strategic trends in asia

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This article was downloaded by: [University of Kent] On: 23 November 2014, At: 13:29 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Small Wars & Insurgencies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20 Strategic trends in Asia Thomas A. Marks a a Teaches social sciences , Academy of the Pacific , Honolulu, Hawaii Published online: 26 Nov 2007. To cite this article: Thomas A. Marks (1996) Strategic trends in Asia, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 7:1, 79-84, DOI: 10.1080/09592319608423132 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592319608423132 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

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Page 1: Strategic trends in Asia

This article was downloaded by: [University of Kent]On: 23 November 2014, At: 13:29Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Small Wars & InsurgenciesPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20

Strategic trends in AsiaThomas A. Marks aa Teaches social sciences , Academy of thePacific , Honolulu, HawaiiPublished online: 26 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Thomas A. Marks (1996) Strategic trends in Asia, Small Wars& Insurgencies, 7:1, 79-84, DOI: 10.1080/09592319608423132

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592319608423132

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions andviews of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor& Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information.Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly inconnection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

Page 2: Strategic trends in Asia

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 3: Strategic trends in Asia

Strategic Trends in Asia

THOMAS A. MARKS

In examining possible areas of Asia - where future multinational peaceoperations might take place, a special operations component thus following- there are two possible approaches. The first, which I shall decidedly notuse, is to comb the region systematically for likely candidates, an inventoryof instability if you will. This leads only to argument between self-appointed experts. It is, in any case, rather an exercise in futility, since thereis little chance we can raise our intelligence gathering and analyticalcapabilities to the necessary level of viability. What we can do, though, asecond approach, is to sketch out the strategic trends and, in the process, citesome exemplars.

It is the end of the Cold War, of course, which sets the stage for whatfollows. It is a stage which has seen 50 years of arrangement. World WarII's conclusion found the democratic powers, having defeated Fascism,locked in immediate confrontation with their erstwhile ally, the SovietUnion, an opponent more powerful in every sense than either the Nazis orJapanese militarists (Italy need not detain our discussion). How subsequentCold War victory was actually achieved by the Washington-led coalitionremains a subject of much debate, the most salient aspect of which is aconcerted effort by the academic veterans of the anti-Vietnam Warmovement to paint the struggle as neither victory nor crusade but onlyAmerica forcing conflict upon an unwilling, frightened Moscow (withsundry Third World victims suffering alongside, targets of our institutionaland systemic terrorism). Less debatable has been the result: to use WorldWar II imagery, we have not seen peace in our time.

In retrospect, this seems hardly surprising. That we expected victory tobring with it a moment's rest can only call forth analytically a jadedrecitation of the truism that hope springs eternal in the breasts of men. Whathas followed, the veritable explosion of violence, appears with the benefitof hindsight to be all too predictable. That it was not anticipated is a tellingcommentary upon our complete preoccupation with the trees at the expenseof the forest. Likewise, the intense discussion which has greeted efforts atexplication often does more to reveal respective ideological positions thanit does to provide accurate commentary about either the posited frameworksor the realities the explication seeks to elucidate. Nevertheless, certainimportant works have served as a foundation for the intellectual andstrategic debate which has emerged in the so-called 'New World Order'

Small Wars and Insurgencies (special issue), Vol.7, No.l (Spring 1996), pp.79-84PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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80 SOF IN MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

(which, as any number of wags have had it, has turned out to be neither newnor very ordered). The notes cite them.

What the references attempt to do is to grapple with the underlyingstrategic dynamic(s) at hand now that the overwhelming dynamic of theCold War has collapsed. Huntington1 argues that future conflict is likely tobe driven by a 'clash of civilizations', as dissimilar worldviews playthemselves out in local arenas. Gurr2 lowers his sights a notch below thisand speaks of ethnonationalism erupting in a bewildering array ofcircumstances and groups. Riggs3 provides a macro-historical context inanalyzing what he calls the 'three tsunamis [tidal waves]' of recent worldhistory: consolidation (of the globe's peoples into geopolitical units),liberation (as distinct peoples have sought autonomy), and self-determination (as the previous stage moves forward in logical sequence).Homer-Dixon et al. examine the seemingly inevitable violent consequencesof resource depletion and population growth. Tobias5 does the same but goesbeyond the descriptive to present a journalistic immediacy that includesinterviews with key players worldwide. Kaplan6 takes the lot and describesa world already reduced to near-anarchy in spots and rapidly heading for thesame in others. Rummel,7 in tabulating the sheer awesome scope of man'sinhumanity to man, highlights the political consequences of non-democraticpolitical solutions and the quest for power. Finally, Anderson8 has servednotice that the communities we take for granted are, in a very real sense,artificial. They have been created and sustained.

These works are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily designed toexplain the universe of problems which have surfaced in the post-Cold Warpolitical arena. Rather, they offer means to deal analytically with theproblem. Using their strategic explanations, we can say that the operationalissues which confront us are as follows:• Systemic Disintegration - the ripping apart of nation-states as nations

clash with states, the latter necessarily artificially created, but theformer, too, in some cases, artificially created; the point being, however,that the 'fit' between the two has never been perfect, any more so in Asiathan in other areas of the globe. In some cases the results are simplyannoying (e.g. is it of more than passing concern that even tiny Bhutannow has active ethnic unrest as Nepali migrants in its south work againstthe Bhoot majority?), but in numerous other cases the implications areprofound. The situations in India and Pakistan come readily to mind,where, amidst the numerous uprisings only just contained through adegree of militarisation which is quite astonishing (e.g. India'sparamilitary forces), there are some (e.g. Kashmir) which havethreatened to embroil rival powers (i.e. already India and Pakistan havenarrowly avoided military engagement over Pakistan's alleged

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STRATEGIC TRENDS IN ASIA 81

assistance to the Muslim insurgents in Kashmir).• Ideological Clash - the march of communist utopianism may have been

halted, but in its place we have the 'subversion' of other ideologies (e.g.democracy or fundamentalism). This has already led to serious violencein the largest Asian state of all, China, but one should not disregard thelower but equally serious level of disorientation which has emerged inthe likes of Japan or Thailand as demands for increased democraticaccess have shaken the bureaucratic polities so-favoured by Asiangovernments, whether civil or military.

• Ecological Concerns/Population Growth - throughout the region, thegrowth of population and the depletion of resources is creating scenariosfar closer to that outlined years ago by Morris West in his novel Shoesof the Fisherman than is generally noticed (i.e. populations forced on themove in search of sustenance). India has long been the premierillustration, but in truth there is no Asian country which can be said notto have either present or potential for serious violence in this area. Evengiant China, the subject of West's treatise and long thought in thepopular mind to have established a base level of subsistence for all, inreality has problems of ecological devastation which rival those whichhave recently come to light in eastern Europe and the former SovietUnion. Consequently, there are enormous areas (i.e. enormous bothactually and comparatively) which are already all but inhabitable. Thechain reaction which will necessarily be set in motion as largepopulation movements begin to occur will become increasingly moreevident as the years pass and population growth, even if checkedsomewhat, ensures that the carrying capacity of the land will beexceeded.

• Resource Scarcity - it follows from the discussion above that resourcesnot only are strained now but increasingly will become a source ofconflict, both internally and in international relations. We see the formerin any number of cuiitexts (e.g. Homer-Dixon et al. discuss the tragiccase of the ongoing clash in the Bangladeshi Chittagong Hills betweenresisting upland tribesmen and migrating lowlanders). The latter hasrecently emerged as a serious concern in the South China Sea (Chineseirredentism may be at work, but it seems more likely that Peking'sinfatuation with the region stems from the possibility that it will containresources). In either case, the results are likely to be explosive.

• Economic Dislocation/Clash - again, what has just been discussed leadsnaturally to another concern, one which has both an internal and anexternal dimension. As presently we understand the realities of life onearth, there is no mechanism save industrialisation capable of providingwork and sustenance for burgeoning populations. Industrialisation,

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though, brings with it a host of conflict-laden problems which arereaching crisis proportions in many areas of Asia, Further, theconsequences of alienation, as the recent growth of cults exemplifies(with or without a desire to use poison gas in subways), contains anelement of concern which has been all but ignored by governments.Some decades ago, the consequences of 'development' were examined,particularly as they related to the Cold War clash (i.e. the exploitation byone side or the other of 'grievances'), but of late our attention has turnedelsewhere. Occupying us instead have been the external manifestationsof economic growth, the growing clash between systems, of which theUS-Japan tiff is only the most obvious and serious.

• Culture Clash — one does not have to agree wholeheartedly withHuntington9 to accept that he is on to something. The bitterness evidentin recent exchanges between the United States and Singapore (or evenbetween two Asian states, such as the Philippines and Singapore)highlights the potential here for conflict. How the states of the regiondeal with the various problems identified above can lead to seriousdisagreements of style and substance. When the fallout is but bad blood,as in the Michael Faye caning case, it is one thing; when bilateralrelations are actually endangered, as is presently the case following thedisputed execution of a Filipina maid, it is another matter altogether.There are, as well, at least four concerns which might be called more

traditional:• Cold War Holdovers - victory may have been achieved, but the war is

not over. The West still has enemies who do not wish it well. NorthKorea is only the most obvious, but China should not be judged a partnerand may yet precipitate conflict in the region. Of most concern arePeking's current aggressive moves in the South China Sea and itscontinuing efforts to isolate Taiwan.

• Weapons Proliferation - Not only do at least three Asian states possessweapons of mass destruction (i.e. China, India, and Pakistan), there alsocontinue to be efforts by others (e.g. North Korea, certainly; Taiwan, byaccusation of some) to obtain these. Further, proliferation of weapons ofmore traditional concern goes on unabated. China, for instance, hasemerged as a leading supplier.

• Natural Disasters - disease, movement of refugees, earthquakes, andsuch all remain significant regional phenomena. Of particular concernshould be the inevitable consequences of HIV moving into AIDS incertain states, devastating the population (e.g. in Southeast Asia, especi-ally Thailand).

• Drugs - far from vanishing, this problem has become more serious andwidespread than ever, with the added element that the products no longer

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simply transit the states concerned but have instead contributed toserious domestic problems..What is difficult, and fortunately the concern, in a sense, of others, is to

discern precisely where these trends will achieve substantive form such thatwe might anticipate multinational action. One thing is clear, any suchaction, in fact, will involve a special operations component, for it becomesincreasingly obvious that it is special operations forces which are capable ofcarrying out those functions peculiar to what we at one time termed, almostprophetically, 'stability operations'. It is also clear that we discard at ourperil the possibility of multinational action, since it is obvious that will andfunding, both facets which rise and fall with distressing frequency, are thekeys, not probability per se. Ergo, there is just as likely to be multinationaleffort in support of flood relief in, say, Bangladesh, as there is to be a moretraditional deployment, such as that which remains along the demarcationline between Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir. And it is their off-the-mark capabilities, as well as the simple fact that they will go where they aretold, do what is ordered, and work long hours at bargain wages, whichguarantee special forces uses in roles as disparate as civic action,coordination and control, or ready reaction. Gunships or water systems, allare of a special operations piece - and Asia is as likely to see theiremployment as areas we think of as perhaps more unstable..

A ready illustration might be the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka, whereIndian intervention was ultimately carried out in summer 1987 under theguise of providing a peacekeeping force. There were any number ofobservers who at the time were urging Colombo to invite in aCommonwealth or United Nations presence. This did not happen, and wemay consider it unlikely that it would have, but how likely is the presentsituation, where India has departed, but the US now sends in Special Forcestraining teams to work with Sri Lankan forces? As has been demonstrated,it has become a logical step that such presence should become part andparcel of a multinational peacekeeping effort should the internationalcommunity decide that such would facilitate 'peace' (whatever that is, thecynic would add).

More to the point of what has been discussed above, the conflict in SriLanka, though 'ethnic' in its externals, involved 'deeper' considerations ofideology, population pressure impinging upon scarce resources, geopolitics,and a host of other concerns - none of which in isolation could have beenjudged beforehand likely to turn an island paradise into a protracted battlezone.

Likewise, might we not expect some sort of UN involvement in calmingthe growing tensions in the South China Sea? It is certainly not beyond therealm of possibility that a solution, requiring verification and observation,

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would require specialised work which would consequently be assigned tothe only bodies able to carry it through instantly, special operations forces.Yet what drives Chinese actions? Population pressure combined withresource scarcity? Irredentism?

My point is not that either of these illustrations is imminent, only that,given the trends above, we ignore possibilities at our peril. The use of amassive matrix (driven perhaps by factor analysis?) might be useful; but so,too, would be simple area expertise. To continue the point, it may be hardto envisage another immediate multinational deployment on the scale of theCambodian mission (1992-93), but can we seriously rule out the possibilitythat a similar action might not surface in Timor or Jaffna or any of severalother trouble (and troubled) spots? True, Asia contains economicpowerhouses such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. It is also, however, a hostof other worlds, with possible multinational effort as diverse in form as theregion. No matter: in any effort, special operations forces will play a keyrole.

NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993)pp.22-49. 'Comments: Responses of Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?'",ibid. 72/4 (Sept/Oct. 1993) pp.1-26; Samuel P. Huntington, 'Response: If Not Civilizations,What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World', ibid. 72/5 (Nov/Dec. 1993) pp.186-94.

2. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk-A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict (WashingtonDC: US Inst. of Peace Press 1993); idem, 'On the Political Consequences of Scarcity andEconomic Decline', Int. Studies Qtly 29/1 (March 1995) pp.51-75. 'Peoples Against States:Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System'. Presidential Address to Int. StudiesAssoc. Annual Meeting, 1 April 1994, Washington DC.

3. Fred W. Riggs, 'Ethnonationalism, Industrialism, and the Modern State'. Paper presented toPolitical Economy Sect., Int. Studies Assoc. Annual Meeting, 6 April 1994, Washington DC.

4. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey H. Boutwell, George W. Rathjens and 'EnvironmentalChange and Violent Conflict: Growing Scarcities of Renewable Resources Can Contributeto Social Instability and Civil Strife', Scientific American (Feb. 1993) pp.38-45. Thomas F.Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: Environmental Change as Causes of Acute Conflict', Int.Security 16/2 (Fall 1991) pp.76-116.

5. Michael Tobias, World War III: Population and the Biosphere at the End of the Millennium(Santa Fe: Bear & Co. 1994). See review in this issue.

6. Robert D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', Atlantic Monthly (Feb. 1994) pp.44-75.7. Rudolph J. Rummel, Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 (New

Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press 1994); idem, 'Focus on: Power, Genocide and MassMurder', Jnl of Peace Revearch 31/1 (1994) pp.1-10.

8. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism (London: Verso Editions 1983).

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