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Supporting Indonesia’sDemocratic Transition:FES 10 Years after the Political Reform

Supporting Indonesia’s Democratic Transition:FES 10 years after the Political Reform

Written by:Paskal Kleden

Published by:Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)Indonesia Office

Printed by:d’print communicationsphone : 0817 486 7117

All rights reserved.

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Foreword

I n 2008 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)looks back on 40 years of cooperation with

partner organizations in Indonesia. In particular,

we look back on ten years of support for the

democratization project known as “Reformasi.”

During this period the focal points of FES activity

have changed, but the main underlying motivationremains the same: To contribute to international

dialogue and understanding, and the development

of democracy, based on the social democratic core

values of our organization, namely freedom, social

justice, and solidarity.

This paper presents and reviews the past andcurrent activities of FES in Indonesia, with a view

to laying the foundations for a broader understanding

of FES’s motives, aims, and activities. It shows

that the historical change which started in Indonesia

in 1998 with the beginning of Reformasi has led to

a parallel change in the activities of FES Indonesia.While previously these activities were restricted

mainly to support for cooperatives and government-

controlled trade unions, Reformasi opened up a

window of opportunity to add a core aspect of FES’s

international portfolio, Democracy Promotion. And

while at the beginning of Reformasi the object wasdemocracy itself, FES can now focus more on

supporting a socially just and economically

prosperous form of democracy: Social Democracy.

In the following pages, all of these changes

are illustrated and explained by former FES staff

member Paskal Kleden. And this is also part ofFES’s identity: A strong reliance on our local staff.

Their efforts and motivation build bridges between

October 2008

Erwin Schweisshelm and Marius Mueller-Hennig

our various local partners and FES. We are verygrateful for and proud of their long-term

commitment.

We would also like to thank our various

partners and the Indonesian authorities, whose

contributions enable FES to continue to facilitate

international dialogue, understanding, and thespread of democracy.

The insights of Friedrich Ebert, the first

democratically elected president of the Weimar

Republic, and of Willy Brandt, former German

Chancellor and former President of the Social

Democratic Party of Germany, still neatlyencapsulate FES’s core concerns:

“There is no freedom without democracy.”

and

“International cooperation is far too important to

be left to governments alone.”

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) wasfounded in 1925 as a legacy ofFriedrich Ebert, who started his career

as a craftsman and became the firstdemocratically elected German president. TheFoundation started its activities in Germany,providing scholarships to students fromworking-class backgrounds. Having beenreestablished after the Second World War,FES continued with the provision ofscholarships for students, but also becameengaged in political education andconsultancy in Germany. Furthermore, itexpanded its activities beyond Germany andtoday the Foundation has programs in morethan 100 countries around the world. Like theother political foundations in Germany, FESis almost exclusively funded by the Germanstate through annual allocations byParliament.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung initiated itsactivities in Indonesia in 1966 by inviting adelegation of trade unionists to Germany tostudy industrial relations. In 1967 this programwas followed by courses for trade unionistsand officials of cooperatives that wereconducted in Indonesia. This cooperation wasmade possible because the then Minister ofManpower and later Indonesian Ambassadorto Germany, Professor Djamin Awaloeddin,was interested in FES’s political educationsystem and residential colleges in Germanyand wanted to replicate this system inIndonesia. In addition, Mr. Awaloeddindeveloped a friendship with the then head ofFES, Dr. Heinz Kühn. The personalrelationship between former IndonesianForeign Minister Adam Malik and former

German Chancellor Willy Brandt also helpedto start the FES Indonesia program. Theseinstances of initial cooperation have led towhat has become almost half a century ofcooperation between the Foundation and itspartners in Indonesia.

In July 1968, FES and the Governmentof the Republic of Indonesia (GoI) signed thefirst framework agreement, which served asthe basis for long-term cooperation. FESstarted its programs in Indonesia in the 1960sdespite the fact that the country was underthe authoritarian rule of the Suharto regime.At that time, development cooperation wasinfluenced by Cold War considerations andSuharto seemed to be a promising Third Worldleader who could prevent the spread ofCommunism in Southeast Asia. SinceGermany was part of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) the anti-communistconcern was understandable. FESmotivations can also be understood if oneremembers how communists and socialdemocrats had competed for influence in thepast. All these factors contributed to FEScooperation in Indonesia. Due to this Cold Warparadigm FES did not cooperate withopposition forces in Indonesia: preventing thespread of communism was the main priorityof cooperation. Only after the Berlin Wall fellin 1989 cooperation with pro-democracyactors was significantly increased.

1. FES in Indonesia: A Short History

Supporting Indonesia’s Democratic Transition: FES 10 Years after the Political Reform

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Friedrich Ebert

Despite the public funding they receiveand their special relationships withpolitical parties, Germany’s political

foundations are considered as independent.The German government knows that it is theirindependence that enables politicalfoundations to fulfill unique functions in thepromotion of international understandingcompared to government institutions, such asthe Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperationand Development (BMZ) and the FederalForeign Office (AA). While the main task ofpolitical foundations in the internationaldomain is to contribute to democracypromotion, they can also provide forums forsecond track diplomacy –for official actors tomeet in their informal capacities – and for thirdtrack diplomacy that involves non-state actors,such as persons from the NGO community.Nevertheless, receipt of public funds alsoentails certain restrictions on FES activities. Itis important that FES’s work does notnegatively affect relations between theGerman and the host governments. This isan important consideration when choosingFES partners and activities.

The independence of German politicalfoundations is sometimes also questionedbecause of their relations with German politicalparties. However, it should be noted that,despite this close relationship, the SocialDemocratic Party (SPD) does not and maynot determine FES programs. FES isorganizationally and financially independentfrom the SPD. The Foundation shares theparty’s values and ideologies, but iscompletely independent in choosing theprograms it implements.

FES’s independence is also reflected inwhether and how FES chooses to operate ina country. FES can open a representativeoffice and start its cooperation activities onlyafter official approval from the host country.Therefore, it is hardly convincing to accuseFES of engaging in a form of foreign“intervention.” Other criteria, such as thepolitical importance of a country for Germanyand whether it has a likeminded partnerstructure that includes trade unions, politicalparties and NGOs, are also considered in theprocess of opening an office abroad.

Unlike today, “political” developmentcooperation in Indonesia could not be freelyconducted during the Suharto era. At that time,the Indonesian government preferred politicalstability in order to achieve economicdevelopment and did not allow politicalpluralism and political debate. The challengefor FES was how to cooperate with theIndonesian state without sacrificing its ownprinciples, namely the promotion of socialdemocracy and social justice, as well as peaceand understanding between people. To solvethis dilemma, FES opted for a soft approachin fostering liberal and democratic thinking.By supporting “de-officialization” in theIndonesian cooperative movement, FES in itscooperation with the Ministry of Cooperativestried to contribute to the modernization of theministry and so reduce governmentintervention in societal and economicprocesses, as well as corruption. Thiscooperation also appealed to the governmentof Indonesia because “Koperasi,” as explainedin the constitution, was considered to be oneof the backbones of the economy. Programswith non-state actors, such as trade unions,women, and farmers, were conducted only inlimited numbers and in ways that would notoffend the government. Nevertheless, throughits activities FES engaged its partners indialogues on democracy, and thus indirectlyprepared civil society actors for the time afterSuharto.

2. The FES Framework in InternationalDevelopment Cooperation


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After the fall of Suharto Indonesia’s civilsociety mushroomed, causing FES’s partnerspectrum to grow tremendously. To respondto the demands from Indonesian civil society,human rights, democratization, independentmedia, free trade unionism, and electoralreform became the major topics of FES after1998. The post-1998 era also opened uppossibilities for programs in the domain ofconflict resolution.

The sections below consist of adescription of FES’s and its partners’ activitiesduring the reform era and the challenges theyface. They conclude with some lessonslearned about democracy promotion inIndonesia.

A s a social democratic politicalfoundation historically close to thetrade union movement in Germany,

one of the missions of FES is to support freetrade union work. FES carries the explicitmandate of the German Confederation ofTrade Unions (DGB) to represent the Germantrade union movement overseas. This missionis implemented in almost all countries in whichFES is currently operating, includingIndonesia. The program with trade unionsstarted as early as 1969 with the BINAKOPproject in North Sumatra in which FESassisted in the establishment of trade unionsamong rural laborers.

The political context in Indonesia duringthe New Order was very much against freetrade unionism. For example, General AliMortopo explained in 1971 that “the distinctionbetween workers and employers must go; onlyone class will remain, namely that of thekaryawan.”1 The harmonious relationshipbetween workers and employers was definedby so-called Pancasila2 industrial relations,which compared industrial relations to familyrelations in which the state assumed the roleof father to both capital and labor. This doctrinedoes not recognize the right to strike becausestrikes would be against the Pancasila way ofconflict resolution that relied on mutualconsultations. Especially in conflicts that

3. The Traditional Scope of FES:Trade Union Support

1 Karyawan means “employee.” This terminology blurs therelationship between the working class and the bourgeoisie asused in Marxist terminology and was preferred by the statebecause it was believed to soften the opposition of workerstowards the government.

2 The basic philosophy of the Indonesian state consisting offive principles, namely: belief in God, humanitarianism,nationalism, democracy, and social justice.


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Semiloka Promosi Gagasan dan Pendalaman PemikiranSosial Demokrasi Bagi Kaum Muda Indonesia di Jakarta

involved foreign investors the governmentalways opted to support the entrepreneurs.However, trade unionism has changed afterthe Reform.

The context of trade union work after1998 was influenced not only by the increasingpolitical freedom, but also by the Asianeconomic crisis. Therefore, FES applied threedifferent strategies to deal with thesecircumstances. First, it was necessary toimprove relations between the Indonesian andthe international trade union movements. Thisstep was necessary to improve the bargainingposition of Indonesian trade unionists, as wellas to share some lessons learned from theirmore established international counterparts.Second, democratic trade unions needed toconsider the interests of all members equally,and because the interests of women tend tobe underrepresented it was necessary toimprove the representation of women withintrade unions. To address the shortcomingswith regard to women’s representation, FESheld workshops about how women couldpresent their interests more effectively. Third,the organizational capacity of trade unionsneeded to be improved so that they couldbecome an independent, democratic, andeffective representation of working people. Inorder to achieve these goals FES conductedworkshops, trainings, and seminars.

Consolidation was and remains one ofthe weaknesses of Indonesian trade unions.Splits within trade unions due to the personalinterests of the leadership significantly reducetheir bargaining position towards governmentand employers. Therefore, FES sought topush consolidation by supporting theintegration of trade unions into federations.

Another aspect that needed to beconsidered was the creation of opportunitiesfor companies to outsource their productionto developing countries in order to reduce theirproduction costs. However, as is often thecase, companies often apply different socialstandards in their home countries than in

others. Therefore, FES supported moves bytrade unions and NGOs to monitor andimplement labor standards in companies inthe textile and shoe industries that supplyGerman buyers such as Adidas and Karstadt/Quelle. In 2003, FES started the program onmonitoring Codes of Conduct (CoC) that largeGerman buyers have adopted for themselvesto safeguard workers’ rights and a decent levelof social standards for workers in theirsupplying factories in Indonesia. Basically,FES efforts on CoC can be classified into twosorts of activities. First, the socialization of CoCthat is conducted by the CoC Network – anetwork that consists of trade unionists fromvarious federations – in different areas inIndonesia. The socialization of CoC has thepurpose of raising workers’ awareness of theirrights and providing them with comparativeknowledge about workers’ rights in Germany.Second, FES organized surveys of factoriesin Indonesia that supply German companies.These surveys were initially conducted withthe help of German trade unionists and theGerman NGO Suedwind e.V., and have thefunction of informing German consumersabout whether or not German companiesensure good social standards in their supplychains in Indonesia. At least half of theparticipating trade unionists reported thatintroduction of the CoC and informationprovided to German consumers about workingconditions in Indonesia has helped them toargue plausibly and convincingly for theimplementation of better working conditions.

Despite the obvious successes, severalchallenges remain in strengthening tradeunion work in Indonesia. Splits within tradeunions and low women’s representation inleadership positions remain. Efforts to gender-mainstream trade union programs often collidewith the traditional culture that prefers menas leaders. This development is disappointing,particularly in view of the fact that women paytheir dues more regularly than men.


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The contest for influence between tradeunions and labor NGOs is also not beneficialfor workers. Labor NGOs are more concernedabout the socialization of norms and tend toact across social groups, while trade unionsare concerned with improving the workingsituation of their members through training inlabor law and improving members’ bargainingtechniques. Though these different functionscan reinforce each other, NGOs and tradeunions often compete for influence.International organizations such as FES areable to provide technical support and improvenetworking between local and internationalactors, yet success in improving workingconditions in Indonesia still largely dependson the efforts of domestic trade unionists tosolve their own differences and developgreater solidarity.

I n the past, before the beginning ofReformasi, the Indonesian state oftenresorted to coercion when dealing with

conflicts. FES and its partner organizationstried to address this problematic approach andhelp to shift the focus of attention to the moreunderlying causes of conflicts, such as the lackof political representation, as well as theunequal economic distribution between thecapital city and the provinces. In a country thatexperiences a democratic transition such asIndonesia, programs on conflict prevention arecrucial because formerly strong stateinstitutions experience significant changesand can no longer legitimately resort tocoercion as easily as during the authoritarianregime. At the same time, democraticinstitutions that ensure peaceful conflictresolution mechanisms are not yet fullyembedded. During the transition periodconflicts from Aceh to Papua destabilizedIndonesia’s political situation. FES, togetherwith IDE, IPCOS, PPRP, and YLBHI, tried todevelop and socialize mechanisms forpeaceful conflict resolution. The work of PPRPin the Moluccas realized clear successesbecause the conflict could be settled bypeaceful mediation.

FES also contributed to conflict resolutionon the international level. In 2003 theFoundation organized a conference, togetherwith the West Papua Network and WatchIndonesia!, on the special autonomy in Papuainitiated by MPR Decree No. IV/1999 whichpromises Special Autonomy to Papua andpledges legal measures to address humanrights violations. Although Special Autonomyin Papua has still not been settled, the

4. Expanding Programs into NewTerritories: Security Sector Reform(SSR) and Conflict Prevention


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Dialog langsung dengan masyarakat lokal.

conference directed international attentiontowards Papua. The results of the seminarwere publicized in a book titled Autonomy forPapua: Opportunity or Illusion?

Security Sector Reform was anotherimportant pillar in the process of reformasi andled to the implementation of supportiveprograms by FES in Indonesia. Since theReform the military’s political privileges havebeen reduced: for example, they no longerhave a seat in the parliament; Indonesia nowhas a civilian Minister of Defense; and themilitary budget is determined by civilians inthe parliament. In addition, MPR Decree No.VI/MPR/2000 stipulates a clear separation offunctions between the military and the policeforce. The military in the reform era shouldfocus on external defense, while the policeshould be responsible for domestic security.However, when FES started its SSR-relatedactivities in 2000 the military maintained itsinfluence in Indonesia, especially through itsterritorial command structure which enabledit to conduct business in the provinces andpreserved its influence within local politics.

In German development cooperation andforeign affairs, security sector reform at thattime was still in the very early stages and nothigh on the political agenda. Therefore FESfirst had to create awareness of the necessityof supporting security sector reform inIndonesia and organized a series of seminarsin Berlin about the importance of involving theIndonesian military in the democratic transitionprocess. This step was – and still is – regardedas crucial if in the future the military is to beunder better civilian democratic oversight.After the workshop, the German governmentrealized that assisting Indonesia in improvingits democratic oversight of the military wascrucial for the success of the country’sdemocratic transition. Moreover, Germanycould share some of the lessons it learned inestablishing the civil oversight of the militaryinitiated after the Second World War toprevent military dominance.

This series of workshops led to theapproval of the FES SSR program that wasinitiated in Indonesia in 2001 with a focus oncivil–military relations. It was necessary todiscuss how a democratic country conductsoversight and control over its military. Tostrengthen the discourse of civilian oversight,FES invited Professor Thomas Meyer from theUniversity of Dortmund to hold a debate onthe rule of law, governance, and democracywith the National Resilience Institute(LEMHANNAS), a government think tanktasked with providing the President withrecommendations and analyses on securityissues. The cooperation with LEMHANNASprovided FES with the credibility to work withother government institutions in the securityfield.

Another military reform concerned thetakeover of military businesses by the state,which is stipulated by Article 76 of Law No.34/2004. This is an effort to improve statecontrol over its military apparatus. The RIDePInstitute in cooperation with FES hasconducted research in many provinces inIndonesia on military businesses. The resultsof the research were presented to governmentagencies and to the parliament to completethe government data on military businesses.The goal of this research is to assist the statein taking over as many military businesses aspossible in 2009, regardless of whether theyare large corporations or small companies.

Additionally, reform of the territorialcommand structures which is stipulated byArticle 11 of Law No. 34/2006 is also not yetfully implemented. To promote reform in thisfield FES cooperates with LESPERSSI indiscussing the effectiveness of territorialstructures in the provinces by involving localgovernment officials, the TNI, NGOs, andacademia. The forum provided byLESPERSSI has the benefit of bringing allactors together and thus was able to create aholistic understanding of the effects of theterritorial command structure.


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Recommendations based on thesediscussions were handed to the Departmentof Defense in 2006.

FES and its partners also dealt with othersecurity apparatus, such as the police andintelligence. A publication also produced incooperation with the RIDeP Institutediscussed, for example, the importance ofreform within the police force.

Cooperation with the university-basedthink tank PACIVIS was conducted in the fieldof intelligence reform. During the New Order,the intelligence service was fully utilized fordefending state interest, and civilian oversightwas all but impossible, not least because ofthe lack of an intelligence bill. Against thisinsufficient legal background it was especiallydifficult to prevent and prosecute thesignificant human rights violations committedby the intelligence during that period. Theactivity with PACIVIS has produced twopublications intended to improve theunderstanding of democratic oversight of theintelligence. The events with PACIVIS alsostrengthened the coalition of civil societyactors concerned with intelligence which isunder the coordination of this think tank.

Activities in the field of SSR advancedsignificantly in 2004 when the Germangovernment (at that time a coalition of theGerman Social Democratic Party and theGreen Party) decided to boost its efforts incivil crisis prevention. The correspondingaction plan on “Civilian Crisis Prevention,Conflict Resolution and Peace Consolidation”listed security sector reform abroad as onecrucial aspect of civil crisis prevention andsignificant amounts of money have beenearmarked since then for the support of SSR.As an interdepartmental initiative, involvingdifferent ministries, the lead lies with theGerman Federal Foreign Office. Indonesiawas even chosen to be a model lighthousepartner country for the support of securitysector reform. From this program, the Germangovernment provided funds to the Geneva

Center for the Democratic Control of ArmedForces (DCAF). DCAF is a Swiss-basedinternational organization whose constituentsare 49 governments, including Indonesia andGermany, and which specializes in SSR, withexperience of working mainly in Eastern Europeand Africa. The Organization has at its disposala vast network of experts consisting ofacademics, government officials, andmembers of parliament who are able to providebest practices of SSR from around the world.DCAF has chosen FES as its implementingpartner organization in Indonesia. With thiscooperation and the additional resourcesprovided by DCAF, FES has been able tobroaden the scope of its SSR programs.

The biggest challenge for SSR programsin Indonesia is the currently decreasingattention paid to SSR by donors. Many donorsconsider the SSR process to be completed,assuming that civilian supremacy over themilitary is already established. FES is one ofthe remaining organizations continuing itswork in this domain, arguing that the SSRprocess is not yet over. Some importantchallenges still need to be addressed. Oneimportant domain in this regard is thestrengthening and deepening of theparliament’s capacity to meet the challengesof legislative oversight over the security forces.The recent timely and reasonable expansionof parliamentary support staff for Commission1, which is concerned with these issues,provides a good opportunity for FES tocontinue and extend its efforts in the facilitationof capacity-building in this domain. Civil societyactors that specialize in SSR are also stilllimited in number. Despite their significantcontribution in terms of draft laws or researchthe impact of their work depends on thepolitical situation, which at the moment isunlikely to move beyond the status quo. SSRis also of secondary interest for the mediathese days. Natural disasters, corruption, orviolent crime tend to be more compelling topicsto cover. The only thing that FES could do to


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cope with this lack of interest is to keepjournalists informed about developments inSSR. Without continued attention to SSRissues, the ongoing reform process in thesecurity sector would lack a valuable andsubstantive source of constructive feedback.Therefore, it is crucial that, despite all thechallenges, FES continues its work in keepingthe SSR discourse in the public sphere. A fter the fall of Suharto new

opportunities arose for civil societyto play a central role in Indonesian

democracy, and topics that were consideredas taboo under Suharto – such as how toaddress human rights violations, how to makepolitical parties more accountable, and howto implement decentralization – could bediscussed. For instance, FES instigated adiscussion on Indonesia’s decentralization,referring to Germany’s federal system as anexample. On this basis FES tried to promotea more equal political and economicdistribution between the central governmentand the provinces.

Moreover, in order to cope with thechallenges of the Reform era, in 1998 FESinvited Professor Amien Rais, at that timeleader of the National Mandate Party (PAN),together with six NGO representatives, toGermany to explain the course of the newreform movement to the FES leadership andMembers of Parliament. The meeting providedinput concerning how FES in particular andGerman cooperation in general couldcontribute to dealing constructively with thechallenges and opportunities of post-SuhartoIndonesia.

The general framework for assisting thereform movement was defined in two of threeFES objectives, namely to contribute to theconsolidation of the democratization processand to support the reform movement so thatit can become a determining element inpolitics, economics, and society. These twoobjectives, embedded in FES’s 1998 annualplanning, were especially devoted to

5. Democracy Promotion since 2006:From Human Rights, the Rule of Law,and Electoral Reform to BuildingStructures for Social DemocraticPolicy Making


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addressing democracy promotion at that timeand provided a framework for projects tosupport human rights, the rule of law, andelectoral reform.

In 2000, FES organized a seminar withthe youth branch of PAN and a seminar withthe National Awakening Party (PKB) aboutopenness and pluralism inside political parties.It is important to note that cooperationbetween FES and political parties in Indonesiais subject to certain crucial restrictions. Sowhile the activities conducted by FES, suchas seminars and trainings, are permissible,international organizations in general and FESin particular should not be involved insupporting institutional costs, electioncampaigns, or day-to-day internal partyactivities.

All in all, the activities of FES havefocused on improving the “formal aspect ofdemocracy” in Indonesia. However, reformhas not progressed as far as many peoplehoped it would. Suharto’s children are still inpossession of their businesses, and corruptionis still too often taken for granted in manyareas. In other words, despite the fact thatthe political reform after the New Order hasbrought political freedom, social and economicreform have not been properly conducted. Inrecognition of this problem and in order toaddress these democratic shortcomings, FESrealized that it needs to fine-tune its strategy.

In today’s Indonesia democraticassistance by international organizations ingeneral can be categorized into supportingthe electoral process (for example, assistingin free and fair elections, and contributing tothe creation of strong and democratic politicalparties), supporting state institutions (acompetent legislature or a military underdemocratic oversight), and supporting civilsociety (for instance, strong trade unions,independent media, and active NGOs). AllFES work falls into this scheme. However, inits democracy promotion program FES

recently decided to focus more intensively onthe promotion of social democracy, in line withthe Foundation’s spirit. This new approach hasbeen applied since 2006 and implementedthrough programs on social and economicreform and programs of political relevance forsocial democratic actors. Since 2007 FES hasbeen supporting a network of social democraticmovements. One avenue of support is the newquarterly Jurnal Demokrasi Sosial thatorganizes discussions and is edited by a teamconsisting of activists and academics withsocial democratic values.

Another pillar of democracy promotionis support for free and independent media.Press freedom enjoyed widely after the reformera still faces further challenges which derivemainly from the media themselves. First,instead of focusing on the provision ofaccurate information to the public, manymedia companies are simply established toreap profits. This leads to insufficient salariesfor journalists, resulting in a culture of briberythat influences the accuracy and objectivityof the news being reported. Second,journalists in Indonesia come from variousbackgrounds, not necessarily related tojournalism. Especially in the provincesjournalistic skills such as reporting andinvestigating are still insufficient. These twoissues need to be dealt with becauseotherwise it might reduce media credibility inthe long run.

FES deals with these two issues inparallel. It addresses the low salaries ofjournalists by supporting the Alliance forIndependent Journalists (AJI) that advocatesbetter welfare for journalists, and conductstraining to improve journalistic skills in theprovinces. So far, such trainings have beenconducted in Bali, Aceh, and Papua.


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S ince FES is a social democraticpolitical foundation gendermainstreaming and gender balance

have been implemented at FES headquartersfor a long time and have influenced FESinternal policies, such as recruitmentprocedures: for instance, if a man and awoman apply for a position, and both havethe same qualifications, FES would hire thewoman, as long as underrepresentation ofwomen persists.

Additionally, FES tried to contribute togender balancing and mainstreaming in andvia its offices abroad, and as a result of theFES coordination meeting in Hanoi in October2006, all FES offices worldwide are nowobliged to gender-mainstream their programsin order to enhance gender equity. It isconsidered important to improve the practiceof democracy through a more balancedpolitical representation in society, and toovercome poverty through more equalparticipation of men and women in thedistribution of resources. Gendermainstreaming itself is considered only as atool to achieve gender equality. In its strategy,besides gender mainstreaming, FES usesother tools, namely anti-discrimination andwomen’s empowerment. Overall, FESprograms on gender are based on theimplementation of these three strategies.

It is important to note that gender hasbeen an FES concern since 1995. To name afew examples, FES supported women’sinfluence in trade unions, and tried to informthe public about women’s working conditionsthrough the magazine Halo, which waspublished in cooperation with Bupera in 2001.

FES also supported women committees intrade unions, such as ASPEK, that open uppossibilities for women’s participation.Furthermore, before the election in 2004 FESworked with many NGOs in socializing theimportance of reaching the 30 percentwomen’s quota in parliament, a target that hasnot yet been reached, but is laid down in thelaw concerning the upcoming elections in2009. The representation of women in theHouse of Representatives (DPR) and theRegional Representative Council (DPD)remains off target, at 11 percent and 22percent, respectively.

What is really new since 2006 is the effortto ensure that gender balance and gendermainstreaming are properly achieved andimplemented, not only in Germany but also inall FES programs worldwide. Because thisendeavor has some policy as well asadministrative consequences, FES conducteda training with gender consultants from FESheadquarters for its staffs in Asia in 2006.While in the past the number of men andwomen participants was considered as asufficient indicator of gender balance,nowadays FES program officers also have toconsider how their programs could have anequal impact on men and women. In addition,since 2006 gender analysis is applied indefining the overall objective (Oberziel) andthe project objective (Projektziel) of FESprograms around the world, so that programscan have a gender-balanced impact.

Indonesia has ratified the Convention onthe Elimination of Discrimination againstWomen (CEDAW) through Law No. 7/1984,but so far there have been no clearconsequences for those who contravene thislaw, not least because the complex legal issueis still not sufficiently introduced andappreciated in Indonesian institutions.Research by Jurnal Perempuan, Indonesia’sleading publication on gender issues, showsthat in the provinces the budget for organizingsports competitions at district level is much

6. Securing Gender Balance – GenderMainstreaming of FES Programs


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higher than the budget for women’s education.Moreover, cultural barriers, such as thepreference for sending sons instead ofdaughters to school, make gender equality inIndonesia especially difficult to achieve.However, it must be admitted that to gender-mainstream all programs can be complex.Especially in the SSR program gendermainstreaming still faces some significantchallenges, not least because the number ofwomen engaged in discussions on SSRissues is still limited.

Since 2006, the FES office in Jakarta hasalso had the special responsibility ofcoordinating gender activities in SoutheastAsia with activities involving participants fromall over the region and carried out by differentFES offices. The forums created by FES areintended to share lessons learned betweenthe different countries. For example, a regionalconference in Bangkok in 2007 discussed howto get the women’s quota inserted inlegislation. Participants from Indonesia couldshare how it had been implemented in theircountry with participants from countries thatdo not yet have a women’s quota.

Gender mainstreaming is a top-downapproach and critics have considered it asundemocratic. However, FES realized that inorder to guarantee more equal distribution ofeconomic resources and greater politicalrepresentation for women, gendermainstreaming is crucial.

The conflict in Aceh dates back to 1953and several attempts had been madeto find sustainable solutions for peace.

In recent years the peace process in Aceh hasfailed twice. The first talks, labeled the“Humanitarian Pause,” were conducted in2000 between the government ofAbdurrahman Wahid and the Free AcehMovement (GAM). However, they soon brokedown because they were not accepted by theIndonesian security forces, as well as theGAM, and thus resulted in behavior thatexhibited no trust in the peace process. Thesecond round of talks under the presidencyof Megawati Sukarnoputri was initiated in 2002and resulted in a document widely known asthe Cessation of Hostilities FrameworkAgreement (COHA) that stipulates thedisclosure of GAM “placement sites,” wherethey have concealed their weapons, and the“phased relocation” of TNI forces from Aceh.Nevertheless, because many crucial points inthe COHA – for instance, concerning thecommon understanding of the NAD law (theformer Special Autonomy Law for Aceh) thatwas fundamental to the GAM as starting pointfor the discussions – were unclear, the peacetalks lost their legitimacy and soon the GAMand TNI started accusing each other of majorviolations, causing the peace talks to falter in2003.

Development of the peace process afterthe tsunami was influenced by at least twoimportant factors that have contributed to thecurrent state of peace in Aceh. First, thehuman suffering and international presencein Aceh created an opportunity for the GAMto engage the Indonesian government in

7. The Aceh Experience: FromHumanitarian and Material Assistanceto Peace Building


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dialogue. With the international presence inAceh, it was unlikely that the governmentwould use force against the GAM and risk itsinternational credibility. Moreover, the GAMalso had strong incentives to act peacefullyand not to disrupt the humanitarian assistanceprovided to their fellow Acehnese. Second,President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whowas elected in September 2004, a few monthsbefore the tsunami, and his Vice-PresidentJussuf Kalla were committed to creating peacein Aceh and had initiated secret negotiationsalready before the tsunami struck Aceh.Therefore, the tsunami provided only awindow of opportunity for both the GAM andthe government of Indonesia to resumenegotiations and settle the conflict. In sum,developments in domestic politics bolsteredby international attention stimulated andfacilitated a new approach to conflictsettlement in Aceh. In this political context,FES started its work in Aceh.

FES’s Aceh program started as aresponse to the tsunami that hit thiswesternmost province of Indonesia onDecember 26, 2004. The program started withmodest medical assistance to a humanitarianNGO, the People’s Crisis Center (PCC).

As more funds became available, FEShad the objective of assisting NGOs such asLBH Banda Aceh and KontraS Aceh inrebuilding their offices and of establishing amedia center in cooperation with theAssociation of Independent Journalists inBanda Aceh (AJI Banda Aceh). The objectivewas not only to rebuild the destroyedinfrastructure, but also to strengthen civilsociety so that civil society actors would beable to contribute to and monitor thereconstruction process. Additionally, the TradeUnion Care Center (TUCC)- Banda Aceh wasestablished in cooperation with ASPEK inJakarta to strengthen the still weak trade unionmovement in Aceh. Funds for TUCC wereobtained from the Confederation of GermanTrade Unions (DGB), which was truly

committed to supporting the colleagues inAceh. In short, FES used three sources offunds to kick start its Aceh program: FES’sown budget, private donations, and funds fromDGB. Unlike the typical FES programs on civiceducation, this initial stage of activities in Acehincluded mainly humanitarian and materialassistance, and was conducted with a verylimited budget.

However, the Aceh program soondeveloped into a long-term program of FESIndonesia, ranging from trade union, gender,and security sector reform to democracypromotion and the support of free media.These programs were made possible mainlyby additional funding from Germanyearmarked for post-tsunami support in Aceh.In March 2006 FES started its cooperation withGeRaK and ICW, two anti-corruption NGOs,to monitor the implementation of aid. Byimplementing this program FES assisted notonly the Acehnese, but also the foreign donorswho were interested in knowing how well theirfunds were being spent on the ground.GeRaK’s findings, for instance, includedhouses that were not built according to theinitial plan for which a budget was pledged.

In order to assess the conflict situationin Aceh and plan its future programsaccordingly, FES conducted the Peace andConflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). Thisresearch was conducted with the cooperationof German researchers. One of the landmarksof FES programs in Aceh – democracytraining for former GAM combatants – derivesfrom the recommendations of this study. Itacknowledged that there were insufficientefforts to include the GAM in the peaceprocess on the part of foreign donors.Nonetheless, their involvement in thedevelopment efforts is crucial to prevent futureconflicts. Furthermore, the study also identifiedthat, due to the long duration of the conflict,democracy in Aceh has not yet beensufficiently introduced and popularized.Questions such as the origin of democracy,


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the compatibility of Islam and democracy, andvoters’ rights need to be addressed if a long-term peace based on democratic values andpractices is to be achieved. For this reasondemocracy trainings have to be conducted inorder to tackle this lack of understanding ofdemocratic politics.

FES was one of the first organizationsto include former GAM fighters in theiractivities. The cooperation was conductedthrough an NGO related to the GAM calledthe Association for Peace and DemocracyAceh (PPDA). The Olof Palme InternationalCenter, a Sweden-based organization thatworks on international and security issues,started to cooperate with FES in 2007 insupporting democracy trainings. Teachingmaterials include the theoretical aspects ofdemocracy, such as the role of political partiesin a democracy, as well as practical skills suchas time management, moderation,presentation, and leadership, as well asteamwork and communication. The trainingsare meant for trainers who are supposed topass on the knowledge to others in their areas.In 2007, the trainings included around 500participants from various districts in Aceh.

Based on the Helsinki MoU signedbetween the GAM and the Government ofIndonesia, the way in which Aceh should begoverned in the future should be based onthe Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) which willreplace the Special Autonomy Law for Acehimplemented since 2001. This law was passedby parliament on July 11, 2006, and stipulatesamong other things how independentcandidates could run for local executivepositions. FES assisted in socializing this newlaw and provided, in cooperation with theNGOs DEMOS and IPCOS, capacity-buildingrelated to how civil society could demand moretransparency and accountability from theirlocal governments.

One of the remaining challenges for Acehis the issue of how the province shouldcontinue its development once foreign aid is

no longer available; also, it remains to be seenhow gender equality and other aspects whichare considered as “Western” can come to bewidely accepted by Acehnese society.Furthermore, in comparison to post-tsunamiAceh in 2005 international attention has fallenaway dramatically. Whether with the SyariahLaw Aceh will be able to attract foreigninvestment is another issue to be solved.However, so far the case of Aceh can beconsidered as one of the most successfulstories of peaceful conflict resolution bothdomestically and internationally.


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This last section discusses FES strategyin implementing its projects inIndonesia. Overall, this strategy is a

result of FES’s working ethos and objectives,the Indonesian political environment andculture, the available budget, and the office’sadministrative capacity.

Bridging Different Levels of Interests inDevelopment Cooperation

Mutual consultations among all partiesare of the utmost importance in developmentcooperation. Otherwise, foreign organizationscan easily be accused of having a “hiddenagenda,” using development mechanisms topromote their own purposes. Experiencesfrom the Cold War era when developedcountries utilized development cooperationsimply to achieve their own political goalsremain a problem, and the question of whyinternational organizations such as FES arewilling to spend public funds in other countriesfor “good purposes” still linger in nationalistcircles. Therefore, it is critical to confirm thecooperative character of developmentsupport, meaning that the mutual interests ofall parties are accounted for. In the era ofglobalization turmoil in one country can leadto turmoil in other countries, while on the otherhand opportunities in one country can alsobecome opportunities for other countries.

It is clear that developed countries wantto achieve certain objectives with the publicfunds they provide to organizations such asFES which are engaged in internationaldevelopment cooperation. There are practicalas well as idealist motivations. First, developed

countries consider it important that developingcountries share certain core values which arecrucial with regard to democracy and humanrights. It is widely believed that countries withdemocratic values and systems tend not togo to war with each other, and thus bettercooperation can be achieved. Second, it is inthe interest of donor countries to ensure thatuniversal rights are achieved not only withintheir own borders, but also in other countries.This is the rationale behind programs thatsupport human rights, or programs thatsupport the socialization of ratifiedinternational conventions such as theCEDAW. Third, development cooperation isconducted according to demands andpriorities of the corresponding organization’sdomestic constituency. For example, FESsupport of the trade union movement inIndonesia derives from the solidarity ofGerman trade unions with trade unionmovements in Indonesia and worldwide.

At the same time, local partners havetheir own interests that they want to achievethrough cooperation with foreignorganizations. Instead of being theimplementers of foreign objectives, localorganizations try to identify common goals andopportunities to achieve their own interests.In considering their cooperation with a foreignactor, funds are not the only consideration.Local organizations also consider how muchcontrol their international partners require, andthe possibility of mission drift. The interests oflocal organizations are as follows. First, theycan gain financial support for their activities.In Indonesia, it is still very seldom the casethat NGOs can fund their programs throughdomestic sources, thus reliance oninternational support is still substantial.Second, local partners can gain access tointernational resources and thus improve theirnetwork of advocacy abroad. Networking hasalways been a motivation for attendinginternational conferences and forums. Third,local organizations can learn the management

8. Lessons Learned from SupportingIndonesia’s Democratic Transition


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systems of their international partners and soimprove their own internal management.

In the course of its work in Indonesia FESmust consider how to cope with these differentinterests. The overall development objectivesfor every country, the Oberziele, are redefinedevery three years. These redefinitions takeplace in close coordination between theDepartment for International DevelopmentCooperation at FES headquarters and eachResident Country Director. FES can haveseveral Oberziele that determine theframework of its projects in Indonesia. The roleof the FES Resident Director is crucial inensuring that discussions with partnerorganizations and the priorities of the hostcountry are reflected in the overall objective.The overall development goal is a broad target– for example, “the democratization processis consolidated” – and its achievement issupported by many project objectives. Inaddition, projects should always operate withinthe framework provided by FES headquartersfor the Foundation’s international activities,namely the promotion of democracy, socialjustice, and international cooperation.

This consultation mechanism bridges thegoals of FES and its local partners. To ensuretheir ownership of the project FES encouragesits partners to develop and adapt their ownstrategies in achieving the goals which arejointly decided upon. Very seldom do the FESResident Director or Program Officersintervene in partners’ strategies. Usuallyadjustments are made only on the basis offinancial and administrative considerations.

Creating Trust with State and Non-StateActors

FES needs to work with civil society aswell as government actors for at least tworeasons. First, its purpose of facilitating mutualunderstanding cannot be achieved without theinvolvement of different actors. Without allparties coming to the table it would be

impossible to obtain a holistic understandingof an issue. A complete understanding can beachieved only by reflecting different points ofview, and thus the involvement of differentparties is imperative. Second, working withsome government agencies can increase theFoundation’s credibility when dealing withother government agencies that are notfamiliar with the work of a foreign organizationthat cooperates with Indonesian civil society.They often assume that foreign developmentagencies could undermine Indonesia’snational interest, namely the country’s security.FES is widely known among the Departmentsof Manpower and Foreign Affairs, and theNational Resilience Institute. FES’s reputationis also well known among civil society actors.Thus, it is usually relatively easy to cooperatewith NGOs, even those not familiar with FES’swork. However, the Foundation’s work andreputation are widely unfamiliar to stateapparatuses in the provinces, such as theIndonesian military (TNI) working in territorialcommands in Indonesia.

Some of the middle ranking officersinvited to participate in discussions so far havehad little exposure to foreign cooperation andare sometimes skeptical of the role offoreigners in democracy promotion. To gaintheir trust FES is applying a two-prongedapproach. First, the Foundation works withlocal partner organizations which are wellconnected among policy circles in Jakarta.Members of these organizations come fromacademia or NGOs and have developed areputation among the military for theirexpertise, and are often requested to provideinput to the Department of Defense. By thismeans it is often possible to involve thesecurity forces themselves, even in publicevents at which their concerns andreservations can be addressed and eased inthe course of constructive discussions. In thatway, cooperation with international actorsbecomes a more common and less suspectthing. There are numerous forms of bilateral


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cooperation today, and cooperation with non-state actors can be compared to cooperationwith state actors. Second, FES can establishits credentials by explaining its cooperationwith government institutions such as theNational Resilience Institute or the Departmentof Manpower. Reference to activities thatinvolve members of parliament or in whichFES facilitates a forum between governmentofficials in Indonesia and Germany can alsobe useful. Having the backing of the Germangovernment in its work is therefore beneficialfor FES. Third, especially in the field ofsecurity, program officers are often accusedof “selling out” their country to foreigners byproviding sensitive information. Therefore, itis important to assure all concerned actors andinstitutions that the information made availablethrough FES work, such as research, isdelivered publicly to interested domestic aswell as international constituents, and thatthere is no information that is secretly usedfor purposes that could endanger Indonesiannational security.

Another important domain of possiblemisunderstanding is rooted in FES’s identity,namely social democracy. This politicalorientation is often misunderstood assomething close to the ideology ofCommunism, and thus is sometimesconsidered as a potential threat.Remembering the conflict between the NewOrder government and the Communist Party(PKI) in the past, this suspicion isunderstandable, even though SocialDemocracy and Communism in fact aremutually exclusive concepts. Therefore,whenever necessary this fundamentaldifference needs to be explained in order toavoid history and culture basedmisunderstandings.

One means of avoiding these and othermisunderstandings is the transparentconception of FES activities. Therefore, atimely report on annual activities to the StateSecretariat (Setneg), which functions as the

umbrella partner organization for all Germanpolitical foundations in Indonesia, is one ofthe most important requirements that theFoundation has to comply with. All activitiesand their impacts have to be explained indetail. Providing comprehensive informationabout FES activities prevents the developmentof distrust among state institutions.


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FES Indonesia all staf.

In ten years of Reformasi in Indonesia, FEShas achieved results that are both tangibleand intangible. Some of the tangible

results are plain, such as the establishmentof new organizations, publications, and draftlaws.

Nevertheless, working in the field ofdemocracy promotion, FES’s most importantachievements are rather intangible. Theproblem with these intangible results is notonly that they are not visible, but also thatmany other factors, such as the activitiesconducted by other organizations anddomestic political progress, contribute to them.Moreover, some people tend to see theachievements of a program only in terms ofits concrete and final results. For instance, aprogram on gender balance in the parliamentis considered to be successful only if thetargeted women’s quota is achieved. However,in democracy promotion it is not just the finalresult that matters, but rather how the programcontributes to the process as a whole. This isimportant because some of the impacts of aprogram can be observed only with thepassage of time. But it can already be statedthat the activities of FES and otherorganizations in democracy promotion havedefinitely made some modest contributions tothe successful process of democracy inIndonesia.

The abovementioned problems can beovercome by looking at three different typesof achievement. The first is creatingawareness of a certain issue. When a newidea of democratic universal value becomesa need for certain groups, this can already beconsidered as an achievement, despite the

fact that a more concrete final goal has notyet been achieved. For example, in Indonesiagender balance is now a topic of seriousdiscussion. Though the 30 percent quota hasnot yet been reached, this can already beconsidered as a success on the part of thegroups involved in the process.

Through its programs FES hascontributed significantly to the understandingand spread of democratic values. Books onthe role of the military in a democracy, or onhow democratic political parties should bemanaged, as well as other publications andseminars, have undoubtedly contributed to thedevelopment of democratic discourse inIndonesia, which is as important as theestablishment of formal democraticinstitutions.

The second type of achievement is thedelivery of targeted output. A draft law createdthrough an FGD is already an achievement,even though the final version passed by theparliament might include only a few points fromthis draft law. FES work also has contributedto the socialization of internationalconventions such as the CEDAW, and locallaws such as the LoGA. This work is importantto ensure that what has been achieved in thelegal domain at both the international and thedomestic levels is put into practice.

The third type of achievement is anactivity’s concrete positive impact. Indevelopment cooperation it can be argued thatthis is the most difficult kind of achievement.However, international organizations mustensure that they not only produce certain“outcomes” but also have a visible andsustainable impact such as the creation of atrade union network in Aceh for the first time.

In general, FES contributions toIndonesia within the last ten years can becategorized as follows:

9. Achievements


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Tangible Achievements

Publications on social democracy, tradeunion issues, conflict studies, mediafreedom, security sector reform, localgovernance, and gender.The establishment of the Trade Union CareCenter in Banda Aceh that consolidatestrade unions in Aceh province.Delivery of draft laws in the fields of laborand security sector reform. These draft lawsare made available through the contributionof FES’s local partner organizations. Draftlaws are presented to certain commissionsin the House of Parliament or governmentagencies, or are distributed to universitiesand think tanks to stimulate furtherdiscussions.

Intangible Achievements

Establishing a network among socialdemocratic actors through seminars andfocus group discussions.Training for trainers which enhances theskills and knowledge of participantsconcerning how to contribute to democraticgovernance.Building awareness of universal democraticvalues through its publications, seminars,and workshops.Contributing to peaceful conflict resolutionmechanisms through dialogue.Improving journalists’ reporting andinvestigating skills.Providing a forum of interaction for stateand non-state actors.Sharing of Indonesian and internationallessons with other countries throughparticipation in international forums.Improving mutual understanding betweenIndonesia and Germany.

The ten years after the Reform constituteonly a short period of time. Nevertheless, theReform opened up new possibilities for

cooperation, and these possibilities have ledto significant results, which are documentedwithin these pages. Hopefully this report isable to capture the spirit and achievementsof FES in Indonesia, and at the same timeresponds to some unanswered questionsabout the Foundation’s strategies, funding,and relations to the various actors ofdemocracy.

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Annex Abbrevations

AA : Auswaertiges Amt (German FederalForeign Office)AJI : Aliansi Jurnalis IndependenASPEK : Asosiasi PekerjaBINAKOP : Pembinaan KoperasiBMZ : Bundesministerium fürwirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit undEntwicklung (German Ministry forEconomic Cooperation and DevelopmentCEDAW : Convention on the Elimination ofDiscrimination Against WomenCOHA : Cessation of Hostilities FrameworkAgreementCoC : Code of ConductDCAF : Geneva Centre for the DemocraticControl of Armed ForcesDEMOS : Lembaga Kajian Demokrasi danHak Asasi ( Center for Democracy andHuman Right Studies)DGB : Deutscher GewerkschaftsbundDPD : Dewan Perwakilan DaerahDPR : Dewan Perwakilan RakyatFES : Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungFGD : Focus Group DiscussionGAM : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – The FreeAceh MovementGeRaK : Gerakan Anti Korupsi (NGO inAceh – Anti Corruption Movement)GoI : Government of IndonesiaICW : NGO- Indonesian Corruption WatchIDE : Indonesian Institute for DemocracyEducationIPCOS : Institute for Policy and CommunityDevelopment StudiesLBH : Lembaga Bantuan Hukum – LegalAid Institution)LEMHANNAS : (Lembaga KetahananNasional- National Resilience Institute)LESPERSSI : (Lembaga Studi Pertahanan

dan Studi Strategis IndonesiaLoGA : Law on Governing of AcehSetneg : Sekretariat Negara (StateSecretary)MoU : Momorandum of UnderstandingMPR : (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat –People’s ConsultativeNAD : Nanggroe Aceh DarussalamNATO : North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGO : Nongovernmental OrganisationPACIVIS : Center for Global Civil SocietyStudiesPAN : Partai Amanat NasionalPKB : Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa ( NationAwakening Party ?)PCC : People’s Crisis CentrePCIA : Peace and Conflict ImpactAssessmentPPDA : Perhimpunan Perdamaian danDemokrasi AcehPPRP : Pusat Pemberdayaan untukRekonsiliasi dan Perdamaian (Centre forEmpowerment of Peace andReconciliation)PKI : Partai Komunis Indonesia ( TheIndonesia Communist Party)RIDeP : Research Institute for Democracyand PeaceSWP : Stiftung Wissenschaft und PolitikSPD : Sozialdemokratische ParteiDeutschlands (German SocialdemocraticParty)SSR : Security Sector ReformTNI : Tentara Nasional Indonesia(Indonesian National Military)TUCC : Trade Union Care CentreYLBHI : Yayasan Lembaga BnatuanHukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal AidFoundation)


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