States and Markets Revisited: Nature Tourism and the Local Political Economy in Kenya and South Africa

Introduction

My dissertation will examine how engagement in different national and transnational

markets affects contemporary rural politics and the nature of the interaction between actors in

rural localities and actors from the central state. I seek to understand how translocal

economic structures and dynamics, which connect African rural localities to a myriad of

extra-local consumers, producers, political actors, and organizations, affect politics at the

local and national level. My dissertation will address these effects by examining the political

economies of rural localities in which nature-based tourism is economically important. My

central research question is: how does the character of the dominant sector affect the local

political economy? By the character of the dominant sector, I mean traits such as the physical

nature of commodity, the production process, and the market structure. These traits affect the

distribution of resources and relationships in localities and between local actors and markets

and those in national centers abroad. Control over crucial sectoral resources provides actors

with political influence as well as economic influence. This study will be conducted in two

African states, Kenya and South Africa.

Statement of the Problem

Most research on African politics focuses on dynamics at the national level. This is

not an unreasonable focus because African states generally are highly centralized. Formal

authority is often concentrated in central government offices and agencies; the head of state

may exert greater decisionmaking power than formal rules indicate (Bratton and Van de

Walle 1997; Schatzberg 2001). Yet while productive, this focus on national politics cannot

help us understand important aspects of contemporary politics in sub-Saharan Africa. Most

Africans do not live in the capital cities; many, if not most, live in rural areas. Rural people

are affected by changes in national government, and may play a role in producing régime

changes, but much of their political and economic life is not captured in national level

analyses. For many, the political and economic dynamics of the local areas in which they

live have the strongest and most immediate impacts. The significance of rural economic and

political dynamics (which I refer to as rural political economies) extends beyond their impact

on rural inhabitants. Rural political economies are also consequential for our theories. Most

depictions of African politics are built around a particular understanding of the relationship

between rural localities, urban localities, and the state. If this understanding of the nature of

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how rural localities operate or connect to the state and urban localities proves wrong or

requires modification, the basis on which these theories are built begins to unravel.

Influential depictions of rural politics provide an explanation for the persistence of

extremely centralized politics in largely rural societies, helping to explain how African states

could extract resources from rural areas and channel them to urban residents and a relatively

small group of elites. Patron-client theories are most prevalent in the literature.1 After the

first years of independence failed to produce “modernization,” many scholars turned to

Weber’s conceptual typology of authority to explain African politics; his concepts of

patrimonialism and rational legal authority were most influential (Weber 1968). Using

such as “personal rule,” “sultanism,” “prebendalism,” and “neopatrimonialism,” scholar

have characterized African states as hybrid systems in which rational-legal bureaucratic

structures and patrimonial authority co-exist (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Jackson and

Rosberg 1982; Joseph 1987; Sandbrook 1985). According to neopatrimonial theories,

political allegiance to officials is based on clients’ loyalty to and dependence on their patron

rather than agreement with patrons’ policy stances. Rural residents are tied to the state

through patrons that provide favors but little accountability. The “politics of the belly” and

“rhizome state” described by Bayart (1993) bear strong resemblance to neopatrimonialism.

Although variants of neopatrimonialism recur throughout the literature, and play a centr

role in explanations of economic crisis and incomplete liberalization (See, for example

Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993; van de Walle 2001, 2003; Widner 1994), some scholars

taken a different approach to analyzing national and rural politics in Africa. Migdal (1988)

argues that weak states connect to societies through a web of strongmen. Mamdani (1996)

uses the term “decentralized despots” to describe the rural “customary” authorities that

connect these localities to the central state. rational choice approaches have emphasize

barriers to collective action, transaction costs, and leaders’ incentives (Bates 1981, 1983

1989). Neopatrimonial and rational choice theories emphasize the distribution of divisible

benefits in producing rural quiescence; Migdal and Mamdani emphasize the role of coercion.

Marxist, dependency, and world systems approaches have tended to refrain from detailed

analysis of agrarian economies, focusing instead on the terms through which African

and economies are integrated into world systems, the conditions required for

industrialization, and the nature of class alliances (Amin 1972; Leys 1975). Hyden’s (Hyd

and Williams 1994; 1980) “economy of affection” asserts that peasants are independent of

terms

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1 The patron-client framework has been used to analyze politics and society in many places outside sub-Saharan Africa (See, for example, Scott 1972).

2

the state. In each of these arguments, either the lack of ties between rural people and the

or the structure of those ties inhibits rural political mobilization and accountabi

state

lity.

Recent scholarship challenges this depiction of African politics in three ways. One,

this work demonstrates that many rural people do not act in the manner that dominant

theories of African politics would predict. Case studies and comparative work show that

rural people often act strategically to advance their interests; patronage and despotism do not

always prevent organized action. For example, Berry’s (1993) research on Ghana, Kenya,

Nigeria, and Zambia describes rural polities filled with contention between local and extra

local actors. Individuals in rural areas behave as strategic actors selecting the most promising

venues, such as customary or Western courts, through which to engage the state and other

actors on a given issue. Second, this work indicates that many, if not most, rural localities are

deeply embedded in national and transnational markets for labor, capital, and commodities.

While many rural people are not fully dependent on capitalist markets, markets clearly

influence rural living conditions and behavior. Berry (1989) argues that Africa and producers

responded to economic crisis by increasing their investment in the social relations that could

provide a safety net. Third, this work documents rural engagements with the central state that

clearly affect state governing strategies. Contrary to what many theories of African politics

would predict, rural inhabitants often pursue strategies that bring them into direct contact

with central state actors and organizations. Moore’s (1994; 1998; 1999) work on Zimbabwe

also depicts rural actors strategically engaging with the state and with each other. Based on

work in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal, Boone (2003) argues that state leaders’ governing

strategies differed according to the nature of the rural political economy and strategic

interactions between regional and central state elites. Rural actions have shaped and will

continue to shape the working of states and economies in Africa.

Changes in the broader political economic landscape also have brought common

assertions about African rural politics into question. Since the 1970s, the international trade

and financial infrastructure has changed substantially, and most sub-Saharan African

countries have undergone partial political and economic liberalization (Oyejide, Elbadawi,

and Collier 1997; van de Walle 2001; World Bank. 1994). At the global level, technological

and regulatory changes have reduced barriers to rapid capital movement. Powerful actors

have placed substantial pressure on African states to open their markets and reduce subsidies

to domestic producers (Wade 2003). In most countries, there have been changes in national

economic policy following a long period of economic stagnation, rising international debt,

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and increased emphasis on policy conditionality from foreign donors and lenders.2 Most sub-

Saharan African states have adopted and partially implemented structural adjustment and

liberalization policies. Reforms have included elimination of barriers between domestic and

global markets, reductions in social spending, and privatization of some parastatals.

The changes in the global and national economic context may render earlier or

existing portraits of rural politics less valid. Evidence suggests that economic reform has

reduced the flow of resources, both in the form of public and divisible goods, to rural areas.

Analysis indicates that state leaders have implemented liberalization and privatization

policies so as to protect or benefit important allies, but there is little evidence of serious

efforts to preserve benefits to rural people (Lewis and Stein 1997; Reno 1993; van de Walle

2001). These reforms have altered market structures and producer incentives. Liberalization

has resulted in a retreat from monopsonic commodity marketing boards, tariff controls, and

direct subsidies of production. These organizations and mechanisms provided substantial

opportunities for patronage and selective allocation of divisible benefits, and thus supported

patron-client politics.

At the same time that economic reforms have begun to challenge pre-existing modes

of rural incorporation into national-level politics, political liberalization has altered formal

political arrangements at multiple levels of government. While only nine of forty eight

African states had competitive, multiparty elections between 1985 and 1989, forty one states

held competitive elections between 1989 and 2000 (van de Walle 2003).3 In some cases, a

shift to competitive elections involved substantial changes in the formal rules governing the

selection of leaders; in other cases, electoral practices were changed so that opposition

candidates and parties had more opportunity to compete. These elections have produced

several changes in government and multiparty representation in most legislatures; thirty five

countries have had second elections. While the evidence indicates that democratization has

not yet produced radical shifts in political authority, there is evidence of increased conflict

over political offices (Gibson 2002; van de Walle 2003). When there is competition for

offices, the likelihood that elected officials will seek to address the interests of their

constituents increases. This is true in patrimonial systems as well as pluralist systems

because when patrons must compete for clients, the clients are offered more favors for their

loyalty. 2 Some scholars see South Africa’s path as somewhat divergent; state leaders arguably had greater choice about whether to adopt adjustment and liberalization policies (Fairfield 2002; Habib and Padayachee 2000). 3 The following states did not hold competitive multiparty elections: Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zaire/DRC.

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In many places, political liberalization has been accompanied by decentralization

(Crook and Manor 1998; Reddy 1999; Ribot 1999). As discussed, most African governments

are highly centralized. Decentralization is the transfer of authority from central government

to actors with a closer spatial-territorial relationship to the resource of concern.4 Power may

be shifted to local offices of central government or to appointed or elected local officials.

Although actual transfer of power appears to be more limited than formal decentralization

measures suggest, the formal transfer of authority to local elected officials increases the

opportunity for local people to influence decision-making (Barkan et al. 1998; Ribot 1999).

In Touba Mosquée, Senegal, local merchants engaged in organized protest against taxes

introduced by the rural Council. Because this area had been historically dominated by the

Marabout and the ruling party, it is one where patron-client model should have applied. Beck

(2001) interprets this revolt as a sign that people are seeking greater accountability from

political leaders. In some circumstances, she argues, decentralization may serve as a catalyst

for democratization.

Taken jointly, globalization, economic liberalization, and political liberalization could

undermine the patronage-based and coercive means by which rural localities have historically

been linked to the central state. When Africanist scholars have sought to theorize the

implications of these changes for African politics, their research has focused primarily on

explaining widespread undesired outcomes at the national level: lack of economic growth,

weakness of state institutions, and failure to fully democratize the state (Bayart et al. 1999;

Chabal and Daloz 1999; van de Walle 2001). Scholars have been much less attentive to how

economic and political change has altered local political arrangements and could rework the

relationship between rural localities and national governments in those countries where the

formal state has maintained substantial authority.5

Kenya and South Africa

I plan to conduct my research on the political effects of sectoral market engagements

in Kenya and South Africa. Examining localities in Kenya and South Africa will allow me to

move beyond the limitations of a single country study while restricting variation on many

potential confounding factors. These countries are regional economic powerhouses, but they

are broadly similar to other African countries in their political and economic trajectory. Both

4 My definition of decentralization draws from Agrawal and Ribot (1999), Crook and Manor (1998), and Ribot (1999). 5 Hart’s (2002)examination of globalization, industrialization and local politics in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa is one of few recent works to address this question.

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countries experienced a long period of authoritarian rule followed by a recent opening.

While Kenya and South Africa have had regular elections since independence, each was

dominated by a single party (the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the National Party

in South Africa). South Africa’s franchise was limited to the white minority population for

most of its history; the first inclusive democratic elections took place in 1993. South Africa’s

political transformation encompassed régime change, a change in government, and changes

in local governance structures. The African National Congress (ANC) has won each election

since 1993 and now has sufficient votes to alter the Constitution without support from other

political parties. In Kenya, KANU held power between 1963 and 2001 under two leaders,

Jommo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi. KANU was the only party permitted to stand for

election between 1982 and 1992. In the 2001 elections, the opposition coalition National

Alliance Party defeated KANU and produced the first change in government since

independence. The new head of state, Emilio Mwai Kibaki, was not an outsider; he served in

Moi’s government during the 1980s. Neither South Africa nor Kenya can yet be regarded as

consolidated democratic régimes.

Like most developing countries, South Africa and Kenya adopted and implemented

statist economic policies including import substitution industrialization, agricultural

marketing boards, and creation of many parastatal organizations. Under National Party rule,

the South African state implemented a number of measures to promote industrialization and

raise the status of Afrikaners (O'Meara 1996; Posel 1999). In Kenya, state leaders

implemented economic policies favoring the interests of their co-ethnies and other allies.

Generally, Kenyatta favored the Kikuyu, and Moi favored the Kalenjin (Lofchie 1987).

Efforts to industrialize met with more success in these countries than most; manufacturing

accounts for thirteen percent of Kenya’s GDP, and eighteen percent of South Africa’s GDP.6

Both countries experienced a period of rapid growth followed by stagnation. Kenya and

South Africa subsequently shifted from import substitution to export promotion and made

formal commitments to structural adjustment and economic liberalization measures such as

reduced government spending, privatization, and a retreat from direct state involvement in the

market. Kenya has formally adopted neoliberal economic policies several times but

implementation has been limited. Kibaki has pledged to implement economic reforms and

diminish corruption. South Africa adopted the neoliberal Growth, Employment, and

6 While Kenya’s manufacturing sector has not grown since independence, Kenya has the most developed manufacturing sector in East Africa (Economic intelligence unit 2003). South Africa also has a large mining industry.

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Redistribution (GEAR) economic policy in 1996; the state has implemented many of the

proposed liberalization and privatization measures.

Kenya and South Africa are broadly similar in several factors that could potentially

affect political outcomes: both were colonized by the British, had substantial settler

populations, and have indigenous populations which experienced substantial land

expropriation. Land was set aside for European commercial farming and the establishment of

protected areas. After independence in Kenya, many European land holdings were transferred

to members of the Kikuyu, Luhya, and Kalenjin ethnic groups. The South African

government has floated the idea of creating a black medium and large farmer class through

land policies but has not yet implemented its proposals. Both countries have had substantial

rural populations with marginal land holdings for several decades. Issues of access to and

control over land thus have particular political salience in Kenya and South Africa. These

factors distinguish Kenya and South Africa from other African countries in which European

settlement was more limited, land expropriation has been more limited, and rural land

scarcity appears to be a more recent problem.7 My work should complement research on

West Africa; that literature should also help me to assess how far my findings can be

generalized.

Sectoral Analysis & Contemporary Local Politics.

In examining rural political economies, I adopt a sectoral approach. This perspective

offers a means to disaggregate the rural, to recognize the variety of rural political economies,

and to systematically explore differences between places dominated by different sectors, and

explore connections between the local and the extralocal. While most research on African

rural politics has focused on agricultural production, rural economies are highly varied.

Agriculture is not the only important sector in rural areas or at the national level.8 Tourism,

mining, and, less frequently, manufacturing are dominant sectors in some rural localities.

There is also substantial variation within agriculture: swidden agriculture, pastoral livestock

production, domestic food crop production and export production have different attributes.

7 Namibia and Zimbabwe have a similar history of large-scale land expropriation. Berry (2002) argues that competition over land is endemic in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. 8 In sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture comprises seventeen percent of gross domestic product (GDP), industry accounts for thirty one percent, and services, including tourism, account for fifty three percent (World Resources Institute 2004). In Kenya, agriculture comprises about twenty percent of GDP. In South Africa, agriculture comprises about three percent of GDP. According to Clancy (1998), “tourism constitutes the largest service industry in the world, and also accounts for the single largest item in international trade of services.”

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Despite the significant variation in dominant sectors and their attributes across the

region, theories of African politics seem to have down-played, even at times ignored, the

likely resultant variations in local political economies. Agriculture, manufacturing, and

resource extraction differ along several dimensions such as the nature of the commodity and

the production or extraction process. These differences imply divergent market structures,

economic fortunes, and political structures. My research will systematically explore the

political economy of areas in which nature tourism is dominant, contrasting this sector and its

political effects to the literature’s portrayal of agriculture.

National-level research demonstrates that the dominant sector attributes influence

political dynamics. For example, Bates’ (1983a; 1989) research showed that the structure of

small-scale agriculture posed a barrier to effective political organization by producers; in

contrast, the structure of manufacturing facilitated organization by owners and workers.

Shafer (1994) asserts that sectoral traits shape state capacities and the organization of

interests; his empirical work examines copper mining, light manufacturing, industrial

plantation crops, and peasant cash crops.9 A growing empirical literature on the “resource

curse” focuses on the relationship between dominant sector attributes and politics. Scholars

have argued that that oil extraction may weaken state capacity and diminish prospects for

stable democracy (Karl 1997; Ross 2001; Ross 1999). These effects are thought to stem from

the relative scarcity of oil and the geographic concentration of deposits, the enclave nature of

oil extraction, the flow of oil rents to the central state, and the global organization of oil

distribution consumption. Oil dependency reduces the incentives for taxation and productive

investment, its effects on currency can hinder other export sectors, and the rents can fund

state repression. Although previous research has highlighted the national political

consequences of dominant sector characteristics, the analysis often draws from local sectoral

attributes such as the spatial concentration or distribution of production.10 These attributes

should affect the local political economy as well as the national political economy.

The nature tourism sector provides a good basis for investigating the local political

effects of dominant sectors. Tourism possesses substantial economic importance in many

lower income countries throughout the world. The tourism sector directly accounts for 3.7

9 My conceptualization of sectors and their effects is less deterministic than that presented by Shafer, who contends “sectors have an optimal, or at least typical, economic organization.” 10 Recent research on civil conflict suggests that there is a strong spatial dimension to conflict. Those states which possess economic enclaves, often based on natural resource extraction, or isolated rural areas in which insurgents can hide seemed to be more vulnerable to conflict (Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier 2000; Herbst 2000; Leonard and Straus 2003).

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percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and comprises the main source of foreign

currency for at least thirty eight percent of all countries (Roe and Urquhart 2001; World

Travel and Tourism Council 2003). The importance of tourism varies substantially across

areas. Tourism is most viable in countries which are perceived to be relatively stable and to

possess outstanding natural or cultural assets. In 1997, ten countries in continental sub-

Saharan Africa garnered more than US$100 million in tourism receipts (World Tourism

Organization. 2002).11

Tourism has become increasingly important to sub-Saharan African countries as other

formal linkages between these countries and transnational markets, such as private capital

flows and manufacturing, have declined relative to other world regions (Rasiah 2000).12

Formal financial flows to sub-Saharan Africa are mostly public (Callaghy 2001). While

export of primary commodities continues to play central role in most African economies,

agricultural terms of trade have declined and mineral exports are subject to price volatility

(UNCTAD2003). These sectors are situated at the nexus of local, national, and global

markets, and they are important at each level. Because production in the sectors is resource-

based and linked to the land, these sectors have a deep local presence. Because these sectors

generate foreign exchange and tax revenue, they are important to national governments.

Because these sectors are deeply embedded in transnational markets, they are affected by

changes in global trade régimes.

While the literature on agriculture and resource extraction contributes to our

understanding of the relationship between dominant sectors and politics, the substantially

different attributes of the sector and the different contexts in which these sectors are

important indicates that these insights cannot be readily applied to nature tourism. Work on

resource extraction has often focused on unstable and conflict-ridden countries; oil and

mineral extraction often has negative effects on local people, national politics, and state

capacity. Work on informal and criminal markets has enriched our understanding of some

sectors and domestic-transnational linkages, but also focuses disproportionately on violent,

failed or war-torn African countries (Bayart et al. 1999; Mbembe 2003; Reno 1997a, b,

1998). My work on nature tourism will examine sectoral effects and linkages in more stable

countries. Tourism and agriculture and often are the primary sectors integrating states and

11 These countries were, ordered by declining revenue: South Africa ($2,297 million), Tanzania ($392), Kenya ($377), Namibia ($336), Ghana ($266), Zimbabwe ($230), Botswana ($184), Senegal ($160), Uganda ($135), and Nigeria ($118). 12 Informal flows in weapons and minerals appear to be substantial but are hard to measure. It is possible that engagement in transnational and transregional criminal networks has increased.

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domestic markets into the global economy. My work will complement research on growing

agricultural sectors, such as horticulture and citrus (Dolan 2004; Freidberg 2003; Kritzinger,

Barrientos, and Rossouw 2004; Mather 1999; Mather and Greenberg 2003).

An analytic focus on nature tourism should also diminish concern about endogeneity,

that is, that the relationship between local politics and dominant sectors is co-constitutive

rather than unidirectional. Tourism has a long history in Africa, as research on early travel

narratives and the Western gaze has documented (Bruner and Kirshenblattgimblett 1994;

Pratt and NetLibrary Inc 1992). The literatures on conservation and tourism in sub-Saharan

Africa generally, and in Kenya and South Africa in particular, provide an empirical starting

point for my research and a historical base for comparison. Contemporary nature tourism is

rooted in the game hunting, wildlife viewing, and protected areas established during the

colonial period (Beinart and Coates 1995; Carruthers 1995; Kameri-Mbote 2002; Neumann

2002). Because local indigenous actors had limited control during this period, it is less likely

that local political structures drove choice of sector. Local influence over sectoral

engagements has undoubtedly increased over time, but sectoral characteristics have been

substantially altered by shifts at the national and global level outside the control of local

actors.

While tourism is economically important in both Kenya and South Africa, Kenya is

more heavily dependent on tourism. Mining and manufacturing comprise a substantial share

of South Africa’s GDP. Tourism accounts for 20 percent of Kenya’s GDP, and it is the third

largest earner of foreign revenue (Kenya. Central Bureau of Statistics.). Tourism is estimated

to be South Africa’s fourth largest sector; it comprises about 7 percent of GDP (South Africa.

Government Communications (GCIS) 2003). Wells (1996) estimated that nature tourism

accounts for approximately US$225 to 1,909 million in 1993. Traditionally, nature tourism

and “sun and sand” (beach) tourism have accounted for the majority of Kenyan tourism;

convention travel and cultural heritage tourism have been less important (Sindiga and

Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden. Afrika-Studiecentrum. 1999). South African tourism is a mix of

“sun and sand,” cultural heritage tourism, convention and business travel, and wildlife or

nature tourism.

In recent years, the Kenyan and South African tourist sectors have moved in opposite

directions. Kenyan tourism is primarily oriented towards the international market, and thus is

highly vulnerable to external fashions and perceptions(Sinclair, Alizadeh, and Onunga 1992;

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Sindiga 1996; Sindiga and Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden. Afrika-Studiecentrum. 1999).13

Between 1995 and 2000, tourism declined sharply in response to perceived domestic

instability, declining infrastructure, and increased competition (Kenya. Central Bureau of

Statistics.). South Africa has a large domestic tourist market and thus is somewhat less

vulnerable to external perceptions. During the latter years of apartheid, sanctions and

boycotts limited travel to South Africa. Since the transition, international travel has increased

and the tourism sector has grown substantially. At present, tourism is the fastest-growing

sector (South Africa. Government Communications (GCIS) 2003).

Core concepts

Local Politics My working definition of politics draws from Easton (1957), who defined the

“political system” as “the interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a

society.” Politics is not limited to the formal apparatus of government but also comprises

other settings in which binding decisions are made. These binding decisions are made at

multiple scales—local, regional, national, global—and in different institutional contexts—

formal state agencies and legislatures, customary organizations, formal or informal markets,

shadow states or informal venues.14 My analysis will focus on politics at the village or

municipality-level, and the broader contexts in which these local politics are embedded. My

examination of local politics will focus on five dimensions: elite characteristics,

organizational structure, central and local government involvement in governance, decision-

making processes, and the issue agenda.

• Elite characteristics indicate which sorts of actors—such as “customary

authorities”, elected officials, civic leaders, or wealthy individuals—exert

influence at the local level.

• The local organizational structure suggests how politics are organized;

organizations may be patron-client, identity-based, or interest based.

• The role of central and local government includes the types of activities

undertaken, the agencies involved, and the types of government actors. Roles

may vary substantially from one area to another. Governments may be involved

13 See Sindiga (1996) on the barriers to developing a substantial domestic tourism market. 14 This study does not seek to investigate thoroughly those aspects of politics, or the arts of government, highlighted by Foucault such as the means through which something becomes a problem, an issue, an object of discourse, knowledge, and intervention (Foucault 1979).

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in extraction (taxation), regulation, service provision, coercion, and allocation of

property rights, inter alia.

• The issue agenda comprises the topics which are subject to public debate and

contention.

• The decision-making process comprises the processes, organizational setting, and

spatial setting in which binding decisions are made. It is likely that actual

practices diverge substantially from what formal institutional rules would predict.

Sector and Dominant Sector: I use “sector” to refer to economic activities centered around

the production and marketing of a particular product or service or a set of related products

and services, and the collection of actors, institutions and markets involved in these activities.

While the term “industry” is often used to refer to the collection of firms engaged in

manufacture or production of a good or service, it is not used in standard practice for tourism,

an experiential good and set of related services that involves multiple industries (Keyser

2002). As used here, each set of economic activities that exhibits distinct forms of

organization and is engaged in distinct markets, such as large scale commercial farming,

smallholder export crop production, and food crop production, would be treated as a sector.

My analysis will address three central characteristics of dominant sectors. The first

characteristic is the nature of the commodity. Watts’ (1994; 1999) work on oil draws our

attention to the physical character of the commodity: experiential, fungible, liquid, or solid.

Tourism, and cocoa, and beef are not the same commodities. Commodities also vary in their

tradeability. Analysts commonly distinguish between tradable goods such as coffee and beef,

and supposedly nontradable things such as financial services, construction, and tourism.

Many of these nontradables are deeply integrated into global networks, but they travel

differently than traditional tradable commodities. Shafer’s (1994) work highlights a second

characteristic, the production process. This characteristic includes factors such as capital

intensity, economies of scale, production flexibility, and asset/actor flexibility. A third

characteristic is the market structure, comprising factors such as the nature of the transaction

between producers and consumers, the level of concentration and organization among buyers

and sellers, and the form of state engagement. Table one presents key dimensions of each

characteristic.

Table One: Sectoral Characteristics

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Characteristic Subsidiary Dimensions

Physical: experiential, fungible, liquid, or solid; fragility/durability Tradeable/nontradeable

Nature of the commodity

Abundance/scarcity; uniqueness/ uniformity What is required for production? (labor, capital, material, machines or technology) What is nice to have? Which entities govern access and control over these crucial inputs?

• Who funds production? Source of capital: Investment streams, capital concentration • Who works to produce? Source of labor: skill mix

What is the production cost structure ? How capital or labor intensive is production ? What proportion of costs are fixed ? How flexible or sticky are production assets and factors?

Production process

Are there economies of scale? What limits are there to production ? How do producers access markets? What are the barriers to market entry or lack thereof? What is the nature of the transaction (direct/arms-length); Degree/type of mediation between producers and consumers? Who mediates transactions? Nature of consumption: Limits are there to consumption? Is there crowding? Subject to exhaustion? What is the character of demand for the product? Volatility/stability, specificity Level of Market concentration among producers (supply) or consumers (demand) Producer attributes: numbers, organization or lack thereof Consumer attributes: numbers, organization or lack thereof? Who are the money players?

Market Structure

Form of state engagement in the market: regulation, consumption, production, husbandry/midwifery

Sectoral Attributes of Tourism15

For the most part, analyses of African politics have worked within an agrarian

framework; agricultural production was assumed to be the primary mode of production.

However, nature tourism differs substantially from most forms of agriculture along each of

the sectoral dimensions I have outlined. With regard to the nature of the commodity, tourism

is an experience, agricultural products are tangible goods. Most agricultural products, unlike

tourist sites, possess little uniqueness; one orange, one rose, or one pound of cocoa can easily

be exchanged for another. The production process is also different; producers of tourism still

services that gain value because of their location. Tourism also differs from agriculture in the

15 This discussion draws from the following general works on tourism: Clancy (1998), Sinclair and Stabler (1997), Dieke (2000), and Harrison (1992; Harrison 2000).

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nature of the transaction between producers and consumers. Tourism necessarily involves

movement of the consumer to the site of production, while agriculture does not require any

direct contact between producers and consumers as the goods themselves may be transported.

The role of the state in structuring agricultural and tourist markets also differs. States have a

long history of intervention in export-oriented agriculture through input subsidies and

monopsonic purchasing. State involvement in the tourism sector has taken a different form.

While states exercise formal control over movement across borders, an important element of

transnational tourism, in most cases both production and consumption is governed by private

markets. States do exercise regulatory authority over both sectors, and some states have been

directly involved in production. In most cases, state involvement in nature tourism has been

led by parastatal organizations that have a dual mission of profit and conservation or

development such as the Kenyan Wildlife Service and South African National Parks.

Because the attributes of nature tourism differ markedly from those of agriculture, closer

examination is necessary to assess whether agriculture-based theories are valid in tourist

settings.

Nature of the commodity. Tourism is an experiential good. To consume tourism, a

tourist must travel to the place of production. Producers profit by charging for access to the

tourist site, for related services such as transportation, lodging, and tour guidance, and selling

goods linked to the experience. While it may seem odd to refer to the production of nature, a

large scholarly literature has documented the production of nature and nature tourism (Bruner

and Kirshenblattgimblett 1994; Eastman 1995; Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003; Norton

1996). In most cases, the “nature” that tourists experience is heavily managed. Nature

tourism is only feasible in places that possess scenic views and exotic animals, or in which it

can be made to appear as if these animals are authentic. These properties constrain

economies of scale and organization of production. Because nature tourism is subject to

crowding, the volume of production is limited.16 One cannot simply make more nature; the

easiest to way to expand is to enlarge the borders of protected areas or create new ones.

Production process. In nature tourism, scenic views and exotic animals are crucial

resources. Yet under many legal systems, one cannot possess property rights to wildlife.

Instead, actors seek recognized property rights to the land on which animals reside. Nature

16 The supply of roads, views, and lodges in protected areas is limited. Crowding diminishes the quality of visitors’ experience—most likely reducing their expenditures.

14

tourism often occurs on land that has protected status.17 In sub-Saharan Africa, 10.9 percent

of total land has protected status, and most protected lands are held by the state (Geisler and

Letsoalo 2000). In Kenya, 10.9 percent of the land has protected status (World Resources

Institute 2004). In South Africa, 6.2 percent of land has protected status. Privately and

communally owned nature tourism often occurs on land proximate to state controlled

conservation areas. Capital investment in nature tourism may support essential infrastructure

such as roads and lodging. The level of investment required depends on the target market;

Oldham et al (2000) estimate that the per bed cost for nature lodges in KwaZulu/Natal, South

Africa range from 141 to 566 thousand Rand (US$19 to 79 thousand). Actors with property

rights but little capital may lease their land or engage in joint ventures with private firms.

Joint ventures and franchising arrangements are common in the hotel industry (Clancy 1998).

Employment of labor is necessary to manage the nature and to provide tour services. The

asset specificity and mobility of land/nature, capital, and labor varies substantially. While

investors may move capital from one locale to another, the core product, “nature,” cannot be

moved without a substantial shift in the nature of the commodity—a zoo is not equivalent to a

game park or conservation area. Similarly, tourism infrastructure may be converted to other

uses, but usually is not relocated. Evidence on the opportunity costs of using land for nature

tourism is mixed and varies with the agricultural or resource extraction potential of the land

(Emerton 2001). Nature tourism generally involves a mix of skilled and unskilled labor on

site. “Skilled” laborers such as lodge managers may move from one tourist sites to another,

but “unskilled” laborers often have fewer options.

Market structure. Although the tourism sector involves several overlapping markets

at different scales, a crucial challenge for producers and lower income countries lies in

securing access to the tourist market. Tourism in these countries is oriented towards domestic

elites and foreigners, and producers often lack direct links to potential consumers. To market

their products, producers often work through travel agents in urban centers and abroad.

These mediators are well positioned to extract a substantial share of the revenue for those

services that tourists pay for an advance (Clancy 1998; Sinclair and Stabler 1997). Producers

operate in a highly competitive market. While many nature tourism sites can make a credible

claim to uniqueness—one may not be able to find that particular landscape or mix of animals

elsewhere—tourists often have a choice of lodging and guidance within a given location,

17 Protected areas are places in which the state or the owner has imposed legal restrictions on the use of land and other resources to advance conservation.

15

such as Kruger Park.18 For those tourists who seek an exotic nature experience, rather than a

specific location, a wide array of sites around the globe may meet their needs. Because

tourists cannot personally assess the quality of the good before purchase—a trait of

experiential goods—mediators and agents may prove highly influential. Demand for

particular sites is highly elastic, and tends to fluctuate with perceptions of security in the host

country (Richter 1992; Sinclair and Stabler 1997).

Since tourism is a luxury good, the aggregate level of demand fluctuates with

economic conditions in sending countries. The potential for stabilizing the market through

organization among nature tourism producers appears be low. Production is dispersed

throughout the globe, and ownership of land, lodging, and local transportation appears to be

dispersed. Nature tourism thus differs from other segments of the tourism sector; research

indicates that the hotel and transport sectors are highly concentrated (Clancy 1998). It is

possible that management of nature tourism ventures is more concentrated; my research

should indicate whether this is the case in Kenya and South Africa.

Hypotheses and causal mechanisms

Economic influence is an important source of political power. Access and control

over crucial production resources and markets provides actors with influence over those

involved in production.19 Dominant sector characteristics also influence the distribution of

resources and relationships. In so doing, dominant sectors shape interests, affect political

cleavages, and influence interactions between central and local governments. These effects

are most likely to be evident in localities with dominant sectors.20 In these places, I would

expect those actors or organizations that govern access and control over important sectoral

inputs and markets to have political influence. I would also expect changes from one

dominant sector to another or changes in the characteristics of a dominant sector over time to

produce changes in local politics. Comparison of the same locality over time should show

these effects. In making comparisons across localities, those localities with the same

dominant sector should exhibit similarities along major dimensions of local politics. (As

was discussed, there may be some variation in sectoral traits across localities dominated by 18 This factor tends to differentiate nature tourism from other forms of tourism such as beach tourism in which particular sites can readily be exchanged. 19 My use of access and control draws from political ecology (Blaikie 1985; Ribot and Peluso 2003; Ribot 1998). Access refers to the ability to obtain or use a resource. Control is the ability to set the terms of use, to determine who can use what at what times under what conditions. 20 In localities with several important sectors, these sectoral networks may overlap, and thus reinforce the influence of a limited set of actors, or divergent networks may provide multiple sources of political influence.

16

the same sector. In these cases, variation in the political characteristics of these localities

should be consistent with sectoral characteristics.) If characteristics of the dominant sector

do not affect local politics, then the character of local politics should not vary systematically

by sector in otherwise similar localities. However, I do not expect dominant sector

characteristics to fully explain local politics. Dominant sectors and other sources of economic

influence are not the only source of political power. Initial hypotheses regarding how

dominant sector characteristics affect each dimension of local politics are outlined below.

• The characteristics of local elites will vary by sector. Control over sectoral

resources increases actors’ relative influence. Sectors distribute resources

differently, and thus empower different actors. In nature tourism, individuals or

organizations that possess property rights to land, control over employment, and

control over market access should be part of the political elite.

• Sectoral characteristics affect the organizational structure of politics. Sectors that

distribute resources broadly favor associational forms of politics, such as civic,

identity, or interest-based organizations. Sectors in which control over critical

resources is concentrated favor patron-client or strongman politics. The effect of

nature tourism will depend on particular characteristics of each site; nature

tourism does not inherently favor either associational or patrimonial politics.

Nature tourism does reduce the likelihood that local government agents will be

the primary patrons because in most cases local government will not govern

access and control over key tourism resources. State lands are likely to be

controlled by central or provincial governments. Nonstate lands are likely to be

controlled by customary authorities, kinship groups, or firms; ownership is often

collective. If rights to resources are held collectively, this increases the likelihood

that some form of associational politics will develop.

• Sectoral characteristics influence the level and the form of local and central

government involvement in local governance. Sectoral attributes determine which

parts of the formal institutional are salient and affect incentives for involvement.

In nature tourism, direct central government involvement in local governance is

likely be limited. However, tourism provides an economic incentive for central

government involvement in otherwise marginal locales; this involvement is likely

to take the form of agency or parastatal governance of areas to which the state

holds property rights.

17

• The characteristics of the dominant sector will affect which resources actors seek

to control, and thus will influence the political agenda. Actors will seek control

over resources crucial to the functioning of the sector. Whether these issues

become subject to public debate should be affected, but not fully determined by

the public or private locus of decision making. In nature tourism, market access,

information access, employment, and property rights should be on the agenda.

Resources which are controlled by state, communal, or local actors or more likely

to become subject to public debate. Because market access is likely to be

mediated by outside private actors, it is less likely to become a local political

issue.

• The ability of local residents and producers to influence decisions should vary

systematically with dominant sector characteristics. Sectoral characteristics will

affect the institutional setting in which political struggles occur, and the level of

local control over crucial resources. Venues vary in their private or public

character, in physical location, and in the level within organizations at which

decisions are made. For example, decision-making may occur in a tribal court, at

a town meeting, inside a provincial or national government agency, or in the local,

national, or global office of a private company. Local actors should have greater

ability to influence outcomes in public and local venues. In nature tourism, local

actors should possess some ability to influence allocation of property rights, and

to determine which types of consumers to target, but limited influence over market

access will sharply constrain local influence.

Theories of African politics provide alternative images of elite, organizational structure, and

decision-making processes.

• Neopatrimonialism would suggest a patron-client structure in which there are

many vertical links between individuals of different statuses, but few horizontal

ones between those of the same status (Joseph 1987; van de Walle 2003). One

would expect to see few peer-based organizations such as unions or cooperatives;

if they exist, such organizations should clearly be dominated by one or two

powerful individuals. Patrons would exercise control over the issue agenda and

decision-making; a map of patrons should do better than organizational map

predicting outcomes. For the most part, we would expect decisions to advance the

18

• Migdal’s (1988)strongman theory suggests that local politics should be dominated

by few individuals with access to coercion or control over key resources. Local

organizations are likely to be dominated by the strongmen.

• Mamdani’s (1996) decentralized despotism predicts that those “customary”

authorities who were favored during the colonial period should possess

disproportionate influence. These authorities would assert a traditional right to

rule; one would expect to see many ethnic organizations and few interest based

organizations.21

• Pluralist models of politics would suggest we should see multiple organizations

based on interests and identities; the formal institutional structure of government

should tell us where binding decisions are made.

• Marxist theories predict that those who exercise control over the means of

production should have political influence as well. The interests of those

economic elites are likely to conflict with those of non-elites; the interests of non-

elites would only be recognized in those places where non-elites have formed

collective organizations.

To evaluate these hypotheses, I will trace the distribution of sectoral resources, map

sectoral networks, and collect evidence regarding local politics in localities dominated by

different sectors. This approach should allow me to identify the mechanisms through which

dominant sectors affect local politics. I plan to focus on sectoral networks because these

networks connect the local political economy to translocal actors, markets, and institutions.

In so doing, sectors empower those local individual or organizational actors that receive

resources and/or mediate their allocation. Through tracing the networks that link owners,

investors, producers, marketers, consumers, and regulators, I should be able to describe how

dominant sectors distribute resources such as capital, employment, and information, and to

show whether and how these resource flows affect local politics.

21 This opposition between ethnic organizations and interest-based organizations is, of course, somewhat deceptive; ethnic organizations may advance the material interests of their members (Bates 1983b).

19

Research Methodology

I will address my question through a structured focused comparative examination of

localities in Kenya and South Africa, two countries which have experienced the political and

economic liberalization. I plan to closely examine several localities in which nature tourism

is economically important. Within the sector, I will examine places in which local collective

actors have recognized property rights to the land on which tourism actors are situated or

recognized entitlements today share of the proceeds to those in which local collective actors

do not have recognized property rights.

Approach to the cases. Each case will comprise a locality with a dominant sector and the

sectoral network in which it is embedded. I expect to use political boundaries to define each

local case; each case would then encompass the area bounded by the smallest unit of local

government. In South Africa, the smallest unit is a municipality governed by an elected local

Council. In Kenya, the smallest unit is a local authority. If my initial research indicates that

it would make more sense to look at a slightly higher unit of governance, I will shift units. I

will collect information on each of the dimensions of local politics and sectors discussed

above; table two presents indicators and possible sources for local politics.

Table two : dimensions of local politics

Dimension Indicators/sources

What is the composition of the local elite?

Interviews with longtime residents, activists, and heads of organizations. Interview donors and other outsiders who regularly visit the site. Ask people who has power; observe interactions in collective settings and see whose actions affect outcomes.

What is the character of the local organizational structure?

Map the local organizations and their formal goals, using interviews and documents as primary sources. Observe whether organizations appear to be driven by their formal goals (suggesting interest based structure), by personal loyalties (patron-client), or by coercion (despotism). Look for overlap in leadership of different organizations.

What roles do central and local governments play in local governance ?

Analyze governmental documents and interview officials and sectoral actors to answer the following questions:

• What types of activities are governments undertaking in the area? • which agencies and what type of actors (elected officials, appointed officials) are involved? • How are activities divided between local and central governments? Who regulates the dominant sector? Which body collects which taxes from dominant sector producers, mediators, and consumers? Which body is responsible for

20

allocating or adjudicating property rights? • Which central government agencies have a local presence? What are their primary activities?

What issues are on the agenda?

Agendas for local organizations such as town councils and tribal councils; oral or written petitions to decision-making bodies; recurring topics discussed in social gatherings

How are decisions made?

Trace decision-making processes to answer following questions • Through what processes are decisions made ? (e.g. formal vote, administrative decision) • In what spatial settings are political decisions made? (local, provincial, national, extranational) • In what organizational settings are decisions made ? (public/private; governmental—by elected officials, appointees, or bureaucrats, customary organization, association, NGO, or by firm or private individuals)

Use organizational map to outline formal processes by which these issues should be addressed; use interviews with elites and affected parties and participant observation to map likely practice. Identify 4-5 issues likely to have salience across cases to get baseline for local political processes. Trace decision-making processes for sector-specific issues.

While Shafer suggests that each sector has an optimal organization, other scholarship

on tourism (Binns and Nel 2003; Bishop and Robinson 1998), environmental management

(Agrawal 2001; Schafer and Bell 2002), agriculture (Bates 1981, 1989; Boone 2003), and

mining (Davis 1998) indicates that sectoral characteristics are deeply shaped by historical

events and processes, such as changes in the property rights regime or market structure, that

may be country specific and may also vary over time. My research will therefore seek to

collect empirical information on each dimension for each locality. Interviews with

representatives of sectoral organizations, related state agencies, and country-based scholars

should provide a broad overview of the sector. The sector literature, including industry

publications, government data, and scholarly publications will assist in identifying the nature

of commodity, general tendencies of the production process, and the overall market structure.

To characterize the dominant sector in each locality, I will interview producers, consumers,

intermediaries, investors, and regulators and seek access to relevant documents, records, and

other archival sources. I will also engage in participant observation when it is feasible.

My principal sources of data will be interviews, documents, and participant

observation. I anticipate interviewing elected officials, bureaucrats, traditional and civic

association leaders, entrepreneurs, business leaders, sector employees, consumers, marketers,

and staff of nongovernmental organizations. Documentary sources would include meeting

agendas and minutes, marketing brochures, business records, and official statistics. While no

21

single piece of evidence is likely to be fully persuasive, I expect triangulating between

multiple individuals and documents should allow a valid portrayal of political and sectoral

dynamics. Within each case, I expect to use a mix of pattern matching and process tracing.

Although the locality will be my principal unit of observation, I will also collect national

level data as I expect the national context to influence local characteristics. To do so, I will

draw on existing literature (e.g., Nieuwoudt and Groenewald 2003; Sindiga 2000),

government and trade association records, and interviews with individuals involved in

tourism and agriculture at the national or international level.

To describe and analyze the networks through which dominant sectors influence local

politics, I expect to draw from concepts developed in the international integration literature.

Held and co-authors (1999) argue that globalization has four dimensions : extensity, intensity,

velocity, and impact. Extensity connotes the breadth of networks; possible indicators include

the number of arenas through which a sector links local and translocal actors. Intensity

connotes the depth of networks: indicators include the magnitude of interactions (such as

revenue, number of tourists, tons of beef), the extent to which interactions or flows are

mediated by the state, and the degree to which local actors can exercise control over

movement of goods and resources. One indicator of impact is the relative economic

importance of the dominant sector to the local economy. Velocity, the speed of interchange,

is less useful for my purposes. One dimension of networks that this literature has not focused

on is the type of objects that is moving. Networks facilitate the flow of capital (investment,

debt, consumption), but sectoral networks also channel the movement of people (workers,

refugees, tourists), goods (products/ commodities), and information. The mix of objects and

people moving through networks differs substantially by sector.

The global commodity chain literature offers a second approach to tracing networks.

A commodity chain is “a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a

finished product” (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz, and Korzeniewicz 1994). Within each chain,

nodes are used to represent specific processes taking place in different locations. This

literature usefully highlights the embeddedness of networks and sectors in social relations,

and offers an empirical means for documenting inequity to tracing the extraction of value at

different points along networks. However, this literature has focused on goods rather than

services, and often neglects political variables.22 Clancy’s (1998) work on tourism

commodity chains provides insight on the organization of tourism markets and a basic 22 The commodity chain literature is an outgrowth of Wallerstein’s world systems analysis (Wallerstein 1974). Thus, change tends to be conceptualize in long historical periods, and the unit of analysis is often global.

22

mapping of the hotel and airline commodity chains but does not explore the role of state

actors. I plan to look to the research on organizational networks for other ways to

conceptualize and measure sectoral networks.

Sampling. As discussed above, there is substantial variation within each sector. I expect that

the distribution of property rights to nature tourist sites is one of the critical sources of

intrasectoral variation. I will therefore seek to divide my cases evenly between those in

which a collective body, such as a tribe or communal association, has recognized property

rights and those in which property rights are held by different actor, such as an individual, a

private firm, or the state. Information on state controlled conservation areas is readily

available, and many private and communal ventures are located proximate to these areas. I

expect to focus on localities proximate to internationally famous wildlife attractions such as

Kruger National Park in South Africa or Amboseli, Masai Mara, or Tsavo in Kenya. These

flagship attractions receive the largest numbers of visitors, and private or communal wildlife

tourism ventures situated near these state conservation areas have a decided marketing

advantage. Nature tourism is far more likely to be a dominant economic sector in these

localities. There are communal actors with property rights in some of these sites. For

example, the Makuleke community hold title to part of Kruger Park and local councils are

involved in governance of the Amboseli and Masai Mara Reserves. Limited community

participation in state-held protected areas is increasingly common.

Dominant sector characteristics are unlikely to be the only source of variation across

localities. Factors such as personal and partisan ties between the district (Kenya) or

provincial (South Africa) leader and the head of state affect local political dynamics.

Regions also vary by the general level of economic development, ethnic composition, and

influence of customary authorities. While ethnic composition is not necessarily linked to

local political traits, in some cases it is correlated with political affiliations—in Kenya,

national leaders have strong ethnic affiliations—and in others it is correlated with

fundamental aspects of livelihood strategies and the organization of production—pastoral

groups and sedentary communities are quite different. To the extent possible, I will compare

localities that are similar on the dimensions discussed above. The Kenyan and South African

governments publish substantial descriptive data about regional characteristics, that I will use

to map each region. Locality-level economic information is much less available. Thus, I will

first select districts or provinces and then interview sectoral actors and public officials to

select appropriate localities within each.

23

Although limiting my research to four or six cases will restrict the scope of my

generalizations, I do not think it is feasible to collect a full set of data on a larger number of

cases. I expect data collection to be time intensive. To obtain valid data in my interviews

and observations, I will need to spend sufficient time and each locality to develop

relationships of trust with my informants. If it seems feasible, however, I may add shadow

cases to my analysis. This would involve doing less intensive studies of other localities

proximate to my principal cases. I do believe that conducting this study and two countries

rather than one increases my analytic leverage. If I find broadly similar political dynamics in

localities dominated by the same sector in different countries, this would suggest that sectors

are influential and broadly similar across contexts. If dynamics differ from country to

country, my analysis may highlight crucial factors driving this divergence.

This research strategy serves several purposes. First, this design should provide a

strong basis for describing contemporary rural local politics and making bounded

generalizations about the effects of dominant sectors. It should allow me to adjudicate

between contrasting depictions of African rural local politics. Secondly, this strategy should

permit me to make comparisons between different types of nature tourism, between nature

tourism and export agriculture, and across countries. Because these sectors possess national

economic importance, I should be able to make bounded inferences about how the local

political effects of dominant sectors may affect politics at the national level. Although my

analysis and data collection is likely to encompass international actors and markets, this

research is not designed to characterize the global characteristics of nature tourism and export

agriculture. Rather, it will show how these transnational sectors intersect with and affect

local and national politics.

24

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