svanikier political elites

Political Elite Circulation Implications for Leadership Diversity and Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana

Johanna Odonkor SvanikierDepartment of Politics and International Relations

University of Oxford UKjohannasvanikierpoliticsoxacuk

Abstract Th is article proposes that elite theory is at the heart of understanding political conflict in Africa A case study of Ghana analyses the historical origins of elite conflict in Ghana before and after independence Th e article links high levels of political elite circulation resulting from the transformation of traditional social structures with high levels of political elite differentiation and instability in the post-colonial era Since 1992 Ghanarsquos new liberal democratic regime has flourished Th ere are indications that there is a gradual increase in unity amongst competing political elites Diversity amongst political elites has resulted in greater representa-tion at the leadership level Th ese factors may explain the sustained period of political stability and the gradual deepening of liberal democracy in Ghana

Keywords political elites elite circulation elite transformation democratization Ghana

Introduction

Th is article is based on the premise that political processes in Africa are driven by the same logic as politics elsewhere Th erefore general theories which aim to explain the persistence of democratic regimes are equally applicable to Africa Here I aim to highlight the importance of modern elite theory in understanding the dynamics of political conflict and regime stability in Africa Th is will be done by using the case study of Ghana to examine the processes of political elite formation circulation differentiation and transformation in an historical context Th e goal is to shed light on the

copy Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden 2007 DOI 101163156913307X187423

Comparative Sociology 6 (2007) 114ndash135

ComparativeSociologyCompSoc

wwwbrillnlcoso

COSO 61-2_f7_114-135indd 114COSO 61-2_f7_114-135indd 114 52407 74715 PM52407 74715 PM

J O Svanikier Comparative Sociology 6 (2007) 114ndash135 115

1) It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the quality of democracy in Ghana Nevertheless problems as to definition and quality of democracy are not limited to

new consensus for democracy amongst competing political elites which is evidenced by the remarkable persistence and stability of Ghanarsquos liberal democratic regime from 1992 to the present time1

Since undergoing decolonisation the continent of Africa has endured violent political struggle and conflict Various paradigms have been put forth to explain the politics of the continent (Bayart 1993 Chabal and Daloz 1999 Van de Walle 2001) Th ese are generally characterised by Afro-pessimism or motivated by a repudiation of dependency theory Th e emphasis on neo-patrimonialism as a cause rather than a symptom of Afri-can political instability has often led to the marginalisation of Africa from the mainstream of contemporary scholarly debate Moreover there is little attempt to account for different political trajectories in African countries within a unified theoretical framework

Some writers like Fatton (1991) Samatar (1997 1999) and Ake (1967 2000) have portrayed African political elites from a more multi-dimen-sional perspective and in the process recognised the critical role they play both in regime change and stability In this article the focus on the role of political elites in analyzing the progress of democracy in Ghana is based on historical accounts and empirical observation of events in Ghana which indicate that the major conflicts amongst Ghanaians for control of the state during the period of decolonisation and subsequently took place at the political elite level (Apter 1955)

A consensus for democracy has existed amongst Ghanaian political elites since Ghanarsquos formal transition to democracy under the 4th Republican Constitution in 1992 and particularly in the period between 1996 and the present Th is is evidenced by a dramatic expansion of political freedoms successive free and fair elections the gradual institutionalisation of consti-tutional bodies the peaceful alternation of power and public shows of unity amongst politicians from opposing sides Previous to this period Ghana experienced a series of military overthrows of government author-itarian and repressive military rule and fierce conflict amongst competing political elites Th is paper explores the dynamics of this evident transfor-mation in political elite competition from habitual conflict and political instability to consensus and democratic regime stability


116 J O Svanikier Comparative Sociology 6 (2007) 114ndash135

Th eoretical Background

One of the most compelling recent attempts to create a universally appli-cable elite theory comes from John Higley and Michael Burton (2006) Th ey distinguish between united and disunited political elites and propose a typology of elites which they suggest may apply in all cases Th ey define political elites as lsquopersons who are able by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantiallyrsquo (Burton and Higley 20018) Burton and Higley have developed a systematic theory of elites which aims to establish the connections between political elite unity and regime stability

lsquoOnly after elites have entered into and sustained peaceful competitions for mass support under agreed rules do constitutions and other political institutions embodying representative principles and practices strengthen and citizens become more self-confident and sophisticated in their politi-cal participation At varying speeds relatively inclusive lsquodemocraticrsquo politi-cal orders emerge But the starting point is the taming of politics by elitesrsquo(Burton and Higley 200191)

Th e key role of political elites in sustaining political stability and liberal democratic regimes is echoed by several other writers (Aron 1950 Ake 1967 Miller 1974 Fatton 1992 Samatar 1999) What emerges is that in order to sustain a liberal democratic regime there is the need for a balance between both diversity and cohesiveness amongst political elites to main-tain political stability and an enabling environment for political and eco-nomic progress Ake aptly describes this as

a paradigm of elite accommodation by which the elites from the different social groups could reach a consensual arrangement and rule as a coalition Under this arrangement some integration and political stability can be achieved by virtue of the fact that members of the diverse social groups can identify with the ruling elite or part of it and even feel that they have a stake in the government (Ake 200043)

Th is article draws from Burton and Higleyrsquos (2001 2006) elegant theory linking consensually united elites to stable liberal democratic regimes

African democracies For a comprehensive and animated statement on the matter see Claude Ake 2002 Th e Feasibility of Democracy in Africa



Direct links between political elite circulation and political elite unity are rightly discounted by Burton and Higley (2001 2006) However links between elite circulation levels of differentiation and regime stability though alluded to are not fully explored Th e revision of their typology in Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (Higley and Burton 2006) further loses the nuances emanating from their concept of elite lsquodifferentiationrsquo in ldquoTh e Study of Political Elite Transformationsrdquo

Differentiation is the process through which groups making up political elites become more numerous organizationally diverse functionally spe-cialised and socially heterogeneous (Burton and Higley 2001183ndash184)

Th e outcome of higher levels of elite circulation and differentiation is greater representation of different sectors of society at the political elite level Higley and Burton (200125ndash26) point out the importance of high levels of representation for regime stability However they lose this sense of the meaning of representation in their new typology2 by focusing exclu-sively on elections to signify representation (200618) A state may hold regular multi-party elections that are not fully representative for reasons that are not immediately obvious to a casual observer For example lack of education could act as a barrier to the full participation of social or ethnic groups in political parties and electoral competitions

Th is article aims to demonstrate the importance of exploring links between elite differentiation and democratic regime stability by examin-ing circulation and differentiation amongst Ghanarsquos political elites in terms of their diversity in social status and background from an historical per-spective I suggest here that political elite circulation may lead to higher levels of political elite differentiation which could impede political elite unity in the short to medium term ldquoTh e proliferation of elite groups implies a dispersion of power and ensuing turf wars that make integration difficult to reach or sustainrdquo (Burton and Higley 2001184) Th is may account for the frequent military coups experienced by Ghana in the six-ties seventies and eighties However if political elite transformation sub-sequently takes place giving rise to consensually united elites the higher levels of elite differentiation result in a more representative and therefore more stable regime On the other hand it may be argued that low levels of

2) See Higley and Burton (200618) Table 11



political elite circulation lead to low levels of differentiation which may enhance integration and lead to regime stability in the medium but not the long term

Any inferences that one could make regarding other African countries can only be very tentative at this stage However examining Ghanaian political elite struggles may shed some light on the causes of the instability and regular military coups that occurred in some African countries follow-ing independence on the one hand and the relative stability and longevity of one-party regimes on the other In some African countries the political power of relatively (socially and or ethnically) homogenous political elites became entrenched following independence However it may be argued that the exclusive and unrepresentative nature of such long-lasting regimes eventually creates political instability in the longer term and leads to deeper social and ethnic divisions On the other hand higher levels of political elite circulation can lead to more representative political leadership Th ere-fore when elite transformation does occur resulting in greater unity amongst highly differentiated political elite groups there is a greater likeli-hood of stability under a liberal democratic regime

In this article I shall establish the historical antecedents of political elite conflict in Ghana by examining political elite formation and circulation in the Gold Coast and Ghana I propose that the main political conflict has centred on demands by newly educated commoners for political inclusion and their largely successful attempts to wrest power from more established political elites Th is has resulted in an identifiable cycle of elite circulation spawning successive generations of political elites Th e consequences have been that political elite groups have become more numerous more socially and ethnically diverse and for the greater part of the nationrsquos history dis-united More recently signs of political elite unity and consensus over democratic rule may account for the remarkable stability of the liberal democratic regime of the past 14 years

Elite Formation in the Gold Coast

Th e Notion of Class

In traditional Akan society although social differentiation was often based on descent it did not equate to the type of social stratification born out



of feudalism and the industrial revolution that exists in some European societies Th is view is supported by Arhin (1983) in his article ldquoRank and Class among the Asante and the Fanterdquo Both by demographic socio-economic and cultural standards the Akan are the most dominant of Ghanarsquos ethnic groups Many Akan norms have therefore been adopted as representative of traditional Ghanaian society According to Maxwell Owusu

Th ough many of the symbols of the state are Akan in origin they are often shared by other societies in Ghana who may have similar symbols and tradi-tions During the colonial period as the Gold Coast Chiefs List of 1936 stressed the Akan paradigm of state-craft was with some local modification adopted by nearly all other ethnic groups in the country (198681)

In his book Nkrumah and the Chiefs Richard Rathbone (200012) states that some cultures in Ghana ldquomost notably that of the Akan had a long tradition of powerful monarchs supported by extensive aristocraciesrdquo He further explains that the colonial and anthropological convention of using the word ldquochiefrdquo rather than ldquokingrdquo diminished the status of the position of such traditional rulers to avoid the absurdity of having ldquoa British king with imperial subjects who were also kingsrdquo Within the social structure of the Akan there was also the notion of commoners (asafo or nkwankwaa in Twi) literally meaning lsquoyoung menrsquo As Allman (199329) points out the sense of the term was not that they were necessarily young but it distin-guished them from elders (mpanyinfu) and political office holders (chiefs) who were their superiors in traditional social hierarchy Several writers have recognised the role of organised commoner associations (eg asafo companies) as a means of checks and balances on chiefly power especially in the context of the destoolment of chiefs (Rathbone 2000 Li 1995 Owusu 1986 Austin 1970 Apter 1955) Th e traditional rights of protest and rebellion by commoners have been linked to the protests of lsquoyoung menrsquo in the nationalist struggle for independence (Rathbone 2000) and military coups in the post-colonial era (Owusu 1986)

Ivor Wilks wrote of the nineteenth century Nkwankwaa as men who ldquobelonged to old and well-established families but whose personal expecta-tions of succeeding to office or even of acquiring wealth were lowrdquo (Wilks 1989) In his landmark study of Education and Social Change in Ghana Philip Foster (1965) highlights how a new kind of status system emerged



in the Gold Coast during the colonial period due to the critical impact of Western-style education and the implications that this had for the configuration of political power in the independent state of Ghana Th e importance of education to social mobility is also emphasised by Dennis Austin (1970) When talking about Nkrumahrsquos Convention Peoplersquos Party he observes that

the demand made by the party for self-government was bound up with a struggle for power which had many of the characteristics of a class struggle ndash provided the words were widened in scope to connote a level determined as much by education and by social standing within a traditional political sys-tem as by economic criteria (Austin 197013)

In the pre-independence Gold Coast colony the principal routes to elite status occurred through aristocratic connections commercial activity and formal Western-style higher education Th e corresponding elite types were neo-traditional elites coastal merchantsintelligentsia and educated com-moners Th ese categories are oversimplified for the sake of clarity and dis-tinctions could sometimes be more blurred than the typology suggests

Neo-Traditional Elites ndash the First Generation Aristocrats form the first category of elites that I discuss in this article and I describe members of this group as the first generation of political elites that emerged in the colonial era Th e authority and legitimacy of neo- traditional elites lay on the one hand in their role as indigenous traditional rulers and on the other in their role as partners of the colonial government in the administration of the colonial policy of indirect rule I shall further sub-divide royal elites into those who had a Western-style education and those who did not Foster (1965) suggests that from an early date British policy had aimed at the enrolment of the sons of chiefs into schools in the hope of co-opting them to the British side However the British failed to take into account the fact that the Akan matrilineal system of inheritance excluded the sons of chiefs from the assumption of chiefly office Indeed the distinction they failed to make was between ahenemma and adehye Ahenemma were the off-spring of the king or chief However they were not in the line of succession Adehye on the other hand were siblings of the chief (who had the same mother) or his sisterrsquos children and were therefore in the direct (matrilineal) line of succession Some chiefsrsquo sons did attend



schools but since they were not eligible to inherit their fathers the main motive for educating them was thwarted (Foster 1965) Moreover such a reforming role as the British hoped future chiefs would play would have been in direct conflict to their conservative role as the guardians of cus-toms and traditions within their own societies Indeed for this very reason before independence a Western-style education was generally not deemed suitable for a potential traditional ruler3

early recruitment into the schools was from groups who were not primar-ily associated with traditional activities but were rather connected with the exchange economy and European-type functions it would also appear that most of them were not eligible for traditionally prestigeful office In functional terms the schools by operating increasingly as the gateway to new occupational categories constituted an alternative avenue of mobility operating independently of traditional modes of status acquisition (Foster 196563)

Th is trend had a profound impact on the future balance of political power within Ghanaian society and resulted in what Foster (1963) describes as the ldquodysfunctional consequences of Western educationrdquo Here I argue that the social phenomenon created by the introduction of formal Western education formed the basis of political elite circulation differentiation and subsequent fragmentation in the run up to independence and after As a more immediate consequence however the failure of traditional authorities to take up Western education for their future rulers meant that instead of the hereditary authority and power of chiefs being mutually reinforced through such education a new breed of political elites whose high status was inextricably linked to their close connections with Euro-pean merchants and colonial officials on the coast as well as their high levels of Western education emerged to challenge the authority of the chiefs Foster writes

Th e position of traditional elites in the Gold Coast was progressively weak-ened by their inability to perceive the necessity for European education For once European political control became effective there was always the

3) Ironically the exact opposite is now true in modern day Ghana where a higher education is now seen as a prerequisite for potential traditional rulers



possibility that the locus of power would shift from the chiefs in favour of alternative groups which had earlier recognised the potential significance of schooling (Foster 196564)

Nevertheless the fact that some chief rsquos sons and lesser aristocrats were educated meant that some royals of that period did receive education to high levels helping to bridge the gap between neo-traditional elites and the coastal elites who had begun to challenge their political role A subsequent political alliance diffused the potential conflict between these two groups Th is fusion of vocal coastal elites and educated royalty formed the core of what came to be known as the ldquointelligentsiardquo Austin asserts

To be sure the Colony chiefs and the intelligentsia had been close rivals for power and position on the legislative council But there was little sense of permanent hostility between any section of what constituted (by 1946) a triple ruling elite ndash the officials chiefs and intelligentsia (Austin 19709)

Indeed because the educated aristocrats straddled the neo-traditional elites and the professional coastal elites they are not clearly defined in the litera-ture as a unique group However their distinctive role is central to the arguments made here as they came to form the core of a nationalist con-servative faction which lay at the heart of political elite disunity in an independent Ghana Most prominent amongst this group was Dr JB Danquah the younger half-brother of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I paramount chief of Akyem Abuakwa an area between the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti4 He was a prominent lawyer and politician who had acted as his brotherrsquos secretary before earning a PhD and a law degree in the UK

Coastal Elites ndash the Second Generation

Th e political sophistication of the Gold Coastrsquos coastal elites is well-documented in DB Kimblersquos A Political History of Ghana (1963) Th ey consisted of wealthy coastal merchant families whose offspring typically travelled to Europe for their higher education Th ese families due to their early and direct contact with Europeans and their role in the exchange economy had

4) Th ey shared the same father which meant that Danquah was not in the line of succession



by independence been educated for several generations and together with the neo-traditional elites came to form part of an established indigenous elite By contrast commoners who had acquired secondary school education in the decades preceding independence would tend to be the first generation to be educated in their families According to Foster (196568) ldquo[t]he great merchant families constituted a highly educated minority who to a great extent identified themselves with and were accepted by Europeans on terms of parityrdquo Some of this group came from Fante aristocratic back-grounds or were the descendants of European merchants and officials From this group emerged what I categorise as the second generation of political elites Political tensions arose between such intellectual elites and traditional rulers as to which group was more qualified to represent the people on the Gold Coast Legislative Council

However [t]he passage of time had softened the earlier disputes of the 1920s and Danquah had worked hard throughout the 1930s and the war years to form a common front between the two sets of leaders (Rathbone 200050)

Th e United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was initially created as a coalition of lawyers and coastal merchants with the aim of advancing the cause of the intelligentsia for increased representation in the Legislative Council (Foster 1965 Austin 1970) Several of the founding committee members of the UGCC were highly-educated as well as having aristocratic connections As already mentioned Dr JB Danquah was the younger half-brother of the paramount chief of Akyem Abuakwa Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I and William Ofori-Atta another prominent member of the UGCC was the paramount chief rsquos son Edward Akuffo-Addo yet another promi-nent member was married to a daughter of the paramount chief Th erefore characterising this particular struggle as between chiefs and commoners as Austin (1970) does is an over-simplification Indeed the main political struggle prior to independence was not amongst indigenous elite factions or between indigenous elites and British colonial elites who had already begun to prepare the colony for a gradual political hand over but between a coalition of neo-traditional and professional elites on the one hand and a coalition of educated and semi-educated commoners on the other Th e driving force behind the radical nationalist movement was the educated and semi-educated commoners who by dint of their education aspired to



political economic and social elite status themselves To achieve this they would need to mobilise a mass following and the charismatic Kwame Nkrumah was just the man for the job

Educated Commoners ndash the Th ird Generation

Although widely used in the literature on politics in Ghana it is important to clarify the use of the word ldquocommonerrdquo In this context it refers to those who were not traditionally of aristocratic birth Th erefore in the traditional system of social differentiation commoners could not generally have aspired to equal political and social elite status as royals However this article seeks to highlight the dramatic nature of the social changes trig-gered by the introduction and expansion of Western-style education dur-ing the colonial period which made this possible In this new context education through its close association with the process of upward social and career mobility played an increasingly significant role in emergent conceptions of social status (Foster 1965) Since education and occupation were becoming the new determinants of social status for the first time commoners could potentially become members of the political elite and eventually did Such educated commoners some of whom obtained higher education up to university level could be categorised as the third genera-tion of political elites

Economic Transformation and the Expansion of Education

Th ere is a popular misconception that the level of provision of education in particular regions of Ghana before independence was determined by the Christian missions or by colonial officials However it is one of Fosterrsquos key arguments that the expansion of schooling in the Gold Coast was demand driven Demand for education determined where schools were established and this was in turn contingent on prospects for social mobility through available occupational opportunities and increased levels of wealth Th ere-fore the progressive development of a large-scale exchange economy and the accompanying creation of a differentiated occupational structure led to an increased demand for education in the urban areas particularly along the coast where European trade was centred Th is increased demand led to the provision of basic primary education to an increasing number of chil-dren in that area Hence a group emerged which came to be known as the



ldquoCape Coast Scholarsrdquo (Foster 1965) Foster contrasts them with the intel-ligentsia of the coast

At the other extreme were the lsquoCape Coast Scholarsrsquo poorly educated and regarded with disdain both by the Europeans and the more highly educated Africans Th ere is a curious ambivalence in fact about the whole European attitude towards the lesser products of the schools Urged to emulate European behaviour they were at the same time an object of derision for attempting to do so and Europeans were particularly critical of the results of a process which they themselves were responsible for setting in motion (Foster 196568)

Th is group of semi-educated commoners expanded dramatically after the ldquotake off rdquo of cocoa as a major cash crop in Ghana at the beginning of the 20th century According to Polly Hill (1997) most of the cocoa that was produced in Ghana up to 1911 was grown on land which had been bought outright by migrant farmers for the purpose of growing cocoa ldquoTh ese migrants who in their general outlook surely had more in common with lsquocapitalistsrsquo than with lsquopeasantsrsquo were familiar with the cash economy their principal source of wealth being the oil palmrdquo (Hill 1961209)

Th erefore there appears to be a correlation between increased domestic purchasing power and the demand for schools as many commoners in the cocoa growing areas of the Eastern Province (predominantly Akwapim and Akyem) acquired increased wealth through the expansion of their cash cropping activities and could therefore increasingly afford Western-style education for their children Indeed Foster argues that the demand for education tended to follow the movement of cocoa production with increasing educational activity in the Akwapim area quite early in the cen-tury but no real evidence of mass demand in Ashanti until the thirties when cocoa was becoming firmly established there (Foster 1965126) Th is partly accounts for the Ashanti and particularly the Northern Regions lag-ging behind the South in the extent and level of educational provision Th e rapid expansion of the cash-crop economy and increases in incomes that followed undermined traditional structures of social status because the new wealth acquired opened new channels for acquiring prestige and sta-tus outside of the traditional one Kwame Arhin (1983) discusses the con-trasting contemporary Asante and Fante views about the lsquoidealrsquo man In the case of Asantes to be chief-like is most esteemed whereas in Fante society being a scholar and a gentleman is the model for social excellence



Th is contrast in outlook of the two groups is attributed to different experi-ences with regard to ldquochanges in the economy the European presence and formal Western education as sources of new life stylesrdquo Arhin (1984) Th e effects on Fantes were more pronounced because of their coastal location

Traditional structures became more fluid allowing for the acceptance of Western education more readily which then became an alternative mode of achieving elevated social status A considerable proportion of the earnings derived from cocoa production was utilised in the education of children

in such a way as to qualify them for any other occupation than cocoa farm-ing It is therefore appropriate to regard the extension of Western educa-tion and the enlargement of the exchange sector of the economy as mutually reinforcing factors leading to the progressive disintegration of traditional structures and their successive replacement by new concepts of social status and new modes of acquiring it (Foster 1965127)

Moreover the provision of education was dominated by Christian mission schools who offered a predominantly academic education in response to demand Since their main mission was to proselytise within the communi-ties Christian religion formed a significant part of the education which further undermined traditional beliefs and social structures A result of the expansion of basic education was increased pressure on secondary schools Achimota College was set up in 1927 by the colonial government as a response to this pressure It was set up as a non-fee paying highly selective educational establishment which would allow the brightest and the best from around the country to attend secondary school in a boarding environ-ment with no emphasis on any particular religion ethnicity or social back-ground It became a training ground for the future leaders of Ghana many of whom used it as a stepping stone for further studies abroad In this way many commoners were given the opportunity for education on a par with the privileged coastal elites and educated aristocrats By 1950 the ldquostrate-gicrdquo sector of education so far as social mobility was concerned had shifted from the primary to the secondary level (Foster 1965) Indeed ldquothe Gold Coast had developed a more extensive system of schooling than any other African territory outside the Union of South Africardquo (Foster 1965171)



Political Implications of Social Change

Th e impact of this unprecedented mass extension of education to com-moners particularly at the basic level led to social tensions between elites and commoners as the economy did not grow to meet the supply of school graduates Th is led to increased unrest around the country as commoners challenged the authority and legitimacy of traditional rulers Th ere was widespread resistance by some traditional commoner associations or asafo companies that were organised into youth organisations against the over-bearing and corrupt practices of some traditional rulers whose powers were protected by the colonial authority (Rathbone 1970) In addition to the social divisions that had developed through education there were high levels of discontent in the Gold Coast following the Second World War due to economic hardship triggered by general inflation and the swollen shoot disease which had infected a quarter of cocoa trees Th ere was anger and despair amongst cocoa farmers who had seen large numbers of their trees felled under a government directive to control the disease To add further to this social unrest ex-service men who had been exposed to new ideas during the Second World War had now returned and expected fair compensation for their contributions to the War effort By Austinrsquos (1970) account economic grievances abounded and people were demand-ing a change

Th e Role of Political Agency

Having highlighted some major structural factors that led to social and political change and unrest in the Gold Coast the picture would be incom-plete without a discussion about the role and importance of certain per-sonalities and their agency in the evolving political process Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I was the Okyehene or paramount chief of Akyem Abuakwa between 1912 and 1943 based in their capital town of Kyebi5 Th e Akyem Abuakwa stool had a record of close cooperation with the colonial govern-ment and had collaborated in the campaign for the submission of the Ashanti King to the British Crown ldquoMilitary contingents from Akyem Abuakwa were involved in both the alliances which fought in the 1874 and 1900 wars against Asanterdquo Rathbone (1996508) Th e rule of Ofori-Atta I coincided with the heyday of the doctrine of indirect rule and Nana Ofori

5) Th is is written ldquoKibirdquo in the older literature



Attarsquos relationship with the British illustrated the policy operating at its best with him skilfully combining elements of both the traditional and the modern within his court His authority and prestige were greatly enhanced by his close relationship with the British and his ldquopolitical and economic shrewdness protected and enriched his immediate family in Akyem Abuakwardquo (Rathbone 1989446) In 1927 at the age of 46 he was hon-oured by the British Crown as a Knight Commander of the British Empire He was a member of the Gold Coast Legislative Council from 1916 to 1943 where he represented the interests of the chiefs and was one of the first two Africans to sit on the Executive Council in 1942

After Nana Ofori-Attarsquos death in 1943 the Odikro or sub-chief of a small town in Akyem Abuakwa was allegedly murdered at the royal palace in Kyebi by 8 members of the royal family as part of the funeral rites asso-ciated with the death of a paramount chief Th e colonial government arrested prosecuted and convicted these members of the Akyem royal family for murder One of the counsels for the defence was Dr JB Dan-quah the half-brother of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I In the end 3 of the 8 men were hung despite all efforts of Danquah to obtain a pardon from the Gov-ernor and the colonial government Th is event soured the relationship between the colonial government and the royal house of Akyem Abuakwa

Danquah went on to form the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947 with seven others initially to agitate for increased representation of the merchant class and intelligentsia on the Legislative Council However their overall goal was ldquoself-government in the shortest possible timerdquo and it is likely that the outcome of the Kyebi murder trial created the impetus for a new nationalism amongst this normally moderate group which included the late kingrsquos brother son and son-in-law (Rathbone 1989) Th ey recruited Kwame Nkrumah a doctoral student at the London School of Economics to be the Secretary-General of their newly formed political organisation Nkrumah had been active in student movements in the US and the UK and had belonged to the anti-imperialist Pan-African movement which called for independence and unity amongst African States

It is arguable that Nkrumahrsquos interest in Pan-Africanism in the US and the UK was bolstered by the fact that he was not a member of the established elite within his own home country and did not therefore immediately see a leading political role for himself at the national level However his return to the Gold Coast coincided with an increased politicisation of the country



particularly amongst cocoa farmers ex-service men and the semi-educated youth His charisma organisational skills and common touch hit a high note with this group but his increasing radicalism made the generally sedate members of the UGCC extremely uncomfortable Amidst increas-ing acrimony he broke away from the UGCC to form the Convention Peoplersquos Party With the increasing prospect of democratic elections a mass following was the key to political victory His radical message of ldquoSelf-Gov-ernment Nowrdquo and his hostility towards the African and colonial estab-lishment made him appear to be the more likely candidate to fulfil the aspirations of the commoners in their new heightened state of politicisa-tion Th e tension created by the murder trial between the highly influential Akyem royal family and the colonial government may have created the political space for these events to unfold with such dramatic speed Nkrumah harnessed all the pent up frustration of the semi-educated commoners many of whom were unemployed who swept him to victory in elections held in 1951 (Austin 1970) Th us the stage was set for open political conflict between aristocratic educated conservative political elites and educated and semi-educated commoners who now replaced the colo-nial elite to become the new ruling elite Commenting about the period of transition from colonial rule to full self-government where Nkrumah worked closely with the colonial officials Sir Arden-Clarke the Gold Coast Governor stated

It was indeed unnerving at times to observe as we worked from one Consti-tution to the next how much depended upon the personal relationships between a few leading personalities (Arden-Clarke 195832)

Politics in Independent Ghana

Diversity in Leadership

Th e events described above account for the extreme disunity that existed amongst Ghanaian political elites prior to and after independence foster-ing a politics of fierce conflict and instability Although indigenous politi-cal confrontation in Ghana prior to independence has been characterised in the literature as one between chiefs and commoners the real battles since independence have raged at the political elite level Unlike other African



countries where civil wars have involved the masses as combatants or victims the casualties of political struggles in Ghana have predominantly been amongst political elite groups themselves

Elite circulation leads to diversity and differentiation amongst political elites both in terms of social status and ethnicity Th is can result in a sense of increased representation even where political elites are not united Higher levels of representation prevent a situation where certain social or ethnic groups feel completely excluded from the political process As a result political conflict is largely contained at the elite level where different groups struggle for pre-eminence A situation where there is a low level of elite circulation and a non-representative or non-diverse group of elites monopolise political power for a long period may lead to political stability in the medium term but widespread and violent conflict in the long term

Political elite disunity has characterised Ghanaian politics since indepen-dence Th is has been evidenced by assassination attempts imprisonment of dissidents deaths of opposition politicians in prison successive military coups political persecution and the execution of leaders Further elite circula-tion and differentiation occurred with the entry of the military into the polit-ical fray Th e intrigues rivalries and turf wars of the various elite factions which emerged after the military overthrow of Nkrumah are documented by Austin and Luckham (1975) in Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana

Th is period saw the crystallization of the two main political traditions which represent the two main political cleavages in the country Th ey are the Nkrumahist tradition which is perceived as ethnically and socially inclusive broad-based populist and left-wing and the BusiaDanquah tra-dition which is perceived as elitist ethnically exclusive liberal-democratic and right-wing At the leadership level both traditions have representatives from all the main ethnic groupings although political parties in the Nkrumahist tradition have tended to have more diversity at the top How-ever the political cleavages that divide Ghanaian politics go beyond ethnic-ity and include historical social and ideological ones

Colonel IK Acheampong the military Head of State between 1972 and 1976 was derided by established elite groups for not being a university graduate or even attending one of the more academic secondary schools Under his regime the role of education as a vehicle for upward social mobil-ity was deeply undermined Suddenly kalabule had become the main chan-nel to secure the lifestyles which had formerly been guaranteed by a university degree and a civil service job Kalabule was a word coined to



describe the rampant corruption rent-seeking and profiteering of the Acheampong era In this period for the first time in the 20th century Ghana-ians begun to question the value of education as a vehicle for social and economic mobility Suddenly professionals such as university lecturers doctors nurses teachers and civil servants were obliged to start up small side-line businesses like poultry farming catering and dress-making to make ends meet

Th e Fourth Generation of Elites

Th e June 4th 1979 military mutiny coupled by the 31st December 1981 military coup led by Flight Lieutenant JJ Rawlings acted as a catalyst in the conflict amongst Ghanarsquos disunited political elites In 1979 during its brief 3 month rule the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings executed several members of the government and some former heads of state before handing over to an elected civilian government However economic conditions did not improve significantly under the new government and by December 1981 Rawlings staged a military coup which returned him to power Rawlingsrsquo Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) regime attracted a new generation of home-grown left wing intellectuals who had been politicised by the economic chaos and corruption that had ensued in the seventies Th ese were predominantly commoners who had benefited from the expan-sionist and inclusive education policies of the Nkrumah era Th ese policies involved the building of new secondary schools around the country as well as the expansion of domestic free tertiary education Th erefore Ghanaians no longer needed to bear the cost of going abroad to acquire university degrees and this increased the number of commoners who could now benefit from a university education

However with the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions particu-larly under the materialistic and profligate regime of Acheampong the life-style and prestige which a good education was expected to deliver did not materialise creating a new generation of disaffected educated commoners ready to challenge the status quo Th e return of Rawlings provided this group with the opportunity to join the ranks of the political elites How-ever the width and depth of elite circulation was not as far-reaching as might have been expected as links with some former politicians were not completely broken Some of Rawlingsrsquo new ministers and advisors had



been connected with past governments in both the Nkrumahist and the BusiaDanquah traditions Indeed the current President JA Kufour served as Minister for Local Government for a brief period

Rawlings declared a peoplersquos ldquorevolutionrdquo and lashed out at former poli-ticians as well as the business and professional classes Th e many human rights abuses which occurred under an increasingly lawless climate included the murder of three judges who by their rulings were deemed to be unsym-pathetic to the regime Th is marked a turning point for the Ghanaian middle-classes in general and previous generations of political elites in par-ticular who by then felt they were living under siege Most of their patron-client networks were broken and most who had not left the country already scuttled into exile Rawlingsrsquo ldquorevolutionrdquo swept away past structures of political power and created new ones featuring a new set of political elites Nugent documents the desperate scramble of the PNDC hierarchy to define the role and will of ldquothe peoplerdquo in the early days of the ldquorevolutionrdquo ldquoWhereas Rawlings insisted that it was the people who should govern the fact of the matter was that the real decisions were made in Accra by PNDC functionaries who were not strictly speaking accountable to anyonerdquo (Nugent 199548)

A Shared Sense of Destiny Coalitions Alliances and Inclusion

For the first time political elites belonging both to the BusiaDanquah tradition as well as the Nkrumahist tradition whether in exile or at home began to perceive each other as victims and potential allies Th e shared trauma of persecution and human rights violations many of them had directly or indirectly experienced under the AFRCPNDC had finally given them a sense of a shared destiny Th ey now came together to become an established elite united in opposition to the new ruling elite Some of them worked together in agitating for a return to democratic rule which eventually bore fruit when multi-party elections were scheduled for 1992 However the two dominant political traditions failed to form a coalition and Rawlings won the election amidst protests of fraud from the opposition

For the 1996 elections the ldquoGreat Alliancerdquo was formed between the National Patriotic Party representing the BusiaDanquah tradition and the Nkrumahist Peoplersquos Convention Party an offshoot of the CPP Due to a lack of resources and effective organisation the alliance lost once again to



Rawlingsrsquo NDC and he became President for a second term By 2000 the NPP had made the necessary reforms within their party and built up the confidence to enter the elections in their own right once again None of the parties received the 50 plus one of the valid votes cast for an outright victory in the first round In the runoff between the NDC and the NPP however the opposition parties most of which were in the Nkrumahist tradition put their weight behind the NPP by calling on their supporters to vote for the NPP presidential candidate JA Kufour helping the NPP to sweep to victory with a convincing margin of 569 votes to the NDCrsquos 431 Th e victory of the NPP in the 2000 elections signified a joint effort between two traditionally opposed political sides in their bid to oust the newcomers and bears witness to an emerging integration of Ghanarsquos estab-lished elites Recognising the role the NPPrsquos erstwhile political opponents had played in their victory President Kufour promised an inclusive gov-ernment and in the first term of office the NPP appointed a token number of ministers from other parties to symbolise a new era of political unity One of these was Dr Paa Kwesi Ndoum who survived as a minister into the second term of President Kufourrsquos government On his website it states

It is indeed historic and significant that Dr Nduom a leading member of the Convention Peoplersquos Party can serve as a Cabinet Minister in a New Patriotic Party government (wwwndoumcom)

Dr Ndoum the current Minister of Public Sector Reform has also held the portfolios of Minister of Economic Planning amp Regional Cooperation and Minister of Energy in President Kufourrsquos government

Significantly however the NPP no longer see the CPP or other offshoots of the original CPP as a major political threat but rather as potential allies or coalition partners Th is may be due to the fact that in the pro-cess of becoming established elites themselves the educated commoners of the Nkrumah era and their heirs have lost their common touch In achieving increased acceptance and integration with political elites of the BusiaDanquah tradition they have lost the political edge required to attract a mass following Th e divisions within the Nkrumahist group led to the emergence of several CPP off-shoot parties which have become increas-ingly politically marginalised allowing the NDC to take over the mantle as the dominant party in the Nkrumahist tradition Th e question therefore is how much unity exists between the established political elites of the two



opposing traditions and the new elites of the NDC Th is issue is the subject of on-going research

Conclusion

Th is article has chartered the history of social change political elite forma-tion competition conflict and disunity which existed in Ghana prior to the current liberal democratic regime under the 4th Republic It has argued that the initial source of political conflict were the changes in traditional social hierarchy created by increased wealth amongst commoners and the introduction of Western-style education during the pre-colonial and colo-nial eras It has further striven to illustrate how political elite circulation was fuelled by the emergence of successive generations of political elites resulting in increased differentiation amongst political elites Th e ensuing disunity led to insecurity amongst political elites and a cycle of military coups interspersed with brief periods of multi-party civilian government Nevertheless elite differentiation also resulted in political elites becoming more heterogeneous and representative of the different interest groups within Ghanaian society compared to for example the Ivory Coast Sierra Leone or Liberia in the same period After almost 50 years of indepen-dence competing Ghanaian political elites are finally beginning to show signs of unity Th e emerging political elite unity combined with the exist-ing diversity amongst Ghanaian leadership may account for the persistence and deepening of the liberal democratic regime under the 4th Republic over more than a decade a record in the history of Ghanaian politics

References

Ake C 1967 A Th eory of Political Integration Homewood Dorsey Press mdashmdash 2000 Th e Feasibility of Democracy in Africa Dakar CODESRIA Allman JM 1993 Th e Quills of the Porcupine Asante Nationalism in an Emergent

Ghana Madison University of Wisconsin Press Arhin K ldquoRank and Class among the Asante and Fante during the 19th Centuryrdquo

Africa Journal of the International African Institute 532ndash22 Arden-Clarke C 1958 ldquoEight Years of Transitionrdquo African Affairs 5729ndash37 Aron R 1950 ldquoSocial Structure and the Ruling Class Part 2rdquo Th e British Journal of

Sociology 2126ndash143



Apter DE 1955 Th e Gold Coast in Transition Princeton Princeton University Press mdashmdash 1970 Politics in Ghana 1946ndash1960 London Oxford University Press Austin D and R Luckham 1975 Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana 1966ndash1972

Studies in Commonwealth Politics and History No 3 London Cass Bayart J 1993 Th e State in Africa Th e Politics of the Belly London Longman Burton M and J Higley 2001 ldquoTh e Study of Political Elite Transformationsrdquo Inter-

national Review of Sociology 2181ndash200 Chabal P and J Daloz1999 Africa Works Disorder as Political Instrument Oxford

James Currey Fatton Jr R 1992 Predatory Rule State and Civil Society in Africa Boulder Lynne

Rienner Foster PJ 1965 Education and Social Change in Ghana London Routledge and

Kegan Paul J Higley and M Burton 2006 Th e Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy Lanham

Rowman and Littlefield Hill P 1961 ldquoTh e Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana A Study in Rural

Capitalismrdquo Africa Journal of the International African Institute 3209ndash230 mdashmdash 1997 Th e Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana A Study in Rural Capital-

ism Classics in African Anthropology Oxford James Currey Joseph R 2003 ldquoAfrica States in Crisisrdquo Journal of Democracy 3159ndash170 Kimble D 1963 A Political History of Ghana Th e Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism

1850ndash1928 Oxford Clarendon Press Li A 1995 ldquoTh e Asafo and Destoolment in C+olonial Southern Ghana 1900ndash1953rdquo

Th e International Journal of African Historical Studies 28327ndash357 Miller RA 1974 ldquoElite Formation in Africa Class Culture and Coherencerdquo Th e

Journal of Modern African Studies 4521ndash542 Nugent P 1995 Big Men Small Boys and Politics in Ghana Power Ideology and the

Burden of History 1982ndash94 London Pinter Owusu M 1986 ldquoCustom and Coups A Juridical Interpretation of Civil Order and

Disorder in Ghanardquo Th e Journal of Modern African Studies 2469ndash99 Rathbone R 1996 ldquoDefining Akyemfo Th e Construction of Citizenship in Akyem

Abuakwa Ghana 1700ndash1939rdquo Africa Journal of the International African Institute 66506ndash525

mdashmdash 1989 ldquoA Murder in the Colonial Gold Coast Law and Politics in the 1940srdquo Th e Journal of African History 3445ndash461

mdashmdash 2000 Nkrumah amp the Chiefs Th e Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951ndash1960 Western African Studies Oxford James Currey

Samatar AI 1997 ldquoLeadership and Ethnicity in the making of African State Models Botswana versus Somaliardquo Th ird World Quarterly 4687ndash707

mdashmdash 1999 An African Miracle State Class and Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development Portsmouth Heinemann

Van de Walle N 2001 African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis 1979ndash1999 Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Wilks I 1989 Asante in the Nineteenth Century Th e Structure and Evolution of a Political Order African Studies Series Cambridge Cambridge University Press



1) It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the quality of democracy in Ghana Nevertheless problems as to definition and quality of democracy are not limited to

new consensus for democracy amongst competing political elites which is evidenced by the remarkable persistence and stability of Ghanarsquos liberal democratic regime from 1992 to the present time1

Since undergoing decolonisation the continent of Africa has endured violent political struggle and conflict Various paradigms have been put forth to explain the politics of the continent (Bayart 1993 Chabal and Daloz 1999 Van de Walle 2001) Th ese are generally characterised by Afro-pessimism or motivated by a repudiation of dependency theory Th e emphasis on neo-patrimonialism as a cause rather than a symptom of Afri-can political instability has often led to the marginalisation of Africa from the mainstream of contemporary scholarly debate Moreover there is little attempt to account for different political trajectories in African countries within a unified theoretical framework

Some writers like Fatton (1991) Samatar (1997 1999) and Ake (1967 2000) have portrayed African political elites from a more multi-dimen-sional perspective and in the process recognised the critical role they play both in regime change and stability In this article the focus on the role of political elites in analyzing the progress of democracy in Ghana is based on historical accounts and empirical observation of events in Ghana which indicate that the major conflicts amongst Ghanaians for control of the state during the period of decolonisation and subsequently took place at the political elite level (Apter 1955)

A consensus for democracy has existed amongst Ghanaian political elites since Ghanarsquos formal transition to democracy under the 4th Republican Constitution in 1992 and particularly in the period between 1996 and the present Th is is evidenced by a dramatic expansion of political freedoms successive free and fair elections the gradual institutionalisation of consti-tutional bodies the peaceful alternation of power and public shows of unity amongst politicians from opposing sides Previous to this period Ghana experienced a series of military overthrows of government author-itarian and repressive military rule and fierce conflict amongst competing political elites Th is paper explores the dynamics of this evident transfor-mation in political elite competition from habitual conflict and political instability to consensus and democratic regime stability






























































































































Conclusion


References

























































































































































Conclusion


References





























svanikier political elites

Documents