stakeholder engagement and corporate social responsibility reporting: the ownership structure effect
TRANSCRIPT
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
* Correspondence to: Isabel Gallego-Alvarez, Campus Miguel de Unamuno, University of Salamanca, Edifi cio FES, Salamanca, 37007 Spain. E-mail: [email protected]
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental ManagementCorp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009)Published online 24 February 2009 in Wiley InterScience(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/csr.189
Stakeholder Engagement and Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting: the Ownership Structure Effect
Jose-Manuel Prado-Lorenzo, Isabel Gallego-Alvarez* and Isabel M. Garcia-SanchezCampus Miguel de Unamuno, University of Salamanca, Edifi cio FES, Salamanca, 37007 Spain
ABSTRACTSocial disclosure, according to Ullmann’s conceptual framework (1985), could be explained by stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance, where the power of stakeholders is a function of the resources they control that are essential to the company.
The aim of this work is to test the effect that shareholder power and dispersed ownership structure have on the decision to disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) information in the Spanish context, controlling for the rest of the dimensions.
Our results allow us to affi rm that this paper tests a stakeholder theory approach to analyzing corporate social disclosures and is consistent with the framework proposed, although the power of shareholders is quite limited. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
Received 23 October 2008; Accepted 27 October 2008
Keywords: corporate social responsibility reporting; stakeholders’ engagement; ownership structure; corporate governance
Introduction
COMPANIES, IN ORDER TO SURVIVE AND GROW, NEED TO PERFORM WELL AND UNDERTAKE SOCIALLY DESIRABLE actions, including the distribution of economic, social or political benefi ts to the groups from which they
derive their power (Shocker and Sethi, 1973).
In this sense, there is a growing recognition within the business sphere of the importance key stake-
holders attach to socially, environmentally and ethically responsible behaviour by corporations (Zadek et al., 1997).
As businesses recognize their stakeholders’ social expectations, the role of corporate social reporting takes on
increasing importance as a mechanism through which such duties of accountability may be discharged (Gray
et al., 1996).
Taking stakeholder theory as a basis, Ullmann (1985) proposed a three-dimensional model that can explain
companies’ social disclosure: stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance. In this model, the
power of stakeholders is a function of the resources they control that are essential to the companies.
Roberts (1992) demonstrated the validity of Ullmann’s conceptual framework empirically, except for the power
of the main stakeholders: the shareholders. This lack of signifi cant results for this type of stakeholder is a
Stakeholder Engagement and CSR Reporting 95
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
consequence of considering only one group of shareholders representing concentrated ownership, delimited by
the hypothesis that the interests of majority shareholders are incompatible with socially responsible practices and
their disclosure.
In general, a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profi t of the stockholders and
this is not to deny that there may be situations where the interests of shareholders and nonshareholders diverge
in a manner that makes it more diffi cult to rationalize an act undertaken for the benefi t of a nonshareholder
constituency that is not, ultimately, in the interests of the shareholders (Lee, 2005, pp. 34–35).
Moreover, western continental European countries are characterized by the presence of an ultimate majority
shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002) who often uses multiple classes of shares, pyramids
and cross-holdings to exercise control while owning only a small fraction of the company’s cash fl ow. Within this
structure, potentially large agency costs between majority and minority shareholders are argued to be involved
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bebchuk et al., 2000) due to the simultaneous presence of nonaligned interests (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) and entrenchment (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988).
But by adopting a set of socially responsible practices, companies generate benefi ts that are directed away from
stockholders at the same time that the fi rm is arguably positioned to take advantage of previously unforeseen
business opportunities (Haigh and Jones, 2006, p. 246).
In this sense, Anderson et al. (2003) argue that majority shareholders have an important interest in the long-
term survival of the fi rm and in the importance of maintaining their own reputation, which is strongly linked to
that of the fi rm. This suggests that the dominant shareholders, in comparison with other types of owners, will be
more likely to adopt decisions that maximise the fi rm’s economic, social and environmental behaviour. Further-
more, the need to conserve their reputation will entail appropriate communication of corporate behaviour to the
market.
On the other hand, Solomon (2006) showed that institutional investors and their active engagement represent
an important corporate governance mechanism, which is being used to infl uence corporate governance in the
social, ethics and environmental area.
The objective of this work is to test the effect that shareholder power and dispersed ownership structure have
on the decision to disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) information, controlling for the rest of the dimen-
sions proposed by Ullmann. It must be taken into account that shareholders, fi nancial institutions and dominant
shareholders are the most important stockholders in the European and Spanish context (La Porta et al., 1999;
Claessens and Tzioumis, 2006) and, according to previous research, have different interests in CSR and in the
disclosure of information about it.
Moreover, methodologically a redefi nition is made of the contents of the information disclosed. Specifi cally, in
this study we opt for classifying the reports on CSR taking into account: fi rst, whether or not the information
disclosed includes the economic, social and environmental aspects; next, whether the information is suited to the
format and contents of the most widespread international model, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); and fi nally,
whether the adoption of the GRI model has been certifi ed and the information verifi ed or audited.
This paper tests a stakeholder theory approach to analyzing corporate social disclosures and our results are
consistent with the framework proposed by Ullmann (1985), although the power of shareholders is quite
limited.
Stakeholder Theory and Social Disclosures
Stakeholder theory offered a new form of managerial understanding and action (Jonker and Foster, 2002), a new
way to organize thinking about fi rms’ responsibilities by suggesting that the needs of shareholders cannot be met
without satisfying the needs of other stakeholders (Foster and Jonker, 2005; Hawkins, 2006; Jamali, 2008). The
maximisation of profi ts and the creation of value for the shareholders can no longer be the sole objectives of
management; rather, they must be obtained through or in coexistence with a grid of values of other stakeholders
(Longo et al., 2005), among which are the demands and needs related to social and environmentally sustainable
behaviour.
96 J.-M. Prado-Lorenzo et al.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
Freeman (1984, p. 46) defi nes a stakeholder as ‘a person or group that can affect or is affected by the achieve-
ment of the organization’s objectives’. In accordance with this paradigm, stakeholders include customers, sup-
pliers, employees, communities, and the general public, besides managers, stockholders and creditors.
CSR reporting, or social disclosure, is a strategic plan by corporations to show a fi rm’s social performance to
the stakeholders (Roberts, 1992); in other words, we can understand CSR reporting as a part of the dialogue
between the company and its stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995, p. 53). Hence, stakeholder theory provides a useful
framework to evaluate CSR through social reporting activities (Snider et al., 2003).
Initially, this reporting provided almost anecdotal information (Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989)
strongly linked to the political structure of society, as well as to environmental or social crises that had occurred
(Hopwood, 1987; Loft, 1988). Subsequently, especially in the last two decades, the practices for disclosing envi-
ronmental and social information have increased in amount and complexity (Gray et al., 2001).
Among others, Guthrie and Parker (1990) showed that UK fi rms publish a larger volume of information than
US fi rms, and the latter publish more than Australian fi rms. Gray et al. (1995) confi rmed the increase in the
volume of information issued between 1979 and 1991 by UK fi rms. Similar results were obtained for Australian
fi rms in the paper by Deegan and Gordon (1996).
Analyses similar to those described above have been carried out in different countries, such as New Zealand
(Hackston and Milne, 1996), Spain (Moneva and Llena, 2000; Archel, 2003; Gallego, 2006), Greece (Bichta, 2003),
Italy (Secchi, 2006), Canada (Nitkin and Brooks, 1998) and Western Europe (Adams et al., 1998).
One area of consistent interest through the years has been the attempt to explain the social and environmental
disclosures with reference to an observable set of factors (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Adams et al., 1998; Gray
et al., 2001; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; García-Sánchez, 2008). But, in general, the existing literature on social
disclosure or CSR reporting can be classifi ed into three groups. In the fi rst group, the authors examine the rele-
vance of this information to investors. The second group explores the relation between social disclosures and social
performance. Finally, the third group of studies analyzes the factors affecting fi rms’ decisions to disclose corporate
social information. We discuss the last group since it is the most relevant to our study.
As regards the analysis of the factors that affect the decision to prepare and disclose CSR, Adams (2002) affi rms
that they attempt to test aspects of the legitimisation theory, and can be classifi ed as (i) fi rm characteristics, (ii)
general contextual factors and (iii) internal context.
With respect to the use of stakeholder theory as a conceptual framework for analysis, mention should be made,
among others, of the studies by Roberts (1992) and Van de Laan Smith et al. (2005) for the individual analysis of
fi rms at a national and international level, respectively.
These studies are generally founded on the theoretical bases proposed by Ullmann (1985) who put forward a
conceptual framework for the factors affecting social disclosure. His model has three dimensions that can explain
corporate social reporting:
1. Stakeholder power refl ects the theoretical basis of the cited framework, since, when stakeholders control
resources critical to the organization the fi rm is likely to respond in a way that satisfi es the demands of the
stakeholders.
2. Strategic posture describes the mode of response of an organization’s key decision-makers toward demands.
An active posture implies a position in which managers seek to infl uence their organization’s relationship with
important stakeholders in order to achieve optimal levels of interdependence.
3. Economic performance is important in two ways: (i) it determines the relative weight of social demand and the
attention it receives; for instance, in periods of high profi tability, social demand receives more attention; and
(ii) it infl uences the fi nancial capability to undertake costly programmes related to social demands.
Roberts (1992) showed the validity of Ullmann’s conceptual framework empirically, except for the main stake-
holders: the stockholders. This lack of signifi cant results for this type of stakeholder is a consequence of a single
group of shareholders representing concentrated ownership.
This study, therefore, focuses on analyzing the effect of shareholder power on the disclosure of corporate social
information, while controlling for the rest of the dimensions proposed by Ullmann (1985).
Stakeholder Engagement and CSR Reporting 97
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
Stockholder Power: Research Hypothesis
The power of stakeholders is a function of the resources they control that are essential to the corporation (Ullmann,
1985). Resource dependency theory suggests that power accrues to those parties that control resources required
by the organization, thus creating power differentials among stakeholders (Pfeffer, 1981).
At the most fundamental level, ownership stakes controlled by different stakeholder groups accrue power to
these groups vis-à-vis the fi rm and heighten the urgency that the demands of these groups be met (Van der Laan
Smith et al., 2005).
La Porta et al. (1999), in the international sphere, and Classens and Tzioumis (2006), in the European sphere,
demonstrate that in many countries, among them Spain, the ownership structure is characterized by a strong
presence of fi nancial institutions and a physical person as dominant shareholder.
Financial Institutions
Financial investors, according to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Pound (1992) and Solomon et al. (2004), have
strong interest not only in the fi nancial performance of the fi rms in which they invest, but also in the social and
environmental strategies and activities of those companies. This kind of shareholder is unable to move quickly in
and out of funds without affecting share price (Qu, 2007).
Within the group of fi nancial investors, Thompsona and Cowton (2004, p. 199) argue that banks, as facilitators
of industrial activity, by lending or investment, are under an obligation to demand sustainable behaviour from the
fi rms they fi nance or control through investment in their capital.
When fi nancial institutions invest in the fi rm, they have voting rights to monitor the fi rm’s policy, and, thus,
they generally demand that the fi rm should not cause environmental or social damage and should inform on its
social behaviour.
Taking into account these considerations, the following alternative hypothesis is posed:
H1: Ceteris paribus, the contents and quality of the CSR report are positively affected by the presence of fi nancial institutions in the fi rm’s ownership structure.
Dominant Shareholder
The existence of ownership structures characterized by the presence of dominant shareholders that control
corporate behaviour affects the organizational objectives and how control is exercised in the fi rm (Thomsen
and Pedersen, 2000). It must be borne in mind that a high percentage of shares held by the main shareholder
enables the latter to carry out important transactions without any other shareholder being able to intervene
(Bianco and Casanova, 1999; Destefanis and Sena, 2007).
These shareholders imply a context of concentrated ownership, which, according to Fan and Wong (2002),
entails the existence of two lines that link with disclosure practices in general. The fi rst line, entrenchment, means
that the information disclosed will mainly refl ect the interests of the dominant stockholder as opposed to the
refl ection of the fi rm’s economic situation. However, it seems to be confi rmed that, from a certain level of owner-
ship concentration, an alignment effect arises between the interests of the main shareholder and the minority
shareholders. The second line, information effect, is based on the fi rm’s interest in limiting the transfer of the
company’s specifi c information to its competitors.
Moreover, Anderson et al. (2003) argue that this type of shareholder is different from the rest of the stock-
holders in two aspects: (i) interest in the long-term survival of the fi rm, and (ii) the importance of maintaining
their own reputation, which is strongly linked to that of the fi rm. This suggests that the dominant shareholders,
in comparison with other types of owners, will be more likely to adopt decisions that maximise the fi rm’s economic,
social and environmental behaviour. Furthermore, the need to preserve their reputation will entail appropriate
communication of corporate behaviour to the market.
98 J.-M. Prado-Lorenzo et al.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
Derived from the above arguments, the following hypothesis is posed, without determining a priori the infl uence
of this type of stockholder:
H2: Ceteris paribus, the contents and quality of the CSR report are affected by the presence of a physical person that exercises control over the fi rm.
Dispersed Ownership
Another aspect of stockholder power which may infl uence the level of disclosure is the level of ownership disper-
sion (Keim, 1978, Ullmann, 1985). Prior studies (Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Christopher and Hassan, 1996; Frost,
1999) suggest that the less the infl uence of the top shareholders, equivalent to more dispersed ownership, the
greater the likelihood that fi rms will disclose more information.
These shareholders do not have enough power to infl uence the fi rm’s decision and their motivations stem from
personal preferences. But, in this respect, independent directors play a special role in ensuring observance of the
law and defending minority shareholders’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Independent directors, according to Zahra and Stanton (1988), are especially interested in showing compliance
with regulations and the socially responsible behaviour of the company owing to the fact that their image and
reputation are strongly joined to the ethical and responsible behaviour of the fi rm whose board of directors they
form part of.
The following hypothesis can thus be posed:
H3: Ceteris paribus, the contents and the quality of the CSR report are positively affected by the presence of a greater number of independent directors representing the interests of dispersed ownership.
Methodology
Sample
The target population in the study corresponds to the 116 nonfi nancial Spanish fi rms quoted on the Spanish con-
tinuous market. It should be pointed out that the population was selected taking into consideration the criteria of
size and stock market listing used in previous studies (Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Hackston and Milne, 1996;
Collett and Hrasky, 2005), as well as the fact that they are obliged to deposit information on corporate governance
before the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Stock Market Commission). Consultation of their
database provided us with reports from 99 fi rms, the sample used in the analysis.
Subsequently, CSR reports were obtained from the web pages of the fi rms previously identifi ed. As will be
pointed out below, these documents were analyzed by fi tting their contents to the lines included in the most
widespread international model, the GRI, which is a framework for corporate reporting on the social and environ-
mental performance of businesses (Dentchev, 2004).
The annual report on CSR was chosen as the document to be analyzed in order to fi nd the fi rms’ disclosure
practices, since, as a source of information for the interested public, it is the most important individual document
(Adams et al., 1998), and is also of public knowledge (Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Gray et al., 1987; Zéghal and
Ahmed, 1990) and the one most used internationally.
Variables
Dependent Variable: Practices in Corporate Social Reporting (PCSR)In almost all previous studies, the dependent variable is usually constructed using the technique of content
analysis of the CSR reports. This method consists of coding the text of this document in categories. Generally,
diverse items are previously defi ned relating to the general lines established in the preceding bibliography.
Stakeholder Engagement and CSR Reporting 99
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
The disclosure of information on each item is usually expressed numerically, measured by means of different
units of analysis, such as number of pages, number of sentences (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Milne and Adler,
1999), number of words (Neu et al., 1998), etc.
Furthermore, indexes have also been created assigning the score ‘1’ to fi rms that report on the item, and ‘0’
otherwise. At times this measurement can be improved by scoring from ‘1’ to ‘3’, if the characteristics of the
information are taken into account, that is, whether it is qualitative, quantitative or monetary.
Although this process of synthesis of the fi rms’ endeavours in disclosure is characterized by high objectivity in
the metrics, it should be pointed out that the assessment of the items depends on the subjectivity of the person
who prepared the information. In other words, if those in charge in the fi rms decide not to disclose unfavourable
information concerning the fi rms’ behaviour, or use the optimum1 but not the most appropriate expression, this
would not be penalized.
In order to overcome the limitations mentioned, in this study we opted for classifying CSR reports by taking
into consideration: (i) whether the fi rm makes any disclosure on economic, social and environmental aspects; (ii)
whether the information is given out in an informal format or the contents are adapted to a standard of the most
widespread international model, the GRI; and (iii) whether compliance with the demands of the GRI on the part
of the organization responsible has been certifi ed.
Together with the contents and characteristics of the information, their veracity is observed, that is, whether the
information has been verifi ed or audited by an independent entity which guarantees its accuracy and credibility.
The choice of the GRI standard is based on the obligation that this model imposes of reporting on all the fi rm’s
aspects – economic, social and environmental – regardless of whether this involves refl ecting negative data or
situations that are not optimal for the fi rm. Moreover, there is an obligation for certain information to be expressed
numerically and monetarily so as to facilitate its comparison.
It was also chosen because it is a harmonized, standardized, understandable and objective report for all fi rms,
regardless of their country of origin. Hence, Adams (2002) reveals the fi rms’ great interest in the standardization
of the corporate social report issued by the fi rms according to GRI format. Empirically, a recent report drawn up
by KPMG International’s Global Sustainability Services, together with the University of Amsterdam (2005), shows
that this model of corporate social information is widespread throughout the world.
Finally, studies such as that of Clarkson et al. (forthcoming) recognize the objectivity of the fulfi lment index of
the GRI model in the analysis of corporate social disclosure practices.
Consideration of the verifi cation or auditing of the document is a consequence of the great importance given to
the process by the fi rm managers, as seen in Adams’s work.
Specifi cally, we use fi ve dummy dependent variables that take the value of ‘1’ in order to identify the content
and quality of CSR reporting, and ‘0’ otherwise. Information disclsures identifi es these companies that make any
disclosure on social or environmental aspects. Informal preparation shows that fi rms report on CSR by giving out
information in their own informal format. Preparation GRI comprises those fi rms whose CSR contents are adapted
to the GRI recommendations. GRI Certifi cation identifi es whether the GRI has certifi ed the annual report or the
fi rm’s CSR reporting has been verifi ed or audited by an independent entity.
Although we use the fi ve original variables, or a summative variable such as the dependent variable, with a view
to objectively summarizing all the categories of analysis or classifi cation of CSR reporting, a principal components
analysis was estimated to make it possible to simplify the dependent variables previously considered into compo-
nents that refl ect the underlying common dimensions. These components describe the initial data with a much
smaller number of concepts than the original individual variables.
The selection of the factors obtained by the principal components’ analysis allows us to consider jointly all the
common intra-variables aspects that the analysis of each variable independently does not permit. And, moreover,
the weight given to each variable when defi ning the factor is statistically objective, as opposed to the subjectivity
of assigning numerical values, identical or ordinal, to each of the fi ve variables to obtain a summative variable.
Prior to estimation of the principal components analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measurement of sampling
adequacy and Bartlett’s sphericity test were run. The results obtained show an adequate basis for the empirical
1 In this respect, Adams (2002) confi rms that some business mangers doubt whether it would be advisable to publish in their reports negative data that could harm the fi rm’s reputation.
100 J.-M. Prado-Lorenzo et al.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
examination of factor analysis suffi ciency. Table 1 shows how the suffi ciency measurement of the general sampling
falls within the range of acceptance, as well as the signifi cance of Bartlett’s sphericity test.
Subsequently, principal components analysis (VARIMAX rotation) was run, and the results are given in
Table 2.
By analyzing the loadings, it can be seen that Component 1, Validation, represents CSR reporting where the
information has been verifi ed by an independent entity and the contents and format certifi ed as In Accordance by
the GRI.
Component 2, Information disclosed, identifi es those fi rms that give out information on economic and social,
and/or environmental matters, in an informal format, that is, they do not follow an internationally recognised
standard model.
Finally, the last component, GRI format, includes CSR reporting in which the contents and format meet the
requirements and demands of the GRI but have not been certifi ed. The disclosing of information in accordance
with this model would entail an increase in the contents, quality and objectivity of the information.
Independent Variables: Stockholder PowerThe independent variables are summarized in Table 3.
Control variables2
The Power of Other Stakeholders: Government and CreditorsRoberts (1992) empirically tested the positive effect that political power or the power of the fi nancial institutions,
when the latter act as lenders, has on the disclosure of corporate social information.
With respect to political power, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) developed a political costs hypothesis to affi rm
that the information which a company provides is used to draft the government regulations affecting them; as a
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measurement of sampling adequacy 0.503
Bartlett’s sphericity testChi-squaregl.sig.
108.223 10 0.000
Table 1. Estimation of the adequacy of the principal components analysis
Variables Components
1 2 3
VERIFICATION INFORMATION 0.682 0.249 0.476GRI CERTIFICATION 0.944 −0.096 −0.160PREPARATION GRI −0.036 −0.054 0.968INFORMAL PREPARATION −0.204 0.868 −0.280INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 0.277 0.766 0.294
Total variance explained 84.849%
Table 2. Principal components analysis of the dependent variablesBold type indicates the greatest weights of each component per variable.
2 Other dimensions of Ullmann.
Stakeholder Engagement and CSR Reporting 101
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
consequence the executives of that company will attempt to choose the disclosure policies which most contribute
to eliminating political interference and to producing a decrease in costs such as taxes, fees and regulated charges,
among others.
Generally, size, under the hypothesis that larger fi rms are more visible politically, is used as a proxy for the
impact of political exposure. Specifi cally, studies such as those by Trotman and Bradley (1981), Belkaoui and Karpik
(1989), Patten (1991), Deegan and Gordon (1996), Hackston and Milne (1996), Gray et al. (2001), Archel and
Lizarraga (2001), Archel (2003) and Ochoa and Aranguren (2005) have detected a positive direct relationship
between the contents of the CSR report and the size of the fi rm. For this reason we include size in our analysis.
But this variable is also correlated with other corporate characteristics and could represent other effects. To
reduce this problem, we use the industry where the fi rm operates. It is conceivable that companies belonging to
highly sensitive industries will face more stringent government regulations. As such, these companies are pre-
dicted to disclose more social and environmental information in order to minimize government sanctions (Cowen
et al., 1987; Freedman and Jaggi, 1988; Adams et al., 1995, 1998; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Deegan and Gordon,
1996). Thus, following the sector classifi cation established by the Spanish Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, we considered the following industries: transport, industrial, energy and vonstruction.
According to Roberts (1992), creditors control access to fi nancial resources that may be necessary for the con-
tinued operation of a corporation. So the greater the degree to which a corporation relies on debt fi nancing to fund
capital projects, the greater the degree to which corporate management would be expected to respond to creditor
expectations concerning a corporation’s role in socially responsible activities. To test the hypothesis we used the
traditional debt-to-equity ratio, a variable that captures the importance of creditors as stakeholders relative to equity
investors.
Ownership
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS Dummy, takes the value of ‘1’ if one or several fi nancial institutions form part of the ownership structure, and ‘0’ otherwise
DOMINANTSHAREHOLDER Dummy, takes the value of ‘1’ if there is a dominant shareholder and this is a physical person, and ‘0’ otherwise
INDEPENDENT Numerical variable representing the percentage of independent board members who represent the interests of the minority shareholders
Control variablesGovernment power
SIZE Numerical variable represented by the fi rm’s number of employeesTRANSPSECTOR Dummy, takes the value of ‘1’ if the fi rm’s activity belongs to the Transport and
Communications sector, and ‘0’ otherwiseINDUSSECTOR Dummy, takes the value of ‘1’ if the fi rm’s activity belongs to industrial sectors, and ‘0’
otherwiseENERSECTOR Dummy, takes the value of ‘1’ if the fi rm’s activity belongs to the Energy sector, and ‘0’
otherwiseCONSTSECTOR Dummy, takes the value of ‘1’ if the fi rm’s activity belongs to the Construction sector, and ‘0’
otherwise
Creditors’ powerDEBT Numerical variable based on the debt-to-equity ratio
Strategic postureISO14001 Dummy, takes the value of ‘1’ if the fi rm has ISO 14001 environmental certifi cation, and ‘0’
otherwiseOHSAS18001 Dummy, takes the value of ‘1’ if the fi rm has OHSAS 18001 certifi cation, and ‘0’ otherwise
Economic PerformanceROA Numerical variable that represents the return on assets.
Table 3. Independent variables and control variables
102 J.-M. Prado-Lorenzo et al.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
Strategic PostureStrategic posture refers to how a company may respond to social demands. An active strategic posture towards
social demands is expected to result in greater social responsibility activities, outstanding among which are the
drawing up and disclosure of CSR reports (Ullmann, 1985).
To represent this dimension we have selected the presence/absence of ISO14001: Environmental Management
Systems and OHSAS18001: Occupational Health and Safety Assessment certifi cation. These certifi cations involve
a rigorous process in order for the fi rm to be seen as environmentally and socially compliant, respectively, and are
thus signifi cant in the strategic posture of the fi rms.
Economic PerformanceCowen et al. (1987), Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) and Hackston and Milne (1996), among others, have empirically
tested the relationship between corporate social disclosure and economic performance. Owing to the substantial
costs involved in becoming socially responsible, economic performance is an important factor in determining
whether social responsibility issues will be on the priority list.
In this study, an accounting-based measure, Return on Assets, is used to test the impact of economic performance
on the company’s social disclosures.
Analysis Model
Testing hypotheses H1 to H3 entails analyzing the effect of the power of the different stockholders in the Spanish
ownership structure on the characteristics and contents of the CSR report, which have been synthesized in three
components through factor analysis. Dependence models or multiple linear regression models are used for this
purpose.
In order to control the effect of collinearity among the independent variables, four explanatory models were
estimated for each component (twelve models). The fi rst only includes the control variables as independent vari-
ables, whereas the other models incorporate to the initial model, in an individualized way, variables representing
the presence of fi nancial institutions in the fi rm’s capital, the existence of a dominant shareholder, and the per-
centage of independent board members representing the power of the minority shareholders.
Results of the Analysis
Table 4 gives the results for the models estimated. The overall fi t of the different models (R2) are relatively high,
although the small increase produced in them when considering the variables representing ownership structure
should be pointed out. Specifi cally, the explanatory power of the control variables accounts for between 21.9% and
40.9% of the veracity and extent of the CSR reports issued by the fi rms.
When ownership structure is also considered, the explanatory power undergoes a slight increase, to be precise,
from 22% to 41.2%. These increases are not signifi cant, except in Model 3 for Component 3.
On analyzing the variables individually, it can be seen that the three independent variables proposed, which
represent the presence of fi nancial institutions, dominant shareholder and minority shareholders in ownership
structure, do not affect any of the characteristics determined for the fi rms’ social disclosure practices. We must,
however, mention the positive effect of the presence of the dominant shareholder on the adoption of the GRI
format as a standard used for giving out social information. These results lead us to reject hypotheses H1 and H3
and to partially accept H2.
Regarding the control variables, the variable size is statistically signifi cant in all the models estimated for Com-
ponents 2 – disclosure of information – and 3 – GRI format – although with a different sign and signifi cance level.
To be exact, it has a negative effect at a 95% confi dence level for Component 2 and a positive effect at a 90%
confi dence level for Component 3.
The variables representing the sectors of activity are not signifi cant, except for the dummy referring to the
transport sector, which has a positive effect at a 95% confi dence level in all the models estimated for Component
1 – validation of the information.
Stakeholder Engagement and CSR Reporting 103
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
Var
iabl
esC
ompo
nent
1C
ompo
nent
2C
ompo
nent
3
VA
LID
ATI
ON
DIS
CLO
SUR
E O
F IN
FOR
MA
TIO
NG
RI
FOR
MA
T
Mod
el 1
Mod
el 2
Mod
el 3
Mod
el 4
Mod
el 1
Mod
el 2
Mod
el 3
Mod
el 4
Mod
el 1
Mod
el 2
Mod
el 3
Mod
el 4
Con
stan
t0
.00
0**
0.0
00
**0
.00
0**
0.0
00
*0
.00
00
.00
00
.00
00
.00
00
.00
0**
*0
.00
0**
*0
.00
0**
*0
.00
0**
*SI
ZE
0.0
270
.022
0.0
330
.025
−0.2
27**
−0.2
35**
−0.2
10**
−0.2
29**
0.1
79*
0.1
81*
0.1
36*
0.1
69*
TRA
NSP
SEC
TOR
0.2
24**
0.2
18**
0.2
19**
0.2
27**
0.0
120
.00
20
.00
00
.017
0.0
520
.054
0.0
830
.072
IND
USS
ECTO
R−0
.043
−0.0
39−0
.048
−0.0
42−0
.143
−0.1
37−0
.156
−0.1
420
.018
0.0
170
.051
0.0
21EN
ERSE
CTO
R0
.090
0.0
840
.085
0.0
890
.096
0.0
870
.082
0.0
950
.012
0.0
130
.049
0.0
07
CO
NST
SEC
TOR
0.1
09
0.1
230
.10
50
.110
−0.0
03
−0.0
21−0
.014
−0.0
02
0.1
460
.142
0.1
740
.151
DEB
T−0
.170
*−0
.180
*−0
.171
*−0
.174
*−0
.027
−0.0
44−0
.030
−0.0
330
.362
***
0.3
65**
*0
.369
***
0.3
34**
*R
OA
0.0
580
.046
0.0
590
.058
0.0
900
.071
0.0
940
.090
0.1
01
0.1
05
0.0
910
.10
1IS
O14
00
10
.148
0.1
480
.147
0.1
500
.479
***
0.4
78**
*0
.475
***
0.4
81**
*0
.241
**0
.242
**0
.251
**0
.252
**O
HSA
S180
01
0.4
89**
*0
.489
***
0.4
85**
*0
.488
***
−0.1
37−0
.136
−0.1
47−0
.139
−0.1
19−0
.120
−0.0
94−0
.126
FIN
AN
CIA
L IN
STIT
UTI
ON
S–
0.0
64–
––
0.1
08
––
–−0
.019
––
DO
MIN
AN
TSH
AR
EHO
LDER
––
−0.0
33–
––
−0.0
89–
––
0.2
29**
*-
IND
EPEN
DEN
T–
––
0.0
15–
––
0.0
22–
––
0.0
97R
20
.40
90
.412
0.4
100
.40
90
.219
0.2
290
.227
0.2
200
.346
0.3
470
.394
0.3
54F
6.68
3***
6.0
31**
*5.
971*
**5.
950
***
2.71
7***
2.52
1***
2.71
7***
2.42
3**
5.11
9***
4.56
1***
5.60
2***
4.72
2***
F Te
st f
or D
R2
–0
.50
80
.149
0.0
29–
1.0
980
.80
70
.044
–0
.042
6.85
0**
*1.
094
Tabl
e 4.
Eff
ect
of o
wne
rshi
p an
d co
rpor
ate
gove
rnan
ce o
n th
e di
sclo
sure
of
corp
orat
e so
cial
info
rmat
ion.
Mul
tiple
reg
ress
ion.
Sig
nifi c
ant
valu
es in
bol
d ty
pe.
* p-
valu
e <
0.1
0.
** p
-val
ue <
0.0
5.**
* p-
valu
e <
0.0
1.
104 J.-M. Prado-Lorenzo et al.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
The debt variable has a negative effect on all the models for Components 1 – validation of the information – and
2 – disclosure of information, although it is only signifi cant for the fi rst component. On the contrary, for Compo-
nent 3 – GRI format – a signifi cant positive effect is seen.
The ROA variable, the numerical expression of economic performance, is not statistically signifi cant, although
it shows a positive effect in all the models proposed.
The variable relating to the presence/absence of ISO14001 certifi cation has a positive effect at a confi dence level
between 95% and 99% for Components 2 – disclosure of information – and 3 – GRI format.
The OHSAS18001 variable has a positive effect at a 99% confi dence level in all the models relating to Compo-
nent 1 – validation.
With respect to the interpretation of the results indicated, it can be affi rmed that the effect of the stockholders’
power is very limited in relation to corporate social reporting practices, although a certain infl uence is seen in the
improvement of the disclosure of such information relating to its standardization, an aspect that affects the com-
parability of the data offered.
Regarding this standardization of the information through the adoption of the GRI standard, the infl uence of
other stakeholders, such as the Government and creditors, can be seen.
In relation to the validation (auditing and certifi cation) of the social information disclosed, the political pressure
exerted on the transport sector was confi rmed. This relation may be due to the fact that it is one of the sectors
most harmful to the environment, and therefore greater importance is attached to the veracity of the information
disclosed with respect to the adoption of policies and laws that are less permissive regarding the fi rms carrying
out these activities.
The aspect pointed out above is strengthened by the negative assessment the Government makes with respect
to the informal disclosure of information, without common contents and structures among the fi rms.
Moreover, validation of the information disclosed is not viewed positively by the fi nancial institutions when they
act as lenders, perhaps because it is information that is complementary to the information that these entities actu-
ally use for the granting of loans (fi nancial information) and hence they do not require processes that guarantee
its authenticity.
Finally, mention must be made of the strength that the strategy adopted by the fi rm in environmental and social
matters has in the disclosure of a greater amount of information, as well as in its veracity and improvement.
Conclusions
Business, in general, recognizes the importance that key stakeholders attach to socially, environmentally and
ethically responsible behaviour on the part of corporations. In this line, CSR reporting is used as a mechanism
through which companies provide information to stakeholders about environmental, community, employee, and
consumer issues.
The disclosure of this information has traditionally been measured through indicators of the volume of informa-
tion published. This study, following the conceptual framework proposed by Ullmann (1985), considers CSR
reporting from a different perspective. It analyzes the level of contents, their quality and their objectivity through
compliance with the rules for preparation of the GRI model. It also takes into account whether the fulfi lment of
these rules has been certifi ed by the GRI organization, and whether the data refl ected have been verifi ed or audited
by entities independent of the fi rm.
The results obtained confi rm that the infl uence exerted by certain stakeholders (government and creditors),
together with the strategic posture of the fi rm, have an important effect on the publication of a CSR report. On
the contrary, as other authors have already demonstrated, economic performance has a null effect on this
process.
Regarding the infl uence of the stakeholders, particularly government power, when the disclosure of homoge-
neous and objective information is taken into account, it can be seen, the same as in other studies, that the larger,
and therefore more politically visible fi rms, are the ones that disclose more information with a view to reducing
political costs. These are fi rms that also usually carry out an economic activity linked to sensitive sectors of envi-
ronmental activity, which leads to greater government interest.
Stakeholder Engagement and CSR Reporting 105
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
In this sense, the results confi rm that the Government is one of the most important agents for change and has
an impact on social responsibility disclosure practices. This fi nding has signifi cant implications for the Govern-
ment in the sense that it should strengthen regulations in relation to business aspects such as transparency in
social and environmental behaviour by defi ning the contents and veracity of CSR reporting, especially since the
empirical analysis showed that creditors positively infl uence the contents of this type of information but are not
interested in the veracity of these documents.
From the point of view of the shareholders, especially in an ownership structure defi ned by the presence of a
main shareholder that exerts control over the fi rm, there is encouragement to adopt the GRI format as a CSR
reporting model to be used by the fi rm for disclosing information.
In contrast, fi nancial institutions, investors that are unable to move funds quickly in and out without affecting
share price, and dispersed shareholders seem to be only interested in the fi nancial performance of the fi rm, but
not in its sustainable strategies or activities.
But both corporate ownership results may indicate that, although, in general, investors are interested in profi ts
and in economic aspects, when there is large dominant shareholder, with interest in the long-term survival of the
fi rm and in maintaining his or her own reputation, which is strongly linked to that of the fi rm, the fi rm will be
more likely to adopt decisions that maximise its economic, social and environmental behaviour.
Likewise, it has also been shown that an active posture towards social and environmental issues leads to a greater
level of social disclosure.
It can thus be affi rmed that the fi rms with the best disclosure practices in matters of CSR are those that
have defi ned a clear policy or strategy in CSR which entails integral sustainable behaviour. This includes the
fulfi lment of international standards in environmental and social issues as well as total transparency in their
actions in this context. It must be said that this strategy is strongly backed by the support of the fi rm’s main
stockholders.
In short, it can be said that the increasing value that society is placing on the socially responsible behaviour of
organizations in economic, social and environmental terms, and the legal requirements for this kind of behaviour
and its reporting to society, have become essential factors leading fi rms to begin to disclose information on CSR
that has been verifi ed and can be compared internationally. In this sense, the presence of stockholders whose
personal image and social reputation are strongly associated with the evolution of the company notably fosters the
development of these disclosure practices. On the contrary, the investors with a reduced stake in the fi rm’s capital
show only a limited interest in this area.
It would thus be of interest for future studies to analyze the economic, philanthropic and other motivations that
are behind this kind of business behaviour, as well as the social and legal pressures, among other things, that
could foment it.
References
Abbott WF, Monsen RJ. 1979. On the measurement of corporate social responsibility: self-reported disclosures as a method of measuring
corporate social involvement. Academy of Management Journal 22(3): 501–515.
Adams CA. 2002. Internal organisational factors infl uencing corporate social and ethical reporting. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
15(2): 223–250.
Adams CA, Hill WY, Roberts CB. 1995. Environmental employee and ethical reporting in Europe, ACCA Research Report 41. Chartered
Association of Certifi ed Accountants: London.
Adams CA, Hill WY, Roberts CB. 1998. Corporate social reporting practices in Western Europe: Legitimating corporate behaviour? British Accounting Review 30(1): 1–21.
Anderson RC, Mansi SA, Reeb DM. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68:
263–285.
Archel P. 2003. La divulgación de la información social y medioambiental en la gran empresa española en el período 1994–1998: Situación
actual y perspectivas. Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad XXXII(117): 571–601.
Archel P, Lizarraga F. 2001. Algunos determinantes de la información medioambiental divulgada por las empresas españolas cotizadas. Revista de Contabilidad 44(7): 129–153.
Belkaoui A, Karpik PG. 1989. Determinants of the corporate decision to disclose social information. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 2(1): 36–51.
106 J.-M. Prado-Lorenzo et al.
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
Bebchuk LA, Kraakman R, Triantis G. 2000. Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the creation and agency costs of separat-
ing control from cash fl ow rights. In Concentrated Corporate Ownership 2000, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Volume,
Morck R (ed.). University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
Bianco M, Casanova P. 1999. Italian corporate governance: effects on fi nancial structure and fi rm performance. European Economics Review
43: 1057–1069.
Bichta C. 2003. Corporate socially responsible practices in the context of Greek industry. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 10: 12–24.
Christopher T, Hassan S. 1996. Determinants of voluntary cash fl ow reporting: Australian evidence. Accounting Research Journal 19: 113–
124.
Claessens S, Tzioumis K. 2006. Ownership and fi nancing structures of listed and large non-listed corporations. Corporate governance – An international review. 14(4): 266–272.
Clarkson M, Li Y, Richardson GC, Vasvari FP. Forthcoming. Revisiting the relation between environmental performance and environmental
disclosure: an empirical analysis. Accounting, Organizations and Society (in press).
Craswell AT, Taylor SL. 1992. Discretionary disclosure by Oil and Gas Companies: An economic analysis. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 19: 296–308.
Collett P, Hrasky S. 2005. Voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices by listed Australian companies. Corporate Governance-An International Review 13(2): 188–196.
Cowen S, Ferreri L, Parker LD. 1987. The impact of corporate characteristics on social responsibility disclosure: A typology and frequency-based
analysis. Accounting, Organizations and Society 12(2): 111–122.
Deegan C, Gordon B. 1996. A study of the environmental disclosure practices of Australian corporations. Accounting and Business Research
26(3): 187–199.
Dentchev NA. 2004. Corporate social performance as a business strategy. Journal of Business Ethics 55: 397–412.
Destefanis S, Sena V. 2007. Patterns of corporate governance and technical effi ciency in Italian manufacturing. Managerial Decision Economics 28: 27–40.
Faccio M, Lang LHP. 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 65: 365–395.
Fama E, Jensen M. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301–326.
Fan JPH, Wong TJ. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 401–425.
Foster D, Jonker J. 2005. Stakeholder relationship: the dialogue of engagement. Corporate Governance 5(5): 51–57.
Freeman RE. 1984. Strategic management. A stakeholder approach. Pitman: Marshfi eld, MA.
Freedman M, Jaggi B. 1988. An analysis of the association between pollution disclosure and economic performance. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 1(2): 43–58.
Frost GR. 1999. Environmental reporting: an analysis of company annual reports of the Australian extractive industries 1985–1994. Doctoral
Thesis, University of New England: Armidale, NSW.
Gallego I. 2006. The use of economic, social and environmental indicators as a measure of sustainable development in Spain. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 13: 78–97.
García-Sánchez IM. 2008. Corporate social reporting: segmentation and characterization of Spanish companies. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 15: 187–198.
Gray RH, Owen DL, Maunders KT. 1987. Corporate social reporting: accounting & accountability. Prentice-Hall: Hemel Hempstead.
Gray RH, Kouhy R, Lavers S. 1995. Methodological themes: constructing a research database of social and environmental reporting by UK
companies. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 8(2): 78–101.
Gray RH, Owen DL, Adams C. 1996. Accounting and accountability: changes and challenges in corporate social and environmental reporting. Prentice
Hall: Hemel Hempstead.
Gray RH, Javad M, Power D, Sinclair CD. 2001. Social and environmental disclosures and corporate characteristics: a research note and exten-
sion. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 28: 327–356.
Guthrie J, Parker LD. 1989. Corporate social reporting; a rebuttal of legitimacy theory. Accounting and Business Research 19(76): 343–352.
Guthrie J, Parker LD. 1990. Corporate social disclosure practice: a comparative international analysis. Advances in Public Interest Accounting
3: 159–175.
Hackston D, Milne MJ. 1996. Some determinants of social and environmental disclosures in New Zealand companies. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 9(1): 77–108.
Haigh M, Jones MT. 2006. The drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility: a critical review. The Business Review 5(2): 245–251.
Hawkins D. 2006. Corporate social responsibility: balancing tomorrow’s sustainability and today’s profi tability. Palgrave Macmillan: New York.
Hogner RH. 1982. Corporate social reporting: eight decades of development at US Steel. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy
4: 45–55.
Holderness CG, Sheehan DP. 1988. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations. An exploratory analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 317–346.
Hopwood A. 1987. The archaeology of accounting systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society 12(3): 207–234.
Jamali D. 2008. A stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility: A fresh perspective into theory and practice. Journal of Business Ethics 82: 213–231.
Jensen MC, Meckling W. 1976. Theory of the fi rm: managerial behavior, agency cost, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5–50.
Stakeholder Engagement and CSR Reporting 107
Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 16, 94–107 (2009) DOI: 10.1002/csr
Jonker J, Foster D. 2002. Stakeholder excellence: framing the evolution and complexity of a stakeholder perspective of the fi rm. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 9: 187–195.
Hossain M, Reaz M. 2007. The determinants and characteristics of voluntary disclosure by Indian banking companies. Corporate Social Responsibility and Management 14: 274–288.
Keim G. 1978. Managerial behaviour and the social responsibilities debate: Goals versus constraints. Academy of Management Journal 21:
57–68.
KPMG International’s Global Sustainability Services. (2005). KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2005. www.
kpmg.com/Rut2000_prod [accessed 9 November 2005].
La Porta R, López-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance LIV: 471–517.
Lee IB. 2005. Corporate law, profi t maximization, and the responsible shareholder. Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 10(2): 31–72.
Loft A. 1988. Understanding accounting in its social and historical context: The case of cost accounting in Britain, 1914–1925. Garland Publishing:
New York.
Longo M, Mura M, Bonoli A. 2005. Corporate social responsibility and corporate performance: the case of Italian SMEs. Corporate Governance
5(4): 28–42.
Milne MJ, Adler RW. 1999. Exploring the reliability of social and environmental disclosures content analysis. Accounting, Auditing and Account-ability Journal 12(2): 237–256.
Moneva JM, Llena F. 2000. Environmental disclosures in the annual reports of large companies in Spain. The European Accounting Review I: 7–29.
Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny RW. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293–315.
Neu D, Warsame H, Pedwell K. 1998. Managing public impressions: Environmental disclosures in annual reports. Accounting, Organizations and Society 23(3): 265–282.
Ochoa E, Aranguren N. 2005. Divulgación de información social y medioambiental. Un estudio empírico de las empresas del IBEX 35, Comu-
nicación presentada al XIII Congreso AECA, Oviedo.
Nitkin D, Brooks LJ. 1998. Sustainability, auditing and reporting: the Canadian experience. Journal of Business Ethics 17(13): 1499–1507.
Patten D. 1991. Exposure, legitimacy and social disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 10(4):297–308.
Pfeffer J. 1981. Power in organizations. Pitman: Marshfi eld, MA.
Pound J. 1992. Beyond takeovers: politics comes to corporate control. Harvard Business Review 70(2): 72–83.
Qu R. 2007. Effects of government regulations, market orientation and ownership structure on corporate social responsibility in China: an
empirical study. International Journal of Management 24(3): 582–591.
Roberts RW. 1992. Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure: an application of stakeholder theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society 17(6): 595–612.
Secchi D. 2006. The Italian experience in social reporting: an empirical analysis. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 13: 135–149.
Snider J, Hill R, Martin D. 2003. Corporate social responsibility in the 21st century: a view from the world’s most successful fi rms. Journal Business Ethics 48: 175–187.
Shleifer A, Vishny RW. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52: 737–783.
Solomon A, Solomon J, Suto M. 2004. Can the UK experience procide lessons for the evolution of SRI in Japan? Corporate Governance 12(4):
552–566.
Solomon JF. 2006. Private social, ethical and environmental disclosure. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 19(4): 564–591.
Shocker AD, Sethi SP. 1973. An approach to incorporating social preferences in developing action strategies. California Management Review
Summer: 97–105.
Thompsona P, Cowton CJ. 2004. Bringing the environment into bank lending: implications for environmental reporting. The British Account-ing Review 36(2): 197–218.
Thomsen S, Pederson T. 2000. Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal 21: 689–705.
Trotman KT, Bradley GW. 1981. Associations between social responsibility disclosure and characteristics of companies. Accounting, Organiza-tions and Society 6(4): 355–362.
Ullmann AA. 1985. Data in search of a theory: a critical examination of the relationships among social performance, social disclosure, and
economic performance of US fi rms. The Academy of Management Review 10(3): 540–557.
Van der Laan Smith J, Adhikari A, Tondkar RH. 2005. Exploring differences in social disclosures internationally: a stakeholder perspective.
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 24(2): 123–151.
Watts R, Zimmerman J. 1978. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting Review 53: 112–134.
Zadek S, Pruzan P, Evans R. 1997. Building corporate accountability: emerging practices in social and ethical accounting, auditing and report-
ing. Earthscan and nef (the new economics foundation): London.
Zahra SA, Stanton WW. 1988. The implications of Board of Directors’ composition on corporate strategy and performance. International Journal of Management 5(2): 229–236.
Zéghal D, Ahmed SA. 1990. Comparison of social responsibility information disclosure media used by Canadian fi rms. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 3(1): 38–53.