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North American Philosophical Publications Kant, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientific Essentialism Author(s): Erik Anderson Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, Studies on Kant (Oct., 1994), pp. 355- 373 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744637 . Accessed: 17/09/2013 13:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History of Philosophy Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.81.226.149 on Tue, 17 Sep 2013 13:07:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: Studies on Kant || Kant, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientific Essentialism

North American Philosophical Publications

Kant, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientific EssentialismAuthor(s): Erik AndersonSource: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, Studies on Kant (Oct., 1994), pp. 355-373Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744637 .

Accessed: 17/09/2013 13:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR todigitize, preserve and extend access to History of Philosophy Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

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Page 2: Studies on Kant || Kant, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientific Essentialism

History of Philosophy Quarterly Volume 11, Number 4, October 1994

KANT, NATURAL KIND TERMS, AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM

Erik Anderson

I. Introduction

WHAT,

for Kant, is the semantic status of proposition (1) Water is H2O? Is it analytic or synthetic? The question is not one of merely esoteric

import since an answer to it would constitute (at least in part) a statement about the meaningfulness of all our scientific propositions. And in so far as

the Critique is a defense of the possibility of the natural sciences, it seems

that we should be able to find in it the answer to our question. Further, we

should be able to find an answer to the question of whether or not Kant is

(was) a scientific essentialist.1 An attempt will be made to show that he is not an essentialist despite the fact that his semantics of natural kind terms

greatly resembles that of some modern authors who are essentialists and take their semantic theories to provide evidence for their views. One way to

go about this would be simply to locate Kant's criteria for the analytic/syn thetic distinction and then to place the proposition in the category dictated

by those criteria. But instead of this method some of Kant's specific exam

ples will be employed. The hope is that by means of the examples the criteria themselves will achieve a greater degree of clarity and that through this clarification Kant's position will emerge as a genuine alternative to some

contemporary positions. It will be useful to first make a couple of distinctions so as to facilitate the discussion later. We will then, in rather straightforward fashion, proceed by cases.

The two distinctions relevant here are quite simple and yet pivotal. The first concerns two modalities: i) logical necessity and ii) physical necessity. A proposition may be true (or a state of affairs may obtain) by virtue of

physical necessity and yet be logically contingent. For example, that the

entropy of a closed system always increases is determined by virtue of

physical necessity. That is, given the nature of the universe as described by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, a certain quantity S must increase for

any closed system. In this sense it does not just so happen that the kinetic

energies of the particles of an ensemble tend toward equilibrium. Neverthe

less, logically speaking, it could have been otherwise. For it might have turned out that the entropy of a closed system decreased on odd numbered

Thursdays. For right now this is enough to make the distinction intuitive.

355

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356 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

The second distinction concerns the semantic status of certain terms. The semantic properties (reference and/or sense) of some terms, it has been

argued, depend in part upon external conditions (or pragmatic concerns) and are not solely a function of the epistemic situation of the speaker.2 Indexicals are one clear although somewhat trivial example. Proper names and natural kind terms have been suggested as further cases. Let us call such terms semantically unstable. By contrast, terms whose semantic prop

erties remain the same for any population of speakers in qualitatively the same epistemic state let us call, semantically stable? "Electron" is an

example of the former, while "identity" is an example of the latter. The need for the distinction should be clear enough: it is that which allows us to posit necessities concerning the semantic properties of terms independently of the contingent epistemic situation of the speaker who happens to be employ ing them. This will allow us to make use of the second distinction in

conjunction with the first. It will be suggested that, in the end, the only truly exciting notion of analyticity will be the one which involves both logical necessity and semantically stable terms.

Let us now move directly to the discussion of proposition (1). What, for

Kant, is its semantic status? Let us proceed by cases.

II. Is (1) Analytic?

We might compare (1) to a Kantian example which is, at least prima facie, analogous.

(2) Gold is a yellow metal.

Kant claims that (2) is analytic despite the fact that the predicates are

empirical concepts.

All analytic judgments depend wholly on the principle of contradiction, and are in their nature a priori cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with

matter be empirical or not. For the predicate of an affirmative analytic judg ment is already thought in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without contradiction. . . . For this very reason all analytic judgments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical, as for example, "Gold is a

yellow metal"; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of

gold, which contained the thought that this body is yellow and metal. It is, in

fact, this thought that constituted my concept; and I need only analyze it, with out looking beyond it elsewhere.4 [Prolegomena, pp. 12-13, emphasis added].

Given the "thought" accompanying the kind term "gold," the predicate "is a yellow metal" cannot (without contradiction) be denied of gold since it is in fact just this predicate which constitutes (partially) the first concept. Can we apply this same reasoning to proposition (1)? Yes, but it seems that we arrive at a different result. It could not be the case that Kant's concept of water "contained the thought" that this body is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. For Kant presumably knew nothing of the periodic table and the theory of atomic and molecular structure. There is then no question of the predicate "is composed of hydrogen" being already thought in his

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 357

concept "water." And so Kant could quite easily deny proposition (1) without contradiction. It is therefore not analytic (for Kant).5

This calls for a further bit of discussion. What, if nothing concerning molecular microstructure, could be contained in the concept "water"? Well, obviously its macrostructural properties. And this seems to be precisely what Kant has in mind (so to speak). As with "gold is a yellow metal," so too the propositions "water is wet," "water is clear," "water is drinkable" and

so on, would be analytic for him. In view of the quotation from the Prole

gomena cited above, Kant, in what follows, will be interpreted in a way that uses indexicals such that in order to know these kinds of propositions, he

requires "no experience beyond his concept of water which contained the

thought that this stuff (pointing to a puddle in K?nigsberg) is wet, clear, drinkable, etc." Thus given Kant's epistemic situation, it will be clear both how (2) comes out analytic and how (1) does not. What remains to be accounted for now is exactly how physical microstructure can come to

account for macrostructure as a matter of (at least) physical necessity despite the fact that the truths linking the two are not analytic (because

they are a posteriori and contingent.) This puzzle will not be so puzzling if we keep in mind that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is not (for Kant) about the order of acquisition or learning.6 So this leaves open the possibility of learning necessary truths (either analytic or synthetic) a posteriori, but without requiring that they be so learned. We hope to show that Kant is

right about this and that if so then the anti-scientific essentialist is well on

his way to blocking the scientific essentialist's attempt to tell us what our

words really mean.

III. Is (1) Synthetic A Posteriori?

So perhaps (1) is synthetic a posteriori. In that case it should be akin to another Kantian example.

(3) All bodies are heavy [A7/B11].7

Kant holds that (3) is synthetic, and known a posteriori:

[W]hen I say, 'All bodies are heavy', the predicate is something quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment.8 [A7/B11].

The possibility of the synthesis of the predicate 'weight' with the concept of

'body' thus rests upon experience. While the one concept is not contained in the

other, they yet belong to one another, though only contingently, as parts of a

whole, namely, of an experience which is itself a synthetic combination of intuitions [B12, emphasis added].

Again, let us apply Kant's reasoning to proposition (1). As above, we should say that the predicate "is composed of hydrogen and oxygen" is not

(for Kant) something thought in the concept "water." For Kant did not know the requisite chemistry. But, on the occasion of performing the appropriate

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358 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

experiments (e.g., hydrolysis), we can then (and only then) make the "addi tion" to our concept which thereby yields the synthetic judgment that water is H2O. Judgments concerning proposition (1) depend upon the testimony of experience and their truth is known therefore a posteriori.9 It is simply a

matter of contingent fact that the macrostructural properties with which we associate the term "water" have been discovered to be associated with the microstructural properties with which we associate the term "H2O." For our experiments might just as easily have returned the result XYZ rather than H2O.10 Thus the answer to our question is at hand: proposition (1) is

synthetic a posteriori.

Let us review our reasoning in arriving at this result. On the basis of Kant's remarks concerning proposition (2), we concluded that proposition (1) could not be analytic since Kant was not in a position (given his epistemic situation) to know the requisite chemistry and could not therefore have had

H2O as the contents of his thoughts about the clear, wet, drinkable stuff. So

(1) must be synthetic. Then, on the basis of his remarks concerning propo sition (3), we concluded that because the macrostructural properties (clear, wet, drinkable, etc.) actually thought in the concept "water" are only contin

gently related to the microstructural properties from molecular theory, the

testimony of experience is required in order to bring about the synthesis of the latter properties with the former. So (1) must be known a posteriori. Conclusion: proposition (1) is synthetic a posteriori. This conclusion leaves us with a feeling of unease. One of the key steps in the reasoning concerns

proposition (2). If (2) is analytic (as Kant maintains in the Prolegomena) then (1) must be synthetic (as we have concluded). But it could be argued (perhaps not conclusively) that propositions involving such natural kind

terms11 (as subjects) and phenomenal quality terms (as predicates) are not

logically necessary and cannot therefore be analytic.12 This is a direct

challenge to Kant.

Here is an attempted diagnosis of the problem. It is a logically contingent fact that the material body gold is associated with the phenomenal quality yellow. Nevertheless it is not contingent in the same sense as is the mere fact that I am wearing a yellow T-shirt. Tomorrow will come and I may not be

wearing any shirt at all, let alone a yellow T-shirt. But are we similarly prepared to hold that tomorrow will come and gold might not be colored at all, let alone

yellow? No. Thus proposition (2) apparently carries some kind of necessity with it. For this reason, Kant might be inclined to hold that (2) is known a priori.

The a priori method gives us our rational and mathematical knowledge through the construction of the concept, the a posteriori method our merely empirical (mechanical) knowledge, which is incapable of yielding necessary and apodeictic propositions. [A721/B749].

It is then a further step to show that (2) is analytic. Kant thinks that he can do so by making use of a concept "containment" principle together with the principle of non-contradiction.13 Again,

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 359

All analytic judgments depend wholly on the principle of contradiction, and are in their nature a priori cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with

matter be empirical or not. For the predicate of an affirmative analytic judg ment is already thought in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without contradiction.For this very reason [i.e., containment] all analytic judgments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical, as for

example, 'Gold is a yellow metal'; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold, which contained the thought that this body is yellow and metal. It is, in fact, this thought that constituted my concept; and I need

only analyze it, without looking beyond it elsewhere. [Prolegomena, pp. 12-13,

emphasis added].

This is peculiar in that it is hard to see how the predicate "is a yellow metal" could be necessarily contained in the concept "gold." After all, our

access, via phenomenal properties, to the world of material bodies might have been such that gold appeared blue to us. (Even in the actual world! And we might have been ignorant of this fact to the extent that we thought that (2) was analytic, but it turned out that we were wrong). But again, we

would not anticipate such an event occurring, for example, tomorrow after

noon. Note, however, that this problem can be dissolved if we take seriously Kant's reliance upon the indexicals in the quotation above. This usage suggests that Kant thinks that natural kinds are picked out indexically. Thus to say that "Gold is a yellow metal" is just to say that "This material body (which I call "Gold') is both yellow and metal." It is worth citing the German in order to emphasize the role of the indexical "this."

Eben darum find auch alle analytische S?tze Urtheile a priori, wenn gleich ihre

Begriffe empirisch find, z. B. Gold ist ein gelbes Metall; denn um dieses zu

wissen, brauche ich keiner weitern Erfahrung ausser meinem Begriffe vom

Golde, der enthielte, das dieser gelb und Metall sei; denn dieses machte eben meinen Begriffe aus, und ich durfte nichts thun als diesen zergliedern, ohne mich ausser demselben wornach anders umzusehen.14

We should, then, rewrite (2) so that it conforms to Kant's account of its

analyticity.

(2') This material body (which I call "gold") is yellow and metal.

How is it that (2') can be analytic despite the fact that "gold" is an indexical term? Well, it is analytic in the sense that the predicate "is a yellow metal" is what is contained in the thought (a concept) when we (Kant, really) do in fact use the term. And what is "contained in the thought" remains relatively fixed throughout a language community for some relevant time span. If this is hard to swallow, consider the following examples, which might be the kinds of propositions which could lead someone like Kant to hold that they are analytic.

4) Whales are fish.

5) Coral is rock.

6) Jupiter is a star.

So in a qualified sense it not that difficult to see how it could be that (20

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360 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

is indeed analytic for Kant despite the fact that it may not be so for a

twin-earth Kant (or even a modern Kant!) for whom the proposition "This material body (which I call 'Gold') is blue and metal" is analytic. And so, on

this reading, the sense in which (2') is analytic is the unsatisfying pragmatic sense of being analytic within a restricted set of experiences (language community, relevant time span). On this view, whether or not a proposition is analytic depends more upon practical considerations and external environ

ment than upon the meanings of the words themselves. And this seems to be

precisely what Kant has in mind.

[I]n the concept of gold one man may think, in addition to its weight, colour,

malleability, also its property of resisting rust, while another will perhaps know

nothing of this quality. We make use of certain characteristics only so long as

they are adequate for the purpose of making distinctions; new observations remove some properties and add others; and thus the limits of the concept are never assured. And indeed, what useful purpose could be served by defining an

empirical concept, such, for instance, as that of water? [A728/B756].

So on this reading, natural kind terms behave for Kant (at least some

times) something like indexicals. By this we mean only that context is

required in order to pick out the references of these sorts of terms. They can, nevertheless, serve as the constituents of analytic propositions in virtue

of indexically associated contents which are "thought with" the term on the

occasion of a particular use. This view, as we have noted above, has the

unfortunate consequence that "what's analytic for me might not be what's

analytic for you." Therefore, if we want analyticities of a variety more robust than this anemic pragmatic sort, we should engage in some sort of investi

gation designed to isolate the references and/or senses of our terms. Again, this is consistent with what Kant claims in the later sections of the Critique.

When we speak of water and its properties, we do not stop short at what is

thought in the word, water, but proceed to experiments. The word, with the few

characteristics which we attach to it, is more properly to be regarded as merely a designation than as a concept of the thing; the so-called definition is nothing more than a determining of the word. [A728/B756].

But still, we should refrain from hasty conclusions. It seems that Kant's

construal of natural kinds is not strictly indexical. In the case of gold, for

example, he maintains (apparently) that there is some sort of core concept to which other predicates may be contingently attached on the occasion of a particular use of the term. A limited analysis of the concept could then be

performed by which one isolates necessary but not sufficient constituents

of the intension of the kind term. Let us call the structure uncovered by such an analysis the uintensional microstructure" of the concept.15

Thus I might analyse my empirical concept of gold without gaining anything more than merely an enumeration of everything that I actually think in using the word, thus improving the logical character of my knowledge but not in any

way adding to it. But I take the material body, familiarly known by this name

[gold], and obtain perceptions by means of it; and these perceptions yield various propositions which are synthetic but empirical. [A721/B749].

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 361

So it seems that we can consistently hold that, for Kant, natural kind terms are quasi-indexical terms whose meanings and references are deter

mined in two steps. First, a core-concept consisting of necessarily associated

predicates isolates a specific range of possible referents. These predicates will be categorial terms, and will be semantically stable in the sense men

tioned above. Thus their references will not vary as a function of the

epistemic situation of the speaker. Secondly, more specific reference pro ceeds indexically. That is, a pragmatic outer component consisting of quali tative (and/or) theoretical terms associated with the core-concept by the

speaker (language community) serves to fix the reference within the

epistemic situation of the speaker making use of the term. Further, and

perhaps more importantly, some of these "outer" concepts may be associated

with the core concept as a matter of physical necessity. This might be the case with, for example, "gold" and "yellow." It is a matter of physical but not logical necessity that the phenomenal quality yellow is associated with

the particular frequency of light which is, as a matter o? physical necessity, reflected by the chemical element (or "material body") which we call "gold."

Thus natural kind terms will be semantically unstable, in a limited but

significant sense. Their "core-concept" will consist of semantically stable

predicates and thus there will be logically necessary propositions concerning them. The proposition "Gold is a material body" for example. On the other

hand, there will be contents which belong to the term only in virtue of the

epistemic situation of the speaker (broadly construed). If this turns out to

be a matter of physical necessity, then these contents will belong to the term

by virtue of physical (but not logical) necessity. "Gold is a stable element"

is, perhaps, an example. Finally, there will be predicates associated with the core simply in virtue of the contingent epistemic situation of the speaker. It

is due primarily to these contents that natural kind terms are semantically unstable and have an indexical nature. "Coral is rock" is an example of the

latter.

What then, to return to our original question, can we make of proposition (1)? Based on Kant's remarks concerning empirical concepts in the "defini

tions" section late in the Critique, it seems that (1) must be known a

posteriori.

When we speak of water and its properties, we do not stop short at what is

thought in the word, water, but proceed to experiments. [A728/B756].

This is curious since (1) seems to carry a sense of necessity with it. Thus

the problem that we are left with is making sense both of Kant's insistence that empirical science must proceed by experiment, and cannot therefore be a priori, together with the fact that empirical science makes discoveries

concerning necessities and is not therefore simply a study of contingent fact.

One way to reconcile this tension is to draw apart the notions of analyticity and necessity. But we could just as well, on this account, draw upon the

distinction between semantically stable and semantically unstable terms.

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362 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

But to reiterate, this leaves us (in certain cases) with a rather anemic sense

of analytic: "unstable analyticity. "

IV Kant versus Kripke

Perhaps the issues could be clarified in the context of contemporary debate.

Specifically, we should be able to determine whether Kant is a scientific

essentialist, and if not then what is it that makes his position unique. Saul

Kripke and Hilary Putnam (of the '70's) are commonly taken to argue for the recognition of a "strong" form of non-logical modality which obtains in the case of empirical discoveries of substance identities. Recently, however, Putnam has backed away from the notion of "metaphysical necessity," arguing along empiricist lines, that we have no need to introduce a new

modality in addition to physical and logical necessity. For this reason the discussion here will center on Kripke and, when helpful, on what is some times assumed by others to be entailed by his semantics. Beginning with one formulation of essentialism which takes it to be a consequence of the

theory of direct reference, we will then be in a position to assess the extent to which Kant's treatment of natural kinds involves an essentialism. The

goal will be to show that Kant's theory is particularly well suited to accom

modate indexicality and direct reference without entailing the further com

mitment to essentialism.

Classical arguments by Kripke and Putnam,18 which are sometimes cited as refutations of the theory that names have reference-determining descrip tive senses, take on an importantly different flavor in the context of Kant's semantics. Namely, the arguments in question purport to show that since we can use a definite description to refer to something despite the fact that the description does not (uniquely) apply to the thing referred to, there must be a further, referential, use of these descriptions which does not require the sense as mediator. The fact that a description "the F" can be used in

referring to something which either does not F or does not uniquely F serves to show (it is claimed) that knowledge of such a uniquely applying descrip tion is not a necessary condition of reference. Further, singular names seem

to behave in just this manner: they can be used to refer to things inde

pendently of whether or not contents generally associated with the name

pick out or describe (uniquely) in all possible worlds the thing referred to. General names, or natural kind terms, it is argued, behave in this manner

too.19 It is often assumed that the referential use of the terms allows us to "reach beyond" contingently associated contents and "latch onto" a meta

physical essence: the Kind. This at least seems to be Keith Donnellan's view.

The theory of natural kinds terms developed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam is seen by both authors, I believe, as being intimately connected to Kripke's views about reference, perhaps even a consequence of them. [Emphasis added].20

If this is so then we can see (or so goes the argument) how certain necessary truths involving natural kinds would be discovered empirically. That the

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 363

referents of co-referential kind terms are identical is a necessary truth, but the fact that the terms (with their associated contents) are used in order to refer to those things is something the knowledge of which requires empirical investigation.

One way to cast this notion is to borrow from Putnam the idea that we can give a definition of some natural kind ? by pointing out a particular

sample of what in a language community is generally referred to as "<|>" and

announcing that something is ? just in case it shares the important physical properties o? that. For a specific case let us use "water," as above. Donnellan,

speaking directly to Putnam, offers the following first pass at such a defini tion:

(P) Something is water just in case it is a liquid and agrees in its important physical properties with the general run of stuff which English speakers call "water.'*21

The use of "the general run of stuff. . ."is to indicate that which is picked out by surface properties which English speakers generally associate with "water." This "definition" can be generalized in order to apply to possible

worlds cases.

(P') For all worlds W, something is water in W just in case it is a liquid and

agrees in its important physical properties with the general run of stuff which English speakers call "water" in the actual world.22

As it turns out, being H2O is one of these important physical properties and so that water is H2O is, according to Donnellan, "an exotic necessary truth."23 It is exotic because it tells us something about the essential na

turel) of water and H2O, and so expresses a logical-metaphysical necessity. This is how essentialism is supposed to derive from direct reference.

But it could argued that the step from the "direct referential" theory of natural kind terms to this type of essentialism is not so easy Nathan Salmon, for example,24 argues that essentialism is not a logical consequence of the

theory of direct reference, and follows only upon supplementation by some

"non-trivially essentialist" premise. In order to make this explicit, Salmon offers the following version of such an argument.

(1) It is necessarily the case that: something is a sample of water if and only if it is a sample of dthat (the same substance that this is a sample of).

(2) This (liquid sample) has the chemical structure H2O.

(3) Being a sample of the same substance as something consists in having the same chemical structure.

(4) It is necessarily the case that: every sample of water has chemical struc ture H20. [R 166].

Salmon argues that the direct reference theorist need not hold (3) and therefore need not be committed to essentialism. Perhaps we could imagine worlds in which (3) does not hold.

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364 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

But chemical-structure-essentialism is not the only possible form for essentialism to take and, therefore, a rejection of (3) does not entail a

rejection of essentialism. One could simply retreat to some other criterion of substance identity, even in full knowledge that the criterion might turn out to be wrong. After all, the essentialists need not claim that their theory is a priori. It might, for example, be the case that the theory of atomic and

molecular structure turns out to be false. Perhaps the fundamental constitu ents of natural substances are not the quarks and leptons that contemporary particle physics posits, but are instead something described by a "hidden variable" theory which makes no mention of such entities. This contingent fact about what we happen to know does not bear on our having picked out a particular substance (such as water) whatever the correct scientific theory describing its essential nature happens to be. So one could still hold that the act of ostensively picking out some substance is the picking out of an essence, even despite our ignorance of just what the important (i.e., necessary and

sufficient) microstructural properties constitutive of this essence happen to be. One could latch onto the essence via the stereotypical properties that are

displayed at the macrophysical level of human phenomenal experience whether or not current scientific theory concerning the physical microstruc ture which explain or account for them happens to be correct. Ignorance of the (essential properties constitutive of the) referent does not defeat the

possibility of directly referring to a natural kind such as water via (perhaps) contingently associated "reference-fixing" properties. This sort of thing seems to be what Putnam really has in mind despite the fact that Donnellan

presents his case as so heavily dependent upon the ostensive definition style of argument. The force of his argument is not simply that we can make a

priori stipulations. If this were the sole force of the argument then Salmon would be justified in his criticism. But the real force of the argument seems to lie in the intuition that we could have a directly referential use of a kind term which "picks out" a particular substance independently of the

epistemic situation of the speaker. This is what Putnam has in mind when he insists that the "this" in the following "definition" is a de re "this."25

(P") (For every world W) (For every x in W) (x is water = x bears sameL to the

entity referred to as "this" in the actual world Wi)

With this understood we can see how one can retain an essentialism about such natural kinds as water but without having a final metaphysical doc trine concerning exactly what constitutes those kinds. Given these consid erations it seems then that we can conclude that Salmon's criticism of essentialism does not go through so long as the essentialist is free from commitment to specific theses such as (3) above. Nevertheless (we should

add) the essentialist, if his position is to be more than just an empty assertion, seems committed to some such nontrivially essentialist thesis in addition to mere theory of reference.26

We are now in a position to contrast Kant's treatment of natural kinds

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 365

with Kripke's. Recall Kripke's remarks concerning the necessity of certain

propositions known a posteriori.

. . . Such statements [as "water is H2O"] representing scientific discoveries about what this stuff is are not contingent truths but necessary truths in the

strictest possible sense.27

... A good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as mere natural

necessity is actually necessity tout court.

Support for this claim is to be found in arguments for the theory of direct reference. But, as we saw above, the direct reference theorist is not neces

sarily committed to essentialism. For, as in the present case of water, the direct reference theorist is free to deny that substance identities are to be

decided on the basis of chemical structure (or a similar candidate criterion).

Let us now give a preliminary sketch of one possible way to adopt indexi

cality (and perhaps analyticity) without commitment to essentialism. The

idea, taken from David Kaplan, is to show that the extension of sentences

containing indexicals depends upon contextual factors (speaker, language

community, etc.).29 Consider the following proposition,

(7) I am here now.

Kaplan claims that this sentence is true in virtue of the semantics of the

language. Anyone sufficiently versed in the English language would recog nize that (7) expresses a true proposition in every context of utterance.

Nevertheless the proposition expressed is, in most cases, contingent. For in

my own case, for example, each utterance of (7) is true despite the fact that

I might not have been at this particular place at this particular time.

The task now is to extend this sort of case to one involving natural kinds.

Let us take Kant's example:

(2) Gold is a yellow metal.

How can Kant hold that (2) is analytic? As before, (2) can be rewritten as

(2') This material body (which I call "gold") is yellow and metal.

Now, we can make the semantic claim that (2') is analytic but nevertheless

deny the essentialist's logical-metaphysical claim of necessity. For it is in

fact the case that this body is yellow and metal and it is this to which Kant

refers with the kind term "gold." Thus "gold" and its associated contents

"yellow" and "metal" behave in (2') analogously to the indexicals "I", "here", "now" and their associated contents in our example above: "I am here now."

So, it seems, we can hold that (2') is analytic but then qualify this in holding

only that such propositions are unstably analytic.

There is room for an objection here.30 Is it really the case that (20 is

analytic (that is to say, true in all contexts)? For consider a case in which the

body referred to as "this" in (20 is in fact plastic. Now this objection can be met in the following way. First, for the sake of a more comprehensive reply

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366 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

and since the same objection applies in this case as well, let us use Putnam's claim that anything which bears the equivalence relation sameL to the thing referred to as "this" in the actual world counts as water. According to this "definition" the following would be analytic,

(8) Water is a liquid.

Or alternatively,

(9) This substance (which I call "water") is liquid.

Now the objection will be that there is no way for the speaker to know a

priori that (9) is true. For the substance referred to as "this" may in fact be

(for example) plastic, and if this were the case then there is no way that (8) could be known a priori?1 The way to respond to this objection is to hold that the reference of a natural kind term is determined by means of a

Kripkean "original baptism" and that the subsequent use of the kind term "refers back" to the context of the baptism. By the latter we mean that there is some sort of causal history which connects the context of the baptism with the present context of utterance. If this is the case we can see that since the

"original baptizer" does have a kind of privileged epistemic status, (8) can

be known a priori. Then, if subsequent use of a kind term such as "water" is held to refer back to the context of the original baptism, a speaker of the

language could still be said to know (8) a priori despite the possibility that the substance referred to in (9) is really plastic. The fact that a speaker knows (8) a priori (in virtue of the semantics of the language) does not

necessarily clash with the fact that the actual referents of these terms might differ with change of context. This is precisely what is involved in claiming that natural kind terms behave like indexicals.32

With this in mind let us now return to our original question concerning Kant's position on proposition (1). The idea is to present his position as a

genuine (perhaps even viable) alternative to current stances, and this arises

quite naturally out of his idealism. Transcendental idealism and talk of the

synthetic a priori became unfashionable in the heyday of logical positivism. But now that positivism is largely discredited, perhaps a reexamination is in order.

Recall the relevant passages from the Critique and the Prolegomena.

For this very reason [their necessity] all analytic judgements are a priori even

when the concepts are empirical, as, for example, 'Gold is a yellow metal'; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold, which contained the thought that this body is yellow and metal. It is, in fact, this thought that constituted my concept; and I need only analyze it, without looking beyond it

elsewhere. [Prolegomena, p. 12].

For since we find in [an empirical concept (e.g., gold)] only a few characteristics of a certain species of sensible object, it is never certain that we are not using the word, in denoting one and the same object, sometimes so as to stand for

more, and sometimes so as to stand for fewer characteristics. [A727/B755].

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 367

When we speak of water and its properties, we do not stop short at what is

thought in the word, water, but proceed to experiments. The word, with the few characteristics which we attach to it, is more properly to be regarded as merely a designation than as a concept of the thing; the so-called definition is nothing more than a determining of the word. [A728/B756].

In the second place, it is also true that no concept given a priori, such as

substance, cause, right, equity, etc., can strictly speaking, be defined. For I can never be certain that the clear representation of a given concept, which as given may still be confused, has been completely effected, unless I know that it is

adequate to its object. [A728/B756].

When I point to this body and claim that it is a member of some certain

species, I have in mind a number of characteristics associated with the word such that these characteristics allow me to denote the object in such a way that the word serves as merely a designation for the thing rather than a

complete concept of the thing, something for which would require experi ence in order to know that it is adequate to its object.

It is tempting just to render these passages by means of a fairly straight forward assimilation to Kripke's theory of direct reference. And then, as

we've said, it is easy to move from there along some train of reasoning (keeping in mind that this is just one style of argument) very much like the essentialist train presented by Salmon above. This would, without too much

trouble, allow for (or perhaps be) an interpretation by which it follows that Kant is (or should have been) an essentialist. There is, however, no need to follow this path. For we saw earlier that traditional empiricist worries

(particularly concerning identity) block the attempt to derive essentialism from Donnellan's ostensive definition style of argument. Salmon, if his

argument is successful, shows that no "nontrivially essentialist" conclusions

follow from this sort of argument. So carving the semantics away from the

metaphysics apparently opens the way for an empiricist reply to essentialist claims concerning the empirical discovery of logical-metaphysical necessi ties. Thus they open the way for an interpretation of the above passages by which Kant could be seen to have an indexical theory of natural kind terms, but by which he nevertheless does not turn out to be an essentialist.

How does this work? Kant's natural kind terms are like indexicals in that, depending upon context, the same kind term could be used to pick out different referents.33 Thus the contents of the proposition that Gold is a

yellow metal can vary as a function of context despite the fact that it is

analytic: true in virtue of the semantics of the language. The term "gold" is

(partially) a dummy, "more properly to be regarded as merely a designation. "

Similarly the terms "water" and "H2O." Again, at this point it is tempting to make a certain essentialist leap: Because empirical concepts like "water" and "H2O" are indexical, they should be taken as rigid designators whose denotation with respect to some other possible world is just the same as their denotation with respect to the actual world. This leap would be unjustified for Kant.

The reason for this lies in the fact that Kant often wishes to restrict talk

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368 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

about possible worlds to a limited range of cases: those in which our concepts are "adequate to their objects," or are "objectively valid." This restriction

applies in all cases o? synthetic propositions.

For I can never be certain that the clear representation of a given concept, which as given may still be confused, has been completely effected, unless I know that it is adequate to its object. [A728/B756].

All synthetic judgements of theoretical knowledge are possible through the relation of a given concept to an intuition.Since (for us men) pure intuition is only possible (since no object is given) in so far as it consists merely of the form of the subject and of his receptivity to representations, that is, his

capacity to be affected by objects, the actuality of synthetic propositions a priori is already sufficient to prove that these propositions concern only sensible

objects and cannot transcend appearances.This is because the limits of our capacity to give objective reality to our concepts determines neither the bounds of the possibility of things, nor of the use of the categories in respect to the super-sensible, as concepts of an object in general, which ground actually gives practical Ideas of reason.34

This apparently rules out the possibility of (at least some) essentialist claims

concerning what may or may not be the case in all possible worlds. It rules

out, for example, the possibility of our quantifying over worlds in which the forms of our intuitions (i.e., space and time) are somehow other than they are. Thus when asked to imagine the substance water in some non-spatial

world, Kant is prepared to balk. And this is because he takes seriously empiricist worries concerning objects of thought which are not possible objects of experience.

Perhaps this point could be clarified by reference to Kant's transcendental

argument of the Aesthetic. Recall that this argument was designed to establish the necessity of the representations of space and time. The point crucial to the argument is (to put it overly simply) that, upon inspection, the

proposition that all objects are temporal is not simply a tautology but neither is it a mere empirical generalization. For this reason, if it is necessarily true then there must be some other (non-logical) modality at work. The solution offered is, of course, that such cases could only be explained by invoking the notion of the synthetic a priori. Time, on this view, is one of the a priori forms of intuition and thus functions both to structure our experience and at the same time to limit its range of possibility. Thus he solves the problem of the non-logical modality by (again, crudely put) taking it as mind imposed, but in so doing frustrates attempts to reason about objects in all possible worlds. For eliminating the structure (temporal and spatial structure for

example) eliminates the very constitution of any candidate object (or sub stance) to which our possible worlds intuitions are supposed to apply. (This

was a point made earlier.)

But perhaps there is a place for an interpretation of Kant which does not rule out essentialism. Consider the proposition,

(10) All bodies are extended.

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 369

We might be inclined to render this proposition as necessarily true without the restriction to some set of worlds. In symbols we would have,

(11) (Vx)(Bx -> Ex)

where the domain of "x" is not restricted to the members of worlds in which there are creatures like us. The restriction to a certain class of worlds is no

longer needed because in those worlds there are no bodies and so the conditional in (11) would be vacuously true for those cases. Indeed it is not unreasonable to think that this is just what Kant has in mind. For, in the introduction to the Critique, Kant holds that (10) is analytic. One should

not, however, allow the notion of "analytic" to simply collapse into the notion of "true at every world." For there may be synthetic propositions which have the same logical form as (11). The fact that such synthetic a priori proposi tions happen to have this form is enough to show that the form of (11) is not sufficient for bringing out what Kant has in mind by "analytic." (11) is

analytic because the concept of extension is simply "thought" in the concept of body. But of a synthetic proposition having similar logical form such as

"Every event has its cause" we would not say that it is true according to the

principle of containment alone. Rather, one is required to, so to speak, look into a particular world in order to evaluate such propositions at these worlds. In general we could say that analytic propositions are non-vacuously true

at all worlds (by virtue their "intensional structure") while synthetic a priori propositions are non-vacuously true in a restricted set of worlds and vacu

ously true at all others.

So now let us return to the case of water. As we have said, the kind term "water" can be held to be indexical-like: it has a constant component of

meaning which is held fixed throughout all contexts of use but its reference is unstable. To extend this notion we could claim that in the same way that the proposition "All water is wet" can be analytically true, one could hold that "All bodies are extended" is analytically true. In both cases the propo sition is true in virtue of the semantics of the language: true in virtue of what is "thought" in every context of use of the terms. But because epistemic conditions (e.g., those deduced in the Aesthetic) may vary throughout pos sible worlds it seems that it would be more accommodating to Kant to

interpret propositions such as ( 11) as necessarily true but only in a restricted set of possible worlds.35

Thus Kant might well assent to the proposition that it is necessarily the case that some substance identity holds. That water=H2U for example. But he would deny that it involves a metaphysical principle that holds in all

possible worlds. And this is because the substance terms "water" and "H2O"

refer, to be sure, indexically (and so directly), but not to the extent that they can refer beyond the necessary categories of experience and latch onto noumenal objects. Thus possible worlds semantics involving natural kind terms would have to be restricted to a certain range of worlds: those

sufficiently similar to our own, in which the synthetic a priori principles

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370 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

obtain. Without such a restriction, discussion would become arbitrary. (This was also a point made earlier).

Hence if the pure concepts of the understanding try to go beyond objects of

experience and be referred to things in themselves (noumena), they have no

meaning whatever. [Prolegomena, p. 55].

So Kant is prepared to accept the indexicality and thus the direct referential use of natural kind terms, but only in this restricted sense. That is, one should not

hastily employ such concepts as "substance" beyond the bounds of possible experience.

The principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world only serve our understanding for use in experience. Beyond this they are arbitrary combi nations without objective reality; and we can neither cognize their possibility a

priori, nor verify their reference to objects, let alone make such reference

understandable, by any example, because examples can only be borrowed from some possible experience, and consequently the objects of these concepts can be found nowhere but in a possible experience. [Prolegomena, p. 55].

And thus talk of "same substance" for natural kinds shall be similarly restricted. And if this is the case then there is no sense in which Kant could turn out to be a scientific essentialist. Because the references of our con

cepts, if they are more than "arbitrary combinations," must be possible objects of experience, we cannot establish identities across all possible worlds for non- phenomenal objects. And so discovery of the metaphysical identities claimed by scientific essentialists is precluded from the start.

So to conclude, although Kant's semantics of natural kind terms closely resembles that of modern scientific essentialists, it nevertheless does not commit him to an essentialist position. We have seen that treatment of natural kind terms as directly referring indexicals allows for statements such as "Gold is a yellow metal" to come out analytic in virtue of a Kripke style "original baptism" together with a causal history which connects the context of the original baptism with the present context of utterance. We have seen as well how statements such as "Water is H2O," even though they contain terms for empirical concepts, might carry some sort of necessity with them. But in virtue of his account of natural kind terms as indexicals, Kant is saved from commitment to an essentialist position since, as Nathan

Salmon points out, there is no step from direct reference semantics to essentialist metaphysics that does not involve a "non-trivially essentialist"

premise. Finally, Kant's arguments from the Aesthetic make it clear that he would not be willing to accept the sort of non-trivially essentialist premise that involves going beyond the bounds of possible experience. This being the

case, it is apparent that Kant's brand of idealism is still a viable alternative

position even (or perhaps especially) in the light of some recent advances in the theory of meaning and reference.36

University of Colorado at Boulder

Received November 15, 1993

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 371

NOTES

1. We might envision a theme: "Kant's Anticipation of Kripke" in the vein of Mackie's "Locke's anticipation of Kripke." See J. L. Mackie, Problems From Locke

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 93-100.

2. See, for example, Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1980); Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning, '"Philosophical Papers II: Mind, Language, and Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1975); and Tyler B?rge, "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Phi

losophy, vol. 4 (1979), pp. 73-121.

3. See George Bealer, "Mental Properties", The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 91

(1994), for further discussion, as these are his terms and not mine. See also, Alan

Sidelle, "Rigidity, Ontology, and Semantic Structure," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 89, p. 410. Sidelle introduces the notion of "rigid de facto" descriptions for

roughly the same purposes. 4. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis, IN:

Hackett, 1977).

5. One might be further inclined to claim that neither is it analytic for us, since

what is presumably "thought" in our concept is rather a number of macroscopic

properties. This will be discussed in greater detail below.

6. This is controversial for a number of reasons not the least of which concerns some of Kant's apparently contrary views expressed in the introduction to the

Critique (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). There Kant seems to hold that

necessity counts as a criterion of a priori knowledge.

Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be

otherwise. First, then, if we have a proposition which in being thought is

thought as necessary, it is an a priori judgement.Necessity and strict

universality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable from one another. [R 43-4].

A somewhat more sophisticated reading of this passage is possible if we render them

consistent with some remarks from the preamble to the Prolegomena.

For this very reason [containment] all analytic judgments are a priori even

when the concepts are empirical, as, for example, "Gold is a yellow metal"; for

to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold, which con

tained the thought that this body is yellow and metal. [P 12]. On our alternative reading, Kant holds that certain propositions are such that they must be thought as necessary but that the concepts (partially) constitutive of of the

thought may be learned empirically. 7. All quotations from the Critique of Pure Reason taken from the Kemp-Smith

translation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965).

8. In the Prolegomena, the reasoning goes as follows: "[T]his judgement, 'Some

bodies have weight', contains in its predicate something not actually thought in the

universal concept of body; it amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my

concept, and must therefore be called synthetic." [P 12].

9. This is strongly supported by analogous remarks about "gold" at A721/B750 and A728/B756.

10. Note that this reasoning may be incorrect. It could simply be a case of epistemic

contingency rather than metaphysical contingency, in which case the purportedly contingent facts concerning the relations between microstructure and macrostruc

ture would not be contingent at all. In order to correct the reasoning, it will be

necessary, in what follows, to make use of the two distinctions outlined earlier. In

particular, we will make use of the notion of semantic stability. 11. I am taking natural kinds to be such things as water, heat, light, gold, and so

on.

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372 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

12. See Kripke, op. cit., p. 39. The type of case I have in mind is Kripke's example of gold. We might discover something with all the phenomenal properties with which we associate the kind term "gold" but which nevertheless turned out to be something else, such as fool's gold.

13. This point was made clear to me in discussions with Robert Hanna.

14. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden k?nftigen Metaphysik, Preamble section 2. b. (Prussian Academy edition, p. 267). It is worthy of note that Kripke, in

discussing this passage [NN p. 39], relies upon the old Beck (1950) translation which

leaves out the indexical:

"... for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a

yellow metal."

This, I think explains Kripke's puzzlement with the fact that Kant took "Gold is a

yellow metal" to be analytic. He did not realize that Kant treated natural kind terms

as indexicals!

15. I owe this notion to Robert Hanna.

16. See in particular, Keith Donnellan, "Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind

Terms," in Knowledge and Mind, Ginet & Shoemaker, eds. (New York: Oxford, 1983), pp. 84-104. Also, Robert Farrell, "Metaphysical Necessity is not Logical

Necessity," Philosophical Studies, vol. 39 (1981),pp. 141-53; as well as Michael

Ayers, "Locke Versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 78

(1981), pp. 247-72.

17. Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). In

particular, see the essay "Is Water Necessarily H2O?," pp. 54-79, ofthat volume.

18. The same idea can be found in works by Kaplan and Donnellan as well. Kaplan sometimes refers to this notion as the "Kripke-Kaplan-Donnellan theory of direct

reference." See, David Kaplan, "Demonstratives", in Themes from Kaplan, Almog,

Perry, and Wettstein, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481-563, and Keith Donnellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions", in Semantics

of Natural Language, Donald Davidson, ed. (Boston: D. Reidel, 1972), pp. 356-79.

19. The most extensive treatment of this position that I have found is contained

in Joseph Almog, "DThis and DTaht: Indexicality Goes Beyond That", Philosophical Studies, vol. 39 (1981), pp. 347-81. But see Farrell, op. cit., as well, and Donnellan,

op. cit.

20. Donnellan, op. cit., p. 84.

21. Ibid., p. 96.

22. The scope of "For all worlds W" in (P') is a matter of some dispute. Putnam

makes it clear that he intends that "the entity referred to as 'this'" in (P') means

"the entity referred to as "this" in the actual world," and has thus a reference

independent of the bound variable "W." See Putnam (1973), p., 707. It seems fairly clear that this is also the sense in which Donnellan is taking (P'). The description, "The general run of stuff which English speakers call 'water'" is understood to refer

directly. Joseph Almog (op. cit.), however, disputes Putnam's claim that there is an

ambiguity which need be explained in terms of a scope distinction. His claim is that

since no modal operators are involved, "scope distinctions are irrelevant." (Almog,

1981, p., 353-4). I will avoid involving myself in the dispute over scope and simply

agree with Putnam and Donnellan that the description is used to refer directly. 23. Ibid., p. 97.

24. Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1981).

25. Op. cit., Putnam, p. 707

26. Clearly, Kant would want to rule out the sort of essentialism involving reference to objects (and their properties) which lie beyond the limits of all possible

experience. 27. Naming and Necessity, p. 125.

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KANT AND SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 373

28. Naming and Necessity, "addenda" in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics and Natural Language (Boston: D. Reidel, 1972), p. 769.

29. David Kaplan, "Thoughts on Demonstratives," in Yourgrau, Palle, ed., Demon

stratives (New York: Oxford, 1990), pp. 34-49.

30. The possibility of this sort of objection was made clear to me by George Bealer.

31. It may be of interest that Albert Cassulo levels a similar objection at Kripke's claim that an ostensive definition of "meter" can known a priori. See Albert Cassulo,

"Kripke on the a priori and the Necessary," Analysis, vol. 37 (1977), pp. 152-59.

32. For a formal treatment see Almog (1982), pp. 355-59.

33. According to Kaplan, the intensions as well as the extensions of indexicals are

determined by contextual factors. Only the "character-meaning" is held constant

throughout the contexts. The same idea is at work here with the exception that it

is the a priori nature of the mind (something which cannot be "derived from

experience") which accounts for this component of meaning rather than something like linguistic practice.

34. From, Henry Allison, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy (Baltimore, MD: Johns

Hopkins, 1973), pp. 164-65.

35. This interpretation involves a carving apart of analyticity and necessity which

would probably disturb Kant. But given that he is willing to admit the possiblity of forms of experience unlike our own together with the fact that he nevertheless denies the possibility of meaningful discourse concerning the nature of the constitu

ents of these experiences, it seems that Kant is committed to at least some sort of

division here.

36.1 wish to thank Robert Hanna, George Bealer, and Steve Leeds and the referee

for their many helpful and challenging comments. More specific citations are made

in the text where appropriate.

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