syrian neighboring insurgency

8/11/2019 Syrian Neighboring Insurgency

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Neighboring Insurgency:

How are the Syrian Crisis and International

Responses Driving Lebanon to Fragility Trap?

Leila Nicolas, PhD

[email protected]

www.leilanicolas.com


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Is Lebanon a fragile State?


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Is Lebanon a fragile State?

Actually, Lebanon is a middle income country,which was not really a fragile state before

Syrian crisis ,but had "Situations of fragility.


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Lebanon: Open border policy


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Syrian Spillover Consequences

Violent conflicts, terrorism and organized

crime increased in Lebanon:

Sunni Radicals called for supporters to back

Syrian opposition thus sending arms and

fighters from Lebanon to Syria , while

Hizbullah (Shia) intervened in Syria to back

Asaad regime, this escalated more sectariantensions in Lebanon.


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Stability and Security effects

A- Fighting in Tripoli between the Alawites whosupport Syrian regime and Sunnis supportingSyrian opposition.

B- Several terrorist attacks and suicide bombersblew in Tripoli, Beirut and Bekaa.

Jihadist groups frequently claim responsibility for those.

C- crimes increased dramatically.D- Weapons are being smuggled in both

directions between Lebanon and Syria.


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Demographic stress

UNHCR have registered around 1.1 million

Syrian refugees.

Lebanese officials: more than 1.3 million

Syrian refugees have entered Lebanon by

May-2014 (37% of Lebanons pre-crisis

population)

500,000 Palestinian refugees

50,000 Iraqi refugees


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Economic and Social Stress

5.7 billion $ lost economic activity till Summer 2013

170,000

Lebanese expected to fall into poverty by 2014, in

addition to thecurrent 1 million poor 10%

increase in unemployment rate in Lebanon

340,000 Lebanese

expected to join the ranks of unemployment

$348-$434 million

needed by Lebanon's public education system toaccommodate all the additional Syrian students


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Economic and social Stress

1.1 billion $

The grow of total budgetary spending by the Governmentalone

2.6 billion $

The deficit of public finances has widen 1.5 billion $

Is the estimated to cut in revenue collection

589 million $

the fiscal cost on infrastructure 1.1 billion $

required for stabilization of infrastructure

including 258 million$for current spending


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Political and Institutional Effects

ATensions among Lebanese

B- Increasing tensions between refugees andhost communities

Example: Ersal province, has 40,000 Lebaneseinhabitants, hosts 120, 000 Syrian refugees.

C- Crises of state legitimacy and authority

Postponing parliamentary elections from May 2012 to Nov.2014.

Presidential void started at 25thof May 2014.


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WHY?


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Work, Settle freely, International Aid


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Donors' Policies

Western donors countries as well as Gulfstates have been reluctant to disbursesubstantial funds to the Lebanese

government. As a result, the international aid was managed

around the Lebanese government in directcooperation with non-state actors on theground or the refugees themselves leadingto increased burdens on Lebanese institutions.


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WHY?

More than 40% of the 1.1 million registeredrefugees (UNHCR) came from non- conflict

areas in Syria.


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Direct cash programs

In Lebanon, Cash delivered via ATM card has

become the preferred modality used by

international donors for:

food, non-food needs, winter assistance etc..

the experience in Lebanon prove that "giving

cash directly had some benefits, however it

affected negatively the host communities

and put pressure on Lebanon.


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Disadvantages of Direct Cash

Discriminated between refugees Caused tensions

among them , and the hosting communities.

Caused 100% raise to the prices of food and supplies

A small refugee family gets an average cash of 280 $ permonth, while the average wage in Syria for a non- skilled

person is about 68 $ and a university graduate

employee wage is 115$ (2013- 2014)

officials say: 20% percentage of registered refugees, passthe Lebanese- Syrian border at the end of each month to

collect their vouchers or Cash money..then go back to

Syria.


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Solutions


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Suggested Solutions

First- Keep the current policies and let the

Lebanese State collapse.

Second- Pragmatic Approach:

Doing things differently; e.g. doing things

outside traditional expertise in dealing

with refugees crisis.


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Pragmatic Approach

Step ONE- Classify Refugees:Category 1- who are really in need for humanitarian assistance,

those should be on the top of assistance priority.

Category 2- who came from prior conflict- now safe areas; but

may have no homes or places to live. This category should beencouraged to return, on condition that aid and assistance bedelivered by UN in Syria.

Category 3- Economic refugees should be encouraged to return totheir homelands, the aid assistance in Lebanon should be

stopped.Category 4Syrian workers previously working in Lebanon, and

registered as refugees to benefit from aid. Those should neverbenefit from any aid program, as they are exploiting the funds.


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Syrian refugees voting in Lebanon


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Future- oriented dilemma

It has been accepted that:

When governments are unwilling or unable toprotect their citizens, the internationalcommunity then steps to take this responsibility.

But, what if practicing this internationalresponsibility becomes a cause to deprivinganother state's citizens from their rights?

what if taking this responsibility is leadinganother state to the edge of civil war, or tocollapse?.

syrian neighboring insurgency

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