supreme court of the united states - polsinelli2 sandifer v. united states steel corp. opinion of...

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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1 C ite as: 571 U . S . ____ (2014)

O pinion of the C ourt

N O T I C E : T his opinion is subject to formal rev ision before publ ication in thepreliminary pr int of the U nited S tates R eports. R eaders are requested tonoti fy the R eporter of D ecis ions, S upreme C ourt of the U nited S tates, Wash-i ngton, D . C . 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the prel imi nary pr int goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

N o. 12–417

C L I F T ON S A N D I F E R , E T A L ., P E T I T I O N E R S v. U N I T E D

S T A T E S S T E E L C OR P O R A T I ON

O N WR I T O F C E R T I O R A R I T O T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E S E V E N T H C I R C U I T

[J anuary 27, 2014]

J U S T I C E S C A L I A delivered the opinion of the C ourt.*

T he question before us is the meaning of the phrase

“changing clothes” as it appears in the F air L abor S tand-

ards A ct of 1938, 52 S tat. 1060, as amended, 29 U . S . C .

§201 et seq. (2006 ed. and S upp. V ).

I . F acts and P rocedural H istory

P etitioner C l ifton S andifer, among others, fi led suit

under the F air L abor S tandards A ct against respondent

U nited S tates S teel C orporation in the D istr ict C ourt for

the N orthern D istrict of I ndiana. T he plaintiffs in this

putative collective action are a group of current or former

employees of respondent’s steelmak ing facili ties.1 A s

——— ———

* J U S T I C E S OT OMA Y O R joins this opinion except as to footnote 7. 1 P etitioners fi led this action under 29 U . S . C . §216(b), which estab-

lishes a cause of action that may be maintained “by any one or more

em ployees for and in behalf of h imself or themselves and other employ-

ees s imi larly s ituated.” P ending resolution of the instant summ ary-

judgment dispute, a M agistrate J udge set as ide a m otion to cer ti fy the

suit as a col lective action, see N o. 2:07–C V –443 R M, 2009 WL 3430222,

*1, n. 1 (N D I nd., O ct. 15, 2009), but petitioners asser t that their rank s

are about 800 strong.

2 S A N D I F E R v. U N I T E D S T A T E S S T E E L C O R P .


relevant here, they seek back pay for time spent donning

and doffing various pieces of protective gear. P eti tioners

assert that respondent requires work ers to wear all of the

items because of hazards regularly encountered in steel

plants.

P etitioners point speci fically to 12 of what they state are

the most common k inds of required protective gear : a

flame-retardant jack et, pair of pants, and hood; a hardhat;

a “snood”; “wristlets”; work gloves; leggings; “metatarsal”

boots; safety glasses; earplugs; and a respirator.2 A t bot-

tom, petitioners want to be paid for the time they have

spent putting on and tak ing off those objects. I n the ag-

gregate, the amount of time—and thus money—involved is

lik ely to be quite large. B ecause this donning-and-doffing

time would otherwise be compensable under the A ct, U . S .

S teel’s contention of noncompensabi li ty stands or falls

upon the validity of a provision of i ts col lective-bargaining

agreement with petitioners’ union, which says that this

time is noncompensable.3 T he validity of that provision

depends, in turn, upon the applicabil ity of 29 U . S . C .

§203(o) to the time at issue. T hat subsection allows par-

ties to decide, as part of a collective-bargaining agreement,

that “time spent in changing clothes . . . at the beginning

or end of each work day” is noncompensable.

T he D istrict C ourt granted summary judgment in perti-

nent part to U . S . S teel, holding that donning and doffing

——— ———

2 T he opinions below include descriptions of some of the i tems. S ee

678 F . 3d 590, 592 (C A 7 2012); 2009 WL 3430222, *2, *6. A nd the

opinion of the C ourt of A ppeals provides a photograph of a male model

wear ing the jack et, pants, hardhat, snood, gloves, boots, and glasses.

678 F . 3d, at 593. 3 T he D istr ict C ourt concluded that the col lective-bargaining agree-

ment provided that the activ ities at issue here were noncompensable,

2009 WL 3430222, *10, and the S ev enth C ircuit upheld that conclusion,

678 F . 3d, at 595. T hat issue was not among the questions on which we

granted cer tiorar i , and we tak e the import of the col lective-bargaining

agreem ent to be a given.

3 C ite as: 571 U . S . ____ (2014)


the protective gear constituted “changing clothes” within

the meaning of §203(o). N o. 2:07–C V –443 R M, 2009 WL

3430222, *4–*10 (N D I nd., O ct. 15, 2009). T he D istrict

C ourt further assumed that even if certain items—the

hardhat, glasses, and earplugs—were not “clothes,” the

time spent donning and doffing them was “de minimis”

and hence noncompensable. I d., at *6. T he C ourt of

A ppeals for the S eventh C ircuit upheld those conclusions.

678 F . 3d 590, 593–595 (2012).4

We granted certiorari , 568 U . S . ___ (2013), and now

affi rm.

I I . L egal B ack ground

T he F air L abor S tandards A ct, enacted in 1938, governs

minimum wages and maximum hours for non-exempt

“employees who in any work week [are] engaged in com-

merce or in the production of goods for commerce, or [are]

employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the

production of goods for commerce.” 29 U . S . C . §206(a)

(minimum wages); §207(a) (max imum hours); see §213

(exemptions). T he A ct provides that “employee” general ly

means “any individual employed by an employer,”

§203(e)(1), and, in turn, provides that to “employ” is “to

suffer or permit to work ,” §203(g).

T he A ct did not, however , define the k ey terms “work ”

and “work week ”—an omission that soon let loose a land-

slide of l i tigation. S ee I B P , I nc. v. A l varez, 546 U . S . 21,

25–26 (2005). T his C ourt gave those terms a broad read-

ing, culminating in i ts holding in A nderson v. Mt. C lemens

P ottery C o., 328 U . S . 680 (1946), that “the statutory

——— ———

4 P etitioners also sought, inter al ia, back pay for time spent travel ing

between the lock er rooms where they don and doff at least some of the

protective gear and their work stations. T he D istrict C ourt denied that

portion of respondent’s motion for summ ary judgment, 2009 WL

3430222, *11, and the S eventh C ircuit reversed, 678 F . 3d, at 595–598.

T hat issue is not before this C ourt, so we express no opinion on i t.



work week includes all time dur ing which an employee is

necessari ly required to be on the employer’s premises, on

duty or at a prescribed work place.” I d., at 690–691. T hat

period, A nderson explained, encompassed time spent

“pursu[ing] certain prel iminary activ ities after arriving

. . . , such as putting on aprons and overalls [and] remov-

ing shirts.” I d., at 692–693. “T hese activi ties,” the C ourt

declared, “are clearly work ” under the A ct. I d., at 693.

O rganized labor seized on the C ourt’s expansive con-

struction of compensabi li ty by fi l ing what became k nown

as “portal” actions (a reference to the “portals” or entranc-

es to mines, at which work ers put on their gear).

“P OR T A L P A Y S U I T S E X C E E D A B I L L I O N ,” announced

a newspaper headline in late 1946. N . Y . T imes, D ec. 29,

1946, p. 1. S tating that the F air L abor S tandards A ct

had been “interpreted judicial ly in disregard of long-

established customs, practices, and contracts between

employers and employees,” C ongress responded by passing

the P ortal -to-P ortal A ct of 1947, 61 S tat. 84, as amended,

29 U . S . C . §251 et seq. (2006 ed. and S upp. V ). §251(a).

T he P ortal-to-P ortal A ct l imited the scope of employers’

l iabi lity in various ways. A s relevant here, it excluded

from mandatori ly compensable time

“activ ities which are prel iminary to or postliminary to

[the] pr incipal activ ity or activi ties [that an employee

is employed to perform], which occur either prior to

the time on any particular work day at which such

employee commences, or subsequent to the time on

any particular work day at which he ceases, such prin-

cipal activi ty or activities.” 61 S tat. 87, 29 U . S . C .

§254(a)(2).

T he D epartment of L abor promulgated a regulation

explaining that the P ortal -to-P ortal A ct did not al ter what

is k nown as the “continuous work day rule,” under which

compensable time comprises “the per iod between the

5 C ite as: 571 U . S . ____ (2014)


commencement and completion on the same work day of an

employee’s principal activ ity or activi ties . . . [,] whether or

not the employee engages in work throughout all of that

period.” 12 F ed. R eg. 7658 (1947); 29 C F R §790.6(b)

(2013). Of particular importance to this case, a L abor

D epartment interpretive bulletin also speci fied that

whereas “changing clothes” and “washing up or shower-

ing” “would be considered ‘preliminary’ or ‘postl iminary’

activ ities” when “performed outside the work day and . . .

under the conditions normally present,” those same activ i-

ties “may in certain si tuations be so directly related to the

speci fic work the employee is employed to perform that

[they] would be regarded as an integral part of the em-

ployee’s ‘principal activ ity.’” 12 F ed. R eg. 7659, and n. 49;

29 C F R §790.7, and n. 49.

I n 1949, C ongress amended the F air L abor S tandards

A ct to address the conduct discussed in that interpretive

bulletin—changing clothes and washing—by adding the

provision presently at issue:

“H ours Work ed.—I n determining for the purposes of

[the minimum-wage and max imum-hours sections] of

this ti tle the hours for which an employee is em-

ployed, there shal l be excluded any time spent in

changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end

of each work day which was excluded from measured

work ing time during the week involved by the express

terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide

collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the par-

ticular employee.” 63 S tat. 911, 29 U . S . C . §203(o).

S imply put, the statute provides that the compensabili ty

of time spent changing clothes or washing is a subject

appropr iately committed to collective bargaining.

I n S teiner v. Mitchel l , 350 U . S . 247 (1956), the C ourt

echoed the L abor D epartment’s 1947 regulations by hold-

ing that “changing clothes and shower ing” can, under



some circumstances, be considered “an integral and indis-

pensable part of the principal activities for which covered

work men are employed,” reasoning that §203(o) “clear[ly]

impli [ed]” as much. I d., at 254–256. A nd in I B P , we

appl ied S teiner to treat as compensable the donning and

doffing of protective gear somewhat similar to that at

issue here, 546 U . S ., at 30. We said that “any activity

that is ‘integral and indispensable’ to a ‘principal activ ity’

is itself a ‘pr incipal activity’” under §254(a), id., at 37.

A s relevant to the question before us, U . S . S teel does

not dispute the S eventh C ircuit’s conclusion that “[h]ad

the clothes-changing time in this case not been rendered

noncompensable pursuant to [§]203(o), it would have been

a principal activi ty.” 678 F . 3d, at 596. P etitioners, how-

ever, quarrel with the premise, arguing that the donning

and doffing of protective gear does not qualify as “chang-

ing clothes.”

I I I . A nalysis

A . “C lothes”

We begin by examining the meaning of the word

“clothes.”5 I t is a “fundamental canon of statutory con-

struction” that, “unless otherwise defined, words wi ll be

interpreted as tak ing their ordinary, contemporary, com-

mon meaning.” P errin v. U nited S tates, 444 U . S . 37, 42

(1979).

D ictionaries from the era of §203(o)’s enactment indicate

that “clothes” denotes i tems that are both designed and

used to cover the body and are commonly regarded as

articles of dress. S ee Webster’s N ew I nternational D ic-

tionary of the E nglish L anguage 507 (2d ed. 1950) (Web-

ster ’s S econd) (defining “clothes” as “[c]overing for the

——— ———

5 A lthough the L abor D epartment has construed §203(o) on a num ber

of occasions, the G overnment has expressly declined to ask us to defer

to those interpretations, which have vaci l lated considerably over the

years.

7 C ite as: 571 U . S . ____ (2014)


human body; dress; vestments; vesture”); see also, e.g., 2

Oxford E nglish D ictionary 524 (1933) (defining “clothes”

as “[c]overing for the person; wearing apparel; dress,

raiment, vesture”). T hat is what we hold to be the mean-

ing of the word as used in §203(o). A lthough a statute

may mak e “a departure from the natural and popular

acceptation of language,” G reenl eaf v. G oodrich, 101 U . S .

278, 284–285 (1880) (ci ting Mai l lard v. L awrence, 16 H ow.

251 (1854)), nothing in the text or context of §203(o) sug-

gests anything other than the ordinary meaning of

“clothes.”

P etitioners argue that the word “clothes” is too indeter-

minate to be ascribed any general meaning but that,

whatever i t includes, it necessar ily excludes i tems de-

signed and used to protect against work place hazards.

T hat position creates a distinction between “protection,”

on the one hand, and “decency or comfort,” on the other—a

distinction that petitioners appear to have derived from

Webster’s S econd, which elaborates that “clothes” is “a

general term for whatever covering is worn, or is made to

be worn, for decency or comfort.” Webster’s S econd 507

(emphasis added). B ut that definition does not exclude,

either expl ici tly or impl ici tly, items with a protective

function, since “protection” and “comfort” are not incom-

patible, and are often synonymous. A parasol protects

against the sun, enhancing the comfort of the bearer—just

as work gloves protect against scrapes and cuts, enhanc-

ing the comfort of the wearer. P eti tioners fur ther assert

that protective items of apparel are referred to as “cloth-

ing” rather than “clothes.” T hey point out that, when

introduced by the adjective “protective,” the noun “cloth-

ing” is used more commonly than “clothes.” T hat is true

enough, but i t seems to us explained by euphonic prefer-

ence rather than difference in meaning. We see no basis

for the proposition that the unmodified term “clothes”

somehow omits protective clothing.



P etitioners’ proffered distinction, moreover, runs the risk

of reducing §203(o) to near nothingness. T he statutory

compensation requirement to which §203(o) provides an

exception embraces the changing of clothes only when that

conduct constitutes “an integral and indispensable part of

the pr incipal activ ities for which covered work men are

employed.” S tei ner, 350 U . S ., at 256. B ut protective gear

is the only clothing that is integral and indispensable to

the work of factory work ers, butchers, longshoremen, and

a host of other occupations. P etitioners’ definition of

“clothes” would largely limit the appl ication of §203(o) to

what might be called work ers’ costumes, worn by such

employees as waiters, doormen, and train conductors.

P etitioners insist that their definition excludes only i tems

with some specific work-hazard-rel ated protective func-

tion, but that l imitation essentially abandons the asser-

tion that clothes are for decency or comfort, leaving no

basis whatever for the distinction.

P etitioners’ position is also incompatible with the histor-

ical context surrounding §203(o)’s passage, since it flatly

contradicts an il lustration provided by the L abor D epart-

ment’s 1947 regulations to show how “changing clothes”

could be intimately related to a principal activ ity. S ee 29

C F R §790.7, and n. 49. T hose regulations cited the situa-

tion in which “an employee in a chemical plant . . . cannot

perform his [job] without putting on certain clothes” and

specified that “[s]uch a situation may ex ist where the

changing of clothes on the employer’s premises is required

by law, by rules of the employer, or by the nature of the

work .” 12 F ed. R eg. 7660, and n. 65; 29 C F R §790.8(c),

and n. 65. A nd petitioners’ position contradicts this

C ourt’s only prior opinion purporting to interpret §203(o).

S teiner, announced less than a decade after the statute’s

passage, suggested in dictum that, were there a pertinent

provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, §203(o)

would have appl ied to the facts of that case—where work -

9 C ite as: 571 U . S . ____ (2014)


ers “ma[d]e extensive use of dangerously caustic and toxic

materials, and [we]re compelled by circumstances, includ-

ing vital considerations of health and hygiene, to change

clothes” on the job site. 350 U . S ., at 248, 254–255.

P etitioners contend that any attempt at a general defi-

nition of “clothes” wil l cast a net so vast as to capture all

manner of marginal things—from bandol iers to barrettes

to bandages. Y et even ack nowledging that i t may be

impossible to el iminate all vagueness when interpreting a

word as wide-ranging as “clothes,” petitioners’ fanciful

hypotheticals give us little pause. T he statutory context

mak es clear that the “clothes” referred to are i tems that

are integral to job per formance; the donning and doffing of

other i tems would create no claim to compensation under

the A ct, and hence no need for the §203(o) exception.

Moreover, even with respect to i tems that can be regarded

as integral to job performance, our definition does not

embrace the view, adopted by some C ourts of A ppeals,

that “clothes” means essentially anything worn on the

body—including accessories, tools, and so forth. S ee, e.g.,

S alazar v. B utterbal l , L L C , 644 F . 3d 1130, 1139–1140

(C A 10 2011) (“clothes” are “items or garments worn by a

person” and include “k nife holders”). T he construction

we adopt today is considerably more contained. Many

accessories—neck laces and knapsack s, for instance—are not

“both designed and used to cover the body.” N or are tools

“commonly regarded as ar ticles of dress.” O ur definition

leaves room for distinguishing between clothes and wear-

able i tems that are not clothes, such as some equipment

and devices.6

R espondent and its amici , by contrast, give the term in

——— ———

6 P etitioners and their a mici insist that equipment can never be

clothes. While we do not bel ieve that every wearable piece of equip-

ment qual i fies—for example, a wr istwatch—our constr uction of

“clothes” does not exclude al l objects that could conceivably be charac-

terized as equipment.



question a capacious construction, effectively echoing the

C ourts of A ppeals mentioned above. On this view,

“clothes” encompasses the entire outfit that one puts on to

be ready for work . T hat interpretation is, to be sure, more

readi ly administrable, but it is even more devoid of a

textual foundation than petitioners’ offer ing. C ongress

could have declared bargainable under §203(o) “time spent

in changing outfi ts,” or “time spent in putting on and off

al l the i tems needed for work.” F or better or worse, it used

the narrower word “clothes.” “T he role of this C ourt is to

apply the statute as it is written—even i f we think some

other approach might accord with good pol icy.” B urrage v.

U nited S tates, ante at 14 (internal quotation mark s and

brack ets omitted).

B . “C hanging”

H aving settled upon the meaning of “clothes,” we must

now consider the meaning of “changing.” P etitioners

assert that when used with certain objects—such as “tire,”

“diaper,” or, indeed, “clothes”—the term “changing” connotes

substitution. T hat is undoubtedly true. S ee Webster’s

S econd 448 (defining “change” as “to mak e substitution

of, for, or among, often among things of the same k ind

. . . ; as, to change one’s clothes”). O ne would not normal ly

say he has changed clothes when he puts on an overcoat.

P etitioners conclude from this that items of protective gear

that are put on over the employee’s street clothes are not

covered by §203(o).

We disagree. A lthough it is true that the normal mean-

ing of “changing clothes” connotes substi tution, the phrase

is certainly able to have a different import. T he term

“changing” carr ied two common meanings at the time of

§203(o)’s enactment: to “substi tute” and to “alter.” S ee,

e.g., 2 Oxford E nglish D ictionary 268 (defining “change,”

among other verb forms, as “to substitute another (or

others) for, replace by another (or others)” and “[t]o mak e

11 C ite as: 571 U . S . ____ (2014)


(a thing) other than i t was; to render different, alter,

modify, transmute”). We think that despite the usual

meaning of “changing clothes,” the broader statutory

context mak es it plain that “time spent in changing

clothes” includes time spent in altering dress.

T he object of §203(o) is to permit collective bargaining

over the compensabili ty of clothes-changing time and to

promote the predictabil ity achieved through mutual ly

beneficial negotiation. T here can be li ttle predictabi lity,

and hence li ttle meaningful negotiation, i f “changing”

means only “substi tuting.” Whether one actually ex-

changes street clothes for work clothes or s imply layers

garments atop one another after arriving on the job si te is

often a matter of purely personal choice. T hat choice may

be influenced by such happenstances and vagaries as what

month it i s, what styles are in vogue, what time the em-

ployee wak es up, what mode of transportation he uses,

and so on. A s the F ourth C ircuit has put it, i f the statute

imposed a substi tution requirement “compensation for

putting on a company-issued shir t might turn on some-

thing as tr iv ial as whether the employee did or did not

tak e off the t-shirt he wore into work that day.” S epulveda

v. A l len F amily F oods, I nc., 591 F . 3d 209, 216 (2009).

Where another reading is textually permissible, §203(o)

should not be read to allow work ers to opt into or out of its

coverage at random or at wi ll.7

——— ———

7 T his C ourt has stated that “exemptions” in the F air L abor S tand-

ards A ct “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seek ing to

asser t them.” A rnold v. B en K a nowsky, I nc., 361 U . S . 388, 392 (1960).

We need not disapprove that statement to resolve the present case.

T he exemptions from the A ct general ly reside in §213, which is entitled

“E xemptions” and classi fies cer tain k inds of work er s as uncov ered by

various provisions. T hus, in C hr istopher v. S mi thK l ine B eecham C orp.,

567 U . S . ___, ___–___, n. 21 (2012) (sl ip op., at 19–20, n. 21), we de-

clared the narrow-construction pr inciple inappl icable to a provision

appearing in §203, entitled “D efinitions.”



C . A pplication

A pplying the foregoing principles to the facts of this

case, we hold that petitioners’ donning and doffing of the

protective gear at issue quali fies as “changing clothes”

within the meaning of §203(o).

P etitioners have pointed to 12 particular items: a flame-

retardant jack et, pair of pants, and hood; a hardhat; a

snood; wristlets; work gloves; leggings; metatarsal boots;

safety glasses; earplugs; and a respirator . T he first nine

clear ly fit within the interpretation of “clothes” elaborated

above: they are both designed and used to cover the body

and are commonly regarded as articles of dress. T hat

proposition is obvious with respect to the jack et, pants,

hood, and gloves. T he hardhat is simply a type of hat.

T he snood is basically a hood that also covers the neck and

upper shoulder area; on the sk i slopes, one might cal l i t a

“balaclava.” T he wristlets are essential ly detached shir t-

sleeves. T he leggings look much lik e traditional legwarm-

ers, but with straps. A nd the metatarsal boots—more

commonly k nown as “steel-toed” boots—are just a special

k ind of shoe.

T he remaining three items, by contrast, do not satisfy

our standard. Whereas glasses and earplugs may have a

covering function, we do not believe that they are commonly

regarded as articles of dress. A nd a respirator obviously

fal ls short on both grounds. T he question is whether the

time devoted to the putting on and off of these i tems must

be deducted from the noncompensable time. I f so, federal

judges must be assigned the task of separating the

minutes spent clothes-changing and washing from the

minutes devoted to other activ ities during the period in

question.

S ome C ourts of A ppeals, including the C ourt of A ppeals

in this case, have sought to avoid, or at least mitigate, this

difficulty by invok ing the doctrine de mi nimi s non curat

lex (the law does not tak e account of tr i fles). T his, they

13 C ite as: 571 U . S . ____ (2014)


hold, enables them to declare noncompensable a few

minutes actually spent on something other than clothes-

changing—to wit, donning and doffing non-clothes i tems.

A lthough the roots of the de minimi s doctrine stretch to

ancient soi l, its appl ication in the present contex t began

with A nderson. T here, the C ourt declared that because

“[s]pl it-second absurdities are not justified by the actual i-

ties of work ing conditions or by the policy of the F air

L abor S tandards A ct,” such “tr ifles” as “a few seconds or

minutes of work beyond the scheduled work ing hours”

may be “disregarded.” 328 U . S ., at 692. “We [thus] do not

. . . preclude the application of a de minimis rule.” I bid.

We doubt that the de minimis doctrine can properly be

appl ied to the present case. T o be sure, A nderson included

“putting on aprons and overalls” and “removing shirts” as

activ ities to which “i t is appropriate to apply a de minimis

doctrine.” I d., at 692–693. I t said that, however, in the

context of determining what prel iminary activi ties had to

be counted as part of the gross work week under §207(a) of

the F air L abor S tandards A ct.8 A de mi ni mis doctrine

does not fit comfortably within the statute at issue here,

which, it can fair ly be said, is al l about tr ifles—the rela-

tively insignificant periods of time in which employees

wash up and put on various i tems of clothing needed for

their jobs. Or to put it in the context of the present case,

there is no more reason to di sregard the minute or so

necessary to put on glasses, earplugs, and respirators,

than there is to regard the minute or so necessary to put

on a snood. I f the statute in question requires courts to

——— ———

8 We note, m oreover, that even in that context, the current regula-

tions of the L abor D epartm ent apply a stricter de mi ni mi s standard

than A nderson expressed. T hey specify that “[a]n em ployer may not

arbitrar i ly fai l to count as hours work ed any par t, however smal l, of the

em ployee’s fixed or regular work ing time or practically ascer tainable

period of time he is regular ly required to spend on duties assigned to

him.” 29 C F R §785.47.



select among tri fles, de mi ni mis non curat lex is not L atin

for close enough for government work.

T hat said, we nonetheless agree with the basic percep-

tion of the C ourts of A ppeals that i t is most unl ik ely

C ongress meant §203(o) to convert federal judges into

time-study professionals. T hat is especially so since the conse-

quence of dispensing with the intricate exercise of separat-

ing the minutes spent clothes-changing and washing from

the minutes devoted to other activi ties is not to prevent

compensation for the uncovered segments, but merely to

leave the issue of compensation to the process of collective

bargaining. We think it i s possible to give the tex t of

§203(o) a meaning that avoids such relatively inconse-

quential judicial involvement in “a morass of diffi cult, fact-

specific determinations,” S epulveda, 591 F . 3d, at 218.

T he forerunner of §203(o)—the P ortal -to-P ortal A ct

provision whose interpretation by the L abor D epartment

prompted i ts enactment—focused narrowly on the activi-

ties involved: “activi ties which are preliminary to or

postliminary to [the employee’s] principal activi ty or activ-

ities.” §254(a)(2). S ection 203(o), by contrast, i s addressed

not to certain “activi ties,” but to “time spent” on certain

activ ities, viz., “changing clothes or washing.” J ust as one

can speak of “spending the day sk iing” even when less-

than-negligible portions of the day are spent having lunch

or drink ing hot toddies, so also one can speak of “time

spent changing clothes and washing” when the vast pre-

ponderance of the period in question is devoted to those

activ ities. T o be sure, such an imprecise and colloquial

usage wil l not ordinarily be attributed to a statutory text,

but for the reasons we have discussed we think that ap-

propriate here. T he question for courts is whether the

period at issue can, on the whole, be fair ly character ized as

“time spent in changing clothes or washing.” I f an em-

ployee devotes the vast majority of the time in question to

putting on and off equipment or other non-clothes i tems

15 C ite as: 571 U . S . ____ (2014)


(perhaps a diver’s suit and tank ) the entire period would

not quali fy as “time spent in changing clothes” under

§203(o), even if some clothes items were donned and doffed

as well . B ut if the vast majority of the time is spent in

donning and doffing “clothes” as we have defined that

term, the entire period quali fies, and the time spent put-

ting on and off other i tems need not be subtracted.

I n the present case, the D istrict C ourt stated that “the

time expended by each employee donning and doffing”

safety glasses and earplugs “is minimal ,” 2009 WL

3430222, *6, a conclusion with which the S eventh C ircuit

agreed, 678 F . 3d, at 593. A s for respirators, the D istrict

C ourt stated that they “are k ept and put on as needed at

job locations,” 2009 WL 3430222, *2, which would render

the time spent donning and doffing them part of an em-

ployee’s normal work day and thus beyond the scope of

§203(o). T he S eventh C ircuit did not address respirators

at all , and we are not incl ined to disturb the D istrict

C ourt’s factual conclusion.

* * *

T he judgment of the C ourt of A ppeals is affirmed.

I t i s so ordered.

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