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Sudan and the Not SoComprehensive PeaceGareth Curless a & Annemarie Peen Rodt ba Department of History , University of Exeterb Roskilde University , DenmarkPublished online: 25 Aug 2013.

To cite this article: Gareth Curless & Annemarie Peen Rodt (2013) Sudan and the Not SoComprehensive Peace, Civil Wars, 15:2, 101-117, DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2013.817844

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Sudan and the Not So Comprehensive Peace

GARETH CURLESS AND ANNEMARIE PEEN RODT

This special section examines the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement/Army. It focuses on why the agreement was possible, the

challenges involved in reaching and implementing it, and the issues that now

lay ahead for both North and South Sudan. The purpose of this undertaking is

to tease out what lessons might be learnt from this case for the future study and

practice of seeking to settle civil wars through agreement and implementation

of conflict settlements. This introductory article first provides a brief

summary of the Sudanese civil war; it then examines the CPA’s power and

wealth-sharing arrangements and their implementation to date; and finally

concludes with an analysis of statebuilding in the recently independent

South Sudan.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2011, the people of southern Sudan voted in favour of the South seceding

from the North and becoming an independent state. The referendum marked the

culmination of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA, signed on

9 January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GoS), led by

the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and the primary opposition group in the

South, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), brought to an

end more than two decades of civil war in Sudan (1983–2005). With the creation of

the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan

(GoSS), the CPA provided a formula for a power-sharing partnership between the

NCP and the SPLM/A. Key features of the CPA included: the sharing of oil revenues

between the GoNU and the GoSS; the demarcation of the North–South border and

the completion of a national census, national elections and a referendum on the

issue of southern secession. In short, over a 6-year interim period, the CPA was

designed to achieve a more equitable division of political and economic power

in the hope that the southern Sudanese would vote for unity and not separation of

the country.1

On the eve of the referendum, however, much of the optimism that had

accompanied the signing of the CPA had dissipated. It had been hoped that the

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Vol. 15, No. 2, 101–117, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2013.817844

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resolution of the North–South conflict would provide political space that could then

be expanded to incorporate Sudan’s other marginalised regions: Darfur and eastern

Sudan. However, the exclusive nature of the CPA negotiations contributed, in part,

to an escalation of violence in Darfur and eastern Sudan, thereby threatening to

undermine the fragile North–South peace.2 Moreover, since 2005, a series of

disputes between the NCP and the SPLM/A threatened to derail the peace process

entirely. Disagreements over the demarcation of the North–South border, revenue

sharing and the census slowed the implementation of the CPA, eroding trust and

heightening tensions between the two parties. As Edward Thomas argues, the

fractious nature of the NCP–SPLM/A relationship, together with the slow

implementation of the CPA, meant that as the referendum drew closer all but a few

southerners expected independence and many northerners were ‘resigned to or even

supportive of’, separation as well.3 The failure of the NCP and the SPLM/A ‘to make

unity attractive’ during the CPA period was reflected in the referendum results,

when 98 per cent of those southern Sudanese who participated in the referendum

voted in favour of secession.4

South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 and now the NCP and

the SPLM/A must resolve a number of complex post-referendum issues – many of

which remain unresolved from the CPA period. These include the status of Abyei

and the demarcation of the North–South border, numerous constitutional issues

relating to citizenship and nationality, arrangements for the sharing of oil revenues

and the division of national assets and debts. Since June 2010 the NCP and the

SPLM/A have been engaged in post-referendum talks, mediated by the African

Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan, in an attempt to reach

a negotiated settlement.5 In September 2012, the two parties reached agreements

on a number of post-referendum issues, including border demarcation and the

sharing of oil revenues, but, as of March 2013, these agreements remain

unimplemented. As a result, NCP–SPLM/A relations remain tense and ongoing

violence along the North–South border has undermined the negotiations, with both

parties accusing each other of instigating localised conflict in order to destabilise

the talks.6

Apart from these North–South issues, both the NCP and the SPLM/A must

confront a range of internal issues. In the South, a region where even the most basic

infrastructure is lacking, political division and inter-ethnic violence threaten to

destabilise the nascent state.7 The North, with most of Sudan’s proven oil reserves in

the South, faces an uncertain economic future unless the NCP can succeed in its

attempt to create a broad-based economy by utilising the country’s considerable

hydro-agricultural resources. The NCP must also address a number of other

challenges. Ongoing conflict in the border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile

between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and a coalition of rebel groups, including

the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the SPLM-North, has contributed to

further North–South tensions. The North is also politically divided. Some pro-

secession groups such as the Forum for Just Peace, a group of Islamists linked to the

Khartoum-based newspaper, al-Intibaha, welcomed the South’s secession,

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regarding it as an opportunity to consolidate Sudan’s status as an Arab and Islamic

state. However, opposition groups, such as the youth-led movement Girifna (We’re

Fed Up), are demanding political reforms and a negotiated settlement to Sudan’s

remaining conflicts.8

STRUCTURE OF SPECIAL SECTION

Using Sudan as an informative case study, this Special Section makes a significant

contribution to the literature on peace-making and peace-building as well as that on

conflict settlement and resolution by examining the negotiation and implementation of

the CPA. Critics of the liberal peace agenda have questioned the transformative

potential of negotiated civil war settlements, arguing that such agreements often serve

to perpetuate the conditions that permit elites to continue exploiting existing political

and economic structures for personal gain. However, as the contributions to this Special

Section demonstrate, in the Sudanese case the CPA offered its signatory parties – the

NCP and the SPLM/A – considerable transformative potential. For the NCP, the CPA

was part of a broader strategy which aimed to bring stability to Sudan in order to

consolidate its power and redeploy political and economic resources for the regime’s

ambitious development projects. For the SPLM/A, the CPApresented the possibility of

realising the South’s historic objective of establishing an independent state. These

competing visions for the CPA contributed to tensions between the NCP and SPLM/A,

undermined efforts to achieve a more equitable division of economic and political

power in Sudan, and ultimately resulted in failure of the agreement and the secession of

the South, thus bringing change rather than continuity.

This contribution sets the stage for the rest of the Special Section through a brief

analysis of the civil war and the provisions of the peace the CPA brought about. Harry

Verhoeven’s article goes on to investigate why the NCP signed the CPA. Focusing on

the internal dynamics of the governing party in the North, Verhoeven argues that the

CPA was a key element in the regime’s attempt to transform Sudan’s economy

through its ambitious dam building programme. Subsequently, Douglas Johnson’s

article presents a historical analysis of Sudan’s difficult North–South relationship,

explaining why the choice of ‘unity’ became so unattractive for the southern

Sudanese. Although Johnson acknowledges that independence will not settle all

issues of the war – particularly for the people along the North–South border – he

argues that an independent state in South Sudan is more viable than many analysts

suggest. DimahMahmoud’s contribution relates these domestic dynamics to regional

and international aspects of the CPA process and finds that challenges and

opportunities at all three levels have affected the chance of a sustainable peace. Lovise

Aalen’s concluding part explores the implications of the CPA in both theory and

practice. Aalen questions whether the CPA, which brought an end to Africa’s longest

civil war, also contributed to the division of Sudan. Drawing on interviews with key

stakeholders, Aalen identifies disagreements between theNCP and SPLM/A over key

provisions of the CPA as well as the ongoing violence in Darfur as key causes of the

agreement’s failure ‘tomake unity attractive’. She concludes therefore that although a

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power-sharing agreement succeeds in ending the war, it may well fail to secure the

peace – a finding, which she argues, is not unique to Sudan.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUDANESE CIVIL WAR

Sudan and the now independent South Sudan are among the most heterogeneous

countries in Africa. However, since independence in 1956 political and economic

power has been monopolised by an Arab-elite in Khartoum to the exclusion of

Sudan’s ethnically diverse peripheries – Darfur, eastern Sudan and South Sudan.9

Consequently, while Khartoum has become a ‘middle income enclave’, Sudan’s

peripheries remain among the most underdeveloped regions in the world.10 Sudan’s

civil wars (cf. 1963–72 and 1983–2005) and the more recent conflict in Darfur have

only served to entrench the dominance of Khartoum, deepen cultural and ethnic

divisions, and hinder development in the peripheries.11

The second civil war began in 1983 with the formation of the SPLM/A, which

followed a series of mutinies by southern army battalions.12 The SPLM/A, under the

leadership of Dr John Garang, committed itself to the creation of a united secular

‘New Sudan’, where economic and political power would be distributed evenly

throughout the country.13 Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ ideology attracted support from

foreign powers opposed to Khartoum, such as Ethiopia, as well as other opposition

groups within Sudan.14 By the late 1980s, as a result of this support, the SPLM/A had

consolidated its position within the South and even extended the civil war into

northern Sudan – in South Kordofan and the southern Blue Nile region. However,

following the fall of Mengistu’s regime in 1991 – Garang’s principal supporter – a

group of senior SPLM/A officers, led by Riek Machar, broke away to form their own

rival rebel faction – initially known as SPLA-Nasir.15

What followed was a decade of intra-South violence, as Khartoum sought to

capitalise on divisions within the SPLM/A by supplying weapons to Riek’s faction

and other local militias. Scorched earth campaigns, the destruction of villages and

the deliberate targeting of civilians all became regular features of the conflict –

particularly during the fight for control of the oil fields in the Upper Nile region of

South Sudan during the mid-to-late 1990s.16 Deepening violence within the South

was accompanied by an escalation of the conflict elsewhere in Sudan – in the Nuba

Mountains, Blue Nile and in eastern Sudan in 1995–96.17 Overall, it is estimated that

the civil war resulted in some two million deaths, mostly as a result of disease and

malnutrition, and displaced a further four million people – although these figures are

contested with analysts pointing to the absence of reliable and detailed information

on the human cost of the war.18

WHY WAS THE CPA POSSIBLE?

Since 1993 the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had led

several attempts to resolve the civil war in Sudan, but by 2000 the negotiations had

faltered.19 However, in the period from January 2001 to June 2002, owing to a

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particular convergence of domestic, regional and international interests, hopes of

a negotiated settlement were revived.20 Within Sudan, the civil war had reached a

military deadlock. The NCP’s military strength had increased following Sudan’s

emergence as an oil exporter in 1999 but the flow of petro-dollars was insufficient to

bring about a decisive end to the war, while US economic sanctions in response to

the regime’s aggressive Islamism and sponsorship of terrorism during the 1990s

meant that Sudan had become a ‘pariah state’ in the view of much of the

international community.21 As a result, by 2001–02 leading NCP figures, such as

Vice President Ali Osman Taha, were becoming more amenable to a peaceful

resolution of the conflict as this would enable the regime to derive maximum benefit

from oil revenues, allow for further oil exploration and facilitate rapprochement

with regional and international powers.22 For its part, the SPLM/A, although

strengthened following Garang’s reconciliation with Riek’s faction in January 2002,

was aware that it could do little to halt existing oil flows, and therefore while the

NCP benefitted from the influx of petro-dollars the South was excluded. Peace

would also provide the SPLM/A with an opportunity to develop the South’s other

resources – namely, water and land.23

Sudan’s neighbours, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, also had vested

political and economic interests in a peaceful resolution to the civil war. Finally,

bringing about a peaceful resolution to Sudan’s protracted civil war would be a

political victory for IGAD, which was (and still is) attempting to establish itself as a

credible player in the emerging new African political and security architecture.24

A stable Sudan was also in the economic interests of IGAD’s members, all of whom

hoped to benefit from Sudan’s newfound oil wealth and develop closer economic

ties with the South – which was also regarded as a potential ally in any future

negotiations with Egypt over Nile water rights.25

Regional support for the peace process in Sudan was given added impetus by

changing interests within the wider international community. During the 1990s, the

Clinton administration had pursued a policy of de facto regime change in Sudan but

the Bush administration, under pressure from advocacy groups in the USA and itself

eager to share intelligence with Sudan as part of the ‘War on Terror’, committed to

supporting the IGAD peace process.26 In early 2002, the USA, together with Norway

and the UK, began to provide technical assistance, as well as applying political

pressure on both the NCP and SPLM/A.27 Western support for the peace process

received tacit approval from Sudan’s oil industry partners – China, India, Malaysia

and the Gulf states – who regarded political stability as vital to future economic

relations. In short, in the early 2000s, it was a particular combination of factors –

widespread international and regional support for the peace process, the absence of

dissenters or potential spoilers, the relative military strength of the two parties and

the prospect of increased oil revenues – which provided a ‘window of opportunity’

for the negotiations that began in Machakos on 16 June 2002 and culminated with

the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005.28

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IMPLEMENTING THE CPA

Once the initial sense of triumph that accompanied the signing of the CPA had

subsided, the focus switched to the difficult task of implementing the agreement.

A number of factors were regarded as possible impediments to the implementation

of the CPA. Both the NCP and the SPLM/A were unsure of each other’s

commitment to the process. During the course of the negotiations, both sides had

continued military operations – with Garang supporting the rebels in Darfur and

Khartoum continuing to supply anti-SPLM/A factions in the South. There was a

concern, therefore, that any isolated incident or disagreement could spark a return to

a much broader conflict. There was also a fear among some observers that leading

NCP figures, who believed that the CPA conceded too much to the SPLM/A, would

seek to stymie its implementation or renege on the agreement altogether. Some

analysts pointed to the escalation of the conflict in Darfur from 2003 onwards, which

included a violent counter-insurgency campaign by the GoS, as an attempt by the

NCP to draw the international community’s focus away from the peace negotiations

and the CPA to the crisis in western Sudan. There were also concerns that the SPLM/

A lacked the capacity to implement the agreement – particularly after the death of

John Garang just 3 weeks after he was sworn in as first vice president.29

Power Sharing

The Power Sharing Protocol, in force until the 2010 national elections (originally

scheduled for 2008–09), provided the South, through the SPLM/A, regional

autonomy with the establishment of the GoSS and greater representation in the

National Assembly (NA). In accordance with the terms of the interim constitution,

the NCP were allocated 52 per cent of the seats in the NA, the SPLM/A were

allocated 28 per cent and the remaining 20 per cent were held by various opposition

parties.30 The NCP and the SPLM/A’s dominance of the assembly, coupled with the

exclusion of the political opposition from the peace negotiations, meant that the

CPA was, in effect, a two-way deal between the two biggest military–political

groups in Sudan.

The CPA’s international sponsors acknowledged the exclusive nature of the

agreement that might hinder its implementation but hoped that the NCP and the

SPLM/A could deliver ‘free and fair’ elections in the belief that this would enable

the opposition to bring about internal change.31 Such sentiment, as Justin Willis and

Atta el Battahani argue, is part of the ‘pervasive international logic’, which views

‘free and fair’ elections as the key to ‘political transformation’, a necessary step to

end conflict and deliver good governance.32 However, a combination of NCP–

SPLM/A disputes and logistic difficulties resulted in the elections taking place not in

2008, as originally scheduled, but in April 2010, just 8 months before the

referendum on southern secession. With the referendum only months away, the

SPLM/A, certain of a strong electoral performance in the South, sought to preserve

its level of representation in the GoNU, rather than contest the elections on a

nationwide basis.33 The SPLM/A nominated Yasir Arman, one of the party’s most

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prominent northern members, but on 31 March 2010, it, together with the Juba

Alliance, an umbrella organisation of opposition parties, announced that they would

boycott the presidential elections, citing ongoing violence in Darfur, unresolved

issues surrounding the 2008 census and the NCP’s failure to reform the security and

media laws.34 Following the withdrawal of his main rivals, al-Bashir, with 68 per

cent of the vote, recorded a comfortable victory in the presidential elections. There

was a similar situation in the South where Kiir was elected as the president of

southern Sudan, receiving almost 93 per cent of the vote and easily defeating his

only rival Lam Akol.35

The electoral process throughout Sudan was marred by accusations of fraud and

voter intimidation. However, although international observers, such as the Carter

Center, admitted that the elections failed to meet international standards, the results

were accepted in the hope that the NCP and SPLM/A could maintain Sudan’s fragile

peace in the run-up to the 2011 referendum.36 Little has changed since the

referendum. Mindful of aggrieved political forces coalescing in an alliance against

the regime and concerned about the prospect of popular protests as the economic

consequences of southern secession become increasingly acute, the senior

leadership of the NCP has sought to fragment the opposition by either co-opting

or excluding its opponents.

The success of this ‘divide and rule’ policy has been mixed. Within the NCP,

members have been critical of the party’s senior leadership, condemning the

political and economic mismanagement of the ruling elite. These divisions were

exposed in November 2012 when a number of security and army officers, including

the former head of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), Salah

Gosh, were detained.37 Outside of the NCP, opposition is also increasing.

Throughout 2012, sporadic street protests in Khartoum by youth groups and

professional associations were indicative of increasing political and economic

discontent among key urban constituencies. However, in spite of the growing unrest,

the two main opposition parties – the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the

Umma Party – have wavered over how best to respond to the dissatisfaction, veering

between co-operation and opposition to the NCP. In January 2013, for example, the

Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF),38 which comprises the four main armed

factions currently fighting the government, and the National Consensus Forces

(NCF),39 a broad coalition of opposition parties, signed the ‘New Dawn’ charter,

which advocated a policy of regime change. However, shortly after signing the

agreement, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Umma Party, effectively repudiated the

charter by arguing for reform rather than regime change.40

It is a similar situation in the South, where the opposition has been frustrated and

undermined by the SPLM/A’s reluctance to increase the political space. In October

2010, with the referendum approaching, Salva Kiir, Garang’s successor, convened a

southern Sudan Political Parties Conference, which brought together 24 southern

political parties, factions and militia groups, in an attempt to resolve some of the

grievances arising from the April elections.41 Key provisions of this reconciliation

process included amnesty for a number of the militia groups, and arrangements to

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discuss post-referendum issues such as the formation of an inclusive interim

government, the completion of a new census and the holding of elections.42

Moreover, since the referendum, the SPLM/A has indicated a willingness to expand

the cabinet to include deputy ministers. Such a move would create several additional

posts which could then be used to accommodate senior figures from the SPLM/A

and the opposition. However, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG),

many senior SPLM/A officials have developed a ‘winner-takes-all’ mentality and

have demonstrated an unwillingness to relinquish high-profile positions.43

Therefore, although this South–South dialogue is promising, unless the SPLM/A

is able to accommodate the opposition in the GoSS, political divisions within the

South will remain strong and are likely to be a continuing cause of instability.

Wealth Sharing

During the CPA negotiations, oil was regarded by many analysts as both ‘an obstacle

and an opportunity to achieving peace’.44 An opportunity because both the NCP and

SPLM/A sought political stability in order to derive the maximum benefit from oil

production but also an obstacle as oil was closely linked to issues of contention, such

as the status of Abyei and the demarcation of the North–South border. During the

CPA period, although neither side risked a return to war, oil was a source of

continuous political tension and localised conflict. Under the terms of the CPA,

revenues from the southern oil fields were to be shared equally between the GoS and

the GoSS, after 2 per cent was allocated to the oil-producing states. However, the

SPLM/A has often complained about a lack of transparency in the oil industry and

that the GoSS has not received an equal share of revenues. Other sources have made

similar suggestions. In 2009, for example, Global Witness, citing discrepancies

between production figures published by China National Petroleum Company,

Sudan’s largest oil industry partner, and data published by the GoS, claimed that the

GoSS was owed as much as $180 million in oil revenues.45

In October 2007, citing a lack of transparency in the oil industry and the

exclusion of GoSS from its management, the SPLM/A withdrew from the GoNU.

After several months of tense negotiations, during which time both sides mobilised

military forces along the North–South border, the SPLM/A agreed to rejoin the

GoNU.46 Although most issues were resolved, including a negotiated greater role for

the GoSS in the oil sector, both sides failed to reach agreement over the oil-rich area

of Abyei. The disputed territory, an area where land, grazing rights and oil

contribute to tensions, has been a focal point for many NCP–SPLM/A disputes.47 In

2008, for example, 89 people were killed and more than 50,000 people displaced

following a confrontation between the SAF and the SPLM/A over Abyei.48 The

proximity of the two forces along the North–South border has contributed to

tensions and increased the possibility of localised violence escalating into a wider

conflict.

Although disputes over oil have helped to fuel mistrust between the NCP and

SPLM/A, both parties are dependent upon oil revenues. Approximately 75 per cent

of Sudan’s proven oil reserves are located in the South, but the only export route is a

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pipeline through the North.49 Moreover, during the CPA period 98 per cent of the

South’s revenue was derived from oil production, while in the North oil accounted

for approximately 60 per cent of government revenue.50 However, in spite of their

dependency on oil, during post-referendum negotiations neither side was able to

agree a formula for the sharing of post-secession oil revenues. In late November

2011, ahead of further negotiations scheduled to start in mid-December, the GoS

claimed that South Sudan owed $727 million in transit fees for the period July to

October 2011. When South Sudan refused to pay, Khartoum prevented four ships

carrying southern oil from leaving Port Sudan and confiscated 1.2 million barrels of

oil. On 20 January, with further negotiations having failed to produce an agreement,

the GoSS retaliated by shutting down oil production. This dramatic step is evidence

of South Sudan’s determination not to be intimidated by what it regards as repeated

attempts by Khartoum to extort greater concessions.51

Following the decision to stop oil production, the GoSS was forced to introduce a

series of austerity measures, including a 50 per cent cut in government expenditure,

a 10 per cent reduction in monthly grants to the states and improvements in tax

collection.52 Significantly, however, the GoSS refused to cut public sector salaries,

including those of the security forces, fearing that such a move would contribute to

further instability and would undermine popular support for the decision to halt oil

production – particularly in urban centres, such as Juba, where the government is

the largest employer in the formal economy.

Observers questioned whether the austerity measures would be sufficient, with

the World Bank warning that the loss of currency reserves would lead to capital

flight, the depreciation of the currency and hyper-inflation.53 However, although the

South’s economy shrank by an estimated 55 per cent, a $100 million loan from Qatar

helped to prevent its complete collapse.54 In September 2012, it was reported that the

GoSS was seeking to obtain further international loans, secured, in part, against

future oil revenues. In the short term, such loans could strengthen the local currency

and provide capital for imports and essential development projects. However, the

immediate benefits could be undermined by mismanagement, corruption and high

interest rates – particularly if future oil revenues decline as a result of fluctuations in

world market prices or diminishing production levels. Global Witness has warned

that this could create a debt cycle whereby the GoSS is caught in a loop of repaying

debt with current revenues, while being forced to obtain additional loans in order to

finance its ongoing public expenditure.55

The oil shutdown was exacerbated by an escalating conflict along the North–

South border, particularly in the northern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Violence in these two states, where elements of the population fought with the

SPLM/A during the civil war and have remained allied to Juba following South

Sudan’s independence, has been ongoing since June 2011. In late February 2012,

it was reported that the SRF had captured the towns of Tess, Buram, Dar, Taroge and

Jau.56 On 26 March, the conflict intensified when the SPLM/A occupied the

contested town of Heglig – the site of one of Sudan’s main oil fields. Although

reserves in Heglig are diminishing, it continues to produce approximately 60,000

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barrels per day – the equivalent to half of Sudan’s oil output. The SPLM/A held

Heglig for 10 days during which time fighting spread along the North–South border

and Khartoum bombed the disputed area in an attempt to isolate the occupying

forces.57 The SPLM/A eventually withdrew from Heglig on 20 April – although

Khartoum disputed this, claiming that the SAF forced southern troops out of the

town.58

After months of further on–off negotiations, mediated by the AUHIP, the sides

agreed a deal on oil in late September 2012, as well as further agreements on security

issues, such as the establishment of a demilitarised and internationally monitored

border. As part of the oil deal, the GoSS agreed to resume the oil production, pay

Sudan between $9 and $11 per barrel for the use of the northern oil infrastructure and

provide Khartoum with a $3 billion financial aid package to alleviate the fiscal

impact following the loss of southern oil revenues. However, although the oil

agreement provided both parties with an incentive to resolve the remaining post-

referendum issues, such as the disputed territory of Abyei and the ongoing conflict in

South Kordofan and Blue Nile, neither side was willing to compromise on these

matters. The failure to resolve these outstanding issues has, as predicted,

undermined efforts to resume oil production. Following the September agreement, it

was anticipated that oil exports would restart in December 2012 but production did

not resume until April 2013. The economic consequences of the oil shutdown have

been severe for both sides – with rising inflation and shortages of foreign currency

reported in both Sudan and South Sudan. It is therefore essential that oil production

remains uninterrupted but in view of the mistrust between the two parties both sides

may seek to use oil as a bargaining chip during negotiations over the remaining

post-referendum issues, such as the ongoing conflict in South Kordofan and

Blue Nile.

Delivering a ‘Peace Dividend’ and Ongoing Conflict in South Sudan

There is considerable scope for economic development in South Sudan. Aside from

the South’s oil reserves (during the CPA period Sudan was the third largest oil

producer in Africa behind Nigeria and Angola), the areas of Equatoria and Upper

Nile are rich in agricultural land and there is the possibility of developing closer

economic ties with East African neighbours – particularly Uganda and Kenya.59

With these resources available for development, the GoSS has had a comparable

advantage over many other post-conflict governments.60 Once the CPA was signed

therefore there was an expectation that the GoSS, in view of the new peace,

enhanced autonomy and guaranteed oil revenues, could deliver a tangible peace

dividend.

Establishing a functioning government in the South, however, has proved to be a

difficult task.61 When the CPA was signed, South Sudan was one of the most

underdeveloped regions in the world. In 2005, there were only 30 km of paved road

in a region of 648,000 km2 and Juba, the capital and the most developed city in the

South, was without electricity or running water.62 The GoSS lacked sufficient staff

with the necessary training and experience – before the CPA, for example, the

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SPLM/A Secretariat for Finance managed funds of just $100,000 per year, but in

2005 the GoSS budget was $800 million.63 The lack of administrative experience

and expertise within the GoSS has impeded the delivery of basic services and the

lack of accountability has contributed to the misappropriation of funds by officials.

The ICG reported in 2011 that while the GoSS introduced some foundational

legislation and initiated some key reforms, such as standardising a primary school

curriculum and rationalising a bloated public sector payroll, tangible peace

dividends have been few and the gap between ‘established’ and ‘functioning’

institutions remained evident.64

Although blame for the lack of development in the South is often attributed to

corruption and mismanagement by GoSS officials, foreign donors and organisations

such as the World Bank must accept some responsibility.65 Critics have argued that

when planning development and aid programmes, there was an assumption among

some donors and NGOs that the situation in the South was a ‘post-conflict recovery’

scenario – even though state institutions were absent, violence remained ongoing

and major emergency humanitarian needs persisted.66 The failure to appreciate

the specific challenges in South Sudan has contributed to delays in the delivery of

basic services and poor results relative to donor investment.67 The Multi-Donor

Trust Fund (MDTF) is an example of this. The aim of the MDTF, which is

administered by the World Bank, is to provide a vehicle for donors to pool

resources and co-ordinate support with the GoSS, particularly for recovery and long-

term development activities.68 However, the GoSS’s inability to cope with

bureaucratic procedures, combined with staffing problems and complicated

administrative requirements within the World Bank, have contributed to delays in

the disbursement of budgets.69 By 2009, only $190 million of the $526 million

allocated to the MDTF by donors since 2005 had been spent. The delay in the

disbursement of budgets has had an impact on the delivery of services. The

Umbrella Health Programme, for example, was supposed to deliver, through sub-

contract agents, the GoSS’s Basic Health Package to 37 counties across 10 states in

the South but by 2009, owing to administrative and procedural delays, only three

agents were active.70

Delays in implementing development and service schemes have been

exacerbated by unbalanced government spending. The CPA’s wealth-sharing

arrangements provided the GoSS with a large annual budget which has increased

from approximately $800 million in 2005 to approximately $1.7 billion in 2010.71

This should have provided the GoSS with sufficient revenue to begin the process of

creating a broad-based economy but since the signing of the CPA, expenditure has

been unbalanced, with spending on security and government salaries rising

sharply.72 In 2007, out of a total budget of approximately US$1.5 billion, 30 per cent

was spent on security, in contrast, the same amount was spent on education, health

and infrastructure combined.73 The GoSS unbalanced budget was, in part, a result of

the SPLM/A’s policy of maintaining a strong and credible military threat to counter

any attempt by the NCP to abrogate the CPA. Since 2005, preoccupied with the

referendum and concerned about the possibility of renewed war with the North, the

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SPLM/A’s security strategy has focused on defending the North–South border and

other key strategic positions.74 This strategy requires considerable resources and has

therefore constrained not only economic development but has also limited the

SPLM/A’s ability to address ongoing security problems within the South.75 In 2009,

inter-communal violence and LRA attacks killed an estimated 2,500 people and

displaced another 350,000, nearly twice as many as in 2008.76 The security situation

was no better in 2010, when it was estimated that more than 900 people were killed

and approximately 215,000 displaced as a result of armed conflict.77

Although the causes of the ongoing violence are manifold and often related to

local issues rooted in the history of the civil war, a few general points can be made.

In some cases, insurgencies are led by opportunistic individuals, seeking to increase

their own influence vis-a-vis the government, and therefore exploit local resentment

towards the state, which is perceived to be exclusionary or indeed predatory.

Insurgencies attract local participation and support given the widespread availability

of arms and the lack of opportunities, economic or otherwise, for young men in

particular. Aside from the immediate prospect of weapons, food and impunity to

loot, the insurgencies offer disenfranchised people, in this case southern Sudanese,

a sense of purpose – an attractive proposition given the lack of tangible peace

dividends.78 In other instances, the violence occurs in remote areas – such as the

Greater Upper Nile region – where the government has little or no presence. Here

high levels of civilian gun ownership, limited security provision and frequent

resource scarcity (land, cattle and water) all contribute to ongoing inter-ethnic

tensions.79 On 29 August 2009, for example, a clash between communities in Twic

East County, Jonglei State, resulted in 42 deaths, 60 injuries and the displacement of

24,000 people from 17 villages.80

The SPLM/A’s response to these instances of localised conflict has fluctuated

between military engagement and attempts at political accommodation. The

instances of military engagement often entail forcible disarmament of civilians and

violent counter-insurgency campaigns, which have resulted in the deaths of

thousands of people (civilians and combatants).81 In June 2008, for example,

a policing operation carried out by SPLM/A soldiers spiralled out of control,

resulting in the deaths of at least 12 civilians, arbitrary arrests and the displacement

of 4,000 people. In February 2011, clashes between SPLM/A troops and forces loyal

to George Athor, a renegade SPLM/A commander, resulted in the deaths of

hundreds of civilians and restricted the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

and NGO access to the affected region in Jonglei state.82 The severity of the response

illustrates a concern among the SPLM/A that the insurgents, who are suspected of

being armed by Khartoum, are part of a possible wider conflict in Sudan.83 With

ongoing conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, such concerns are legitimate but

the SPLM/A’s ‘strong-arm’ approach, which often includes instances of ‘scorched

earth’ tactics, ill-discipline and abuses against civilians, has hardened local

resistance and created the conditions for continued instability.84

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CONCLUSION

The CPA was a remarkable achievement, in that it brought to an end more than

two decades of protracted civil war in Sudan. At its signing in 2005, the hope was

that the CPA would also provide the NCP and the SPLM/A with a framework to

transform the root causes of the conflict in Sudan’s exclusionary political and

economic structures through the establishment of a more equitable and inclusive

division of wealth and power. However, after continuous delays, disagreements and

violence, it came as little surprise that the southern Sudanese voted so

overwhelmingly in favour of independence, when they finally got the chance in

January 2011. The challenge now confronting the NCP, the SPLM/A and the wider

international community is to manage Sudan’s divorce without a return to war.

Central to this task will be the successful negotiation of those post-referendum

issues that are yet to be resolved – most importantly the sharing of oil revenues.

Recent violence along the North–South border and rising tensions over oil has

highlighted the possibility of a renewed North–South conflict. Given the difficult

nature of the NCP–SPLM/A relationship prior to the 2011 referendum, it remains

to be seen whether the two parties can resolve the outstanding disputes. Aside

from the North–South issues, both Sudan and South Sudan face a range of

political and economic challenges relating to security, development and political

inclusion. Failure to resolve these issues could lead to further fragmentation both

within the North and South. In conclusion, while the southern Sudanese have

decisively answered the question of unity or separation in favour of the latter, it is

clear, in spite of the CPA’s success in ending the war, that many of the issues which

have contributed to Sudan’s multiple conflicts remain unresolved. The

transformation of these underlying conflicts is the sine qua non for a comprehensive

and sustainable peace for the two Sudans – and that is perhaps the most important

lesson for the international community of scholars and practitioners to learn from

this case.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the contributors, the journal editors and the anonymous referees for theircontributions to this Special Section.

NOTES

1. The CPA is an amalgamation of a series of protocols and agreements signed by the GoS and theSPLM/A between 2002 and 2005, including: the Machakos Protocol (20 July 2002); the Agreementon Security Arrangements (25 September 2003); the Agreement on Wealth Sharing (7 January 2004);the Protocol on Power Sharing (26 May 2004); the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict inSouthern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (26 May 2004) and the Protocol on the Resolution of theConflict in the Abyei Area (26 May 2004). See Elke Grawert, After the Comprehensive PeaceAgreement in Sudan (Oxford: James Currey 2010) pp.1–2; See also Douglas H. Johnson, The RootCauses of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey 2007) p.xviii.

2. Johnson (note 1) p.xix and David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine andRelief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983–1989 (Oxford: James Currey 2008) pp.xviii–xxi.

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3. Edward Thomas, Against the Gathering Storm Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(London: Chatham House 2009) p.10.4. Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, Southern Sudan Referendum Final Report Results, online

at ,http://southernsudan2011.com/sites/default/files/Final_Results_Report_20110206_1512.pdf.,

accessed 1 Mar. 2011.5. For a timeline of these negotiations, see Enough Project, FACT SHEET: Timeline for Negotiations

Between the Two Sudans, 17 Jan. 2012, online at ,http://www.enoughproject.org/files/

SudanNegotiationsTimeline.pdf., accessed 30 Mar. 2012.6. On the failure of the talks over the sharing of oil revenues, see, Alex De Waal, ‘South Sudan’s

Doomsday Machine’, The New York Times, 24 Jan. 2012, online at,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/

01/25/opinion/south-sudans-doomsday-machine.html., accessed 30 Mar. 2012.7. Sara Pantuliano, ‘South Sudan: A Nation in the Making’, The Guardian, 8 Jul. 2011, online

at ,http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/08/south-sudan-

independence., accessed 15 Jul. 2011.8. Harry Verhoeven, ‘Northern Sudan at a Deadly Crossroads’, The Guardian, 18 Jan. 2011, online at,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/18/sudannorthern-south-violence., accessed 1

Mar. 2011; See also Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Once Again War Comes to Southern Sudan’,

Parliamentary Brief Online (2011), online at ,http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/2011/12/once-

again-war-comes-to-southern-sudan., accessed 7 Jan. 2012 and Edward Thomas, ‘Sudan’s

Referendum Amidst Revolution’, Middle East Report 258 – People Power, 41 (2011), online at ,http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/sudans-referendum-amidst-revolution., accessed 30 Mar. 2012.

9. On the causes and consequences of Sudan’s conflicts, see Douglas H. Johnson (note 1); David Keen

(note 2); Francis M. Deng,War of Visions: Conflicts of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC: The

Brookings Institute 1995); Alex de Waal, ‘Sudan: The Turbulent State’, in Alex De Waal (ed.) The

War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (Cambridge, MA: Global Equity Initiative, Harvard

University 2007) and Akol Deng Ruay, The Politics of Two Sudans (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute

for African Studies 1994).10. Alex De Waal, ‘Sudan’s choices: Scenarios beyond the CPA’, in K. Maas-Albert and T. Weis (eds)

Sudan – No Easy Ways Ahead (Berlin: Heinrich Boll Foundation 2009), online at,http://www.boell.

org/web/136-531.html., accessed 10 May 2010, p.17.11. De Waal (note 9) p.4.12. Johnson (note 1) pp.61–2.13. SPLM, Manifesto (SPLM 1983).14. Johnson (note 1) pp.62–5 and Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International

Relations (London: I.B. Tauris 2003).15. Ethiopia had supported Garang’s leadership of the SPLM/A since its formation in 1983. Ethiopia had

provided Garang with military equipment and support against his rivals for the leadership of the

SPLM/A. In exchange, Garang supported Mengistu against Eritrean opposition groups, such as

the EPRDF. Douglas H. Johnson, ‘The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem

of Factionalism’, in Christopher Clapham (ed.) African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Currey 1998)

pp.62–5.16. Amnesty International, Sudan: The Human Price of Oil (London: Amnesty International Press 2000);

Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil and Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch 2002);

International Crisis Group (ICG), God, Oil, and Country: The Changing Logic of War in Sudan

(Brussels: ICG 2002) and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, ‘“Food Itself is Fighting With Us”:

A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Sudan’s Civil War on South Sudanese Civilian Populations

located in the North and the South’, in Vigdis Broch-Due (ed.) Violence and Belonging: The Quest for

Identity in Post-Colonial Africa (London: Routledge 2005).17. Richard Barltrop, Darfur and the International Community: The Challenges of Conflict Resolution in

Sudan (London: I.B. Tauris 2011).18. For an analysis of such estimates, see Ibid., pp.27–8 and Johnson (note 1) p.143.19. Ibid., pp.40–7.20. Øystein H. Rolandsen, ‘A Quick Fix? A Retrospective Analysis of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace

Agreement’, Review of African Political Economy, 38/130 (2011) pp.552–53.21. Tim Niblock, ‘Pariah States’ and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Boulder, CO:

Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001).

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22. Peter Woodward, ‘From CPA to DPA: “Ripe for Resolution”, or Ripe for Dissolution?’ in ElkeGrawert (ed.) After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (Oxford: James Currey 2010)pp.232–33.

23. Peter Woodward, ‘Sudan’s Foreign Relations Since Independence’, in Daniel Large and LukeA. Patey (eds) Sudan Looks East: China, India, and the Politics of Asian Alternatives (Oxford: JamesCurrey 2011) p.47.

24. For an overview of the new African peace and security architecture, see Malte Brosig, ‘The Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa’ International Peacekeeping, 17/3 (2010) pp.327–42.

25. Woodward (note 22) p.234 and Jacob Høigilt, Ashild Falch and Øystein H. Rolandsen, The SudanReferendum and Neighbouring Countries: Egypt and Uganda (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo2010) pp.8–9.

26. Peter Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (London: Ashgate 2006).27. Barltrop (note 17) pp.50–2.28. Rolandsen (note 20) p.554.29. ICG, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead (Brussels: The ICG 2006).30. Marc Gustafson, Electoral Designs: Proportionality, Representation, and Constituency Boundaries

in Sudan’s 2010 Elections (London: Rift Valley Institute 2010) p.25.31. Thomas (note 3) p.6.32. Justin Willis and Atta el-Battahani ‘“We Changed the Laws”: Electoral Practice and Malpractice in

Sudan Since 1953’, African Affairs, 109/435 (2010) p.192.33. Johnson (note 1) Revised Edition p.176.34. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Sudan Politics: Trade-off?’, 5 Apr. 2010, online at ,http://www.

intelligencequarterly.com/2010/04/sudan-politics-trade-off/., accessed 8 Jun. 2010.35. Gareth Curless, ‘Sudan’s 2010 National Elections’, Ethnopolitics Papers, No. 3 (2010) p.7.36. Carter Center, Carter Center Reports Widespread Irregularities in Sudan’s Vote Tabulation and

Strongly Urges Steps to Increase Transparency, 10 May 2010, online at ,http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/counting-tabulation-may2010.pdf., accessed 20 May 2010.

37. ICG, Sudan: Major Reform Or More War (Brussels: ICG 2012).38. The SRF includes the SPLM-N; the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions of Mini Minawi (SLA-

MM) and Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW); and the JEM.39. As of January 2013, the alliance includes the Communist Party of Sudan (CPS), the National Umma

Party (NUP), the DUP/alMirghani, the Popular Congress Party (PCP), the Umma party (Reform andRenewal) of Mubarak al-Fadil, the Sudanese National Alliance of Abdelaziz Khalid, the threefactions of the Ba’ath Party, the Nassirite Unionist Party, the Nassirite Arab Socialist Party, theUnited Unionist Party (a DUP breakaway faction), the Unionist National Party (a DUP breakawayfaction), the Justice Party (Original/Mekki Ali Balayel), the Movement of the New DemocraticForces, the Movement of the Modern National Forces, the Sudanese Congress Party of Ibrahim al-Sheikh, the Farmers Alliance, the Alliance of al-Gezira and al-Managil Farmers, the Trade-UnionSolidarity, the Political Women Forum and other small groups. ICG (note 37) p.17.

40. Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan’s Bashir Renews Attack on New Dawn Charter, Reiterates Commitment toShar’ia’, 13 Jan. 2013, online at,http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45177., accessed 7Feb. 2013.

41. Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan Political Forces Join Hands Ahead of Referendum’, 18 Oct. 2010,online at ,http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-political-forces-join,36641., accessed 8Dec. 2011.

42. Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan Political Forces Join Hands Ahead of Referendum’, 18 Oct. 2010,online at ,http://www.sudantribune.com/NCP-minister-criticizedover,36395., accessed 1 Mar.2011.

43. ICG, Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan (Brussels: ICG 2011) p.8.44. J. S Morrison and J. G. Cooke, ‘Sudan’s Oil Sector’ (background paper, Center for Strategic and

International Studies 2002) cited in Luke Patey, ‘Crude Days Ahead? Oil and the Resource Curse inSudan’, African Affairs, 109/437 (2010) p.617.

45. Global Witness, Fuelling Mistrust: The Need for Transparency in Sudan’s Oil Industry (London:Global Witness 2009) pp.6–9.

46. ICG, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis (Brussels: ICG 2008) p.13.47. ICG, Negotiating Sudan’s North-South Future, (Brussels: ICG 2010) pp.4–5.48. Sudan Tribune, ‘Heavy Fighting Erupts in Sudan’s Abyei Area’, 20 May 2008, online at ,http://

www.sudantribune.com/Heavy-fighting-erupts-in-Sudan-s,27218., accessed 1 Mar. 2011.

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49. Luke Patey, ‘Oil and Sudan’s Coming Referendum’, Making Sense of Sudan, (2010), online at

,http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2010/10/04/oil-and-sudans-coming-referendum/., accessed 28 Feb.

2011.50. Global Witness (note 45) p.7.51. Amanda Hsiao, South Sudan and Sudan Back to War? A View From Juba (Washington, DC: Enough

Project), online at,http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict_areas/sudan_south_sudan., accessed 14

May 2012, p.12.52. BBC, ‘South Sudan Slashes Spending After Halting Oil Output’, 20 Feb. 2012, online at ,http://

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17098350., accessed 14 May 2012.53. Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan Inflation up by 21 per cent in Q1 2012’, 3 May 2012, online at,http://www.

sudantribune.com/Sudan-inflation-up-by-21-in-Q1,42484., accessed 14 May 2012.54. Alex de Waal, ‘Sizzling South Sudan: Why Oil is Not the Whole Story’, Foreign Affairs, 7 Feb. 2013,

online at ,http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138836/alex-de-waal/sizzling-south-sudan.,

accessed 26 Feb. 2013.55. Global Witness, ‘South Sudan Faces Test of Transparency Commitments in Pursuing Oil-backed

Financing’, May 2012, online at ,http://www.globalwitness.org/library/south-sudan-faces-test-

transparency-commitments-pursuing-oil-backed-financing., accessed 23 May 2012.56. Hsiao (note 51) pp.2–3.57. Ibid., p.6.58. Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan Declares “Liberation” of Heglig as Juba Announces SPLA Pullout’, 20 Apr.

2012, online at ,http://www.sudantribune.com/BREAKING-NEWS-Sudan-declares,42329.,

accessed 14 May 2012 and Sudan Tribune, ‘Juba in Full Control of Heglig Area, Dismisses

Khartoum’s Claim of Takeover – Kiir’, 20 Apr. 2012, online at ,http://www.sudantribune.com/

Juba-in-full-control-of-Heglig,42333., accessed 14 May 2012.59. Harry Verhoeven, Black Gold for Blue Gold? Sudan’s Oil, Ethiopia’s Water and Regional

Integration (London: Chatham House 2011) p.13.60. World Bank, Sudan the Road Toward Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth (Washington, DC:

World Bank 2009) p.11.61. ICG (note 43) p.1.62. World Bank (note 60) p.11.63. De Waal (note 10) p.18.64. ICG (note 43) p.1.65. Rolandsen (note 20) pp.560–61.66. J. Bennett, S. Pantuliano, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, Aiding the Peace: A Multi-

Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan,

2005–2010 (Hove, East Sussex: Itad 2010) p.67.67. Rolandsen (note 20) p.560.68. Scanteam, Review of Post-Crisis Country Multi Donor Trust Funds, Final Report and Annexes,

(Commissioned by World Bank, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD in Cooperation

with CIDA, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DFID, 2007) pp.80–123.69. Sara Pantuliano, ‘International Engagement in Fragile States: Lessons from Southern Sudan’, ODI

Opinion, 135, (2009) p.1.70. Bennett et al. (note 66) p.73.71. Thomas (note 3) p.27; Government of Southern Sudan, Approved Budget 2010 (Juba: Ministry of

Finance and Economic Planning 2010), online at ,http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliapublic/en/

ministries/Finance/AnnualBudgets/mainColumnParagraphs/0/content_files/file/Budget%202010%

20-%20Final.pdf., accessed 27 Jan. 2011, p.2.72. World Bank, Sudan Public Expenditure Review: Synthesis Report (Washington, DC: World Bank

2007) pp.67–74.73. Thomas (note 3) p.27; Government of Southern Sudan, Approved Budget 2007 (Juba: Ministry of

Finance and Economic Planning 2007), online at ,http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/

ministries/Finance/AnnualBudgets/mainColumnParagraphs/0/content_files/file9/2007%20Budget.

pdf., accessed 27 Jan. 2011, p.11.74. Small Arms Survey, ‘Conflicting Priorities GoSS Security Challenges and Recent Responses’, Sudan

Issue Brief, No. 14 (2009) pp.1–11, online at Conflicting Priorities GoSS Security Challenges and

Recent Responses, accessed 1 Mar. 2011.75. Ibid.

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76. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA in 2010: Annual Planand Budget (Geneva: United Nations 2010), online at ,http://ochaonline.un.org/ocha2010/OCHA2010_hires.pdf., accessed 3 Mar. 2011; United Nations Office for the Coordinationof Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Update Southern Sudan, 5 Sept. and Oct. 2010, online at,http://ochaonline.un.org/sudan/SituationReports/SouthernSudanReports/tabid/3369/language/enUS/Default.aspx., accessed 3 Mar. 2011.

77. Small Arms Survey (note 74) p.1.78. Ibid.79. Bennett et al. (note 66) p.39.80. Ibid.81. Claire McEvoy and Emile LeBrun, Uncertain Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan, Geneva:

Small Arms Survey, 2010), ICG; Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan(Brussels: ICG 2009); Adam O’Brien, Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan CivilianDisarmament Campaign (Geneva: Small Arms Survey 2009) and Small Arms Survey ‘Anatomy ofCivilian Disarmament in Jonglei State’, Sudan Issue Brief, No. 3 (2006–2007) pp.1–8.

82. Small Arms Survey, ‘Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile’, Sudan IssueBrief (2011) p.9.

83. Ibid.84. ICG (note 43) p.12; Laura Heaton and Amanda Hsiao, ‘SometimesWe See Ourselves as Apart’ South

Sudan’s Response to Violence in Jonglei (Dec. 2012), online at,http://www.enoughproject.org/files/JongleiReport.pdf..

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