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State science, risk and agriculturalbiotechnology: Bt cotton to Bt Brinjalin IndiaRonald J. HerringPublished online: 20 Nov 2014.

To cite this article: Ronald J. Herring (2014): State science, risk and agricultural biotechnology: Btcotton to Bt Brinjal in India, The Journal of Peasant Studies, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2014.951835

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.951835

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State science, risk and agricultural biotechnology: Bt cotton to BtBrinjal in India

Ronald J. Herring

Agricultural biotechnology has been a project of Indias developmental state since 1986,but implementation generated signicant conict. Sequential cases of two crops carryingthe same transgene Bt cotton and Bt brinjal (eggplant/aubergine) facing the sameauthorization procedures produced different outcomes. The state science thatapproved Bt cotton was attacked as biased and dangerously inadequate by opponents,but the technology spread to virtually universal adoption by farmers. Bt auberginewas approved by the same Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), butthe decision was overruled, the GEAC downgraded and a moratorium imposed on thecrop. Resultant conicts engaged international networks, expanded the domesticarena in which science is contested and instigated restructuring of institutions forgovernance of genetic engineering. Divergent trajectories of the two cropscorresponded to global patterns, but also reected differences in agro-ecologies andstate interests. In Bt cotton, state and cultivator interests dominated precautionarylogics; in Bt eggplant, politics of risk dominated questions of agro-economics. Thecases illustrate both the inherent vulnerability of science in politics and specicvulnerabilities of science embedded in particular institutions. Differences ininstitutional specicity of state science matter politically in explaining variationacross countries in adoption and rejection of genetically engineered crops.

Keywords: agriculture; biotechnology; India; Bangladesh; politics of science; Btcotton; Bt brinjal; Bt eggplant (aubergine); bio-safety; risk; GMO; regulation; foodsafety

State science and the Indian puzzle

New technologies create challenges for states in assessing risk on behalf of a publicinterest in safety. Because interests are affected, and scientic knowledge is bothplural and continuously revised, the question of whose science counts is potentiallysalient in politics. In Merchants of doubt (2010), Oreskes and Conway demonstratedempirically how small numbers of scientists tied to industry created consequentialdoubt about the science behind global warming, the link between smoking and cancer,ozone depletion and other phenomena in which established science would hurt corporate

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Acknowledgements: Many people helped me; only a few can be mentioned: Deepthi Kolady,Chavali Kameswara Rao, N. Chandrasekhara Rao, Channapatna S. Prakash, Anthony Shelton, Sivra-miah Shantharam, Justus Wesseler, Aniket Aga, Klaus Ammann, B. Choudhary, John Harriss, MilindKandlikar, Phil Oldenburg, P. Balasubramanian and anonymous reviewers for JPS. Of course noneshares responsibility for errors.

The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2014http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.951835

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interests if not strategically unsettled. Dan Agin subtitled his book Junk science (2006):An overdue assessment of government, industry and faith groups that twist science fortheir own gain. As both procedures and knowledge of science across multiple eldsimpose dauntingly high information costs for all citizens, there is a great deal of relianceon specic institutions authorized to dene procedures and criteria for authoritativeknowledge: are new pharmaceuticals safe and effective? What level of dioxin if any is safe in drinking water? What pesticide residues in food crops or soft drinks ifany constitute acceptable risk for consumers? Who decides? Is highly specializedexpertise authorized by the state trustworthy? We may think of these sanctioned pro-cesses, criteria and institutions as generating state science, legitimated by the authorityof a state at some level.

Few issues, and none in agriculture, have produced so dichotomous and vigorous acontentious politics involving contested science as agricultural biotechnology (Pinstrup-Andersen and Schioler 2000; Ho 2000; Schurman and Munro 2006; Herring 2008).Dimensions of institutionalizing state science vary greatly across crops and nations.Sheila Jasanoff in Designs on nature (2005) carefully analyzed quite variable styles of gov-ernance of biotechnology in different nations of the more-industrialized world with longerexperience with the technology. Robert Paarlberg in Politics of precaution (2001) derivedfrom his research in Kenya, China, India and Brazil a four-fold multi-dimensional typologyof institutional arrangements and criteria for approval of rDNA crops: promotional,permissive, precautionary and preventive. Kyoko Sato (2007) discovered variance in thespecically cultural politics of contesting the science of biotech food safety across Japan,France and the United States. One lesson from these works is that the science necessaryor sufcient for assuring biosafety of genetic engineering is not the unitary Scienceinvoked in political debates, but is rather science ltered, weighted and selected throughpolitical processes constituted by or aimed at the state. Variations along these dimensionshelp explain patterns of states acceptance and rejection of agricultural biotechnology, butare not always decisive: interests are at stake.

The map of acceptance and rejection of agro-biotechnology shows a discontinuouspattern within both the global North and South. For the rst time, in 2012, the total areaunder genetically engineered crops in developing countries exceeded that of so-calleddeveloped countries.1 There is no robust or parsimonious explanation for why somecountries accept agricultural biotechnology with little contention, whereas others changepositions over time or reject the technology altogether. One commonality across nations,however, is that science is invoked by both proponents and opponents as a reason fortheir positions (Herring 2007a). However, as with climate change, different politicaldynamics produce different outcomes. As Aarti Gupta (2011) argues from work onIndia, a viable science-society contract is elusive, and contested on grounds of the credi-bility of state institutions in which science is done and evaluated. Without such a contract,the legitimacy of state science whatever its objective standing in the epistemic commu-nity of scientists will prove unstable. There are deep differences in the nature of this con-tract; many are under continuous renegotiation, as in the EU (Wesseler andKalaitzandonakes 2011). India has been a pivotal case. The state ofcially promoted bio-technology, though with much less success than China, but remains unable to gain consen-sus on deployment. A major reason for dissensus proved to be the authority of statutory

1See James (Annual). Besides the problematic categories, this counting explicitly excludes stealthseeds, and is certainly a conservative estimate, but is commonly considered authoritative.

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state science, which became an object of contentious politics in two episodes that sub-sequently unsettled institutions: approval of Bt cotton and Bt brinjal (eggplant/aubergine).2

These two cases enable comparison of the dimensions and dynamics of state science inIndia that are suggestive of broader application. The transgenic brinjal contains the same Btcry1Ac transgene as the early and dominant Bt cotton hybrids. The purpose of the insertedgene was the same: to provide a trait missing in existing varieties and hybrids resistance toinsects (specically Lepidoptera) that damage the crop. Developers claimed similar advan-tages in pest protection, pesticide reduction and farmer income as those demonstrated inrst-generation Bt cotton (though most hybrids planted now in India contain two stackedBt genes).3 But whereas transgenic cotton became virtually universal in adoption bycotton farmers, Bt brinjal failed to gain approval and evoked a crisis of state science.

India began formal institutional development of indigenous capacity in agricultural bio-technology with the logic of the developmental state. The Department of Biotechnology(DBT), under the Ministry of Science and Technology, was established in 1986 as an expli-citly promotional institution. National policy envisioned biotechnology as a state develop-mental project across a wide range of applications, from combatting diseases and nutritionaldeciencies to increasing agricultural production and reducing the environmental external-ities of agriculture while improving the welfare of farmers.4 Recombinant DNA (rDNA)plants are governed by the Environmental Protection Act of 1986, Rules of l989 and speci-cally Notication No. GSR 1037 E, dated 5 December l989. Assessment of trial data andbiosafety regulation rested by statute with the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee(GEAC) of the Ministry of Environment.

Despite developmental-state aspirations similar to those of China, no genetically engin-eered crops had been successfully released from the public sector as of early 2014. Approvalby the GEAC of Bt cotton developed in the private sector became ofcial on 26 March 2002,making India the sixteenth country in the world to commercialize a genetically engineered cul-tivar; there were 28 such countries in 2013. Bt cotton hybrids diffused rapidly and widely onfarms and in commercial rms seed offerings; over 1000 cultivars of Bt cotton the numbercontinually increases have been approved for cultivation. India ranked fourth in the world inarea under transgenic crops in 2010, following the United States, Brazil and Argentina, andahead of Canada and China. Ofcial data understate Indian acreage, however, as illicitseeds continue to circulate in unknown quantities, some with more advanced gene constructsthan approved seeds. Cotton yields have increased signicantly along with aggregate pro-duction and reduction of pesticide applications.5 India surpassed the United States in 2010

2Solanum melongena. Brinjal is an Indian-English word; baingan is the common Hindi name. WestBengal is the largest producer, with 30 percent of production, followed by Orissa, Gujarat and Bihar.For a description of the transformation, see Choudhary and Gaur (2008); Kumar et al. (2011).3Over 80 percent of the Bt cotton seed sold in 2011 was the more expensive two-gene implementation,though the original cry1Ac single-gene hybrids are available; non-Bt hybrids are produced as well, butmainly used for refugia. Underground markets now have illegal stacked Bt gene implementations plusa gene for glyphosate tolerance, called locally ex Bt.4Annual Reports of the Department of Biotechnology carry this theme consistently.5Studies naturally vary in coverage and detail, but behavioral indicators such as adoption rates andfarmers stealth tactics in diffusion of Bt cotton strongly indicated agro-economic success. For con-clusions from a large number of eld studies, see Grure et al. (2008); Grure and Sengupta (2011);Herring and Rao (2012). For representative studies, see Bambawale et al. (2004); Gupta and Chandak(2005); Naik et al. (2005); Bennett et al. (2006); Gandhi and Namboodiri (2006); Narayanamoorthyand Kalamkar (2006); Patil and Hanchimal (2007); Roy, Herring, and Geisler (2007); Subramanian(2007); Sadashivappa and Qaim (2009); Subramanian and Qaim (2009, 2010); Rao and Dev

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as the second-largest cotton-producing nation, behind China. From being a major importer ofcotton, India has become a major exporter. The developmental outcomes in this case seemed toratify ofcial visions for biotechnology.

However, institutional capacity to regulate transgenic crops was called into question whenillegal Bt cotton undetected by both state and civil society was discovered growing inGujarat in September of 2001. The GEAC ordered destruction of the crop, creating a conictwith farmers representatives and state governments, but had no police powers and could notcarry out its order. Banning the illegal but successful Bt hybrid Navbharat 151 led to acottage industry of stealth Bt cotton seed breeding and production, especially but not exclu-sively in Gujarat state.6 Since the cry1Ac transgene had been regularized ofcially in Btcotton as safe for introduction to hundreds of hybrids without additional testing, and utilizedillegally in localized plant breeding for at least eight years, agricultural scientists expectedrapid release of Bt brinjal as well. Developers of the crop claimed similar advantages inpest protection, pesticide reduction and farmer income; normal science vetted by the statutorybody responsible for rDNA crops conrmed these conclusions. Following nine years of testsinvolving seven government departments, committees and institutes a complex array ofstate science institutions coordinated by the GEAC both hybrids and varieties of Btbrinjal were approved in October of 2009. None could be planted legally, however, followinga ruling by the Minister of Environment to reject the GEAC decision in 2010.

Comparison of the two cases and their implications proceeds as follows. The rstsection discusses dimensions of opposition to Bt brinjal that proved important to the Min-isters decision: what precisely was wrong with the state science that certied the crop assafe and effective? The second section asks: how did the logics of assessing risks and com-paring hazards differ as between state science and those who rejected its conclusions? Thethird section looks to a dimension of state science in India that is missing from institutionalarrangements in some other countries: risks and benets to farmers who might adopt a cul-tivar if ofcially approved. This methodology is implicit in the approach of the develop-mental state to technology: new technology should be benecial to agriculture andfarmers. The political process by which divergent assessments entered the politicalsystem and resulted in a denitive ruling constitutes the fourth section. The overruling ofGEAC clearance of Bt brinjal produced a counter-mobilization led by agricultural scientiststhat reached international networks; their arguments and tactics are covered in section ve.The essay then puts the ndings from the Indian cases together to suggest dimensions ofnational specicity of state science and some resultant dynamics. Conclusions considerthe central issue of state science: to what extent do outcomes attain sufcient legitimacyto have power in the face of contending interests?

Dimensions of opposition to Bt brinjal

Residues of mobilization against Bt cotton conditioned subsequent politics, as one wouldexpect: protest cycles are common in contentious politics (Tarrow 2011). Rival advocacynetworks in India drew different lessons and resources from cotton. Proponents argued

(2010); Kathage and Qaim (2012). For an argument that these studies are systematically biased, seeStone (2012, 2013).6On illicit Bt cotton diffusion, see Shaik (2001); Sahai (2002); Gupta and Chandak (2005); Mehta(2005); Shah (2005); Roy (2006); Scoones (2006); Roy, Herring, and Geisler (2007); Ramaswami,Pray, and Lalitha (2011).

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that virtually universal adoption of Bt cotton both legal and illegal hybrids constitutedevidence of superior pest control at lower cost and less environmental damage from spray-ing pesticides. Opponents emphasized continuing uncertainty about negative externalitiesof technologies approved by institutional science. More important, opponents took the Btcotton episode as a clear demonstration of institutional incapacity to evaluate, monitorand control biotech crops.

No one disputes the failure of the GEAC to detect or control stealth Bt cotton hybrids thatspread through underground networks and produced a cottage industry of illicit transgenicplant breeding. This fact created a powerful political argument against further commerciali-zation of biotech crops: if the regulatory Panopticon in Delhi could neither detect nor preventthe spread of illegal Bt cotton, why should civil society trust it a second time? Opponentsleveraged prior institutional failure with an emphasis on creation of potential andunknown hazards inherent in genetic engineering.7 Facts in this institutional failure storyare clearly settled; the agro-economic story remained contested. Though farmers hadvoted with their plows for Bt technology, sometimes even at the risk of prosecution for illeg-ally breeding, distributing and utilizing the seeds, stories of Bt failure circulated both in Indiaand in international networks. Prince Charles famously stated in New Delhi: I blame GM[genetically modied] crops for farmer suicides.8 Reports of livestock deaths from ingestionof Bt cotton leaves reinforced the narrative of toxicity that carried over to brinjal (Rao 2007a,2007b). Allergenic effects and unusual human ailments were reported as well. OperationCremate Monsanto rejected both the regulatory process and outcome of bio-safety pro-ceduresmandated by ofcial science inDelhi, aswell as the dominance of agriculture bymul-tinational corporations (Bharathan 2000; Herring 2006; Scoones 2006, 242350; Shiva2006). Stories of livestock deaths and farmer suicides in the media reinforced an atmosphereof hazard that proved impervious to refutations of both the GEAC and peer-reviewedscience.9 The cotton campaign also solidied ties with transnational advocacy groups,especially in Europe, that provided the coalition with both resources and expertise(Bownas 2008). The aura of uncertainty and distrust of state science proved to be a politicallypowerful residue. Damaged by institutional failure, the locus of state science the GEAC was vulnerable. Dr. Suman Sahai, head of Gene Campaign, emphasized a unique threatbeyond state capacity to understand or control:10

Too little is understood about what happens when foreign genes are abruptly pushed into thegenetic material of living organisms like plants. The results are intrinsically unpredictable andthere exists the potential for damage across generations. [T]he Government of India has notresponded to persistent demand for an overhaul of the regulatory mechanism. The existing pro-tocol for safety tests and impact monitoring in India is extremely inadequate despite growingscientic evidence of the impact of GM foods on public health.

Finally, apprehensions of foreign control that proved resonant in Operation Cremate Mon-santo remained prominent. Dr. Sahai argued: The only ones to benet from it are a fewmultinational corporations. At stake is the food security and food sovereignty of nations

7The most detailed account is that of C. Kameshwara Rao (2010), as acknowledged even by his criticVisvanathan (Financial Express 2010); the two dialectically lay out the contours well.8See Shiva et al. (2000); Shiva and Jafri (2004); Shiva (2006); Grure et al. (2008); Herring (2009).9See representative studies contrary to these claims in note 5 above. On the dispute itself, see Stone(2012, 2013); N.C. Rao (2013); Herring (2013).10Dr. Sahais comments were carried on the front page of The Hindu under the title Supreme Courtorder on GM food items a breakthrough, 13 April 2008. See also Sahai in RAS (2011).


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(The Hindu April 13, 2008 p. 1). This was the core of the campaign against Bt brinjal:special unpredictability of molecular plant breeding, resulting in irreducible risk in thecontext of inadequate state science and weak state capacity, compounded by foreigncontrol conferred by a novel and unnecessary technology.

Assessing risk: comparative hazards

Determining risk in genetic engineering is one of the most important dimensions that differ-entiate national implementations of state science. As in other countries, regulation in India istheoretically based on incremental risk that is, risk added by the transgene that is notpresent in the isogenic variety of the same plant without the transgene. Risk in a strict scien-tic sense means probability of exposure to some hazard, usually expressed as hazard exposure = risk.11 Risk thus assumes a known probability distribution of some hazard. Inthe real world, and in politics, this deceptively simple and logical formulation is often irrele-vant. Sometimes neither hazard nor probability is known, or cannot be measured. In this case,we do not know risk, but rather are in a condition of uncertainty, sometimes called Knightianuncertainty, as conceptualized by the economist Frank Knight (1921). In a world of uncer-tainty, risk is of necessity a social construction. In common use, risks are commonly taken,but usually without formal calculation. Anyone booking a ight, taking prescription drugs orscheduling surgery recognizes potential hazards. Some risks are taken because of expectedbenets air travel, for example or because the risk of doing nothing is higher surgeryand pharmaceuticals, for example. The common cell phone is a good example: there issome evidence of hazard, no proof of hazard and no estimate of probabilities, but suchobvious utility that the hypothetical risk is discounted by nearly everyone who can affordthe device. The question in taking risk is always: compared to what? Ideally, regulation ofany technology would reach some threshold of acceptable risk balanced with benets for a whole society. Given the plurality of values and knowledge in societies, consensusmay be difcult to attain and politics contentious; consensual democratic procedures forweighting preferences prove elusive.

Science cannot assess uncertainty, and has nothing to say about appropriate risk toler-ance; these are of necessity political decisions. Moreover, science explicitly recognizes thepossibility of unknown unknowns: no consensus precludes future revisions based on newinformation. Both of these caveats produced difculties for the state science of agriculturalbiotechnology. Even if risk seems low in the genetically engineered crop, why would onetake any risk at all, no matter how low? There is adequate supply and great diversity of thebrinjal crop in India. Risk thus presents a difcult question for promoters of biotechnology;as Gupta (2011) argues, the political problem for transgenics is that governance must inevi-tably deal with anticipatory risk. Since the Bt brinjal is a transgenic crop, assessment of itsrisk and safety was delegated by statute to the GEAC of the Ministry of Environment.

To answer the governance question, the GEAC mandated a dossier prepared by appli-cants for release of any specic transformation. The dossier on Bt brinjal was developed byMahyco and two public universities the University of Agricultural Sciences (UAS),Dharwad and Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (TNAU), Coimbatore.12 Mahyco had

11On transgenics and environmental risk specically, see Thies and Devare (2007).12The report is ofcially Ministry of Environment and Forests, Genetic Engineering Approval Com-mittee (2009) Report of the Expert Committee (EC-II) on Bt Brinjal Event EE-1 Developed by: M/sMaharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company Ltd. (MAHYCO), Mumbai; University of Agricultural Sciences

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begun transformation and integration of Monsantos cry1Ac gene construct into brinjals ingreenhouses in 2000. Each new genetic event requires independent evaluation under Indiasbiosafety protocol. The genetic event under testing was named Event EE-1.Tests byMahyco in 20022004 included studies of weediness and aggressiveness, pollen ow,growth, toxicity and allergenicity. In 20062007, Mahyco submitted environmentalsafety, gene efcacy and agronomic performance data to the GEAC. The GEAC publisheda bio-safety dossier showing the results of studies from 20012007 on its website. It thenapproved large-scale eld trials for seven hybrids under the supervision of the Indian Insti-tute of Vegetable Research of the Indian Council for Applied Agricultural Research (ICAR)for the period 20072009. Based on test results for the seven hybrids, public sector insti-tutions introduced the transgene donated by Mahyco into open-pollinated varieties(OPVs) for eld testing, beginning in 2007. Field trials of the Bt OPVs were carried outin collaboration with the two agricultural universities at Coimbatore and Dharwad.

Promoters of the technology had claimed reduction of a known environmental hazard: pes-ticide spraying. Lepidopteran pests are quite destructive of brinjals; the most important, thefruit and shoot borer (FSB, Leucinodes orbonalis), damages crops both by boring intostems, weakening the plant, and by damaging fruits, reducing market acceptability andprices received by farmers. The FSB alone destroys up to 70 percent of the crop; variationdepends on pest pressure in specic elds at specic times.13 Control of the insect by spraying,the GEAC concluded: has led to increased dependence on pesticides and consequent adverseeffects of higher costs of production, environmental pollution, destruction of natural enemies,and development of pesticide resistance in FSB (MoEF 2009 GEAC EC II 1.2.1).

Similar concerns were expressed as reasons for approving Bt cotton. The problem is moresevere in brinjal because of the life cycle of the FSB (Chaudhary andGaur 2008, 234;Kumaret al. 2011). Larvae bore into plant tissue soon after hatching fromeggs planted bymoths; onceinside tissue, they cannot be reached by topical sprays. Consequently, farmers losemany fruitsto insect damage despite heavy spraying. Conventional breeding offers no solution; there is nogene for FSB resistance in the genome.Aprotein producedby the soil bacteriumBacillus thur-ingiensis (henceBt) is lethal to this class of insects. Bt insecticidal proteins in granular or liquidformhave been used for decades in India as bio-pesticides and are certied for organic crops.14

SprayingBt solutions has limitations, however: uneven application, undersides of leaves, vul-nerability to rain, expense. In contrast, the introgression of the bacterial gene into the plantcauses the Bt protein to be expressed in all plant tissues, which should in theory lessen pestdamage with less spraying of whole Bt cells and spores in solution or synthetic pesticides.The GEAC concluded (MOEF 2009, 1.2.24):

(UAS), Dharwad; and Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (TNAU), Coimbatore. 8 October (NewDelhi: Government of India). It will be cited as MoEF 2009 GEAC EC II.13The Expert Committee of the GEAC cited a range up to 6070% based on the scientic literature.See MoEF 2009 GEAC EC II Section 1.2.1; also Dhandapani, Shelkar, and Murugan (2003); Koladyand Lesser (2008, 2011).14Section 9(3) of the Insecticide Act of 1968, as on 28 December 2006, lists as approved bio-pesti-cides products containing Bacillus thuringiensis (var. kurstaki); one of these is LIPEL, recommendedfor use against Helicoverpa (the cotton bollworm and common pest of eggplant), spodoptera andother caterpillar pests. AGRI LIFE, the producer, is an ISO 9001-2008 Certied Companyapproved for products used in organic agriculture, for both national use and export. Dozens ofrms foreign and domestic are registered for distribution of Bt-k formulations up to 18 k IU per g wet-table powder (Dr. Venkatesh Devanur Managing Director Agri Life, pers. comm.). See also www.agrilife.in


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the current practice of using extensive pesticides is not only harmful to the health and environ-ment but also non-sustainable in future for control of FSB in brinjal crop. In view of the above,there is an urgent need for developing alternative control strategies. Adoption of transgeniccrops engineered primarily using the cry proteins to prevent damage caused by insect pests hasgiven excellent results in cotton and maize worldwide resulting in signicant economic benets.A similar approach in brinjal is expected to provide substantial benets to farmers.

These conclusions were based on both the international literature on Bt crops and on eldtrials from 2004 through 2008. In those trials, applications of FSB-directed insecticideswere reduced by 80 percent; total insecticides, by 42 percent. Tests for weediness, pollenow, growth, toxicity, composition, nutrition and allergenicity found no substantial differ-ences from conventional cultivars when compared to the Bt cultivars. The GEAC concludedthat the risk prole of the new crops was lower than demonstrated hazards incurred by exist-ing practices. These hazards extend beyond damage to local agro-ecologies. The GEACExpert Committee II (EC II) referenced specic risks to humans in current practice:

Pesticide exposure causes ill effects (including neurotoxic, birth and reproductive) such asheadache, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, lack of coordination, tremor, mental confusion, sei-zures, coma etc. Some pesticides have long residual effect and are reported as probable/poss-ible carcinogens (MoEF 2009 GEAC EC II: 1.2.4)

Food safety is then another dimension of potential risk of existing practices. After posting atable showing pesticide residues in brinjals, ECII of the GEAC highlighted evidence ofresidue from one insecticide (an organophosphate, monocrotophos) not permitted for useon vegetables in India (MoEF 2009 GEAC EC II, 1.2.4) and banned entirely in the USand other countries. The GEAC investigations found in contrast to existing practices no concerns for food safety in the transformed plants from the Bt protein, just as Bttopical sprays have long been bio-safe ofcially in India.

Agrarian risks and benets

Documenting pesticide risks to rural producers was one outcome of GEAC evaluations. Butunlike regulatory science in some countries, the GEACwas tasked with an additional dimen-sion of evaluation: assessing farmer benets. No crop would receive de-regulation and com-mercialization without evidence of benets to farmers. On-farm effects were tested in eldtrials of various scales. In the All-India Coordinated Trials, yields roughly doubled in com-parison with non-Bt isogenic counterpart control plants; the yield increase of Bt brinjal overpopular hybrids was 116 percent and over popular open-pollinated varieties was 166percent.15 Large-scale eld trials (LSTs) were conducted independently by the Indian Insti-tute for Vegetable Research of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research from 2007 to2009. This data set showed a less dramatic increase in marketable yields between 33percent and 45 percent over non-Bt counterparts and national best check, respectively.16

Variation in marketable yield data between multi-location research trials (MLRTs) and theLSTs was caused by differences in plot size in the two models of testing, different locationsand varying levels of infestation. Variation in pest pressure in particular is a major cause ofyield variation: the higher the infestation, the larger the Bt effect. Farmer income depends on

15Data generated by Mahyco and independently by ICAR during the multi-location research trials(MLRTs) 20042006.16For LST data on marketable yields, see Table 25 in Choudhary and Gaur (2008).

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Data sources for Tables 13

Multi Location Research Trials [MRLT] of private sector Bt hybrids conducted byMahyco 20042005,20052006

IndianCouncil ofAgricultural Research [ICAR] trials underAll IndiaCoordinatedResearchImprovement Project (AICRIP-Vegetables) of Mahyco Bt hybrids 20042007

Large scale trials of Mahyco Bt hybrids conducted by Indian Institute for VegetableResearch, IIVR, Varanasi 2007-2009

MLRT of public sector Bt brinjal OPVs conducted by University of AgriculturalSciences, Dharwad 20072008

MLRT of public sector Bt brinjal OPVs conducted by Tamil Nadu AgriculturalUniversity, Coimbatore 20072008

weight of harvested plants and their marketability. FSB penetration of the stems weakensplants and reduces yields; penetration of fruits reduces market value. Table 1 displaysyield data on marketable yield, not yield by weight alone. Undamaged fruits sell at apremium price; visibly worm-infested fruits are discounted. Coding marketable fruitsintroduces some discretionary variation in studies. Because yield effects vary withtesting mode and location though always in the same direction it is useful to look atpooled national data. Table 1 offers a more robust measure because the data combine thethree different trial modes, from 2004 to 2009, pooling all-India data from all test sites.

Table 1. Summary data on mean yields: brinjal eld trials (means of all trial modes, pooled nationaldata 20042009).

Brinjal cultivar Marketable yield Bt yield difference over checks

Bt Hybrids 404.91 q/haNon-Bt counterparts 236.84 q/ha 71%National checks 205.80 q/ha 97%

Source: MOEF (2009), GEAC EC II, 52. q = quintal=100 kg; ha = hectare = 2.47 acres.

Table 2. Variance in trial yields, brinjal cultivars 20042009 (means of three test modes).

Cultivar Low (q/ha) High (q/ha)

Bt Hybrids 293.45 MHB 10 Bt 638.02 MHBJ 99 BtNon-Bt counterparts 171.76 MHB 10 305.83 MHB 39National checks 189.70 221.90

Source: MOEF (2009), GEAC ECII, 53.

Table 3. Economic effects of Bt in brinjal (means of three test modes).

CultivarMean cost of

pesticides (Rs/ha)Economic effect of Btyield increase (Rs/ha)

Net economic advantage:pesticide cost + yield

effects (Rs/ha)

Bt Hybrids 752Non-Bt counterparts 5952 64,800 69,239National checks 5920 80,800 85,291

Source: MOEF (2009), GEAC ECII, 52. Rs = Indian Rupees.


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The decrease in marketable yield in comparison with Bt cultivars measures the most impor-tant nancial loss to farmers caused by FSB and related insects. Table 2 presents the bestand worst performance of specic Bt cultivars in comparison with counterparts isogenicor near isogenic hybrids (the same hybrid minus the transgene) and local best checks.

The net economic benet to the farmer is conceptually the value of higher yields addedto savings on purchased pesticides. Table 3 makes this comparison using the same pooleddata for the same years, 20042009. Bt hybrids roughly doubled the yield of marketablefruits over national checks. This pattern held over both high- and low- yielding hybrids.The combination of lower pesticide costs and increased harvest resulted in an increase ofINR 69,239 per hectare over non-Bt counterparts and INR 85,291 over national checks.Though limited and tentative, and subject to revision as seed price and market conditionschange over time, data generated by eld trials mandated by state science did covermany sites across India over a number of years. Moreover, these data provided the only evi-dence on agro-economics available at the time of decision.

GEAC testing routines did not consider all agronomic alternatives: for example, inte-grated pest management without synthetic pesticides was not evaluated. Nor were testsdone with Bt cultivars plus integrated pest management (IPM), which in early cotton trialsproved to be the best practice agronomically (Bambawale et al. 2004). One study (Mathur,Singh, and Singh 2012) using botanical oils of pungam (Pongamia pinnata L.) andiluppai (Madhuca indica) in IPM modules and female sex pheromone in moth trapsproved to be quite effective in lowering both shoot and fruit infestation. The authors con-cluded, like Bambawale and colleagues, that Bt brinjal can have a great scope if incorporatedas part of IPM technology. It is conceivable that extension of eld testing to alternatives pro-posed by opponents of the transgenic method of achieving insect control might haveimproved public support for Bt technology. The GEAC also did not explicitly test the certi-ed organic Bt topical sprays used on brinjals for comparative safety, cost-effectiveness andefcacy. Questions of IPM and organic pest controls were not part of the GEACs mandate,but might enter into any broader developmental debate on crop options.

Benets to farmers of any technology depend not only on agronomic characteristics but onintellectual property: at what cost will new seeds be available? Will increased output justifyhigher costs if seed costs are higher? Bio-property was a large part of the critique of Btcotton by Operation Cremate Monsanto; in subsequent political debates, the Indiancompany Mahyco a joint applicant for approval of Bt brinjals was called Monsantosavatar. Monsanto holds a 26 percent share in Mahyco but is widely held to control thecompany. Because global transgenic crop development has been concentrated in the handsofmultinational life-science corporationswith signicant exceptions (Cohen 2005;Davidson2008) seed controlwas relevant toGEACconclusions on farmer benets.Mahyco-MonsantoBiotech did enjoy privilegedmarket position for Bt cotton in India, but not because of propertylaw: therewas no patent onBt cotton.Rather, bio-safety regulation conferred signicant advan-tage: their hybrids were for some time the only ones legally approved for sale by the GEAC,though there was competition from the underground market (Herring and Kandlikar 2009).

Property in Bt brinjal presented a different picture, in part because of bio-property con-troversies over Bt cotton. In a public-private collaboration, beginning in 2003, Mahycodonated its technology to public institutions in India as well as Bangladesh and thePhilippines.17 One can see how Mahyco could benet from this counter-intuitive corporate

17For explanation of arrangements, and ex ante analysis of potential outcomes, see Kolady and Lesser(2008).

10 Ronald J. Herring

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generosity by examining the market. Mahyco specializes in hybrids; the universities devel-oped open-pollinated varieties (OPVs). Indian farmers grow both hybrids and OPVs.Hybrids produce higher yields (see Tables 1 and 2), but seeds are costlier to produce,and typically must be purchased every year.18 Varieties breed true and allow seed savingby farmers. Hybrids cover about 40 percent of Indias eggplant area; varieties, 60percent. It was reasonable for Mahyco to believe that becoming accustomed to the Bt tech-nology would facilitate farmers moving to hybrids for higher yields over time, expandingits market.

Public institutions in India developed locally popular Bt varieties for different regions.Tamil Nadu Agricultural University developed four varieties for southern India; for thesouthwest, the University of Agricultural Sciences, Dharwad, developed six. The IndianInstitute for Vegetable Research in Varanasi developed both hybrids and OPVs for thenorthern and eastern regions. Though Monsanto became the object of political practice,more OPVs from the public sector than hybrids from their private sector partner Mahycowere planned for release in marked contrast to Bt cotton. For farmers this would meana choice between two types of insect-resistant brinjals: lower-cost varieties with savableseeds or higher-yielding, more expensive hybrid seeds. In this sense, the interests offarmers were better served by plans for diffusion of eggplant than cotton (Krishna andQaim 2007; Kolady and Lesser 2008). Knowledge of this bio-property arrangement,however, was largely missing from public debate, at every level.

Political reversal of GEAC science: food, risk and Monsanto

An Expert Committee of the GEAC submitted recommendations on Bt Brinjal Event EE-1 to the full GEAC on 9 October 2009. They concluded that release of both hybrid andopen-pollinated varieties, both private and public-sector versions, was scientically war-ranted. The technology was judged to be effective in controlling target pests, safe to theenvironment, non-toxic as determined by toxicity and animal feeding tests, nonallergenicand has potential to benet the farmers. The full GEAC approved these recommen-dations on 14 October. In the Bt cotton precedent, this would have completed the roleof state science. But Minister of Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh announcedthe following day that he would consider the GEAC approval decision only a recommen-dation, and announced a decision to go instead to public consultations (Jayaraman 2010;Rao 2010).

Where and how public consultations enter or interact with deliberations of scienticregulatory bodies is a complex institutional problem in democracies (Scoones 2009).Indias framework allowed for public input at the stage before nal approval by theGEAC. The report of its expert committee took cognizance of numerous comments fromdomestic civil society, foreign and Indian scientists, prominent activists and a new coalition(the I AM NO LAB RAT campaign). GEAC responses covered 25 pages (MoEF 2009GEAC ECII 2009 Annexure 1). Cautions and objections were acknowledged, but the com-mittees response was primarily that issues raised in these communications had alreadybeen addressed in the report (MOEF 2009 GEAC ECII, 6691). The Minister evoked adifferent standard; he wrote to the GEAC that the moratorium will continue for as long

18Bt cotton proved an exception; farmers in Gujarat effectively used F2 (second generation) seeds ofhybrids that expressed the cry1Ac protein when Navbharat 151 was banned by the GEAC (Roy,Herring, and Geisler 2007).


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as it is needed to establish public trust and condence and all stakeholders are satised thatthey have been heard to their satisfaction.19

Many scientists in India and some Ministers viewed this standard as setting the barimpossibly high. It is difcult to imagine what tests from normal science would satisfy allstakeholders or establish public trust and condence. Sociology of knowledge alonesuggests the reason: organized groups around the world remain unconvinced by thescience supporting evolution, viral origins of human immunodeciency virus infection /acquired immunodeciency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), global warming or the lunar landings,to name but a few (Agin 2006; Specter 2009). Cass Sunstein (2009) explains how knowledgecontrary tomajority consensus based on evidence can become solidied frommechanisms ofinformation cascades, social polarization and network effects. It is difcult to specify consen-sual sources and routines of evidence; opponents had campaigned to stop even the eld trials.Absent data from eld trials, by what other measure could the state assess some risk-utilitymatrix? There may be no such evidence. Suman Sahai of Gene Campaign concluded from adifferent criterion: The crisis is that we will never be able to guarantee total safety. I cannotsee a day when we can remove precautions on GE research (MoEF 2010).

Agricultural scientists argued that no innovation could satisfy all stakeholders, orguarantee total safety, not even the ubiquitous mobile phone. Nevertheless, one of thedimensions of variation across episodes and loci of state science was illustrated in themove to plebiscitary science: what forum could decide legitimately? How majoritarianmust a decision be? What level of certainty is necessary for closure? The political objectiveof opponents was to raise the bar from the acceptable uncertainty often used in technologyassessment of the cost/benet form vaccines, pharmaceuticals to absolute consensus onabsence of risk. How this could be done in a nation of 1.2 billion people is unclear. Theministers plan was to hold public meetings in seven cities, eventually involving almost8000 people (MoEF 2010). Opposition groups appeared in strength in these meetings.On 9 February 20l0, MoEF Minister Jairam Ramesh placed a moratorium on cultivation,demoted the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee to the Appraisal Committee, andpromised its eventual replacement by a new statutory body: the National BiotechnologyRegulatory Authority.

Reasons for his decisions were very clearly articulated by the minister, and supported byan extraordinary display of transparency: everything was made available. Some concernsreected core functions of his ministry. Risks of biodiversity effects explicitly geneow constitute one example (Samuels 2013). The Minister cited the National Bureauof Plant Genetic Resources on biodiversity risk, but the bureaus director within theweek challenged the claim: Our bureau has not done any study on the issue. We cannotgive such a view without a study (Haq 2010). Less clearly environmental issues such asbio-property and vulnerability of the food system emphasized by Operation Cremate Mon-santo were cited, despite plans for release of OPV Bt brinjals by public-sector institutionsthrough such outlets as rural post ofces.20 Minister Ramesh stated:

Very serious fears have been raised in many quarters on the possibility of Monsanto controllingour food chain if Bt-brinjal is approved. Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to say that

19Jairam Ramesh, letter reproduced in MoEF (2010) Decision on Commercialisation of Bt-BrinjalMOS(IjC)E&F 9 February 2010 (New Delhi: Ministry of Environment and Forests) I.2. para. 29.20The Tamilnadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore, had planned to release its OPVs at costthrough post ofces and small shops for wide availability and use in kitchen gardens. Interviews14 October 2010.


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public concerns about Bt-brinjal have been inuenced very heavily by perceptions of Mon-santo itself.

(MoEF 2010).

Other residues of claims made in opposition to Bt cotton were rejected; the Minister wrote:

Bt-cotton has catapulted India into second position in the world as far as cotton production isconcernedOver 90% of cotton farmers in India cultivate Bt-cotton. Studies done by the TataInstitute of Social Sciences, Mumbai challenges the popular NGO [non-government organiz-ation] belief that there is a link between Bt-cotton and persistence of farmer suicides especiallyin Maharashtra.

(MoEF 2010).

The ministers reasoning rejected claims of Bt cotton failure, but accepted caution onMonsanto and food security and food safety. Some agricultural scientists asked: whywould a Minister of the Environment rule on science concerning food safety? TheGEAC had appealed to international standards of food safety to legitimate its methodsand conclusions, and found no risks to food safety in the new crop.21 Conceptually, the min-ister shifted criteria for approval from standard international food-science testing to a higherlevel of precaution. His power to do so reects the logic of the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety, a protocol under the framework Convention on Biological Diversity: the Minister ofEnvironment rather than the ministries dealing with food and agriculture or science andtechnology had the structural power to make a nal determination. A leading opponent ofbiotechnology, Kavita Kuruganti of Kheti Virasat Mission, explicitly tied public consul-tation to the Cartagena Protocol (GM Watch 2010):

Public consultations are mandated in the Cartagena Protocol to which India is a signatory. Theenvironment minister is right in setting a precedent like this. He had faced opposition from theagriculture minister and science and technology minister on the issue.

International networks also played a role in producing counter-science to oppose theGEACs claim of compliance with international norms of food safety testing. The Ministercited a paper indicating a specic Bt food hazard, by Professor Gilles-Eric Sralini of CaenUniversity, France. It concluded: the risk on human and mammalian health is too high forauthorities to take the decision to commercialize this GM brinjal (MoEF 2010). ProfessorSralini had declared Bt eggplant unsafe in 2008. He specied hazards to humans in con-suming cry Bt proteins as organ toxicity and risk of organ failure, potentially resulting indeath. The science of Professor Sralini became critical in subsequent controversy becauseit was the only evidence cited by the minister for potential food hazards.

Counter-mobilization

Rejection of the GEAC decision caused many scientists in India to express concerns about thedenigration of not just state science but Science. The dominant strategy was to marshal scien-tic authority to counter doubts about Bt technology. Professor C. Kameswara Rao,

21The Committee cited guidelines from the Ministry of Science and Technology (2008), as well asguidelines of the Indian Council of Medical Research for foods derived from genetically engineeredplants which refer to the international standards of Codex Alimentarius Commission as adopted by theRCGM and the GEAC.


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Executive Secretary of the Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness and Education, Banga-lore, wrote to Minister Ramesh under the heading European food safety authority analyzesand dismisses the new Sralini paper. Professor Sralini had written of hazards without con-ducting any tests on any plants in India; the paper was not peer-reviewed. Moreover, his pub-lications indicating similar hazards of Bt proteins in other crops were judged faulty by statescience of the European Union. Of particular importance was a nding of the GMO [geneti-cally modied organism] Panel of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA):

The GMO Panel concludes that the authors claims, regarding new side effects indicatingkidney and liver toxicity, are not supported by the data provided in their paper. There is nonew information that would lead it to reconsider its previous opinions on the three maizeevents MON810, MON863 and NK603, which concluded that there were no indications ofadverse effects for human, animal health and the environment . The GMO Panel notesthat several of its fundamental statistical criticisms of the authors earlier study of maizeMON863 are also applicable to the new paper by de Vendmois et al..

Proceedings of the EFSA GMO Panel are not widely read even in Europe. Defenders of theGEAC ensured that this esoteric science was made available to the media. One article, by ZiaHaq of the Hindustan Times, was entitled Scientists slam key study behind Bt brinjal ban. Itappeared three days after the ministers decision. Noting that the decision had stirred consider-able controversy inEurope (some stimulated by networks of Indian scientists),Haq commented:

Experts now claim Sralini was unduly inuenced by the renowned international NGO Green-peace with its aggressive green agenda which sponsored the study, and never carried out a peer-reviewed laboratory study on GM crops he called hazardous, including Bt maize and Bt brinjal,its gene or seeds 22

(Hindustan Times, 2010a)

Having questioned the primary epistemic broker legitimating the Bt hazard story, Indian scien-tists publicized contrary expertise from Europe. Prominent scientists such as Marc VanMontagu and Klaus Ammann aided in legitimizing conclusions of the GEAC.23 Theseefforts had some effect. First, the Prime Minister whose cabinet was divided over the issue called a meeting to reafrm Indias commitment to biotechnology (and food safety andenvironmental integrity). Second, the Minister of Environment, stung by critiques that heignored science for political advantage, was quoted as saying: scientists are not Gods. Heinsisted, and continues to insist, that scientists disagree (see interview in Current Science2011). But one public statement expressed some doubt: I took a decision I may be wrong.24

The conceptual divide between the GEAC and the Minister was between risk and uncer-tainty. GEAC studies and tests found no credible evidence of hazard in consumption orgrowing the new crop. The minister called the tests incomplete and inadequate. As science

22Greenpeace Germany is acknowledged by Sralini as a funding source for the earlier work on organtoxicity in Bt maize; Greenpeace India is acknowledged for the paper used in the petition to theSupreme Court to block release of Bt brinjal.23Prof. Em. Klauss Ammann of the University of Bern is one of the founders of ASK-FORCE, anetwork of scientists for contesting claims about biotechnology. Prof. Em. Dr. Marc Van Montaguof Ghent University is the founder of the Institute of Plant Biotechnology for Developing Countries,and President of the European Federation of Biotechnology (EFB) and of the Public Research andRegulation Initiative (PRRI) in Delft, The Netherlands.24Hindustan Times (India) 14 February 2010. There is no question that the Ministers statement was aresponse to mobilization of national and international scientists. Pers comm. 22 January 2014.


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is inherently open-ended, all knowledge is contingent, subject to revision with new tests andnew data. Tentativeness of conclusions and the presence of unknown unknowns creategreat political uncertainty; hence the inevitability of what Gupta (2011) calls anticipatoryrisk governance. It is unclear how polities could know how to govern anticipatory risk:how cautious is cautious enough? In contrast to hypothetical or anticipatory risk, or uncer-tainty, the GEAC EC II had documented very specic hazards in current practice to whichany anticipated risk would have to be compared, most importantly exposure of farmers,laborers and consumers to pesticide residues (MoEF 2009 GEAC EC II: 1.2.4).

Counter-mobilization by scientists was politically ineffectual, however, as defenders ofthe GEAC had no institutional leverage where it could count. One tactical response wasforum shifting (Sell and Prakash 2004). On 23 April 2010, the NGO Foundation for Bio-technology Awareness and Education released a petition at a press conference in Bangaloreaddressed to the Minister of Agriculture, attempting to shift the forum to one more amen-able to biotechnology and leverage a split within the Union cabinet:

There have been protests from concerned scientists the world over on the irrational decision andits effects on Indian agricultural development. We present here a submission from 540 globalscientists to the Minister for Agriculture, Government of India, urging him to intervene andexplore how the Indian government can reverse the moratorium and release Bt brinjal for com-mercial cultivation, in the interests of both the farmer and the consumer.

(The Hindu 2010)

A second tactic was to emphasize that support of the GEACs science came not only fromscientists in Indian and international civil society, but from within the state as well: ICARand the Department of Biotechnology. The Minister of Agriculture, Sharad Pawar, wrote tothe prime minister that biotech innovations that withstood scrutiny should be vigorouslyencouraged. Pawar specically worried that public institutions in India would be discour-aged in their own rDNA research, to the detriment of Indian agriculture. The Minister ofScience and Technology, Prithviraj Chavan, concurred: slogan-shouting and protestscannot be allowed to cloud our scientic vision. Former Minister of Science and Technol-ogy Kapil Sibal argued that sound science could not be determined by popular protests.The director general of the Council for Scientic and Industrial Research (CSIR), Dr.Samir Kumar Brahmachari, argued that Bt fears were not substantiated, as did his predeces-sor at CSIR, Dr. R.A. Mashelkar.25An analysis by six elite scientic academies sub-sequently produced a judgment that Bt brinjal was safe, but this conclusion did not settlethe issue of public trust in state science.26

Media also played a political role in the counter-mobilization. A Financial Express(India) editorial on 16 February 2010, under the title On the side of science, voiced aview common among supporters of the GEAC:

The problem is the ministers apparent disdain for scientic process, opinion and institutionsand supreme faith in his, a single individuals, ability to make the right decision on what isa complex scientic exercise. That isnt good either for institutions or for decision-making.

(Financial Express (India) 2010)

25Quoted in Indian Express, February 15, 2010. On the cabinet split, see also Jayaraman (2010).26Their report reproduced some material from the Department of Biotechnology; an amended reportwith additional references was still held suspect for plagiarism. The matter was widely covered in theIndian and some international press; see for example AgBioWorld (2010).


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If the proposed new regulatory institution were to be established, the editorial asked, whatwould prevent future ministers from ignoring or overruling its ndings? This concernproved prescient. Once the GEAC ceased to have authority over rDNA plants, theinstitutional matrix of contestations around state science expanded, with unclear trajectory.The Supreme Court became involved, some states proposed GMO-free status, the legitimacyof eld trials became clouded and developers of Bt eggplant were taken to court on charges ofbio-piracy (C.K. Rao 2013). The institutional base of state science was fragmented as a con-sequence of mobilization around the GEAC decision and the Ministers subsequent actions.This turbulence illuminates the institutional question that confronts all embedding of sciencein political systems addressing biotechnology: new crops confront not a unitary knowledge ofScience, but rather the national specicity of state science.27

The national specicity of state science: dimensions and dynamics

Despite the idealized and strategically deployed conception of a unitary Science disem-bodied from and un-embedded in the gritty world of interests, operative state science takesspecic forms in different times and places. Climate change initiated a process that pro-duced an institutionalized global consensus on atmospheric science ndings of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Though rejected by some nations, somesocial groups and some scientists, IPCC ndings became largely authoritative and certainlyconsequential. There is no comparable global consensus on genetic engineering, onlynational implementations of science embedded in elds of power and administrative struc-ture. Observed differences over nations and time do, however, have speciable dimensions,and these contribute to explanation of variance in acceptance and rejection of rDNA plants.Robert Paarlberg (2001), in his examination of regulation in Kenya, China, India andBrazil, offered a four-fold typology of institutional arrangements and criteria for approval:promotional, permissive, precautionary and preventive. These approaches reect the cumu-lative effects of dimensions of national specicity of state science. The dimensions affectoutcomes in specic cases, but also change over time in response to politics. Comparisonof the two cases in India suggests specic dimensions that matter:

(1) Insertion of science into state structure. How and where science gets plugged intostate routines and institutions makes for differences in politics and outcomes. Auth-ority over transgenic plants in India was rst allocated to the Review Committee onGenetic Manipulation of the Department of Biotechnology. This institutionaliza-tion created a promotional setting in Paarlbergs schema; DBT was mandatedto promote biotechnology as a project of the developmental state. Subsequently,the GEAC was given authority under an act promoting environmental protection,not biotechnology; that institutional space is inherently more precautionary giventhe complexity of tracing ecological effects over time and uncertainty given thiscomplexity. Environmental ofcials and activists are more likely to recognizethe limitations on knowledge and the risk of unknown unknowns. This patternholds generally: ministries of environment are more likely to be precautionary intheir approach, ministries of agriculture and science/technology more likely to be

27This specication is more common in the economic policy literature but has been used by FranzSeifert to explore variance over time and space across Europe in mobilization against biotechnology(pers. comm.).


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promotional or permissive (Paarlberg 2001, 14856). The Indian cases conrm thisobservation. Indias cabinet was divided in the Bt eggplant controversy; a differentforum would have produced different results (Jayaraman 2010). The NGO FBAE(Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness and Education) presented its globalpetition from scientists defending GEAC conclusions to the Minister of Agricul-ture, not Environment, but the tactic failed because the forum itself lacked statutorypower. The new institution promised by Minister Ramesh now the BiosafetyRegulatory Act of India, or BRAI remained in 2014 stalemated in Parliament,precisely for the reason identied by Aarti Gupta (2011): the absence of any work-able science-society contract. One dimension of this stalemate has been thespecic location of regulatory science in the state: whether under the ministry ofscience and technology or environment and forests.

(2) Contending mobilizations vary. In the accounts of Sato (2007), Bonny (2003) andSchurman and Munro (2010), the interpretation of and active mobilization aroundbiosafety in civil society explain the trajectory of national differences. When askedwhy the Center had placed a moratorium on release of Bt brinjal, Prime MinisterManmohan Singh said in an interview with Science:

Biotechnology has enormous potential and we must make use of genetic engineering toincrease the productivity of our agriculture. There are NGOs funded from the US andScandinavian countries which are not fully appreciative of the developmental chal-lenges our country faces (Laxman 2012).

Similar assertions about foreign-funded NGOs blocking biotechnology have beenmade by cabinet ministers, particularly Agriculture, and are widely believed byscientists in India. Both foreign funding and NGOs, and especially the two in com-bination, are popular targets of criticism. But mobilization against the conclusionsof ofcial science by NGOs had no discernible effect on the near-universal adop-tion of Bt cotton. Farmer interests on the ground and in sub-national politicsremoved approval of transgenic cotton from the realm of both ofcial scienceand activist protests. Moreover, Minister Ramesh has stated: I didnt act underthe pressure of NGOs in the case of Bt Brinjal. But I must say that NGOs, attimes, try to hijack the debate (Hindustan Times 2012). It is clear that the Ministerhad prior doubts about the safety of Bt transformations; he believed that the fullprotocol of tests had not been completed, a view shared, he said, by prominentscientists such as Dr. M.S. Swaminathan (Current Science 2011).Comparison across the Bt cases reinforces Minister Rameshs point: NGO opposi-tion was a constant, not a variable. Nevertheless, mobilization was of critical impor-tance in a distal and path-dependent way. Social movements active internationallyagainst agricultural biotechnology successfully created an object of governancethrough lumping and splitting of gene splicing: making the GMO (Herring 2010;Schurman and Munro 2010). This framing success was so complete that the cat-egory is normalized in political discourse and administrative law; inclusion in thecategory entails special surveillance and control that create administrative chokepoints through which some, but not all, plants must pass, and in which power is con-centrated. These institutions enable a special kind of politics, where mobilizationsof expertise and counter-expertise overshadow broader democratic processes.

(3) Macro political structure. India is a federal union; the Constitution allocates auth-ority over some subjects, including agriculture, to the constituent states. Twoimportant cotton-growing states Gujarat and Maharashtra rejected GEAC


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authority in 2001 and in effect legalized Bt cotton months before the GEAC ruledthree hybrids bio-safe (the day after a farmer organization threatened a nationalstrike to demand release of the technology).28 In effect, cotton approval was afait accompli given politics at the state level. The institutional status of theGEAC was more directly and consequentially attacked in the brinjal case. MinisterJairam Ramesh consulted State governments after his decision to reject the GEACndings. Predictably, opposition surfaced, especially in states not governed by theruling Congress party. Many states (represented by either the Chief Minister orChief Secretary, some in writing, some by telephone) urged caution and delay ofapproval. The Minister stated in his decision (MoEF 2010, II.8, 3) that AllStates which have written to me expressed apprehension on Bt brinjal and havecalled for extreme caution.29 A verbal communication from Uttarkhand wasblunt: Ban Bt Brinjal.30 The contrast to Bt cotton is striking, but not surprising.Except for the Congress Party, all political parties had opposed GMOs in theirmanifestos for national elections in 2009. With a minister of agriculture in the Con-gress-led government at the Center supporting Bt brinjal, as well as the Prime Min-ister, opposition parties could expect state-level opposition to cause either a cabinetrift or provide a platform and organizations for populist mobilization against thegovernment. GMO-free states have been declared and bans on eld trials of rDNAplants at the state level have considerable support. These responses indicate thatsubnational variation affects the unity and stability of any national position ofthe kind presupposed by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which assumesnation states as unitary actors.

(4) Political ecology of agriculture matters. Before GEAC approval of Bt cotton, twomajor cotton-growing states backed their farmers demands over the slow scienticdeliberations and bureaucratic procedures of the GEAC. Why did state governmentsnot support new technology for eggplant farmers? Brinjal is in many ways ideallysuited to a populist political project. It is mostly grown on small family farms andis labor-intensive, unlike many specialized cash crops. Data from the All-India Coor-dinated Field Trials indicated that farmersmaterial interests were signicant. But thetranslation of these anticipatory interests into any effective political force did nothappen. First, farmers interests had not been made apparent through the undergrounddiffusion of illegal stealth seeds, in contrast to Bt cotton. Second, numbers count inpolitical arithmetic. Though India is the second-largest aubergine producer in theworld, after China, there are comparatively few farmers: only 1.4 million, farmingabout 550,000 hectares of land or roughly 0.36 ha per farmer.31 Cotton farmersnumber 6.3 million, on an area exceeding 12 million hectares. Third, collectiveaction was problematic because most farmers grow other crops as well. Interestsamong potential beneciaries are thus diffuse, rather than concentrated, and hence

28See Sahai (2002); Mehta (2005); Shah (2005); Herring (2006); Roy (2006); Scoones (2006).29See MoEF (2010 Annexure II: Letters from States/MPs, 85108). Gujarat, Maharashtra, WestBengal and Himachal Pradesh gave no ofcial communication of a decision (934). For analysis,see Rao (2010) and Jairam Ramesh (Current Science 2011).30My discussion with a party leader and cabinet minister in the state government of Kerala reectedthree reasons: most important, multinational capital in agriculture; second, food and safety concerns;third, biodiversity (Thiruvananthapuram, 16 December 2009).31The normal practice of farmers who grow brinjals is often diversication, not specialization. IndianHorticulture Data Base (2006); Choudhary and Gaur (2008, Ch 4).


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less conducive to collective action. There are no signicant exports, nor forwardeconomic linkages to engage broad developmental interests.Cotton, in contrast, is a major industrial input, earns signicant export revenues and isthus embedded in larger state and commercial interests with forward linkages andinternational consequences. The domestic linkage is to textiles, accounting forabout 5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Indias developmental stateinvested in such initiatives as the Intensive Cotton Development Program for improv-ing technology, production and marketing. Minister Ramesh, in announcing the mor-atorium, stated that Bt cotton had made signicant contributions to economicdevelopment, and mentioned specically Indias surpassing the United States incotton production (MoEF 2010). On the ground, these linkages and state programswere paralleled by farmer organizations supporting cotton and specically Btcotton, especially in Gujarat. State governments were not pressured to defend theinterest of brinjal farmers by any network of programs and lobbies. There is little evi-dence of systematic consultation with affected farmers. There are farmer organiz-ations, and numerous NGOs, that claim to speak for farmers, but the representativenature of these claims is quite contested (Omvedt 2005). Yet representation maynot be critical; the GEAC data suggest that interests are strong enough for stealthseeds to diffuse underground like the illicit Bt cotton seeds; there is anecdotal evi-dence that this is happening.32

(5) Variations in what must stand before the bar of state science. Not all plants need of-cial approval. The rationale for putting a transgenic eggplant before the bar of statescience was the use of rDNA to introduce a trait insect resistance that could notbe produced by breeding with selection and crossing because the relevant gene isabsent from the genome. Ministers of Agriculture and Science and Technology wereconvinced of the safety and efcacy of the plants. But because the new trait was intro-duced by rDNA techniques, this agricultural crop became subject to a decision by aMinister of Environment. That outcome is a path-dependent effect of the regulationof agricultural biotechnology under an environmental protection act. Had the Btbrinjal been produced by mutagenesis, rather than transgenesis, for example, itwould not have needed special clearance. This is true even though there is evidencethat mutagenesis may produce more transcriptomic errors than transgenesis (Batistaet al. 2008). India has 259 mutagenized cultivars in the ground, none of which wentthrough the GEAC. One of these is a brinjal specically, Dehra Dun local, trans-formed by gamma radiation. The plant is registered with the Joint FAO/IAEA Div-ision of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture.33 There are globally only vemutagenized eggplants registered with the International Atomic Energy Agency, theother four being in Italy. Had the Bt trait resulted from modifying the plants geneticmaterial by gamma radiation, or mutagenic chemicals, rather than from insertion of atransgene, it would not have faced the bar of state science at all.

32Kishor Tiwari, leader of the Vidarbha Jan Adolan Samiti campaign, stated: Bt.brinjal is being soldin Maharashtra without any permission, Narendra, 7 February 2010. Underground production ofOPV Bt brinjal seeds is far easier than Bt cotton hybrids. Many anecdotal reports of stealth plantingshave been conveyed to me, but without hard evidence. Mahyco tested one report, but it proved false(interview, Usha Barwale, October 2011).33Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture and FAO/IAEA Agricul-ture and Biotechnology Laboratory, Seibersdorf, of the International Atomic Energy Agency inVienna (http://www.iaea.org).


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Limits of state science: risk and interest

Comparison of the cases of Bt cotton and Bt brinjal in India illustrates both the limits ofstate science and its importance. It is limited rst in what claims science itself can make;certainty is inherently tentative, uncertainty pervasive, knowledge pluralism inevitable(Giddens 1999). State science is additionally limited by its very embeddedness in particularstates, connected to political institutions and actors with interests. The free-oating dis-interested conditions for autonomous enquiry are difcult to claim credibly in state insti-tutions. Moreover, the science produced by a state institution cannot escape any penumbraof doubt surrounding the institution itself; few institutions are universally trusted. Distrustof the state in general is animated from many angles of the political spectrum, left to right.Yet the importance of settled knowledge on scientic matters involving risk confrontssociety continually: global warming, novel pharmaceuticals, pesticide residues in foodand water, disease vectors and pathogens even cell phones. In the absence of certainty,risk is socially constructed, politically decided; variance on these dimensions matters indifferential consequences of state science.

Not all issues of state science create contentious politics; much is routinized and nor-malized. Agricultural biotechnology is an exception in much of the world. Indias experi-ence with two transgenic crops illustrates both what is at stake in the global rift anddimensions of contention between rival networks confronting scientic uncertainty, risksand interests (Shah 2011). The state science that was established to authoritatively settlesuch issues in India instead became a fulcrum of attack and defense in mobilizing forand against biotechnology. Both proponents and opponents claimed the authority ofScience, and attacked or defended the specic state science instantiated in the GeneticEngineering Approval Committee (GEAC). During 16 years of approving germplasmtransformations, mandating eld trials, assessing results and approving over a thousandBt cotton hybrids, the GEAC was the institutional locus of regulatory science for geneticengineering in agriculture. Confrontations over its approval of Bt brinjal successfully chal-lenged its scientic conclusions and diminished its authority. The result was a broader,more fragmented and unstable institutional conguration. Subsequently, it becameunclear where authority for regulatory science resides. Critical to this outcome was thenational specicity of state science in which the Minister of Environment and Forest haddecisive power. But the trajectory for biotechnology is unclear; structural power remains,but individuals change. Veerappa Moily, as Minister of Environment and Forests, author-ized in 2014 eld trials of transgenic crops that had been banned for a year; his predecessor,Jayanthi Natarajan, had declined to do so because of a recommendation by the TechnicalExpert Committee of the Supreme Court, which sought a moratorium until a new indepen-dent regulatory system could be established. Regulations from Delhi may not be decisive,however. State Governments of Maharashtra and Punjab, both major agricultural states,gave approval to eld trials even as most states declined to proceed before the SupremeCourt case was settled.34 These elements of a fragmented system await but resist a nationalpolitical resolution on how and where to re-constitute state science.

Democratic resolution of these institutional questions is inherently difcult. The Carta-gena Protocol on Biosafety assumes that nation states have national policies and act asunitary actors internationally. Not only is there a normative treaty consideration, it is unlikely

34Press reports from multiple sources; e.g. Business Standard, 2014. The two Ministers disagree onthe implications of the pending Supreme Court case. The situation is currently unstable and willremain so until at least after the elections of 2014. For analysis, Gupta (2011).


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that a system of vetting controversial crops differentially by farm, village or state wouldsatisfy anyone. The Bt cotton case demonstrated that individual state policies such asbanning particular Bt cotton hybrids failed: farmers simply obtained their favored cultivarfrom a neighboring state or underground markets (Herring and Kandlikar 2009). Seedsmove. Interests of farmers in new seeds may or may not conict with broader societal inter-ests organized around anticipatory risk.With Bt cotton, interests drove the evasion of biosaf-ety controls in underground seed markets; with Bt brinjal, farmer interests wereconspicuously absent from the public debate: hypothetical societal risk dominated potentialmaterial effects on farms. What is known about farmer interests is known because regulatoryscience in India, unlike some countries, requires multiple layers of different-scale eld trialsto assess effects. Interests of farmers were, however, sidelined by disputes over how to codeuncertainty on biosafety issues. The translation of uncertainty to acceptable or unacceptablerisk is a political decision and largely ignored particularistic interests of farmers or developersof new crops.

There is putatively a general public interest in biotechnology, as explicitly spelled outby the developmental logic of the Government of India, similar to that of China and Brazil.There is a public interest in biosafety as well. The GEAC was tasked with balancing thoseinterests on the basis of scientic knowledge. Consensus on the shape of some optimal risk/benet balance is difcult to reach because of inherent ambiguities in who represents thepublic in public interest. Representation of any public interest through electoral means isdifcult. Fractionalization of political parties has produced a quite divided polity nationally;no party has majority popular support and states have markedly different political complex-ions. Civil society likewise does not speak with one voice: divergent positions were takenby NGOs claiming to represent societal interests in the two cases. The rst ofcial report inIndia, in 2010, found 3.3 million registered NGOs, but admitted to signicant undercount-ing.35 Europe faces the same dilemma. State science of the EU on bio-safety of transgenicplants, congruent with the conclusions of independent research and a number of nationaland international scientic academies, has not settled anything in politics.36 Decisions atthe farm and ofcial levels are widely contested by social movements; EU directives arefrequently ignored by constituent states, leading to disputes before the European Courtof Justice over refusal to follow EU law and international trade disputes with othernations (Kanter 2010; Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes 2011). Differences at the level ofboth formal politics and civil society organizations resist any consensual conclusion on aunitary representation of public interest in biotechnology.

Successive governments in India have stated a national interest in genetic engineeringas a project of the developmental state. Ambitious goals, backed by state power andresources, and led by the Department of Biotechnology, were announced in 1986.37 Thevision resembled that of China, which likewise began with development of Bt cotton.But Indias rst crop, unlike Chinas, was developed in the private, not public, sector;

35Shukla (2010). About INR 9,700 crore was raised in 20072008 by foreign contributions, morethan half of total social sector expenditure by the state in the XI plan, underscoring the critiques ofseveral ministers of undue foreign inuence. See Cooley and Ron (2002) on NGO dynamics.36European Commission Directorate-General for Research (European Union (EU) Research Directo-rate, 2010, 16). A more recent review is Nicolia et al. (2013). A sampling of national academies isprovided by the Genetic Literacy Project: http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2013/08/27/glp-infographic-international-science-organizations-on-crop-biotechnology-safety/#.Uo_I4ihOS-J37See annual reports of the DBT, which covered a wide range of aspirations and included a nominalprovision for poverty alleviation, though the means were unclear.


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bio-property and multinational control became inseparable from assessment of crops onnarrow technical grounds of bio-safety risk. Nevertheless, the ofcial stance toward bio-technology was promotional, and some national developmental aspirations were realizedby Bt cotton: yields improved from the lowest in the world in the late 1990s to levels suf-ciently attractive that farmers planted an additional 3 million hectares of cotton, virtually allBt, in the 20092012 period. Import dependence in cotton was replaced by signicantexports. When an indenite moratorium was put on Bt eggplant by the Minister of Environ-ment in 2010, the Minister of Agriculture wrote to the Prime Minister that the resultinguncertainty would hamper ongoing research in public-sector institutions on transgenicpotato, tomato, rice, mustard, chickpea, groundnut and pigeon pea, to the detriment ofIndian agriculture. His position was underlined when Kerala State wrote to the Ministerof Environment in 2010: States policy decision is not to allow GM crops, even eldtrials; declare a moratorium at least for the next 50 years (MoEF, 2010, Annexure II:Letters from States/MP's , pp. 85108). Without clear procedural guidelines and nationalcriteria, both public and private-sector investment would be discouraged. If there can beno eld trials, there can be no regulatory state science at all, and thus no state-approved bio-technology. Without data from eld trials, it is difcult to know when enough precautionhas been exercised or what the effect of new varieties on farmers would be. Statescience then becomes hamstrung because the government can hardly promote a sector ofthe economy without convincing citizens that it can assess, monitor and control the technol-ogy to assure safety. Moreover, state science provides a layer of insulation from privateinterests, at least in theory; assessments by Monsanto scientists of Monsanto transgenicswould hardly carry legitimacy. This charge of corporate inuence was made about theGEAC, adding to uncertainty about its independence.

The Indian cases thus highlight the vulnerability of state science to a politics of risk.Constructions of risk are culturally and temporally contingent but have powerful politicaleffects (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Latour 2003). Science itself has no normativeclaims about risk preference, nor method; there is no authoritative guide to how much evi-dence is enough evidence, how cautious is cautious enough. Nor can science conclusivelyrule out consequences unexpected from currently settled knowledge: any long-establishednding may be overturned by new evidence or new analysis (Giddens 1999). Risk-aversepublics demand certainty; science can respond only with to the best of our current knowl-edge. All science is thus epistemically vulnerable in politics; state science adds vulner-ability by its embeddedness in particular institutions. The science produced by theGEAC could not be divorced from the institution itself, which had been subject to numer-ous critiques and challenges, many of which involved interests: the absence of autonomyand independence.38

Within the politics of uncertainty and risk, the comparative cases conrm the generalnding that food safety is especially prominent (Schurman and Munro 2010; DeFrancesco2013). Demands for proof of complete safety (Gene Campaign) cannot be met throughany mechanisms of normal science; some uncertainty is inevitable. Food safety more gen-erally is the fulcrum that differentiates an unstable line between permissive and precau-tionary approaches. China responded to the global food crisis of 2008 with plans not onlyto expand offshore production via land acquisition, but to further develop biotechnologythrough state institutions for food security. In 2009, bio-security certicates were issuedfor phytase

state science, risk and agricultural biotechnology.pdf

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