectforsettlementatleastintheshortterm,findingwaystoachievedétenteandcreateatmosphereforeco-nomicdevelopmentinbothPRCandTaiwan.Socialandculturalcontactscontinuedbetweenthetwosidesandbothsidesthoughtthattheyservetheirinterest.InthatframeworkTaiwandevelopednon-political relationswithmany states and inter-nationalorganizations.48IninternationalenvironmentwithdifferentwordinglikeTaiwan,TaiwanChina,TaipeiChina,Taiwanconductrelationsandparticipation.InFebruary1986AsianDevelopmentBankadmittedPRCasamemberandaskedTai-wantochangeitsnamefromROCtoTaipeiChina.In1986and1987Taiwanboycot-ted the AsianDevelopmentBankAnnualmeetingsbutretaineditsmembershipandin1988returnedfullcooperationwiththeorganization.TaiwancontinuesitscloserelationswiththeUSintheframeworkofTaiwanRelationsAct.IntheabsenceofthediplomaticrecognitionAmericanInstituteinTaiwancontinuecontactswiththeStateDepartment.TaipeiEconomicandCulturalRepresentativescontinueTaiwan’srelationswithothercountries.49

47 Eiki Berg andRaulToomla, “FormsofNormalisation in theQuest forDe Facto Statehood”,International Spectator,Vol.44,No.4,December2009,p.35-36.

48 BrunoCoppieters,“ConflictResolutionafter2008Georgia-RussiaWar:TheTaiwanandKosovoModelsasToolsforMobilizationandComparision”,Nationalities Paper: Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity,Vol.42,No.5,September2012,p.681-683

49 ScottPegg,“TheTaiwanoftheBalkans?TheDeFactoStateOptionforKosovo”,Southern European Politics,Vol.1,No.2,December2000,p.94-95.

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Taiwan case shows an exampleof high level economic and cultural tieswithstatesthatnotrecognizedit.InthecaseofTaiwanthetwoentityclaimsrightinthesameterritoryagreeingthatthereis“OneChina”.OfcoursethereisabigdifferenceofwhatOneChinameans in thebothsides.50BothChina’sandTaiwan’s interestrequirescontinuationofcloser ties.Thereforedespite tensionbetweenChinaandTaiwanafter2016electionsandasaresult30%dropnumberoftouristsvisitsTai-wanfrommainlandChinain2016and9.8%dropinbilateraltradevolume,ChinaandTaiwanwillcontinuehighleveleconomicandculturalties.Ethnicandreligiousdifferencescontributedtension inCyprusandKosovocasesdoesnotexist in thecaseofTaiwan.

Cyprus as aMediterranean islandwith its size andpopulations and in somepointwithitshistorymoresimilaritywithKosovocasethanTaiwan.Cypruswasruledbythetwobigempires;OttomanandBritish.TheendofBritishruleraisedthequestionofwhowouldcontroltheisland.GreeksdemandedislandunificationwithGreece.TurkeyfirstdemandingCyprus’s integrationwithTurkeyand thenitsupportedpartitionoftheislandbetweenGreeceandTurkey.AttheendTurksandGreeksestablishedfederationcalledCyprusRepublic.But thisdidnotworkandTurkeyhadtointerveneinordertoprotectrightofTurksintheisland.TheEUinvolvedthedisputeacceptingtheGreeksideoftheislandtobeamemberwithoutsolutionoftheproblem.Twodifferentethnic,religiousandculturalcommunitiesliveseparatelyinCyprus.

TRNC faced embargoes and sanctions. International organizations includingtheUniversalPostalUnion,theInternationalCivilAviationOrganizationandtheInternationalAirTransportAssociationhaverefusedtodealwiththeNorthofCy-prus.HoweverlaterinternationalcommunityandparticularlyEuroperealizedthatignoringTurkishCypriotswouldnothelptofindsolution.51InfactlatertherealityoftheseparateexistenceofTurkishCypriotswasrecognizedand24April2004ref-erendumconductedinthenorthandsouthatthesametimeanditwasacceptedthatonesideoftheislandifrejectedtheAnnanPlan,itwouldnotbeimplemented.Laterthedifferentsolutionscenarioshavebeendiscussed.TaiwanmodelforTRNCwasoffered.TRNChaslackofrecognitioncanimproveeconomicandculturalrelationswithotherstateslikeTaiwanthroughrepresentativesystem.Therearealreadyrep-resentativesofvariouscountriesinTRNCandwithsomeeffortthisnumbermightbeincreased.52HoweverKosovocaseimpactedonCyprusquestion.DespiteICJstat-edthatKosovohasspecialcasenottobeanexampleofCyprus,itwasobviousthatICJ’sopinionevenacknowledgedthefactthatmanymightunderlinedthesimilari-ties.InCyprus,TurksandGreeksseparateddefactoin1963andthetwosideshavetheirownadministrationandstructuraldevelopmentsince1974.LikeSerbianabol-

50 Eiki Berg andRaulToomla, “FormsofNormalisation in theQuest forDe Facto Statehood”,International Spectator,Vol.44,No.4,December2009,p.33-34.

51 ScottPegg,“TheTaiwanoftheBalkans?TheDeFactoStateOptionforKosovo”,Southern European Politics,December2000,Vol.1,No.2,p.92-93.

52 “BağisOffersTaiwanModelforCyprus”,Hürriyet Daily News,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/bagis-offers-taiwan-model-for-northern-cyprus.aspx?pageID=238&nID=7927&NewsCatID=338,28November2011(ErişimTarihi:26Eylül2016).

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ishmentofKosovo’sautonomy,MakariosandtheGreeksideofCyprusgenerallywantedtochangethe1960ConstitutioninordertolimittherightoftheTurksgiventothemwithLondon-ZurichTreaties.ThedeadlockofnegotiationsresultedinthedeclarationofindependenceofTRNCin1983.Despitethisdeclaration,Turkishsidecontinuesnegotiationstocreatebi-zonalandbi-communalfederalstate.TRNChasalltheelementsofstateandfunctionaldemocracy.ComparewithKosovoregardingthestatestructure,TRNCisfarbetterposition.DemocraticTRNChasbeenexistedsince1983.InthatatmospheretorecognizeKosovoandnottorecognizeTRNCcre-atesmoraldilemmafortheEU.ThisisclearlydoublestandardsandsayingKosovoisasuigeneriscasedoesnotchangethefactthatTRNChasmuchmoreacapacitytobeanindependentstatethatKosovoandproofedthissince1983.

Kosovoamongtheseexamplesconstitutesacasethat114countriesrecognizeditasanindependentstate.Kosovobecameindependentwithunilateraldeclarationofindependenceasaresultofabsenceofprospectsfindingasolutionregardingstatusissue.KosovoisapartoftheprocessofdisintegrationoftheformerYugoslavia.Ser-bianadministration’sextremehumanrightsviolationsarebeingusedasjustificationtoconductNATOoperationtosavepeopleinKosovo.

WhileinTaiwancaseisbasedonbalanceofpowerpoliticsregardingbigpowersrelationswiththePRCandcrossstraitrelations,Kosovomodelisbasedon“1. Using the just-cause argument of a massive breach of human rights by the central government as justification for recognizing a unilateral declaration of independence. 2. Using the last-resort argument of the lack of a reasonable expectation that further status negotiations could lead to a settlement. 3. The willingness of an outside power to supervise the strengthening of the institutions of the breakaway state. 4. The prospect of resolving the conflict between the parties through their joint integration within a broader framework on the basis of sovereign equality.”53

CONCLUSION

Amongthethreeexampleswhichwereanalyzedinthisresearch,KosovoandCypruscaseshadmoresimilaritiesthanTaiwancase.KosovoandCyprusincludestwomajorethnicgroups,tworeligion,twolanguagesandcultureclaimingrightofthesameterritory.Inbothcaseshistorywasalsousedasanargument.Inthecaseofethnicallybasedconflicts,identityissuebecomesdominantandindividualloyaltiesarequiterigid.IdentityissueisparticularlyimportantinthecaseofCyprus.Thedif-ferencesofthesidesoftheconflictwillbewideningwhiletheirseparationtimegetslonger.Inthepost-ColdWareradevelopmentsandparticularlytheindependenceofKosovochangedtheparametersintheprocessoftheCyprusquestion.TheEUdecisiontoacceptSouthernCyprusasamemberstateas“CyprusRepublic”also

53 BrunoCoppieters,“ConflictResolutionafter2008Georgia-RussiaWar:TheTaiwanandKosovoModelsasToolsforMobilizationandComparision”,NationalitiesPaper:JournalofNationalismandEthnicity,Vol.42,No.5,September2012,p.683.

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contradictedtheEU’spractice.InEuropeCzechoslovakiadividedandthetwostatesemergedasCzechRepublicandSlovakiaandbothofthembecametheEUmember.

Ifpartieshavethehistoryofconflict,toforceorencouragepopulationtoliveandshare the same territory (disregardingbizonal solution) create securitydilemmaswhichintensifyviolence.Kaufmannstatedthat“restoring civil politics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because the war itself destroys the possibilities for ethnic cooperation”.54BothinKosovoandCyprustherewereconflictandbloodshedinre-centhistoryamongmajorethnicgroups.

Post-ColdWarinternationalenvironmenthelpedKosovotobeanindependentstateandafterKosovocase,twostatesolutionsstartedtobediscussedinCyprusalso.August2008Russia-GeorgiaconflictandfollowingRussianrecognitionofAb-khaziaandSouthOssetia’s independence indicated thateven thestatesofpopu-lationof less than200.000and in the caseofSouthOssetia less than100.000 canbecomeindependent.

InthecaseofTaiwan,Thefutureprospectisverymuchdependentonhowcross-straitrelationswouldbedeveloped.Despitethefactthatethnic,culturalandhistori-caltiesbetweenmainlandChinaandTaiwan,thedifferencesofregimesinthebothsidesofthestraitandalsopublicopinionparticularlyinTaiwanwoulddefinetherelationsandpossibleoutcomes.Confidencebuildingmeasuresifbecomessuccess-fulmighthelpat leastcontinuationofpeacefulnegotiationandfurthereconomicintegration.

54 ChaimKaufmann,“PossibleandImpossibleSolutionstoEthnicCivilWars”,International Security,Vol.20,No.4,Spring,1996,p.137.

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