state of women in pakistan

8/7/2019 State of Women in Pakistan

1/27

State of Women in Pakistan

Introduction:

Woman is one of the best creatures of the universe. She has been equally endowed with in

terms of intellect, prudence and rights as man has been.The state of woman in Pakistan as

compared to man are awfully miserable. She is badly victim of domestic violence and sexual

assaults at working places. She is indeed meted out with massive atrocity and injustice. Sheis being denied her due social, economic, political and financial rights. She suffers badly in

pursuit of her fundamental rights.

Surprisingly enough, she has been deprived of her basic birth right of education which is the

best source of women empowerment. It is only education that can empower her not only

socially but also financially and professionally. It will be because of education that helps her

widen the mental horizon. Thus, it is an undeniable fact that provision of education to every

ordinary woman on the basis of equality can considerably change her fate. Undoubtedly,

education plays a role of backbone in the development of woman at every level.

The state of rural women as compared to urban ones needs urgent attention. The rural

women are undergoing worst experiences at the hands of feudal lards. The have been kept

vastly ignorant of their fundamental rights such as education, health, participation inpolitics, professional and financial liberty. They being illiterate and uneducated can not fight

for their basic rights. This gruesome state of woman is just because of lack of education.

Inevitably enough, poor economic condition of woman has badly told upon state of woman.

She has no say in any domestic affairs of life. She has been victim of male dominance. It is

only male, who is to wield power in both domestic and private affairs of life. Whether it be

choice of marriage, casting votes and some other financial and professional matters.

There is another social evil of our society which is feudalism. It wipes out the entire factors

which help woman to be empowered. It has really become a stumbling block in woman

Empowerment. This social evil urgently needs to be addressed so that the chances of

woman empowerment can became possible in the near future.

Truly speaking, the poor state of woman can only be improved by promoting educationranging from primary to higher level and opening up the doors of opportunity for jobs in

different departments. So that they can become socially, economically, politically and

professionally strong.

Factors which mar state of women in Pakistan

Illiteracy

Poverty

Feudalism

Weak institution

Judiciary

Parliament Executive

Lack of Political awareness

Cultural barriers

Misinterpretation of Islam in terms of woman empowerment

Corrupt media

Illiteracy:


2/27

Illiteracy indeed is a big obstacle to the social, economic and political development of

woman. It has rendered common woman the helpless, voiceless and ignorant of their basic

privileges. They being illiterate and under privileged cannot voice against the atrocities

meted out to them. They have been reduced to extreme voracity and hunger. The

developed nations of the world are encouraging woman empowerment by promoting

standard education to women. Thus, they become strong not only socially and economicallybut also politically and professionally while the less developed countries are questing for

foreign aid in terms of female education and spends a negligible amount of education and

the rest of the amount is to be swallowed by the corrupt people and overlooking the

standard of female education. As a result, most of the women remain illiterate and become

unaware about their birth rights of education.

Finally, if education is given to women, they can easily become able to snatch their

fundamental rights. They can also become capable of doing profession and thus avoiding

the pangs of hunger and voracity.

Truly speaking, promotion of education among women can enable them to be economically

and politically strong. Thus, they will stop depending upon their parents in terms of financial

support.

Poverty:

It is well said that poverty is the mother of crime or revolution. So far it has not brought

about revolution in society but it has surely raised the ratio of crime in society. Poverty and

illiteracy are inextricably interwoven with each other. Illiteracy breeds poverty and poverty

creates crime and crime disrupts the whole social economic. As a result, not only the

women but also the entire society suffers at the hands of poverty. There is no doubt about it

that poverty has rendered common women unable to attain even primary education. Thus

many a woman falls prey to it becoming helpless and fed up. It is only because of poverty

that woman is socially, economically and politically weak. If all women were rich enough to

deal with all affairs of life, they could exercise enormous influence in every spheres of life.They usually depend on their male members in terms of economic and social security.

Resultantly, they turn, to be enormously weak and fragile. Poverty has really affected on

the creative ability of women. It has bred numerous hindrances in the way of womens

intellectual development. As it is rightly said that hungry man is angry man. It means when

you are hungry, you are not in a position to do any work effectively. Thus it can safely be

said that if poverty remains intact then there is a greater unlikelihood of women

empowerment and the state of poor woman cannot improve in near future.

Feudalism:

Feudalism is a greater impediment to social, economic and political development of women.

It has utterly damaged the state of women in Pakistan. Feudalistic attitude in any society is

not a good omen. It often discourages national development of a country.Regrettably enough, the state of women in Pakistan has been reduced to the beasts and

animals. It is only feudal who exercise absolute power over women and their male member

are at their call and back. They dare not voice against their opinions or views. They are their

slaves and nothing more. The poor farmers whether male or female heavily depend on them

for their livelihood. They have no any source of income except harboring the fields of

landlords. Moreover, feudalism is a huge hindrance to educational development whether it is

for girls or boys. They dont allow the government to build schools in their premises. If


3/27


4/27


5/27

warrior. Bibi Aysha Prophets wife a war against Hazrat Ali. It means that she can wage a

war participate in it. Thus it is proven from the facts of Islam that women are free to be

professionals and adopt any way that can protect her basic rights of liberty. But regrettably

the ulema of Islam are not discussing these basic issues of women empowerment in open

public. They can address these issues at the occasion of Juma prayer frequently and this

frequent discussion can remove rigid and narrow minded approach toward women. ReqularJuma prayer address regarding the state of women in Pakistan can mould the opinion of

common men in favour of women. In this way every ordinary man will be vastly aware of

the rights of women. As a result, of all these repeated address, as about women

empowerment can help the masses to care for the privileges of women. But what happens

here that every ulema belonging to the lower category who are virtually hailing from

villages admit in madressa for the purpose of gaining religious knowledge. Now how can

man hailing from village can easily understand the multi dimensional modern scientific

trends and requirements of the globe. This seems quite impossible that this kind of man

may represent true Islam. He cannot fathom out the various global phenomena such as

woman empowerment, rise of democracy, professional and personal liberty, religious

tolerance.Finally, the role of ulema can play an effective role in bringing about the improvement in the

state of women and it can further develop the state of women in better condition.

Corrupt media:

Corrupt media men have played havoc with socio-economic and political development of

women. It has not yielded positive result yet. It has failed to protect the real state of

women of Pakistan at international level. Majority of the poor women being victim of

domestic or professional violence cannot cast their viewpoints before any authorized

organization of the state. The reason as to why the media has not reached them is lack of

access to the far flung areas of the country. Most of the media men demand for certain

amount of rupees for projecting their issue at national as well as international level. These

are number of women who die of hunger daily. They cannot eke out their living comfortably.The media persons are absolutely reluctant to spread the news at a considerable level. But

on the contrary they make fun of their misery and plight. In this way one can find such

examples in our society on daily basis.

Now it is our responsibility being citizens of the country that we should exercise enormous

pressure on the media men to end this brutal trend of women harassment which bitterly

mass the state of women.

The factors that can foster women development are as under:

Promotion of education among women.

Reduction of poverty.

Abolition of feudalism. Strong institution ensuring women empowerment.

Social, political, cultural financial and professional liberty among women.

Positive role f religions in terms of women empowerment.

Job opportunities for women.

Legislation on honor-killing, child marriage and vatta-satta system of marriage.

Promotion of education among women:

Promotion of education among women at primary and secondary level can greatly improve


6/27

the state of women in Pakistan. Indeed it is education that renders common women socially

politically and economically strong. When they become strong, they stop being dependent

on their parents in terms of support. Thus the state of women can highly be improved by

the incredible enhancement of education among them.

Reduction of poverty:

This is an undeniable fact that poverty has wreaked havoc with socio-economic and politicaldevelopment of women. It is poverty that has made them unable to get standard education.

It is because of lack of education less access to wealth that women face sheer injustice and

torture at the hands of cruel and barbaric people. They bear that torture and persecution in

ignorance. As a result, most women fall succumb to depression and dejection. If the

government of Pakistan and other several NGOs working for the reduction of the poverty

take it serious and start pondering over the plight of woman that she suffers because of

abject poverty can easily be managed so as to make the state of women better and worth

living.

Abolition of Feudalism:

Truly speaking, it is feudalism that has brought common woman to the verge of destruction

and devastation. It has become a great hurdle in improving the state of Pakistan woman. Ithas incredibly discouraged promotion of education of both male and female in rural areas in

particular and common in urban areas. It means it has utterly damaged the state of women

in Pakistan. Now it is the crying need of the hour that it must be wiped out of the face of the

globe so that the state of woman and colossal development at national level can be ensured

for the better future of the country. Because developed countries of the world see the

development of women in different sphere of life. Later they call the developed countries

the developed ones. If the state of women is not plausible then they do not call it a

developed country.

Strong institutions:

Strong institutions play a vital role in developing socio-economic and political condition of

women. Undoubtedly, strong institutions can certainly provide for speedy justice and viableimplementations of different laws passed by the assembly. If these institutions start working

effectively and honestly, nothing can do wrong in the country. All the developed countries, it

is just because of their strong institutions that they face no pangs of torture and persecution

at the hands of the institutions.

Again it is institutions that can help improve not only the oppressed women but also every

segment of society, victim of any oppression and brutality. Social, political, cultural,

financial and professional liberty can massively improve the state of women in Pakistan.

Social and political development of women can help them to be socially and politically active

and enabling them to participate in social-politico activities of life. This will enhance their

intellectual and personal qualities. On the other hand, financial and professional liberty of

women can also make them self reliant and self dependent. They will deal their matters oflife on their won. They being professionally liberal begin their independent life depending on

no body in terms of economy. Thus, socio-economic and political liberty of women can

enormously add to the development of women in every walk of life.

Positive role of religious scholars in terms of womens empowerment:

Religious scholars can play a positive role in bringing about improvement in the state of

women. Ours is a highly religious society. It greatly influences their socio-economic spheres

of life. It is religious scholars who can easily mould the opinions of various persons in terms


7/27

of developing the social, economic and political development of women. Islam is also in

favour of women empowerment. It was Islam which gave her due socio-economic rights. It

never discouraged their professional and personal liberty. But here the ulemas of our

country are not addressing there sensitive issues so as to develop their role in every walk of

life. Last but not the least, the state of women can massively be improved if the role of our

religious scholars remains positive and satisfactory.Job opportunities for women:

Indubitably enough, job opportunities for women in different departments are very scanty.

This has badly discouraged women from applying for the jobs. They have least means to

scraps by. As a result, most of them get fed with seeking for something than can meet their

incomes. Thus it is inevitably necessary that our government should open the doors of

opportunities for their jobs in various departments so that they can make the best of their

abilities in earning certain amount of sum and lead an easy and comfortable life. This will

further encourages the women empowerment and make them excited for applying next

time for the jobs.

Legislation on honour, killing, child marriage of girls and system of vatta-satta marriage:

Traditional honour-killing, child marriage of girls and system of vatta-satta marriage hasawfully maligned the state of women in Pakistan. These hateful traditional practices are

extremely obnoxious for women development. If the present phenomenon remains intact,

the development of women at socio-economic and political level might be least possible. It

is now crying need of the hour that government of Pakistan, should legislate on these

sensitive issues which halt women empowerment at a large scale parliament, judiciary and

executive may take strong measures in order to tackle these in for moldable problems

which are extremely injurious to the social, economic, political professional progress of

women. If these institutions are failed to cope with these issues then surely the state of

women in Pakistan is in great jeopardy.

Conclusion:

Finally, the state of women can only be improved on the basis of promotion of education,greater participation in politics and widespread awareness about social, economic and

political issues. Professional and financial liberty can further improve the state of women.

Reduction of poverty and feudalism can open numerous chances for the improvement of the

state of woman in Pakistan. Positive role of religious scholars and media can hopefully

ameliorate the miserable state of women in to a pleasant one. Last but not the least, the

role of strong and cogent institutions can also heighten the state of women of Pakistan.

Words: 3,856


8/27

Economic Problems

EVER since its birth almost 60 years ago, Pakistans economy has been on a roller-

coaster. It does well when foreign capital flows become available to the country.

This happened in the first seven years of President Ayub Khans tenure whenAmerica poured in economic and military assistance into the country. The

consequence was a pick up in growth with the rate of increase in GDP improving

to more than 6.5 per cent a year.

In the first post-independence decade, the GDP had increased by only 2.7 per cent

a year. The American flow of money was in return for Pakistans participation in

the defence pacts sponsored by the US to contain the spread of communism to

Asia. Americas help stopped after Pakistan went to war with India. It resumed

again but at a much reduced level.

In the 1970s, Pakistan isolated itself from the West first by initiating militaryaction against the secessionist forces in East Pakistan and then by opting for an

independent foreign policy. Under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan built

strong relations with China, a country that was out of favour with the United

States.

Accordingly, Bhuttos Pakistan was not a favoured destination for foreign

assistance. His socialist policies which led to the nationalisation of large scale

industries and commercial banks were not popular with such development

institutions as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. They also reduced

the amount of assistance provided to the country. There were other reasons for

the economys poor performance during the Bhutto period, but fall in foreign flowsplayed an important role. The rate of growth in GDP declined to only 3.9 per cent

in 1971-77.

Pakistan did not immediately return to favour following the demise of Bhuttos

regime. That happened in 1980 following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet

Union. Once Pakistan signed on as a very active partner in the American effort to

force Moscow out of Afghanistan, foreign flows started in large quantities once

again. That led to a pick-up in GDP growth; it increased to 6.5 per cent a year. But

the flow of American money began to dry up again once Pakistans job was done

and the Soviet Union vacated Afghanistan. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush

failed to certify that Pakistan was not engaged in developing a nuclear bomb. Thatcertificate was a condition of continuous American support. In its absence, US aid

stopped flowing.

In terms of foreign capital flows, the 1990s were a difficult period. The decision by

the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to follow India and carry out

nuclear tests in May 1998 resulted in western sanctions being imposed on both

countries. Once again, there were other reasons for the slowdown in economic


9/27

growth but a decline in the availability of foreign capital was an important

contributing factor. The rate of GDP increase declined to 4.7 per cent a year in

1988-99.

The military government that took office in October 1999 had to wait for two years

before Pakistan gained favour once again with the West, in particular with theUnited States. That happened immediately after the terrorist attacks of September

11, 2001, on the United States. Large amounts of foreign assistance began to flow

into the country after General Pervez Musharraf pledged his full support for the

American war against terrorism.The economy benefited from the opening up of the

aid tap. America also helped by easing Pakistans debt burden. The rate of GDP

increase began to pick up in 2003. For the 1999-2006 period, I estimate GDP

growth at 5.7 per cent a year. The conclusion from this quick overview of the

performance of the economy over the last 60 years is obvious: there is a direct

relationship between Pakistans economic performance and its foreign policy.

Pakistan is about to hit a rough spot again. What happened in 1965 when thecountry fought a sharp and brief war with India and what happened again in 1989

when Pakistan, working with the United States, was able to force the Soviet Union

out of Afghanistan, is going to occur again. History will repeat itself, perhaps not

this year, perhaps not also in 2008, but most likely in 2009 when the reins of the

American government will change hands in Washington.

What I am referring to is the likelihood of the withdrawal of American assistance

to Pakistan. This will happen as the situation worsens both in Iraq and

Afghanistan and Washington, under a new set of leaders, begins the process of

pulling out of these two countries.

Two, not so subtle changes are afoot in Washington. The first is a growing belief

that it was wrong for America to attack Iraq and, once having attacked that

country, not plan properly to occupy it. For the moment, the critics of the Iraq war

and they are growing by the day as the number of American casualties mount

and the Sunni-Shia conflict takes on a sharper edge are of the view that instead

of spending more human and financial resources in that losing endeavour,

Washington should concentrate on Afghanistan.

The American invasion of Afghanistan and the defeat of the Taliban are generally

considered to be justified moves. It troubles many people that by going into Iraq,

Washington allowed itself to be distracted from what should have been its mainaim: to destroy for good the bases from which terrorists could attack America and

its interests, and to create an environment that would not produce movements

such as Al Qaeda.

The second change in thinking is equally important. For instance a recently

published book by a highly respected scholar, John Mueller, presents a case to the

American public that it did not adopt the right set of policies after the terrorist


10/27

attacks on its territory. Titled Overblown, the book argues that the United States

response to 9/11 not just the war in Iraq but the entire war on terror was an

overreaction. The response was overblown.

In his words: Which is the greater threat: terrorism, or our reaction against it? . .

. A threat that is real but likely to prove to be of limited scope has been massively,perhaps even fancifully, inflated to produce widespread and unjustified anxiety.

This process has then led to wasteful expenditures and policy overreactions.

The stage, therefore, is being set for America to pull back from some of the

forward positions it has taken since 9/11. There are many moments in the

countrys history when, after a military effort that produced unhappy results,

America withdrew into itself, leaving the world to take care of itself. Such a

moment arrived more than a century ago when its military involvement in the

Philippines became unpopular at home. The result was a period of isolationism

broken only by the First World War. America was reluctant to enter the Second

World War. It was drawn into it by the successful machinations of WinstonChurchill and the ill-advised Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

If the successor to President George W. Bush in the White House decides to

rewrite American strategy in the world he (or she) is very likely to abandon the

pre-emptive strike option that became the Bush doctrine. There is great likelihood

that the next US administration will leave the world more or less on its own.

If that happens, what will be the consequences for Pakistan? What I have said

above about the possible change in thinking by the American policy elite was by

way of a prelude to the suggestion that Pakistan is once again headed towards

difficult times. Contrary to what the countrys leaders have repeatedly said andpossibly believe in Pakistan has not prepared itself for the day when it will have

to stand on its own feet.

The economy has done well in the last three years for the simple reason that it has

received large amounts of external capital flows to produce savings for

investment. These flows have come from five sources: American assistance,

assistance provided by other donors, remittances by the members of the Pakistani

diaspora, investments by foreigners and foreign entities and capital raised in

international financial markets.

Four out of these five sources are likely to reduce the amounts they are preparedto direct towards Pakistan if political instability returns to the country and if

Islamic radicals gain further ground. If that were to happen, even the fifth source

the Pakistani diaspora may have serious misgivings about its continuing

involvement.

While the large amount of American assistance to Pakistan since 9/11 was the

product of that countrys preoccupation with terrorism, other donors, and foreign


11/27

investors were putting money into the country out of a conviction that Pakistan

needed to be helped or had some attractive opportunities available for making a

reasonable amount of profit for the willing investor.

These perceptions have also begun to change. Islamic militants are becoming

more assertive in the country lending to the increasing belief that Pakistan is not asafe place to do business in. The western press has also begun to project its belief

that Pakistan is getting involved in activities that are deeply resented by its

neighbours. On two days, February 19 and 20, 2007, The New York Times

published three stories that portrayed Pakistan in an unfavourable light. In one,

the paper detailed how North Waziristan had become the new base for Al Qaedas

operations.

Then there was the accusation by a senior Iranian official according to which a

Sunni group was using western Balochistan as a sanctuary and training ground for

mounting attacks on the countrys Revolutionary Guards. And, finally, there was a

story that militants operating out of Pakistan may be responsible for blowing up aPakistan bound train north of New Delhi. Nearly 70 people were killed in that

incident.

With likely reduction in American assistance, with the shying away of foreign

investors and with exports not increasing at the rate at which they can adequately

finance critical imports, Pakistan will have to rely almost totally on the amounts

sent from abroad by the members of the expatriate community. There are two

parts to this particular flow. One part constitutes the money sent in to support

families and friends. The other part represents investments made in the homeland

by the members of the diaspora. The second part will be in jeopardy if the

international community loses confidence in Pakistans economic future.

It is unfortunate and it is a consequence of the failure of public policy that

Pakistan is once again heading towards difficult times. It has made little effort to

provide a domestic base for the growth of the economy. Without such an effort in

place, Pakistan seems poised to take another plunge down the economic roller-

coaster.


12/27

High cost of the conflict

ECONOMIC costs associated with the pestering Kashmir conflict and the resultant

slowdown in the rate of economic growth can be estimated by using

counterfactual analyses of the type described in a previous article. This can bedone by estimating the cost of the conflict and likely benefits that would have

resulted had relations between the two countries been more amicable.

We can distinguish among four different costs of the conflict and than estimate the

benefits that would have accrued to the economy and to the society had India and

Pakistan been on better terms with each other. The four areas of likely benefit

include reduced military expenditures; increase in intra-regional trade, in

particular trade between India and Pakistan; a larger flow of foreign direct

investment; and an investor-friendly domestic environment.

There is no doubt that in the absence of the Kashmir dispute, military expenditureas a proportion of GDP would have been lower in the case of Pakistan than for

India. Small countries in the neighbourhood of large states tend to spend less on

defence if relations among them are cordial. In 2002, Argentina, for instance,

spent only 1.1 per cent of its GDP on defence compared to 1.6 per cent for Brazil.

For Canada, the proportion was only 1.1 per cent compared to 3.4 per cent for the

United States.

Even Bangladesh, that now has uneasy relations with India, the countrys much

larger neighbour, spent only 1.1 per cent on defence. If Pakistan had spent 2.5 per

cent on defence a proportion roughly equivalent to that of India it could have

saved as much as three per cent of GDP a year. Compounded over this period, theamount saved is equivalent to four times the countrys gross domestic product.

What would have been the consequence if this entire amount had been invested in

the economy? Assuming that the rate of return would have been the same as that

realized from investments in the past, additional capital flows into the economy

would have significantly added to the rate of growth of the economy. Put another

way, military expenditure maintained at a level of 2.5 per cent a year with savings

utilized at an incremental capital ratio of four which means that investment

equal to four per cent of GDP raises the rate of GDP growth by one per cent

would have increased the long-term GDP growth rate by as much as 0.75 per cent

a year. This addition to the rate of GDP growth compounded over a period of 55years would have meant an increase of more than 50 per cent in the size of the

gross domestic product.

While a smaller amount committed to military expenditure would have directly

contributed to increasing GDP growth, conflict with India also hurt Pakistan by

reducing trade as a proportion of its economy. Indias initial antipathy towards

Pakistan was not the result of the Kashmir dispute. The first generation of Indian


13/27

leaders in particular Jawaharlal Nehru, the countrys prime minister and Sardar

Vallahbhai Patel, the powerful interior minister in the first Indian cabinet were

angry at Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and his political associates.

Jinnah and his colleagues stood in the way of the realization of the Hindu

leaderships dream of a united India. The Indian leaders were also convinced thatthey could get Pakistan to return to the Indian fold by increasing the economic

cost of separation. It was this reason and not because of Kashmir that India

launched its first trade war against Pakistan. However, Kashmir later worsened

relations between the two countries and progressively loosened the strong

economic links that had existed between the two parts of British India before they

became independent states.

Had the two countries continued to trade at the level of the exchanges that

occurred before independence, the rate of increase in international trade in the

case of Pakistan would have been of the order of eight to 10 per cent a year,

rather than the average six per cent achieved over the last quarter of a century.This, too, would have contributed to increasing the growth in GDP.

The World Bank maintains that growth in trade leads to an increase in GDP by a

perceptible amount. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that by maintaining trade

with India at the levels of the late 1940s Pakistan would have added another one-

third to half a percentage point to its GDP increase. This would have meant an

additional one-third increase in the current level of GDP.

The other important outcome of good relations with India would have been

greater flow of foreign direct investment into the country. The contribution large

FDI flows have made to the development and modernization of the economies ofEast Asia is now well recognized. South Asia has not benefited from the increased

availability of these flows in large part because of the security problems

associated with the Kashmir conflict.

There were other reasons as well, among them the less open economic policies

followed by the countries in South Asia for nearly four decades. However, even

when these policies were abandoned in favour of greater openness and they

were in the early 1990s foreign capital still did not become an important

component of investment for the South Asian region. This was particularly the

case for Pakistan. Better relations with India and greater amounts of intra-

regional trade would have brought in additional foreign direct investment into thecountry, adding significantly to the relatively low level of domestic savings and

domestic investments. In 2002, Pakistan received $823 million FDI compared to

$3 billion for India. Both countries did poorly in that area compared to those in

East Asia. For instance, Malaysia received $3.2 billion, Thailand $2.4 billion, South

Korea $2.0 billion, and the Philippines $1.1 billion.

Foreign investors stayed away partly because of the less open economies of the


14/27

region but also because of the virtual absence of intra-regional trade and a deep

concern about security. If these concerns were not there, both India and Pakistan

would have attracted amounts of capital on the order of perhaps $10 billion for the

former and $2 billion a year for the latter. Two billion dollars of foreign flows

would be equivalent to three per cent of Pakistans GDP.

Pakistan has had a long history of poor domestic savings rates which translate

into low rates of investment unless foreign capital is available. In the 1990s while

domestic savings increased from 11 to 13 per cent from 1990 to 2002 gross

capital formation declined by four percentage points, from 19 to 15 per cent of

gross domestic product. The eight per cent savings-investment gap was covered

by foreign flows in 1990; the decline in foreign flows brought investment closer to

domestic savings by 2002.

Had foreign private capital been available in 2002 to the extent suggested above

in the neighbourhood of $2 billion a year this would have brought investment

back to the levels of the late 1980s. Foreign flows amounting to about three percent of GDP would have added about 0.75 per cent to the rate of economic growth.

A serious investment gap emerged between Pakistan and India in the 1990s at the

height of the insurgency in Kashmir. According to a study carried out by Ijaz Nabi

and his associates at the World Bank, private investment in India and Pakistan

was about the same in 1982-1991. However in 1992-2001, private investment in

Pakistan was six percentage points lower than in India. A part of this gap say

about 75 per cent can be attributed to the deterioration of the investment

climate in Pakistan caused by the rise of Islamic militancy in the country which in

turn was associated with the Kashmir problem.

These factors lowered investment rates in Pakistan by 4.5 percentage points

compared to that in India. This implies loss in growth of at least one percentage

point of GDP. Stable relations with India would have brought economic and

perhaps also economic stability to Pakistan. This would have produced better

investment climate in the country and contributed to higher levels of domestic

savings and investment. This would have also contributed to increasing the rate of

GDP growth.

By aggregating the four positive consequences for the Pakistani economy if the

country had not gotten embroiled in the Kashmir dispute, it would appear that the

countrys long-term growth rate could have been some two to two and a halfpercentage points higher than that actually achieved. A higher rate of growth of

this magnitude, sustained over a period of half a century, would have increased

the gross product by a factor of between 3.4 and 4.4. Pakistans gross domestic

product could have been three and a half times larger than that in 2003-04 $330

billion rather than $95 billion and its income per capita would have been $2200

rather than $630 had the country been at peace with India.


15/27

This estimate, of course, is a very rough order of magnitude. It is based on a

series of heroic assumptions about the efficient use of resources diverted from

military to development expenditure; about a significant increase in trade with

India and higher level of trade contributing to economic growth; about Pakistan

becoming an attractive area for foreign direct investment; and about domestic

savings and investment increasing with the presence of tranquillity in the region.Even if half of the benefits estimated above had been actually realized, they are

sizable and they would have changed the economic, political and social

complexion of Pakistan.

In sum a good case can be made that Pakistan, in particular, has paid a very heavy

economic, social and political cost for continuing to keep the Kashmir case on the

front burner. This is a good time to take a very hard look at the cost-benefit

calculus of the position the country has adopted in the past over the dispute in

Kashmir. The situation has begun to change largely because of the promise of

peace between India and Pakistan. New investments have begun to flow into the

country in particular from the Arab world; Pakistans own private sector hasbecome active; the rate of economic growth has picked up perceptibly; the

incidence of poverty has begun to decline; Pakistan now seems ready to join other

fast growing Asian economies. It would be a pity if Kashmir is allowed to

intervene once again in the form of a dispute that attracts extremist elements in

both countries. They will try to derail the process on which India and Pakistan are

currently engaged. Both Delhi and Islamabad must resist these attempts.


16/27

Security Implications for Pakistan

A nation's foreign and security policy formulation and execution rests on the

quality of its domestic polity. The quality of domestic polity, in turn, is based upon

the nature and type of its civil-military relations. Huntington argues, "Nations

which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a greatadvantage in the search for security...[and] nations which fail to develop a

balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run

uncalculated risk." [40]

Having discussed the causes of intervention we now come to the ramifications of

the intervention. What are the imperatives of the military regime for Pakistan's

security? In the first instance, has security under the military regime improved or

been undermined? How is security defined and interpreted under the military,

internally or externally? What view of security prevails and remains predominant

under the current regime? And more specifically, how does the present, overtly

military rule impact Pakistan's foreign security relations, especially vis--vis theUnited States, India, and Afghanistan? Is there any substantial foreign policy shift

in relation to these countries?

Today the concept of "security" can primarily be defined along two broad

dimensions: internal and external. Traditionally, this distinction was based upon

the assumptions that threats to a state's security arise from outside its borders

and that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and

usually require a military response if the security of the target state is to be

preserved. [41] In other words, a state's level of security and insecurity is defined

in relation to vulnerabilitiesboth internal and externalthat threaten to have the

potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial andinstitutional, and governing regimes. [42] Therefore, as Caroline Thomas explains,

in the context of developing states, "Security does not simply refer to the military

dimension, as is often assumed in Western discussions of the concept...[but also

to] the search for internal security of the state through nation-building, the search

for a secure system of food, health, money and trade, as well as the search for

security through nuclear weapons." [43] Thus, to ensure a state's security, a

delicate balance must be preserved and reconciled between the military and civil

society. The dilemma this relationship poses for a developing country is in the

question, "What if the two are mutually exclusive?" Or, "What if there exists an

inverse or a trade-off relation between the two?" In the context of developing

countries, promoting and strengthening one may weaken the other, since thebalance is so delicate and precarious to preserve either by civil or military regimes

in developing countries. For military regimes, achieving this balance tends to be

more difficult because of the fact that military regimes, more often than not, are

favorably disposed towards an economic-military view of national securitywhich

usually translates into forming an alliance relationship with external (super or

great) powers. Given this security paradigm, the questions arise as to how military

regimes in Pakistan conceive of national security, and how the present regime


17/27

contemplates the reconciliation between internal and external components of

national security?

Internal Security

The regime's primary stated objectives on the eve of the takeover were internal in

nature. These objectives included "putting the house in order," so to speak, bycreating a basis for economic development, building institutions, restructuring,

and establishing accountability. At the same time, the regime had also promised to

initiate the process of democratization at the grassroots level, and had given a

specific timeframe in which it expected to bring the plan to fruition. As such, the

drive for legitimacy was motivated internally. The regime has met with some

degree of success, in the eyes of some (this success appears marginal to others)

in its movement for accountability and collecting more revenue. It is interesting to

observe that, unlike the Ayub and Zia regimes, the present regime has not faced

significant political opposition. Rather, the main opposition comes from two other

sources. The first is the business classowing to the government's attempt to

impose tax reforms resulting in new taxes. The other set of people who couldconceivably defy the military regime are religious groups. Religious political

parties rose to the fore in response to the governments' proposed procedural

amendments to blasphemy law, which they found unacceptable. As a result of the

opposition from the business class and religious parties, the government had to

withdraw on both of these accounts. Despite the significant opposition from these

quarters, however, the corresponding political parties were unable to take

advantage politically on a national scale on the strength of these issues. Rather,

the politicians and political parties have responded in an opportunistic way to the

idea of local body elections (at the district level), and in a way have politically

accepted and facilitated the legitimization of military rule. This also suggests that

the military's success in intervening and maintaining its hold in Pakistan owes agreat deal to the gross inability of political parties to organize and align

themselves.

The Socio-economic View of Security

A cursory glance at the history of democratization in Pakistan reveals the trend

that the end of one economically progressive authoritarian regime marked the

beginning of an economically regressive civilian regime, and vice versa. For

instance, Ayub's eraknown as progressive in economic termswas followed by

the secession of East Pakistan (a political failure) and Bhutto's regime, whereby

industry received a setback as a result of nationalization policies. Similarly, during

the Zia era in the 1980s, Pakistan's economic performance was far better thanthat of most of the developing countries in the world. This period was followed by

the brief regimes of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir in the 1990s, during which time

economic activity and performance was at its lowest ebb, despite the opening-up

of the economy through measures like trade liberalization, privatization, and

deregulation.

Therefore, because of this pattern some economists are of the view that the


18/27

economic aspect of security improves during the reign of military regimes, while

the rule of political-constitutional governments produces economic chaos.

According to Shahid Javed Burki, "The type of democracy we had practiced under

two of our three constitutionsthe constitutions of 1956 and 1973had not been

good for economic development. These two constitutionsunlike the constitution

of 1962were given by civilian rather than military leaders. The first of these twoconstitutions had produced economic chaos. The secondthe Constitution of

1973was really operative in two periods. During both1973-77 as well as 1988-

99it had seen a dramatic slowdown in the rate of economic growth and a sharp

increase in the incidence of poverty." [44]

Nonetheless, what is significant and necessary is to quantify how much of the

economic development can be attributed to the good governance and managerial

performance of the military regime, and to what extent it is just a function of

foreign policy compliance resulting in the easy flow of international capital.

Second, economic benefits alone never present the full picture, unless we also

calculate the socio-political and economic costs (in the form of the deepening ofdebt crises for generations to come) associated with the decisions. While the

military regimes in Pakistan have been successful in negotiating and achieving

foreign policy objectives, their performance in the domestic theater has been

abysmal. It is quite obvious that the internal component of security weakens

during military regimes. For instance, both Ayub and Zia successfully concluded

separate economic and military package deals with the United States and

enhanced the economic-military view of security, but had severely negative fall-

outs in the area of internal security. The regimes of Ayub and Yahya Khan

culminated in the separation of East Pakistan. Zia's ten years of rule saw the rise

and upsurge of ethno-linguistic factions, the extreme polarization of society and

militarization of religious groups, along with an increase in the spread of guns,drugs, and social violence. The present regime again follows the trend of past

regimes in securing aid and loans from abroad, as comprehensive economic

packages are reportedly being worked out in Washington, the European Union,

and international financial institutions out of its foreign and security policy

compliances. [45]

The Impact of the Events of September 11

The events of September 11 have further complicated the issues of military

intervention and democratization of society and the polity in Pakistan. First, the

aftermath has given the military regime an international legitimacy, as Pakistan's

support and participation was critical to the United States in its fight againstAfghanistan. This may hamper and delay the process of democratization, owing to

the kind of legitimacy and financial support the regime enjoys from international

quarters. In other words, these circumstances may prove to be a replay of the sort

of situation present under the Ayub and Zia regimes. Second, the serious

ramifications of September 11 in terms of Pakistan's military regime are that in

drawing attention to its foreign policy-making role, it has also highlighted its

sensitivity to internal security policies. Though civilians and military may never


19/27

differ substantially on foreign policy choices, the military's explicit rule means

facing the wrath of the public. As the events following September 11 have shown,

the military's popularity and internal legitimacy have been eroded drastically.

Therefore, there is a shift in the regime's drive for legitimacy: from internally

driven to an externally or internationally oriented one. This may also mean a

greater compliance at the international level with the United States and the Westat the security policy level, translating into a more repressive regime internally.

Institutional Fall-outs

September 11 carries the most serious policy repercussions for national security

related organizations. In early October, General Pervez Musharraf moved swiftly

against military commanders who resisted his support for the United States,

forcing many to the sidelines or into retirement. Now, men who owe their jobs to

him personally fill all of the top army posts. Analysts of the Pakistani military say

that it amounts to a coup within a coup, and the most important change in twenty

years. [46] The dismissal and reshuffling of the top brass within the army can be

interpreted in two ways. It signals the friction or tension concerning theorganizational integrity of the armysomething never exposed before in such

clear terms. At the same time, it reflects the army's ability to resolve and

overcome national security policy-making dilemmas. This friction is natural once

the army evolves into an agent for security policy-making, rather than policy-

implementing,which is inherently riskier and dangerous. One analyst suggests,

"The friction itself may have been caused by certain structural imbalances that are

the product not so much of the military's internal working but its interaction with

civilian governments and the rise in its stature from implementers of policy to

makers of policy." [47]

In a move similar to this purging of military commanders, three top nuclearscientists were detained for questioning about their links and alleged sympathies

toward the Taliban. A more grave concern is not that the top brass generals and

scientists were dismissed over the perceived policy differences from within, but

for the extraneous reasons of their alleged allegiance and sympathies toward the

Taliban. These acts indicate a disturbing eagerness to acquiesce and accept the

influence of the United States and its interpretations of the security structure of

Pakistan.

The External Security Economic Front

As referred to above, the military regime has shown a somewhat better

performance on the external economic front by securing fresh loans and therescheduling of debt payments from international sources like the Asian

Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World

Bank. A profile of the government's cabinet also reveals a strategy of pursuing

economic management. These developments resulted in steady cash inflows and

debt restructuring by the new economic managers, even before September 11,

2001.


20/27

Nonetheless, complying with IMF reforms and adjustments means negating and

going against local and national industry and business, in the form of the

imposition of new taxes, price hikes in utilities and food, and taking away

subsidies. These policies created an environment discouraging investments by

domestic investors who become alienated and frustrated with the present regime.

This is a situation again quite unlike that of the Ayub and Zia regimes. The Ayubregime not only made foreign capital inflow available, but also augmented local

industry through financial incentives and reforms. Similarly, Zia also made

reversals on Bhutto's decision to nationalize and won the confidence of

local/national business and industry people. Meanwhile, the present regime seems

to be at odds with local business and investors and relies heavily on foreign

goodwill. The problem with foreign inflow is that it is highly volatile, inconsistent,

unreliable, and strategic in nature (since it depends heavily on the state of

international politics). Hence, too much reliance on foreign sources of financing

makes the regime more vulnerableand weakens national security in the long-

term perspective.

The scenario also implies, if a trade-off between internal security and international

security exists, that the present military regime is certainly disposed towards

achieving national security through strategies involving international security,

rather than through internal policy.

The United States

One of the common features that invariably all military regimes in Pakistan

emphasize is extremely good relations with the United States. This may be

because of a strange coincidence whereby military takeovers in Pakistan have

accompanied a resurgence in its geo-political significance in world politicsthus

making Pakistan a "frontline" state, and hence explaining the convergence of itsinterests and security policies vis--vis the United States.

Nevertheless, unlike previous military regimes in Pakistan who had other options

for conflict resolution (rapprochement with the Soviet Union, for example, during

the Zia regime)the present regime seems to be under intense pressure to

cooperate with the United States. [48] It may very well be that the regime was

already inclined to cooperate, but in any case for all practical purposes it had no

option other than to do so. Pakistan, upon resisting American wishes, would have

been perceived as harboring terrorists and hence considered equally responsible

for the events of September 11. In addition, India's readiness to join the American

coalition against Afghanistan generated greater impetus for Pakistan to join theUnited States as well. The gravity of the situation was reflected in General

Musharraf's statements that an alliance with the United States was a dire

necessity and Pakistan chose this option in order to save its strategic interests and

assets. At the same time, Pakistan is in pursuit of its legitimate concerns vis--vis

Afghanistan; that is, not to have an unfriendly and pro-Indian regime in post-

Taliban Afghanistan. The United States at the moment seems to take note of this

concern. However, the question arises, what if the Talibanpredominantly a


21/27

Pashtun entity that Pakistan has now antagonizedremains in one form or

another? What if the United States pulls out abruptly (as happened in 1990) and

leaves Pakistan once again to face the wrath of Afghan turmoil or civil war? What

if the United States stays for longer than required? What if the United States

becomes unable to set up a broad-based government in Afghanistan? What if the

Northern Alliance and other groups vying for power refuse to accept the Americanversion of peace? What if civil war persists?

The more pertinent issue here is to look for the degree of U.S. interests and hence

America's commitment to Afghanistan and the region. This would be a

determinant for explaining its security relations with Pakistan. At a very broad

level, U.S. interests seem to be a mixture of short and long-term objectives: from

the capture of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda forces, to the destruction of terrorist

camps, to routing out the Taliban, to oil pipeline and geo-strategic interests. These

do not relate to September 11 only, but instead date back even before that. [49]

Though the idea of the pipeline and geo-strategic interests are more often than

not denied by the representatives of the U.S. State Department, [50] nevertheless,they do talk of its viability indirectly, and the opinion that the economic benefits of

an oil pipeline will have a stabilizing impact for all states in the region, including

fostering a strategic stability in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Accordingly, the U.S. concern for Pakistan's strategic stability has increased

manifold owing to the following:

i) Pakistan's geo-strategic centrality for providing a foothold in Central Asia and

Afghanistan.

ii) The fact that most of the strategic analysts in Washington envisage the possiblescenario (although this currently has a remote chance of coming true) that

Pakistan, a country with nuclear capabilities, risks being taken over by radical

Islamists. Hence, the United States wants to reduce such a possibility either by

helping the regime in politico-economic terms or by evolving means to ensure the

safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

iii) The perceived need for greater control of fissile materials and its possible

leakage into "the wrong hands" through personnel working in Pakistani nuclear

installations.

iv) The desire to avoid nuclear war in the region. The India-Pakistan conflict andits escalation to an exchange of nuclear weapons is perhaps the more real and

probable threat than any of the above.

Hence, American interest in the stability of the present military regime is not

simply something related to the phenomenon of September 11 and its aftermath.


22/27

Right on the eve of the takeover, General Anthony C. Zinni, Commander-in-Chief of

the U.S. Central Command, said, "If Pakistan fails, we have major problems. If

[military strongman, Pervez] Musharraf fails, hard liners could take over, or

fundamentalists, or chaos. We cannot let Musharraf fail." [51] This was clearly

pointed out in a report published in the Washington Post, that it was Zinni who

"pushed the Clinton administration to open the diplomatic door with Musharrafwhen many demanded it be slammed shut. Convinced that Pakistan should be a

regional stabilizing force, he helped persuade Clinton to visit Musharraf in March."

[52]

It is equally important to recognize how Musharraf responded to the United States

on the eve of the takeover. "When the general finally placed his call it was not to

President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Defense Secretary

William S. Cohen or the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad. Instead Musharraf

telephoned Marine Corps General Anthony C. Zinni, who happened to be sitting

with Cohen at an airfield in Egypt. 'Tony,' Musharraf began, 'I want to tell you

what I am doing...'" [53] This suggests the usefulness of further study, beyondthe scope of this paper, on the deeper institutional links between Pakistan and the

United States, especially as to how military-to-military relations impact

democratization and polity in Pakistan. Some experts are of the view that

institutional linkages of this sort may be the cause of democratization in Pakistan,

as the U.S. military has become more sensitized over a period of time to the

promotion in an effective way of democracy in developing countries. [54] Such

linkages may act as an inhibiting factor preventing the military from intervening in

a given country. Similarly, the U.S. military can effectively exert pressure for a

return to democracy once a coup has taken place. Nonetheless, it can have the

opposite impact as well, as happened in the case of Pakistan in past decades. With

the realization of Pakistan's enhanced geo-strategic significance and Americanconcern for regional stability, the military's presence in the polity is bound to

prolong itself, as happened in the cases of Ayub and Zia. General Musharraf has

already indicated that he intends to remain as President and Chief of Army Staff

(COAS) even after holding the elections in 2002.

An issue related to the stability of the military regime is the nuclear program and

policy of Pakistan. Seymour Hersh, famous investigative journalist on nuclear

affairs, articulates this American concern: "The Bush administration's hunt for

Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network has evolved into a regional crisis that

has put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at risk, exacerbated the instability of the

government of General Pervez Musharraf, and raised the possibility of a nuclearconflict between Pakistan and India." [55]

The scenario envisioned by Hersh and a consequent contingency plan for

Washington as to what happens to Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the case of any

instability for the regime concerns taking care that those nuclear weapons do not

fall into the hands of religious extremists, with the possible involvement of not

only the Pentagon, but also the special-operations unit 262 of Israel. [56] This


23/27

presents a very bleak security scenario for Pakistan, implying that nothing is

secret and secured from Israel and the United States (and also suggests the

potential for the involvement of India, given its level of cooperation with the two).

Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi responded to the article in a very comprehensive manner,

asserting that the Pakistani army has established an elaborate and effective

command and control authority over nuclear weapons, ever since 1977. Inaddition, he also showed that over a period of time various forces have attempted

to defame Pakistan's efforts to become a nuclear state in the wake of Indian

nuclearization, by terming it as an "Islamic bomb" and speculating about a

possible attack on nuclear installations in Pakistan. [57] Though Dr. Rizvi has

emphasized that this is a speculative scenario, it is not inconceivable, given that

the American forces are already stationed in Pakistan, and considering the

historical level of distrust and the fact that despite the on-going cooperation

between the United States and Pakistan, American authorities, media, and think

tanks [58] continue to differentiate between the military and Pakistan's main

intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and subsequently

end up blaming ISI for non-cooperation with the Musharraf regime and the UnitedStates. Therefore, any change in government regimes in Pakistan (though the

chances are very remote, since it ignores the current institutional and societal

dynamics) is bound to be interpreted as a result of religious extremism.

At this point, it is equally important to recognize that the opposition and

resentment to the United States, and hence with the Musharraf regime, are of two

types: one which is obviously manifested in the streets of Pakistan is religious-

based activism; the second can be termed as a secular, genuinely nationalistic and

patriotic onepassive and institutional in nature. The problem with American

government, think tanks and media is that they are overwhelmed with radical

Islam and hence unable to make distinctions between these two types ofopposition, and increasingly the latter gets mixed up with the former one. This

could prove fatal for the United States in the long-term, where America sees states

like Pakistan either as blind and faithful allies or as religious extremists. In other

words, people and institutions with genuine patriotic concerns are likely to be

dubbed as radicals, and hence treated likewise. Therefore, the very rationale for

going all-out along with the United States, perceptibly in order to enhance stability

and security for Pakistan by the military regime, is not free from challenge and

criticism.

Afghanistan

Historically, U.S. policy towards Afghanistan had always been shared by andconverged with that of Pakistan. Contrary to popular belief, Pakistan never

followed an independent path divergent of U.S. interests and policies vis--vis

Afghanistan. The Taliban has been attributed as a creation of both the ISI (though

not acting alone) and the CIA, since both wanted strategic stability in the region.

[59] In fact, what happened after the Taliban established power was that the

Taliban's extremism, ties with Osama bin Laden, and refusal to cooperate with

Unocal (who had proposed the construction of a Central Asia Gas pipeline between


24/27

Turkmenistan and Pakistan that would have crossed western Afghanistan) made

the United States anti-Taliban. The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan in 1998, seen in

the context and events of September 11, represented a hardened and entrenched

U.S. position to do away with the Taliban.

It is generally believed that Pakistan has completely reversed its Afghan policyunder the military regime. However, this is not the case. Like other nations of the

world, Pakistan also felt alienated by the Taliban and considered the Taliban

government a liability due to its extremist policies and harsh treatment of women,

young Afghans, and western aid workers. [60] There was a series of events from

which Pakistan received diplomatic setbacks, such as the destruction of the

Buddha statues in Bamiyan in February 2001, sectarian criminals hiding in

Afghanistan, and the Taliban's inflexibility in dealing with United Nations workers.

In actual fact, Sharif pursued a policy towards the Taliban similar to that of the

current government. Recently it came out that Sharif's regime gave clearance to

U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. This was further supported by the

military's monitoring of religious institutionsthe maddrassasthat acted as asocial and financial support base for the Taliban. This leads to the fact that foreign

policy in regards to Afghanistan remains the same and in continuity under civilian

and military regimes in Pakistan. The events of September 11 increased the pace

at once of the United States as well as Pakistan to adopt anti-Taliban policies. Like

the United States, Pakistan is also in a quagmire regarding the possibilities for the

post-Taliban settlement in Afghanistan. Deposed King Zahir Shah and the Northern

Alliance are not attractive options for Pakistan. Pakistan has already annoyed the

Taliban and the Pashtuns, the ethnic group that makes up almost 40-45 percent of

the Afghan population. Similarly, the United States is also quite skeptical of the

predominant role the Northern Alliance could potentially play after the fall of the

Taliban. Both Pakistan and the United States are vying for a broad-basedrepresentative government in Afghanistan.

India

India's initial reaction to the change in government in Pakistan was not to

recognize the military regime. It was widely believed in India that General

Musharraf was the one responsible for the Kargil crisis and hence the exit of

Nawaz Sharif, and that peace and negotiations (the Lahore Declaration) were

something not acceptable to the Pakistani army. Nevertheless, owing to

Musharraf's peace initiative, force reduction at the Line of Control in Kashmir, and

U.S. pressure, India changed its stance. Subsequently, the Agra summit was

convened. Later, the ascension of the military regime was considered andinterpreted as an opportunity to settle down Kashmir, as the military was

considered to be the real entity with which to talk and strike a deal (and this was

the case even in times when a civilian regime was in power). It was also believed

that the military enjoys greater popularity than political regimes. The Indus

Waters Treaty signed by the Ayub regime was most widely cited as an agreement

that stood the test of time.


25/27

The events of September 11 had a de-legitimizing effect on Kashmir, from the

perspective of Pakistan. India quickly moved back to square onethat is, of

confrontation and denialfrom the position of continuing dialogue and diplomacy.

India is now bent on cashing in upon the new atmosphere condemning global

terrorism. India wants to make Kashmir militant groups into objects of the U.S.

anti-terrorism campaign. [61] The United States has succumbed considerably toIndia's pressure, as the initial list of organizations whose assets were frozen by

the United states included two (and later, a third one, Jaish-e-Mohammad) with

extensive activities in Kashmir. India sees the build-up of relations between

Pakistan and the United States as zero-sum in nature, and wants to prevent

Pakistan from again becoming the driving force behind U.S. regional policy. [62]

India has been playing off of and sensationalizing the U.S. concern for the stability

of Pakistan and the region by threatening Pakistan with war. The recent massive

firing on the international border, let alone on the Line of Control, upon the visit of

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,

constitutes a message not to ignore India. Hence, it is imperative that U.S. policy

officials engage with India at the same time that they do so with Pakistan, so as toreduce the risk of an India-Pakistan war and further instability in the region.

For Pakistan, raising its voice at diplomatic and political levels has and will

become even more difficult as India (through its powerful lobbying) is bent on

establishing linkages between Afghans and the situation in Kashmir, thereby

ignoring Pakistan's legitimate concerns and the historical context of the Kashmir

dispute. India also intends to heighten its threat perception from Pakistan for its

alleged support to Kashmir, and to legitimize hot pursuit across the border,

possibly leading to war in the wake of the war of the United States against

Afghanistan over terrorism. [63] From the American perspective, "an India-

Pakistan crisis at this time would be most unwelcome to U.S. policy makers, andwould strain relations with both India and Pakistan." [64]

Therefore, one can observe that with the arrival of the military regime, there has

been no substantial shift in security policies of Pakistan towards the United States,

Afghanistan, and India. The events of September 11 impacted in facilitating and

enhancing the building of bridges in Pak-US relations, which even the erstwhile

civilians wanted. In the wake of such a priority policy and as has been

demonstrated above, Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan should not be viewed

as a reversal. Nonetheless, Pakistan-India relations suffered a severe setback, not

because of regime change from civilian to military, but in the context of the post-

September 11 world.


26/27

Politics and economics interplay

DR Shahid Javed Burki (article, April 11) is right in emphasising the interplay

between politics and economics. However, in treating the history of Pakistan, heseems to have inverted cause and effect. He asserts that political instability was

due to repeated economic crises when the fact is that it was the other way round.

It was mostly the frequent martial laws and other negative political developments

that aggravated economic difficulties, which a developing country inevitably faces.

Of course, this is an oversimplification, since history is a far more complex affair,

but to reinforce my view, l give four instances where political mistakes or political

events caused a major national setback, with adverse economic, political and

social consequences. These were the 1965 war, the separation of East Pakistan,

the encouragement of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and the atomic

explosion in 1998.

The Third Five-Year Plan for 1965-1970 envisaged a massive transfer of resources

to East Pakistan intended to alleviate the problem of growing economic disparity

between the two wings. The Third Plan and the underlying strategy were aborted

by the 1965 war. What was the economic compulsion for this misadventure? None.

We are too deferential to the military to attempt an assessment of the economic

loss sustained by the country because of the 1965 war. In my view, Dr Burki is not

right in asserting that disillusionment with economic policies was the main cause

of President Ayubs overthrow. He was forced to abdicate for largely political

reasons (Tashkent, denial of democracy, censorship, corruption, loss of confidence

of the military brass)

The greatest disaster in Pakistans history, the civil war in 1971 and the violent

separation of East Pakistan, was entirely a political failure. Even though East

Pakistan had many economic grievances, the critical cause of separation was that

the rightful share of political power was continuously withheld from the people of

that wing because of the repeated promulgations of martial law by which a non-

Bengali army was seen as dominating the political processes.

Dr Burki has stated that in 1977 Mr Bhutto ran into difficulties because his

economic policy failed to end poverty and various regions were unhappy at the

way Islamabad was treating them. It is true of course that big business andpersons adversely affected by nationalisation were unhappy about economic

policies but the public agitation against the PPP government was based mainly on

political demands, i.e, free election and the establishment of Nizam-i-Mustafa.

Economics did not figure prominently either in the themes pursued by the

combined opposition parties or in the US displeasure, expressed by Dr Henry

Kissinger.


27/27

The encouragement of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, for the political purpose

of acquiring strategic depth, was initiated and maintained by the military though

the democratic governments acquiesced in it. The damage done by this policy to

the political and social infrastructure and economy of the country has been

enormous and continues to this day.

Lastly, the crisis of 1998 was due to the explosion of the atomic bomb and the

consequent imposition of international sanctions. The country was in economic

difficulties but nowhere near a breakdown. The problem was due to a political

decision to explode the bomb and the adverse international reaction that followed.

Dr Burkis article, unintentionally I am sure, helps the propaganda line of the

present military government that martial law is essential for salvaging the

economy. The government has undertaken a systematic campaign to demonise

democracy by exaggerating its economic failures and often falsifying the record.

I hope Dr Burki will forgive me for recalling that when Mr Bhutto came to power atthe end of 1971, Dr Burki had greeted him with an article in The Pakistan Times

titled GDP dethroned. This posed a difficulty for some of us who were trying to

convince our new socialist bosses that while pursuit of equity was very important,

it could not be achieved without growth. It did not help that an eminent economist

was stating that GDP (or growth) was a tyrant that was best removed from the

economic scene. Since then Dr Burki has had a distinguished career in the World

Bank and must have modified his views on growth. This illustrates the interplay

between economic postures and political circumstances

state of women in pakistan

Documents