New Ideas in Psychology 28 (2010) 168–174

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Stern words on the mind–brain problem:Keeping the whole person in mind

Steven R. Sabat*

Department of Psychology, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online 4 March 2009

* Tel.: þ1 202 687 3457; fax: þ1 202 687 6050.E-mail address: sabats@georgetown.edu

0732-118X/$ – see front matter � 2009 Elsevier Ltdoi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2009.02.003

a b s t r a c t

The presentation of recent research in neuroscience in articles,books, and the popular press, has reflected what Bennett andHacker refer to as the mereological fallacy, in which a variety ofpsychological aspects of experience such as distorting, telling,directing, controlling, producing, managing, winning, interpreting,being political expecting, sensing, or talking, have been attributedto the brain or parts of the brain. In each and every case, theauthors of such locutions are begging the question and creatinga new form of Cartesian dualism that their efforts were undertakento avoid. In this article I present Stern’s view of the mind/brainrelationship as found in his Critical Personalism, wherein heanticipates and refutes such attributions as are being madepresently and instead attributes such experiences and tendencies notto the brain, but to the person. Stern’s views and the relationshipbetween brain development and culture are briefly explored.

� 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The mind/brain problem is an abiding issue that has occupied the interest of philosophers, physi-ologists, psychologists, and now neuroscientists. Centuries after the rejection of Cartesian dualism, thedebate continues and scholars support one or another position on the question. In recent years, thedebate has entered another stage at which we find the issue of the mereological fallacy raised byBennett and Hacker (Bennett, Dennett, Hacker, & Searle, 2003), who argue that it is fallacious to ascribe‘‘to the constituent parts of an animal attributes that logically apply only to the whole animal’’ (p. 22).They go on to say that,

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‘‘human beings, but not their brains, can be said to be thoughtful or thoughtless; animals, but nottheir brains, let alone the hemispheres of their brains, can be said to see, hear, smell and tastethings; people, but not their brains, can be said to make decisions or to be indecisive’’ (p. 22).

Although the book is, itself, devoted to the debate surrounding this and related issues, it is not mypurpose in this article to join that debate, but rather to explore William Stern’s contributions to thisabiding debate as expressed in his Critical Personalism. Before doing so, however, it is worthwhile tonote the importance of this issue in terms that Bennett and Hacker delineate in their discussion of‘‘Why it matters to the educated public’’. The authors note that the ways in which the relationshipsamong mind, brain, and person, are discussed by neuroscientists can lead to confusion among the laypublic. Although it is apparent that neuroscientists are keen to convey their findings in the public pressin newspapers and books that reach audiences beyond those who read scientific journal articles, it isalso apparent to Bennett and Hacker that

‘‘.by speaking about the brain’s thinking and reasoning, about one hemisphere’s knowingsomething and not informing the other, about the brain’s making decisions without the person’sknowing.neuroscientists are fostering a form of mystification and cultivating a neuro-myth-ology.(that) does anything but engender the understanding on behalf of the lay public that it isaimed at.(and) the lay public will look to neuroscience for answers to pseudo-questions that itshould not ask and that neuroscience cannot answer. Once the public become disillusioned, theywill ignore the important genuine questions neuroscience can both ask and answer’’ (p. 47–48).

It is abundantly clear that what Bennett and Hacker call the mereological fallacy has already made itspresence felt tremendously in the public press. I present below some recent examples attesting preciselyto the confusion that the authors warn against and indicate the points of confusion and of conflation:

1) ‘‘The brain’s inclination to distort time is one reason we so often feel we have too little of it.’’(Stefan Klein, NY Times, March 7, 2008).

It has not been established that the brain can ‘‘incline’’ to do anything, including to ‘‘distort’’. In thisexample, it is the brain that distorts time and ‘‘we’’ therefore feel we have too little time. Exactly wherethe brain ends and ‘‘we’’ begin is unclear here, but in this example, ‘‘it’’ does something, or is inclined todo something, and ‘‘we’’ then feel this or that way.

2) ‘‘There is a friendly power struggle roiling deep in Brian Bannister’s brain. The right hemi-sphere d the half that controls creativity and imagination d tells him how to design Web sitesand produce photo illustrations. The left hemisphere d the half that directs motor skills and isresponsible for logic and reason d endows him with the ability to throw a 12-to-6 curveball andmanage a flourishing commercial-photography studio. The two hemispheres are constantlycompeting for Bannister’s attention. Neither may ever emerge victorious in the melding of histwo selves, the artist and the baseball player.’’ (Ben Shpigel, NY Times, February 20, 2006)

It has not been established that a hemisphere of the brain can ‘‘control’’ a person’s creativity andimagination, or ‘‘tell’’ anyone anything, including the person whose brain it happens to be. Likewise, ithas not been established that a hemisphere of the brain can ‘‘direct’’, or be ‘‘responsible’’, or ‘‘produce’’or ‘‘manage’’ anything, including a business, or ‘‘compete’’ for the person’s attention, or that a brainhemisphere can be ‘‘victorious’’.

3) ‘‘Dr. Damasio argues that the insula, in effect, maps these signals from the body’s physicalplant, and integrates them so the conscious brain can interpret them as a coherent emotion.’’(Benedict Carey, NY Times, January 26, 2007)

It has not been established that it is the brain that is ‘‘conscious’’ or that the brain can ‘‘interpret’’anything.

4) ‘‘The frontal insula is where people sense love and hate, gratitude and resentment, self-confidence and embarrassment, trust and distrust, empathy and contempt, approval anddisdain, pride and humiliation, truthfulness and deception, atonement and guilt.’’ (Sandra Bla-keslee, NY Times, February 6, 2007).

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It has not been established that the frontal insula (or any other part of the brain) is ‘‘where’’ people‘‘sense’’ any of the qualities enumerated above.

5) The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation by Prof. DrewWesten, Public Affairs Press, 2007.

It has not been established that a brain can be ‘‘political’’.

6) ‘‘Researchers Pinpoint Brain’s Sarcasm Sensor’’ Health Day News May 23, 2006

It has not been established that the brain has, or even could have, a ‘‘sarcasm sensor’’.

7) ‘‘In Memory-Bank ‘Dialogue,’ the Brain Is Talking to Itself.’’ NY Times, December 18, 2006.

It has not been established that a brain can talk at all, much less to anyone or to itself.

8) ‘‘Brain makes decisions before you even know it.your brain makes up its mind up to tenseconds before you realize it, according to researchers.’’ Kerry Smith, Nature News, Onlinepublication, April 11, 2008.

It has not been established that the brain ‘‘has’’ a mind. Adding further confusion to the issue, theauthor separates the brain from ‘‘you’’ and endows the brain with a mind of its own that is somehowseparate from ‘‘you’’, the individual whose brain it is, supposedly.

In each of the above examples, the authors who are reporting about news and information gainedfrom neuroscientists, are begging the question and in some cases they are simply reflecting the factthat the neuroscientists themselves are begging the question. There is not an iota of scientific evidencethat brains can do any of the things that have been ascribed to them by the authors of the articlesabove. In spite of this, the authors (and some neuroscientists) are making these attributions as if theywere established scientific facts, as opposed to the interpretations offered by the neuroscientists aboutwhose work the authors are reporting. There is clearly a difference between facts and interpretations.Just as clearly, there is nothing amiss about stating one’s interpretations and beliefs. Also just as clearly,there is something quite amiss about presenting one’s interpretations and beliefs as if thoseinterpretations and beliefs were facts established by science.

Interestingly enough, the verbs in question in the examples above such as: distort, tell, direct,control, produce, manage, win, interpret, being political (or anything else), sense, or talk, have all beenattributed to the brain or parts of the brain, whereas in the past these verbs and others have beenattributed to the person. It is not clear at all just how making these questionable attributions to thebrain provides greater clarification of the issues at hand than would be achieved by attributing thoseactions to the person. Nor is it clear how the allegedly conscious brain could tell a person (its person,perhaps?) anything or how the conscious parts of the brain (as opposed to the ‘‘unconscious parts’’?)could do anything and then communicate that to the person. In all these examples, it becomes difficultto understand the relationship between brain, its parts, and the person whose brain it happens to be. Ina way, all this talk serves to depersonalize the operations of the brain, which is, itself, now going to‘‘report’’ to the person whose brain it is, just what ‘‘it’’ finds is going on in the world and what ought togo on in the world. Of course, one might choose to meld all these parts of brain and person intoa physical whole, as does Kalat (2007), when he says, ‘‘your brain is you!’’ (p. 10), but then again, thatwould be stating an opinion as if it were a proven fact, which is it not. On the other extreme, we havethe example in number eight above in which the author clearly takes exception with Kalat, by indi-cating that the ‘‘you’’ in all this is different, somehow, from the brain and ‘‘its’’ mind which ‘‘it’’ made upbefore ‘‘you’’ knew as much. Thus, in this form, the person, the ‘‘you’’ in this equation, is merelya robotic figure that acts according to the dictates of his or her brain, thereby leading some neuro-scientists to question the existence of free will, as does John-Dylan Haynes, of the Max Planck Institutefor Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, who was quoted in the Nature News article to which I referredabove as saying: ‘‘.there’s not much space for free will to operate.’’

Within these attributions and debates, we also find conceptual misunderstandings such as thatrevealed by Searle (Bennett et al., 2003) when he indicates that there are questions that would be‘‘outlawed’’ by the approach taken by Bennett and Hacker. One such question would be, in his words,‘‘What are the NCCs (neuronal correlates of consciousness) and how exactly do they cause consciousness?’’

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(p. 124). There is the possibility of some confusion here, for although there may be neuronal events thatare correlated with this or that aspect of consciousness, or with consciousness itself, they are not andcannot be considered to be causes simply because they happen to be correlates. So even if we were toascertain the NCCs, they could not, on that basis alone, be considered as being the ‘‘causes’’ ofconsciousness.

From all of the above, it would appear that the attribution of this or that level of awareness to thebrain or some part or parts thereof, which then tells the person what ‘‘it’’ thinks or decides is no moreanalytically sound, no more scientifically tenable, no more parsimonious, than was the Cartesiandualism that it so fervently seeks to replace. Indeed, Bennett and Hacker propose that a modern form ofCartesian dualism is taking shape herein. So how might we think about these issues in a moreconstructive way? To explore this question, I shall now turn to the views expressed by Stern.

2. The person as a unitas multiplex

As if to anticipate the aforementioned mereological fallacy, Stern (1938) states rather plainly in hisGeneral Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint, that the individual is ‘‘not partly body and partlymind, but a person with the capacity for experience’’ (p. 84). He rejects Cartesian interactionism as well asWundtian psychophysical parallelism, but asserts instead that ‘‘every relationship of the physical andthe mental passes through the person and is first set up and afterward directed by his total activity andtotal aims.A particular brain cell does not ‘experience’ a definite idea when it is excited; rather doesthe person respond to a definite stimulus situation with a total reaction that is physically concentratedin certain cerebral tracts and that mentally results in an ideational experience’’ (p. 85). Hence, both themental and the physical occur in the person, who is not a ‘‘go-between or passive theater of psycho-physical events, but as their true generator and carrier, governor and regulator’’ (p. 85). If we hearkenback to examples in the introduction and reformulate them to reflect Stern’s point of view, it is not thebrain that tells the person this or that, but the person who experiences this or that. It is the person towhom all the verbs discussed in the introduction are to be ascribed, not the person’s brain or part of theperson’s brain. It is the person who is conscious of this or that, not the person’s brain or one or anotherstructure in the person’s brain that is conscious. The person is, therefore, in Stern’s view, ‘‘psycho-physically neutral’’, and defined as being ‘‘a living whole, individual.striving toward goals, self-con-tained and yet open to the world around him; he is capable of having experience’’ (p. 70).

Indeed, insofar as Stern believes that a person can be understood as having qualities that ‘‘existapart from the differentiation into body and mind’’ (1938, p. 70), he seems to avoid falling into the trapsof Cartesian dualism and that of the mereological fallacy. The personalistic view is that individuals arenot comprised partly of mind and partly of body, but that an individual is a person who has, by defi-nition, a capacity to experience. As individual persons, we are part of the physical world in ourcorporeal nature, and we also have the capacity to reflect inwardly, which is our mental nature. Ourlives include both and so Stern asserts, ‘‘there is no experience and no capacity for experience that is notbound up with the physical aspect of life and with bodily functions’’ (1938, p. 84). So although herecognizes that we encompass physicality and mentality, through the concept of ‘‘psychophysicalneutrality’’, he avoids the trap of a materialistic monism that endows personal qualities of mind andexperience to one or another part of the brain, that then must somehow ‘‘communicate’’ its thoughts tothe person as we saw in examples presented in the introduction. Stern seems to have anticipated thisformulation when he says, ‘‘.the person is not here regarded as a mere go-between or passive theatre ofpsychological events, but as their true generator and carrier, governor and regulator’’ (1938, p. 85). Decadesearlier, he noted about the person, ‘‘It is not that here there are the physical and the psychological, butrather that there are real persons, that is the primary fact of the world. That these persons can appeardifferently to themselves than they appear to others, thereby producing the distinction between the mentaland the physical, is a fact of secondary order’’ (Stern, 1917/2010, p. 20).

In examples 1–8 of the introduction, a part of the body, the brain, is assumed to be the author,regulator, controller of behavior, or interpreter of experience. In some cases, one or another part of thebrain is given those qualities. Stern, on the other hand, does not see what is attributed to the brain or toparts of the brain as being coeval with being attributed to a person, for he views a person as being morethan merely the body or a part of the body. The entire body is only a part of a person, not the totality of

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a person. Therefore, a part of the body is a still smaller part of the person and so it is incorrect in Stern’sview to attribute to parts of a person that which can be attributed only to the whole person. A person isnot merely physical, as any inanimate object in the world is physical. Although there is a biologicalcomponent to a person, a person’s existence and experience are more than merely biological. To wit,the person’s life appears in three realms, that of (1) the biosphere, (2) the world of objects andexperience of the outside world and also of one’s subjective experience, and (3) the world of values. Aperson is an individual who is inherently valuable and who projects value on objects in the world. Inthis sense, the person can be understood as being a ‘‘unitas multiplex’’, as being a unity that iscomprised of different facets.

3. The significance of the body

The personalistic view of the body is that the person makes use of the body ‘‘in the service of hisexperience’’ (p. 85) in his or her efforts to pursue and achieve goals. Some aspects of our experience areconnected with the systems that circulate blood, assimilate nutrients, and the like, whereas otheraspects of our experience are connected with the central nervous system. Thus, in those aspects of ourexperience that involve thought, imagination, and creativity, ‘‘the cerebrum is the properly qualifiedinstrument’’ (p. 86). Note that Stern uses the word, ‘‘instrument’’ here just as he indicates that the bodyis used in the ‘‘service’’ of our experience. In this way, we see that Stern’s view is quite different from,and a corrective to, that expressed in the mereological fallacy wherein we find, in example 8, that a partof the person’s body is somehow functioning as a person: ‘‘Brain makes decisions before you even knowit.your brain makes up its mind up to ten seconds before you realize it.’’ To Stern, writing in the early 20thcentury, this statement would have been no more coherent than it is to Bennett and Hacker a centurylater.

So the body is significant in that it serves the psychophysically neutral person as an instrumentthrough which and with which the person acts in a goal-directed way in the world and has experiencesthat are often value laden. This is quite different from the point of view expressed in the above andother examples, wherein the brain or part of the brain (‘‘the frontal insula is where people feel love andhate.atonement and guilt.’’) is the locus of the feeling rather than the person him or herself. Aperson may feel a sensation that he or she localizes in the leg (‘‘Something’s crawling on my leg’’), butwe do not indicate that we feel trust for someone in our frontal insula. Trust or love is something wefeel in our totality as persons, according to Stern. Likewise, the purveyors of the mereological fallacyremove goal-directedness from the person and simply ascribe it to this or that part of the person’sbrain.

The body also has what Stern called ‘‘radial significance’’. That is, the body is more than simply theinstrument with which the person experiences and acts upon the world, but it is also through thebodily states and movements that the person portrays him or herself: ‘‘The arrangement by which theperson expresses his life inwardly and outwardly includes both components (feelings and posturalmovements) in one’’ (p. 88). Thus it is the person who directs the flow of motor skills, not the motorcortex (or the left hemisphere as in example 2), the person who directs and focuses attention towardthis or that in connection with some goal that he or she wishes to realize, not the left or right hemi-sphere that is ‘‘vying’’ for the person’s attention. Persons compete for this or that, and they may usetheir bodies as instruments in goal-directed behavior in Stern’s view, but their hemispheres surelyaren’t persons and they do not compete or even ‘‘compete’’.

4. Neural underpinnings, bases, correlates?

In the past few decades, we have become accustomed to hearing locutions such as ‘‘the neural basisof perception’’ or the ‘‘physiological underpinnings of explicit memory’’. As the research using func-tional neuroimaging techniques expands, we find locutions such as, ‘‘Smokers’ brains compute, butignore, a fictive error signal.’’ (Chiu, Lohrenz, & Montague, 2008, p. 514) and ‘‘.belief and disbelieflikely emerge from the activity of neural circuits that participate in a wide variety of cognitive andbehavioral tasks’’ (Harris, Sheth, & Cohen, 2007, pp. 141–142). On the other hand, we also find ‘‘Neuralcorrelates of envisioning emotional events.’’ (D’Argembeau, Xue, Lu, Van der Linden, & Bechara, 2007,

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p. 398). The words, underpinnings and bases on one hand, and correlates on the other hand have verydifferent meanings and thus convey very different points of view about the relationship between brainfunction and various different psychological states. Stern’s views on these differences can be quiteinformative.

Of course, Stern would not agree that a brain could ‘‘compute’’ or ‘‘ignore’’ anything, but it is in theselatter areas that more subtle notions emerge. In exploring these matters, Stern begins by asking thequestion directly: ‘‘Do mental data have any ‘substratum?’ Is there an entity by which they aresubstantiated and from which they issue? The question must be answered in the affirmative’’ (p. 68). Atissue, though, is from what, exactly, do mental data issue? Here Stern indicates clearly, ‘‘.mentalphenomena, processes, and states are simply properties of the concomitant individual self that ‘has’them. Not the existence of a substratum, but only its nature is open to question (p. 69). According toa materialistic point of view, the ‘‘substratum’’ of what is commonly referred to as ‘‘mind’’ – or ofoperations that would fall under the category of mental or psychological or cognitivedwould bephysiological, bodily processes. So that the ‘‘underpinnings’’ or ‘‘bases’’ to which I referred above are, inthis calculus, assumed to be neural and it is assumed further that the psychological aspects ‘‘emerge’’from these neural events.

In Stern’s view, the science of mind does not deal with physiological processes, but with ‘‘.internalexperience and events and the ability to have experience; and these categories are different from thoseof the purely physical world’’ (p. 69). So what is the substrate of mind in the personalistic approach?While rejecting the monism that replaced dualism, Stern asks the question of whether the substratumof mental data can be defined by criteria ‘‘.belong neither to the purely psychical nor to the purelyphysical sphere.whether the categories, ‘physical’ and ‘psychical’ can themselves be subordinated assecondary to another category that appropriately defines its essential nature. The affirmation of thisview is the fundamental task of personalistic theory’’ (p. 70). And, as if to come full circle, Sternindicates that the substrate of which he speaks is none other than the person who is ‘‘psychophysicallyneutral’’ and that referring to the person as being both physical and mental allows that the psycho-physical relationship is ‘‘meaningful’’.

Finally, on the matter of correlations between mental and physical aspects, Stern indicates thatinvestigation of such relationships is potentially informative, although he does indicate that there isroom for improvement: ‘‘It is.a justifiable and fruitful inquiry to seek relatively generic and constantcorrelations between mental and physical items. But this is only one perspective; the rigid coordinationmust be tempered by recognition of the capacity of such correlations to be transformed and madenovel and individual, and to have more than one meaning’’ (p. 86). He goes on to assert that differentareas of the brain are ‘‘no longer regarded as fixed local organs that are solely and immutably thedeterminants for storing up, associating, and promoting the activity of definite mental functions. Theyare simply regions that have peculiar readiness for performance of special functions for which they arepredisposed (but not predestined) by heredity’’ (p. 87). This view has found support in the expandingliterature (see Halsband, 2006 for a review) indicating that the acquisition and use of at least twolanguages early in life affect (a) a reorganization of the neural areas generally thought to be involvedwith language, and (b) enhancement of certain executive functions. Similar effects have been reportedwith regard to the learning of complex skills involving music and mental calculations (Hanakawa,Honda, Okada, Fukuyama, & Shibasaki, 2003).

Cagigas and Bilder (2009) have discussed Luria’s imprint on recent research regarding culturaleffects as seen in neuroimaging studies. In their chapter, the authors assert that all of this is reflectedclearly in the theoretical perspective of Luria (2002) who saw that the ‘‘brain itself was part ofa functional system, which extended into the cultural-historic world. This ‘extracortical organization’readily observable in the environment was dynamically intertwined with the neural organization ofthe ‘working brain’.’’ Cagigas and Bilder go on to show how Luria saw that complex neurocognitivesystems were formed by the interaction of the person with cultural aspects of the everyday world.These ideas were captured, I believe, in Stern’s assertion that ‘‘This commerce between person andworld is so intimate that there is no separating cause from effect in any given case.it is possible todistinguish two directions of activity in the person–world relation; one is centripetal (world–person),the other is centrifugal (person–world). In the first case, the person is receptive and responsive inencountering the world, in the second he is seeking and giving’’ (p. 89). Stern’s notion here is mirrored

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also in the findings reported by Hedden et al. (2008) in their imaging studies, that the activation ofbrain networks involved in simple visual and attentional tasks was affected by the subject’s culturalbackground and the degree to which the subject identified with those cultural values. This, too, ismirrored in Stern’s (1917/2010) earlier treatise : ‘‘The person is, according to his/her inner dispositions,simultaneously goal-striving and in need of supplementation. Regarding this latter need, room anddirection is postulated for the participation of the world in the person’s development.On this view, it is dueto the incompleteness and breadth of latitude of every personal disposition that its determination throughthe world factor is required, while yet at the same time the way in which this influence can occur iscircumscribed by and colored through the goals of the person’’ (p. 24).

The philosopher Mary Midgley has noted that

People sometimes say that the human brain is the most complex item in the universe. But thewhole person of whom that brain is part is necessarily a much more complex item than the brainalone. And whole people can’t be understood without knowing a good deal both about theirinner lives and about the other people around them. Indeed, they can’t be understood withouta fair grasp of the whole society that they belong to, which is presumably more complex still.(Midgley, 2001, p. 120)

Rather than conceiving of conscious, depersonalized brains or parts thereof, that somehowcommunicated with ‘‘us’’ (without indicating the precise nature of the ‘‘us’’ or of the system ofcommunication), Stern also eschewed dualist as well as parallelist approaches to the mind–brainproblem and the difficulties of explaining the interactions that would exist within such formulations.Instead, as if to anticipate Midgley, Stern asserted the fundamental primacy of the person asa psychophysically neutral unitas multiplex, a unified combination of physical and mental attributes,considering as fundamental the experience and goal-seeking efforts of the person in his or her relationswith the world at large. In so doing, he paid homage to and celebrated the intrinsic value anduniqueness of the human being as one who had the ability to impose value on the world as well to aslive in a world of values, a world that the person acted upon and that acted upon him or her. It isabundantly clear that seventy years after his death, the echoes of Stern’s voice are especially valuable.

References

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Cagigas, X. E., & Bilder, R. M. (2009). Where culture meets neuroimaging: the intersection of Luria’s method with modernneuroimaging and cognitive neuroscience research. In A. L. Christensen, D. Bougakov, & E. Goldberg (Eds.), Luria’s legacy inthe 21st century. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chiu, P. H., Lohrenz, T. M., & Montague, P. R. (2008). Smokers’ brains compute, but ignore, a fictive error signal in a sequentialinvestment task. Nature Neuroscience, 11(4), 514–520.

D’Argembeau, A., Xue, G., Lu, Z.-L., Van der Linden, M., & Bechara, A. (2007). Neural correlates of envisioning emotional events inthe near and far future. NeuroImage, 40, 398–407.

Halsband, U. (2006). Bilingual and multilingual language processing. Journal of Physiology, Paris, 99(4–6), 355–369.Hanakawa, T., Honda, M., Okada, T., Fukuyama, H., & Shibasaki, H. (2003). Neural correlates underlying mental calculation in

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control. Psychological Science, 9(1), 12–17.Kalat, J. W. (2007). Biological psychology (9th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth.Luria, A. R. (2002). Vygotsky and the problem of functional localization. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 40(1),

17–25.Midgley, M. (2001). Science and poetry. London: Routledge.Stern, W. (1917/2010). Psychology and personalism (J. T. Lamiell, Trans.). New Ideas in Psychology, 28(2), 110–134.Stern, W. (1938). General psychology from the personalistic standpoint. (Howard Davis Spoerl, Trans.). New York: Macmillan.