state building and social obligations in post-communist systems: assessing change in russia and...

Canadian Slavonic Papers

State Building and Social Obligations in Post-Communist Systems: Assessing Change in Russiaand UkraineAuthor(s): Andrea ChandlerSource: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 38, No. 1/2 (MARCH-JUNE 1996), pp. 1-21Published by: Canadian Association of SlavistsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40869770 .

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Articles Andrea Chandler

State Building and Social Obligations in Post- Communist Systems: Assessing Change in Russia and Ukraine*

When the Soviet successor states became independent in 1991, there was much interest in the impact that the transition from communism would have on state-

society relations. Market reform would presumably impel changes in the role and

scope of the state, while democratization would likely bring demands from the

citizenry to protect social interests.1 Among the post-Soviet states, Russia and Ukraine were perhaps the most promising democracies, and both embarked on

fairly dramatic economic reforms (Boris Yeltsin's Russia in 1991, Ukraine under President Leonid Kuchma in 1994). Research on the role of society in politics in the post-Soviet transition has focussed on participation in political institutions, labour relations, or on the social safety net.2 Certainly, the post-communist welfare state is generally considered to be in crisis, and most analysts argue that

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 26th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in November, 1994. The research in this paper was funded by a GR-6 grant awarded through the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research at Carleton University, which was supported by a general research grant of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. In addition, I would like to acknowledge Carleton University's Faculty Exchange Program with Moscow State University, which enabled me to travel to Moscow for research on this topic in the spring of 1994. I would like to thank Lisa Semenoff for her research assistance, as well as her insightful comments on the general subject. I am very grateful to Dominique Arel for kindly allowing me access to his copies of published stenographic records of the Ukrainian Supreme Council. I would like to thank Tom Darby for his comments and suggestions. Lawrence Robertson, the discussant on the AAASS panel where an earlier version of this paper was presented in 1994, provided useful comments. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of Canadian Slavonic Papers whose constructive and insightful criticisms helped me to improve the paper in the revised version. 1 See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Sarah Michaeljohn Terry, "Thinking about Post-Communist Transitions: How Different are They?" Slavic Review 52.2 (1993): 333-337. 2 See, for example, Linda J. Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Stephen Crowley, "Barriers to Collective Action: Steelworkers and Mutual Dependence in the Former Soviet Union," World Politics 46.4 (1994): 589-615; Thomas F. Remington, ed. Parliaments in Transition: the New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994); Donna Bahry, "Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika," Slavic Review 52.3 (1993): 512-554.

Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes Vol. XXXVIII, Nos. 1-2, March-June 1996



2 ANDREA CHANDLER

social welfare mechanisms need to be strengthened.3 However, the problem with the concept of the welfare state is the assumption that citizens are primarily beneficiaries of state policy, rather than providers of the resources and labour that allow the state to exist. In fact, under communism, Soviet citizens had considerable compulsory obligations to the state, such as taxation, military conscription, and police obligations. As post-Soviet states moved away from Communism, one might expect the state-society relationship to be based less on coercion and more on citizen consent. Yet in practice governments such as those in Russia and Ukraine have faced contradictory pressures since 1991. On the one hand, they have been under some pressure to to reduce the heavy state burdens, surveillance, and regimentation to which citizens were subjected under the Soviet regime. On the other hand, governments had to reassert state power in the wake of the Soviet system's collapse, in the process imposing new obligations on society. Have citizens' obligations been changed to reflect a more harmonious state-society relationship?

This paper aims to provide a preliminary, empirical analysis of changes in social obligations towards the state in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine. It focusses on government policy, legal changes, and political debate within the two countries from late 1991 until 1994, when the main outlines of state policy were established. In some respects, Russian and Ukrainian governments have changed the way in which they extract citizen obligations to the state. It appears that citizens' obligations to the state have remained quite heavy, although elites in the parliaments of both countries have attempted to modify state demands on citizens. To some extent, the state's weakness and high rates of evasion prevent these citizen obligations from being truly onerous. The state has asked the

population to pay a high cost for the transition, without necessarily delivering the hoped-for responsiveness. Nonetheless, social policy and social obligations became important issues in the political agenda, suggesting that governments can yield to societal pressure, and that the question of social obligations has shaped political struggles and debates. Yet the evidence suggests that the transition from communism will not automatically reduce the state's demands

upon the citizenry - nor will the citizenry automatically comply.

3 For example, World Bank, Ukraine: the Social Sectors during Transition (Washington: World Bank, 1993).



STATE BUILDING AND SOCIAL OBLIGATION: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 3

I. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS Social obligations to the state can be defined as the compulsory demands that the state imposes on all citizens, such as the payment of taxes, military service, and obedience to the police. Some social scientists argue that although state

obligations are often unilaterally imposed over an unwilling public, social

pressures and the need to consider citizens' interests may eventually compel the state to modify initially draconian demands.5 Historically, new states developed strategies to conquer the inevitable social evasion and resistance to state-imposed obligations, such as conscription and taxation. However, if a state is legitimate, citizens may be more likely to comply with the state's demands; for example, conscription is easier when the state can command the patriotic feeling and

loyalty of draftees.7 Some democratic political theorists begin with the premise that state power

in a democracy is based on the individual's free choice to become a citizen, and that this restrains state power. If citizens are able to participate in choosing their

governments, they comply with its laws out of a* sense of "political obligation."8 Yet as Carole Pateman pointed out, there is a troubling contradiction between the power of the state to impose punishment and violence for non-compliance, and the notion of the democratic state as a collectivity of free individuals, as opposed to an authoritarian state where power is imposed. Citizens may resist their obligations to the state out of a sense of protest.9 John Rawls saw political obligation to the state as both a matter of self-interest and moral responsibility following voluntary entry into a set of just political

4 I do not suggest that all states impose these obligations equally. Universal conscription may be found in democratic and authoritarian regimes alike. Although many countries do not impose conscription in peacetime, they may still engage in military mobilization in wartime. Most Westerners are familiar with taxation as primary source of state revenue, yet as Lisa Anderson points out, not all states rely on taxation as a primary source of revenue. Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," Comparative Politics 20.1 (1987): 1-18. 5 See the essays in Charles F. Tilly, ed. The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); in particular, Gabriel Ardant, "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations," 164-242. 6 See, for example, Isser Woloch, who argues that conscription and taxation were spheres of struggle between the state and society in modern France, in "Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil Society," Past and Present 111 (1986): 100- 129; Arthur N. Gilbert, "Why Men Deserted from the 18th Century British Army," Armed Forces and Society 6. 4: 563-567. 7 Alon Peled, "Force, Ideology, and Contract: the History of Ethnic Conscription," Ethnic and Racial Studies 17. 1 (1994): 61-78. ° Carole Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: a Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1979). 9 Pateman 1-2, 33-34, 58-59.



4 ANDREA CHANDLER

institutions based on fairness and equality. An authoritarian state might be able to compel obedience, but not to inspire citizen responsibility.10 The key is that once citizens have a say in their own social obligations, obedience to the state is universal and compulsory for its resident citizens. Ideally, states do not just impose obligations such as conscription or taxation by force, but also by inspiring a sense of civic responsibility and convincing citizens that their participation will enhance individual and collective well-being. Indeed, historians of taxation argue that citizen tax revolts, and demands for reform in tax policy, sometimes successfully pressured governments to allow increased participation and representation in legislatures.

Another social science approach assumes that citizens and governments are rational actors, who seek to realize their own best interests: citizens like to pay as few taxes as possible, while politicians strive to finance their programs without provoking citizen tax protests. Hence, it is in the interest of governments to find tax programs that are relatively easy to collect, tolerable to the taxpayer, and spread out across various social groups. Therefore, strategy rather than force is the key here, to ensure that the citizen accepts grudgingly an inevitable obligation, rather than supporting it enthusiastically. Social obligations to the state should be conceived not as passive compliance with the established order, but as the active, compulsory surrender to the state of goods. If citizens must pay taxes, comply with conscription, and observe the law, they are compelled in the process to surrender a portion of their wealth, their health, and their free time. In complying with the draft or a military mobilization, they may even be putting their lives at risk.14

The question becomes particularly relevant when we turn to authoritarian and totalitarian states, where it is assumed that citizens must comply with a repressive and illegitimate government. Western assessments of state-society relations were conceived initially under the totalitarian model, which envisaged a

10 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) 60-61, 235-236, 333-42. I would like to thank Tom Darby for drawing my attention to this aspect of Rawls' theory. 11 Rudolph Braun argues this point with respect to taxation in "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and Statebuilding: Great Britain and Brandenburg Prussia," in Tilly 314-315; also Peled. 12 Braun 326; Ardant 196. 13 B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Taxation: a Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991) especially 1-5. See also Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 14 See Michael Walzer, "The Obligation to Die for the State," in Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) 77-98.




citizenry forcibly compelled to comply with the state's extensive demands. So then what would we expect from a totalitarian state making a transition to

democracy? Would citizen obligations to the state increase or decrease? Would citizens be more likely to comply eagerly with a state in which they had a voice? Rather than trying to operationalize "consent," my analysis will focus on the

empirical level of state policy. However, governments in both Russia and Ukraine claim that citizen evasion of their responsibilities to the state is endemic. Elites ponder whether the source of this problem is the state's weakness or the citizenry's lack of a sense of civic obligation. Is it possible that

despite the "transition to democracy," citizens are withholding consent?

Π. SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE SOVIET STATE Western scholars reconceptualized the post-Stalinist Soviet state-society relationship as a "social contract," in which the regime was seen to provide citizens with social rights and labour protections, in exchange for acceptance of the political regime.16 Philip G. Roeder argued that the Soviet state had achieved the "departicipation" of society, although citizens were actively involved in the execution of state policy.17 In the Soviet Union, taxation, conscription and

police obligations were closely related social obligations, but these were

relatively rarely explored by scholars. Taxation, for example, was mainly of 1 R

interest to economists as a feature of the centrally planned command economy. Taxation in the Soviet Union was perhaps surprisingly complex; as James R. Millar and Donna Bahry argued, Soviet authorities relied more on direct taxes and

1 Q more sophisticated methods of taxation as economic development increased. The définitive study of Soviet taxation argued that citizens paid payroll taxes of a

progressive nature that were actually quite heavy, although Soviet citizens were

15 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 4th ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968); Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl J. Friedrich, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger, 1956). 16 See Cook, and Peter Hauslohner, "Politics before Gorbachev: De-Stalinization and the Roots of Reform," in Seweryn Bialer, ed. Politics, Society and Nationality inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989) 41-90. 17 Roeder' s concept of "departicipation" involves the notion that citizens were involved in the implementation of policy but deprived of a real voice in political decisions. Philip G. Roeder, "Modernization and Participation in the Leninist Developmental Strategy," American Political Science Review 83.3 (1989): 859-884. 18 P.T. Wanless, Taxation in Centrally Planned Economies (London: Croom Helm, 1985) 1-2. iy James R. Millar and Donna Bahry, "Financing Development and Tax Structure: Change in the USSR," Canadian Slavonic Papers XXI.2 (1979): 166-174.



6 ANDREA CHANDLER

relatively unaware of their high tax payments. Indeed,it was quite commonplace to perceive Soviet people as quiescent with respect to their social

obligations.21 Another important social obligation towards the state was universal military

conscription of males. In the Soviet Union it had a long history, with the last law on the draft passed in 1967. The enforcement of the draft was given to the localities, who were required to register and report draft age males, and deliver

conscripts, to the central authorities. In order to enforce Soviet policy and ensure political compliance, the police, or militsiia, interacted with society on a

day-to-day basis. Mervyn Matthews argued that in the Soviet Union, the

workplace, police controls including internal passports and residence permits, and

military conscription reinforced each other in ensuring that society met the demands of the Soviet state. The Soviet system, in theory, was relatively difficult for citizens to evade. Since citizens had their taxes deducted by the

enterprise, it was difficult to avoid paying taxes. Draft obligations were onerous

(Soviet men aged 18 to 27 were obliged to perform military service for two to three years unless they had a higher education); draft evasion involved the

prospect of at least one to three years' imprisonment. 4 The passport system

enforced social control: it served as proof of one's identity and registration, and

provided a record of military service. As such, it facilitated the fulfilment of

employment and the draft.25 In theory, the police were supposed to act according

20 Frankly η D. Holzman, Soviet Taxation: the Fiscal and Monetary Problems of a Planned Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) 8, 256. A later study came to a similar conclusion, noting that the Soviet state was less dependent on taxation for state revenue than were capitalist states. Michael A. Newcity, Taxation in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1986) 73-74, 365. 21 As one author remarked with respect to the Soviet police, "People in the West often view the system of Soviet law enforcement as being too oppressive and too intrusive in the lives of its citizens.... the Soviet government has been able to implement such a system because the people are essentially patriotic and non- political. Moreover, throughout their history, the Soviet people have come to respect power and authority....

" Richard J. Terrill, 'Organization of Law Enforcement in the Soviet Union," Police Studies 12 (1989): 23. 22 Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985) 31-33, 53-55. 23 Mervyn Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993) 27-39. 24 "Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty," in Mervyn Matthews, ed. Party, State, and Citizen in the Soviet Union: a Collection of Documents (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989) 320-333. 25 Leon Boim, "The Passport System in the USSR with Special Reference to the Status of Jews," Review of Socialist Law 2.1 (1976): 15-45.




to "socialist legality," and to observe civil rights.26 On the other hand, as Mark Galleotti argues, with Andropov, and then Gorbachev, crackdowns on police corruption coincided with increases in reported crime. A police reform introduced in 1990 considerably decentralized the MVD, while the breakup of the USSR turned over police responsibiities to the independent republics.27

Under perestroïka, the question of social obligations to the state became reconceptualized. Glasnost allowed the creation of a political discourse in which the state could be criticized, and in which citizens could envision participating actively in political change. This process helped to propel democratization and the eventual collapse of the Soviet state.29 In addition, economic reform presumably required a new model of social obligations. With respect to taxation, a transition away from the centrally planned economy towards independent enterprises would change the importance of taxation: taxation would replace the command mechanism by which enterprises would provide revenue to the state. Therefore, taxation would become more important. In the second place, glasnost and democratization exposed the abuses of the Soviet army and generated criticism of universal conscription and calls for a volunteer army. As republican nationalism grew under perestroïka, some draftees asked to serve in their own republic, or refused to respond to the call-up. By the end of Gorbachev's tenure, draft evasion was already widespread. Even before the formal breakup of the USSR, republics had begun to create alternative forms of

26 A. P. Korenov, "The Rights of the Soviet Police and Socialist Legality," Soviet Law and Government XXII.4 (1984): 81-94. I find the title of this 1984 article- the rights of the police, as opposed to the rights of citizens - very revealing. 27 Mark Galleotti, "Perestroika, Perestrelka, Pereborka: Policing Russia in a Time of Change," Europe-Asia Studies 45.5 (1993): 769-786. l* Mary Buckley, Redefining Russian Polity and Society (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993) 1-3. 29 See for example Gail W. Lapidus, "From Democratization to Disintegration: the Impact of Perestroika on the National Question," in Gail W. Lapidus and Victor Zaslavsky with Philip Goldman, eds. From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics (New York: Cambridge, 1992) 45-70; Rasma Karklins, "Explaining Regime Change in the Soviet Union," Europe-Asia Studies 46.1 (1994): 29-45. 30 E. Iasin, V. Mashchits, and S. Aleksashenko, "The Thirteenth Five- Year Plan: From Economic Norms to Taxation of Enterprises," Problems of Economics 32.8 (1989): 78-92. 31 David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev," International Security 14.3 (1989-1990): 14-16. 32 Stephen M. Meyer, "How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: the Politicization of the Soviet Military," International Security 16.3 (1991-1992): 19.



8 ANDREA CHANDLER

military service.33 Conscription depended on police cooperation, and the local militia organs were not always providing the state with expected lists of recruits.34 There is no particular reason why a post-totalitarian state should necessarily abolish the draft. However, one might expect the existence of an unpopular draft to be questioned in a newly-democratic legislature. Finally, under perestroïka the whole idea of the passport system was questioned. As the Soviet successor states became independent in 1991, they had to design new state institutions for social obligations, and to redefine their relationship with citizens. However, they had inherited the Soviet Union's problems of social obligations.

ΠΙ. CHANGES IN SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE A. Taxation In the newly-independent Russian Federation, it seemed certain that social obligations would be redefined, as Boris Yeltsin's leadership embarked on the economic reform strategy of "shock therapy." Among the goals of the government were reducing the budget deficit, privatization and limiting military expenditures.36 In late 1991, the Russian government presented to the Supreme Soviet new taxation legislation. The principle of equal treatment in the tax system was a cornerstone of Yeltsin's reform strategy, along with the idea of a centralized and unified tax system, intended to stimulate small business, investment, and the construction industry.37 The proposed taxation system would involve a significant reliance on a value-added tax (VAT), excise taxes on luxury goods and imports, a profits tax on enterprises, and a wage and payroll tax from citizens, supplemented by pension fund and social insurance

38 contributions. The reform also provided for a personal income tax. The new basis of the Russian tax system was discussed in December 1991, and its outcome was the passage of a series of related laws on income tax, profits tax,

33 Meyer 24. See also Robert V. Barylski, 'The Soviet Military Before and After the August Coup: Departization and Decentralization," Armed Forces and Society (1992): 27-45. 34 Roy Allison, "Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States," Adelphi Paper 280 (1993) 8. 35 Matthews, The Passport Society 80-81. 36 Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski, and John S. Earle, eds. The Privatization Process in Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1993) 5. 37 V.V. Gusev, head of the Russian Federation State Tax Service, introduction in Nalogi ν Rossii: nalogovaia sistema Rossii, sbornik normativnykh dokumentov (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1994) 6, 12-13. 38 Frydman, et al. 12.




indirect taxes, and other taxes and duties.39 Among them, the laws on the Value- Added Tax and excise tax (on imports and luxuries) were passed in the parliament on December 6, 1991.

The VAT was noteworthy for its high taxation rate (28%, 21.88% for goods with controlled prices); also, in its initial form, neither such essentials as children's clothing nor basic foodstuffs were exempt from this stiff tax which was essentially passed on to the consumer.40 The Russian parliament debated this aspect of the tax in December 1991, voicing reservations about the effect that high taxation would have on the masses, who also faced hardship from the imminent price liberalization.41 A spirited debate also accompanied discussions on property tax, insofar as it would affect ordinary citizens who owned their own apartments, cottages, and gardens: as with other issues, the question arose as to whether invalids and pensioners should receive special treatment.42 The income tax law, passed also in December 1991, established seven progressive tax brackets for individuals, but outlined a lengthy set of categories of income (such as social assistance payments) that were tax-exempt, and provided various levels of tax reductions for certain categories of citizens, such as veterans and invalids.43

The debate in July 1992 on the growing revenue crisis prompted a heated discourse on the relationship between taxes and social welfare. This debate was inextricably linked with the question of the effectiveness of tax collection, which required police forces; and on conscription, in the context of discussions over the inadequacy of the social safety net for military personnel. Egor Gaidar initially made a convincing case that taxation was necessary to correct the Russian government's budget crisis and to replace the preexisting Soviet tax system. For Gaidar, a high VAT would help provide revenue for long-term economic and social prosperity, without hampering industrial development; he argued that the tax burden on the citizenry would be offset in part by the enhancement of the state's social programs with financing from tax revenue. Meanwhile the remarks

39 "Naloei-92," Ekonomika i zhizn' 4 (1992):1. 40 "Zakon ο naloge na dobavlennuiu stoimost'," and "Zakon ob aktsizakh," Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR 52, 26 December 1991: 2113-2119. 41 See remarks by Ruslan Khasbulatov, and by P.G. Suturin, Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, Sovmestnogo Zasedaniia Soveta Respubliki i Soveta Natsional'nostei, 4-aia sessia Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR 17, 6 December 1991: 16, 20 and 17 respectively. 4Z See in particular Biulleten Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, Sovmestnogo Zasedaniia Soveta Respubliki i Soveta Natsional'nostei, 4-aia sessiia 19, 9 December 1991: 4-6. 43 Zakon RSFSR, "O podokhodnom naloge s fizicheskikh lits," Ekonomika i zhizn' 12 (1992): 16-18.



1 0 ANDREA CHANDLER

from the head of the parliament's Committee on Budgets, Plans, Taxes and Prices, Aleksandr P. Pochinok, demonstrated a similar faith in equal taxation without privileges or exemptions, partly because he feared that tax loopholes would complicate the system, and partly because he argued that the social welfare system could protect those people truly in need.44 This premise of a benevolent welfare state seems rather discordant with Gaidar's depiction of a cash-strapped state, and also overlooks the rather commonplace notion that indirect taxes such as VATs disproportionately hit the poorest groups in society. Yet on the whole the December 1991 debates were fairly technical, and focussed rather a lot of attention on market reform and taxes on enterprises, rather than the impact of tax reform on the population.

In short, the citizenry were not just being asked to endure "shock therapy": they were also being asked to help finance it. In the debate on the budget which took place in July 1992, parliamentary deputies in Russia demonstrated an awareness that social welfare institutions and the well-being of members of the armed forces were already suffering from the effects of the economic crisis. Yet as Gaidar pointed out, the state lacked funds to provide a sufficient cushion for society, in part because the government had not been able to collect taxes at predicted levels. Meanwhile, Pochinok told the parliament he no longer supported such a steep VAT, and suggested that improved tax collection methods could ameliorate the revenue problem.46 The VAT was lowered in July 1992 to 10% on groceries and 20% on consumer goods, partly because the high rates were seen as encouraging tax evasion; it was offset in part by increased taxation of imports.47 However, reportedly, income tax rates had not sufficiently kept

44 See for example, remarks by Gaidar, Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, Sovmestnogo Zasedaniia Soveta Respubliki i Soveta Natsional'nostei, 4-aia sessia, 17, 6 December 1991: 16; Pochinok, in ibid., 15. Pochinok also argued, in the debate on income tax, that a single, unified tax system applicable to all would be simpler to administer. Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, Sovmestnogo Zasedaniia Soveta Respubliki i Soveta Natsional'nostei, 4-aia sessia 18, 7 December 1991: 5. 43 See discussion of the 1992 budget, Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossuskoi Federatsii, 4-aia sessiia, Sovmestnogo Zasedaniia Soveta Respubliki i Soveta Natsional'nostei 72. 1 Julv 1992: 6^t8. Gaidar's remarks are on 6-8 and 44-45. 46 See Pochinok' s remarks proposing VAT reductions, Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Sovmestnogo Zasedaniia Soveta Respubliki i Soveta Natsional'nostei, 4-aia sessiia 73, 2 July 1992: 4-6; his question of why the government was raising so little of expected VAT revenue was directed at Gaidar, on 44. Gaidar, it should be pointed out, claimed he did not categorically oppose the VAT reduction, and claimed shortfalls in tax collection were due to poor economic performance. 47 Svetlana V. Almakaeva, "Corporate Taxation in the Russian Federation," Review of Central and East European Law 21 (1995): 42^3, 48.



STATE BUILDING AND SOCIAL OBLIGATION: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 1 1

pace with wage inflation: as wages rose in the inflationary spiral in the country, people were being pushed into higher tax brackets, while a new tax measure was designed to curb wage inflation relative to profits. Ian Roxburgh and Judith Shapiro argued that the Russian tax imposed on wages that surpassed specified levels, actually had the effect of preventing unemployment and keeping wages relatively low, because it gave enterprises reason to maintain large staffs of low- paid workers.49 By 1994, in Russia, the personal income tax had been amended to elaborate in more detail the categories of people eligible for tax reductions or exemptions, but had narrowed the number of tax brackets to three.50

In Ukraine, taxation also was described as a trade-off of tax hardships on the population versus the undesirable economic effects of continued budget deficit. Like Russia, Ukraine in 1991 and 1992 introduced a personal income tax, VAT, and enterprise income tax.51 In April 1992, the Rada tried to limit wage inflation by requiring that wage increases would not be tax deductible for enterprises unless they were accompanied by production increases. But as in other areas of Ukrainian law, loopholes and contradictory policies impeded revenue collection.52 Ukraine's VAT was also established at high levels: 28%, and 22% for goods with regulated prices.53 As in Russia, the VAT was later amended - in Ukraine, medicines and medical equipment, meat, and children's books, food, and consumer goods were later excluded.54

Similar to the Russian model, Ukraine established a personal income tax, by decree of the Council of Ministers. It excluded social assistance payments and income from private agricultural plot from income tax; it also provided tax

48 Aleksandr Buynov, "A New Year, New Taxes," Rabochaia tribuna, 26 January 1993, 3, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), Central Eurasia, FBIS-USR-93-012 3 February 1993: 45^6. 49 Ian Roxburgh and Judith Shapiro, "Russian Unemployment and the Excess Wages Tax," Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 8.1 (1996): 5- 27. 50 Zakon, "O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolenii ν zakon RF Ό podokhodnom naloge s fizicheskikh lits," Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 35, 26 December 1994: 5184-5192. 51 Frydman, et al. 91-92. 52 John Odling-Smee, Peter Hole, et al., IMF Economic Reviews: Ukraine 10 (1993) (Washington: International Monetary Fund, September 1993) 21-22. 53 Ό naloge na dobavlennuiu stoimost1," Vidomosty Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny 14, 7 April 1992: 382-386. The date of the law was 20 December 1991- shortly after the passage of the Russian law. 54 Zakon 'Ό vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii ν zakon Ukrainy ο naloge na dobavlennuiu stoimost'," Vidomosty Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny 21, 26 May 1992: 621-622.



1 2 ANDREA CHANDLER

benefits for Chornobyl victims, war veterans and invalids. The enterprise income tax law gave tax benefits for small businesses engaged in the service industry, repairs, or consumer goods production; industries who develop new technology; or for enterprises which developed health care, daycare and housing for their workers' families. Later amendments allowed more tax benefits for agricultural production, and for investments in military housing.57

As in Russia, the government justified tax policy on the basis of short-term economic stringency. While acknowledging the costs of taxation to the citizenry, Ukraine's Minister of Finance presented to the parliament during budget discussions in 1992 the proposition that either taxes should be increased or, as a lesser evil, tax exemptions reduced to contribute to a balanced budget and

58 development of a market economy. Some deputies objected to taxing the population so heavily while reducing social expenditures and raising prices; one deputy questioned why groceries were subject to the VAT.

B. Conscription Given the sorry state of the Soviet armed forces by 1991, and the breakdown of the conscription system in the republics, the new independent governments of Russia and Ukraine would both need to make rapid decisions on the direction of their armed forces. This is especially the case for Ukraine.60 Draft evasion, which expanded in the final years of the USSR, may have been in part prompted by fear of violence in the military.61 As for the Russian military, John Erickson argued that the military's poor housing and social conditions deterred draftees from responding to the call-up, while inadequate law enforcement meant that

55 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, "Pro prybutkkovyy podatok ζ hromadian," Vidomosty Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny 10, 10 March 1993: 238-252. 56 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, "Pro podatok na prybutok pidpryemstv i orhanizatsii," 26 December 1992, Vidomosty Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny 10, 1993: 225-237. 57 See texts of corresponding 1993 decrees and laws in Nalogi ν Ukraine 1993 g. spravochnik (Kyïv: Libra, 1994) 71, 80, 280-281, 294. 58 Remarks by Hryhoriy Oleksandrovych P'iatachenko, Biuleten' Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny, 5 sesiia Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny, 12 sklykannia, Biuleten1 48, 21 April 1992: 60-64. 59 Biuleten' Verkovnoï Rady Ukraïny 5 sesiia, 12 sklykannia, Biuleten1 48, 21 April 1992: 66-69. B. Guy Peters notes that most countries which use a value-added tax do not impose the tax on staple food and clothing, The Politics of Taxation: a Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991) 35. &υ Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) 65-67. 61 Stephen Foye, "Civilian and Military Tension in Ukraine," RFE/RL Research Report 2.25, 18 June 1993: 65.




draft evaders are at little risk of punishment.62 The pages of the military newspaper Krasnaia zvezda in recent years prominently featured discussion about the advantages of a volunteer army.63 In 1992 and 1993, the Russian parliament paid increasing attention to the question of social welfare and housing benefits for the military, which included tax exemptions.64 While these measures are directed at long-term military servers, the question cannot be divorced from the issues of taxation and conscription.

Despite its volatility, both Russia and Ukraine affirmed the principle of universal conscription. As a totally new state whose leaders were strongly . influenced by nationalism, Ukraine's conscription law was adopted relatively early, while the Russian parliament did not pass its law until 27 November 1992. Russia's delay in adopting a new conscription law was cited in the

parliament as a reason for high draft evasion. Both states relied on a mandatory conscription system that was fairly similar to the Soviet model, with 18-month

terms; requirements for local government authorities, enterprises and institutions to participate in conscription (spelled out particularly elaborately in the Russian

law); and alternative service for conscientious objectors, as well as educational deferments. Both also affirmed an acceptance of a contract army system coexisting with the draft. A noteworthy feature of the Russian law was the considerable attention to the rights of conscripts, and the bar on ethnic discrimination or identification of ethnicity in a conscript's military documents.

62 John Erickson, "Fallen From Grace: the Russian Military," World Policy Journal 10 (1993): 19-20. 03 See for example, "Voennaia sluzhba: stimuly, l'goty, kompensatsii," interview with Vasillii Vorob'ev, head of the Main Administration of Military Budget and Finance of the Ministry of Defense, Krasnaia zvezda 14 November 1992: 1-2; Aleksandr Smirnov, "Dobrovol'tsy gotovy stat1 ν stroi," Krasnaia zvezda 25 December 1992: 2. "4 See for example, "Zakon ο voennosluzashchikh," Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1 1 February 1993, 6: 344-369; also, the law on taxation of physical persons was amended in December 1992 to allow tax privileges to spouses or parents of someone killed while performing military service, or veterans of the war in Afghanistan. Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 4, 28 January 1993: 254 ff. 65 See remarks of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Piskunov, deputy chairman of the parliament's Committee on Defense and Security, in presenting the draft conscription law. Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Sovmestnogo zasedaniia Soveta Respubliki i Soveta Natsional'nostei, 5-aia sessia 23, 25 November 1992: chast1 2: 53. 66 "Law of Ukraine on Universal Military Obligation," Narodnaia armiia 12 May 1992, 2-4, translated in FBIS-USR-92-081, 30 June 1992: 17-33; "Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ο voinskoi obiazannosti i voennoi sluzhbe," Zakony Rossii: voennyi paket (Moscow: Krasnaia Zvezda, 1993) 37-89.



14 ANDREA CHANDLER

A controversial law increased conscription terms to two years in Russia in 1995, although amendments eventually softened its impact, to the apparent consternation of the Ministry of Defense. The issue of conscription arose

during the 1996 presidential election campaign. A month before the first round of elections, Boris Yeltsin signed an ukaz promising an end to the draft and conversion to a volunteer army by the year 2000, even though the state was

already having chronic difficulties paying salaries and providing for its existing armed forces.68

Ukraine illustrates the degree to which resistance to conscription can become

regionalized and politicized: Yuri Meshkov's short-lived separatist government in Crimea declared in March 1994 that draftees from Crimea would only serve in Crimea.69 The Soldiers' Mothers' Committees in Crimea had made similar demands as early as 1992.70 As in Russia, the Ukrainian conscription law allowed for a variety of exemptions and deferrals.71 As one deputy expressed in a discussion on the military in the Ukrainian parliament, there had been a mistaken belief that once conscripts had the opportunity to serve on Ukrainian soil in an Ukrainian army, draft evasion and social problems within the military would decrease.

Ukraine's then-Defense Minister, Kostiantin Morozov, argued before the

parliament that the military's effectiveness and discipline was being compromised not just by draft evasion, but desertion of conscripts. While

acknowledging that intra-military violence was a cause of this phenomenon, Morozov claimed that soldiers wanted to serve closer to home: he cited law enforcement authorities, local governments, and even Soldiers' Mothers' Committees for their compromising attitude towards military service, claiming that it was necessary "to inculcate in youth patriotic feeling and pride in service

67 Zakon, Ό vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii ν zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ο voinskoi obiazannosti i voennoi sluzhbe," Rossiiskaia gazeta 4 May 1995: 3. Aleksey Overchuk, "It won't be enough, and it won't help anyway, experts believe," Moskovskii komsomolets 25 April 1995: 2, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-091-S, 1 1 May 1995: 49-50; Interview with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by Igor Korotchenko and Andrey Poleshchuk, "Pavel Grachev: Emphasis on force in Chechnya should be retained," Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie 3, November 1995: 1-2, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-223, 20 November 1995: 31-32. 68 Svetlana Marzeeva, "Na reformu stanovis1!" hvestiia 27 July 1996: 5. 69 "Meshkov Instruction on Crimea Military Service," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-94-058, 25 March 1994: 34. 70 "Crimean Conscripts Refuse to Serve in Country," FBIS-SOV-92-098, 20 May 1992: 45. 71 Foye 65. 72 Biuleteri Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny, 5 sesiia, 12 sklykanma, Biuleten 44, 8 April 1992: 19-21.




in the Armed Forces of their Fatherland - Ukraine."73 Of course, Morozov was also preoccupied with another problem of military obligation: the appearance of refusals in the military to take the required oath of loyalty to Ukraine.74

Interestingly, the Russian discourse on the draft focussed more than Ukraine on the shortcomings of the military and the inadequacies of the law, rather than on individual moral responsibility. The desirability of conscription seems to have been questioned more often in Russia than in Ukraine; the unpopular Chechen war was no doubt a factor.

C. The Police: Enforcement and Societal Compliance Changes in the police will be considered here only briefly with respect to the

ways in which they enforce citizens' obligations: do the police effectively ensure that these obligations are observed? Both countries affirmed in law their commitment to the rule of law, and police are to respect civil rights and act within the law.76 This raises the question of what exactly are citizen rights and

obligations under the law. The 1993 Russian constitution includes in its section on human rights and freedoms, articles that affirm that citizens are obliged to pay taxes and render military service.77 Meanwhile, in the absence of a constitution, Ukraine was slow to establish its formal position on citizen obligations to the state. The new Ukrainian constitution, interestingly, speaks of citizen

obligations "towards society," rather than the state; citizen obligations include "defense of the fatherland," including military service; the protection of the environment and culture; the payment of taxes - including the completion of an annual tax declaration; and the observance of law and the constitution.78

73 Kostiantin Petrovych Morozov, remarks to Ukrainian parliament, Biuleten' Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny, 5 sessiia, 12 sklykannia, Biuleten1 43, 8 April 1992: 61- 62. 74 Ibid., 68. 75 However, in Ukraine various branches of government have been blamed for low draft levels as well. For example, an article in Holos Ukraïny on July 20, 1993 charged that local draft registration bodies were to blame for inadequate and improper registration of conscripts - published in "Violations of Military Service Law Viewed," FBIS-SOV-93-139, July 22, 1993: 50. Another article argued the defects of the judicial system, noting that it was uncommon for draft dodgers to face criminal charges or trials. See "Procurator's Office Notes Tendency to Evade Military Duty," Demokratychna Ukrai'na 10 August 1993: 3, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-154,12 August 1993: 45. 76 See "Zakon ο militsii," Vedomosti S"ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR 16, 18 April 1991: 426-445. 77 Articles 57 and 59. "Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Izvestiia 28 December 1993: 4-6. 78 "Konstitutsiia Ukrainy," articles 23, 65-68, Golos Ukrainy 27 July 1996: 5-7.



1 6 ANDREA CHANDLER

The police are significant for their role in the discourse on non-compliance of social obligations to the state, and the growth in crime, in view of the state's inability to enforce existing, contradictory laws and decrees. Executive and legislative branches in both countries have deemed this to be a question of urgent concern.79 Both countries advocated strengthening the powers of existing polices, and created new ones, as the solution for the crises of street crime, organized crime, tax evasion, and intra-state corruption. Both countries passed laws on the militia in 1991. The Russian parliament in 1992 approved with little opposition a polozhenie and oath to ensure professional standards and legal

ο ι

supervision of the militsiia. Ukraine in December of 1991 moved to establish the police forces that were a necessary corollary of independent statehood. Its government was admittedly hampered by the small size and resources of its

82 militia, inherited from the Soviet Union, to meet its needs as a new state. This shows a disadvantage that Ukraine had in the Statebuilding process. Spokespeople from the executive branch have made a point of arguing that tax evasion deprives the state of financing for social welfare programs, hence creating a need for an armed tax police. A 1994 article argued that there had been a recent noticeable government push, along with a December 1993 presidential ukaz, to eliminate tax loopholes and enforce taxation sternly in order

79 For example, in December 1992, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies passed a resolution to make the problem of organized crime and state corruption an urgent priority, requiring government attention to prioritize laws to stop this and to put laws fighting crime high on the agenda. "On the State of Legality and the Struggle against Crime and Corruption," Rossiiskie vesti 24 December 1992: 5, translated in FBIS-USR-93-002 6 January 1993: 21-24. Russian President Yeltsin has also been concerned, as demonstrated by a report conducted by the president's bureaucracy claiming that organized crime was endemic and that it was supported by links within the police, as reported in "Rossiiskaia mafiia sobiraet dos'e na krupnykh chinovnikov i politikov," Izvestiia 26 January 1994: 1-2. 80 The tax police was created in Russia, as separate from the preexisting Tax Service, in 1993. "Zakon o federal'nykh organakh nalogovoi politsii," Vedomosti S'ezda Narodnykh Deputatov RF i verkhovnogo soveta RF 29, 22 July 1993: 1763- 1775. In Ukraine, a law allowing special powers for state bodies to fight organized crime and protect state property and finances. "Zakon ob organizatsionno-pravovykh osnovakh bor'by s organizovannoi prestupnost'iu," Vidomosty Verkhovnoï Rady Ukraïny 35, 30 June 1993: 893-898. 81 See Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Sovmestnoe zasedaniia, 5-aia sessia, Biulleten1 31, 23 December 1992: chast' 2: 34-40. 82 "The Law has Become More Effective," Uriadovyy kuryer 3 (49), January 1992: 5, translated in FBIS-SOV-92-025, 5 February 1992: 76. 83 See Ivan Sas, interview with Yuri Chichelov, deputy chief of the Main Administration for Tax Investigation, "The Tax Police are being Created in Russia...." Nezavisimaia 18 February 1993: 4, translated in FBIS-USR-93-026, 6 May 1993: 29-31.




to crack down on tax evasion and abuses. One wonders whether the state was carrying out new functions using old Soviet methods. Ukraine reportedly created a state service directed against "economic crime," including tax evasion, that was based on the former BKhSS - the body of the Soviet militsiia that was used to

85 crack down on "speculation." Indeed, in most respects except for conscription (where Ukraine's legislation

predated Russia's), Ukrainian policy and legal changes on paper were very similar to those of Russia, notwithstanding that country's initial skepticism towards market reform prior to Kuchma's election as president in 1994. Leaders in Russia and increasingly in Ukraine argued that the state needed to be scaled down, suggesting a lessened involvement of bureaucracy in citizens' lives, and greater scope for individual freedom. However, state elites also found that in making the transition to a more market-oriented economy, new revenue sources (notably new forms of taxation) would need to be found in order to finance the post-communist state's activities and to manage an accumulated budget deficit. As production continued to fall, and as the state experienced difficulties in collecting new taxes, it became expedient to rely on the citizenry for the tax burden, therefore risking the bitterness of a population already unsettled by price liberalizations, delays in wage payments, inflation and unemployment. Although this immediately led to demands for tax relief, especially for underprivileged groups, such relief risked increasing the budget deficit, rendering the state even less able to provide social services and fulfill its end of the "bargain" to citizenry. Similarly, Russia and Ukraine continued to impose conscription on the male population despite chronic difficulties in ensuring that the draft could be fairly and uniformly observed. Universal military service was tempting to elites in Russia and Ukraine, which were forming their own militaries as newly- independent states, and who considered their state coffers too impoverished to be able to maintain volunteer armies.

The de facto inequality of social obligations is a theme that is connected with law enforcement. A story in Izvestiia put the fairness issue thus: "People are not upset that there are those wealthier than they are, who build villas, buy elite apartments, expensive cars. They are upset because they wonder: have the rich paid their taxes?" If tax and draft evasion are rampant, and if the state is bitterly divided over the main outlines of budgetary and social policy, this means that some citizens (particularly the most socially disadvantaged and those who

84 Maksim Rubchenko, Il'ia Solov'ev, and Andrei Smarov, "Cherez nalogovye ternii - kuda?" Kommer sant 18, 24 May 1994: 54-61. 85 Larisa Koritskaia, "MVD beret ekonomiku pod svoiu zashchitu," Pravda Ukraïny 16 July 1993: 3. 86 "Poslezavtra- 1 aprelia!" Izvestiia 30 March 1996: 1.



1 8 ANDREA CHANDLER

fall within the state sector of the economy) might feel the full brunt of state demands while others will be able to avoid their obligations. In Russia, as the budgetary crisis mounted, new tax legislation was passed at the end of 1995, an attempt to rationalize what had become a very complicated system.87 Changes to the personal income tax law eventually introduced more levels of progressive taxation, and were reportedly intended to increase the amount of revenue gained from citizens as opposed to enterprises. In Ukraine, the budgetary crisis influenced President Kuchma's adoption of a market-oriented reform program following his election in 1994, which put a new impetus on tax collection. Ukrainian government officials have acknowledged publicly that taxation of citizens is steep, and that tax reform should better tax the private sector and incorporate the informal economy into the taxable sector; this in turn would

89 alleviate the state's budgetary problems. No doubt partly because of these serious budgetary problems (as well as the absence of a military engagement comparable to Chechnia), the question of abolishing compulsory military service has been less prominent in Ukraine; in fact, in 1996, an amendment to the

military service law actually increased conscription terms for sailors.90 For post-communist states pursuing market reform, the creation of new

income tax systems has involved a difficult choice between establishing progressive tax systems in the interest of fairness to citizens, as opposed to

simpler mechanisms that facilitate tax collection and enforcement under transitional conditions.91 Officials admit that the frequent changes in tax law and tax levels complicate tax collection, even though tax changes have been

necessary to keep up with inflation and reflect the need to nuance initially primitive tax systems. A draft ukaz proposed in July 1996 in Russia would

87 Vladimir Kucherenko, "Taxes should be constructed to make it more profitable to pay them than to evade them," Rossiiskaia gazeta 9 December 1995: 6, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-247S, 26 December 1995: 69-71. 88 Iaroslav Shimov, "Income Tax 96: Increasingly Higher and Higher and Higher," lzvestiia 29 November 1995: 2, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-243S, 19 December 1995: 30-32. 89 Roundtable discussion, by Nikoliy Zakrevskiy and Anatoliy Skichko, with Viktor Pynzenyk, Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Reform and others, Kievskie Vedomosti 29 December 1995: 4-5, translated in FBIS-SOV-96-014-S, 22 January 1996: 35-40. 90 Zakon Ukraïny "Pro vnesennia zmin do statti 23 zakonu Ukraïny pro zahal'nyy viyskovyy obov'iazok i viys'kovu sluzhbu," Holos Ukraïny 8 May 1996: 3. 91 Fiona Coulter, Christopher Heady, Colin Lawson and Stephen Smith, "Fiscal Systems in Transition: the Case of the Czech Income Tax," Europe-Asia Studies 47.6 (1995): 1010. 92 See, for example, Interview with Ukrainian Finance Minister Petro Hermanchuk, "Taxes as a Mirror of the Economy," Uryadovyy Kuryer 5 September 1995: 5, translated in FBIS-SOV-95-176, 12 September 1995: 60-61.




give the MVD, working along with the State Tax Inspection, greater responsibility for tax collection and the guarantee of revenue delivery to the state.93

Given the unnevenness of the implementation of state policy, one should not assume that citizens are a unified mass who share equal obligations. In this light, more work needs to be done on the class and group hierarchies that have emerged in post-Soviet society. Moreover, parliaments and executives have often engaged in heated struggles over tax policy and the social dimension of the armed forces, which have emerged in the context of tense, politicized debates over the approval of the annual budget, and which have prevented the articulation of a uniform and coherent policy. Meanwhile, in both Russia and Ukraine regions and republics have periodically ignored or contradicted the central government on these matters, in part because of grievances over perceivedly unfair treatment, further compromising the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state. Although these topics are too vast to be broached in detail here, it suggests that intergovernmental and executive-legislative conflicts mediate and shape state- society relations in the post-Communist states, and one cannot assume that "citizens" throughout various parts of the country perceive or pay their

Q4 obligations in the same way.

IV. CONCLUSION The author of this paper is rather pessimistic as to the ability of the state to be able to reflect the will of civil society; more persuasive is the notion that the state seeks to expand its demands and power over society, and that only citizen resistance and the political process can counter this expansion. Indeed, some social movements organized to demand change in government policy towards

95 social obligations such as taxation and conscription. For most ordinary

93 Iuliia Ul'ianova, "Nalogovuiu politsiiu usiliem militsiei, a esli ne pomozhet - armiei i flotom," hvestiia 30 July 1996: 2. y4 I have raised some of these issues in more depth in two unpublished draft papers: "Centre-Periphery Relations and the Politics of Taxation in Russia and Ukraine," presented to the 27th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington, DC, 29 October 1995, and "Executive- Legislative Relations and the Politics of Taxation in Russia and Ukraine, 1991- 1994," unpublished paper, June 1995. y:> Such organizations include the Soldiers' Mothers' Committees, which began in the final years of the Soviet Union, and continued in both Russia and Ukraine, which have criticized conscription policy and demanded that young men be able to serve closer to home; also, the formation of "taxpayers' rights" groups in Russia. See, for example, Tatiana Khudiakova, "Nalogoplatel'shchik bespraven i bezzashchiten, khotia on - glavnaia figura ν gosudarstve," hvestiia 25 December 1993: 5; Sergei Popov, "Soldatskie materi ob"ediniaiutsia. No ne dlia piketov," Krasnaia zvezda 1 April 1994: 1; Bohdan Pyskir, "Mothers for a Fatherland: Ukrainian Statehood,



20 ANDREA CHANDLER

citizens, social obligations remain onerous. Leaders and parliamentarians in the two countries seem perfectly aware of the problems of their decisions. Without taxes, the state has less money for social welfare; the tax system requires police enforcement and cooperation; the police and army are funded by tax revenues; and police are partly responsible for delivering conscripts. So deficiencies in one sphere tend to affect the others. It seems that post-Communist governments have a chronic problem in collecting taxes and funding social welfare.96 Until the law is uniformly and properly enforced, the state will continue to face the problem of

people who evade obligations to the state. This evasion creates a legitimacy problem for the government, since it must confront the frustration of those citizens who do comply. But if high citizen evasion levels indicate a lack of consent and a lack of political community, then the problem goes beyond government performance.

The impossibility of implementing state policy consistently threatens the

acceptance of the idea of purportedly "equal" obligations to the state. While

politicians debate which type of reforms are in the interest of preserving a state commitment to social welfare, it is less and less clear what the state is offering to society in exchange for its social obligations. Is the state inadequately policing, or is it failing to inculcate norms of civic responsibility? Are citizens

resisting the state in protest, or are they simply acting out of self-interest?

Perhaps politicians and bureaucrats should be asking themselves why they fail to

inspire loyalty.

RESUME

Cet article évalue les changements des obligations sociales envers l'état depuis la transition émanant de l'autorité communiste en Russie et en Ukraine, tout en se concentrant sur la taxation, la conscription et l'application de la loi. L'article examine d'un œil critique la supposition que les états post-totalitaires imposeraient moins d'exigences aux citoyens que le régime communiste et que ces exigences seraient plus légitimes. La théorie occidentale des sciences sociales offre des hypothèses divergentes sur la façon dont l'état impose des obligations sociales sur l'ensemble de ses habitants: certaines hypothèses soutiennent que ce

processus est conflictuel et d'autres soutiennent que la question des obligations sociales peut être réglée à l'aide du processus démocratique. Étant des états

Motherhood and National Security," Journal of Slavic Military Studies 7.1 (1994): 50-66. 96 Louise Fox, "What to do about Pensions in Transition Economies?" Transition 5.2-3 (1994): 3-6.




récemment devenus démocratiques et qui entreprennent des mesures de réforme du marché, la Russie et l'Ukraine offrent des exemples intéressants. Les évidences empiriques sur le changement post-communiste en Russie et en Ukraine suggèrent que malgré les changements qualitatifs des obligations du citoyen envers l'état, les citoyens ordinaires connaissent toujours, dans leurs vies quotidienne, une implication considérable de la part de l'état.

