STATUTORY CASES

Case Title: G.R. No. L-19650 (September 29, 1966)Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his capacity as The Postmaster General

1) Facts

The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, parying “that judgment be rendered declaring its ‘Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public”.

In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest� which calls for participants to “estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.� The contest is open to all “motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivres�. There is neither a fee or consideration required nor a purchase required to be made. The forms are available upon request at each Caltex station and there is also a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.

Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the contest, thus, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest. However, the postal authorities denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which prohibits the use of mail in conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.

Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no consideration involved in the part of the contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their view and even threatened Caltex that if the contest was conducted, “a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representativesâ€?. This leads to Caltex’s filing of this petition for declaratory relief.

The court ruled that the “petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution or said rules by the mails�. The respondent then appealed.

2) Issue(s)

a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?

b) Whether or not the proposed “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest� violates the Postal Law?

3) Ruling

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

4) Ratio

Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions. Based on Section 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.

Requisites for Declaratory Relief:- There is justiciable controversy- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse- The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy- The issue is ripe for judicial determination

* The “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest� is a mere “gratuitous distribution of property by chance�. It does not qualify as a lottery due to the lack of consideration. An act to be deemed as a lottery must constitute a (1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) consideration. The participants are not required to do anything or purchase anything from Caltex in order to participate in the contest. The true test for having consideration is “whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize.�

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. EismaGR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective

bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Paat v. CA GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring

Facts: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzman’s truck was seized by Department of Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENRO’s Jovito Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck. Its owner, De Guzman, failed to submit the required explanation within the reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENRO’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. De Guzman filed for reconsideration but was denied.

The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by De Guzman and company against Layugan and Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2), contending that the only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in the transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman further contended that the seizure is illegal, as she did not use the truck in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as

allegedly admitted by the Regional Executive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to De Guzman. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court sustained the trial court’s order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition.

Issues:

Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances belongs to the courts

Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277

Held: The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts exclusively (pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentioned nor included in the former provision. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. In the case at bar, the phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”

Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of the amendatory executive order, when it eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code “ and inserted the words “ shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,” meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

People v. MapaGR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur

Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm

Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.

Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the

municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San NicolasGR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring

Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,” found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49)En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring

Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioner’s opposition. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without Comelec approval.

In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK election as a regular local election.

Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election in a recall proceeding

Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in “the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth”. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this would render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become moot and academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay office concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.

Floresca v. Philex MiningGR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part, others dissenting

Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations’ mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workman’s Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer is negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.

Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1976, involving the issue whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee or his heirs’ action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or his heirs have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees, or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae are diverse.

The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is selective, i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies, but that they cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further held that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judicial legislation.

Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court

assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.” Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.

Republic v. CA and MolinaGR 108763, 13 February 1997En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result

Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment

declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Aisporna v. CAGR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.

For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act

Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from

acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

China Bank v. Ortega (J)GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest Development Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.

To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the bank’s cashier, disallowed the same invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was directed to comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank and Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation), and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the case, the position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforementioned provisions of law.

Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.

Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costs against the petitioners.

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. BautistaGR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring

Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents. On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilao’s failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to complete his supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.

Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilao’s monthly pension was, however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date.

In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved. The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that since the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence from the date of approval of the application.

Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.

Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges, and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a life pension for the incapacited, pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law. Gasilao’s claim was sustained.

The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22 June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.

Salvatierra v. CAGR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was survived by his legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and sister Marcela, all surnamed Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three parcels of land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax Declaration 11950, Cadastral Lot 26, covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot 27, covered by Tax Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvatierra sold Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo Salvatierra by means of a deed of sale, and in consideration of P1,000.00. Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to Venancio. Bartolome’s share was sold by his heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968, an “Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale” was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and descendants of Enrique Salvatierra. After the partition, Venancio owned 1041 square meters consisting of Lot 27 and portion of Lot 26 (which is approximately 749 square meters), Anselmo owned 405 square meters of Lot 26, while the heirs of Tomas owned 1,116 square meters, the whole of Lot 25. Thereafter on 15 June 1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 to spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through a relocation survey that the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 was outside Longalong’s fence as Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a title in his name (Original Certificate of Title 0-4221) covering the whole of Lot 26). Efforts to settle the matter at the barangay level proved futile because Purita Salvatierra (widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to the latter the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26.

Longalong filed a case with the Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of the said portion of Lot 26. The court a quo dismissed the case on the grounds that Longalong failed to establish ownership of the portion of the land in question, and that the prescriptive period of four years from discovery of the alleged fraud committed by defendants’ predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs should have filed their action had already elapsed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, ruling that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized to sell; and as to the co-owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell his pro indiviso share therein to, but he cannot sell more than his share therein. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in Lot 26

Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil Code (“If the terms of a contract are clear and

leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.”) Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their forms maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present. In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale). Since Macario’s share (later Anselmo’s) is only 405 of the 749 square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the remaining 344 square meters of Lot 26, 149 square meters of which was sold to Longalong. Supplemented by the holding that the prescriptive period on reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in Caro v. CA, Longalong is entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was filed five years after the constitution of Anselmo’s fraudulent Original Certificate of title.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for want of merit, with costs against petitioners.

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad CompanyGR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.

The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for mandamus. The court determined Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees’ debt from the latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’ credit union; but which does not convert the credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.

Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.

Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages and salaries.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

Abellana v. Marava [GR L-27760, 29 May 1974]Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concur, 1 concur based on paragraph 2 & 3 of opinio

Facts: Francisco Abellana was charged with the City Court of Ozamis City with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeño. Abellana was found guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded.

Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, Lamason et.al. filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of Abellana. In such complaint, Crispin Abellana, the alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was already on appeal. The judge in the latter CFI ordered on 28 April 1967 that the City Court judgment is vacated and a trail de novo be conducted. He noted that the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or reserved their right to institute it separately in the City Court; but which they filed in the CFI. In view of the waiver and reservation, the Court would be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused and in favor of the offended parties. the motion to dismiss is denied. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the petition.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.

1. Appeal of judgment in municipal trial court, new trial as if originally instituted in the CFIThe rule in the jurisdiction of the Court is that upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it had been originally instituted in that court (Section 7 of Rule 123, People v. Jamisola). So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. An interpretation that an independent civil action is barred absent a reservation under Section 1 of Rule 111 is a non-sequitur, as the inference does not per se arise from the wordings of the rule and ignores what is explicitly provided in Section 7, Rule 123.

2. A statute must not be construed in a manner giving rise to a constitutional doubtA court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. The grant of power to the Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right. Thus, substantive right cannot to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear when it provides that in cases of . physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed

independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

3. Assurance of parties justice according to law must not be ignored in the pursuit of serving the interest of a client; Construction should be based on legal norm, not literalnessA counsel must not ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law, in serving the interest of his client. He is not to fall prey to the vice of literalness. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.

PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor RelationsGR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring

Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by employees who did not want any union. On its face therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.

Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills

Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as 1 May 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1 November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen,” a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: “The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.” There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty,” a 1918 decision: “Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.” Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions. As was emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, “the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner PAFLU.

Philippine Apparel Workers’ Union v. NLRCGR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring

Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the Union submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company. The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.

On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission (Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions.

Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was already in force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is nothing in the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May 1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with inflation brought about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that negotiations were still being held on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977).

The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is

based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law.

The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the company.

IBAA Employees Union v. InciongGR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)Second Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner’s complaint for payment of holiday pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.

On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads as “Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing the bank’s appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.

Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: “employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by

the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. OpleGR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of 10 unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from 1 November 1974.

Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid employees the holiday pay and the premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays.

On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner’s claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9, claiming the rule that “If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.”

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly paid employees are not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled to the premium or overtime pay differentials.

Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation, which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy Instruction was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus applies in the case at bar. Since the private respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of 10 legal holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary. They are not among those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday pay

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Minister’s 7 September 1976 order, and reinstated with modification (deleting the interest payments) the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming the 30 October 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter.

Victorias Milling v. Social Security CommissionGR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627)En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring

Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued its Circular 22 providing that “effective 1 November 1958, all employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee’s remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.” Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company, Inc., wrote the SSC in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular 7 (7 October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the SSC ruled that Circular 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to the Supreme Court on appeal.

Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation.

Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it “makes” a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what “compensation” should mean “For the purposes of this Act”. RA1792 amended such definition by deleting some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs against appellant.

Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur

Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner

of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.

1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural questions set aside due to demands of public interestBecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test Mison’s right to the office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.

2. Constitutional ConstructionThe fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez) The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.

3. President’s power to appointSection 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission.

4. Express enumeration excludes others not enumeratedIt is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

5. Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and adopted in light of prior lawsA constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935

Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of “horse-trading” and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a “middle ground” by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.

6. Construction of “also” in second sentence; consideration of different language of proximate sentences to determine meaningThe word “also” could mean “in addition; as well; besides, too” besides “in like manner” which meanings could stress that the word “also” in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word “also” as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.

7. Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character; Limitations construed strictlyThe power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

8. The use of word “alone” after “President” in third sentence is a lapse in draftsmanship, a literal import deemed redundantAfter a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word “alone” after the word “President” in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word “alone” after the word “President” in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word “alone” in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the

second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

9. President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs; Commissioner not included with the first group of appointmentThe position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972).

10. Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must be read in harmony with the new oneRA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Perfecto v. MeerGR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.

Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”. It also provides that “until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos”. When Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not “provided otherwise”, by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.

The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the amount under protest. He contended that the assessment was

illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.

Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amounts to a diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be considered as a diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs. Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

Endencia v. DavidGR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur

Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.

Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.

Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.

Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Resolution)GR L-78780, 23 July 1987En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987.

Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively.

Issue: Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exempt justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.

Held: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the present case, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. Thus, the debates, interpolations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.

Aglipay v. RuizGR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSISGR 122156, 3 February 1997En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent

Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender

of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Tanada v. TuveraGR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectiveness of laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not indispensable.

Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws

Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of

effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication — but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and that unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring

Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause “unless otherwise provided”.

Held: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of

enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

Primicias v. UrdanetaGR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.

Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) became effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.

On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta’s Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S. 1964), for overtaking a truck.” The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s license which he surrendered, and a temporary operator’s permit was issued to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).

Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case. On 29 June 1966, the Court of First Instance Lingayen held in its decision that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez, Suyat, and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace

throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the plaintiff’s driver’s license, and to pay the cost of the suit. The public officials appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.

Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The ordinance’s validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the “mother statute” (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase “vehicular traffic” (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, RA 4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore in view of the foregoing, is void.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.

La Carlota Sugar Central v. JimenezGR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295)En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took no part.

Facts: Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which was under the administration of Elizalde, imported 500 short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate. When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed 17% exchange tax from the Central in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18 November 1955 the Central filed, through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition for the refund of the P20,872.09 paid (the 17% tax), claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore upon request and for the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned and managed by Elizalde, and therefore the importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax in accordance with Section 2, RA 601, as amended by RA 1375.

On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the petition. The Central requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was denied. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18 January 1957, the Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that the importation of the fertilizers does not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of RA 601, as amended by RA 1375; and thus affirming the decision of the Auditor, Central Bank of the Philippines. The Central and Elizalde filed the petition for review in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the exemption (provided by Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).

Held: The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17% tax only if the same were imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The word “directly” has been interpreted to mean “without anything intervening”. Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than his cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption.

When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer. Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through their cooperatives.

CIR v. CAGR 115349, 18 April 1997 (271 SCRA 605)Third Division, Panganiban (p): 4 concurring

Facts: Private respondent, the Ateneo de Manila University, is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines. One auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which has no legal personality separate and distinct from that of private respondent. The IPC is a Philippine unit engaged in social science studies of Philippine society and culture. Occasionally, it accepts sponsorships for its research activities from international organizations, private foundations and government agencies. On 8 July 1983, private respondent received from Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a demand letter dated 3 June 1983, assessing private respondent the sum of P174,043.97 for alleged deficiency contractor’s tax, and an assessment dated 27 June 1983 in the sum of P1,141,837 for alleged deficiency income tax, both for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. Denying said tax liabilities, private respondent sent petitioner a letter-protest and subsequently filed with the latter a memorandum contesting the validity of the assessments. On 17 March 988, petitioner rendered a letter-decision canceling the assessment for deficiency income tax but modifying the assessment for deficiency contractor’s tax by increasing the amount due to P193,475.55. Unsatisfied, private respondent requested for a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the modified assessment.

At the same time, it filed in the respondent court a petition for review of the said letter-decision of the petitioner. While the petition was pending before the respondent court, petitioner issued a final decision dated 3 August 1988 reducing the assessment for deficiency contractor’s tax from P193,475.55 to P46,516.41, exclusive of surcharge and interest. On 12 July 1993, the respondent court set aside respondent’s decision, and canceling the deficiency contractor’s tax assessment in the amount of

P46,516.41 exclusive of surcharge and interest for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. No pronouncement as to cost. On 27 April 1994, Court of Appeals, in CA-GR SP 31790, affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in accord with said decision, petitioner came to Supreme Court via a petition for review.

Issues:

Whether the private respondent has the burden of proof in the tax case. Whether the private respondent is taxable as an independent contractor.

Held: The Commissioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying the well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the imposition of taxes. It is obviously both illogical and impractical to determine who are exempted without first determining who are covered by the aforesaid provision. The Commissioner should have determined first if private respondent was covered by Section 205, applying the rule of strict interpretation of laws imposing taxes and other burdens on the populace, before asking Ateneo to prove its exemption therefrom, following the rule of construction where “the tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer”.

The doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously. Tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.” In case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly import. In the present case, Ateneo’s Institute of Philippine Culture never sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in a business apart from and independently of the academic purposes of the university. Funds received by the Ateneo de Manila University are technically not a fee. They may however fall as gifts or donations which are “tax-exempt” as shown by private respondent’s compliance with the requirement of Section 123 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for the exemption of such gifts to an educational institution.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the private respondent is not a contractor selling its services for a fee but an academic institution conducting these researches pursuant to its commitments to education and, ultimately, to public service. For the institute to have tenaciously continued operating for so long despite its accumulation of significant losses, we can only agree with both the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals that “education and not profit is motive for undertaking the research projects.

Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. MarcosGR 120082, 11 September 1996 (261 SCRA 667)Third Division, Davide Jr. (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act 6958. Since the time of its creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. However on 11 October 1994, the Office of the Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment of realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified. It also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing a governmental functions, which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. It nonetheless stands in the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its powers and functions. The City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA is a government controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), and not an instrumentality of the government but merely a government owned corporation performing proprietary functions. MCIAA paid its tax account “under protest” when City is about to issue a warrant of levy against the MCIAA’s properties.

On 29 December 1994, MCIAA filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the Cebu Regional Trial Court contending that the taxing power of local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees on an instrumentality of the national government. It contends that by the nature of its powers and functions, it has the footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government; which claim the City rejects. On 22 March 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition, citing that close reading of the LGC provides the express cancellation and withdrawal of tax exemptions of Government Owned and Controlled Corporations. MCIAA’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its 4 May 1995 order, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes.

Held: Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are paid for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not apply because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its operations. Further, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) is a “taxable person” under its Charter (RA 6958), and was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Since Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly provides that “All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees [sic], executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” With that repealing clause in the LGC, the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958 had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the LGC. Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the challenged decision and order of the RTC Cebu; without pronouncement as to costs.

Serfino v. CAGR L-40858, 15 September 1987Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT 1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January 1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R (1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. On that same day, TCT 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On 15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter did not present the documents for registration until 17 December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19 November 1964, the spouses Serfinos mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985.

The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the lower court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985; issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties appealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of errors, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification in its decision setting aside the decision of the trial court declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the Serfino spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino and PNB to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.

Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to

enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has been derived from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the mortgagee’s fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs.

The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.

Manahan v. ECCGR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of “Enteric Fever” while employed as classroom teacher in Las Piñas Municipal High School, Las Piñas, Rizal, on 8 May, 1975. The deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20 July 1969, and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated 19 June 1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational disease, and that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.

The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the decision of the GSIS on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or aggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Workmen’s Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker

Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses and Claims), workmen’s compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued Hence, this Court applied the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioner’s claim.. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974, thus, his action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations — like the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Labor Code — should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner the amount of P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit and P600.00 as attorney’s fees, to reimburse the petitioner’s expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts, and to pay administrative fees.

Villavert v. ECCGR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233)First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring

Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. The deceased also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. On 11 December 1975, the deceased reported as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp Crame. He performed his duties not only as Code Verifier but also handled administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel. Although he was complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of said day, he was required to render overtime service until late in the day, typing voluminous classified communications, computing allowances and preparing checks for the salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country for distribution on or before 15 December 1975. Gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling incoherent words while asleep, and when he was not able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to the University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay (UERM) Memorial Hospital where he died at 5:30 am. The NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown, although most research data agree that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease.

On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under PD 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment. The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). On 31 May 1978, the ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to her son’s death benefits.

Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis (acute inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a “bout of alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died, neither is there a showing that he used drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of Internal Medicine (by Harrison 7th Edition, p.

1571). From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. Further, Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.”

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of P6,000.00.

Del Rosario & Sons v. NLRCGR L-64204, 31 May 1985 (135 SCRA 669)First Division, Melencio-Herrera (p): 5 concurring, 1 on leave

Facts: On 1 February 1978, Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered into a “Contract of Services” with Calmar Security Agency whereby the latter undertook to supply the former with security guards at the rate of P300.00 per month for each guard. Thereafter, Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo Borata and Silvino Tudio filed a Complaint against the Security Agency and petitioner, for underpayment of salary, non-payment of living allowance, and 13th month pay. Thereafter, five other guards filed their complaint for the same causes of action. Petitioner contended that complainants have no cause of action against it due to absence of employer-employee relationship between them. They also denied liability alleging that due to the inadequacy of the amounts paid to it under the Contract of Services, it could not possibly comply with the payments required by labor laws.

Assigned for compulsory arbitration, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for want of employer-employee relationship. When the case was appealed to the NLRC, the decision was modified by holding that petitioner is liable to pay complainants, jointly and severally, with the Security Agency on the ground that the petitioner is an indirect employer pursuant to Articles 106 and 107. Hence, the appeal. The petitioner contended that NLRC erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that it was not under oath and the required appeal fee was not paid; in holding it jointly and severally liable with the Security Agency; and in refusing to give due course to its Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue(s):

Whether the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency invalidate the appeal. Whether the security guards from the agency are entitled to benefits claimed from the company

Held: The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were not fatal defects. The lack of verification could have been easily corrected by requiring an oath. The appeal fee had been paid although it was delayed. Failure to pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal. Dismissal is discretionary with the Appellate Court and discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. Failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and such power must be exercised with sound

discretion and with a great deal of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances.” Moreover, as provided for by Article 221 of the Labor Code “in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

Further, Articles 106 of the Labor Code provides that “in the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him,” and Article 107 provides that “the provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.” In the case at bar, petitioner became an indirect employer of respondents-complainants when petitioner entered into a Contract of Services with the Security Agency and the latter hired the complainants to work as guards for the former. However, the petitioner’s liability should be without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement against the Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants. The Security Agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that petitioner’s payments to it were inadequate. As an employer, it is charged with knowledge of labor laws and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any other’s.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review, without prejudice to petitioner’s right to seek reimbursement from Calmar Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants. Costs against the private respondent.

Ty v. First National SuretyGR L-16138, 29 April 1961 (1 SCRA 1324)En Banc, Labrador (p): 8 concurring

Facts: At different times within a period of two months prior to 24 December 1953, Diosdado C. Ty, employed as operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton Factory insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, among which being the 8 above-named defendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. Plaintiff’s beneficiary was his employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the insurance premiums. On 24 December 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object. He was brought to the Manila Central University hospital, and after receiving first-aid, he went to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries (fractures in index, middle, fourth, and fifth fingers of left hand). From 26 December 1953 to 8 February 1954, he underwent medical treatment in the hospital. The above-described physical injuries have caused temporary total disability of plaintiff’s left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the above-named defendants to recover indemnity. Defendants rejected plaintiff’s claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy.

Plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which dismissed his complaints. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa, which absolved the defendants from the complaints. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the disability of his left hand.

Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the case at bar, due to the clarity of the stipulation, distinction between “temporary disability” and “total disability” need not be made in relation to one’s occupation means that the condition of the insurance is such that common prudence requires him to desist from transacting his business or renders him incapable of working. While the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff or his employer, for whose benefit the policies were issued, it can not go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define partial disability as loss of either hand by a amputation through the bones of the wrist.” There was no such amputation in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

De la Cruz v. Capital InsuranceGR L-21574, 30 June 1966 (17 SCRA 559)En Banc, Barrera (p): 8 concurring

Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy. In connection with the celebration of the New Year, the insured, a non-professional boxer, participated in a boxing contest. In the course of his bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The insured died with the cause of death reported as hemorrhage intracranial, left. The insurer refused to pay the proceeds of the policy on the ground that the death of the insured in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by the insurance.

Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and beneficiary under the policy, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of indemnity under the insurance policy. Denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the CFI Pangasinan (Civ. Case No. U-265)) for specific performance. Defendant insurer set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance. After due hearing, the court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff; ordering the insurance company to indemnify plaintiff for the death of the latter’s son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorney’s fees. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the death of the insured is covered by the policy.

Held: The terms “accident” and “accidental” have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. The terms mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation: an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured’s voluntary act, which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of policies insuring against the death or injury from accident. In the present case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, if without the unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he could not have received that blow in the head and would not have died. Further, death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract (What was included was death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling). Failure of the defendant insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against appellant.

Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock InsuranceGR L-4611, 17 December 1955 (52 OG 1982)First Division, Reyes JBL (p): 7 concurring.

Facts: Before WWII, Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned 4 warehouses in Tabaco, Albay used for the storage of stocks of copra and of hemp in which he dealt extensively. They had been, with their contents, insured with the Insurance Company since 1937, and the lose made payable to the Philippine National Bank as mortgage of the hemp and copra, to the extent of its interest. On 21 July 1940, fire of undetermined origin that broke out and lasted almost one week, gutted and completely destroyed Bodegas Nos. 1, 3 and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. Plaintiff-appellee informed the insurer by telegram on the same date. The insurance Company resisted payment, claiming violation of warranties and conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other persons in connivance with him. Qua Chee Gan, his brother Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of his were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of arson but were acquitted by the trial court in a final decision on 9 July 1941.

With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted the action in 1940 with the Court of First Instance of Albay, seeking to recover the proceeds of certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., through its agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegas and merchandise of the insured that were burned on 21 June 1940. The records of the original case were destroyed during the liberation of the region, and were reconstituted in 1946. After a trial that lasted several years, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the insurance company to pay Qua Chee Gan the sum of P146,394.48 (1st cause of action), P150,000 (2nd), P5,000 (3rd), P15,000 (4th) , and P40,000 (5th), each bearing 80% interest per annum in accordance with Section 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from 26 September 1940, until each is paid, with costs against the defendant. It also dismissed the complaint in intervention of PNB without costs. The Insurance Company appealed directly to the Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fire insurance policy prohibited the storage in the premises of oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and their liquid products having a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein.

Issue: Whether gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the forfeiture of claims under the insurance policy.

Held: The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of “oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a flash point below 300° Fahrenheit”, and is decidedly ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, “Oils” mean “lubricants” and not gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. There is no reason why the prohibition of keeping gasoline in the premises could not be expressed clearly and unmistakably, in the language and terms that the general public can readily understand, without resort to obscure esoteric expression. If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to have been plainly expressed in the policy. Still, it is well settled that the keeping of inflammable oils on the premises, though prohibited by the policy, does not void it if such

keeping is incidental to the business and according to the weight of authority, even though there are printed prohibitions against keeping certain articles on the insured premises the policy will not be avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the prohibited articles are necessary or in customary use in carrying on the trade or business conducted on the premises. In the present case, no gasoline was stored in the burned bodegas, and that “Bodega No. 2” which was not burned and where the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured bodegas.

The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, thus affirming it; with costs against the appellant.

Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping LinesGR L-34382, 20 July 1983 (123 SCRA 425)First division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 2 on leave.

Facts: On 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation, shipped on board the SS ‘Eastern Jupiter’ from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of ‘Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods.’ The vessel is owned and operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment was insured with Home Insurance against all risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06. 53 of the 2361 coils discharged from the vessel were in bad order. The Consignee ultimately received the 2,361 coils with 73 coils loose and partly cut, and 28 coils and partly cut, which had to be considered as scrap. The weight also had a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kgs, or 1,209.56 lbs. For the loss/damage suffered by the cargo, Home Insurance paid the consignee under its insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, by virtue of which Home Insurance became subrogated to the rights and actions of the Phelps Dodge. Home Insurance made demands for payment against Eastern Shipping and the transportation company for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same. (A case “Home insurance v. NV Nedlloyd Lijnen” consolidated with this case is of the same nature).

Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance avers that it is a foreign insurance company authorized to do business in the Philippines through its agent, Victor Bello (who holds office at Makati) in both cases. In L-34382, Eastern Shipping Lines denies the allegation of plaintiff’s capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, while Angel Jose Transportation admits the allegation. In L-34383, NV Nedlloyd Lijnen, Columbian Philippines, and Guacods denied plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The court dismissed the complaints in the two cases on the same ground, that the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue, even if the petitioner had already secured the necessary license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines during the filing of the case. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines initially without a license can claim indemnity through Philippine Courts.

Held: The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries. A harsh interpretation would disastrously embarrass trade, unlike if the law is given a reasonable interpretation, it would markedly help in the development of trade. The law simply means that no foreign corporation shall be permitted ‘to transact business in the Philippine Islands,’ as this phrase is known in corporation law, unless it shall have the license required by law, and, until it complies with the law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. A contrary holding would bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result which should be and can be easily avoided. In the present case, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the subsequent registration. Such is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases.The petitioner sufficiently alleged its capacity to sue when it averred in its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to do business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati; as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. General denials inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in the light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so. Nevertheless, even if the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue was not properly raised as

an issue by the answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had the authority to engage in the insurance business at the time it filed the complaints.

The Supreme Court consolidated and granted the petitions, reversed and set aside the CFI decisions. In L-34382 (Civil Case 71923), Eastern Shipping Lines and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered to pay the Home Insurance Company the sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the legal rate from 5 January 1968 until fully paid. Each shall also pay one-half of the costs. The Court dismissed the counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its agent Columbian Phil. Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with interest at the legal rate from 1 February 1968 until fully paid, the sum of P500.00 attorney’s fees, and costs. The Court dismissed the complaint against Guacods, Inc.

Co v. RepublicGR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring

Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the “Colegio” in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco business.

Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered “democracy.; that he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file his income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.

Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.

Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution, which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution. Further, Philippine law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. In the present case, in so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that he has complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Actl; and further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an

amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.

Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. RepublicGR L-12408, 28 December 1959 (106 Phil 775)En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 9 concurring

Facts: On 22 September 1907, petitioner was born in Amoy, China, of Chinese parents. He came to the Philippines sometime in February 1921 and was given the corresponding alien certificate of residence and registration. He settled in Cebu City (where he as continuously resided up to the present time). Petitioner studied 1st to 7th grade in Cebu Chinese High School, a private institution recognized by the government. He speaks and writes English and the Cebu dialect. He, having associated with some Filipinos, engaged in the corn business in Cebu City (1921-WWII) and in the lumber business (1946-present). He invested P5,000.00 capital in the business and at present the actual worth of his share is about P20,000.00. Petitioner is receiving a monthly salary of P400.00 and realizes a profit share worth P10,000.00 every year. He has no tax liability to the government. He possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. As to his family, he married one Sy Siok Bin on 8 December 1929 with whom he had 13 children, all born in the Cebu City. All these children had been issued the corresponding alien certificate of registration, with the exception of Lourdes Lee who married a naturalized Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan. With the exception of William Lee who is not of school age, Angelita who reached 5th grade and Lourdes who stopped in 3rd year high school, the other children are at present studying in private schools and colleges recognized by the government.

Lee Cho filed a petitioner for naturalization before the Court of First Iinstance of Cebu. On 30 August 1956, the court rendered decision finding petitioner qualified to be a Filipino citizen. On 2 October 1957, however, the government filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which if presented may affect the qualification of petitioner, and finding the same well founded, the court entertained the motion. After hearing, the court again rendered decision reaffirming its holding that petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen. The government interposed an appeal.

Issue: Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for naturalization.

Held: The provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled. In the present case, the petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. Angelita Lee has only reached grade five and no explanation was given why no secondary education was afforded her. Lourdes Lee has studied only as far as 3rd year high school and then allegedly stopped allegedly because of poor health. Lourdes admitted in open court, however, that she continued her studies in a Chinese school, which employs strictly Chinese curriculum, despite her illness. This circumstance betrays the sincerity of petitioner to become a Filipino citizen for if his motive were proper he should not have tolerated such deviation from the educational requirement of the law. The petitioner, thus, has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen.

The Supreme Court ruled that appealed decision is reversed, with costs against petitioner.

Guerrero v. CAGR L-44570, 30 May 1986 (142 SCRA 136)Second Division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 1 taking no part.

Facts: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was taken by Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at the Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Benitez was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores. Harvest time which usually comes every 3 months. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.

On 10 September 1971, RA 6389 amending RA 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. Sometime in the early part of 1973, Benitez was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacañang, Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement whereby defendants agreed to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of RA 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines).

In July 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where Benitez and his family lived, thus, making the Benitez feel that they meant business. Hence, the case for reinstatement with damages.

Issue: Whether Benitez is a tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law to warrant reinstatement to the plantation

Held: Longstanding possession is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law, a tenant being one who has the temporary use and occupation of land or tenements belonging to another for the purpose of production. A hired laborer who built his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his dismissal or termination any time, is more consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law. Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. Cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land but also includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. Agreement to share the produce or harvest on a “tercio basis” that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the landowners bolsters the tenancy claim. The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of harvest. Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship is extinguished according to law. In the present case, besides these indications, the agreement made on 2 May 1973 is clear and categorical term that the Benitez is a tenant. Arguing that the intent was different, being that of a hired farmhand, the law existing at that time the agreement was made militate against the claim. Benitez did not commit any of the causes that would warrant his ejectment, and

thus, was unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the CA decision. No costs.

Bello v. CAGR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509)En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.

Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged for estafa before the City Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a lady’s ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a “petition to dismiss appeal” on the ground that since the case was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and the trial in the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended. The CFI per its order of 29 October 1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court “for execution of judgment.” Thereafter, the City court denied petitioners’ motion “for having been erroneously addressed to this court” instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners’ predicament that the CFI had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them.

Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals against the People and City Court. The Solicitor General did not interpose any objection whichever viewpoint is adopted by the Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing principles of law, i.e.. finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after finding that the city court’s judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to the Court of Appeals, it held that since petitioners did not implead the CFI as principal party respondent it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities. With their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is indispensable and the procedural infirmity of misdirecting the appeal to Court of First Instance are fatal to the appellees’ cause

Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity” and therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Thus, in the construction of its own Rules of Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate court.

The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be “overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals ‘ act of dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the CFI itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the

proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.

The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in lieu thereof, judgment was rendered granting the petition for prohibition against City court, enjoining it from executing its judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners’ appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latter’s disposition on the merits; without costs.

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of ManilaGR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 PhilFirst Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation, contending that there was no necessity of taking, that it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the dead.

The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.

Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila

Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.

The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood uses the latter. Where a emetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are held in good faith for future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In this case there is no necessity of taking since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the traffic situation.

The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through the cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of the lower court, with costs against the appellant.

Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)GR L-54718, 4 December 1985En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9 concurring, 2 on leave

Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon in the 30 January 1980 local elections. Later that day, however, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own

handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy “for personal reasons.” His unsworn withdrawal had been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. Later on 25 January 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza’s withdrawal, filed his own sworn “Certificate of Candidacy in substitution” of Mendoza’s for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, however, disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer’s opinion that petitioner’s name does not appear in the certified list of candidates. The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.

On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the petition of Villanueva, stating that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not under oath as required by Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, and that his withdrawal was not made after the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy, as contemplated by Section 28, but on the same day.

Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates the election of Villanueva as vice mayor.

Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza’s withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it should not be defeated through the invocation of formal or technical defects. The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy. The legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza’s failure to observe the requirement should be considered a harmless irregularity. The bona fides of petitioner Villanueva as a substitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. The votes cast in his favor must be counted.

The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned Resolutions of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. The resolution is made immediately executory.

In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitionerGR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring

Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested with Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain its contents to her in her house in San Miguel street, municipality of Argao, province of Cebu in 19 November 1939, which he did in the presence of tree instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After confirming the contents of the testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of the testament in the second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark between her name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the foot of the testament, in

the second page, in the presence of the testator and all three abovenamed witnesses. However, the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left margin or any part of the first page of the testament, composed of two pages. All the three instrumental witnesses signed at the foot of the acknowledgment written in the second page of the testament, and the left margin of the first and second page, in the presence of the testator, Bonifacio Minoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was executed freely and spontaneously, without having been threatened, forced and intimidated, and not having exercised on her (the testator) undue influence, being the same in full use of her mental faculties and enjoying good health. On 22 February 1957, the testator died in here house in Argao.

On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman Aberastine died, leaving her mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document purportedly to be the last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because it involves purely a question of law.

Issue: Whether the absence of the testator’s thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will void

Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case, the contention that the petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to probate.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as to costs.

Matabuena v. CervantesGR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA ___)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court

upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between live-in partners.

Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.

The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

People v. SantayanaGR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division

Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and

ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms

Held: The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v. Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de oficio.

People v. EstenzoGR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur

Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31 December 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31 December 1980. The judge denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and

adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of ¼ each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening of Cadastral Proceedings.

Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. If RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by reference to RA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236. Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents’ contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968, no similar provision is found in RA 6236 expressly extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for by the RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, RA2061, expressly did. Truly, the extension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from “filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.”

The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to costs.

Mutuc v. ComelecGR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion

Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was its contention that the jingle proposed

to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase “and the like.”

Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like.”

Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.”). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited.

The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs.

People v. ManantanGR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.

Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code

Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of “casus omisus” does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term “judge” includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge,” including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.

The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

Lopez vs. CTAGR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur

Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplier invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently, however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal,

filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of 23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal.

Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court of Tax Appeal.

Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy between the two sections, it is more reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of Customs. If persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected but even destroyed. The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the legislature.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the Customs Law and RA 1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs; with costs.

Sanciangco v. RonoGR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 took no part

Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17 May 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said election. Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose A. Roño, who

ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.

Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latter’s filing of a certificate of candidacy for the Batasan.

Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits of more than one construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading “any person holding public appointive office or position,” is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed. A statute’s clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the President as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for, holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.

Capati v. Ocampo [GR L-28742, 30 April 1982]Second Division, Escolin (p): 4 concur, 2 on leave.

Facts: Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. On 23 May 1967, Capati entered into a sub-contract with the Dr. Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in consideration of the amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated therein. Ocampo further bound himself to complete said construction on or before 5 June 1967. Ocampo, however, was only able to finish the construction on 20 June 1967.

Due to the delay, Capati filed in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages (Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85,000.00 with interest, plus attorney’s fees and costs. Ocampo filed a motion

to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract which provides that all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. The lowe court dismissed the complaint. Hence the appeal.

The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee Ocampo.

1. Where personal actions may be filedThe rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Said section is qualified by Section 3 of the same rule, providing that by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.

2. “May” only permissiveThe word “may” is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term “may be” connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. “May” is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. In the case at bar, the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the CFI Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See related case in Nicolas v. Reparations Commission: “May” is not mandatory). Since the complaint has been filed in the CFI Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

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People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y MoradaCase No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3

Primicias v. Municipality of UrdanetaCase No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14

FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dis-missed the case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the

time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the ac-cused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ex-pressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35

FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation of Ordi-nance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annul-ment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Ur-daneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro GimenezCase No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAstorga v. VillegasCase No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be im-posed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.” IS-SUE: W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. IS-SUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly en-acted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enact-ment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not be-come a law.” LATIN MAXIM: b2

HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as ex-pressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one men-tioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and SarmientoCase No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMunicipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the PhilippinesCase No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to Regu-late the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one de-partment to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes col-lection of the same is unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is un-constitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitu-tional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or nar-rowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be re-solved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to pro-hibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the na-ture, scope, and consequences of that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d

5 People of the Philippines v. BuenviajeCase No. 203 G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAlalayan v. National Power CorporationCase No. 8 G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a doctor.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. ISSUE: W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws provided in the Revised Ad-ministrative Code. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. ‘Chiropractic’ is in-cluded in the ‘practice of medicine.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The consti-tutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or nar-rowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be re-solved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title,” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d

FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121”. In Sec-tion 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12% annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a sub-ject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121” does not embrace, thus mak-ing it a rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.” HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesn’t need to be a complete in-dex of the contents of the act. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d

6 Cordero v. Hon. CabatuandoCase No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONTobias v. AbalosCase No. 291 G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this act ex-pressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Con-gress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitu-tional because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are con-stitutional. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Consti-tutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d

FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Con-verting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluy-ong” because Article VIII, Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Man-daluyong shall be split into two separate districts. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conver-sion into a highly urbanized city Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or cata-logue all the contents and the minute details therein. LATIN MAXIM: 20a, d

7 Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of RizalCase No. 11 G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLidasan v. Commission on ElectionsCase No. 148 G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51

FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13, section 2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing, with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pan-tukos,’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality, are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government, af-ter payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three months.” The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administra-tive Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, “An Act amending the Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones Law, which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill,” because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. LATIN MAXIM: 37

FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Di-anaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato, violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be en-acted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Diana-ton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorpo-rated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title mis-leading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Re-public Act 4790. LATIN MAXIM: d

8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. ReyesCase No. 169 G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No. 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople of the Philippines v. FerrerCase No. 208 G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.50

FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to pay some of the install-ments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated dam-ages to Respondent’s indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47 with interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 4122, entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A,” is valid. HELD: Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the pre-cise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. The proper approach in cases of this charac-ter should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 37

FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 1700, other-wise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts af-filiates himself with, becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases were dismissed, to which the Government appealed. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. HELD: Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d

9 Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y MasaCase No. 230 G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957) Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55

FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.” The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolu-tion to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional Representa-tion Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes.” ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. HELD: No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolu-tions No. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines,” which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself, whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Con-gress or the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its ti-tle. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d

FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was “an Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act,” did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the ti-tle of the bill.” ISSUES: 1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. W/N it was inconsis-tent with the Constitution. HELD: No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only, and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 36a, 46a, 50

10 People of the Philippines v. Apolonio CarlosCase No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople of the Philippines v. Leoncio LimCase No. 210 G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83

FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional. HELD: No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and com-plete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitu-tional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 37–1. Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the former having no fixed period and thus es-tablishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition “was for any single period of time not ex-ceeding five years’ duration.” ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was invalid. HELD: Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37–1 was defective because it failed to specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period of time, but it was not nec-essarily rendered void by the omission. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a

11 KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.Case No. 68 G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONHijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central BankCase No. 57 G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)

FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus opera-tors to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare in-crease. ISSUES: 1. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase. 2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. HELD: 1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. 2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase. LATIN MAXIM: None

FACTS: Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGN-MENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1, 1972- June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973- June 30, 1974; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. ISSUE: W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Reso-lution No. 1995. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law, the basic law prevails. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. LATIN MAXIM: 9c

12 China Banking Corp. v. CACase No. 59 G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.84

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSantos v. Honorable EstenzoCase No. 140 G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)

FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching, in return for promis-sory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Pe-titioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act No. 3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. 2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. HELD: 1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. 2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. It is an ele-mentary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive. Thus, the statute cannot be re-pealed or amended by the administrative directive. LATIN MAXIM: None

FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company, of which Petitioners are man-ager and proprietor. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the mother of the decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees ex-ceeded the allowed fees according to Sec.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No. 772 and as a result deprived the court of its ju-risdiction over the case. 2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in at-torney’s fees. HELD: Petition was dismissed. 1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of Congress. Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired juris-diction over the main case. 2. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court. LATIN MAXIM: 30, 35, 46a

13 Grego v. Commission on ElectionsCase No. 120 G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997) Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSantos v. Municipal of CaloocanCase No. 141 G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)

FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of the 2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner, who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his po-sition as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31, 1981. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Govern-ment Code. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. IS-SUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively. It is un-derstood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pend-ing proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the lan-guage of the enactment. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical mean-ing, referring only to an appointive position. Since Respondent was reelected, this does not fall under the scope of the term. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 46crd

FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees in-cluding “slaughterhouse fees,” “meat inspection fees,” “corral fees,” “and internal organ fees,” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655. Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Respon-dent, in the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Common-wealth Act 655. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees.” One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held in-valid without affecting the validity of what remains, if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a, 37

14 National Housing Authority v. ReyesCase No. 85 G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONFrancisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio DyCase No. 73 G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)

FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an expropriation proceed-ings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00, but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments, x x x be-cause the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. The petition for Certiorari is granted. LATIN MAXIM: 37

FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises, and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The case was terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. The trial court dis-missed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. On the compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. On the second issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a different set of evidence. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof, and hence, res judicata does not apply. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 11a, 26,

15 Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ UnionCase No. 169 G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)

FACTS: Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate JaiAlai from local gov-ernments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant fran-chise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then President Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to op-erate all forms of gambling issued by local governments. ISSUE: 1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal protec-tion and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. HELD: R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not dele-gate to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments with-out exceptions. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50

FACTS: Petitioner, an “Iglesia ni Cristo”, was a member of the Respondent Union which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement “ RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a formal letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service. ISSUE: 1. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional? 3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee. HELD: The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well as Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of liti-gation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest” and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and ex-penses of litigation should be recovered”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b

16 Tañada v. TuveraCase No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONGutierrez v. CarpioCase No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presiden-tial Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the de-crees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication in full should be indispensable. With-out such notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a

FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain land, the ownership would vest in the Defen-dants. But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 13, 1928, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed period had already elapsed. IS-SUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. HELD: No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which “month” now means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 39a

17 Guzman v. LichaucoCase No. 56 G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONU.S. v. PaniagaCase No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)

FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the Court of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. 88 of the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, “on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”, the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property held by them. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. As a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. ISSUE: W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.

FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. By various orders of the court, the sale was post-poned from time to time, and finally occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912, the principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application of the sureties, set aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court. HELD: Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be ex-cluded.” This section is only applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also di-rected that the sale should take place on a named future date. The sale here of the property must stand. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

HELD: The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term “month” must now be under-stood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes the length of a month at thirty days. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 25c

18 PNB v. CACase No. 238 G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONHidalgo v. HidalgoCase No. 124 G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19

FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Prop-erty in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. The notices of sale of Appel-lant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspa-per Daily Record”. The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Fri-day and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. In Concep-cion v. Andueta, the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecu-tive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 9b

FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s in-tention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismissed peti-tions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricul-tural share tenancy. The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43

19 U.S. v. NavarroCase No. 300 G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLitex Employees Association v. EduvalaCase No. 149 G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote No.22

FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in con-nection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that they owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the Appellants, except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of the assessed value of P500. ISSUE: W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof.

FACTS: Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners con-tended that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is a statute authorizing Respon-dents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning ex-ecutive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a, 24a

HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of pro-visions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualification is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualifi-cations are under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legisla-tor. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes as-sessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the pay-ment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to se-cure purity of the ballot box. If the property qualification is actual/market value, it would be highly improba-ble to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. LATIN MAXIM: 10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37

20 Regalado v. YuloCase No. 255 G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote No.25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONB.E. San Diego Inc. v. CACase No. 26 G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27

FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931, Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of Peti-tioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office. ISSUE: W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further amended by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65. HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a

FACTS: On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Re-spondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in said area. In her defense, De Jesus ar-gued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in up-holding her rights as a lessee. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. While it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as unjust eviction. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 25a

21 Araneta v. DinglasanCase No. 84 G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 29

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONEndencia and Jugo v. DavidCase No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33

FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency Powers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress convened again on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclama-tions were also terminated. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a

FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from in-come tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. IS-SUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their continu-ance in office”, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a task must be done by the Ju-diciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to se-cure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos NorteCase No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCIR v. Limpan Investment CorporationCase No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55

FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by, An-tero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the Civil Code, that those who have legiti-mate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the re-duction of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a

FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for de-ficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and De-cember 11, 1967 (L-28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed for the pay-ment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount correspond-ing to a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the sur-charge of 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the inter-est shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, CebuCase No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONResins, Inc. v. Auditor GeneralCase No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57

FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax im-posed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a pe-riod of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.

FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to over-rule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such per-son or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, to-gether with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which up-held the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the PhilippinesCase No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONKMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad CompanyCase No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)

FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation out of his back pay pur-suant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was ap-proved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage ex-ecuted by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obliga-tions for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court af-firmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be en-forced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful”. Justice Bar-rera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of CustomsCase No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAlfredo Ramos v. Court of AppealsCase No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.60

FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise. IS-SUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be granted to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 74 hectare fish-pond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the munici-pality is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqual-ify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a private coun-sel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

26 Floresca v. Philex Mining CorporationCase No. 47 G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONEnrile v. SalazarCase No. 40 G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)

FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. However, a later report on the ac-cident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and wanton negligence. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compen-sation Act or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts, the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In allowing Petition-ers to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a

FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Peti-tioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because technically, the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses committed on the oc-casion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of re-bellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multiple frus-trated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore, charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted sep-arately from rebellion, then the principle of non-retroactivity would be violated. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48

27 Manikad v. TanodbayanCase No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No.65

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSenarillos v. HermosisimoCase No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote No.74

FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: “The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and admin-istered by the Authority…” ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investi-gating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. HELD: No, the use of “sole” in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga and investigated by a “police committee” com-posed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. Si-bonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was is-sued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee. The ini-tial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate the proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 6b, 7a

28 People of the Philippines v. Moro MacarandangCase No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople of the Philippines v. MapaCase No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89

FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. Defendant, ad-mitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the ap-pointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his posses-sion 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no au-thority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the “peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of “peace officer” equivalent even to a Munici-pal Police expressly covered by section 879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a

FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a Se-cret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c

29 Co v. CACase No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSy Kiong v. SarmientoCase No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951)

FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associ-ated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Pe-titioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guaran-tee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 46a

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an im-porter of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Peti-tioner to bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter, should be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 43

30 Sumulong v. Commission on ElectionsCase No. 149 G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCentral Capiz v. RamirezCase No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter III, Page 79, Footnote No.8

FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclu-sive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Eleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Pop-ular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is enti-tled, cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector. LATIN MAXIM: 36a, 37, d

FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No. 2874, “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain, and for other purposes,” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” LATIN MAXIM: d

31 Eugenio v. DrilonCase No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote No.20

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople of the Philippines v. PurisimaCase No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16

FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The Subdivision and Condo-minium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secre-tary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal posses-sion of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential el-ement of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpreta-tion of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes nec-essary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, b2

32 People of the Philippines v. EchavesCase No. 207 G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980) Chapter III, Page 77, Footnote No.22

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of CebuCase No. 4 G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965) Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.23

FACTS: The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricul-tural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court, thus bringing the case at hand. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands be-cause its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particu-larly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.” But the Supreme Court dis-agreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is un-mistakable. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is re-sorted to when the legislative is uncertain.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b

FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by the National Government. Accord-ing to Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the scope of the power granted. Petitioners as-sail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. HELD: The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordi-nance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that only those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 36b

Verba Legis - plain meaning rule- when the law is clear and unequivocal the Court has no other alternative but to apply the law and not to interpret

Director of Lands vs CAGlobe Mackay Cable vs NLRCSocorro Ramirez vs CA: legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statuteFelicito Basbacio vs Office of the Secretary, DOJ: when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning

Index animi sermo est-speech is the index of intention

Globe Mackay Cable vs NLRC

Dura Lex Sed Lex - the Court cannot shy away from applying the law when no interpretation is needed no matter how harsh the law may be

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat-that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute - its very word-in interpreting a statute care should be taken that every part be given effect

JMM Promotions and Management vs NLRC

Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex-when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases

B/Gen. Jose Commendador vs B/Gen. Demetrio Camera

Ratio legis est anima-the reason of law is its soul

B/Gen. Jose Commendador vs B/Gen. Demetrio Camera

Doctrine of implications-that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed

City of Manila vs Judge Amador Gomez

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos-where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish

De Villa vs CAColgate-Palmolive Phil., Inc. vs GimenezPilar vs COMELECPhil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs Intermediate Appellate CourtPeople vs Evangelista and Tugonon

Ejusdem generis-where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be

held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

Republic vs MigrinoVera vs CuevasPeople vs Echaves

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius-express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others

San Pablo Manufacturing Co. vs Commission of Internal Revenue

Noscitor a Sociis-where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda vs Sec Juan Flavier

Source: Statutory Construction by Diaz

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Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals

No. 2

Case Digests: Statutory Construction 

Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals248 SCRA 590G. R. No. 93833 September 25 1995

Facts:A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner

offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.”

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner.

From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s order null and void.

Issue:W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.

Held:Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than  or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity)

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Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals

No. 1

Case Digests: Statutory Construction

Director of Lands vs. CA276 SCRA 276G. R. No. 102858 July 28 1997

Facts: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title under P. D. No. 1529. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence his heirs represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The Land Registration Court in its decision dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction.” However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. The trial court dismissed the petition for the reason that the applicants failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Private Respondents appealed to CA, which set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General, brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:W/N newspaper publication of the notice of Initial Hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory.

Held:It is mandatory. The word “shall” denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for Initial Hearing. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.

Stat Con Principle: When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous.

Legal Maxims: Verba Legis and Dura Lex Sed Lex

33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.Case No. 80 G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONFeliciano v. AquinoCase No. 105 G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.28

FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a two-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends, on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period and not the quarterly payment made. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (fi-nal payment). HELD: The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. The Supreme Court said that, “Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.” LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 36b, 36d

FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four days after the procla-mation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings, challenging Petitioner’s eligibil-ity on the ground that Respondent was not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age requirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the existence of a semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code, does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office, pro-vided that he had fulfilled the first two requirements. ISSUE: W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and ille-gal. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded un-less there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. No reason is shown why, after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the elec-tion”, the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal officers. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section, taking part in the election is meant, not capacity to assume office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d, 11a, 11e, 36b

34 US. v. HartCase No. 159 G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONIn re: Estate of JohnsonCase No. 131 G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918) Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote No.38

FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. 519 which pun-ishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or stray-ing through the country without visible means of support”. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had “visible means of support”, it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How should the provi-sion be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substan-tial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent ac-cord with legislative will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legis-lature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inas-much as defendant had, “visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants are acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 11e, 33

FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accor-dance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved, al-lowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.” The will of Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further fact that the word “state” in the body of the sec-tion is not capitalized. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S and therefore an alien, is cov-ered by Sec. 636. HELD: The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or country”. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limit-ing the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petitioner, being a US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probated. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48

35 People of the Philippines v. YabutCase No. 231 G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993) Chapter III, Page 87, Footnote No.43

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople of the Philippines v. MendozaCase No.112 G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933)

FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he was punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160. HELD: No. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English translation of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his convic-tion for murder is not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from the text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or head note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which they prepared without the knowledge and con-sent of the voters. They were tried and convicted. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. HELD: No. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal case. The English text of Section 2654 is defec-tive as the head note clearly shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a ballot in the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed. LATIN MAXIM: 50, d

36 People of the Philippines v. ManabaCase No. 110 G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONU.S. v. QuintanarCase No. 162 G.R. No. 5654 (August 27, 1910)

FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. After trial, De-fendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the of-fended party. Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denied and he was convicted. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy. HELD: No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of the Re-vised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. As the first complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish equiva-lent of the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling, because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 36a

FACTS: Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 were caught in the act of smoking opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761, the “Opium Law”. On appeal, Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues del primero de Marzo.” (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect “despues del primero de Marzo.” HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. The English and original text says: “on and after March 1, 1908”. Where the Act was originally promulgated in English, it shall prevail over its translation. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

37 Employees’ Club, Inc. v. China Banking CorporationCase No. 39 G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMcMicking v. LichaucoCase No. 175 G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914) Chapter III, Page 88, Footnote No.49

FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the regis-ter of deeds because it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only real rights can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a term exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. 496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in order to affect third persons, which in-cludes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the law was relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by the Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49

FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against Defendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pending in its duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Anto-nio Flor Mata – where judgment execution is. And likewise, in the duration of Mata’s judgment, there was yet another pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco P17,666.60. ISSUE: With these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The preference on Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure, which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. However, until the allotment of time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken, the judgment, strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminol-ogy – where it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to. One must take into account that classifica-tion and the incidents of judgments, orders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in part from American and English prece-dents. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. The lien of a judgment is not necessar-ily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply suspended. Even if there was a new judgment, it is simply reversed, not destroyed. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49

38 Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate CourtCase No. 11 G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONVda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal CompanyCase No. 156 G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.57

FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Pe-titioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a complaint in-voking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was a valid notice. 2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD: Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17

FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961, which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been liv-ing together as husband and wife for the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous daughter of the deceased, Racquel. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. HELD: Yes. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still considered dependents under the Act. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c, 12a, 37

39 Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.Case No. 290 G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955) Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONHome Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping LinesCase No. 125 G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64

FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs, represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the deceased Sergio Nico-las wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid. HELD: No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agricul-ture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48

FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the con-signees due to losses suffered by the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue. ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. HELD: Yes. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff Com-pany, must, in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction, prove legal capacity by establish-ing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the case at bar, the insurance con-tracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. Therefore, said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary to public policy. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 8, 9c, 11a, 36a, 37

40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. TrinidadCase No. 154 G.R. No. 18316 (September 23, 1922) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.71

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONGo Chioco v. MartinezCase No. 113 G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923) Chapter III, Page 93, Footnote No.93

FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, doing business in the City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring business, consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain rates of charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from De-fendant, the Internal Revenue Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been paid under protest. Defen-dant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921, the Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said business amounting to P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711, the percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. IS-SUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. HELD: A con-tractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. Therefore, the tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4, 5b, 9c, 11a, 28

FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three months. On the same day, Respondent Her-manos signed another promissory note and sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three months, Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a new promissory note, again due within the next three months, and with this note, Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycle's promissory note bring due only a month later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25,000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000. Therefore, Petitioner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992). Thus, he must give back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,000. ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned together with the interest. HELD: No, since only the interest is forfeited. Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law, the intent of the framers is clear. In a previous law RA 2073, the principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. However, unlike the previous law, the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for viola-tions. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. As a rule of con-struction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one may consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 36a, 37

41 US v. De GuzmanCase No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONBasiana v. LunaCase no. 31 G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.102

FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sen-tenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that impli-cated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice, nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the leg-islative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his un-dertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 22a, b2

FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 183 claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disregard of their agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the dec-laration of location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent. Consequently, Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid, and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s mining claims are valid. HELD: Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) provides: “For the purpose of this section, a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads; a junction of known rivers or creeks, a known public or private structure; a corner of approved public, private or mineral land survey; a kilometer post of public road; or location monument or triangulation station estab-lished by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Mines, Army Corps of engineers, Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or other government agencies.” An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Petitioner’s contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s in-tent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 30a, 33, 36b

42 Baga v. PNBCase No. 27 G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.103

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDe Villa v. CACase No. 88 G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110

FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian under RA 390 or the Uni-form Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the intention of being modeled after the US ver-sion. RA 390 provides that a guardianship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Peti-tioner alleges that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. ISSUE: W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390. HELD: No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for mate-rial aid. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23 applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50, b2

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2

43 National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.Case No. 185 G.R. No. 106724 (February 9, 1994) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONChina Banking Corporation v. OrtegaCase No. 21 G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)

FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized Dept. of the In-terior and Local Government,” laid down the compulsory retirement age of PNP officers. Respondents ar-gue that the age of retirement (56) of said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the same law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). In other words, Respondents wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP). ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the local police force. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force. The use of the term INP is not synony-mous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. Indeed, the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC. The legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retire-ment age is concerned. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11a, 12a, 27, b2

FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in default. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He refused to disclose the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confi-dential nature of this law. ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405. HELD: No. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohi-bition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being gar-nished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b, 43, b2

44 Mayon Motors v. Acting CIRCase No. 173 G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.111

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONKilosbayan, Inc. v. MoratoCase No. 67 G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)

FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different shipments. Respondent as-sessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on the automobiles. Petitioner requested for recon-sideration and, this request having been denied, it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. After the hearing, said court modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund. Hence this appeal. Peti-tioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax court and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the amendments for the Tax Code. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law, con-trolling in the interpretation of the law. HELD: No. Courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator. LATIN MAXIM: b2

FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collabora-tion with any party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD: No. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into ac-count not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase “by itself.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes, races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration, association or joint venture” with others or “by itself.” LATIN MAXIM: 34, 36b

45 Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department UnionCase No. 77 G.R. No. 9265 (April 29, 1957)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCommissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax AppealsCase No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133

FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of over-time work. Employees of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12 hours of work, four hours overtime), given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime. ISSUE: 1. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to sea-men. 2. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land laborer. HELD: The defi-nition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no need for a different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, provides that “when the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset completely, shall not be counted” in the eight working hours. A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he “cease to work,” and may rest completely. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 26

FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan City. Respondent Com-pany availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under protest. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34. HELD: No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only. Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that the private ports are not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E.O. 72. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25d, 30a

46 Buenaseda v. Secretary FlavierCase No. 40 G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCarolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.Case No. 47 G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.146

FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Peti-tioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an or-der directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner con-tends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the pre-ventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative inves-tigation. LATIN MAXIM: 27, 28

FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing, carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. Within three months, the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice to prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes are interpreted, the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself, it is the duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 9

47 Zamora v. Collector of Internal RevenueCase No. 176 G. R. No L-15290 (May 31, 1963)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONTamayo v. GsellCase No. 282 G. R. No 10765 (December 22, 1916) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.149

FACTS: Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila, filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora, bought a piece of land located in Manila on May 16, 1944, for P132,000.00 and sold it for P75,000.00 on March 5, 1951. They also pur-chased a lot located in Q.C. for P68,959.00 on January 19, 1944 which they sold for P94,000.00 on Feb. 9, 1951. The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora, to pay the sum of P235.00, representing alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate. Esperanza Zamora appealed and al-leged that the CTA erred. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora. HELD: No. The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same. LATIN MAXIM: b2

FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was attributed to the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time and without prior instruction. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is enti-tled to recover damages under the Employer’s Liability Act. HELD: Yes. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act was taken, being of American origin. LATIN MAXIM: b2

48 Ossorio v. PosadasCase No. 93 G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCampos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and FelixCase No. 17 G.R. No. L-6884 (March 21, 1956)

FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to the complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by way of income tax. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plain-tiff’s wife constitutes her “separate estate” within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the additional income tax. HELD: Yes. It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax, one against the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her paraphernal prop-erty, returning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff’s wife upon her own separate individual declaration, in accordance with law, the addi-tional income tax for the income from her paraphernal property. LATIN MAXIM: b2

FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against Respondent to re-cover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1,125 and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; hold-ing that the two notes constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Municipal Court likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action, on the ground that the amount of two notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action, was in excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Munici-pal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant’s complaint. HELD: No. The jurisdic-tion of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in each single case of action contained in the com-plaint, but upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

49 Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co.Case No. 8 G.R. No. 33637 (December 31, 1931)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPando v. Kette and SellnerCase No. 99 G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 1930)

FACTS: Petitioner’s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force. The Respondent Company has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. HELD: Yes. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance, is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which states, “The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, b2

FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on January 30, 1929, posted no-tices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places, to wit, upon the land itself, at the market, and on the municipal building of Pasay. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication, and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, more particularly on the 2nd, 9th, and 15th of February, 1929 and the sale took place on February 19, 1929. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question. HELD: Yes. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. 692 of the California Code, the re-quirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question have been substantially complied with. LATIN MAXIM: b2

50 Reyes v. WellsCase No. 135 G.R. No. 30587 (December 4, 1929)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhil. Educ. Co. v. SorianoCase No. 235 G.R. No. L-22405 (June 30, 1971) Chapter III, Page 107, Footnote No.156

FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23,000. However, Plaintiff Guerrero said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. Plaintiff would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. Defen-dant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on June 29, 1922, the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero, or to any of his co-Plaintiffs. Due to the failure of J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said amount of P12,000, the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid, are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of Guerrero. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in question. These are also in line with Sec. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. The prohibition contained in said law against a witness’ testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself and a deceased per-son, is substantially the same as that contained in Sec. 383(7) of our Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2252. Therefore, we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar. LATIN MAXIM: 1, b2

FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. He managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. Palomar received one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the Bank of America. Respondent, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office notified the Bank of irregularity, and deducted from the bank’s clearing account the said amount, in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioner’s account with the same amount. Pe-titioner requested to reconsider the action but was denied. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of US’s own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying departure from the policy or practice. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments. LATIN MAXIM: 2b, 9a, b2

51 Cruz v. PahatiCase No. 28 G.R. No. L-8257 (April 13, 1956)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRepublic v. Workmen’s Compensation CommissionCase No. 132 G.R. No. L-29019 (May 18, 1972)

FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan, for P4,900 which he paid in check. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundment and as a result, he returned the auto-mobile to Bulahan who in then surrendered the check for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attor-ney's fees. Bulahan claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledge of any defect in the title. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter that enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. The court rendered judgment declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered the Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and, upon his failure to do so, to pay him the sum of P4,900, with legal interest from the date of the decision. The claim for damages and attorney's fees of Bula-han was denied. Defendant Belizo was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4,900 and pay the sum of P5,000 as moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evi-dence. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. HELD: Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover the said car. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6,000.00 plus attorney’s fee of P600.00 under the WCC, without deducting the P3,000.00 as death benefit which they had been previously paid by virtue of the pro-visions of RA 610. ISSUE: W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. HELD: The resolution of the WCC is modified; the P3,000.00 received under RA 610 should be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC. It is difficult to construe that the legislature intended to double the compensations re-ceived, considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. Furthermore, Sec. 9 of RA 610 and Sec. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. It was also contended that the phrase “or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employees, generally, of the national, provincial or municipal government” in Sec. 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compensation benefits un-der other laws. LATIN MAXIM: 17, 19b, 29, 38b, 39, 40b

52 Garcia et al. v. Hipolito et al.Case NO. 53 G.R. No. L-1449 (November 30, 1903)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONESSO Standard Eastern Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal RevenueCase No. 41 G.R. No. 70037 (July 7, 1989)

FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1, 1903. The Plaintiffs were notified thereof on May 21. Two days after, they excepted to the judgment and presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on July 23. On July 28, the Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions, which on August 5 was allowed and signed by the court. The term of the court in which the case was tried expired on May 30. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to consent to or for the judge to or-der an extension of the 10-day period. HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with the mechanical part of the appeal—the preparation of the papers for transmission to the Supreme Court. The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by the notice of the intention to pre-pare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the clerk’s office. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in most other laws of American origin, it cannot be extended. But that period is entirely different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of papers, after the right to remove the case has been secured. Therefore, it cannot be said that an extension of this time is an extension of the time to appeal. Moreover, considering when the law was adopted, it seems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the court and the parties of the power to extend the term, given the physical impossibil-ity to comply with it in many cases. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 19b, 27, 48

FACTS: The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the Petitioner’s claims for refund of the margin fees P102,246.00 for 1959 and P434,234.92 for 1960. ISSUE: W/N RA 2609, enti-tled “An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks’ Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange”, is a police measure or a revenue measure. HELD: RA 2609 is a police mea-sure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country’s international reserve. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 2609 was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed by RA 601. This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P. Garcia to Congress as part of, and in order to balance, the budget for 1959-1960. The CTA stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress become important. As a matter of fact, there may be no resort to the legislative history of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and unambiguous, since such legislative history may only be re-sorted to for the purpose of solving doubt, not for the purpose of creating it. Moreover, at least two cases had been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 7a

53 Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc.Case No. 26 G.R. No. L-28329 (August 17, 1975)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPascual v. Director of LandsCase No. 100 G.R. No. L-15816 (February 29, 1964)

FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394. ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law. HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. An-tagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judi-cial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. The Court examined the six statuettes re-pealed by RA 1394. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b, 38a, b2

FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondents, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 102 C.A. No. 141, a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the taxes thereon since 1947, and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon, in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. The policy in the disposition and concession of public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. Thus, in cases of lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or by occupation, until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had, or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. 33, C.A. No. 141). If anyone should be given prior right of entry at all, it should be the actual occupants who have presented several pe-titions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. ISSUE: W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner’s claim to a right of entry was correct. HELD: No. It is well settled that the contemporaneous in-terpretation given by administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserves great weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial court reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources but that of the Office of the President, without the record disclosing in our opinion, that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. To the contrary, they appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner, namely, to give priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is not. LATIN MAXIM: 2a

54 Orencia v. EnrileCase No. 92 G.R. No. L-28997 (February 22, 1974)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONm i k iPeople of the Philippines v. HernandezCase No. 107 G.R. Nos. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23, 1933)

FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission, and he has been performing functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized as such until RA 4040, increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divi-sions, among others, was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief of the nine other divi-sions of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased compensation. Respondents filed their answer, and after usual admissions and denials, interposed a defense that Peti-tioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief, and being a new position created under RA 4040, the same can only be filed by a qualified person; that Respondent, being a lawyer, is more qualified than Petitioner, who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service eligibility, and praying that the petition be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. HELD: For Respondent officials, the answer was not in doubt. Since there was a new legal provision to be construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approach of counsel for Petitioner, has an ambiguous aspect, they chose to follow the principle that a pub-lic office is a public trust. Certainly, such a contemporaneous construction, one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate, is entitled to the highest respect from the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM: 2a

FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on October 16, 1931. At this time, he was a delinquent in the payment of P2,000 for land taxes to the government. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office, the municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. The Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. The Chief of Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. By September, 1932, taxes had been paid for. However, in April 1932, he was charged for violating Sec. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the right to suffrage and public office. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking of-fice as Governor in Camarines Norte. HELD: No. Sec. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by law. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assuming a public office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes, this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. Under these circumstances, we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not conclusive, should be followed unless clearly erroneous. And in this case, it was not. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 32, 42b

55 Sagun v. People’s Homesite and Housing CorporationCase No. 266 G.R. No. 73603 (June 22, 1988) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.180

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhilippine Global Communications, Inc. v. RelovaCase No. 236 G.R. No. L-60548 (November 10, 1986) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.181

FACTS: Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent, low cost housing for those who are un-able to provide themselves with this. In accordance with RA 3208, the lots located in Block 330, LCH Project 3, Quezon City were meant to be used for this purpose. However, the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes, before converting these store units into their dwelling homes. In 1971, Petitioners de-cided that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petition for mandamus al-leging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P50/sq m., which was in violation of RA 3802. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P10/sq m. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest, in reference to Sec. 1 of RA 3802. HELD: No. For mandamus to lie, Petitioner’s rights should be well-defined, clear and certain. In the case at bar, there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is being offered. The Petitioners first leased these units for business purposes. Thus, the price of P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that the market value for the lots is at least P120. The action of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the law nor does it demonstrate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. Moreover, there is no obligation of Respondent Corporation, under RA 3802, aside from the fact that the determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a

FACTS: In 1976, Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication, now NTC, an application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. In 1977, Manila was desig-nated as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1979, BOC gave Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu, subject to that as soon as domestic carriers have upgraded their fa-cilities, applicant shall cease its operations. Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said de-cision, which ruled in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to es-tablish other stations aside from the station in Makati. This is a petition seeking to set aside the ruling ren-dered. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points outside Metro Manila? HELD: Yes. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct, maintain, and operate, apart from its principal station in Makati, other stations or branches within the Philippines for purposes of its inter-national communications operations. This can be seen in Sec. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be es-tablished as long as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The opinion of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of other stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 36b

56 Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of CustomsCase No. 24 No. L-19337 (September 30 1969) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.183

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhil. Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of CustomsCase No. 241 No. 27761 (Dec. 6 1927) Chapter III, Page 113, Footnote No.186

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA which denied the recov-ery of the sum of P28,629.42 which the Petitioner paid under protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax. Under the law in effect at that time, the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes and du-ties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said containers within a 1year period. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1% under Sec. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties. HELD: No. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended. The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund, offer two options to an importer. The first gives him the privilege of importing, free from import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, it is non-extendible. The second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid, provided the articles mentioned are exported within three years from importation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4, 38b, 43

FACTS: Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. shipped 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to United States in a wharf on Pulapandan, Occiden-tal Negros on steamship Hannover. Wharf was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant collected wharfage dues on petitioner’s wharf. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by government. HELD: Yes. The Government can be allowed to collect be-cause not to do so “would overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government, in and by which mil-lions of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves, and it would have defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan.” Dissenting Opinion: Historically, wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be taxed or levied upon. LATIN MAXIM: 3a, 4, 37, 5b, 11d

57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement BoardCase No. 164 No. L-12727 (February 29, 1960) Chapter III, Page 114, Footnote No.190

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRamos v. CACase No. 253 G.R. No. L-22753 (December 18, 1967) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193

FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983, that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run, the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days. HELD: No. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entities are not entitled to the use of such days. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioner’s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6g, 37, 38b

FACTS: The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National Rice and Corn Corpora-tion (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for additional compensation for overtime work, night work and work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC, which was possessed with a distinct and separate corporate existence, they are merely an office directly under the President, a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabilize the price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. To carry out this function, by law of the Com-monwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act, RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropri-ation yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. There has been consistent administrative interpre-tation by the Office of the President as to what may, under law, be granted to RCA workers and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Not a matter of right, such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act. ISSUE: W/N RCA should be held answerable – when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was created – for the said obligation. HELD: While executive construction is not neces-sarily binding upon courts, it is entitled to great weight and consideration. The reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless the President specifically appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not liable to the abovementioned obligation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11a, 38b

58 Salaria v. BuenviajeCase No. 267 G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONUniversity of the Philippines v. CACase No. 305 G.R. No. L-28153 (January 28, 1971) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.195

FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said land to Private Re-spondent Mendiola. A formal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. After the trial, the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. On appeal, the CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. Thus, a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. HELD: No. Memoran-dum Circular No. 970 was issued by the President stating that “except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, partic-ularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families.” Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to implement the law. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case, namely, personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 30a, 38b

FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service Commissioner. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is final, or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Under RA 51 and E.O. 94, the President transferred them under herein Respondent. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U.P. possess full and final authority in disciplining, suspension, and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hos-pital, independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9b, 20c, 38b

59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor RelationsCase No. 120 G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONEverett v. BautistaCase No. 43 G.R. No. 46505 (November 7, 1939)

FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote, which is 432.) Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. CIR. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the ba-sis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. Also, the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 39a

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed Queen’s Theater during the first Quarter of 1937. The partnership charged admission fees of P0.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0.40 but not more than P0.70 per seat. During the first Quarter of 1937, their receipts were P15, 881.41. At that time, imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters, cinematographs, etc. whose admission price exceeds P0.40 (Sec. 1&3 of C.A. No. 128). The law does not say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at the same rate. As such, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No. 94, which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be jointly taken into account for computation purposes. Sec. 1458 of the Administrative Code states that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed. The parties failed to pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec. 1458. They were asked to pay P992.50, which they refused to pay. ISSUE: 1. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law. 2. W/N Regulations No. 94 is in accordance with law. HELD: Yes to both. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. It has also been held that where there is ambiguity in the lan-guage of the law, contemporaneous construction is given weight. LATIN MAXIM: 2a

60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. InciongCase No. 62 G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhilippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRCCase No. 119 G.R. No. L-50320 (March 30, 1988)

FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations im-plementing the Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of paying the hol-iday wages and the motion was granted. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IBAA filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAA’s motion for re-consideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: 1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Re-spondent considering that it has become final and had been partially executed. 2. W/N Sec. 2 of Imple-menting Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 are valid. HELD: A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean ex-actly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the same must be de-clared null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 17, 37, 40c

FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) on April 2, 1977 and was signed on September 7, 1977. CBA stipulated a P22.00 in-crease in monthly wage of workers that will retroact from April 1, 1977. However, on May of the same year, P.D. 1123 granted a P60.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1, 1977, pro-vided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60.00 will be given the difference. Manage-ment argues that since on April 2, there has been an agreement to a P22.00 increase, PAI only had to pay the difference of P38.00. Moreover, PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor support-ing the PAI Management. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P.D. 1123 has been passed. ISSUE: W/N the case falls under the excep-tion of P.D. 1123. HELD: No. There was no formal agreement on April 2, 1977 regarding the increase. Moreover, the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premise and misinterpretation by PAI Management. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law. LATIN MAXIM: 2a

61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security CommissionCase No. 293 G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969) Chapter III, Page 206, Footnote No.206

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONYra v. AbañoCase No. 316 G.R. No. 30187 (November 15, 1928) Chapter III, Page 118, Footnote No.214

FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for their operations. Nev-ertheless, upon knowledge thereof, they paid their premium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not know that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claim-ing that the assessed penalties were inequitable. Respondent said that their organization is embraced in the Social Security Act; therefore the assessed penalties are imposed on them. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for late payment of remittances. HELD: Respondent has no such authority. Peti-tion is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vest-ing Respondent the power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive, or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the SS Act. The reason of the law is “to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people… to provide employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death.” Good faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 7a, 9a, 26

FACTS: Respondent was running for office in Bulacan, his hometown. However, he is a registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate, one of the qualifications is that he/she who is running should be a “duly quali-fied elector therein”. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. HELD: Yes. He is qualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in the Philippine Assembly, Fernando Ma. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the po-sition on the ground that he was not registered in his electoral district. The conclusion to which was, “quali-fied elector” meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a voter and need not be regis-ter. The same was the case and decision of the Executive Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. Laurel. It is sufficient that he possess the qualifications stated in Sec. 431 and none of the disqualifications stated in Sec. 432 of the Election Law. However, it is not least to disregard the forcible argument advanced that when the law make use of the phrases, “qualified electors” and “qualified voter” the law means what it says. It would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own munici-pality. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 3a, 6c, 11a

62 Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. v. CIRCase No. 134 G.R. No. L-6741 (January 31, 1956) Chapter III, Page 120-121, Footnote No.222 & 227

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONIn re: McCulloch DickCase No. 129 G.R. No. L-13862 (April 15, 1918) Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.223

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by Petitioner. The stubs and the daily reports of the con-ductor did not state the value of the goods transported. Pursuant to Sec. 121 and 127 of the Revised Docu-mentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance, the agent assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. Petitioner asked for a refund and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occiden-tal rendered a judgment in their favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the Court of Appeals’ decision is erroneous. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Con-stitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or tolls, or any penalty in relation thereto. The decision of the Court of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. Sec. 121 falls within the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized in Sec. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code. b. The regulation (Sec. 121) is valid also because of the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment. The regulations were approved on September 16, 1924. When the National Internal Revenue Code was approved on February 18, 1939, the same provisions of stamp tax, bills of landing and receipts were re-enacted. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4

FACTS: Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation. Before the Governor-General gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Ad-ministrative Code. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No. 2113 and Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. HELD: Yes, the Governor-Gen-eral has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. “When the provisions of Act No. 2113 were enacted and ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having the force and the effect of a legislative command.” In the interpreta-tion of reenacted statutes, the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes originally had, and by reen-actment to intend that they should again have the same effect. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 4, 9a

63 Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal RevenueCase No. 9 G.R. No. L-19392 (April 14, 1965) Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.222 and 224

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLaxamana v. BaltazarCase No. 144 G.R. No. L-5955 (September 19, 1952) Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.225

FACTS: Commonwealth Insurance Co. (CIC), a domestic corporation, entered into reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance premiums and, on behalf of Plaintiff, paid income tax on the premiums. Plaintiff filed a claim for a refund of the paid tax, stating that it was exempted from withholding tax reinsur-ance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign insurance companies not autho-rized to do business in the Philippines. Plaintiffs stated that since Sec. 53 and 54 were “substantially re-en-acted” by RA 1065, 1291 and 2343, said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of leg-islative approval by re-enactment. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be withheld. HELD: No. The principle of leg-islative enactment states that where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provisions without substantial changes, such action is confirmatory to an extent that the ruling carries out the legisla-tive purpose. This principle is not applicable for the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. Only the tax rate was amended. The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpub-lished letters. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. Finally, the premiums remit-ted were to indemnify CIC against liability. This took place within the Philippines, thus subject to income tax. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4

FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. However, the Provincial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code, appointed herein Petitioner as the mayor. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office. HELD: Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code, applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in par-ticular. A special provision overrides a general one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21 does not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this con-temporaneous interpretation. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec. 2180, the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 4, 38b, 50

64 Bengzon v. Secretary of JusticeCase No. 32 G.R. No. L-42821 (January 18, 1936) Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.226

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONNPC v. Province of Lanao del SurCase No. 187 G.R. No. 96700 (November 19, 1996) Chapter III, Page 122, Footnote No.232

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan. He relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provisions of Act No. 3899. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under the vetoed Sec. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peace to gratuities. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-General by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence, was not subject to item-veto. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. 7 was valid. HELD: Yes. It is clear from reading Sec. 12 that the Leg-islature intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future veto by the Chief Executive. Hence, the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. Fur-thermore, the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well. Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, but when two co-equal branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes, they must be given great respect. Also, this practice of vetoing the separate items in a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 2b, 3a, 6c

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since its tax exempt sta-tus was revoked by P.D. 1931. Because of the Petitioner’s failure to pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder. Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely sus-pended. With the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the tax exemption privi-leges of the Petitioners were restored. However, Respondent contends that the Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to restore tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the President or the Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given exemptions. Note however, that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minis-ter of Finance. In the present case, the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved by the Minister of Finance. ISSUE: 1. W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and law-fully assess RPT against, and thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to ef-fect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes. 2. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges, including its exemption from payment of RPT. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status, but its privileges were only suspended. Thus, the Respondent cannot as-sess deficiency RPT against the Petitioner. Furthermore, since the Petitioner was never delinquent in pay-ing RPT, the subsequent auction and sale of the Petitioner’s assets is also considered void. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 5b, 9a, 20a, 37, 38a, 49

65 J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Mariano & Aquial & CordovaCase No. 64 G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONJ.M. Tuason v. Land Tenure AdministrationCase No. 135 G.R. No. L-21064 (February 18, 1970) Chapter XI, Page 434, Footnote No.7

FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Pe-titioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain ir-regularities in the land registration proceeding. The Tuason’s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judg-ment. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to pur-chase 11 hectares from the Aquials. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involv-ing the validity of OCT No. 735. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 5b

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. They seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the estate. Under Art. 8, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, “The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdi-vided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals” Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitu-tional because the provision in the Constitution refers to “lands” not landed estates. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. HELD: No. The question is one of constitutional construction. The Constitution clearly states that “land” not “landed estates” can be expropriated. It has a broader scope, allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land. The law does not distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be, as long as there is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 24a, 26, 37, 40c

66 Tolentino v. Commission on ElectionsCase No. 154 G.R. No. L-34150 (October 16, 1971)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAglipay v. RuizCase No. 4 G.R. No. 45459 (March 13, 1937)

FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 1 of Art. 5 of the Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. This proposal was to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the November 1971 elections relying on Sec. 1, Art. 15 of the Constitution: “The Congress in a joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a con-vention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratifi-cation.” ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec. 1 of Art. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1. HELD: There was a violation. Be-cause such amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the people for their ratification in an election, “An election” only means one. Also, no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would be modified. The amendments being proposed by the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

FACTS: Respondent, who is the Director of Post, announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. 4052. Petitioner, who is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks prohibition of such because it violates Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the sale of such stamps is in vio-lation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom. HELD: Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. In this case, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. Act. No. 4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36a, 37

67 U.S. v. Ang Tang HoCase No 295 G.R. No. 17122 (February 27, 1922) Chapter XI, Page 435, Footnote No.12

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONOrdillo v. COMELECCase No. 192 G.R. No. 93054 (December 4, 1990) Chapter XI, Page 437, Footnote No.24

FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law. E.O. 53 follows Act No. 2868 which penal-izes monopoly and hoarding of products under extraordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the Legislature has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Governor General. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to the Governor General are, De-fendant will not be charged. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: The act is unconstitutional. The Constitution is something solid, permanent and substantial. As known, no nation living under republican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of gov-ernment. This power is exclusive to the legislative. In fixing the price, the law is dealing with private prop-erty and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: None

FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766 (Organic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifu-gao, Abra and the city of Baguio. Out of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Resolu-tions and memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region. ISSUE: W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone, legally and validly constitute a region. HELD: Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “there shall be created autonomous regions… consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas…” From this, it can be derived that the term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. The provisions of R.A. No. 6766 also show that the Con-gress never intended that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 11g, 25a, 28

68 De los Santos vs. MallareCase No. 89 G.R. Nos. L-3045-6 (August 31, 1950) Chapter XI, Page 440 and 450, Footnote No.33 and 54

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCivil Liberties Union vs. Executive SecretaryCase No. 64 G.R. No. 83896 (February 22, 1991) Chapter XI, Pages 443, 450 and 454, Footnotes No. 41, 51 and 71

FACTS: This case questions the legality of the Petitioner’s removal from the same office which would be the effect of Respondent’s appointment. Petitioner contends that under the Constitution, he can not be re-moved against his will and without cause, citing Sec. 4, Art. 12 of the Constitution which reads: “No officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law.” Re-spondent admits that the position of City Engineer “belongs to the unclassified service”. According to Lac-son vs. Romero, all officers or employees in the unclassified service are protected by the above provision; but notes that there is a difference between this case and the Lacson case. Sec. 2545 of the Revised Ad-ministration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of who is the city engineer. The two provisions are repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. ISSUE: W/N the position of City Engineer is an unclassified service. HELD: No. Reading Art. 12, Sec. 1 of the Con-stitution, it is clear that Sec. 4 protects those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the follow-ing: “policydetermining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature”. The position of city engineer is neither of the above-stated. This is confirmed by the enactment of C.A. No. 177. As a contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construction are to be given the sense they have in common use. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los Santos is enti-tled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appur-tenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause, and that Respondent’s appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges. LATIN MAXIM: 39

FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. This runs counter to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. ISSUE: W/N the pro-hibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2. HELD: No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. The qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” of Sec. 13, Art. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaning-less the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. E.O. 284 is therefore declared null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, b2

69 People of the Philippines vs. MuñozCase No. 217 G.R. No. L-38969 (February 9, 1989) Chapter XI, Page 446, Footnote No.42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONNitafan v. Commissioner of Internal RevenueCase No. 190 G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46

FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death but this was modified by Art. 3, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution providing that “…any death penalty already imposed shall be re-duced to reclusion temporal.” ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the aboli-tion of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. HELD: No. In the case at bar, the Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not follow the Masangkay ruling, and that would be reclusion perpetua. LATIN MAXIMS: 1, 6c, 20a

FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compensations as judicial offi-cers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating that “during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased”, even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. HELD: Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminution of judges’ salaries because “the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries”. Endencia vs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary taxable. LATIN MAXIM: 3, b1

70 Tañada v. Cuenco, et alCase No. 286 G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957) Chapter XI, Page No. 451, Footnote No.55

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAratuc v. COMELECCase No. 19 G.R. No. L-49705-09 (February 8, 1979) Chapter XI, Page 452, Footnote No.62

FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel, Lopez, and Primi-cias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of SET. Then, the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET. Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel, Lopez, and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET, the other Senators must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that six members of the Electoral Tribunal “shall be mem-bers of the Senate or the House of Representatives”, is mandatory. The word “shall” is imperative in nature relative to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or law-ful. HELD: No. “The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted … ex-cept as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contem-porary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case.” Hence, “if the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made impera-tive by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may be rejected.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6b, 9b, 11a

FACTS: Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitioners. HELD: No. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court’s power over COMELEC decisions – in 1935, the Supreme Court may review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari; 1973, Respon-dent’s decisions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. This highlights the 1973 Constitu-tion’s intent to strengthen Respondent’s independence. Consequently, errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in certiorari. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9a, 25a

71 In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and VallartaCase No. 59 A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (November 9, 1998)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMagtoto v. MangueraCase No. 159 G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 (March 3, 1975) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.79

FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998, within 2 months before the election. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. On the one hand, Art. 8, Sec. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled within 90 days of such vacancy. On the other hand, Art. 7, Sec. 15 prohibits the President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elections, except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. HELD: No, the appoint-ments were void. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days, but this does not apply in the special circumstance of Presidential elections, which occurs only once every six years. Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception. The prohibition is for pub-lic policy purposes, to prevent “midnight appointments” – which is more compelling than temporary vacan-cies in the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 35, 36b, 38a, 50, b

FACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 20 Art. 4 of the New Constitution which took effect on Jan. 17, 1973. The provision reads: “… Any person under investigation…shall have the right to re-main silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right…. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible.” Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two informations both dated Feb. 23, 1973. During the trial, his extrajudicial confession dated Nov. 15, 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 15, 1972 is admissible as evidence. 2. W/N Sec. 20, Art. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively. HELD: 1. Yes. Petitioner’s confession is admissible. The court ruled that a confession obtained from a person under investigation, who has not been informed of his right to counsel, is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. Conversely, such confession is inadmissible if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution. 2. No. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. Giving such provision a retroac-tive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 46a

72 Filoteo v. SandiganbayanCase No. 106 G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.80

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCo v. Electoral Tribunal, House of RepresentativesCase No. 66 G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.82

FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. Upon the capture of his co-accused, he was pointed out as the mastermind. When Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. On May 30, 1982, Petitioner exe-cuted sworn statements (confessing what had happened), without the presence of a counsel. The 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Peti-tioner’s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the presence of a counsel. 2. W/N the said pro-visions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively. HELD: 1. Yes, it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. 2. No. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said con-stitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 46a

FACTS: Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern Samar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen hav-ing been born to a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao. ISSUE: 1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. 2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively. HELD: Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. They need not per-form any act of “election” granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957, when he was only 9 years old. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks to rem-edy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9a, 42a

73 Sarmiento v. MisonCase No. 277 G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17, 1987) Chapter XI, Page 458, Footnote No.84

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDomingo v. Commission on AuditCase No. 37 G.R. No. 112371 (October 7, 1998)

FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The Court favored the Respondent based on express provisions of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 16, Art. 7 pro-vides for officers other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appoint-ments. HELD: No. Sec. 16 Art. 7 only provides for the appointment, by the President of “heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” with the requirement of CA approval. Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position “heads of bureaus” from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for “horse-trad-ing”, and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. The word “also” in the second sentence of Sec. 16 Art. 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed “in a like manner” as that of the first group. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24b, 32, 39a, b

FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of the en-tire Region V of DSWD. Respondent sent a communication to the Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances when they should not be. Petitioner asserted that even if she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportation allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle. ISSUE: W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a govern-ment official provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that transportation al-lowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a

74 Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and SalazarCase No. 112 G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLuzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service CommissionCase No. 76 G.R. No. L-37661 (November 16, 1932)

FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with re-spect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-instatement of Respondent Salazar. 2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exception to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations be-tween the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. On May 9, 1932, Respondent required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his trucks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with compensation as provided in Sec. 13 of the Public Service Law. ISSUE: W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. 13 of Act No. 3108 by Act No. 3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner’s business, although it is not a common carrier. HELD: The omission from Sec. 13 of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of the PSC to private en-terprises not devoted to public use. Public service is a service for public use. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” does not show the intent either. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility. Also, notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of the term “public service” introduced by Act No. 3316, there were no alterations made in the basic provisions of the other sections. Respondent has no jurisdiction over Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 36b

75

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

ROUND 2

76 Aparri v. Court of AppealsCase No. 15 G.R. No. L-30057 (January 31, 1984) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.4

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. QuijadaCase No. G.R. Nos. 115008 (July 24, 1996)

FACTS: R.A. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the President. On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resolution No. 13 appointing Peti-tioner as General Manager of NARRA. On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to March 31, 1962. ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. HELD: No, Peti-tioner’s term of office is deemed expired. R.A. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. The word ‘term’ describes the period that an office may hold of-fice and upon expiration of such term, his rights, duties, and authority must cease. In this case, the term of office is not fixed by law, but by the Board. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6c

FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was convicted of 2 offenses, which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art. 248 of the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its ag-gravated form under PD 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 states that, “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.” ISSUE: 1) W/N the trial court’s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon, People v. Caling, etc. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal posses-sion of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. Barros. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing into a single integrated offense. HELD: 1) The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”. It does not use the clause “as a result” or “on the occasion of ”to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime, but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

77 Baranda v. GustilloCase No. 30 G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 125, Footnote No.5

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONBasbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of JusticeCase No. G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)

FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land, Lot No. 4517. The Court, after discovering that private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired, ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot, which the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the final de-cisions of the Court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court. 2. What is the nature of the duty of the Reg-ister of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HELD: 1. Re-spondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens – “Before the final judgment, a no-tice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that … it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. …” 2. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that, “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration …. If the instrument cannot be registered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground therefore, and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-inlaw was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. HELD: No, he is not. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning, un-justly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11a, 25a

78 Segovia v. SandiganbayanCase No. G.R. No. 124067 (March 27, 1998)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONTanada v. YuloCase No. 288 No. 43575 (May 31, 1935) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11

FACTS: FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for NPC’s Mindanao project. The lowest bidder, Joint Venture was disqualified after the PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder, Urban Consolidated Constructors, were “downgraded” thereby ineligible as bid-ders. Since all other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project, the committee de-clared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. NPC Board approved, but for reasons not on record. The project was eventually cancelled. Petitioners were charged under RA 3019 for in “one way or the other, extending undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inex-cusable negligence.” For this, petitioners were suspended from office. ISSUE: W/N it is mandatory or dis-cretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused be-fore it. HELD: Yes, it is mandatory. Under the act, one accused of any offense involving fraud upon govern-ment public funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex, regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation, shall be suspended from office. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information, a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, Luciano, et al. v. Mariano, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 7a Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent by the Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 th birthday on Oc-tober 35, 1934, subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No. 3899. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. 2. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission. HELD: No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Peti-tioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapac-itated. No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is required as it is just an enlarge-ment of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

79 Eliseo Silva v. Belen CabreraCase No. 146

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRadio Communications of the Philippines v. National Telecom. Com.Case No. 129 G.R. No. L-68729 (May 29, 1987)

G.R. No. L-3629 (March 19, 1951) FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Com-mission for a certificate of public convenience, to be able to operate an ice plant in the City of Lipa. Peti-tioner, owner of another ice plant already in the same area, opposed Respondent’s application, claiming that public convenience did not need another ice plant. Atty. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimony and conduct hearing of the contest; thereafter the Commission en banc rendered a de-cision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. After which, Petitioner claimed that under the law, no one except the Commissioner may hear contested cases. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful. HELD: No, the delegation is unlawful. Although Sec. 32 of Public Service Act al-lows the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or take testimony, Sec. 3 of the same act provides that in (1) all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing of rates, the re-ception of evidence may only be delegated to one of the Commissioners. Thus, though the law makes it in-convenient or cumbersome for the Commission to handle contested cases, where the law is clear, the Commission nor the Court may not disregard, circumvent, or interpret the law any other way. Plus, you have to look at the entire Act, and not just specific provisions, in applying the law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 8a, 36b

FACTS: Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a radio communica-tions system, recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC). Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon, Mindoro, and Samar. In 1980, the Respondent, which replaced the PSC, authorized Kayu-manggi to set up radio systems in Mindoro and Samar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a complaint by Kayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, because it didn’t have a certificate of public convenience, which is necessary under EO 546 for any public service to operate. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly operate. HELD: Yes, they need such certificates to validly operate. Petitioner was created under RA 2036, governed by the Public Service Commission. Under it, radio companies did not need a certificate of public convenience to operate. However, P.D. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Under EO 546, Respon-dent must issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communications systems. Peti-tioner did not avail of it when they should have. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 30, 46a, 49

80 National Federation of Labor v. Hon. EismaCase No. 84 G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPascual v. Pascual-BautistaCase No. 198 G.R. No. 84240 (March 25, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16

FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their union leader and un-derpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts to decide. ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. In the La-bor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. However, P.D. 1367 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 amended Sec. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 130 amended the same section, but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from employer-em-ployee relations. Thus the law is clear, respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a

FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, ac-knowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. ISSUE: W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the ille-gitimate child”, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the de-ceased. HELD: In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that “Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron cur-tain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.” Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but peti-tioners are his illegitimate children. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 36b

81 People v. AmigoCase No. 201 G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. SantayanaCase No. 115 No. L-22291 (November 15, 1976)

FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to re-quire a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. HELD: In People vs. Muñoz, the Court held that “A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.” LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7b

FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an inde-terminate penalty from one year and one day to two years, and to pay the costs. ISSUE: W/N the appoint-ment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS, which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms, exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. HELD: Yes. At the time of appellant’s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case of People vs. Macaran-dang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a ‘peace of-ficer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879”. LATIN MAXIM: 46a

82 National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. TecsonCase No. 184 G.R. No. L-29131 (August 27, 1969) Chapter 4, Page 127, Footnote No.18

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSantiago v. Commission on Elections, et al.Case No. 90 G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997) Chapter IV, Page 129, Footnote No.26

FACTS: On 14 November 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the amount was fully paid until May 25, 1960. On 21 De-cember 1965, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment ren-dered in the initial case. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lack of jurisdic-tion over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The complaint was dismissed as having pre-scribed. ISSUE: W/N the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 expired was considered to be December 21, 1965. HELD: NO. "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b

FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2, Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legisla-tion. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: NO. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Ref-erendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amend-ments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amend-ments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 43

83 Villanueva v. COMELECCase No. 170 No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMario R. Melchor v. Commission on AuditCase No. 177 G.R. No. 95398 (August 16, 1991) Chapter IV. Page 133, Footnote No.35

FACTS: On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and pro-claimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dis-missed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal ef-fect, and that assuming it was effective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not with-draw after January 4. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical de-fects. HELD: No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 39c

FACTS: On July 15, 1983, Petitioner, as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of one of the school buildings. The school accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed to sign as a witness to the contract, which was approved by the Minister of Education. During construction, the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increase, but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. Consequently, the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signa-ture of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. For this reason the petitioner was made person-ally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. ISSUE: 1. W/N the contract was null and void. 2. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. HELD: No. The chief ac-countant’s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as substantial compliance with the require-ments of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore the approval of the Minister of Education. Also, it was highly inequitable for the Court to com-pel the Petitioner, who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 968, to shoulder the construc-tion cost of the building, which was being utilized by the school when he was not reaping benefits from it. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9a, 12a

84 Mateo Casela v. Court of Appeals, and Exequiel MagsaysayCase No. 50 G.R. No. L – 26754 (October 16, 1970) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.38

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDe Jesus v. City of ManilaCase No. 86 G.R. No. L-9337 (December 24, 1914) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.41

FACTS: Petitioner was ordered, on Oct. 26, 1956, to vacate the premises and remove his house. Petitioner refused to comply. Thus, the Court issued two more writs on May 6, 1958 and April 14, 1959. Instead of obeying the writs, the Petitioner filed a case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales, asking Private Respondent to pay him the value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed a motion for suspen-sion of the implementation of the writ of execution. The Court granted the motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent Court. For this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated Dec. 6, 1963 and another on Feb. 11, 1964. CAR denied the motion holding that its decision dated Oct. 26, 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. ISSUE: W/N the motion for execution which was filed be-yond the reglementary period was time-barred.

FACTS: In 1907, Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila which was under the Torrens system. Apparently, the original owner incorrectly declared the size of the land. So, from 1901 – 1907, the original owner was paying lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 – 1910. Upon finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes, Petitioner paid the taxes, fees, and interest of P2, 096.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901-1910. Soon after, he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount. Petitioner was awarded P1, 649.82. Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. Taxes may not be due and payable until they are assessed. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. HELD: Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 9a, 38b, 43, 50

HELD: No. From Dec. 17, 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory, to Dec. 11, 1963, the date when Private Respondent’s motion for execution was filed, a period of 6 years, 11 months and 24 days elapsed. From this period, the time during which the writs of execution could not be served, or a period of 3 years, 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. Consequently, only 3 years, 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. Hence Private Respondent’s motion for execution was not time-barred. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 11e

85 Federation of Free Workers v. InciongCase No. 45 G.R. No. L-48848 (May 11, 1988)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMorales v. ParedesCase No. 83 G.R. No. L-34428 (December 29, 1930)

FACTS: In April 1977, PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance. The increase was set at May 1, 1977, as well as the rules issued on the same day. Sec. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. On September 27, 1977, the company filed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the increase. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the company. Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. ISSUE: 1. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 2. W/N the petitioners were in a financial po-sition to pay the additional emergency allowance. HELD: No, the application was not a strict rule. The pur-pose of the PD is to protect wages and income. The law takes into consideration that there is a possibility that some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and such incapability may happen any-time within the year. No, only the Department of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial position to pay. The Department is in a better position to assess the matter. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion, their recommendations will be respected by the courts. Moreover, the com-pany was able prove their financial situation by giving financial statements. LATIN MAXIM: 8, 9a, 42

FACTS: Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other people have already registered such land as their own. Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. While the Motion was still pending, Petitioner brought the present action to the Supreme Court praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 if the Code of Civil Procedure. ISSUE: W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. 513 if there are other adequate remedies available. Peti-tioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, therefore, that action should be finished first. LATIN MAXIM: 9c

86 Prasnik v. Republic of the PhilippinesCase No. 125 G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDe Guia v. COMELECCase No. 30 G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992)

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children with-out the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. 335. ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother. HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an ac-knowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is unneces-sary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowl-edged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law, they should be allowed adoption. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 8a, 9, 12, 26, 36a, 37, 39b

FACTS: Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of the Sangguniang Panlu-lungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. ISSUE: W/N par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. HELD: No. Par (d) Sec.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguni-ang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The court realized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections. LATIN MAXIM: 2, 9c, 11a, 36b, 37, b2

87 Salenillas v. Court of AppealsCase No. 68 G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989) Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSarcos v. CastilloCase No. 276 G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969) Chapter IV, Page 136, Footnote No. 48

FACTS: On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disquali-fied Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on Monge et al. vs. Angeles. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 2. W/N the prescription period had already pre-scribed. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by Respon-dent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners’ contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a fore-closure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. For foreclosure sales, the prescrip-tion period starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 26, 27, 9b, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with misconduct and dis-honesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the al-leged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain pri-vate individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. And on the basis of such administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the “Decentralization Act of l967”. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. HELD: The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan con-siderations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Mu-nicipal Mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 6d, 7a, 9a, 36b, 49

88 Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRCCase No. 7 G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l997) Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote No. 53

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONJose Comendador v. Renato S. De VillaCase No. 69 G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991) Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61

FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders, tasked to su-pervise 36 sewers each. On May 5 and 6, l993, all the line leaders did not report for work. On May 6, l993, Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then required to submit written explanations as to their absence. On May 10, l993, Private Respondents tendered their explanation letters. Despite their explanation, they were not allowed to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. But other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on May 5 and 6, l993. ISSUE: 1. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of back-wages for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine, the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. However, a new doctrine allowed the awarding of “full” backwages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case. The Labor Ar-biter was wrong in awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7a, 49

FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their par-ticipation in the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9, l989. In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-In-vestigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to peremptory challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discon-tinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. 2. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 3. W/N there was a legal basis for the Re-gional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners. HELD: The right to peremptory chal-lenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to peremp-tory challenge was effectively revived. The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creation of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may be referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were abolished, the right to peremptory challenge was revived. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a, 10

89 Matabuena v. CervantesCase No. 172 G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971) Chapter IV, Page 143, Footnote No.69

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax AppealsCase No. 151 G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957) Chapter IV, Page 144, Footnote No.76

FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Pe-titioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.” The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the pro-hibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. HELD: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law rela-tionships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 9c

FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs Collector assessed the cus-toms duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The duties were paid and the shipment released. There-after, the Manila Customs Collector reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the impor-tation and imposed additional duties. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. Provision says that “the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. However, under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector of Cus-toms. HELD: Yes, there is indeed a disparity between Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The Supreme Court con-curred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in Sec. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. To support this, the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code, ‘the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. In this ruling, the court did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rectified an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention of the Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construc-tion, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 16a, 16c, 36a

90 Lamb v. PhippsCase No. 143 G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912) Chapter 4, Page 144, Footnote No.78

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCom. of Internal Revenue v. ESSOCase No. 27 G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989)

FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. Petitioner thus filed an action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot prosper since there is no showing that, as provided by law, “there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law.” ISSUE: W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other ade-quate and speedy remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. HELD: There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. 222 of Act No. 190 which reads in part: “When the complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal, … it may if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law.” The phrase “courts of law” should read as “course of law”. Copied verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the said section in the California Code reads “course of law” instead of “courts of law”. Spanish translation of said Sec. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In Spanish, the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary “courts of law”. On its face, this evident typographical error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensical. It is there-fore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative in-tent and to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a, 36a, 36b, 36d, 36f, 37

FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964. However, Respondent’s payment for 1960 was found to be short. Thus, Petitioner de-manded payment of the deficiency tax together with interest for the period of April 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964. On August 10, 1964, Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. It protested the computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due, claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s over-payment. ISSUE: 1. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367, 994 with interest. 2. W/N Re-spondent is entitled to a refund. HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221, 033 rep-resenting the excess payment of Respondent. Having been paid and received by mistake, the sum be-longed to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such amount, which arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. Since the amount of P221, 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1960, whatever obli-gation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged. It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. Noth-ing is better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. Moreover, a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the leg-islative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 8b, 11a, 11d, 11e, 12a, 12b

91 People v. VillanuevaCase No. 116 G. R. L-15014 (April 29, 1961)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. DuqueCase No. 106

G. R. 100285 (August 13, 1992)Chapter IV, Page 149, Footnote No.97

FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries with damage to prop-erty in amount of P2,362 through reckless imprudence in the Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. The case was considered beyond the court’s jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, which also declared itself without jurisdiction because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through reckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, and even applied to its maximum degree. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has juris-diction.

FACTS: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency, POEA. The Labor Code provides that the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of how to compute it. Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that “prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment”. According to Accused, a literal reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. IS-SUE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Prescription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. There is absurdity in Sec. 2 but Accused does not benefit from a literal reading. It must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention and avoid absurd results. “Institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment” may be ei-ther disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word “until”. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 11a, 11d, 12, 15, 38

HELD: Yes. Angeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that jurisdiction was with the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. Also, since the Court of First Instance would have jurisdiction if the only of-fense were the damage of property, it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. Moreover, there is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical in-juries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property. The Justice of Peace, if given jurisdic-tion, would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2,636 fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot be less than the amount of the damage. LATIN MAXIM: 5, 11

92 Bello v. Court of AppealsCase No. 15 G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCesario Ursua v. Court of AppealsCase No. 306 G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996) Chapter 4, Page 152, Footnote No.112

FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an anal-ogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3) directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. They dismissed the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”. ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of judicial decision. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its purpose and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rule. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 12, 36, 8b

FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because the law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal matters. At the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as “Oscar Perez.” Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombuds-man. He was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142. ISSUE: W/N the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by C.A. No. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be reme-died. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed strictly against the state, and in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11a, 12a, 41a

93 Paat v. Court of AppealsCase No. 95 G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPritchard v. RepublicCase No. 245 G.R. No. L-1715 (July 17, 1948) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156

FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads “The court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the Government…as well as the machinery, equip-ment… which are illegally used…” ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705. HELD: No. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. 68a. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36a

FACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for exemption, it is imperative that Petitioner’s children should be enrolled during the entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his children in school, he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to entitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention. Issue: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking the aforementioned provision. HELD: The provision of law invoked by appellant must be inter-preted in the sense that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. The drafters of the law could not have intended to create an absurd or im-possible situation. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 19a

94 Salvacion v. Central Bank of the PhilippinesCase No. 245 G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDemafiles v. ComelecCase No. 91 G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967) Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159

FACTS: An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of any court. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood firm on the policy. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments were minimal. As, some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be undermined, stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 2, 14, 39

FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Peti-tioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7. 2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. 3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. HELD: RA 4970 reads “the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1 st day of January following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. No, a can-vassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on the said body.” Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclama-tion, there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. LATIN MAXIM: 15, 35, 43, 26

95 National Housing Corporation v. JucoCase No. 86 G.R. No. L-64313 (January 17, 1985)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. MejiaCase No. 111 G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 (July 7, 1997)

FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner, Private Respondent was ter-minated. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for dismissal were for valid reasons. Respondent Court however, despite past decisions, decided in favor of the Private Respondent. ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing the civil service. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockholders. The 1935 constitution’s section 1 article 12 states that “A civil service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law.” While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states that “The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivi-sion and instrumentality of the government, including every government owned or controlled corporation.” Clearly, the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries out a message that the cover-age is broad and all-embracing. Furthermore, P.D. 807 Sec. 56 implements the said provision. In addition to this, the Labor Code states that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 7, 24, 26, 38b

FACTS: Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: • “Sec. 14. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the car-napping or on the occasion thereof.” ISSUE: 1. W/N the phrase “is killed” covers both homicide and murder. 2. If the crime was frustrated murder, would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense. HELD: The words “is killed” make no distinction between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof” makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. The killing, whether it is homicide or murder, cannot be treated as a separate offense and only serves to qualify the carnapping. The phrase “is killed” refers only to consummated murder, and not frustrated mur-der. Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. 14 “by means of violence or in intimidation of persons”. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 26, 38a, 43, 48

96 City of Manila v. Judge Gomez and Esso PhilippinesCase No. 23 G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONChua v. Civil Service CommissionCase No. 60 G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146

FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447), which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, im-posed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125, effec-tive beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila’s con-tention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. The obvious implication is that an addi-tional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to im-pose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 20a, 38b, 43, 49

FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: • Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized un-der this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separa-tion…” Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Re-course by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s sta-tus as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). HELD: The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitu-tion if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11e, 12a, 20a, 20b, 37

97 Solid Homes Inc. v. Teresita PayawalCase No. 280 G.R. No. 84811 (Aug. 29, 1989) Chapter IV, Page 169, Footnote No.164

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRichard Gordon v. Regino Veridiano IICase No. 116 G.R. No. L-55230 (Nov. 8, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 170, Footnote No.171

FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner contends that the case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and not the RTC. ISSUE: 1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the ap-plicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 1344) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent’s argument relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 20c, 50

FACTS: Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Drugstore. A ‘test buy’ operation at San Sebastian Drugstore, wherein agents were sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doc-tor’s prescription, gave rise to the closure ordered by the FDA. Before such order was promulgated, the Mayor revoked the Mayor’s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently, a signboard was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. On May 7, 1980, FDA ap-proved Respondent’s request to exchange the locations of the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). Upon knowledge of this, Petitioner then revoked the Mayor’s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore. ISSUE: The conflict between the FDA’s and the mayor’s power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drugstores. RULING: The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore, the Mayor however did not. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however, the authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction). LATIN MAXIM: 20c, 38b

98 Eufronio Llanto v. Mohamad Ali DimaporoCase No. 155 G.R. No. L-21905 (Mar, 31, 1966) Chapter IV, Page 171, Footnote No.178

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. ConcepcionCase No. 205 G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.202

FACTS: The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the ’60-’61 salary appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general fund. The position, then held by the Petitioner, was abolished. Petitioner came to the court on mandamus, wherein the Respondent’s motion to dismiss was granted hence the current action. ISSUE: 1. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dis-miss? 2. Is it void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no, it is not void. The motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action, which can be determined by reference to the facts in the averred pleading. The question raised is purely one of law. The legal issue was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. Oral arguments are then reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. Further, petitioner con-tends that the stamp of approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. Such ac-tion was, however, done away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. 3a of RA2264). LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 20a, 32, 37, 49

FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion, S. en C, a co-partner-ship. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.” This Section was in ef-fect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were repealed by Act No. 2938. HELD: In the in-terpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legisla-ture. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall vio-late any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 9a, 37, 38b

99 Tantuico, Jr. v. DomingoCase No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAlpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRCCase No. 12 G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997) Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2

FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to 1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in prepa-ration for his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the com-mittee recommended Petitioner’s clearance from accountability and after another special audit, Respondent approved Petitioner’s application for retirement but added that ½ of the money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Peti-tioner’s retirement benefits may be withheld. HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pen-sion to the Auditor General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to gar-nishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insur-ance Act), the benefits granted “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.” Withholding Petitioner’s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the re-tiree’s well-being. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 9d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano Marcos State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the Regional Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the current minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be borne by DMMSU. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for nonpayment of minimum wage. HELD: Yes, Petitioner is jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Section 6 of RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a salary differen-tial, the liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed in Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consider-ation of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 36c, 38b

100 Alfon v. Republic Espino v. CleofeCase No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973) Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980)

FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the following: 1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy. 2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name. 3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. 4. She exer-cised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimate and legitimated children are re-quired to use the surname of their father. HELD: No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally entitled. Petitioner is therefore al-lowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 42a

FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as amended by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement pension. ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who re-tire even after its June 17, 1967. HELD: No. Looking at the legislative intent through the explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum after June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1967. A contrary interpretation which would allow or autho-rize retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would virtu-ally abolish the essential distinction between the two types of retirement benefits and render the ‘option’ un-der the law meaningless and nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a

101 Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of CustomsCase No: 258 G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAsiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal RevenueCase No. 10 G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: “There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines… exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pe-sos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage” ISSUE: W/N the words “products of the Philippines” ex-cludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philip-pines. HELD: No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term “product of the Philippines” should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product pro-duced in the country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are “products of the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

FACTS: The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oils which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was paid under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432 provides that “no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such arti-cles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed of to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.” Said Act took effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915. ISSUE: W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and gasoline which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915. HELD: No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that merchandise “dispose of” had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully recognized that the phrase “disposed of” meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an arti-cle, because in said Act it provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the absence of stipulations to the contrary. The phrase “disposed of” as used in Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 6c, 25a, 43

102 Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. BaluyutCase No. 173 G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCalder & Co v. The United StatesCase No. 44 G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de San Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer of these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 19 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the transfer of Appellants’ empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Ap-pellee was done by authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative Or-der No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE: W/N the decision of the trial court is legally valid. HELD: Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their contents. This is in order to make available at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no requirement similar to that found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans should be noti-fied in writing. The two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as both operate under the flexible cargo system. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50

FACTS: The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine, condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories" the steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification made by customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, exciters, and all other machinery for the generation of power." ISSUE: W/N the machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. HELD: A turbine engine and generator, although intended for use as a power-generating device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine. Component parts must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as "other machinery" under Par 257b. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c, 25a, 43

103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v. RamosCase No. 163

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMalanyaon v. Lising et. alCase No. 160 GR No. L-56028 (July 30,1981) Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.52

G. R. No. L-4268 (January 18, 1951)Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.51

FACTS: Respondent filed a libel suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 11531, against Aproniano G. Borres, Pe-dro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and reporter, respectively, of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper, asking damages aggregating P90,000. With the filing of this suit, the Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50,000 bond. The Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Respondent Quirino and Respondent Corporation, in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from pro-ceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45,000 damages. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 12263. Respondent Judge declared that the suit, in case No. 12263, was "un-necessary, superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the same. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in Case No. 11531. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of court. HELD: Yes, the right to intervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 30, 36a, 36b

FACTS: A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspen-sion pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides, “Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstate-ment and to the salaries and benefits w/c he failed to receive during suspension”. ISSUE: W/N the dis-missal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. HELD: No. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. In People vs. Salico (84 Phil. 722), " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 25a

104 Rura v. LopenaCase No. 139

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONKrivenko v. Register of DeedsCase No. 139 G.R. No. L-360 (November 15, 1947) Chapter 5, Page 190, Footnote No.60

G. R. No. L-69810-14 (June 19, 1985)Chapter 5, Page 189, Footnote No.53

FACTS: Petitioner was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. Only a single decision was rendered. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense. The fiscal invoked Sec. 9 of the Probation Law, which disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from applying for probation. The trial court denied his application on the belief that since the crimes were committed on different dates, he was guilty on each of those dates. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision, he has not yet been pre-viously convicted. ISSUE: How should the word “previously” be construed? HELD: The word “previously” refers to the date of the conviction and not to the dates of the crimes involved. Although he was guilty of five counts of estafa, they were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. Hence, when Peti-tioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction on his record. He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 48

FACTS: Petitioner, an alien, bought a residential lot but its registration was interrupted by the war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. ISSUE: W/N “residential land” falls under the phrase “agricultural lands” as stated in Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. HELD: Under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, which includes residential lands. It may safely be presumed that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. Soon after, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed C.A. No. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by such citizens. Such revision is equiva-lent to a declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated. In addition, the interpretation given by the Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that “residential land” is part of “public agricultural lands”. It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained that “residential lots” are included in “agricul-tural lands”. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agri-cultural, the result would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 5a, 9a, 25a, 30a, b

105 Chang Yung Fa, et al. v. Gianzon, etc. and De la Cruz, etc.Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-7785 (November 25, 1955)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONGarcia v. COMELECCase No. 109 G.R. No. 111511 (October 5, 1993) Chapter V, Footnote No.67, Page No. 192

FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as immigrants under C.A. No. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall be limited to two years. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immi-grants. Petitioners contend that having been classified as “non-quota immigrants”, they should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word “immigrant” is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. ISSUE: W/N the word “immigrant” only refers to a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. HELD: The only definition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philip-pines, other than a nonimmigrant." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" from which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for per-manent residence as now contended by appellants. A review of the whole law would disclose no such in-tention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigra-tion on matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, 36b

FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. Respondent Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initia-tive and referendum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution can-not be the subject of a local initiative. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. ISSUE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative and ref-erendum.

HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is granted because resolu-tions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum (Sec. 32 of Art. VI of the Constitution). Also, RA 6735, the law providing for a system on initiative and referendum, includes resolutions as among the sub-jects of initiative. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution in its definition, the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Resolu-tions are still proper subjects of an initiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9c, 11a, 50

106Motoomull v. dela Paz Case No. 180 G.R. No. L-45302 (July 24, 1990) Chapter V, Footnote No.73, Page No. 195

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. NazarioCase No. 218 G.R. No. L-44143 (August 31, 1988) Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page No. 197

FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner sought issuance of a prelimi-nary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal. The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court, on motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem just, should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or judg-ment may be raised only by motion in the main case. ISSUE: 1. W/N the word “court” refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision. HELD: Yes, the word court refers to the trial court. “The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order.” The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearing should provide otherwise. The law provides fur-ther that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main case. More importantly where a particular word or phrase is am-biguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words. Accordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not in accordance with the legislative intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 12a, 36a

FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to pay municipal taxes worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum.” He ad-mits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. ISSUE: 1. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. 2. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused. HELD: No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above provision that the Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term “manager”. While it appears that the National Government is the owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in the profits they generated. It is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. And obviously, the word owner cannot be construed to include the Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from taxes. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 37

107 People v. EvangelistaCase No. 106 G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONBanco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking CorporationCase No. 12 G.R. No. 74917 (January 20, 1988)

FACTS: Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. However, Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of Private respon-dent’s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recom-mendation and granted Private Respondent’s application on April 23, 1993. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation. HELD: Yes. Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, Private Re-spondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 26, 49

FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of P45,982.23 as a con-sequence of six crossed Manager’s checks which turned out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorse-ments appearing at the back of each check. Philippine Clearing House Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said amount. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks. ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable. HELD: Yes. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC, its operation extends to “clearing checks and other clearing items.” Clearly, the term “checks” refer to checks in general use in com-mercial and business activities, including nonnegotiable checks. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC’s jurisdiction. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should in-stead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to conse-quences. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26

108 Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et. al.Case No. 261 G.R. No. L-12560 (September 30, 1958) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.90

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONVelasco v. LopezCase No. 308 G.R. No. 905 (February 12, 1903)

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to Petitioner who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said properties upon payment of certain royalties. Upon violation of the terms of agree-ment, the company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case for unlaw-ful detainer involving mineral land. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land, including mineral lands. HELD: Yes. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 26

FACTS: Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan, La Union on December 4, 1895, leaving a last will and tes-tament. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds, most importantly that the hour is not stated. ISSUE: W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated. HELD: Yes. Book III, Title II, Chapter I, Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: “The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. After the testament has been drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place, year, month, day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud,” (art 695) “Any will, in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter have not been observed, shall be void.” (art 687) The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if such for-malities aren’t met. (art 687) It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant (overlook-ing the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the code. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a

109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. GimenezCase No. 67 G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONOliva v. LamadridCase No. 191 G.R. No. L-23196 (October 31, 1969) Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote No.96

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Im-portation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is among those Petitioner imports. For every impor-tation, Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that: “Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, trans-portation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors … shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.” The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one spe-cific class, namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The “stabilizers and fla-vors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though “stabilizers and flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch. Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 29, 36

FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, the property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. However, under RA 720, the land could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale, Feb. 4 1963. No redemp-tion was made within that time. On May 31 1963, Plaintiff offered to repurchase, claiming that under C.A. No. 141, he was entitled to repurchase the land, not two (2), but five (5) years after the title was sold be-cause he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 of Sec. 5 of RA 720. HELD: No. Petitioner, as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a torrens title, is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not sub-ject to the two (2) year allotment for redemption. In July 30, 1951, the Court had already decided that Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free patent; therefore, the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act, they should be unified, and should abide by the conditions of the times. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 30a, 38a, 39a, 50, b, b2

110 Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962) Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote No.97

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhilippine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appelate CourtCase No. 234 G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987) Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99

FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various times during employ-ment, fell ill. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to its Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from Respondent Corporation, the employees claimed for sickness benefit al-lowances under the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law. Respondent Corpora-tion countered that having already received sick leave pay, they cannot claim benefits under the Social Se-curity Act as these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer. IS-SUE: W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under the Social Security Act. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as sick leave pay by a pri-vate benefit plan, the employee cannot avail of the privileges under the Social Security Act, would be to en-able the employer to defeat the purpose of the law. The Social Security Act, having been enacted for the welfare of the employees, cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 2b, 3a, 38b

FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the proper-ties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corpo-ration be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Nei-ther the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judg-ment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 26, 36a

111 Ramirez v. Court of AppealsCase No. 251 G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962) Chapter 5, Page 201 , Footnote No.100

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPilar v. Commission on ElectionsCase No. 242 G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995) Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.100

FACTS: A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a confrontation in the lat-ter’s office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated him. Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and filed a criminal case. ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense. HELD: The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such record-ing is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not dis-tinguish. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 7a, 9a, 11a, 24a, B2

FACTS: On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of can-didacy. As a result, Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his state-ment of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a “non-candidate”, having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. HELD: Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy”. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 26, 37, b2

112 Sanciangco v. RoñoCase No. 273 G. R. No. 68709 (July 19, 1985) Chapter 5, Page 203 , Footnote No.106

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONEastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of AppealsCase No. 38 G. R. No. 116356 (June 29, 1998)

FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental un-der the banner of the Mindanao alliance. He was not successful in the said elections. ISSUE: W/N an ap-pointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certificate of candidacy. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even ap-pointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. Since he is unquestionably an appointive member, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certifi-cate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batasan elections. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c, 28, 36b

FACTS: Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of money and attor-ney’s fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to Petitioner between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703,290.18. Despite repeated demands, Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the com-plaint; attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation. ISSUE: W/N EO 1088 is unconstitu-tional. HELD: No. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the court upheld the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from this ruling. The Court’s holding clearly de-bunks Petitioner’s insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. Administrative or Executive Acts, Orders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not con-trary to the laws or the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 9a, 37 49

113 Castillo-Co v. BarbersCase No. G.R. No. 129952 (June 16, 1998)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. MartinCase No. 214 G.R. No. L-33487 (May 31, 1971) Chapter 5, Page 204, Footnote No.110

FACTS: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy equip-ment by the Governor and Provincial Engineer. The items purchased were “reconditioned” instead of brand new and included other irregularities. Emilio A. Gonzales III, Director, and Jesus Guerrero, Deputy Om-budsman for Luzon, placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for 6 months. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign the order of preventive suspension. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to sign the order for preventive suspension. HELD: Yes. The deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsman and only the Ombudsman may sign an order preven-tively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. The word “or” is clearly dis-junctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union, specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court dis-missed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bula-can against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and harboring. HELD: No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. Each act possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The word OR in C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 37, 15b

114 GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications Inc.Case No. 49 G.R. No. 126496 (April 30, 1997)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.Case No. 158 G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994) Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 130

FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of telecommunications equipment pursuant to its con-gressional franchise to operate. The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasi-bility and the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez. ISSUE: Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of Commissioner Kintanar. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should be reached by a majority vote. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners suggesting its collegial nature. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 15a, 24a

FACTS: PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in order to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic organizations, religious elements, women’s and youth groups, and even the local officials angrily denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly en-acted two ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue that by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. IS-SUE: W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. HELD: The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under the LGC, local government units are authorized to pre-vent or suppress “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.” Since the world “gambling” should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be pre-vented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9c, 11e, 28, 37, 38, 50

115 Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine Acetylene CompanyCase No. 72 G.R. No. L-22443 (May 29, 1971) Chapter V, Page 210, Footnote No. 135

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. SantiagoCase No. 224 G.R. No. L-17663 (May 30, 1962) Chapter V, Page 136, Footnote No. 211

FACTS: Charles Butler, manager of Respondent Company, imported a custom-built LPG tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transport it to the company’s plant in Manila. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. The Tax Court held that the term in-dustry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is any enterprise employing rela-tively large amounts of capital and/or labor. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. may be consid-ered engaged in an industry as contemplated in Sec. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question. HELD: Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. Tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer. The obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term “industries” to activities that tend to produce or create or manu-facture, and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary and general definition. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical for Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other in-dustries in general. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 28, 43

FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel." The accused delivered false, malicious, and highly defamatory statements against Mayor Lacson through an amplifier system be-fore a crowd of around a hundred persons. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is not libel but oral defamation. ISSUE: Whether the crime charged in the in-formation is oral defamation, under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Art. 355, in relation to Art. 353, of the same Code. HELD: The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. The word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated, all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of publica-tion is the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening be-tween transmitter and receiver, while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. It has also been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel. LATIN MAXIM: 11h, 25a, 28, b2

116 Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. PalomarCase No. 45 G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966) Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSan Miguel Corp. v. NLRCCase No. 272 G.R. No. 80774 (May 31, 1988) Chapter V, Page 211, Footnote No. 138

FACTS: Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications, Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief. ISSUE: W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the Postal Law. HELD: No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The in-tent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is preserved. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 28

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corporation. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled “Modified Grande Pasteurization Process” and claimed entitlement to the cash award. SMC denied utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. HELD: No, said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is outlined in Art. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par. 3 “all money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement…” While par. 3 refers to “all money claims of workers,” it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Par. 3 should not be read in isolation with the context formed by par. 1 (unfair labor practices), par. 2 (terms and conditions of employment), par. 4 (household services), par. 5 (prohib-ited activities). The unifying element of pars. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. The scope of par. 3 is clarified by its associated para-graphs wherein money claims falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 36b, 36e

117 Gotiaco v. Union Ins. Soc. Of CamilonCase No. 114 G.R. No. 13983 (September 1, 1919) Chapter V, Page 213, Footnote No. 141

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Oil Industry CommissionCase No. 122 G.R. No. L-41315 (November 13, 1986)

FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. The rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Plain-tiffs sought recovery from Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: “Per-ils… of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons,… barratry of the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes…” The trial court ruled that the ship was unsea-worthy and Defendant is not liable. Plaintiffs appealed hence this action. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable for the loss. HELD: No, the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress and not to the insurer. The words “all other perils, losses, and misfortunes” are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. A loss which, in the ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea, from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure of the ship’s owner to pro-vide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a “peril of the sea.” The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils, not against perils of the ship. It was found that the cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. It was appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy. LATIN MAXIM: 29

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in the name of Manuel Yap. ISSUE: W/N Re-spondent Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes. HELD: The contention of the Peti-tioner is well founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express provision providing for disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company. Sec 6 of R.A. 6173 re-stricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f. What the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of Respondent Commission so anything not men-tioned are not or cannot be presumed or indicated. Thus, the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory power and not judicial. The phrase, ”to set the conditions” means the right to prescribe rules and conduct. It only pertains to rule making power and not adjudication. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. 7(4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25, 30, 31, 36

118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of AppealsCase No. 43 G.R. No. 123248 (October 16, 1997) Chapter V, Page 217, Footnote No.158

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and TecsonCase No. 257

FACTS: La Tondeña registered with the Philippine Patent Office, pursuant to RA 6231, the 350 c.c. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known as “Ginebra San Miguel”. Thereafter, a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350 c.c., white flint bottles with the mark “La Tondeña, Inc.” and “Ginebra San Miguel” stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner’s liquor product bear-ing the label “Sonny Boy” for commercial sale and distribution, without La Tondeña’s written consent, and in violation of Sec. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA 5700. ISSUE: W/N La Tondeña was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended by RA 5700. HELD: The words “other lawful beverages” is used in its gen-eral sense, referring to all beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. Hard liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law; hence, it is within the purview and cover-age of RA 623, as amended. To limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 26, 29

FACTS: Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment, to-gether with his supporting evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to “investigate the unex-plained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service.” ISSUE: W/N Pri-vate Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379. HELD: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term “subordinate” as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 30, 36b, 38

119 Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax AppealsCase No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-88 (July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONUnited States vs. Sto. NinoCase No. 302 Chapter V, Page 220, Footnote No.172

FACTS: Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond. ISSUE: W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not as stated by Respondent Court, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in Sec. 2301 of the same code. HELD: Yes. The im-ported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. LATIN MAXIM: 29

FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted under Act No. 1780, which stated that “it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris or other deadly weapons, provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the pos-session of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the provision of this Act. The trial court ruled that, using the principle of ejusdem generis, the law will only apply to bladed weapons ISSUE: W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis. HELD: No. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is clear, the rule must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unli-censed revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 29

120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security CommissionCase No. 263 G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961) Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote No.175 Rep. v. Es-tenzo Case No. G.R. No. L – 35376 (September 11, 1980)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should— following the principle of ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain,” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any trade, business, industry, under-taking. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case. HELD: No. The rule of ejus-dem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of the term “employer” is suffi-ciently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 29

FACTS: Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral Court to declare Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. Petitioners filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. ISSUE: W/N RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. HELD: No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. The Respondent judge was wrong in interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable; the job of the judiciary is to apply laws, not interpret it. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a, 30, 32

121 In re estate of Enriquez and ReyesCase No. 130 G.R. No. 9351 (January 6, 1915) Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 180

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONEmpire Insurance Co. v. RufinoCase No. 97 G.R. No. L – 38268 (May 31, 1979) Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 181

FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate daughters, Petra and Pas-cuala. Petra had 2 legitimate children, Rafael and Josefa. Pascuala had 1 legitimate child, Aurea, and had begotten a natural child by a priest, Vicente. Petra, Pascuala, and Aurea have since died. The lower court held that Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the estate of Francisca. ISSUE: W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. HELD: Yes. G. E. 68, which was promulgated on December. 18, 1899, repealed the law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. Since Vicente was born in 1905 after the said law was enacted, he is considered an acknowledged natural child. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 35, 49

FACTS: Vicente A. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7 children. They then exe-cuted a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabilities or obligations of the decedent. Almost 1 year later, Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabilities and obligations from the Rufino estate. The trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate of the decedent, but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The liabilities claimed by Petitioner were not listed in the obligations acknowl-edged by the Partition Agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 29, 30a, 45a

122 Ching Leng v. GalangCase No. G. R. No. L-11931 (October 27, 1958)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAcosta v. FlorCase No. 5 G. R. No. 2122 (September 13, 1905) Chapter V, Page 224, Footnote No. 187

FACTS: Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. He and his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adoption of his five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. The petition was later granted. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following grounds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization, the children are now considered as Filipino citizens, (2) adoption gave the adopted chil-dren the same rights and duties as if they were the legitimate children of the adopter, (3) since a legitimate child follows the nationality of the adopter, the children are considered Filipino Citizens. ISSUE: W/N citi-zenship can be acquired by a child through adoption. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. Art. 254 of the Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is not a part of the said enumeration. Furthermore, Art. 341 of the Civil Code does not include acquisition of citizenship. Also, Art. 49 of a special law that provides the character of naturalization enumerates the means of acquiring citi-zenship and adoption is not part of it. LATIN MAXIM: 30a

FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same. However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s al-legations that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a result of said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of Municipal President of Laoag, now held by Defendant. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of said office? HELD: No. Art. 199, 200, and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fis-cals, as the case may be, the right to bring such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office, it would have plainly said so in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance. LATIN MAXIM: 30a

123 Lerum v. CruzCase No. 146 G. R. No. L-2783 (November 29, 1950) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 192

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCentral Barrio v. City Treasurer of DavaoCase No. 55 G.R. No. L-25811 (April 3, 1968) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193

FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Attys. Lerum and Fernando filed for this peti-tion in order to test the sufficiency and probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of a divorce decree. ISSUE: Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory re-lief regarding the sufficiency and probative value of (former) Judge Cruz’s testimony? HELD: No, the peti-tion for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Under Sec 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, or who is interested “under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument.” The sufficiency and probative value of a testimony, which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant case, is not included in the enumeration. Thus, the assailed order is affirmed. LATIN MAXIM: 30a

FACTS: On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732, pursuant to RA 2370, declar-ing as officially and legally existing several barrios of the city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion. Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio, as provided in Sec. 3 of RA 3590. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the said barrio, in relation to bar-rios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be determined because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. The Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City’s Treasurer, Council, Audi-tor and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao, which dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of RA 4354, amending the charter of Davao City. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal order was correct. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. Sec. 2 of RA 4354 enu-merated the barrios comprising the City of Davao, which did not include the Petitioner. Thus, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City. A non-existent bar-rio or a barrio not situated in Davao City cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under RA 3590. LATIN MAXIM: 30

124 Vera v. FernandezCase No. 55 G.R. No.L-31364 (March 30, 1979) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONVillanueva v. City of IloiloCase No. 312 G.R. No. L-26521 (December 28, 1968) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 197

FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. Tongoy. The cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3,254.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, as pro-vided in the Tax Code. The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes. HELD: The order appealed from is re-versed. A perusal of the aforequoted provision shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obli-gations of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumer-ated therein. Par. 315 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the gov-ernment from the time the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties, etc. Thus, before the inheritance has been passed to the heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected, even without its having been presented under Sec. 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. LATIN MAXIM: 27, 30, 44

FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower court’s judgment declaring Ordinance No. 11 as ille-gal. The Petitioners, Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva, are owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. By virtue of the ordinance, the city was able to collect P5,824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964. ISSUE: 1. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. Is the City of Iloilo em-powered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? 3. Is it oppressive and unreasonable be-cause it carries a penal clause? 4. Does it violate the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is re-versed; the ordinance is valid. 1. No. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the local government. 2. Yes. RA 2264 confers on local governments’ broad taxing authority. It is clear that the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment tax, which is not among the excep-tions listed in Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. 3. No. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provi-sion that “no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax”, which should not apply; the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax. 4. No. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the taxing authority. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 20c, 30, 35, 42

125 Santo To v. Cruz-PañoCase No. 275 G.R. No. L-55130 (January 17, 1983) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 199

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSamson v. Court of AppealsCase No. 270 G.R. No. L-43182 (November 25, 1986) Chapter V, Page 226, Footnote No. 200

FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. He then filed a petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge, Hon. Cruz-Paño, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, on the ground that granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, and that Santo To was not a penitent offender. In a motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders disqualified to avail probation, as enumerated in the probation law (P.D. 968) Sec. 9. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? HELD: Yes. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. He is a first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. In addition, the Respondent judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. Besides, where the Probation Law expressly enu-merates the persons disqualified to avail of its benefits, the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the enumeration. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b

FACTS: Petitioner Samson, the mayor of Caloocan, terminated the services of Respondent, Mr. Talens, as Assistant Secretary, through Administrative Order No. 3, because of lack and loss of confidence, and ap-pointed Mr. Liwag, co-Petitioner, to said position. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the position of secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. Talens asserts his position was not covered by the said act and, being permanently appointed, he can only be removed for a cause and after due process. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Talens, declaring the order null and void. The Court of Appeals also affirmed said decision. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HELD: Yes, Talens’ ter-mination was illegal; his position is not among those expressly declared by law as highly confidential. The nature of functions attached to a position determines whether such position is highly confidential. Where the law provides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service, except those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policydetermining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, the legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated, for otherwise, it would have included them in the enumeration. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30

126 Finman General Assurance Corp. vs. Court of AppealsCase No. 107 G.R. No 100970 (September 2, 1992) Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 202

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCentano v. Villalon-PornillosCase No. 54 G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994) Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 203

FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his beneficiaries. On October 18, 1988, Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. After a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company, the latter denied the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. The insurance company was found liable by the Insurance Commission to pay P15,000, and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using “expressio unius exclusio alterius” in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. ISSUE: Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure acci-dent on the part of the victim. Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance company. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not been intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30

FACTS: In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, ap-proached Judge Angeles, President of Tikay, and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violated P.D. 1564, which states “Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and Development.” ISSUE: W/N the phrase “charitable purposes” in P.D. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes. HELD: No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be ex-tended to others. The 1987 Constitution treats the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and inde-pendently from each other. Since P.D. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for reli-gious purposes within its coverage. The term “charitable” should be strictly construed to exclude solicita-tions for “religious” purposes. Moreover, since this is a criminal case, penal law must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11g, 11i, 25, 27, 30, 48

127 Escribano v. AvilaCase No. 101 G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978) Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 205

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONManabat v. De AquinoCase No. 161 G.R. No. L-5558 (April 29, 1953) Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 208

FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, filed a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Es-cribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the RTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation, pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct prelim-inary investigations of written defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. The enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11e, 12, 37

FACTS: Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,261.74 plus interest for usury, wherein the couple failed to ap-pear in court and present evidence in the hearing. Notified of the decision on September 7, 1951, they filed for an appeal by registered mail on September 22 of that same year. However, the papers were actually re-ceived by the court on September 24. Thus, the Judge of First Instance declared that the appeal was late and dismissed it. ISSUE: 1. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on September 22, when they were de-posited by registered mail, or Sept 24, when they were actually received by the court. 2. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days. HELD: Yes. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule 27 Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post office by registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. Thus, Pe-titioners filed their appeal just in time. LATIN MAXIM: 3a, 9c, 11d, 12a

128 Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical ExaminersCase No. 115 No. 32441. March 29, 1930 Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.209

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPrimero v. CACase No. 126 G.R. Nos. 48468-69. November 22, 1989

FACTS: FACTS: Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to the administration of opium. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to patients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by subsequent Opium Laws. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff should have his li-cense restored. HELD: No, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. The subsequent Opium Laws can-not be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or remove said prior laws. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term of unprofessional conduct can include improper ad-ministration of opium to patients. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9, the prohibition against fan knives, “balisong” or clubs was in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet, the bladed weapon he was carrying, was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons. ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon that falls un-der the purview of PD 9. HELD: No, the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. Petitioners de-fense of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. It would make no sense if posses-sion of a fan knife, which is less lethal than a bayonet, would be punishable while possession of a bayonet would not. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30a

129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc.Case No. 142 Oct. 23, 1987

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRoldan v VillaromanCase No. 262 G.R. No. 46825 (October 18, 1939) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 229

FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board members or are merely ex-officio board members. ISSUE: W/N past presidents of the association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex officio members. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. There is nothing in the rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past presidents of the association may not run again for board membership even as they are automatically made ex officio mem-bers of the board. LATN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: Respondents were charged of murder. During the trial, Respondent Cuevas became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner, denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of Cuevas. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evi-dence and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Respondents then instituted a certiorari pro-ceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner, impugning the decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. The CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing with the trial. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: No. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. CFI of Laguna, which held that the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” only refers to its proximate antecedent and to “all other auxiliary writs and process.” This ruling is in conjunction with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the interpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phrases found in a law, but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made ex-tensive to the whole. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6d, 9c, 33, 36b, b2

130 Herras Teehankee v. Director of PrisonsCase No. 122 G.R. No. L-278 (July 18, 1946) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 230

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONJose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development CorporationCase No. 170 G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 231

FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with (a) “active collaboration with the Ja-panese,” and (b) “previous association with the enemy.” When she, along with her co-detainees and coPeti-tioners in that case, was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of December 29, 1944, she was detained by said Government under that charge. And under the same charge during all the time referred to, she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. HELD: Yes. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Since the People’s Court Act and the Consti-tution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law, and since the language used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the same subject, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. To hold that the People’s Court has uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evi-dence at all, is to make the Act offensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, which is contrary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 11g, 12a, 26, 35, 37, 38b, 42a

FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except those requir-ing the services of a public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities, improvements, and infrastruc-tures for the lots, and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. HELD: No. Labrador has ev-ery right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commit-ment was made by the developer. The words “which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condo-minium plans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities, improvements, and infra-structures”. The word “and” is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a, 33

131 People of the Philippines v. Teodoro TamaniCase No. 227 G.R. No. L-22160 and G.R. No. L-22161 (January 21, 1974) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 232

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAndres Borromeo v. Fermin MarianoCase No. 38 G.R. No. L-16808 (January 3, 1921) Chapter V, Page 236, Footnote No. 240

FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied. The lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July 13, 1963 through the counsel’s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10, 1963, forty-eight days from July 24th, which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the appeal was forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. ISSUE: W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision. HELD: Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word “promulgation” should be construed as referring to “judgment”, while “notice” should be construed as referring to “order”. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late, not 47, as Appellees contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice”. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 8a 11g, 34

FACTS: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfourth Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District. The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on the basis of Sec. 155 of the Administra-tive Code, which states that “nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district.” ISSUE: W/N Borromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. HELD: Yes. The concluding part of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-General should be construed as a proviso, although it did not start with the usual introductory word, “provided”. The word “appointed” in the proviso should be given its meaning in the ordinary sense, and thus, should mean “the nomination or designation of an individual”. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign, retire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The power to appoint lies on the appointing officer, but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. Hence, appointee’s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. In upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state’s separation of powers, the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 9c, 12a, 24a, 37

132 ALU-TUCP v. NLRCCase No. 2 G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994) Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 250

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONArenas v. City of San Carlos, PangasinanCase No. 20 G.R. No. L-34024 (April 5, 1978) Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 251

FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to consider them as regular employees. Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N Pe-titioners should be considered regular employees. HELD: No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were considered project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically con-verted into regular employees. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that “project” is done, their services will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, the proviso in par. 2 of Art.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 1. The proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6, 33

FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual salary of P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000.00, P350 of which was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city government. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but the Respondent City refused. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12,000 to P18,000. HELD: Looking at the Senate deliberations, the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor. Moreover, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. In case there is repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision, the latter provision, whether a proviso or not, is given preference because it is the latest expression of the intent of the legisla-tion, but more so because provisos are negatively written and gives off a more mandatory tone. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 33, 43,48, b2

133 Tolentino v. Secretary of FinanceCase No. 292 G.R. No. 115852 (August 25, 1994) Chapter V, Page 243, Footnote No. 266

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONALDECOA v. Hongkong and Shanghai BankCase No. 126 30 Phil. 228, (March 23, 1915) Chapter V, Page 245, Footnote No. 272

FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 1630 did not pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third readings were done on the same day. The President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dis-pensed with the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate days. ISSUE: W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code, has been constitutionally passed. HELD: There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immedi-ate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and dis-tributed three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. LATIN MAXIM: 33

FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs, Isabel Palet, was a general partner in the firm, Aldecoa & Company. The said firm, however, was heavily indebted to the Defendant corporation. Isabel’s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and obligations to the Defendant Corporation, and to mortgage certain real proper-ties of her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent. The Petitioners now seek to cancel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1903, and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to execute a valid mortgage on their real property with her consent. HELD: We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor children. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old Spanish code. According to the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no longer a need to be for-mally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. At the time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents, Joaqin was already of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid, while Zoilo’s mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he executed the mortgage. LATIN MAXIM: 49

134 Ocampo v. BuenaventuraCase No. 88 G.R. No. L-32293 (January 24, 1974)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAisporna v. Court of Appeals and PeopleCase No. 6 G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982) Chapter VI, Page 248, Footnote No. 8

FACTS: On September 11, 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 228 which fixed curfew hours. The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance. On appeal, the minors were acquitted since the reason they vio-lated the ordinance was to attend a birthday, which is considered as a wholesome assemblage, and there-fore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Roberto Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respon-dents for serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and commission of a felony. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating the policemen. On March 17, 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commis-sion for the same grounds. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases in-volving police service and personnel. HELD: The Respondents’ argument is devoid of merit. The power of local officials to investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. According to Commission v. Hon. Bello, Sec. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act (September 8, 1969). Sec. 26 may not be interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100 days. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 6d

FACTS: Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because she only assisted her husband, and that she did not receive any compensation. ISSUE: W/N the receipt of compen-sation is an essential element for violation of Sec. 189. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent. Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts, a kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and independently. The term “agent” used in par. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2 of the same section. Applying the definition of an in-surance agent in par. 2 to the agent in par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. 189. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions wherever pos-sible. Every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9c, 28, 36b, 36c, 36d, 37

135 Gaanan v. Indeterminate Appellate CourtCase No. 108 G.R. No. L-69809 (October 16, 1986) Chapter VI, Page 249, Footnote No. 11

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRadiola-Toshiba Phils. Inc. v. Intermediate AppellateCase No. 249 G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 20

FACTS: Atty. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of his complaint for di-rect assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. That same day, Laconico called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. When complainant Pintor called up, Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly listen to the tele-phone call through the extension phone. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited de-vices covered by Sec. 1 of RA 4200. HELD: Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provi-sions of the Act. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the devices enumerated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of Empire Insurance Com-pany v. Rufino, held that the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec. 1 of RA 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is, in-struments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11g, 29, 30a, 36c, 36d, 48, b2

FACTS: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby. ISSUE: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it com-menced four months after said attachment. HELD: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period – one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial con-struction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 36a, 37

136 Lopez v. El Hogar FilipinoCase No. 152 G.R. No. L-22678 (January 12, 1925) Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 16

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONJMM Promotions v. NLRCCase No. 136 G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993) Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 21

FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage, El Hogar Filipino caused the mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale. Lopez and Javelona, in whose favor the loan was made, sought to have the contract of loan and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. They contended that the court erred in holding that the word “void”, as used in the Usury Law, was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of the word “void”, as used in the Usury Law, was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. HELD: No. From the very context of the law, the legislature, in using the word “void”, did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity. It was only with respect to the usurious interest. The intention of the legislature must be ascertained, not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law, but from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof, as compared with the whole. Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 25a, 37

FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cash bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules. When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA, the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond, as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary ap-peals are clear. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an ap-peal from a decision of the POEA. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 6d, 7a, 12a, 36a, 37

137 Araneta v. ConcepcionCase No. 17 G.R. No. L-9667, (July 31, 1956) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 24

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLichauco vs. ApostolCase No. 147 G.R. No. L-19628 (December 4, 1922) Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 23

FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground of adultery. After the issues were joined, Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport; to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her; and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. The judge rendered his decision regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the children to Defendant, a monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house, and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. The judge refused to reconsider the order. IS-SUE: W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. HELD: No. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus petition, it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling period contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code. A recital of grievances in court may fan their grievances against one another; the legislature’s intent is to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. Note, however, that the case was filed after 6 months of the filing of the legal sep-aration case. As such, the determination of the custody and alimony must have been given force and effect, provided it did not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 27, 36a, 36c, 36d, 37

FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. Legislations involved in the case: Sec. 1762 of the Adminis-trative Code – prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign country Sec. 1770 of the Admin-istrative Code – Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3052 – Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052, has been repealed by the implication in Sec. 1770. HELD: No. Sec. 1762, as amended, is of a general nature, while Sec. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. 1762 and it must be considered as a special qualification of Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force and effect, being a special law having spe-cial contingency not dealt within Sec. 1762, which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 36a, 38b, 50

138 Cassion v. Banco FilipinoCase No. 51 G.R. No. L- 3540 (July 30, 1951) Chapter VI, Page 256, Footnote No. 31

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. PalmonCase No. 220 G.R. No. L-2860 (May 11, 1950) Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35

FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. Plaintiffs defaulted and PNB extra judi-cially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan. After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 years, Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land but PNB turned down the offer. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135, which created the PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectively, while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874, known as the Public Land act, which provided that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE: Which of the conflicting statues should prevail? HELD: When two or more conflicting statues exist, as when general and special provisions are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former and a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the respective dates of passage. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property, thus it is an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 38a, 38b, 40b, 50

FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med and max period – 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day – 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. Before the arraignment of the accused, the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground that under Sec. 87 of RA 296, the crime falls under the jurisdic-tion of the justice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that CFI has jurisdiction. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6 months. Sec. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, the CFI and justice of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case. LATIN MAXIM: 36c, 36d, 37

139 Chartered Bank v. Imperial and National BankCase No. 57 G.R. No. 17222 (March 15, 1921) Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMontenegro v. Castañeda and BalaoCase No. 179 G.R. No. L-4221 (August 30, 1952) Chapter VI, Page 258, Footnote No. 39

FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of Plaintiff, and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of said Defendant. In an earlier case, the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which the sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. Plaintiff as-serted that since the insolvent had been declared as such, all civil proceedings against him should have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. 60 of the insolvency law. ISSUE: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HELD: To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law, every section, provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to every other. Thus, Sec. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions of the same law, and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. 60 as stated in the other provision of the same law. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 36c, 36d, 36e, 37, b2

FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. Maximino’s father then submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. Three days after, Pres. Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. IS-SUE: 1. W/N Proclamation No. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition, which is not under the Constitu-tion. 2. W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. HELD: There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include “sedition.” Art. 7 only provides invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. “Sedition” should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. Also, as posed by Prof. Aruego, the Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent danger, while Art. 7 expressly authorized the President to suspend when there is immi-nent danger. Moreover, during the Constitutional Convention, the debates voted down an amendment to add another cause, which is “imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 15a, 20b, 36f, b2

140 Arabay Inc. v. CFI of ZamboangaCase No. 16 G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975) Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote No. 43

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONParas v. COMELECCase No. 196 G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996) Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No. 50

FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribu-tion of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleumbased products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum products, contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a re-fund. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to im-pose a tax on sale. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasoline, there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11e, 12a, 14, 20a

FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, deter-mines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will un-duly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In inter-preting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpreta-tion should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inop-erative or nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38

141 Javellana v. KintanarCase No. 138 G.R. No. L-33169 July 30, 1982 Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote No.55

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONNiere v. CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch IICase No. 188 G.R. No. L-30324 November 29, 1973 Chapter VI, Page 262, Footnote No.60

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago, Bago City, which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls leased to vendors. Said market has served the gen-eral population of the City of Bago for more than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No. 150 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment, maintenance or operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person, entity, or corporation other than the local government. Appellant claims that a public market is one that is not owned privately; whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general public. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a public market. HELD: The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the general public and not its ownership. A scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that by public market, it is meant one that is intended to serve the general public. The Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his market is engaged in servicing the public, not only in Bago City, but also those coming from other municipalities. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 6d, 40c

FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 4858 (the City Charter). After the enactment of the De-centralization Act, Private Respondent was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota City. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. House Bill No. 9711, which became RA 4585, originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor can appoint under Sec. 21 of said RA, but during the pe-riod of amendment in the Senate, the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of Sec. 21. IS-SUE: 1. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec. 21 of RA 4585 an amendment purely of form only or not. 2. W/N appointing authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Mayor or not. HELD: 1. NO, it is a substantial amendment. Nothing could be more substantial than the vesting of a power to ap-point such an important city official as the city engineer. If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of city department, it could have easily re-phrased Sec. 21 of the City Charter to that effect. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor. 2. NO. Since the city mayor under Sec. 21 is without authority to appoint the city engineer, this prerogative can only be exer-cised by the President of the Philippines, who, under Sec. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointments “all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for…” LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 29, 30a, 32, 38b, b2

142 Uytengsu vs. Republic of the PhilippinesCase No. 307 G.R. No. L-6379 (September 29, 1954) Chapter VI, Page 263, Footnote No.61

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONManila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of AppealsCase No. 165 G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976) Chapter VI, Page 264, Foot-note No. 63

FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental n October 6, 1927. After finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines, he went to the United States to further his studies from the year 1947-1950. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. On July 15, 1950, he filed for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l but he did not return to the Philip-pines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the original date of hearing the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be postponed. ISSUE: 1. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. 2. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous. HELD: 1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to “reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admis-sion to Philippine citizenship. 2. No. Although the words “residence” and “domicile” are often used inter-changeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of the other. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not legal residence or domicile, is required. Residence in-dicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. Domicile is residence with intention to stay. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7, 11a, 25a, 37

FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improve-ments, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it neces-sary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would de-feat the policy of legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9a, 36b, 37, 43

143 Almeda v. FlorentinoCase No. 10 G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965) Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAbellana v. MaraveCase No. 3 G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974) Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 71

FACTS: RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 14 that “the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the members thereof…” On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12 of RA 183. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as amended, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secre-tary of the Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Florentino to the position, purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any in-tention on the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 37, 49, 50

FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The crimi-nal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner ap-pealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge, a separate and indepen-dent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. ISSUE: W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Petitioner’s literal reading of the Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 123. Such interpretation, does likewise, give rise to a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance to Art. 33 of the Civil Code.2 As stated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constitution, the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Lastly, in the case at bar, literal construction of the law is not favored. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a proce-dural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 12a, 37

144 Yu Cong Eng v. TrinidadCase No. 317 G.R. No. L-20479 (February 6, 1925) Chapter VI, Page 267, Footnote No. 78

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCity of Naga v. AgnaCase No. 63 G.R. No. L-36049 (May 31, 1976) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83

FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a language other than Eng-lish, Spanish, or a local dialect. Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, was penalized for keeping books writ-ten in Chinese. He and other Chinese merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law.

FACTS: The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage tax. Respondent tax-payers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year, pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 2309). It stated that tax enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect the following year. The Naga City government, on the other hand, claimed that under the Local Au-tonomy Act (RA 2264), tax ordinances take effect 15 days after publication; this allegedly impliedly re-pealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code. ISSUE: Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No, it did not. There is a presumption against implied repeal; a subsequent provision only re-peals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two laws can be harmonized, then the Courts shall do so. Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. RA 2264 only applies for entirely new tax provisions. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a, 38b

ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protection of the public good. This decision is consistent with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, where laundrymen were prohibited from issuing receipts written in Chinese. Class legislation is thus allowed if it is for the public good. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping books in Chinese, it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, or have a duplicate in any of these languages. This liberal interpretation is reasonable and it upholds constitutionality. LATIN MAXIM: 1a, 6d, 9c, 11e, 37

145 Tan v. COMELECCase No. 152 G.R. No. 112093 (October 4, 1994)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhilippine Government v. Municipality of BinangonanCase No. 118 G.R. No. L-10202 (March 29, 1916) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 84

FACTS: BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively composing the new province. The parent provinces, which will get also affected, were not included in the plebiscite. ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitu-tional? HELD: It is unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held in all units af-fected, including the parent province, and not just the new areas. The draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units, and not just the areas constituting the new province, but the final bill only limited it to the latter. LATIN MAXIM: 12a

FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66 by the Governor-Gen-eral granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additional barrios. Petitioner claimed that the Gover-nor-General has no legislative authority and that this legislation was not for the public good. ISSUE: Is EO 66 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. Every act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional and for the public good; facts need not be stated to prove it. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37

146 People v. Del RosarioCase No. 105 G.R. No. L-7234 (May 21, 1955)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSalvatierra v. Court of AppealsCase No. G.R. No. 107797 (August 26, 1996)

FACTS: On July 27, 1953, information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28, 1953. The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. 90 and Art. 91 of the RPC. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Hence, an ap-peal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which it was committed; 2. W/N the term “month” in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days, in-stead of the civil/calendar month. HELD: 1. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to be done, the law has always directed that the first be excluded and the last included (Art. 13, Civil Code). Art. 18 of the CC directs that any deficiency in any special law must be supplied by its provisions. As the RPC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed, resort must be had to Art. 13 of the CC. 2. By express provision of Article 13 on the new Civil Code, a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month. In accordance therewith, the term month used in Art. 90 of the RPC should be un-derstood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month. Hence, the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because July is the 60th day from May 29. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b, 46a

FACTS: Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers, Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His estate consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25, 26, & 27). Macario sold the 405 sq. mts. out of the 749 sq. mts. total area of Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo. Eventually, an “extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale” was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs of Enrique, which consisted of the aforementioned lots. Thereafter, Venancio sold Lot No. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said partition), and a 149-sq. m. portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. It turned out, however, that Anselmo already obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No. 26. The complaints for reconveyance were filed 5 years after the issuance of such OCT to Anselmo. ISSUE: 1. Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail, Art. 1391 of the new CC or Art. 1144 of the same Code? 2. W/N there was a double sale. HELD: 1. Art. 1144 of the CC prevails. The prescriptive period for such ac-tions is 10 years, as held in previous cases. Hence, the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed. There is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. Thus, the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. What Anselmo bought from his father was only 405 sq. m of Lot 26. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of Anselmo was, therefore, done with evident bad faith. 2. There was no double sale. Both parties did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 7a

147 Pasno v. Ravina and RavinaCase No. 199 G.R. No. 31581 (February 3, 1930) Chapter VI, Page 273, Footnote No. 104

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONC & C Commercial v. NAWASACase No. 42 G.R. No. L-27275 (November 18, 1967) Chapter VI, Page 274, Footnote No. 107

FACTS: Labitoria, during her lifetime, mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. When Labitoria died, a peti-tion was presented for the probate of her last will and testament. During the pendency of the case, a spe-cial administrator of the estate of the deceased was appointed by the court. The special administrator failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, and the PNB asked the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. The CFI ruled in favor of the special administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from sell-ing the said lands. ISSUE: 1. W/N the will is valid 2. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis. HELD: 1. The law does not require that the will shall be dated. Accordingly, an erroneous date will not defeat a will. 2. Yes. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. The mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since Act 3135 fails to make provi-sion regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in custodia legis, it would be logical to suppose Sec. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency. Act 3115 must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM: 38a, 38b

FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks projects in Manila, Davao and Iloilo. However, C & C Commercial Corporation, one of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost, filed three corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects contending that NAWASA violated Sec. 1 of RA 912, which should give preference to local materi-als that are available, practicable and usable. The said law also provides that this nationalistic policy of pre-ferring for locally produced materials is in relation to the “construction or repair work undertaken by the Government.” NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of the term “Government” as used in the said law. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the term “government” under RA 912. HELD: Yes. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term “government” found in RA 312, and in the construction of their works or purchase of materials thereof, local material should be given preference whenever available, practicable and usable. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not ex-empted from RA 912. Two laws are being considered in this case: C.A. No. 138 and RA 912. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases, works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First pol-icy). LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 35, 36, 37, 38a, 38b

148 Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of ButuanCase No. 41 G.R. No. L-21516 (April 29, 1966) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 119

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONManila Railroad Co. v. RaffertyCase No. 168 G.R. No. 14205 (September 30, 1919) Chapter VI, Page 279, Footnote No. 124

FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric light, heat, and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, together with the issuance of a certificate of public con-venience and necessity by the Public Service Commission. However, the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11, 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to have im-paired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner of property without due process of law. On the other hand, Respondent maintained that it was vested with the “power to provide for the levy and col-lection of taxes for general and special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950. IS-SUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the taxing ordi-nances pursuant to the city’s power of taxation. HELD: No. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its char-ter. Neither could the latter’s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise, considering the absence of an express or specific grant of power to do so. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the latter general – and the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is gen-eral creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remaining exception to the general as a general law of the land, while the other as the law of a particular case. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 50, d

FACTS: The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an act of Congress in 1913. The latter con-tended that the taxes had been illegally collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. On the other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. HELD: No. A special law (includ-ing private charters) having the character of a private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to at-tend to the special facts and circumstances, the consideration of such being embodied in the special law. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have modified or altered the char-ter, unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. Where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50

149 De Jesus v. People of the PhilippinesCase No. 87 G. R. No. L-61998 (February 22, 1983) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 117

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONUS v. AlmondCase No. 157 G.R. No. 2517 (June 2, 1906)

FACTS: The Petitioner, COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, was charged by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the COMELEC, and, coincidentally, the Court of First Instance (now RTC). ISSUE: W/N the Sandigan-bayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to public officers. HELD: No. Sec. 2 of Art. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power “to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,” while Sec 182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punishable under the same Code. The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections. To divest the COMELEC of its authority would seriously impair its effective-ness in achieving the aforementioned constitutional mandate. At the same time, Sec 184 of the Election Code, which deals specifically with election offenses, must be favored over provisions of P.D. 1606 which speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office. The for-mer cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the latter thereby continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative intent it evinces. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 9, 37, 38, 50

FACTS: The complaint alleges that R.W. Almond, master and in charge of the steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan, is an alien of East India who is afflicted with trachoma. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration officers. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent the landing of Tawas Tahan, and that if the landing was made, it was made without the Defendant’s knowledge or consent. IS-SUE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no consent, either tacit or express, to the landing of the alien. HELD: Sec. 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers and fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. The word “permit” implies that the landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner, officer, agent or person in charge of the vessel. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11e, 41a, 48

150 US v. EstapiaCase No. 298 G.R. No. 12891 (October 19, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 289, Footnote No. 23

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONU.S. v. Abad SantosCase No. 294 G.R. No. 12262 (February 10, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 28

FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting, in violation of Sec. 1 of Act. No. 480. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clearing near a grove of buri palms. The prosecution ar-gued that the term “cockpit” should be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. IS-SUE: W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within the contempla-tion of the law. HELD: The term “cockpit” as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot be con-strued to mean or include a clearing such as had been used by the Defendants. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly and particular words used in the law should be construed in relation to the context. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 37, 48

FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5, 1915 indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. He had employed a bookkeeper with the expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position, including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. Courts will not hold one person criminally re-sponsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent, unless the law clearly so provides. LATIN MAXIM: 41a, 48

151

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

ROUND 3

152 People v. AtopCase No. 202 G.R. Nos. 124303-05 (February 10, 1998) Chapter VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 29

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. PadillaCase No. 113 G.R. No. 47027 (February 4, 1941) Chapter VII, Page 291, Footnote No. 30

FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. The trial court sentenced him to 2 terms of reclu-sion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the third, holding that his common-law relationship with the victim’s grandmother aggravated the penalty. Private complainant Regina Guafin, 12 years old, is the granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos, the common-law wife of the Appellant. ISSUE: 1. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape al-legedly committed. 2. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. HELD: 1. The trial court erred. Nocturnity must have been deliberately sought by the Ap-pellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. Neither can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. The scope of the relationship under Art. 15 of the RPC en-compasses only “the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, and relative by affinity in the same degrees.” Outside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused, no other relationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed. 2. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The offended party’s straightforward and unequivocal statements show in-delible badges of truth. LATIN MAXIM: 30a

FACTS: Appellants Padilla, a Filipino citizen, and Von Arend, a German citizen, acting jointly and conniving with each other, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally evaded the provisions of Art. 4 of C.A. No. 138, which requires Philippine or U.S. citizenship before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in said article. It is contended, however, that notwithstanding the infringement of Sec. 4. of Act No. 138, the Appel-lants cannot be punished therefore since the said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. ISSUE: W/N a violation of C.A. No. 138 may be prosecuted under C.A. No. 108, entitled “An Act to punish acts of eva-sion of the laws on the nationalization or certain rights, franchises or privileges.” HELD: Yes. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who knowingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualified may enjoy the privilege granted to domestic entities by C.A. No. 138, as well as any alien profiting thereby, is guilty of violation of C.A. No. 108. The very title of Act No. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative intent and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of certain rights, franchise or privileges. Sec. 1 of the same Act applies punishment provided therein to “all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requires Philippine or United States citizenship as a re-quirement for the exercise or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.” Under Act No. 108, any legal pro-vision, whenever existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated thereafter, would fall within its scope. One of such legal provision is Art. 4 of Act No. 138. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6c, 9a

153 People v. SalazarCase No. 223 G.R. No. L-13371 (September 24, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 292, Footnote No. 36

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. GarciaCase No. 209 No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 41

FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds. The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer, and as such, accountable for the funds collected and re-ceived by him, did willfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, and convert to his own personal use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77. Upon arraignment, the Appel-lant pleaded not guilty, which he later withdrew and changed to guilty. He was sentenced to be imprisoned, to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine, to indemnify the Government without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The Appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commission of the crime, in that, he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and benefit but lost the same while he was drunk. ISSUE: W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the contention of Appellant. HELD: No. There is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost while the Appellant was drunk. When he entered the plea of guilty, he thereby admitted, not only his guilt, but also all the material facts alleged in the information, namely, that he “willfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, misapply, embezzle, and convert to his own personal use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77,” thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his part. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowledgement or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. LATIN MAXIM: 7b, 11e, 41a, 43

FACTS: The lower court, ignoring the Appellant’s minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to “be committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution,” instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.” ISSUE: W/N the Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, par. 2 of the RPC. HELD: Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it now stands and Art. 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the same statute are never to be supposed or so re-garded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b

154 People v. Terrada, et. al.Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONUS v. ToriboCase No. 304 G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 48

FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied for and were is-sued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were for-est land and as such are not disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the qualifications and had complied with all legal re-quirements of the law to entitle them to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed according to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Pe-nal statutes must be strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the shorter prescriptive period should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 43, 48

FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human consumption, which is in vio-lation of Act No. 1147, “An Act Regulating the Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle.” It appears that in the town of Carmen in Bohol, there aren’t any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of large cattle without permit. Ap-pellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over his property (carabao). ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a carabao is made therein. HELD: No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the Act applies. The Act primarily seeks to pro-tect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands, against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly, it is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of the Philippines, im-periled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease, making it reasonable for the legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal properties of citizens (cattle) if not for the extra-ordinary conditions/threat present. Well settled is the doctrine of the State’s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain laid down in jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must be observed. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 37

155 US v. Go ChicoCase No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 49

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONArriete v. Director of Public WorksCase no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933) Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No. 52

FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insur-rection in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and conse-quently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims acquittal on the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law was referring to “identical” banners, emblem, flag, etc. ISSUE: 1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with criminal intent. 2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the Defendant. HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isn’t nec-essary for violation of the Flag Law. 2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of the class of articles referred to by the law. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statu-tory requirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no interpretation is required. Clearly there-fore, ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a

FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap, sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the sheriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irriga-tion Act No. 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of said lots, but Carmen Jagunap was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided that regarding expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands must be published, and notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in the civil case. No such pub-lication or notice was evident in this case. It is not sufficient that they had “actual” knowledge. Statutes in the derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a republican state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protected by law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property, these statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELECCase No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONGenaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of AppealsCase No. 51 G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry for the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the Presi-dent. Now (1980) he is running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, “No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office…or within six months immediately preced-ing or following an election.” ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can’t be construed as a willful change of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. The consti-tutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 37, 48

FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice of pre-termina-tion in their contract for construction of the flood control facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% neg-ative slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either authorized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15%. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD: No, Respondents may not termi-nate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 102. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily “to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government.” Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqualified bidder, would ac-tually result in a financial loss to the government. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 12a

157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co.Case No. 289 G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 62

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCity of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 64

FACTS: Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation proceedings. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the con-demnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company. HELD: As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of gen-eral right and of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must be at least substantially or ‘fully and fairly’ complied with. In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly enti-tled to institute any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant company having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question, and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value. LATIN MAXIM: 21a, 43

FACTS: Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement – the extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. ISSUE: W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon, the neces-sity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philip-pine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions (of necessity). It is al-leged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43

158 Velasco v. Republic of the PhilippinesCase No. 165 G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLee Cho v. Republic of the PhilippinesCase No. 72 G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

FACTS: Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the requirements of the law. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization. HELD: No. Considering that “nat-uralization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant”, we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 43

FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school recog-nized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private schools recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children. HELD: No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters An-gelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in spite of Lourdes’s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should be denied. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

159 Co v. Republic of the PhilippinesCase No. 24 G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. MarcosCase No. 157 G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he be-lieves in democracy upon cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the dis-qualifications mentioned in the law. HELD: Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our govern-ment as evidenced by his failure to register his family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

FACTS: Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming in its fa-vor Sec. 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a “taxable” person. HELD: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legisla-tive intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore is the exception. LATIN MAXIM: 43

160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, Assessor and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of ManilaCase No. 136 G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and Ateneo de Manila Uni-versityCase No. 74 G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS: In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the cathedral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemption privilege was already ex-hausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining chapel. ISSUE: W/N the house of the arch-bishop of Manila should be exempted from tax. HELD: In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, but their intent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. Al-though separated from the cathedral by an intervening block, and although a parsonage within the area was already exempt, the residence of the archbishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parson-age adjacent to the cathedral. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9b, 43

FACTS: Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philippine society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter re-garding the institution’s tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an “independent contractor” within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractor’s tax. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC, performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3% contractor’s tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code. HELD: No. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining private Respondent’s university status and not in the course of an inde-pendent business of selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpre-tation of the tax laws. LATIN MAXIM: 43

161 Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of CustomsCase No. 167 G.R. No. 30264 (March 12, 1929) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRepublic v. Intermediate Appellate CourtCase No. 256 G.R. No. L-69344 (April 26, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84

FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the bear-ings of the wheel. Under par. 141 of Sec. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of same law, vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are subject to 10% ad valorem. Appellant Insu-lar Collector of Customs classified dust shields as “manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for.” Upon appeal, however, the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on railways. ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as de-tached parts of vehicles for use on railways. HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehicles under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citizen. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enact-ment. LATIN MAXIM: 38a, 43, 50

FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283, 621.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was made and the amount was changed to P17,117.08. They applied for tax amnesty under P.D. 23, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even de-creased to about P12,000. They paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such. The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assess-ments with the BIR. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null be-cause P.D. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty. HELD: Yes, because Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null and void. If Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P.D. 213, then such provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree. LATIN MAXIM: 8, 26

162 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance SecretaryCase No. 82 G.R. No. 108524 (November 10, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONActing Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric CompanyCase No. 3 G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91, copra was classified as a food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages, including distribution. Under Sec. 103(a), the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which the same is produced. Under Sec. 103(b), the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47-91. HELD: No, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not exempt from VAT. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s interpretation is enti-tled to great respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and implementa-tion of tax laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and 80% of the coconut plant is edible, copra per se is not intended for human consumption. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 42a, b RA 1394 exempted payment of spe-cial import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. Re-spondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. ISSUE: W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked into the definition of “insulating oils” under Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8th Edition. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 43, b

163 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Jockey Club Inc.Case No. 68 G.R. No. L-8755 (March 23, 1956) Chapter VII, Page 304, Footnote No. 97

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. Castañeda Jr.Case No. 104 G.R. No. L-46881 (September 15, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102

FACTS: Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. are corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contending that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code. ISSUE: W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers, the PCSO, the White Cross, the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society are subject to the 20% amusement tax. HELD: The law refers to “gross receipts” and not “gross income”. This clause is plain demonstration that the “gross receipts” refer to the collections on days when the race track is open to the general public and admission fees are or are not charged. This necessarily excludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse races. The lease by the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor, lessee, or operator, of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax, the three tax payers being con-nected by the disjunctive conjunction “or”, thereby positively implying that the tax should be paid by either the proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, as the case may be, singly and not all at one and the same time. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 27

FACTS: Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific tax without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. Respondents argued that they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available under P.D. 370 which declares tax amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled to the benefits of tax amnesty under the P.D. HELD: To be entitled to the extinction of liability provided by P.D. 370, the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on such previously untaxed income or wealth. Where the disclosure was not voluntary, the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly excluded from the coverage of P.D. 370. In the instant case, the violations with which the Respondents were charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P.D. 370 took effect. It is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in Sec. 1(a)(4) of P.D. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in court by a fiscal or special prosecutor, but rather to the sworn information or complaint filed by an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's reward. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, 43

164 Zamora v. City of ManilaCase No. 175 G.R. No. 3433 (March 2, 1907) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRepublic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal RevenueCase No. 259 G.R. No. L- 25602 31 (February 18, 1970) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 103

FACTS: Act No. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of Tax revision. Petitioner prays that the word “land” in the title and body of the statute be interpreted to mean “land including buildings and improvements thereon”. ISSUE: W/N the word “land” should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the buildings and improvements thereon. HELD: While the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act No. 123, it is disregarded in Act Nos. 82 and 551. The rule of strict construction of statutes granting exemp-tions from taxation is not applicable in this case. This rule is not without its exceptions and limitations, and the plain principles of justice suggest that the act under consideration should be construed with some liber-ality. It is a remedial statute, providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unjustly and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. While some of the Acts of the Commission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signification, nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviations therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 9f, 27, b2

FACTS: In 1957, Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901. In 1958, Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains, part of which was not used in the business that year. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into flour and sold in 1959. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37,275.55, but the cost of wheat left over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. Respondent Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23,170.17 because materials purchased from tax-ex-empt industries were not acquired from one enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax. HELD: No. Sec. 186-A of Inter-nal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized in the manufacture or production of any article, in the determination of the value of such finished article, the value of such tax-free product shall be deducted. While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law, and are con-strued strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court’s seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

165 Ajero v. Court of AppealsCase No. 5

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONIn re: Testate Estate of TampoyCase No. 61 G.R. No. L-14322 (February 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117

G.R. No. 106720 (September 15, 1994)Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the late Annie Sand. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind, and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. It was also opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to comply with Art. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law. HELD: No. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holo-graphic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. Art. 813 of the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will, but not its probate. A holographic will can still be admitted to pro-bate, notwithstanding noncompliance with Art. 814. In case of alterations, cancellations or insertions, the lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes, but not its entirety. The CA, however, correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other property including the house and lot, which she shares with her father’s other heirs. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 9a

FACTS: In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu, the will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatrix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the testatrix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law, citing Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. HELD: Yes. Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and ev-ery page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the at-testation clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will. Thus, it has been held that “Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will.” Accordingly, we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

166 A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, Inc. v. BorjaCase No. 1 G.R. No. L-17750 (August 31, 1962) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLazo v. Employee’s Compensation CommissionCase No. 70 G.R. No. 78617 (June 18, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123

FACTS: Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover compensation for overtime work rendered, and damages. Pending this, Respondent filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations. ISSUE: 1. W/N the scope of the term “action” falls under RA 1994. 2. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction. HELD: 1. The Petitioner contends that the phrase “action al-ready commenced” employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions filed in a regular court of justice. With this limited and narrow interpretation, we cannot agree. The statute under considera-tion is undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer con-cerned. 2. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he was “separated auto-matically from the said employment with Defendants, and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement, Defen-dants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff,” and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justify the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. On June 18, 1986, the Petitioner rendered full duty. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day. On his way home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained injuries. For injuries sus-tained, he claimed for disability benefits under P.D. 626 but was denied by the GSIS. ISSUE: W/N the de-nial of compensation under P.D. 626 was valid. HELD: No. In the case at bar, it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not come on time. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual, regular home-ward route. While presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compen-sation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general favor of the workingman still subsists. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

167 Villavert v. Employee’s Compensation CommissionCase No. 313 G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAbella v. National Labor Relations CommissionCase No. 2 G.R. No. 71813 (July 20, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

FACTS: The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of acute hemorrhagic pancre-atic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626, as amended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC which affirmed the denial. ISSUE: W/N the ECC com-mitted grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. HELD: From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philip-pine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout of alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. All doubts in the implementation and inter-pretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the la-bor. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: Petitioner leased a farm land, Hacienda Danao–Ramona, in Negros Occidental for a period of ten years. It is renewable at her instance, which she opted to do, for another ten years. During the existence of the lease she employed the private Respondents. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner dis-missed the two Respondents. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays. HELD: Yes. The applicable law on the case is Art. 284 of the Labor Code. Notwithstanding the contention of the Peti-tioner that the aforementioned provision violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obliga-tions and contracts, because when she leased the farm land, neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers upon the expiration of the lease. The court held such contention untenable as the issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. NLRC. It was stated in the said case that “the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general.” The court further stated that the purpose of Art. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment. With-out such law, employees like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled. Moreover, it is well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, the worker’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration, and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 9d

168 Del Rosario & Sons v. National Labor Relations CommissionCase No. 36 No. L-64204 (May 31, 1985) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONManahan v. Employee’s Compensation CommissionCase No. 79 G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

FACTS: Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. The security guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter found the security agency to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging company. The secu-rity agency appealed the case to the NLRC. The latter allowed the appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the appeal was made. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late. ISSUE: W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal. HELD: No. According to Art. 221 of the Labor Code, “in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice.” The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even though the payment was late, it was still paid. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 40b

FACTS: Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a teacher in the Las Piñas Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the deceased, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband was due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case to the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. IS-SUE: W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. HELD: Yes. The findings of the commis-sion indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment, he was treated for Epigastric pain- and ulcer-like symptoms. This was supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe. Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ul-cer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric Fever. Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the case should be re-solved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 9d, 40b

169 Liwanag v. Workmen’s Compensation CommissionCase No. 75 G.R. No. L-12164 (May 2, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSibulo v. AltarCase No. 279 G.R. No. L-1916 (April 30, 1949) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 125

FACTS: Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag Auto Suppy. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard, who was killed in the line of duty by criminals. His widow and children filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, which was granted in an award that ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3,494.40 to the claimant in lump sum. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. However, they claim that because the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not give an express provision declaring solidary obligations of business partners, the compensation should be divisible. ISSUE: W/N the Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally. HELD: No. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring that the obligation arising from compensation is solidary, other provisions of law show how their liability is solidary. Art. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 2 of the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases, the liability of business partners should be solidary. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly, and one of them happens to be insolvent, the award would only be partially satisfied, which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protec-tion to employees. The WCA should be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally for the employee and de-pendents. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 36, 38, 40

FACTS: Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contract of tenancy with Respon-dent. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm implements and Respondent was to defray all ex-penses of planting and cultivation. The net produce was to be divided equally. The contract was disap-proved by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the division contra-venes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. It was taken to the Court of Industrial Relations, which declared the contract illegal as against public policy as contemplated in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, for the reason that instead of receiving 60% of his total share, the tenant shall receive 50% only. Petitioner claimed that the contract is not among those expressly declared to be against public policy in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, which he argues to be an exhaustive list. ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contem-plated in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law. HELD: No. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public policy, the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which, though not specified, are similar to those expressly mentioned. The purpose of the law might easily be defeated otherwise. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable par-ticipation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. Being a remedial statute, it should be construed to further its purpose in accordance with its general intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 12a, 36, 40

170 Guerrero v. Court of AppealsCase No. 54

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONVicente v. Employee’s Compensation CommissionCase No. 168 G.R. No. 85024 (January 23, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 127

G.R. No. L-44570 (May 30,1986)Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 126

FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shared 1/3 of the proceeds with his coconut-related re-sponsibilities. Afterwards, the Petitioners and Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant; the Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. Later the Petitioners or-dered Benitez out. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations, which ordered his reinstatement. The Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the Court of Agrarian Reform’s decision. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the Agricultural Tenancy Act. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of the suit was a share ten-ancy agreement, the decisions lost their validity. ISSUE: W/N share tenancy ended. HELD: No. An agree-ment is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law. The phasing out of share tenancy was never in-tended to mean a reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. The Agricultural Ten-ancy Act and Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Re-form. But assuming that they were, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are im-paired. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 12, 32, 38

FACTS: Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. At the course of his employment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. So at the age of forty-five, he availed an optional retire-ment to entitle him to “income benefits” under the GSIS retirement program. The application was supported by a physician’s certification that Petitioner was classified as under “permanent total disability.” The signifi-cance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income benefits. GSIS con-tended that Petitioner was only “permanent partial disability”. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability. HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11b, 12a

171 Tamayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel CompanyCase No. 283 G.R. No. L-8975 (June 29, 1957) Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 128

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCorporal v. Employee’s Compensation CommissionCase No. 83 G.R. No. 86020 (August 5, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 131

FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co., who had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. 266 of the Administrative Code, as amended by RA 611, when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June 30, 1954, brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Hotel Co. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the same section of the Administrative Code, as later amended by RA 1081, approved on June 15, 1954, that is to say, 15 days before they were separated from the company. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is to have a retroactive effect, it can only be given effect from the date of its approval. LATIN MAXIM: 46a

FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. During the course of her work, she had several pregnancies. On her 4th pregnancy, she suffered complete abortion. On her 5th pregnancy, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a “hilot”. An hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to pro-fuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. Her husband, herein Peti-tioner, filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. But said agency denied. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because the cause of his wife’s death was non-work-related. IS-SUE: W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit. HELD: No. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma’s uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the body. While as a rule that labor and social wel-fare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, there is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are clear. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 43

172 People v. MoranCase No. 216 G.R. No. 17905 (January 27, 1923) Chapter VII, Page 320, Footnote No. 167 People v. Reyes Case No. 222 G.R. Nos. 74226-227 (July 27, 1989) Chapter VII, Page 320, Footnote No. 168

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. When the decision was published, it was in-creased to 6 months. Defendant alleges that the crime has already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030, which was enacted by the Legislature on March 9, 1922. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. HELD: Act No. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. Furthermore, Art. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to Art. 7, the SC contends that Art. 22 should still apply to special laws. Also, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. When the statute makes no distinction, it makes no exception. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 37, 46a, 48

FACTS: On June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as the deed was registered on May 26, 1961, the lower courts held that the period of prescription has long passed. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. HELD: The SC ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of land acts as a notice to the whole world. Under this, it is also presumed that the pur-chaser has examined the instruments of the record. The court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones, should the circumstances warrant. Rights should not be left on a pre-carious balance, always susceptible possible challenges. This should also apply to criminal cases. Further-more, as stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and that of the prescription of crimes, a liberal reading that is most favorable to the accused is the one to be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 48

173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. BautistaCase No. 37 G.R. No. L-37867 (February 22, 1982) Chapter VII, Page 321, Footnote No. 170

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLegaspi v. Executive Secretary and Agrarian ReformsCase No. 145 No. L-36153 (November 28, 1975) Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No. 173

FACTS: Respondent Gasilao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pension. After finally complying with all the necessities, he was awarded with the full benefits of RA 65, Sec. 9 and RA 1920, for P100 a month and an additional P10 per minor. Later, on June 22, 1969, RA 5753 was ap-proved. However, due to the lack of funds, Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and only af-ter January 15, 1971. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension, starting from December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50, and then P100 plus P10 per minor, from June 22, 1957 up to August 7, 1968. To pay the difference of P100 plus P30 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22, 1969 up to January 15, 1971, the difference of P75 plus P22.50 per month for his wife, and P20 per minor from January 16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Re-spondent Gasilao’s pension. HELD: Respondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period for filing for his pension. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally con-strued as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. Granting such pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. But, as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds, the judgment of the lower courts is modified as, effective December 18, 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each minor, increased to P100 from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968. The difference from June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the government. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b

FACTS: Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, sent a letter to the Respondent Secretary of the Department, Conrado Estrella. Petitioner expressed his desire to be laid-off under the pro-visions of RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity bene-fits to which he might be entitled under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616. GSIS approved his retire-ment gratuity under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616 but denied his claim for gratuity under RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616, and RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. HELD: No. There is nothing in RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pension benefits, one under its provisions and another pursuant to C.A. No. 186. This inter-pretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in C.A. No. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits to an employee. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees, all other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees should, in case of ambi-guity, be construed in relation to C.A. No. 186 and in the light of its provisions. It is a rule of statutory con-struction that when the legislature enacts a provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and that in the absence of an express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes, which should all be construed together. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b

174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and JusticesCase No. 60 A.M. No. 09-9-019-SC (October 4, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No. 174

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRe: Application For Retirement Under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the IACCase No. 128 A.M. No. 6484-Ret. (May 15, 1989) Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No. 177

FACTS: This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Official Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justices). P.D. 1438 was published in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 30, which did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement. However, in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 41 provided that the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. Since 1978 however, GSIS computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary, plus 2) highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA), plus 3) longevity pay (which was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. 42, BP 129). The basis was the copy of P.D. 1438 which was published in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 30. ISSUE: Which version of P.D. 1438 must be followed. HELD: The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910, as amended by P.D. 1438, in the same manner as it has done since 1978. This is definitely more in keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that, being remedial in character, retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian pur-poses. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor but, more so, for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon termination of his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by President Aquino, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1 dated February 25, 1986, re-quiring all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court. Justice Britanico served the government for 36.23 years, of which 10 years, 2 months, and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. As provided in Sec. 1 of RA 910, the judges or justices who may en-joy retirement benefits with their lifetime annuity, should have rendered “at least 20 years service in the ju-diciary or in any other branch of the government or both.” They fall into three categories: XXX 2. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their office and had rendered at least 20 years ser-vice in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico belongs to. HELD: He belongs to the second category of Sec. 1. The acceptance of his courtesy resignation, not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. COMELEC), resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, which he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retire-ment age of 70 years. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 40b, 43c

175 Re: Gregorio G. PinedaCase No. 132 A.M. No. 6789-RET (Jul 13, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 323, Footnote No. 178

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRamirez v. ArrietaCase No. 130 G.R. No. L-19183 (Nov. 29, 1962) Chapter VII, Page 325, Footnote No. 181

FACTS: These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired judges, namely Pineda, Mon-tesclaros, de Lara, Montecillo, Paredes and Gerochi, asking that they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910, as amended, in addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P.D. 1146. They want to take advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. ISSUE: W/N they should be granted bene-fits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Britanico ruling. HELD: No. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under RA 910. The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges, there are ample reasons behind each grant. The crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Bri-tanico ruling if the career of the judge was marked by competence, integrity and dedication to the public service. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy considerations, id est courtesy resignations. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in determining whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. It stated that if a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found wanting. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9e, 37, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. The CFI dismissed the complaint. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. The end of the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the follow-ing Monday but one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. The clerk of court suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day. Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was filed one day after the end of the reglementary period. The judge disapproved the bond and rendered the judgment final and executory. Plaintiff interposed a petition for mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discre-tion in disallowing the appeal bond. HELD: Yes, it did. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident ac-cording to the SC. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect. According to the Rules of Court, a personal appeal bond need not necessarily be subscribed by 2 sureties, it would suf-fice that the court approves such. Furthermore, the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. So long as the surety is solvent and acceptable to the court, it should suffice. Moreover, the de-fect in the appeal bond, even if indeed 2 sureties were needed, the court would not have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period. Rules of procedure should be liberally con-strued in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining a just determination of their cases. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 9e, 11b

176 International Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate CourtCase No. 63 G.R. No. L-6970 (Jan. 30, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDel Rosario v. HamoyCase No. 35 No. L-77154 (June 30, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner’s predecessor in interest by mortgaging her properties. The amount approved for release was used to pay for her other obligations to Petitioner. Thus, private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money market placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the bank refused to pay the interest earned by the placement, applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The court is-sued a writ of execution against Petitioner’s property. Private Respondent filed an ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the money market interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all the said orders. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by erasures, alterations, and/or additions. Such bond was therefore rendered without force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. HELD: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. Compensation cannot extend to unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Petitioner is indebted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market in-terest. The debt of P6.81M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. This prevents legal compensation from taking place under Art. 1290 of the Civil Code. The filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the injunction issued. The decision of the CA is af-firmed. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11b

FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Respondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint “for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp. HELD: Yes. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible, the present proceed-ings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have been avoided. By such rigidity, Respon-dent denied the Petitioner substantial justice. He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten minutes. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves, fortified by jurispru-dence, mandate a liberal construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect substantial justice. LATIN MAXIM: 8c, 9d, 18a, 18b

177 Lacsamana v. Intermediate Appellate CourtCase No. 69 No. L-73146-53 (August 26, 1986) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONGimenez v. Securities and Exchange CommissionCase No. 52 No. L-68568 (December 26, 1984) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181

FACTS: A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC, thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a petition for review. However, a decision was promul-gated by the Respondent court ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended and declared the case terminated. The Respondent court cited a Supreme Court deci-sion where the issue was regarding an extension to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. ISSUE: W/N Re-spondent court erred in terminating the case. HELD: Yes. The Court rules, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. 22 of the Judiciary Reorgani-zation Act and Sec. 22(b) of the Interim Rules, may properly be filed with and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). The Court further restates and clarifies the modes and periods as follows: … (6) Period of extension of time to file petition for review: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 5b, 27

FACTS: Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. The SEC denied their motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. The SEC ruled that the 30-day period provided for in Sec. 6 of P.D. 902-A was modified by Sec. 39 of the Judiciary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. HELD: No. Sec. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to “courts”. The SEC is not a court. It is an administrative agency. Repeals by implication are not favored. The 30-day period fixed by P.D. 902-A, the organic law of the SEC, is still in force. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 38b

178 Blanco v. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co.Case No. 36 G.R. No. L-44970 (March 31, 1936) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 183

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCase and Nantz v. JugoCase No. 49 G.R. No. L-832 (October 14, 1946) Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 187

FACTS: To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal Revenue. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. With such, the ap-peal was not deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements. ISSUE: W/N the requisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed for by the Petitioners. HELD: Under Sec. 76 of Act No. 190 on how appeals are perfected, “… The bond to be given shall be filed with the justice of peace …. In lieu of such bond the Appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the Appellant has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the Collector of Internal Rev-enue). The Petitioners therefore have complied with said requirements. The non-presentation of this certifi-cate was not due to the Petitioner’s failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Rev-enue to receive the deposit tendered by the Petitioner. The fact that the corresponding receipt therefore has not been issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect the remedy. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a

FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied with. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply with the requirement. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. On the occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such, the counsel of the Plaintiff was present in his office. He asked the latter if there were objections to the said counterbond and the counsel replied none. Due to unfortunate circumstances the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to formalize the act of furnishing a copy. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such. HELD: Yes to both issues. Negligence or unavoidable circumstances should not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. The sole purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount. There was substantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff’s office the Defendant’s counterbond. LATIN MAXIM 6d, 9a, 9d

179 C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. RaymundoCase No. 91 G.R. No. L-45155 (July 31, 1936) Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 189

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONJavellana v. Mirasol and NuñezCase No. 65 G.R. No. 14881 (February 5, 1920) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192

FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no author-ity to grant additional 5 days to file her brief. ISSUE: W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief. HELD: Yes. Under the Rules of Court “the court may, on motion to the Appellee and notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal.” The word “may” implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court. LATIN MAXIM: 9d

FACTS: A redemption of property from an execution sale, which had been effected in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana), was attacked in this case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the redemptioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same property in other litigation. ISSUE: W/N the re-demption has been effected in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of law. HELD: A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property, to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as possible. Redemption of property sold under exe-cution is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of re-demption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. Any ordinary creditor, or assignee as such, having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the right of redemp-tion. The act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 41

180 Del Rosario v. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc.Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-16215 (June 29, 1963) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDe la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co.Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192

FACTS: Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000 to P3,000, as indemnity for the death of the insured. Petitioner, fa-ther of the insured, filed a claim for payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being forced to jump off the motor launch “ISLAMA” on account of fire. Defendant company refused to pay more than P1,000 since they alleged that their liability was only said amount pursuant to Sec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy. ISSUE: How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del Rosario. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning. There is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is entitled to recover P3,000. The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1,000 to Petitioner so that there still remains a balance of P2,000 of the amount to which he is entitled to recover. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 38

FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital In-surance & Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest participated into by the insured, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left. Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the in-surance policy. Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his partici-pation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance. ISSUE: W/N Ed-uardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or disability caused by accidental means.” HELD: The terms “accident” and “accidental”, as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent and un-foreseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. The failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 25a, 30a

181 Ty Vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc.Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCapati v. OcampoCase No. 46 G.R. No. L-28742 (April 30, 1982) Chapter VIII, Page 330, Footnote No. 8

FACTS: Plaintiff Diosdado C. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, among which being the eight above named Defendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the Defendants to re-cover indemnity under Part II of the policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies. HELD: The clear and express conditions of the in-surance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. There was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that was found by the trial court, which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand." In addi-tion, the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 7a, 9c

FACTS: Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with the Defendant, a resident of Naga City. The Defendant completed a construction job for the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pam-panga an action for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. Defendant filed a motion to dis-miss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The CFI of Pampanga dis-missed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct. HELD: No. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or may be found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides, at the election of the Plaintiff." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, b

182 Chartered Bank v. National Government Auditing OfficeCase No. 58 G.R. No. L-38513 (March 31, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 331, Footnote No. 10

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONGuiao v. FigueroaCase No. 121 G.R. No. L-6481 (May 17, 1954) Chapter VIII, Page 333, Footnote No. 17

FACTS: Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from the general public since 1946. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue receipts for their remaining balance. On 1968, the Bureau of Posts issued an un-numbered circular: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders," ef-fective October 1, 1968, involving the installation of a new postal money order system which requires that all commercial banks, regardless of location, must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1, 1968. The post office said that the ar-rangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private, unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier. IS-SUE: W/N the unnumbered circular and the understanding are directory and permissive in nature. HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the conve-nience of commercial banks operating in the Manila area only. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 9a, 36a, 36b undated memorandum of

FACTS: In the trial of People v. Gopez, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. After the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, and two new ac-cused were included, namely, Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as accused in his information. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be re-sponsible for the crime charged therein. HELD: Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. 2709 states that, “Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor, except in the cases determined in Sec. 2 of this Act.” A perusal of Act No. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be respon-sible for an offense should be included in the information. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "ex-cept in cases determined" shows Sec. 1 is mandatory, not merely directory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 25a

183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of AppealsCase No. 153 G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 22

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDirector of Lands v. Court of AppealsCase No. 95 G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 23

FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdi-vision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organiza-tions within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the presi-dent of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner asso-ciation cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence, Petitioner associa-tion filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. HELD: No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 38b, b

FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. However, it was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Ini-tial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publi-cation of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory. HELD: It is mandatory. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal manda-tory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a

184 Bersabal v. SalvadorCase No. 34 G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978) Chapter VIII, Page 335, Footnote No. 25

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRepublic Planers Bank v. Agana Sr.Case No. 133 G. R. No. 51765 (March 3, 1997)

FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court.” After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsid-eration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Ap-pellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city… courts: Provided… parties may submit memo-randa… if so requested…” It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is op-tional. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo, an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value of P8,000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to re-deem Private Respondents’ preferred shares HELD: Yes. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in question, stated that, “On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said preferred shares of stock, the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stock certificates clearly al-lows the same.” What Respondent Judge failed to recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. The redemption therefore is clearly the type known as "optional". Furthermore, the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6b, 7a, 30b, 36a

185 Phil. Consumers Foundation , Inc. v. Nat’l Telecommunications CommissionCase No. 121 G.R. No. L-63318 (November 25, 1983)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC and PLDT (Resolution)Case No. 94 G.R. No. L-63318 (August 18, 1984)

FACTS: Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. Petitioner states that SIP schedule presented by the Private Respondent is pre-ma-ture and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Sec. 2 of P.D. 217 which provides, “The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropri-ate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately imple-mented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated ...” ISSUE: W/N Respon-dent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Yes. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility. Without promulgation of rules and regulation there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respon-dent, the consumers and the government itself. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is laudable, but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers. Consider-ing the multi-million profits of the company, the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits. LATIN MAXIM: 8b, 9d, 11b, 12a

FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications as mandatory, which construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of said Sec-tion 2. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set rules and regulations imple-menting P.D. 217 should be reconsidered. HELD: Yes. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean "shall" or "must". LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 9f, 30b, 24, 36, 39c

186 Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance CorporationCase No. 93 G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952) Chapter VIII, Page 336, Footnote No. 32

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONBerces v. Guingona, et. al.Case No. 33 G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 34

FACTS: Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304, which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. The lower court sustained Respondent company. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company.

FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi, Albay for 1) abuse of authority; and 2) dishonesty, with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in both cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC. The Office of the President stayed execution, cit-ing Sec. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to Petitioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. ISSUE: W/N R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18. HELD: No. Sec. 530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. 6, A.O. No. 18 be-cause it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intended to be repealed. If there was any repeal, it was by implication which is not favored. In the absence of an express repeal, a subse-quent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repug-nancy exists between the two. There is none in this case. The first sentence of Sec. 68 provides that “an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” It gives discretion to reviewing ap-peals to stay execution. The term “shall” may be read mandatory or directory, depending upon considera-tion of the entire provision where it is found. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 26, 50

HELD: No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word “shall” is imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years.”, the interest to be charged, that the verbphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discount-ing or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the accep-tance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “avail-able loanable funds.” In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, 26

187 Mers Shoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.Case No. 81 G.R. No. 123669 (February 27, 1998) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 35

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONFule v. Court of AppealsCase No. 48 G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37

FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Alleging serious business decline, Pe-titioner barred its workers from entering the company to work. The workers challenged the legality of Peti-tioner’s stoppage of operations. The Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice, and ordered Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Petitioner appealed to Respondent NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. Despite the reduction granted, Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days, resulting to the dismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. ISSUE: W/N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: No. Under Art. 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in an amount equiva-lent to the monetary award. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal re-quirements is fatal. The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 26

FACTS: Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was al-ready closed, thus in violation of BP 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution pre-sented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the Appellate Court. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. HELD: The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”. Because of the word “shall”, in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally con-strued in favor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 9d

188 McGee v. RepublicCase No. 174 G.R. No. L-5387 (April 29, 1954) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPenid v. VirataCase No. 101 G.R. No. L-44004 (March 25, 1983) Chapter VIII, Page 338, Footnote No. 40

FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo, wants to adopt her children by her first husband. However, he is barred from doing so under Art. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that “those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fic-tion” cannot adopt. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. Despite Art. 335, the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption, invoking Art. 338 which states that “a step-child, by the step-father or step-mother” can be adopted. ISSUE: W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child. HELD: No. One strong argument presented by the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold otherwise would ren-der Art. 338 meaningless and a surplusage. However, it must be noted that Art. 335 and Art. 338 should be considered in relation to each other. That a parent can adopt a step-child is limited by Art. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an adopter. One principle behind this is to pro-tect the successional rights of the legitimate child. In addition, under the laws of statutory construction, neg-ative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely direc-tory. Art. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. While Art. 338 is positive: the following may be adopted.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a

FACTS: Confidential Information No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been falsely declaring their gross earnings – on the ba-sis of a parity rate of P2.00 to US $1.00 – defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. Further, Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Confidential Infor-mation. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Inc. Now the Petitioners seek their 25% reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment for their deficiencies – as provided by RA 2338. IS-SUE: W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. Inc, a company which is not included in the Confidential Information. HELD: Yes. According to Sec. 4 of RA 2338, “In order to entitle an informer to a reward, the information given by him must lead to or be instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or viola-tion … and results in the recovery of collection of revenues ….” Not only did the BIR rely on the Confidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigation, but also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings, which led to further investigations and, con-sequently, recovery of collection. Therefore, this information was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation. In jurisprudence, statues offering rewards must be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d

189 Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al.Case No. 96 G.R. No. 110170 (February 21, 1994) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 63

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPimentel v. FestejoCase No. 124 G.R. No. L-2327 (January 11, 1949) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 64

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin. Respondent Ta-balba was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. The trial court dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. Within the 5-day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a “verified appeal” brief. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any “notice of appeal” from Petitioner. Petitioner’s appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period. ISSUE: 1. W/N the “verified appeal” was validly dismissed. 2. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees. HELD: 1. No. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. The filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed period, and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail, filed as of the date of mailing. 2. No. The docket fee was paid al-though insufficient. Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 40b

FACTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 ballots which would have made him win. Appellant’s name in the 59 ballots were written on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor, member of the provincial board or councilor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced but the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. ISSUE: W/N Appellant can claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. HELD: No. For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor, it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who, as provided by the Constitution, is able to read. A name can be counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the ballot for the vote for such office. It is impossible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor, when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. Considering that in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate for mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7b, 43

190 Roxas v. RaffertyCase No. 264 G.R. No. L-12182 (March 27, 1918) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSerfino v. Court of AppealsCase No. 145 G.R. No. 40858 (September 15, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75

FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1913, the construction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. It was finished in all respects on February 15, 1915. The city assessor and collector of Manila, under the date of December 1, 1914, sent Plaintiffs notice, received by them on December 25, 1914, requiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1915. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the taxes, which amounted to P3,000, under protest. Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment. ISSUE: W/N the assessment was legal. HELD: No. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during November. His attempted notifica-tion on December 25, 1914, was not given during the time fixed by statute, thus there was no legal assess-ment of the Roxas Building for the year 1915. Furthermore, the city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list. The city assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 19

FACTS: A parcel of land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares situated in Sagay, Negros Occidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor, under Homestead Patent No. 44139. Upon registration of said patent, OCT No. 1839 was issued by said office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. In 1945, Casamayor sold the land in favor of Nemesia Baltazar. Apparently, OCT No. 1839 was lost during the war and upon the petition of Baltazar, the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name of Casamayor. On the same day, TCT No. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. 14-R. In 1951, Baltazar sold the property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central, which did not present the documents for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title, TCT No. 28985, in the name of Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question was null and void from the beginning. HELD: No, applying Sec. 118 of C.A. No. 141, which prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the is-suance of the patent, and not Sec. 121 which governs sale to corporations. Since the grant was more than 5 years before, the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal. LATIN MAXIM: 37b, 43

191 Quijano v. Development Bank of the PhilippinesCase No. G. R. No. 26419 (October 16, 1970)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONRomualdez-Marcos v. Commission on ElectionsCase No. 137 G.R. No. 119976 (September 18, 1995) Chapter VIII, Page 347, Footnote No.84

FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved. The loan was to be re-leased in installments. The outstanding obligation of the petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P13,983.59. Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14,000 for his outstanding obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. 897 (RA 897). Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when RA 897 was approved. ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s obligation is subsist-ing at the time of the approval of RA 897. HELD: No. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. Hence, when such backpay certificates are of-fered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20, 1953, such corporation may not legally be compelled to ac-cept the certificates. The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and un-ambiguous language of the provision of law. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 7a, 6c, 1

FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candi-date for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with respondent COM-ELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. ISSUE: W/N peti-tioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections. HELD: Yes. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. As a minor, petitioner fol-lowed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban, Leyte. As domicile, once acquired, it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the being born in Manila, Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Parenthetically, when she married then Congressman Marcos, petitioner was obliged, by virtue of Art. 110 of the Civil Code, to follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. Although Mr. Marcos has different places of residence, and even if he had designated one, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. Therefore, she did not lose her domicile of origin. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 37, 39a

192 Portillo v. SalvaniCase No. 243 G.R. No. L-32181 (March 10, 1930) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No. 130

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONQuerubin v. Court of AppealsCase No. 247 G.R. No. L-2581 (December 2, 1948) Chapter VIII, Page 332, Footnote No. 14

FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial governor of Antique. Ap-pellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election protest on July 9, 1928. Decision was rendered on August 15, 1929 declaring appellee Portillo the winner. ISSUE: W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid. HELD: The decision is void for want of jurisdiction. The Election Law provides that all proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. Legislative history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statute from silence to mild admonition to stronger sug-gestion and finally to an emphatic and explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision mandatory. One year having already elapsed, the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses ju-risdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want of jurisdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 9a, 43, 45, b2

FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. Mamuri filed an elec-tion protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal thereafter. The appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case for the court had lost jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. HELD: No. Sec. 178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should be decided within three months after filing. However, this provi-sion is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of the law. The dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The doctrine in Portillo v. Sal-vani should be abandoned. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2, 5b, 18b, 39b

193 Nilo v. Court of AppealsCase No. 189 G.R. No. L-34586 (April 2, 1984) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No. 59

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSalcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and CarreonCase No. 138 G.R. No. L-4495 (June 6, 1951)

FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system. Private respondent then filed for ejection citing “personal cultivation” on March 7, 1968. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal cit-ing that RA 3844 was amended on September 10, 1971 removing “personal cultivation” from the grounds for ejectment. ISSUE: W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is explicitly provided. The legislation involves social justice, however the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be entitled to social justice. Furthermore, to rule against the small landowners would be thwarting legislative in-tent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 46a, 46b

FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. RA 546 was approved and Sec. 1 thereof amended Sec. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. 4007. By virtue of this law, a Board of Den-tal Examiners was appointed by the President, whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Congress, in enacting RA 546, to abolish all the pre-ex-isting Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereof. HELD: Appointment of the re-spondents is valid. It is obvious that it is the intention of Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 4007. In the case of Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obliga-tion, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but that sta-tus is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9c, 46, 49

194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc.Case No. 78 G.R. No. L-23771 (August 4, 1988) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 14

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONGallardo v. BorromeoCase No. 50 G.R. No. L-36007 (May 25, 1988)

FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency fran-chise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as prescribed in Sec. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, RA 3843 was passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light, heat, and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. ISSUE: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the “uniformity and equality of taxation” clause of the Constitution. HELD: It is valid. Sec. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application. RA 3843 did not only fix and spec-ify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it “in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the con-trary notwithstanding,” thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9c, 46, 49

FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job as a letter carrier. Upon appeal, the CA applying Sec. 7 of RA 6389, held that the landowner’s desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispos-sessing the tenant. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. 7 of RA 6389. HELD: No. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. The newer law, R.A. 6389 eliminated this ground. In applying Art. 4 of the New Civil Code, RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive, it may not ap-ply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e

195 Cebu Portland Cement v. CIRCase No. 52 G.R. No. 20563 (October 29, 1968) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 15

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compaňia de SegurosCase No. 76 G.R. No. 14880 (April 29, 1960) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No. 41

FACTS: The case involves petitioner’s claim for refund of sales tax paid from November 1954 to March 1955, and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. Since 1952, however, petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement, and on January 1953, it also protested the payment of the ad valorem taxes. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by respondent are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955), pro-ducers of cement are exempt from the payment of said tax. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise. IS-SUE: Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. HELD: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. While the purpose of the amendment, as mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill, was not only to “accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms,” it certainly could not have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between the taxpayer and the Government. LATIN MAXIM: 46a, 46c, 46e

FACTS: Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in business as a real estate dealer. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a scale of graduated rates; this took effect on August of 1956. Petitioner assessed against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. Respondent appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted a decision in favor of it. ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively. HELD: No. As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar, considering that RA 1612, which imposes the new and higher taxes, expressly provides that said Act shall take effect upon its approval. LATIN MAXIM: 46a, 46c, 46e

196 Laceste v. SantosCase No. 140 G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932) Chapter IX, Page 351, Footnote No. 1

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONBalatbat v. Court of Appeals and PassionCase No. 29 G.R. No. L-36378 (January 27, 1992) Chapter IX, Page 363, Footnote No. 73

FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. The petitioner continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. 344 of the RPC. ISSUE: W/N the last para-graph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. Conscience and good law jus-tify this exception. LATIN MAXIM: 48

FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing 18,490 square meters of land owned by Garcia. Garcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared it for taxation pur-poses under Tax Declaration No. 126. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pur-suant to Sec. 36(1) of RA 3844. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided in light of Sec. 7 of RA 6389 since, in view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to acquire the land. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by law. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our ac-tion with no binding effect until it is enacted, thus laws have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future. LATIN MAXIM: 20, 46b, 46e

197 People v. ZetaCase No. 232 G.R. No. L-7140 (December 22, 1955) Chapter VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 72

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSan Jose v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.Case No. 271 G.R. No. L-7766 (November 29, 1955) Chapter IX, Page 369, Footnote No. 104

FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C.A. No. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would collect. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the pay-ment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive ef-fect. HELD: No. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. Laws can-not be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. Furthermore, strict construc-tion on the law was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 11b, 20, 46e

FACTS: Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her pre-war loan with defendant. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 401, the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from January 1, 1946 to March 14, 1951. The lower court decided for defendant to return the interest to the plaintiff. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correct in imposing the re-turn of interest to plaintiff by the defendant. HELD: Yes. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid inter-est. It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest. Where a statute was amended and reenacted, the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in the original act; but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment. LATIN MAXIM: 20, 46e

198 People v. SumilangCase No. 226 G.R. No. L-49187 (December 18, 1946) Chapter IX, Page 371, Footnote No. 111

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPalomo Building Tenants Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 97 G.R. No. L-68043 (Oc-tober 31, 1984) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with Pre-liminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents Government Ser-vice Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills, as principal defendants, and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila in the injunction aspect of the case. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other ac-tions pending between the same parties for the same cause. Respondent judge granted private respon-dents' motion to dismiss. ISSUE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in sustaining the order of respondent, denying petitioner's motion for approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them. HELD: Yes. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein re-spondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Ruled in Alday vs. Camilon, "[t]he reorgani-zation having been declared to have been completed, BP Big. 129 is now in full force and effect. A Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the In-terim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those provision s may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent' (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [19461.] " LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 46e

FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court. Based on the records, a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney. However, the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. HELD: No. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. LATIN MAXIM: 46e

199 MRCA, Inc. v. Court of AppealsCase No. 78 G.R. No. 86675 (December 19, 1989)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONOcampo v. Court of AppealsCase No. 89 G.R. No. 7960 (December 8, 1989)

FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses sought to be re-covered by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Court. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. HELD: Yes. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. LATIN MAXIM: 46e

FACTS: Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner, while being informed of P.D. 772. Petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. Sec. 1 of P.D. 772, other-wise known as the Anti– Squatting Law has three elements: (a) accused is not the owner of the land; (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or threat or by taking such advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner; (c) such occupation of the property is without the con-sent or against the will of the owner. Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that “after prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.” ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of squatting. 2. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his evidence. HELD: Yes on both counts. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insuffi-ciency of evidence, petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. LATIN MAXIM: 45a, 46b

200 Yakult Philippines v. Court of AppealsCase No. 315 G.R. No. 91856 (October 5, 1990) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 117

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations CommissionCase No. 21 G.R. No. 90501 (August 5, 1991) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 119

FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negli-gence, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. HELD: Yes. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 46e

FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws, respectively. ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced by Sec. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. HELD: Yes on both counts. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and the contested provision “is then a police legislation”. The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive ef-fect for they are procedural or remedial in character. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 46e

201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. v. Court of AppealsCase No. 25 G.R. No. L-54305 (February 14, 1990) Chapter IX, Page 373, Footnote No. 124

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONGovernment of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of BinalonanCase No. 117 G.R. No. L-8243 (December 24, 1915) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No. 44

FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. Peti-tioner also entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER; subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. However, of the total mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, 9 mining claims overlap. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. During the pendency of this appeal, CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compro-mise agreement. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. Due to the promulgation of P.D. 1281, a number of the defendants filed a sup-plemental motion to dismiss. They alleged that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1281. ISSUE: W/N P.D. 1281 prevails. HELD: P.D. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application. LATIN MAXIM: 50

FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec. 61 of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of all private property within a prescribed area in the municipality of Bi-nalonan, Pangasinan on two parcels of land. Act No. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands, or, at most, lands claimed by the Government. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles. Cadastral Act (No. 2259) authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly sur-veyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not permit of similar proceedings. The title of the Public Land Act contains no mention of compulsory registration pro-ceedings. No reference is made in Act No. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. 61 of Act No. 926. IS-SUE: Whether Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands. HELD: Act No. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation on the same subject. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it amends or repeals Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not necessarily rebut this conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 46e

202 Development Bank of the Phil. v. Court of AppealsCase No. 92 G.R. No. L-28774 (February 28, 1980) Chapter IV, Page 175, Footnote No. 199

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONBriad Agro Development Corp. v. Hon. dela Serna, and dela Cruz, et al.Case No. 39 G.R. No. 83225 (June 29, 1989) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 136

FACTS: The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its employ-ees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20 years. However, the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bu-reau of Lands, the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registration by the DBP. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. 13 of RA 85. However, without the knowledge of the DBP, a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. Then, RA 3147 was enacted, amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85), among which was Sec. 13. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 13 of RA 85, by RA 3147. HELD: Yes. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147, by amending Sec. 13 of RA 85, was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. It is, therefore, a curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. LATIN MAXIM: 46e

FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural firm for alleged underpayment/non-pay-ment of minimum wage, ECOLA, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential pay, 13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due no-tice; Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to pay P5,369,909.30. In its appeal to the NLRC, Briad Agro questioned the Regional Director’s authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers, which NLRC dismissed on the strength of E.O. 111 amending Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, which granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. ISSUE: W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters, by force of Art. 217 of the Labor Code. HELD: The Court held that E.O. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provi-sion subject of the amendment. This was clear from the proviso: “The provisions of Art. 217 of this Code notwithstanding…” The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various Re-gional Directors have concurrent jurisdiction. E.O. 111 therefore has retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9, 30b, 38b, 46e

203 Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Andres, Jr. and BurgosCase No. 99 G.R. No. 104215 (May 8, 1996) Chapter IX, Page 377, Footnote No. 140

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSantos v. Duata and the Court of AppealsCase No. 274 G.R. No. L-20901 (August 31, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 134

FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service contract driver. Months af-ter, another contract was executed which changed his position into that of a helper/laborer. When private respondent returned to the Philippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual bonus. Private respondent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E.O. No. 797 was passed, creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees abroad. The La-bor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent. ISSUE: W/N E.O. 797 should be given retroactive effect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. HELD: No. E.O. 797 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule on prospectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is ex-pressly declared or is necessitated. Furthermore, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action; in this case, these were P.D. 1691 and 1391. LATIN MAXIM: 35, 46a, 46c, 46e

FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a quarter part of Lot No. 37. The lot was purchased by Santos, Gaanan and Aguilar. For convenience, the title was issued in San-tos’s name. On August 3, 1955, private respondent Duata, the daughter of the Duata spouses, instituted an action for reconveyance of ¼ of Lot No. 37. Santos denied the spouses’ ownership, claiming that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document. The trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of Santos. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the transaction was actually an equitable mortgage under Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set aside the decision of the trial court. IS-SUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar, in executing the said private document, intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. HELD: It is a mortgage. Art. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase; it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of the loan, a contract purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. Said article is remedial in nature and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 8c, 17, 21, 46e

204 Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.Case No. 182 G.R. No. 103702 (December 6, 1994) Chapter IX, Page 381, Footnote No. 150

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONOrtigas & Co. v. Feati Bank & TrustCase No. 193 G.R. No. L-24670 (December 14, 1979) Chapter VIII, Page 312, Footnote No. 133

FACTS: President C. Garcia, issued E.O. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon. Then by virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later offi-cially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515. It was then attacked of its validity. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of RA 7160 to the peti-tion would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the E.O. cre-ating the municipality of San Andres was cured by Sec. 442(d) of RA 7160. HELD: Yes. The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991, which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives or-ders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the ef-fectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. LATIN MAXIM: 46e, 6c

FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Appellant demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. ISSUE: W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question and if Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: The trial court held that the sub-ject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by the Munici-pal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant. Resolution No. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the con-tractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e

205 Billones v. Court of Industrial RelationsCase No. 35 G.R. No. L-17566 (July 30, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 119

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhilippine National Bank v. AsuncionCase No. 237 G.R. No. L-46095 (November 23, 1977) Chapter X, Page 387, Footnote No. 3

FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge stating they did not authorize the filing. Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescription under Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued; otherwise it shall be barred forever. HELD: It would have applied, provided that actions already commenced before the effec-tive date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed. As the statute shortened the period of ac-tion accrued, it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would op-erate to preclude the six years from their accrual. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. Because the statute shortened the pe-riod within which to bring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants whose claims were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year from the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e

FACTS: On January 1963, Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporated a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo, Carmen and Tomas Borromeo and Manuel Barredo. By May, 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. PNB filed a case against all 4 signatories. However, before the case was decided, Manuel Barredo passed away. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proceedings of M. Barredo and can-not be brought against other surviving debtors. ISSUE: W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 86 prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. HELD: No. Art. 1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to “proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors, or some, or all”. Thus, the choice is left up to PNB to decide. Sec. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desires to go against the deceased debtor. To require PNB to go against the estate would deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art. 1216. In this case, the Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. 1216 because substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution states that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase of modify substantive rights. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c

206 Ongsiako v. GamboaCase No. 90 G.R. No. L-1867 (April 8, 1950)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAmandy v. PeopleCase No. 7 G.R. No. 79010 (May 23, 1988)

FACTS: In 1946, Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract pursuant of Sec. 8 of Act 4054. This act provided that the palay would be divided equally by the 2 parties. However, later that same year, Act 4054 was amended by RA 34. During liquidation, Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. Ongsiako insists that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given retroactive effect. Because of this, the original contract starting an equal sharing of profits should be followed. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and should be given retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. In the past, laws concerning this issue have been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore, producing retroactive effect. Moreover, it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning RA 34 that “this bill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in such a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants… The principal feature of this bill is to increase the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6b, 9a, 49

FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.6 grams of marijuana. Because he pleaded guilty in his trial, he was given a sentence of six years and 1 day (the minimum time for his offense). Peti-tioner then filed for probation alleging P.D. 968. However, the petition was denied because P.D. 1990 had repealed P.D. 968, no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for probation. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandy’s petition for probation. HELD: No. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who aren’t. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been “sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years” are excluded from the benefits of the Probation Law. Because P.D. 1990 was promulgated after P.D. 968, the former prevails. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 22a, 25a, 36a, 43, 49

207 Parras v. Land Registration CommissionCase No. 197 G.R. No. L-16011 (July 26, 1960) Chapter X, Page 390, Footnote No. 16

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDiu v. Court of AppealsCase No. 96 G.R. No. 115213 (December 19, 1995) Chapter X, Page 391, Footnote No. 28

FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit to the Commis-sioner's office, pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300, otherwise known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year, the sum of P57.00 as estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the ini-tial notice of the hearing of the case. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. He prays that he be exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish the notice in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: 1. W/N pe-titioner can be exempted. 2. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec. 114 of Act 496. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said provision of Act 496. LATIN MAXIM: 11, 32, 38b

FACTS: On several occasions, private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchan-dise from petitioners' store all valued at P7,862.55. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated de-mands. Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hear-ing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the parties met, they failed to reach an amicable settle-ment. Private respondents in their Answer, while admitting indebtedness, interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (2) another for P12,0000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as required by law. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". It must be noted that P.D. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court before the effectivity of the LGC. Nevertheless, Sec. 4 and 6 of the former law have been substan-tially reproduced in Sec. 410(b) and 412 respectively, of the latter law. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 5b, 9a, 36b

208 Government v. SpringerCase No. 119 G.R. No. L-26979 (April 1, 1927) Chapter I, Page 38, Footnote No. 166

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMecano v. Commission on AuditCase No. 176 G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992) Chapter X, Page 395, Footnote No. 45

FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in accordance with its by-laws. However, the respondents are stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper shareholders. The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Govern-ment. The Government intended to retain a majority stake in the said company; however, it ended up occu-pying almost 90% of the stock. During the election of directors, three members of the government ap-peared, two from the legislative and one from the executive. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole adminis-trator of the Philippine Government. HELD: Yes. Sec. 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by Sec. 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a, 38b

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorse-ment denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. 2. W/N Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Adminis-trative Code of 1987. HELD: Petition was granted. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied re-peal, and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second sentence of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC … whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.” LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 32, 37, 38b, 49

209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. Concepcion and Lee VooCase No. 20 G.R. No. 33281 (March 31, 1930)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONYnchausti & Co v. StanleyCase No. 174 G.R. No 12330 (January 25, 1917)

FACTS: The accused, one Chan Sam, was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be committed to an asy-lum. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years later on the strength of doctor’s reports. In issuing the order of release the respondent judge relied upon Art. 8, par. 4, of the Penal Code. On the other hand, Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. ISSUE: W/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave the asylum without the approval of the Director of Health. HELD: It is a well-known rule of statutory con-struction that when there is no express repeal, none is presumed to be intended. Likewise, when two por-tions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together, this should be done. Art. 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code. The powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary with each other. Thus, any person confined in any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art. 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. The converse proposition equally holds true. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 49

FACTS: The petitioner, a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business, sought to prohibit the In-sular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requirement, which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on each vessel. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. 2614 was not and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code; Act No. 2614 being specific with re-gard to the management of Philippine vessels. ISSUE: W/N there is a conflict between Act No. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. 1312 of the Administrative Code. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. 2614. It is apparent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. The Philippine Legislature could not have intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the uncontrolled judgment of the Insular Collector of Customs. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 49, 50

210 U.S. v. TantocoCase No. 164 G.R. No. 11338 (August 15, 1916)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONFabros, et al. v. LayaCase No. 44 G. R. No. 70832 (December 18, 1987)

FACTS: The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control a certain amount of opium. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that Act No. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the United States Congress. The Government appealed. ISSUE: What the effect of said Act was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium. HELD: That the United States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the subject of opium appears from the law itself. Whether or not an Act is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by an examination of both statutes, and in the light of the reason, purpose, and object of both. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provisions relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 49

FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authorized tu-ition fee increases of private schools provided for in Sec. 3(a) of P.D. 451, and thereafter, under the Educa-tion Act of 1982 (BP 232). Then Minister of Education Jaime C. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Or-der No. 25, entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232, The Education Act of 1982, relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. Petitioners prayed for temporary restraining or-der on the Rules and Regulations, which was granted to them. However, four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO on the ground that their tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to P.D. 451, which the Court thereby lifted. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P.D. 451 which thereby makes MECS Or-der No. 25 valid. HELD: Yes. Under P.D. 451, the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture, where Sec. 42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to determine its rate of tu-ition and other school fees or charges. P.D. 451 provides that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the school; while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be applied or used in accor-dance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. Hence, there was a repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 39b

211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. FelicianoCase No. 127 G.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965) Chapter X, Page 399, Footnote No. 61

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONBrias de Coya v. Tan Lua, et al.Case No. 16 G.R. No. 30756 (September 22, 1931)

FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Adminis-tration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pur-suant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452. HELD: The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong ex-clusively to private parties, thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to consti-tute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President may autho-rize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. The two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. The two laws can there-fore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 39a

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines while she was in China. At this, she appointed her son to manage, sell and encumber her properties situated in the Philippines. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. Defendant-appellant executed a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. The assignee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him. ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respon-dent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer has been made. HELD: The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act compliment each other and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors, according the latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor's property, against which they may enforce their credits. Construing the In-solvency Law together with the Land Registration Act, we reach the conclusion that in order that the assign-ment of the insolvent debtor's real property made by the clerk of the proper court to the assignee may oper-ate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, both such proceedings and the assignment must have been recorded in the registry of deeds, the former from their commencement. Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land given to him by the latter, which was registered with a Torrens title, is legal and valid. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 39a

212 Villegas vs. SubidoCase No. 314 G.R. No. L-31711, (September 30, 1971) Chapter X, Page 411, Footnote No.96

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONJalandoni vs. EndayaCase No. 137 G.R. No. L-23894, (January 24, 1974) Chapter X, Footnote No. 62

FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. In an Administrative Order, series of 1968, Petitioner, Mayor of the City of Manila, directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the As-sistant City Treasurer, saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation. Petitioner, ap-pointed Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer. Respondent, disapproved the appointment, basing his action, on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provin-cial Treasurers is still governed by Sec. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Sec. 4 of the Decentralization Law, RA 5185. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Law should govern. HELD: No. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so de-clared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be in-consistent with the former. A subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9, 50

FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cruz in the Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. During the hearing of the libel case Cruz, through coun-sel manifested in open court that under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, (the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended par-ties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense), Respondent Judge was devoid of juris-diction to do so. There was, as noted, a negative response. Respondent still tried the case. ISSUE: W/N Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand. HELD: No. As is clear from his well-written memorandum, he did base his action on what for him was the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828, Sec. 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does not exceed pri-sion correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Libel is one of those offenses included in such category. He would thus conclude that as the amenda-tory act came into effect on June 22, 1963, the provisions of Art. 360 as last amended by RA 1289 confer-ring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance, was thus repealed by implication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9, 49

213 CIR vs. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation.Case No. 79 G.R. Nos. 83583-84 September 30, 1991 Chapter X, Page 400, Footnote No.64

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONValdez v. TuazonCase No. 111 G.R. No. L-14957 (March 16, 1920) Chapter X, Page 388, Footnote No. 9

FACTS: Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974,978.50 and P424,303.33, respectively, representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined and manufactured mineral oils, motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized in its operations as a mining concessionaire, using RA 1435 as basis. The Court of Tax Ap-peals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P.D. 231, 436 and 711. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No. 1435 (An Act To Provide Means of Increasing the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been repealed by subsequent statutes. HELD: Yes. We find that the disputed pro-viso found in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the miners and the lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to the increased rates and in effect make them subsi-dize the construction of highways from which they did not directly benefit. Given the present concept of the general fund and its wide application, then the proviso in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an anachro-nism. It is inevitable that, sooner or later, the miners will stand to benefit from any of the government en-deavors and it will no longer be correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific taxes to augment the general fund for government undertakings is "unfair" to the miners because they are not directly convenienced. While we generally do not favor repeal by implication, it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative but to concede the point that an earlier law has been impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an obvious inconsistency. LATIN MAXIM: 49

FACTS: This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent wife. Act No. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage cannot be granted except upon conviction. The respon-dent has never been convicted of the offense of adultery. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce based on prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. 2710. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2710 should be ap-plied in the case. HELD: Act No. 2710 should be applied. Even if the said Act has no repealing clause, when there is a plain and unavoidable repugnancy between two laws, the later must be given effect. Nega-tive statutes are mandatory, and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting pro-visions. The situation in this case does not require the application of any of the artificial canons of interpre-tation, for the language of the statute is so plain that its meaning is unmistakable. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 49

214 Estate of Mota v. ConcepcionCase No. 42 G.R. No. L-34581 (March 31, 1932)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONTorrente v. GroveCase No. 155 G.R. No. L-2340 (December 21, 1905)

FACTS: In 1919, Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to construct several kilome-ters of railroad in Occidental Negros. In 1920, Serra transferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. In December of the same year, Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. On the last sale, only part of the price was paid, so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. Mota regis-tered the contract as an unregistered real property. ISSUE: 1. W/N a mortgage over an unregistered prop-erty is valid. 2. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission. HELD: 1. According to Standard Oil Co. vs. Castro, Sec. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a contract be-tween the contracting parties. 2. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. Serra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway. LATIN MAXIM: 1

FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding, discharging the petitioner from deten-tion. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdic-tion to issue the order directing the making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. It is contended that the arrest and detention of petitioner, were illegal and void. ISSUE: W/N the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may be in the Philippines. HELD: Under the provision of Sec. 13 of G.O. No. 58, a justice of the peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest, wherever he may be in the Philippines. Due to contrary provisions, the general order has impliedly repealed the Spanish law. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. 59 is a proof that the Civil Commission deemed it necessary to make an express grant of such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the publication of the said law the processes of the justices of the peace did not run throughout the province, much less the ar-chipelago. The court however said that the opinion of the law making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is, it is entitled to respectful consideration, but it is not conclusive on the courts. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 49

215 Pamil v. TeleronCase No. 195 G.R. No. L-34854 (November 20, 1978) Chapter I, Page 33, Footnote No. 148

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPeople v. AlmueteCase No. 200 G.R. No. L-26551 (February 27, 1976) Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61

FACTS: Respondent Fr. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. The petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed for Gonzaga’s disqualification based on Sec. 2175 of the Administrative Code which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office. IS-SUE: W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected. HELD: The vote was indecisive. Seven believed Sec. 2175 was no longer operative. Five believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infir-mity. Though the five were a minority, the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision inef-fective, hence it was presumed valid. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution, the supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. Sec. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. Also, legis-lation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repug-nance between the two. No such repugnance is discernible. Sec. 2175 has neither been repealed nor su-perseded. The section also admitted no exception, therefore there can be none. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: Dissenting Seven: 9a, 30a, 32, 49 Minor Five: 6c, 7a, 7c, 37, 43

FACTS: Almuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). The accused, tenants of Fernando, allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without no-tifying her or obtaining her consent. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense, there was no longer any law punishing the act. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. HELD: Sec. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. The ALRC suspended the ATL. It instituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. The prohibition against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant’s act of prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of juris-diction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 10, 47, 49

216 Smith Bell & Co. v. Municipality of ZamboangaCase No. 148 G.R. No. L-33318 (December 20, 1930)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLechoco v. Civil Aeronautics BoardCase No. 71 G.R. No. L-32979-81 (February 29, 1972)

FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No. 226. Plaintiff paid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void. The de-fendant argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Sec. 2625(d) of the Adminis-trative Code but it does have such power under a subsequent enactment of Act No. 3422. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3422 repealed Sec. 2625(d) the Administrative Code. HELD: Repeals by implication are not favored. If the legislature intended its repeal, it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in expressly repealing Sec. 2407 of the Administrative Code. A general affirmative act will not be construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50

FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. 13(a) and 14 of C.A. No. 146, jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power of control over air rates and fares. On the other hand, respondents argue that juris-diction over air fares and rates were, under both statutes, exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC. ISSUE: Whether the authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in the CAB or in the PSC. HELD: Au-thority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. Under RA 776, the CAB can fix and determine reasonable individual, joint or special rates charges or fares for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freights and passengers that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. Furthermore, im-plied repeal of statutes is not favored. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b

217 Villegas v. EnrileCase No. 171 G.R. No. L-29827 (March 31, 1973)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONVillegas v. SubidoCase No. 172 G.R. No. L-24012 & L- 24040 (August 9, 1965)

FACTS: It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec. 4 of the Decentralization Act be given effect, then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lodged in respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila. The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the pro-vision of the Charter of the City of Manila, which negates the assumption of authority on the part of the peti-tioner. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. HELD: No. The issue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in the case of Vil-legas v. Subido. Furthermore, petitioner ignored the provision that the City Fiscal is not included in the enu-meration made in the Decentralization Act. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 5a, 37

FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557and 409 provid-ing for the removal and suspension of policemen. The City Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding ad-ministrative cases of officers and employees in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disciplinary cases. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in the competitive service. HELD: No. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension by the City Mayor can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commis-sioner of Civil Service. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other body. RA 557 and 409 are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Manila, RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260 and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a gen-eral law. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from the decision of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service, instead of to the President. Repeal by implication is not favored and if two laws can be reconciled, the construction will be against such repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b, 50

218 U.S. v. PalacioCase No. 301 G.R. No. 11002 (January 17, 1916) Chapter X, Page 406, Footnote No. 77

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMarin v. NaciancenoCase No. 171 G.R. No. 5939 (March 29, 1911) Chapter X, Page 411, Footnote No. 100

FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec. 87 of Act No. 82 when he willfully omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. He posits that Act No. 2238 repeals by implication Act No. 82 because of the clause in Sec. 18 that states “all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are re-pealed.” ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No. 82. HELD: No. Act No. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and procedure provided in Act No. 82. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. Act No. 2238 provides no penalty thus, Sec. 87 of Act No. 82 continues in force. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b

FACTS: Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix, but the testatrix did not alter her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. The petitioners are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that “When a devise or a legacy is made to a child… and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving issues… such issue shall take the es-tate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done… unless a different disposition is required by law.” The executor of the will opposes the payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein, having died before the testator so as to pass to the heirs. ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa Hernandez be-come the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did not alter her will. HELD: Yes. The con-struction by the respondent would repeal or annul the section absolutely. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy, then Sec. 758 would have no value and might as well have never been written which is an ab-surd interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11

219 Velunta v. Chief, Philippine ConstabularyCase No. 309 G.R. No. L-71855 (January 20, 1988) Chapter X, Page 412, Footnote No. 102

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPacis v. AveriaCase No. 194 G.R. No. L-22526 (November 29, 1966) Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105

FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP) apprehended a motor-cycle driver for violation of traffic rules. An altercation occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. Anacorita, the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there exists a prima facie evidence that petitioner, “with deliberate intent and with intent to kill,” shot Lozano during the performance of duty. Petitioner contends that General Court Martial has no jurisdiction since P.D. 1850 was repealed by E.O. 1040 & 1012. ISSUE: W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. HELD: Yes. It is specifically stated under E.O. 1012 that it is only the “operational supervision and direction” over all units of the INP that was transferred from the Constabulary to the city/municipal government. Under E.O. 1040, it is the exercise of “administrative control and supervision” over units of the INP that was transferred to the President. The allegation that P.D. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clear and precise provision of E.O. 1040 is inaccurate. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the in-tent of the legislators in manifested. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 20c, 27, 37

FACTS: Petitioner, the Acting Collector of Customs, commenced a seizure and forfeiture proceedings pur-suant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed cigarettes. On the same day, Marges, the alleged boat owner, filed a Civil Case for replevin alleging that the boat was stolen. The fishing boat therein was transferred to the Provincial Sheriff, and later on to Marges as commanded by respondent Hon. Averia. ISSUE: 3. 4. HELD: 1. No. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RA 1937 which took effect much later than the Ju-diciary Act. It is axiomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute. 2. Yes. The writ was received by respondent Sheriff. It has also caught the Supreme Court’s notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudgels for the boat owner. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of the boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is more than just the interest of a public official. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 20c, 49 W/N Marges could recover the fishing boat. W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ.

220 Herman v. Radio Corporation of the PhilippinesCase No. 123 G.R. No. 26802 (July 15, 1927) Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No. 107

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhilippine National Bank v. Cruz, et al.Case No. 239 G.R. No. 80593 (December 18, 1989) Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No. 108

FACTS: Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio business (Far Eastern Ra-dio Inc. and Radio Corp.) agreed to merge. The petitioner herein has been largely interested in the respon-dent corporation, and in consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent, it was agreed in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager of the traffic department. IS-SUE: W/N Herman’s claim for salary has been expressly waived in the final agreement. HELD: Yes. In Sec. 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures, it mentions that whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally or deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is true and to act upon such belief, he cannot be permitted to falsify it. Sec. 1815 of the Civil Code also does not apply since the trans-action was more than a compromise. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevail because it is a later ex-pression of legislative will than Art. 1815 of the Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 49

FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was unable to pay its re-maining employees. Two years after, AMEX entered into an operation contract agreement with T.M. San Andres Development Corporation, thus enabling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX. The unpaid workers filed for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter. The said Arbiter awarded back-wages and separation pay. AMEX did not appeal but PNB, as mortgage-creditor, appealed and alleged that the workers should be given their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. The NLRC denied the appeal of PNB. Hence, this instant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon the properties of the employer. ISSUE: W/N Art. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not favoring the unpaid workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. HELD: No. Art. 110 of the Labor Code pro-vides for “worker preference in case of bankruptcy”. It specifically states that “In the event of bankruptcy… of an employer’s business, his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as regards to their unpaid wages, any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding… such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL before claims of the government and other creditors may be paid.” LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 49

221 David v. Commission on ElectionsCase No. 85 G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997) Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of AppealsCase No. 73 G.R. No. 95022 (March 23, 1992) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELEC’s basis is R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. ISSUE: 1. What the term of office of barangay officials is. 2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. HELD: 1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997”. 2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, ‘The term of office of elec-tive local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials. LATIN MAXIM:1, 9a, 20a, 49

FACTS: This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL Retirement Plan repre-senting the withholding tax on income. RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan, including all the re-tirement benefits given to officials and employees of private firms, from income tax. Soon after, P.D. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax of interest on bank deposits previously given by P.D. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is exempt from income taxation. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income tax under RA 4917. Petitioner contends that P.D. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917 and RA 1983, and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax. ISSUE: W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of P.D. 1959. HELD: Yes. The dele-tion in P.D. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under the old law can’t be deemed to be appli-cable to the employees’ trusts. P.D. 1959 is a general law, hence, it can’t repeal a specific provision im-pliedly. It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is general in character can’t be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such ef-fect. Also in Villegas v. Subido, such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are suffi-ciently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 43, 50

222 People v. Leachon, Jr.Case No. 108 G.R. No. 108725-26 (September 25, 1998)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhilippine Airlines Inc. v. National Labor Relations CommissionCase No. 118 G.R. No. 114307 (July 8, 1998)

FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate information for violation of P.D. 772, also known as Anti-Squatting Law before the RTC presided over by respondent judge. After present-ing the evidence, the prosecution rested the cases. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested, respon-dent judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. There-after, the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the subject case. A month after, the respondent judge dis-missed the case again, opining that P.D. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. 9 and 10 of Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that, “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.” ISSUE: W/N re-sponded judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject criminal case. HELD: Yes. The Anti-Squatting law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this court, a law will always be presumed valid. At the time the order was issued by respondent judge, P.D. 772 was still effective. Neither has this court declared its unconstitu-tionality, notwithstanding the social justice provision of the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50

FACTS: Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner PAL. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to board a flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265, as amended by CB Circular 383, in relation to Sec. 34 of RA 265, as amended. PAL placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. Three years and six months after his suspension, PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged but nonethe-less reinstated the latter. The said resolution likewise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action taken by PAL. Upon his reinstatement, respondent filed a claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period of his suspension. ISSUE: W/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA during his period of suspension. HELD: Yes. The rules clearly provide that a pre-ventive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days, after which period, the employee must be reinstated to his former position. If the suspension is otherwise extended, the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 13b

223 Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc.Case No. 127 G.R. No. 45355 (January 12, 1990)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONDe Joya v. LantinCase No. 31 G.R. No. L-24037 (April 27, 1967)

FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247, 3570, and 6020 to install, oper-ate and maintain an electric light, heat and power system in Cagayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan, Opol, Villanueva, and Jasaan. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly ex-empts it from payment of “all taxes of whatever authority” except 3% tax on its gross earnings. The Provin-cial treasurer of Misamis Oriental, however, demanded payment of the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231) and pursuant thereto, the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 19. ISSUE: W/N CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax. HELD: No. No provision in P.D. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247, 3570 and 6020. A special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the terms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the special law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. Also, the Secretary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exempting clause. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 50

FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Customs took custody of the shipment. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdic-tion – on the basis of the Judiciary Act – and not the Bureau of Customs. RA 1937 and 1125, on the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the shipment. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are spe-cial laws, whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over general ones. LATIN MAXIM: 50

224 Arayata v. JoyaCase No. 9 G.R. No. L-28067 (March 10, 1928)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONSitchon, et al. v. AquinoCase No. 147 G.R. No. L-8500 (February 27, 1956)

FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the Government for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. Joya as adminis-trator. Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16, the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120’s full con-veyance of the property to the widow. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisi-tion, disposition, and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil Code. The Civil Code is a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The special law must prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 50

FACTS: Respondent Aquino, the City Engineer of Manila, demolished the houses of the six petitioners in this class suit, because their houses were “public nuisances” built on public streets and river beds. Petition-ers contend that under the Civil Code, Art. 701 and 702, it is the district health officer who should remove public nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that RA 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, grants the power to remove public nuisances to the City Engineer. ISSUE: Whose job it is to deter-mine and demolish public nuisances, the health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409. HELD: The City Engineer, under RA 409, has jurisdiction. The Civil Code is a general law applicable throughout the Philippines, whereas RA 409 is a special law that pertains solely to the City of Manila. When a general and a special law are in conflict, the latter prevails. LATIN MAXIM: 50

225 Bellis v. BellisCase No. 14 G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPhilippine Trust Co. v. MacuanCase No. 123 G.R. No. 32280 (March 24, 1930)

FACTS: Amos Bellis, a citizen of Texas USA, died. He had 7 legitimate and 3 illegimate children, all sur-named Bellis. After the execution of the decedent’s will, which was executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Relying on Art. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides that the national law of the decedent should apply (Texas Law), which did not provide for legitimes, the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. ISSUE: Whether Texas Law or the Philip-pine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary succession. HELD: Texas Law should apply. Art. 16, par 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testa-mentary successions. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. 16, par. 2 a specific pro-vision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this intent, Art. 1039 provides that the capacity to succeed is governed by the national of the decedent. It is thus evi-dent that Congress has not intended to extend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign nation-als. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c

FACTS: Defendant Macuan married F. Tormo, who became mentally incapacitated. Defendant filed a peti-tion to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the person and estate of his wife, the latter con-sisting in undivided half in a certain land with improvements, which is claimed to be conjugal property. Sub-sequently, M. Tormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted by the Court, praying that the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property belonging to his ward. A special guardian, Philippine Trust Co., was appointed for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved. ISSUE: 1. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is entitled to in-clude in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal. 2. W/N the defendant may be compelled to in-clude in the inventory of his mentally incapacitated wife’s property, her undivided half of the conjugal prop-erty. HELD: 1. No. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership, which still subsists, in the inventory of her property. 2. The defendant, being the guardian, cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same, said half of the conjugal property. The Court relied on 1) the Code of Civil Proce-dure, which is general in character; and 2) the Civil Code, which is more specific, referring to the manage-ment of the property of a demented ward who is married. Thus, Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM: 50

226 Tan Liao v. American President Lines, Ltd.Case No. 153 G.R. No. L-7280 (January 20, 1956)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax AppealCase No. 75 G.R. No. 44007 (March 20, 1991) Chapter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 115

FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of P92,755.00, with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff due to the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transportation of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of New York, USA to the port of Manila. The suit was brought more than a year from the receipt of the goods, and thereby, claimed by the defendant to have already prescribed in accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. ISSUE: W/N the action for damages had already prescribed, and thus, barred the appellant to receive compensation for damages. HELD: Yes, it has already prescribed. The Car-riage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or damage suit must be brought within one year after the de-livery of the goods. Relying on the ruling in previous cases, the Court held that the prescriptive period of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro tanto the provisions of Act No. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade, the former being a special act while the latter is a law of general ap-plication. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 50

FACTS: Private respondent, a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a legislative franchise, pur-suant to RA 808, which included a tax exemption from the payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax on its real property. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperative for failure to comply with Sec. 8, Art. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioner’s assessment without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax Code. IS-SUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal effect, for failure of the respondent corporation to com-ply with the 1935 Constitution, the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act. HELD: No. The legislative franchise was valid. As a charter is in the nature of a private contract, the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government and the corporation. RA 808 as a special statute must be deemed an exemption to the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and circumstances. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50

227 NPVC v. Presiding Judge RTC Br. XXVCase No. 87 G.R. No. 72477 (October 16, 1990)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONLopez, Jr. v. Civil Service CommissionCase No. 150 G.R. No. 87119 (April 16, 1991) Chapter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 116

FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. Petitioner contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the case pursuant to P.D. 242 which provides that disputes between agencies of the government including GOCC’s shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice. On the other hand respondent invokes P.D. 464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real prop-erty for purposes of taxation by provinces, cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil ac-tion. HELD: Yes. P.D. 242 must yield to P.D. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. granted that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes whereas P.D. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes, claims and controversies between or among government agencies and instrumentalities. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances calling for a contrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50

FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the appointment of 19 offi-cers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. How-ever, the City Budget of Manila questioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out of city funds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. The City Legal Officer then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. IS-SUE: W/N the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to ap-point all officials entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to appoint all offi-cers and employees of the city. HELD: No. Regardless of their date of passage, a special law (RA 409) pro-viding specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila prevails over a general law. RA 5185 and BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power. Also, since repeals by implication are not favored, conflict between the statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals the other. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b, 50

228 Manzano v. Valera Garcia v. Pascual, et al.Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-16950 (December 22, 1961) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 118

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Case No. 80 G.R. No. 122068 (July 8, 1998)

FACTS: A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner, who initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. However, the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan, Municipal Trial, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed 6 years. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondent’s acceptance of the case for the MTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for libel. HELD: No. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which categorically provides that juris-diction over libel cases are lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by expanding the ju-risdiction of first level courts, the said law is of general character and does not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC, which is a law of special nature. Granted that there seems to be no manifest intent to re-peal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases from the provisions of R.A. 7691it must be maintained that a spe-cial law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38, 50 HELD: The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 75 of the Judi-ciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. Also, there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court, the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the said mayor. Lastly, the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the clerks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, 32, 36d, 50, b2 ISSUE: W/N Sec. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551. FACTS: Petitioner, a junior typist civil service eligi-ble, was appointed by the Justice of Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. When vouchers were submitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them. His reason was RA 1551 has re-pealed Sec. 75 of RA 926, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. Sec. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective justices. RA 1551 however, which is claimed to have repealed Sec. 75 of RA 296 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall be appointed by the mayor.

229 Lagman v. City of Manila, et al.Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-23305 (June 30, 1966) Chapter X, Page 420, Footnote No. 126

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONBagatsing v. RamirezCase No. 28 G.R. No. L-41631 (December 17, 1976) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83

FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 4986, enti-tled “An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and For Other Pur-poses.” ISSUE: W/N the enactment and enforcement unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. HELD: No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. No. 548 and the Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts. Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over mo-tor traffic. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11a, 49, 50 of Ordinance No. 4986 is

FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, “An Ordinance Regulating the Opera-tion of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes.” Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 pre-scribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code. HELD: The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presump-tion that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of “ordinance” in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. In regard therefore, the Local Tax Code controls. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 11a, 17, 40b, 49, 50

230

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Latin MaximsChapter II – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION B. POWER TO CONSTRUE 1. Legis interpreta-tion legis vim obtinet. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law. Chapter III – AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION 2. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. Contemporary construction is strongest in law. Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. Custom is the best interpreter of a statute. Regula pro lege, si deficit lex. In default of the law, the maxim rules. 3. Optimus interpres rerum usus. The best interpreter of the law is usage. Communis error facit jus. Common error sometimes passes as current law. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit. That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid. 4. Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate. 5. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Fol-low past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. The in-terest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. Chapter IV – ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPAR-TURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION 6. Index animi sermo est. Speech is the index of intention. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. Littera scripta manet. The written word endures. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. Things thus standing. 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but it is the law. Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written. B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION 8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Equity never acts in contravention of the law. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. What is good and equal is the law of laws. Jus ars boni et aequi. Law is the art of equity. 9. Ratio legis est anima legis. The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. The letter kills but the spirit gives life. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Be-nignus leges interpretandae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur. Laws are to be construed liberally, so that their spirit and reason be preserved. Qui haret in littera haret in cortice. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning. Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statum generaliter est intelligendum. When the words used in a statute are special, but the pur-pose of the law is general, it should be read as the general expression. 10. Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. 11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. Legis construction non facit injuriam. The con-struction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde. It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly. Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus. Like reason doth make like law. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law. De similibus idem est judicium. Concerning similars, the judgment is the same.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONUbi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition. Where there is the same reason, there is the same law 12. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. Lex injusta non est lex. An unjust law is not a law. 13. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum . Let right be done, though the heavens fall. Nemo est supra legis. Nobody is above the law. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. No power must be above the law. 14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detri-mento et injuria fieri locupletiorem. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another man’s work. 15. Surplusagium non nocet. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. ) 16. Falsa demostratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat. False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat. Error in name does not make an in-strument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain. 17. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur, inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque. Where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right.

232 18. Summum jus, summa injuria. The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice. Jus summum saepe, summa est militia. Extreme law is often extreme wrong. 19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. There is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require an impossibility. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. The law does not intend the impossible. C. IMPLICATIONS 20. Ex necessitate legis. By the necessary implication of law. In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus. The greater includes the lesser. Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdiction explicari non potuit. When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essential to its exercise are also given. 21. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof. Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum. Where the law is uncertain, there is no right. 22. Ex dolo malo non oritur action. An action does not arise from fraud. Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis. Where the parties are equally at fault, the position of the defending party is the better one.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION23. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Chapter V – INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. IN GENERAL 24. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. General words should be understood in their general sense. Generis dictum generaliter est interpretandum. A general statement is understood in its general sense. 25. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. A word is to be understood in the con-text in which it is used. Verba mere aequivoca, si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus est. Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be under-stood according to their common and ordinary sense. Verba artis ex arte. Words of art should be explained from their usage in the art to which they belong. Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel per-sonam. General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. 26. Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. 27. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. B. AS-SOCIATED WORDS 28. Noscitur a sociis. A thing is known by its associates. 29. Ejesdem generis. Of the same kind or specie.

233 30. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. 31. Argumentum a contrario. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. 32. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 33. Ad proximum antecedens fiat re-latio nisi impediatur sentential. A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. 34. Reddendo singular singulis. Referring each to each, or referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place. C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. A thing not being expected must be re-garded as coming within the purview of the general rule. Chapter VI – STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. Ex tota ma-teria emergat resolution. The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONInjustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel respondere. It is un-just to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of one part only by it-self. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda. Reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful. 37. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. B. STATUTE CON-STRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Pari materia. Of the same mat-ter. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law. 39. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. - Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in il-lis. - Times have changed and laws have changed with them. Mutatis mutandis. With the necessary changes.

234 Chapter VII – STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. IN GENERAL 40. Salus populi est suprema lex. The voice of the people is the supreme law. Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be construed liberally. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public. B. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 41. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. 42. Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis. Privi-leges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. Renunciatio non praesumi-tur. Renunciation cannot be presumed. 43. Strictissimi juris. Follow the law strictly. 44. Nullum tempus oc-curit regi. There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right de-pends.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONChapter VIII – MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES A. MANDATORY STATUTES 45. Vigilan-tibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure. He who is first in time is preferred in right. Chapter IX – PROSPEC-TIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES A. IN GENERAL 46. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks for-ward, not backward. Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito. The law provides for the future, the judge for the past. - Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis. - A new statute should affect the fu-ture, not the past. Leges quae retrospciunt, et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus lo-catur in legibus. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janus has really no place in the laws. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. Laws should be construed as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending. B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT 47. Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law. 48. Fa-vorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.

235 Chapter X – AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A. REPEAL 49. Leges posteri-ores priores contrarias abrogant. Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto. 50. Gener-alia specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONTITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum. The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the statute printed in red).

BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMBIGUOUS B. In ob-scuris inspici solere quod versimilius est, aut quod plerumque fieri solet. When matters are obscure, it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what usually often happens. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence. PRE-SUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur. Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently occur. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently, and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. Legislators pass over what happens only once or twice. De minimis non curat lex. The law does not concern itself with trifling matters.Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May 1980]Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur

Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrar’s Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.

She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioner’s prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name but not the surname.

The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon; without costs.

1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusivelyThe word “principally” as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to “exclusively” so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father.

2. Grounds for change of nameThe following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the

grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of name should be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood.

Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985]Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur

Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days.

Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is disqualified for probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200). The court denied the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.

The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due course to the petitioner’s application for probation; without costs.

1. “Previous” applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission of a crimeThe statute relates “previous” to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime. When the accused applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application. Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the crime.

Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., G.R. No. L-27489, April 30,1970Objects and Methods of Construction: Mens Legislatoris/Mischief Rule

It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.

Facts: Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. Although some sort of quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to commute (the Company furnishes their transportation), and the deceased in particular went home about three times a week.

At the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow, Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta, was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past three months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized in the hospital where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta. The Workmen's Compensation Commission awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney's fees.

Issue:

Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Held:

Yes. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents.

Ratio:

It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. Our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the mother's womb.

Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.

Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be

entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail.

To quote from the Lingad case anew: “For it is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its conformity with what the fundamental law requires need arise.”

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. CIR, G.R. No. 147749, June 22, 2006Interpretation and Construction in Relation to the Language of the Statute: Expresio Unius Exclusio Alterius Rule

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Facts: SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount of P8,182,182.852 representing deficiency miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller’s tax was imposed on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products.

SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA cancelled SPMC’s liability for deficiency manufacturer’s tax on the sales of corn and edible oils but upheld the Commissioner’s assessment for the deficiency miller’s tax.

SPMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition on the principal ground that the verification attached to it was signed merely by SPMC’s chief financial officer ― without the corporate secretary’s certificate, board resolution or power of attorney authorizing him to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.

SPMC contends that its appeal should have been given due course since it substantially complied with the requirements on verification and certification against forum shopping. It insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.

Issue: 

Whether or not SPMC is liable for the deficiency miller’s tax.

Held: 

Yes. The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself.

Ratio:

The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller’s tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.

Sec. 168. Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories. Proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central and mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories, shall pay a tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of the gross value in money of all the rope, sugar, coconut oil, palm oil, cassava flour or starch, dessicated coconut, manufactured, processed or milled by them, including the by-product of the raw materials from which said articles are produced, processed or manufactured, such tax to be based on the actual selling price or market value of these articles at the time they leave the factory or mill warehouse: Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and dessicated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products: Provided further, That where the planter or the owner of the raw materials is the exporter of the aforementioned milled or manufactured products, he shall be entitled to a tax credit of the miller's taxes withheld by the proprietor or operator of the factory or mill, corresponding to the quantity exported, which may be used against any internal revenue tax directly due from him: and Provided, finally, That credit for any sales, miller's or excise taxes paid on raw materials or supplies used in the milling process shall not be allowed against the miller's tax due, except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory as provided hereunder. (emphasis supplied)

SPMC’s proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of the exemption clause. The rule is that the exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that the State has granted in express terms all it intended to grant and that, unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor would be intended beyond what was meant.

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a

statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in   strictissimi juris   against the taxpayer . To allow SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.

ISSUE PERTAINING TO RULES OF COURT:

Issue: 

Wheteher or not the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed SPMC’s appeal.

Held: 

No. Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals should be verified. A pleading required to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 43 requires a sworn certification against forum shopping.   Failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

A corporation may exercise the powers expressly conferred upon it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence through its board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Hence, physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board of directors. In the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the officers of the corporation, can bind the corporation.

SPMC’s petition in the Court of Appeals did not indicate that the person who signed the verification/certification on non-forum shopping was authorized to do so. SPMC merely relied on the alleged inherent power of its chief financial officer to represent SPMC in all matters regarding the finances of the corporation including, among others, the filing of suits to defend or protect it from assessments and to recover erroneously paid taxes. SPMC even admitted that no power of attorney, secretary’s certificate or board resolution to prove the affiant’s authority was attached to the petition. Thus, the petition was not properly verified. Since the petition lacked proper verification, it was to be treated as an unsigned pleading subject to dismissal.