ssdpp final paper - the impact of natural disasters on ... · empirical evidences from the wenchuan...
TRANSCRIPT
1
The Impact of Natural Disasters on the Social Protection System: Empirical Evidences from the Wenchuan Earthquake
Miguel Salazar, Qibin Lu, Xiaojiang Hu, Xinsong Wang, Qiang Zhang, Ling Zhou and Xiulan
Zhang∗
1. Introduction The earthquake which occurred in Sichuan in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 12 May 2008 claimed 69,227 lives and resulted in 17,932 people going missing. More than 374,000 people were injured. Nearly 90 counties, over 900 townships/towns, and more than 9,000 communities in the country suffered severe damages in terms of assets, land, jobs, livelihoods, public facilities, infrastructure, and human lives. Over 13 million people lost their homes and millions are now living in temporary shelters. About 1.15 million farmers lost their lands, and 372,000 urban residents lost their jobs. These staggeringly large numbers make the Sichuan earthquake the largest natural disaster in PRC’s 59 year‐old history, thereby necessitating implementation of the largest post‐disaster social protection schemes in China. Numerous studies have been conducted on the issue of social protection for disasters. Many argue about the importance of social protection after natural disasters (Subbarao 2005; Del Ninno 2008). Even more people provide designs, suggestions, and lessons for particular social protection policies that may be suitable for the affected population (Lustig 2000). Vakis (2006) discusses the complementing role of social protection in natural disasters, and raises the importance of local fiscal, administrative, and economic capacities for policy implementation from the social risk management perspective. Subbarao (2005) argues that social protection before disasters plays an important role more in the short‐ and medium‐ term rather than immediately after the disasters. Several factors make the delivery of social protection services after disasters different from that in normal times. Firstly, the social protection system itself is often equally affected by the disaster with, possibly, the loss of social protection personnel themselves, collapse of agency buildings, damage to equipment, and loss of data and records. Secondly, damage to the other social infrastructure (such as roads, the banking system, etc.) also affects social protection delivery. Thirdly, the affected population has a sudden surge of new demands that would be difficult to meet even if the social protection system could function normally. In summary, checking on how disasters affect the social protection system may reveal that any social protection measures that look good on paper could be seriously compromised in the face of huge disasters. Good social protection policies and practices can only be implemented under a robust social protection system.
∗ The authors are affiliated to the School of Social Development and Public Policy, Beijing Normal
University, China.
2
Several angles may be used to assess the social protection system in disaster situations. Three of these angles are reviewed in this paper, that is, institutional capacity, organisational disaster preparedness at the practical level, and the sociological understanding of reconstruction by organisations during a disaster. 1.1 Institutional Capacity The first angle concerns institutional capacity. Since many disaster relief operations may take a long time, the pressure on the existing social protection systems can be extremely high. To this end, disaster often reveals the insufficient capacity of existing social protection systems to respond to the demands of a large and vulnerable group. The test of institutional capacity is harsher when relief operations are discontinued but normal operations have yet to come into being while many disaster‐hit households may still face serious problems such as lack of permanent housing, poor sanitation, social alienation, indebtedness, and so on. It is the responsibility of the State to address these problems by establishing more inclusive and comprehensive social programmes on poverty relief, social protection, employment services, and social welfare. During the period after a disaster, the State faces a particularly daunting task because the number of people needing social protection programmes increases dramatically after the disaster. At the same time, government institutions themselves may also be victims of the disaster, as there may be casualties among civil servants and their families, trimmed‐down tax revenues, and increased responsibilities for both the higher level authorities and ordinary citizens, all of which may drain the government’s capacity to effectively carry out social programmes. Lack of funding further complicates matters. While some programmes such as the re‐establishment of postal services to manage pension and social security payment are crucial during the post‐disaster period, they are not in the interest of potential donors, who tend to target their donations at more immediately responsive programmes. This increases the need for paying attention to and closely monitoring long‐term and crucial social programmes, and for bridging the gap between relief and development programmes (Aysan 2006; Christoplos 2006). 1.2 Organisational Disaster Preparedness The lack of institutional capacity for social protection systems necessitates the assessment of social protection systems during a disaster from a second angle, that of organisational disaster preparedness. In one way, social protection agencies at local levels can be seen as organisations with certain functions to perform. Organisational disaster preparedness comprises the processes, policies, and procedures that an organisation needs to follow in order to restore operations that are critical to the resumption of daily functions. It includes coping with the sudden loss of key personnel; regaining access to data, communications, and workspace; and executing other processes after a disaster. Organisational disaster preparedness (which is also called disaster continuity planning or DCP, and disaster recovery planning or DRP), has become increasingly important among business
3
organisations in the developed world. The rise of information technology has fostered the strong dependence of organisational functioning on information and communications (Haag, Cummings, and McCubbrey 2005). Data show that among the companies that suffer a major loss of computerised data during a disaster, 43 per cent never reopen, 51 per cent close within two years, and only 6 per cent survive over the long term (Hoffer 2001). Thus, business organisations in the West are rapidly devising strategies to protect irreplaceable data. Currently, most large companies spend 2–4 per cent of their information technology (IT) budget on DRP (Buchanan 2000). As compared to the business world, government agencies, even in the developed countries, are generally less prepared to face disasters (Newcombe 1996). At the time of a disaster, government agencies often become the lifeline for communities and virtually the last resort for survival for most vulnerable people. But these very government agencies usually exhibit little concern for ensuring the functioning of all means of communication in response to disasters. Many countries have learnt painful lessons from government apathy and inefficiency during major disasters. After Hurricane Katrina and other Mexican Gulf region disasters, many US government agencies have realised that relying on a single form of communication increases the government’s vulnerability to breakdowns (Rutzick 2005). Government agencies in China are also increasingly relying on streamlining their information and communication systems, as seen in the speedy digitisation of China’s administration (Kluver 2005) . This implies that the problems that have adversely impacted the functioning of governments in other countries are also being foreseen in China. It is thus necessary to ensure that government agencies here follow all measures for preparedness to face disasters. 1.3 Organisational Sociology of Crisis Management and Disaster Reconstruction Merely instituting a good preparedness plan is, however, not sufficient for an organization to manage disaster situations. Sociologists studying organisations view the issue more holistically (Lin, et al. 2006; Starbuck and Farioun 2003). The spectacular organisational failure in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina and other disasters make people wonder as to what went wrong within government agencies. Sociologists have found that the organisational cultures of the Department of Homeland Security, wherein information flows strictly top‐down amid an intelligence and law enforcement scenario, are not conducive to facing disasters when it becomes imperative to spread information as far and as fast as possible (Perrow 2007). Also, organisations tend to adopt different decision‐making mechanisms during disasters than what they do at normal times (Glenn 2005). While the complete organisational failure of government agencies in China was hardly seen in the case of the Sichuan earthquake, these agencies would do well to learn from the experiences of Hurricane Katrina. Presently, what is most relevant to the incidence of the Sichuan earthquake is an understanding of how organisations adapt to new challenges while simultaneously
4
reconstructing damaged capabilities and adapting to the gaps left in the system by disasters. When organisations experience disasters, cracks may appear in their service delivery systems (Tausig 1987). Individuals are described as ‘falling through the cracks’. Different types of cracks can be identified in an organisation’s service networks depending on the nature of the organisational structure, the degree of impact, and the level of preparedness (Gillespie and Murty 1994). It is thus essential to identify and classify ‘cracks’ to ensure resumption of the designated function (Perrow 1994). This is more critical during the post‐disaster reconstruction stage than during the immediate emergent relief stage. Kelly (2008) summarises the research on damage caused by disasters from the perspective of needs and rights. This is because the government would be able to formulate better response‐oriented policies on the basis of an assessment of the damage caused to people, assets, and infrastructure. In the case of the Wenchuan earthquake, the assessment of damages has been mainly focused on defining the level of the damage, and identifying the regions being affected by the earthquake. Losses in terms of lives, assets, infrastructure, livelihoods, as well as employment, health and education were assessed quickly after the earthquake (Hou 2009; Shi, et al. 2008; Zhao, et al. 2008). A significant body of literature is devoted to an assessment of the impact of disasters on the survivors, especially on their physical and mental health status. For example, Norris and his colleagues (2002) have reviewed the studies on disaster‐affected people over the period 1981 to 2001. They have examined 102 studies across 29 countries, and have found that disasters could have a lasting impact on the affected people. In the case of the Wenchuan earthquake, studies have already found similar impacts (Chen, et al. 2009; Dai, et al. 2009; Liu, et al. 2009, Su, et al. 2009; Xiang, et al., 2009; Zhang, et al., 2009). What is, however, missing from the body of research on disasters and social protection, as well as on the Wenchuan mega earthquake is an examination of the social protection system itself. For this purpose, some of the questions that need to be answered are: What are the possible ‘cracks’ that could surface in a social protection system in the face of a mega disaster? What needs to be done for a social protection system to function properly in the irregular situation of a disaster? What measures needs to be implemented to prepare a social protection system in advance to face a disaster? This paper explores the issue of the preparedness of social protection systems to face disasters by using the Sichuan earthquake as a case study. The paper first reviews the prevalent disaster assistance system in China, and social protection policies and practices followed during the Wenchuan earthquake, and then examines the functionality of the social protection systems. By identifying the weak links and the bottlenecks of social protection systems, and by highlighting valuable experiences in this area, this paper would attempt to enhance the preparedness of the social protection system in China.
5
2. Disaster Assistance in China China is one of the countries that are the most affected by natural disasters in the world. In recent times, China has experienced most types of natural disasters except volcano eruptions. These disasters have included floods, droughts, meteorological, seismic, geological, maritime and ecological disasters as well as forest and grassland fires. Natural disasters threaten China's national security and social stability, stand in the way of economic development in some regions, and have impeded poverty alleviation for certain parts of the rural population. During the period 1990–2005, an average of 370 million people in China (about 3 per cent of the total population of the country) was affected by disasters every year. Disaster mitigation and disaster assistance are thus crucial for promoting sustainable development and maintaining social stability in China. 2.1 Disaster Assistance 2.1.1 The Concept and Contents of Disaster Assistance Disaster assistance refers to the social security system used by a country to assist its populations threatened or affected by disasters. It includes providing the victims with clothing, food, shelter, transportation, medical treatment and other means required to maintain basic living conditions, helping to extricate them from the disasters and their consequent dangers, and assisting them to re‐establish their own livelihood. The basic goal of all these measures is to enhance the ability of the people to resist disaster risks, and to reduce their vulnerabilities. Several approaches may be adopted for integrating disaster assistance into a country's administrative structure. A common approach (found in the USA among other countries) is to consider disaster assistance as an extension of civil defence, by connecting disaster assistance with national security and public order agencies. Another approach is to consider disaster assistance and reconstruction as a matter of social protection, and to assign the main responsibility of providing such assistance to social welfare and public health agencies. China usually follows the second approach. Disaster assistance is considered as an important component of China's social protection system. Disaster assistance includes both the actions associated with the emergency relief stage (rescue of the victims immediately after the disasters, and the supply of basic needs to survivors), and the post‐disaster reconstruction stage. Disaster assistance acknowledges the fact that disaster and poverty are often connected in two ways: poverty increases the vulnerability of the population, and the destruction of livelihoods and accumulated wealth can significantly increase the rates of poverty and economic distress. The emphasis on the rapid restoration of the victims' livelihoods and capabilities is inextricably connected with an emphasis on poverty reduction and a concomitant reduction of future vulnerability to disaster.
6
Within this framework of restoring the capacity of the people to support themselves, the goals of disaster assistance are divided into two stages. The first stage is an emergency stage after the disaster occurs. The goal of this stage is to restore the material and spiritual survival conditions required by the population, and to maintain the minimum living conditions of the victims. The second stage is the reconstruction of the disaster areas and recovery of production and living, such as providing assistance for employment in the affected areas, and restoring major industries, among other things. Consequently, the ultimate goal of this stage is to restore people's lives back to pre‐disaster levels and beyond, by rebuilding their homes, restarting economic development, and maintaining social stability. Accordingly, the targets of disaster assistance are two‐fold. The first target is to provide assistance to the affected individuals in order to allow them to survive and recover. The second target is to provide assistance to institutions in order to restore the social programmes that can help restore the normal lives of individuals. This approach refers largely to macro‐level assistance such as rehabilitation of social functions and public facilities, restoration of the administrative capabilities of government agencies, administrative capabilities, reconstruction of social organisations, integration of social mechanisms into the reconstruction process, strengthening of social safety measures, and bringing of social life back to order. While most studies have focused on the assistance provided to individuals and communities, very few focus on the function of public institutions that deliver social protection to communities and individuals. 2.1.2 The Significance of Disaster Assistance Disaster assistance can be considered as an element of social assistance. It is an important part of social security and social protection, as it allows individuals to live their normal lives and to thrive by mitigating disaster risks and minimising the social impacts of disasters. This means that disaster assistance could be constrained by the same issues of social justice, fairness, and rights protection that confront the regular social assistance structures. Thus, disaster assistance must be designed with the same goals of mediating social contradictions, maintaining social stability, and promoting social development. 2.2 Disaster Assistance in China 2.2.1 The Content of Disaster Assistance in China In the 2000‐year old history of China, the provision of disaster relief and assistance has been the main mandate of all the governments. The current disaster prevention and assistance mechanism was initiated in the 1950s. During the following three decades, the goal of disaster assistance was, ‘No body should die of either hunger or the cold’. The general
7
principles adopted by the current Chinese government are: ‘prevention first’, ‘prevention combined with relief’, ‘relying on the people and the collectivity’, ‘self‐protection through self‐reliance’, and ‘mutual aid and relief complemented with the necessary relief and support by the state’. Since the 1980s, the disaster assistance system has gone through a series of reforms. These reforms include: (1) decentralisation of the disaster assistance financing with less Central Government responsibilities; (2) combining relief with self‐reliance; and (3) linking relief with poverty alleviation efforts. In the meantime, China made the decision to accept international aid for dealing with disasters. In keeping with these guiding principles, China's disaster assistance system comprises the following three sub‐systems: disaster prevention, disaster relief, and disaster reconstruction. In the event of natural disasters, pre‐disaster measures and post‐disaster measures are implemented. The pre‐disaster measures consist of planning, prediction, prevention, and early warning. The post‐disaster measures consist of rescue, relief, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. ‘Disaster relief’ is a general term used to signify immediate responses after disasters with the goal of salvaging people's lives and properties, rearranging the victims' lives, mobilising the general population to support disaster areas, and restoring people's livelihoods and normalcy in their everyday lives. The main responsibility for responding to disasters in China lies firmly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA). In China, the MoCA carries out the following disaster assistance tasks:
1. Ascertaining the disaster situation quickly, accurately and comprehensively, and assessing all kinds of disaster losses;
2. Organising emergency rescue, and transferring and resettling victims; 3. Accepting, disseminating and making use of disaster assistance and rescue
materials, or making use of the State budget for disaster assistance arrangements to help victims resolve the difficulties in their basic livelihoods such as those concerning food, clothing, shelter, medicine, etc.;
4. Inspecting and supervising the implementation of national disaster recovery and reconstruction policies of self‐support, mutual aid and relief;
5. Launching, organising and guiding activities of mutual aid and disaster relief; 6. Receiving, distributing, using, and managing assistance funds and materials
donated by foreign and domestic donors; 7. Resolving the placement and pension‐related problems of orphaned survivors and
the disabled; 8. Guiding disaster assistance work related to anti‐poverty and supporting victims to
become self‐reliant again by re‐engaging in production. 9. Summarising the experience of assistance work and sharing this knowledge with
others. The planning and preparatory responsibilities of the MoCA include:
8
1. Formulating a national emergency response plan for large‐scale disasters and
developing a series of contingency plan templates to improve disaster response plans at all levels of the government, particularly at the county, township and community levels;
2. Enhancing coordination through the establishment of joint disaster response mechanisms among the government departments responsible for disaster‐related actions;
3. Improving financing mechanisms for disaster response at all levels of government; 4. Enhancing the inventory management system for disaster response materials; 5. Establishing a disaster information management system at the community level to
improve capacities in disaster information assessment, reporting, and management;
6. Establishing and improving disaster donation mechanisms, disaster response volunteer systems, and emergency expropriation and compensation mechanisms to enhance social mobilisation capacities during major disasters.
2.2.2 Natural Disaster Assistance System (a) Disaster Assistance Management Mechanism: The responsibilities for disaster assistance management are somewhat decentralised. The CPC Central Committee and State Council provide overall leadership and guidance, while local governments are responsible for the execution of all response actions, and the responsibilities of he relevant Central Government organs are clearly assigned in policy documents. The National Committee for Disaster Reduction with its office hosted by the MoCA, the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters, and other agencies are the subordinate public institutions. The leadership system of disaster management is similarly apportioned into each level of the local government by law. At all levels of government systems, the management of natural disasters includes at its core the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), provincial civil affairs departments, and civil affair bureaus at the regional and county levels. The MoCA is responsible for formulating national disaster reduction polices, strategies and programmes, for coordinating with Central Government departments, and for providing guidance to local governments on disaster mitigation and relief activities. (b) Contingency Plans System: The most important recent development in China's disaster assistance is the introduction of comprehensive contingency plans system. All levels of the government must draft localised contingency plans covering all types of disasters, and making provisions for early warning systems (including meteorological forecasting systems and seismic monitoring systems), preparation for early response, and inventory management, among other tasks. These plans enable the local and provincial authorities to react fast, coordinate activities during the chaotic early stages of relief, and use government resources more efficiently.
9
Since 2008, local civil affairs departments under the leadership of the local governments have actively started drafting local natural disaster assistance emergency plans. Two large natural disasters created a sense of urgency in the development of those plans: the blizzards and ice storms that affected 20 southern, central and eastern provinces at the beginning of 2008, and the catastrophic Wenchuan earthquake in May 2008. However, at present, the formulation of these contingency plans has not been completed at the provincial or prefectural level, and the quality of existing contingency plans for assistance is considered to be low. In order to further improve the building of emergency rescue systems, the MoCA launched a project in 2008 to ensure that all cities and counties complete their contingency plans before March 2009. At the national level, the ‘national contingency plan of natural disasters’ issued by the State Council classifies disasters into the following four levels according to the degree of damage: (i) Level I, which is reserved for the most severe situations wherein the response is organised directly by the Central Government, in coordination with the affected provincial and local governments; (ii) Level II, which marks very severe events, wherein the relevant provincial governments are primarily responsible for organising responses, with the assistance of the Central Government; (iii) Level III, which is intended for severe events, wherein the responsibility is shared by local and provincial authorities; and (iv) Level IV, which is meant for general public emergencies, wherein events can be dealt with mainly by local governments, with the assistance of the relevant Central Government departments. This hierarchical system of intervention is intended to spread the duties among the particular levels of government that are capable of executing them. (c) Emergency Assistance: The controlling instrument regulating early response, rescue and emergency assistance was issued by the MoCA as the ‘Procedure Implementation for Dealing with Sudden Natural Disasters’ in 2004. Its most important provisions include dividing central response to unexpected natural disasters into four levels. The regulation also prescribes the maximum time for certain types of responses, particularly mandating that the arrival of the central disaster assistance working group to the affected area, the deployment of assistance supplies at the site of the disaster, and the provision of emergency assistance to the victims of the disaster must be done within 24 hours of the occurrence of the disaster. It also contains specific measures pertaining to the responses to different kinds of emergencies and disasters, and stipulates how responses to specific measures and disaster assistance work should be incorporated in the standardised management workflow. (d) Post‐disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction: Post‐disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction work in the disaster areas mainly implies carrying out repair and restoration of all kinds of facilities, particularly basic infrastructure, private houses, schools, and other public facilities. Among these tasks, the restoration of basic public services and reconstruction of houses are the most crucial and need to be prioritised over the other tasks. The administration of post‐disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction in China is under the unified leadership of the Central Government, with the MoCA having the primary responsibility for coordinating the various departments. MoCA also has the main
10
responsibility of overseeing the reconstruction of housing. (e) Social Contributions: The core of disaster assistance work lies with the local communities themselves. China has a long tradition of neighbourhood assistance and mutual help among the communities as a measure of disaster response. In 1996, the MoCA implemented a regular system of social contributions. At present, the social donation system in China mainly includes the collection of donations during the disaster period, one‐to‐one support, and regular contributions by members of the local communities. Social contribution has thus become an important component of the natural disaster management system in the country. (f) The Legal Framework of Disaster Assistance: Around 30 laws and regulations constitute the basic legal framework for China's disaster management system. The most important legal instruments are the Flood Control Law and the Earthquake Prevention and Disaster Reduction Law. As regards the legal framework in the country, legal obligations and regulatory structures are rapidly changing in present‐day China, leading to improvements in this area. The inception of this legal structure started with the founding of the PRC and it has steadily advanced over the years. The basic structure of disaster prevention and response was set up in 1950, when the Central Government formulated its first disaster assistance guidelines. These guidelines emphasised ‘self‐reliance, conservation, mutual assistance among the masses, and complementary assistance by the government’. The main features of the disaster management system in China are as follows:
1. The administrative structure divides duties between the Central Government, which is in charge of policy‐making, and the various line departments that are responsible for implementing these policies.
2. The executive organisation is based on local governments. 3. The role of the People's Liberation Army in providing emergency assistance is made
explicit. 4. Both the officials and the masses in the disaster regions are encouraged to
undertake self‐help measures in order to promote self‐reliance among the victims of the disaster.
5. There is extensive mobilisation of social forces. 6. The basic goals of disaster relief are defined as minimising the loss of life and
ensuring that no one would either starve or freeze to death. 7. The wider task is defined as ensuring the safety of human lives and property, and
maintaining social stability in the affected area. This basic framework remained in place until the 1980s. As part of the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction or IDNDR (1990‐2000) the Chinese government set up the Chinese Committee for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (CIDNDR) on 1 March 1989. This committee was hosted by the MoCA and was assigned the task of overhauling the disaster relief system and enhancing awareness of
11
disaster prevention among the whole population. On 18 December 1997, the Committee issued the ‘Disaster Reduction Plan of the People's Republic of China’. This plan represented a change of approach towards disaster reduction, as it formally incorporated disaster management into the plans for economic development. The plan also made provisions for more systematic and scientific disaster management. In April 1998, the Chinese Government promulgated the National Natural Disaster Reduction Plan of the People's Republic of China (1998‐2010), which was the first national disaster reduction plan formulated within the framework of the Ninth Five‐Year National Economic and Social Development Plan and the 2010 Long‐term Objectives. The Plan was developed with significant assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In order to carry forward the work of disaster planning after the CIDNDR was wound up, the State Council set up the Contingency Plans Group in 2003. The Group carried out the initial preparation of national contingency plans in 2004. These national and local plans were issued in 2005, and during the same year, the Emergency Management Office of the State Council was formally set up. The current assistance system and operational mechanism for tackling unexpected and serious natural disaster emergencies were basically set up after the State Council approved and promulgated the National Natural Disaster Relief Emergency Plan and the National Earthquake Emergency Preparedness in January 2006. Before that, disaster assistance work in China was carried out in accordance with a number of different laws, in particular the Law on Flood Control, the Law on Earthquake Prevention and Disaster Reduction issued by the State Council in 1997, the Meteorological Law, and the Natural Disaster Reduction Plan of the People's Republic of China (1998‐2010) promulgated by the State Council in 1998. On 5 August 2007, the State Council issued the National General Plan for Disaster Reduction < Eleventh Five‐Year Plan > [part of the Natural Disaster Reduction Plan of the People's Republic of China (1998‐2010) issued in 1998 was removed]. This plan paid more attention to the strengthening of rescue capabilities and the rescue command and control system in the case of a national natural disaster emergency. The main goal of the plan was to establish a unified management structure that would bring all levels of government together and enable them to work in coordination with each other during the chaotic rescue stage. It also paid attention to building the network of central and local material reserves for disaster assistance and the production of equipment for disaster mitigation and assistance, as well as to bringing about an improvement in the social mobilisation mechanisms. For the first time, it also mentioned that the Red Cross, non‐governmental organisations (NGOs), and grassroots organisations should also be responsible for disaster prevention, emergency rescue, disaster relief donations, medical aid, epidemic prevention, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and post‐disaster psychosocial support. On 2 March 2009, the National Disaster Reduction Committee and the MoCA together issued a communiqué that May 12 of every year would be regarded as the ‘Disaster Prevention and
12
Mitigation Day’ starting with 2009. This move is part of an increased emphasis on the part of the government to facilitate disaster prevention, preparation and mitigation, and part of the effort to increase public awareness about disaster risks and disaster assistance structures. 2.2.3 Improving the Disaster Assistance Mechanisms
The government has identified several main tasks for effecting an improvement in the Chinese disaster assistance system. The following critical areas need to be addressed urgently: (1) The development of disaster‐assistance projects cannot keep pace with the rapid development of the national economy. (2) The disaster assistance plans of governments at various levels have yet to be systemised and standardised, and relevant regulations need further improvement; (3) Disaster assessment technologies and methods are relatively backward, and more efforts need to be made on research on disaster reduction measures; (4) The reserve system of disaster assistance materials and emergency response capabilities needs urgent improvement; (5) Disaster assistance publicity and education should be further strengthened; and (6) Since the disaster insurance programme is limited and the level of assistance is very low, the disaster insurance system at both the local and community levels needs to be improved. These tasks mostly fall under the supervisory responsibility of the MoCA. However, the disaster reduction work involves many line ministries and departments, the mechanism of coordination and information‐sharing among government agencies has not been fully established yet, and social participation channels are limited. It is, therefore, will be a challenge for the MoCA to shoulder these tasks if a suitable national disaster management mechanism is not established.
2.2.4 Financing Disaster Assistance1 (a) Central Financing: This includes the following four areas: (1) A new disaster assistance fund, which is used to finance emergency assistance, resettlement, and recovery and reconstruction of the disaster‐affected areas and households— it is aimed to provide temporary assistance in food, clothing, medical care, and house rebuilding; (2) Food, clothing and medical relief for the disaster‐affected people during the non‐harvest seasons—normally these assistances cover basic sustenance for the targeted beneficiaries during spring (March to May) and winter (December to February); (3) Funding for central disaster reserves and stockpile of materials; and (4) A Research and Development (R&D) fund to be used for disaster prevention, emergency management, and risk reduction. The emergency assistance is per‐person based, while the housing assistance is per‐room based. For the temporary assistance in basic sustenance during the non‐harvest seasons, central funding is used to pay one‐third of the basic monthly basic expenses. (b) Local Financing: The disaster assistance is jointly financed by the Central and local governments, with the Central Government paying one‐third of the total expenses, and the
1 Based on the report drafted by the School of Social Development and Public Policy of Beijing Normal University and submitted to the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
13
local government paying two‐thirds of the costs. The management and logistics cost is estimated to be 5 per cent of the total direct disaster assistance fund. Currently, there is no law or national level regulation to mandate the responsibilities of financing the disaster assistance. Table 1: Disaster Assistance in China, 1991‐2006 Year Total
Affected People (Million)
Total Deaths (Per‐ son)
People Emergently Settled (Million)
Rescued People (Million)
People Who Received Assistance (Million)
Collap‐ sed Houses (Million)
1991 419.41 7,315 13.09 5.49 67.25 5.815 1992 371.74 5,741 3.04 2.05 52.59 1.966 1993 375.41 6,125 3.08 1.59 52.58 2.716 1994 437.99 8,549 10.54 2.44 59.90 5.121 1995 242.15 5,561 10.64 2.97 67.10 4.393 1996 323.05 7,273 12.16 4.78 64.47 8.090 1997 478.86 3,212 5.11 3.05 54.87 2.880 1998 352.16 5,511 20.83 9.03 57.81 8.214 1999 353.19 2,966 6.65 3.67 50.58 1.745 2000 456.52 3,014 4.67 3.24 51.27 1.473 2001 372.56 2,583 2.11 4.76 57.27 0.922 2002 378.42 2,840 4.72 4.60 60.13 1.757 2003 497.46 2,259 7.07 10.02 62.42 3.430 2004 339.21 2,250 5.63 4.92 48.55 1.550 2005 406.54 2,475 15.70 6.24 50.97 2.264 2006 2,374 13.24 . . 2.020
(Source: Xiulan Zhang and Xiaohua Wang: Long Term Financing Mechanisms of Social Welfare Programs: An Internal Report to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, October 2007). (c) Disaster Assistance Financing in Recent Years: Table 1 shows that every year from 1991 to 2006, over 50 million people received disaster assistances and millions were rescued or resettled. The annual rate of increase in the disaster assistance fund from 2003 – to 2007 was 16 per cent. The budget in 2008 was 24.2 billion, accounting for 0.45 per cent of the total government revenue. However, the Wenchuan earthquake has totally changed the situation, and consequently, new financing mechanisms have to be created to cope with the damages inflicted by the mega earthquake. 2.2.5 Issues in Financing Disaster Assistances (a) Financing Mechanism Not Fully Established:
14
Due to the uncertainties of disasters, which can be seen from Table 1, the Central Government and local governments have not established regulations of the disaster assistance financing mandate. The Central Government has been asking the local governments to shoulder the main responsibility of dealing with disasters. But already burdened with financing economic development, education, and social security, as they are, local governments often do not have enough funding to provide the necessary assistance when disasters hit, and the Central Government has to step in to provide funding for the affected people. The bargaining process between the Central and local governments may thus cause delays and shortage in assistance. (b) Inadequate Prevention Funding: So far, there is no earmarked spending on disaster prevention and assistance. The maximum spending is on post‐disaster assistance, and very little effort is made in the area of disaster prevention. When major disasters occur, the Central and local governments have to squeeze their budgets to pay for the emergency assistance, and rehabilitation and reconstruction costs. In addition, while urban areas with better facilities and infrastructure have more funding for disaster prevention, rural areas have almost no funding for disaster prevention. Local governments in the countryside mainly pay for the post‐disaster assistance costs. (c) Limited Funding Sources for Disaster Assistance: Currently, the disaster assistance is mainly a government responsibility, and the level of relief is very low, and primarily concentrated on basic living and housing. The disaster insurance mechanism has yet to materialise. During the 2008 snow storm and the Wenchuan mega earthquake, many banks started providing loans and credits to the affected people, which helped speed up the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. Recently, the National Disaster Reduction Expert Committee has made proposals to expand disaster insurances in China2.
3. The Impact of the Wenchuan Earthquake on the Social Protection System in China: Empirical Evidence 3.1 Methodology Using the case of the Wenchuan earthquake, this paper records and analyses the changing needs of social protection within a 16‐month period after the earthquake. On the basis of surveys of the affected households and of local cadres at various points during the 16‐month period, this section examines the process of how the social protection system reacted to disaster; the problems, gaps and cracks that appeared in their capacity to provide the necessary recovering support, and the manner in which the system adapted to the new challenges and demands during the reconstruction period. These processes cannot be properly detected from the exclusive perspectives of the service
2 Interview with Wang Zhenyao, former Director of the National Disaster Reduction Office of China, August 2008.
15
providers. It is also important to include the perspectives of the affected population. Only the combined study of both service providers and recipients provides a comprehensive image of the processes of recovery and reconstruction of the social protection system. The process of reconstruction is studied from two perspectives: (1) how it was carried out by the bureaucrats, on the basis of the perspective of service providers (in particular, the line officials); and (2) how it was viewed by service recipients. 3.1.1 Survey Location Basic Information of Mianyang We chose Mianyang Municipal City as the site for data collection as we have established a solid research base there. Mianyang is located in the northwest of Sichuan with a total area of 20,249 km2, which comprises 4.2 per cent of the total area of Sichuan province. Out of the total area of 20,249 km2, 61 per cent consists of mountainous areas, 20.4 per cent comprises hilly areas, and 18.6 per cent constitutes plain areas. The central city of Mianyang has a total area of 90 km2. The Mianyang Municipal City includes two districts, that is, Fucheng and Youxian; six counties, including Santai, Yanting, Zitong, An, Beichuan and Pingwu; and one county‐level city, viz. Jiangyou. The total population in Mianyang Municipal City is 5.41 million, including 2.8 million males and 2.61 million females. It has 388 urban communities and 3,370 villages, and its rural population is 4.05 million, constituting 83.2 per cent of its total population. Mianyang is a city with 40 minority and ethnic groups. The total minority population is around 200,000, with most of these people being located in the west of the city. It has one minority autonomous county (Beichuan Qiang minority autonomous county) and seven ethnic townships. Beichuan Qiang County is the only Qiang minority autonomous county in China. Mianyang has maintained a GDP growth rare of 14.3 per cent since 1985, and the growth rate of the total industrial output has been maintained at 20.1 per cent annually. The Earthquake’s Damage to Mianyang During the earthquake, Mainyang was the hardest hit city with all its 9 counties and 276 townships suffering very heavy losses. The total number of people affected by the earthquake touched 5.22 million, accounting for 96.5 per cent of the total population. Among the affected counties, Beichuan, Pingwu and An were the heaviest hit area, while Beichuan central town was completely razed to the ground. A total of 21,963 people died, 7,795 were missing, and 174,000 were injured. As regards damage to property, the homes of 814,000 rural households were destroyed, while the houses of 576,000 urban households collapsed or were severely damaged. The earthquake also damaged 6,564 km of roads, 1,503 bridges, 131 power stations and
16
plants, 8,944 electric transmission lines, 597 reservoirs, 9,416 km canals, 1,398 schools, 3,113 hospitals, clinics or public health stations, 282 broadcasting stations or TV stations, and 26 km of optical cables. The total economic losses were huge. As many as 2,410 enterprises suffered losses, and many enterprises had to cease operations. A whopping 1.72 million mu of farmlands (1 mu=666.7 m2) were damaged, While a total of 1.05 million livestock died, and 44 hotels and 51 tourist sites were damaged. The direct economic losses were estimated to be RMB 297.8 billion. The secondary disaster following the earthquake was also very severe. There were 2,432 landslides, collapses, and mudslides after the earthquake, and 55 quake lakes. Among the latter, the Tangjiashan Quake Lake, the largest of its kind, posed a threat to 1.3 million people. A total of 200,000 people had to be evacuated due to the Tangjiashan Quake Lake following the first evacuation after the earthquake. As many as 3.1 million people had to be resettled. The biggest temporary settlement site, the Jiuzhou Stadium, housed 50,000 survivors, and at its peak, housed 40,000 people in a day. The total relief materials received during the three‐month period after the earthquake included 225,000 tents, 155,000 blankets, 1.07 million pieces of clothes, and 125,000 tons of food. Finally, 40,000 temporary houses were also constructed. 3.1.2 Data for the Study The study is based on longitudinal household surveys with the baseline survey having been conducted within two months of the earthquake and the follow‐up survey been undertaken 16 months after the disaster. The survey on local government personnel and local cadres was conducted 8‐9 months after the earthquake. Baseline Household Survey The baseline household survey was conducted between 20 June and 10 July 2008 in Mianyang, the hardest‐hit city by the Wenchuan earthquake. At the time of the survey, all the people in Mianyang city had been evacuated from their homes and were settled in the temporary tent complex. We randomly selected five temporary tent complexes, and from every two tents, we chose one for an interview. Some tents housed several households, so from these, chose the one with the household head in the tent. The total number of households interviewed was 2,003, and we obtained information on each member of the household. The total individual sample size was 7,407. Follow‐up Household Survey In the baseline survey, we obtained their contact information. In July 2009, we contacted each household on the basis of the information they provided in the baseline survey, and if the information was incorrect, we contacted other people that we had successfully traced,
17
and obtained the most recent contact information of some households. Since the baseline survey was conducted in the tents, many of the interviewees have since moved to other places, and many of the households have stopped using the cell phone numbers which were supplied largely by a cell phone company during the settlement period. In the end, we were able to trace 481 households and obtained information on 2,275 individuals. The follow‐up survey was conducted from August to September 2009. Cadre Survey The Mianyang city government decided to train all its cadres in all levels of government and all agencies with the purpose of enhancing the capacity of managing the recovery and redevelopment policies. A total of around 2,060 cadres were trained in the City Public Administrative College from 6 December 2008 to 26 February 2009. The training covered all cadres with administrative ranking of township or above in Mianyang city. We distributed the questionnaires to every cadre and received 1,241 valid questionnaires. Document Reviews and Field Visits We undertook surveys and interviews five days after the quake in the quake‐hit areas, and we undertook the planning policy research for the National Disaster Reduction Commission during and after the earthquake. Key policy documents, especially the new policies issued for the Wenchuan earthquake with regard to social protection, are discussed below. 3.2 Social Protection Policies after the Earthquake The Chinese Government has been widely acclaimed for its fast action following the Wenchuan earthquake. Apart from emergency rescue, evacuation, and relief, the Government has issued a series of social protection measures, and allocated funding for social protection quickly. Table 2 presents the key policies formulated after the Wenchuan earthquake.
Table 2: Key Policies Relevant to Social Protection Issued in May–September 2008
Stages Date Issued Issuance Authority
Key Policies Relevant to Social Protection
Pre-disaster 5 August 2007 State Council National Integrated Disaster Reduction Eleventh Five Year Plan
Wenchuan Earthquake
Emergency Rescue Period: 12–31 May
20 May 2008 Ministry of Civil Affairs
Temporary Assistant to Wenchuan Earthquake-affected People
18
20 May 2008
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China
Strengthening the Monitoring of the Wenchuan Earthquake Relief Materials and Fund
30 May 2008
Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Housing
Arrangement of Temporary Shelter for Wenchuan Earthquake-affected People
2008
31 May 2008 State Council (2008-39)
Strengthening the Management of the Wenchuan Earthquake Relief Materials and Fund
1 June 2008 Ministry of Civil Affairs
Strengthening the Transparency of the Wenchuan Earthquake Relief Materials and Fund Allocations
3 June 2008 Ministry of Civil Affairs
Assistance and Settlement of the Homeless Children, Elderly and Disabled due to Wenchuan Earthquake in Sichuan Province
11 June 2008 State Council Twining Arrangement of Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and Redevelopment
13 June 2008 State Council Guidelines of the Usage of the Wenchuan Earthquake Donations
15 June 2008 Ministry of Civil Affairs
Further Strengthening the Management of the Wenchuan Earthquake Relief Materials and Fund
23 June 2008 State Council Further Improvement in Medical Services and Epidemic Control in the Earthquake Region
29 June 2008 State Council Supporting the Policy Measures of Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and Redevelopment
3 July 2008 State Council Guidelines for Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and Redevelopment Work
18 July 2008
Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Finance
Relief Policy after Initial Three Months Emergent Assistance to the Affected People in Wenchuan Earthquake
Temporary Settlement Period: 1 June– 31 August 2008
6 August 2008 State Council Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and Redevelopment Regulations
4 September 2008 Ministry of Civil Affairs
Comprehensive Damage Assessment of Wenchuan Earthquake
Recovery and Redevelopment Period: 1 September 2008–to date
19 September 2008 State Council Comprehensive Plan of Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery and Redevelopment
(Source: 2008 China Disaster Reduction Yearbook, Office of National Disaster Reduction Commission. December 2009. 147 Baiguang Lu, Dongcheng District, Beijing). The major social protection measures are discussed below.
19
3.2.1 Fast Allocation of Food and Cash
During the three‐month period after the Wenchuan earthquake, the State Council and Central Party Committee issued nine policy documents, while different ministries issued seven documents related to the disaster and covering a wide range of issues. The four policies issued in May 2008 related to the main issues for relief, including provision of 300 yuan for each person per month and half a kilogram of grain per person per day in the quake‐hit areas for three months (called a “three‐month temporary living stipend”). Also, temporary shelters for the affected people had to be built quickly. A specific policy was issued 20 days after the disaster to further protect those who were most in need, that is, the disabled, orphans and the childless, generally known as the “three orphaned people” (san “gu” renyuan) caused by the earthquake. These people were provided 600 yuan per month of stipend for three months. The original stipend for the pre‐existing “three‐orphaned‐people” in the affected areas was also raised to 600 yuan per month for three months. By July 12 (two months after the earthquake), this policy had provided assistance to 8.8 million, including “three no‐people” (that is, people having no housing, no grain and no life security, known as san “wu” renyuan) and 261,000 “three‐orphaned‐people3”.
After three months of providing temporary living subsidies, the Government continued to provide follow‐up assistance to people who were still struggling struggled through unstable living conditions. The main target group constituted the “three‐orphaned‐people”, family members of the dead or seriously disabled who had difficulties, relocated families, and families living in damaged houses. From September to November 2008, the follow‐up stipend was 200 yuan per month per person, and even higher for the “three‐orphaned‐people”. After the follow‐up programme ended, people still in need of Government assistance were covered by the minimum living standard system, the “Five‐Guarantee System”, and the programme of “Temporary Assistance for Winter”.
3.2.2 Establishment of Financing Social Protection Mechanism
In order to encourage donation and to avoid the arbitrary use of donation, the Government issued five policies to regulate and monitor transparent management and usage of the relief materials, fund, and donations. The State Council also issued measures to ensure the financing of the recovery and redevelopment policies. A ‘twinning’ arrangement was set up one month afterwards so that the particular provinces or cities could take responsibility for a particular affected county by providing support for reconstruction and housing.
3.2.3 Quick Recovery and Redevelopment Planning
The Central Government made a great effort to assess the damage and to plan for the recovery and redevelopment in a very short period. The regulations and the comprehensive
3 Statistics from the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China.
20
plan included both financing and delivery of social protection to the earthquake‐affected people.
3.3 Demands for Social Protection after the Earthquake On the basis of the baseline survey in Mainyang, we found that 60.9 per cent of the households found their houses to be completely damaged and in need of being rebuilt, and only 3.8 per cent of the households did not see any major damages to their houses. The rest of the houses needed some level of reinforcement and restoration. As regards the issue of livelihood, among the rural households interviewed, which accounted for 65.2 per cent of the total, 59.8 per cent had their land and fishing pond damaged, and 78.6 per cent of them predicted losses in agricultural production, while 75.5 per cent of the small business owners were compelled to close down their businesses for lack of operating funding. As regards the recovery of household livelihood, 37.8 per cent of the respondents believed that it would take them five or more years to return to their pre‐quake economic condition, and 25.5 per cent of the surveyed people believed that they would never be able to regain their pre‐quake economic status. From the survey, it was found that since many people had lost their sources of income, poverty would become a major problem. A few of the most vulnerable groups were identified as follows:
1. The pre‐quake poor households such as the recipients of the rural and urban Minimum Living Guarantee Programmes. They would find it extremely hard to improve their economic situation.
2. The marginal poor rural and urban households. They were not qualified as recipients of the rural and urban Minimum Living Guarantee Programmes but their income level was low and they would be very likely to fall into poverty.
3. The new orphans, the childless elderly, and the disabled caused by the earthquake. They needed assistance in basic living, medical care, and social services.
4. The households in the hardest‐hit areas such as Beichuan, that had their assets and properties completely lost and damaged, and had no source of income to maintain basic livelihood.
5. The households whose major labour force had died or become disabled. Not only did these households have no income, but they also had to spend more on medical or rehabilitation care.
6. The families with their houses completely damaged and loans yet to be fully paid. Among the surveyed households, 23.5 per cent had loans on their households. These households would easily fall into poverty.
7. The reallocated households without any income during the resettlement period. They needed social protection to help them settle down and regain the sources of
21
livelihood. 3.4 Emergency Social Protection Provided The assistances provided during the emergency period included:
1. Rescue and provision of basic supplies such as water, food, clothing, blanket, medicine, etc. for basic survival. The main deliverers of these assistance materials were the militaries and volunteers as well as the survival local cadres.
2. Emergent reallocation of the disaster‐affected people. The first stage was to move people out of the dangerous areas to safer places such as parks, temporary shelters, and vacant factories. Then they were moved into the tent areas, and finally to the temporary housing complexes.
3. Provision of free food and water. For the first three months, all the disaster‐affected people were provided with free food and water, and some people also received other free supplies such as blankets and clothing.
4. Emergency cash for the disaster‐affected people. A total of 300 yuan and 15 kilograms of food were provided to each person for three months. The orphans, the childless elderly, and the disabled received double benefits.
5. Compensation to the households with casualties. Each household received 5,000 yuan for each casualty.
6. Three levels of housing assistances were defined on the basis of the size and economic conditions of the households. The compensation ranged from 16,000 yuan to 26,000 yuan.
7. Continued assistance was offered to orphans, the childless elderly, the disabled, families with casualties, households reallocated without sources of income, families whose houses were completely or severely damaged, and poor households. These people were entitled to receive three more months of emergency disaster assistances.
In terms of social protection coverage after the earthquake, it was found from the survey that 99 per cent of the respondents said that they had enough food, and most of them had meat in their meals. Nearly 70 per cent of the shelters had electricity, 92.9 per cent of the respondents had safe drinking water, and 86.2 per cent of them reported that they were very satisfied or satisfied with their current living conditions. Table 3 presents these findings.
Table 3: Social Protection Coverage: Two Months after the Earthquake
Current Living Conditions Percentage
Yes 99.0 Having Enough Food to Eat
No 1.0
Daily 23.8
4‐5 Times per Week 5.5
Having Meat in Meals
2‐3 Times per Week 22.8
22
Once a Week 30.8
Less than Once a Week or No Meat
17.1
Yes 68.9 Having Electricity
No 31.1
Safe 92.9
Not Safe 4.6 Having Safe Drinking Water
Unknown 2.5
Very Satisfied 11.1
Satisfied 75.1
Not Very Satisfied 11.6 Satisfaction to Current Status
Very Unsatisfied 2.1
(Source: Compiled from the Baseline Household Survey in Mianyang)
We further analysed the type of assistance that the people had received. Table 4 presents the results. Again, we found that 34 per cent of them were assisted in rescue and evacuation; 92.7 per cent received food and water; 80.9 per cent received other living necessities; 70.4 per cent received cash; 32.1 per cent were placed in shelters; 57.5 per cent received help in setting up tents and shelters; 13.9 per cent received help in childcare or tutoring; 27.3 per cent received consulting services; 16.9 per cent got books; and 6.6 per cent received other forms of assistance. We found that relatives, friends and armies provided the maximum help in rescue and evacuation. Government agencies were the main providers for food, water, living necessities, medical services and medicines, and shelters. Local cadres and friends and relatives were also the main providers of assistance. It was very interesting to note that volunteers had played an important role in social protection provision. While food, water, living necessities, medical services and medicine were mostly provided by traditional actors such as the army and the government agencies, other forms of assistance such as consulting services, childcare and tutoring, and books were mainly provided by the volunteers as compared to the other actors. In comparison, the NGOs played a relatively smaller role in disaster assistance.
Table 4: Social Protection Provision
Social Protection Received Two Months after the Earthquake
Provider (%) Type of Assistances % Received Relatives
or Friends Local Cadres
Government Agencies
Volunteers Army NGOs
Rescue and Evacuation 34.0 9.7 4.0 6.6 8.1 19.0 3.3
Food and Water 92.7 5.0 19.0 61.1 17.9 5.3 6.8
Other Living Necessities 80.9 4.7 16.0 52.0 16.4 3.8 7.3
Medical Services/Medicines
81.2 1.3 15.2 53.8 14.4 3.9 8.1
Cash 70.4 3.4 7.3 45.6 3.8 0.3 2.3
Shelter 32.1 7.1 5.0 17.6 2.2 1.4 1.1
23
Building Tents/Shelters 57.5 5.6 6.7 33.0 6.2 8.8 4.0
Childcare/Tutoring 13.9 0.4 0.3 2.6 8.6 0.6 2.5
Consulting 27.3 6.9 3.2 3.9 16.0 0.7 0.9
Books 16.9 0.0 1.8 4.9 8.8 0.3 1.7
Other Assistances 6.6 1.0 1.3 1.2 2.9 0.4 0.7
(Source: Compiled from the Baseline Household Survey in Mianyang) 3.5 Changing Social Protection Demands between Two Months and Sixteen Months after the Earthquake We asked the earthquake‐affected people what their biggest concerns were at the time of the survey. In the baseline survey, the top three answers were the following: 68.4 per cent of the surveyed people said that they were most concerned about their housing construction, 17.26 per cent were concerned about their livelihood, and 4.69 per cent were concerned about the unclear after‐quake situation and the unclear redevelopment and reconstruction plan. In the follow‐up survey, which was conducted about 16 months after the earthquake, it was found that 39.25 per cent of the respondents were concerned about their livelihood, 32.57 per cent were concerned about the housing construction, and 8.77 per cent were most concerned about their health. The order of concerns had reversed between the baseline and the follow‐up surveys, with livelihood moving up as the top concern and housing being the second. Health had also become an important concern of the people affected by the earthquake. As regards the government’s priorities in redevelopment and reconstruction, in the baseline survey, 48.95 per cent of the respondents said that they wanted the government to make the building permanent housing as the priority, 16.91 per cent wanted the roads and infrastructure to be restored first, 11.99 per cent wanted school conditions to be improved for their children, 11.28 per cent said that they needed temporary housing, and 4.72 per cent were in urgent need of jobs. In the follow‐up survey, it was found that 40.80 per cent of the respondents were concerned about the housing construction, 17.55 per cent wanted the roads and infrastructure to be restored, 16.28 per cent wanted the government to solve their livelihood problems, 15.64 per cent hoped that the government would strengthen the local economic development, and 2.33 per cent wanted improved education conditions for their children. Seen from the order of government priorities expected by the respondents in the baseline and follow‐up surveys, housing, roads and infrastructure restoration were the issues of maximum concern among the respondents. In the second survey, a larger proportion of the respondents expected the government to strengthen local economic development and solve their livelihood problems. At the same time, a smaller percentage of the respondents cited the issue of education conditions as their top concern, probably because the government
24
had already prioritised the improvement of schools on their agenda. While individuals and households suffered heavy losses, the social protection system was also severely affected by the earthquake. The next section concentrates on the assessment of the damages to the social protection system and how, under the severe conditions, the system managed to react to the suddenly increased demands for social protection. 4. Social Protection System during and after the Earthquake
4.1 Damage to the Social Protection System
In Beichuan, the hardest‐hit county in Mianyang Municipal City, among the 3,441 total government personnel, 568 cadres died and 172 cadres became severely disabled, accounting for 21.5 per cent of the total cadres. Table 5 presents the findings of the damages from the cadre survey. As many as 74.2 per cent of the cadres reported that their office buildings were damaged, 53 per cent reported damaged office furniture, and 18.4 per cent reported damaged equipment and vehicles. In addition, 15.6 per cent of the cadres reported that archived files and data were missing, and 7.1 per cent reported that they could not find the official stamps and documents, while 46.4 per cent of the cadres were left with very poor working conditions.
In terms of the personnel, 8 per cent of the surveyed cadres said that their colleagues had died, were injured or had left, and 6.6 per cent complained that the new staff members were not up to the tasks, 8 per cent suffered injury, 13.2 per cent said that their family members were injured, and 6.7 per cent said that their family members had died or were missing.
Table 5: Damages Caused by the Wenchuan Earthquake to the Social Protection System
Damages due to the Wenchuan Earthquake Percentage
Office Building 74.2
Office Furniture 53.0
Archived Files and Data 15.6
Official Stamps and Documents 7.1
Vehicles and Equipment 18.4
Hardware
Very Poor Working Condition 46.4
Staff Died, Injured or Moved 8.0
New Staff Were Not Up to the Tasks 6.6
Injured 8.0
Family Members Injured 13.2
Personnel
Family Members Died or Missing 6.7
(Source: Compiled from the Cadre Survey in Mianyang)
The survey of the 1,241 cadres revealed a very challenging situation for social protection because the system itself had suffered very severe damage in terms of both hardware and personnel.
25
4.2 Coping with the Sudden Increase of Social Protection Needs: Findings from the Cadre Survey
While the earthquake put a great deal of pressure on the social protection system, the local cadres had taken every measure to ensure the delivery of social protection to the needy people. Table 6 presents the findings of how the local cadres responded to the sudden increase in social protection needs.
The cadres at all levels have done a remarkable job since the earthquake. During the one‐month period following the earthquake, they carried out many emergency tasks, such as collecting and reporting statistics on the death and the injured, rescuing and transferring the injured, evacuating and settling the survivors, building and managing temporary shelters, helping in sanitation and epidemic control, and cleaning up the dead bodies and ruins. A majority of the cadres reported that their workload and responsibilities had increased, and that their daily working hours had increased from 8.2 to 13.3 during the first month of the earthquake, while six months later, they were still working 9.3 hours per day.
Table 6: Coping with the Sudden Increase of Demands for Social Protection
Coping with the Sudden Increase of Demands for Social Protection Percentage
Increased Workload 64.1
Increased Responsibilities 67.8
Responsibilities during the One‐month Period after the Disaster
Statistical Information Collection and Reporting 49.8
Rescue and Transferring of the Injured 23.1
Evacuation and Temporary Settlement of the Survivors 51.6
Relief Materials and Fund Allocation and Management 46.5
Building Temporary Shelters 22.4
Managing Temporary Shelters 13.3
Cleaning Up Dead Bodies and Ruins 6.4
Sanitation and Epidemic Control 18.5
Increased Working Hour(s)
Before the Earthquake 8.2
One Month after the Earthquake 13.3
Current 9.3
Changed or Promoted to New Positions 16.7
(Source: Compiled from the Cadre Survey in Mianyang)
4.3 Challenges for Sustained Capacity of Social Protection System: Findings from the Cadre Survey
Table 6 indicates that due to the damages to the social protection system, the local cadre system also experienced very rapid change, with 16.7 per cent of the cadres having changed positions or having been promoted.
26
Table 7 highlights the pressure on the local cadres and the impact on their mental, physical and behavioural health. The average Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES‐D) score of the cadres was 12.9 six months after the quake. As per the survey, 20.1 per cent of them had a score of over 20, indicating severe depression and 12.1 per cent of them had scores ranging between 16 and 19. On an average, the cadres reported 1.9 health symptoms—14.3 per cent of them had chest pain, 9.9 per cent had stomach pain, 11.2 per cent had diarrhoea, 36.6 per cent had headaches, 4.6 per cent had injures not related to the earthquake, 4.9 per cent had fever, 45.3 per cent of them reported having cough or sore throat, 44.8 per cent felt palpitation, and 17.2 exhibited other health symptoms.
There was a significant change in the self‐reported health status. The proportion of respondents reporting excellent health condition dropped from 28.4 per cent to 8.9 per cent, signifying a change of almost 20 per cent change, and the proportion of people who had earlier reported very good health also decreased from 36.8 per cent before the quake to 25.7 per cent after the quake, Simultaneously, those who reported poor and fair health status registered a very significant increase, from 5.3 per cent to 21.6 per cent. Over 30 per cent of the respondents claimed that their health problem was serious, and more than half of them did not seek healthcare, the main reason for which was that they had no time to go to hospital. The pressure exerted by the post‐earthquake situation also resulted in increased substance abuse. For example, before the earthquake, 78.8 per cent of the affected residents were daily smokers, but this figure percentage increased to 87 per cent six months after the quake.
Table 7: Pressure and Impact of the Earthquake on the Local Cadres
Pressure on the Local Cadres and Impact on Health
Mental Health
Average Score 12.9
<16 67.9
16‐19 12.1 CESD
Category (%)
>=20 20.1
Total Score 1.9
Chest Pain 14.3
Stomach Pain 9.9
Diarrhoea 11.2
Headache 36.6
Serious Injury 0.7
Non‐serious Injury 3.9
Fever 4.9
Cough, Sore Throat 45.3
Palpitation 44.8
Symptoms Category (%)
Others 17.2
Self‐reported Health Status Before (%) After (%)
Excellent 28.4 8.9
Very Good 36.8 25.7
27
Good 29.5 43.9
Fair 3.9 17.2
Poor 1.4 4.4
Very Serious 1.7
Relatively Serious 10.1
Serious 27.7
Not Serious 42.5
Self‐assessment of Current Health Problems (%)
Hard to Say 17.9
Hospitalised 4.1
Outpatient Clinic Treated 21.2
Family/Friend Treated 3.7
Bought Drugs 56.3
Treatment when Sick (%)
Not Treated 14.8
Not Serious 31.2
Financial Difficulties 6.7
No Time 43.9
Inconvenient Transportation 0.7
Long Waiting Line in the Hospitals 3.3
Do Not Like Hospitals 9.3
Reason for Not Seeking Treatment
Other 4.9
Behaviour Health: Smoking Before (%) After (%)
Occasionally 21.2 13.0
Daily 78.8 87.0
(Source: Compiled from the Cadre Survey in Mianyang) The local cadres were also confronted with the pressure of delivering social protection and other services to the affected people, and working on redevelopment of the economies in the affected region. Moreover, they had to face the loss and injury of their close family members, relatives, and colleagues, as also the loss of family assets and sources of livelihood. All these factors took a heavy health toll of these personnel. The findings from the cadre survey indicated that while the local cadres could be quickly deployed for carrying out the tasks of delivering social protection and other forms of emergency assistance, their sustained capacity of social protection delivery was severely undermined.
4.4 The Weak Spots of the Social Protection System Identified by the Local Cadres
The local cadres were asked to identify the weak spots in the social protection system during their work in providing earthquake emergency management and relief. Among the surveyed respondents, 38.5 per cent said that relief fund and materials should be better prepared, 34 per cent said that coordination among government agencies needed to be improved, 26.4 per cent said that the rescue and relief operations should be strengthened, and 19.9 per cent said that a disaster insurance system needed to be established. With regard to the performance evaluation of various aspects in social protection delivery,
28
Table 8 presents the satisfaction scores of the cadres. The ranking in terms of lack of satisfaction over the performance of the cadres was quake lake management (8.7 per cent), price control and regulation (7.1 per cent), permanent housing construction (6.5 per cent), temporary housing construction (5.5 per cent), job creation (5.5 per cent) and psychosocial support (5.4 per cent). The ranking in terms of a high degree of satisfaction over the performance of the Government was hygiene and sanitation (47.5 per cent), treatment and transfer of the injured (41.4 per cent), emergency mobilisation (40.9 per cent), evacuation (37.6 per cent), rescue (35.3 per cent), transportation of relief materials (34.9 per cent), temporary settlement (34.7 per cent), restoration of water and electricity lines (33.4 per cent), school reopening (32 per cent) and reopening of markets and stores (31.4 per cent). The health sector has won the highest score in its performance during this earthquake, followed by emergency rescue, evacuation and mobilisation. The provision of basic living conditions (settlement, water, electricity, market, etc.) ranked the third. The area of school reopening was also considered by the cadres to be a very satisfying achievement. Table 8: Evaluation of Service Delivery Performance during the Earthquake
Evaluation of Service Delivery Performance during the Earthquake
Tasks Very Satisfied (%)
Relatively Satisfied (%)
Satisfied (%)
Not Satisfied (%)
Emergency Mobilisation 40.9 44.1 11.5 3.5
Rescue 35.3 47.7 14.1 2.9
Evacuation 37.6 50.7 9.6 2.1
Temporary Settlement 34.7 55.2 8.4 1.7
Transportation of Relief Materials
34.9 56.3 7.9 0.9
Allocation of Relief Materials 29.0 62.4 7.7 1.0
Allocation of Relief Fund 27.2 61.6 9.7 1.5
Temporary Housing Construction 24.7 51.4 18.4 5.5
Quake Lake Management 28.7 43.0 19.6 8.7
Temporary Housing Allocation 25.3 59.3 12.6 2.8
Redevelopment Planning 23.7 59.4 13.7 3.2
Restoration of Transportation 26.2 57.8 12.6 3.4
Restoration of Water and Electricity Lines
33.4 59.1 6.4 1.0
Reopening of Markets and Stores 31.4 62.1 5.9 0.7
Hygiene and Sanitation 47.5 50.1 2.0 0.4
Treatment and Transfer of Injured
41.4 54.3 3.6 0.8
Price Regulation and Control 23.1 50.8 18.9 7.1
Recovery of Productions 25.3 63.9 8.9 2.0
Permanent Housing Construction 19.7 52.8 21.0 6.5
29
Reorganization of Grassroots Organizations and Communities
22.2 63.0 11.9 2.9
School Reopening 32.0 58.5 7.7 1.7
Psychosocial Support 21.3 54.6 18.7 5.4
Creation of Jobs 20.1 56.8 17.6 5.5
(Source: Compiled from the Cadre Survey in Mianyang) 5. Issues in Social Protection during Disasters 5.1 Gaps in Social Protection Implementation At the macro level, in accordance with public expectation, the performance by the Chinese Government appeared to be effective in terms of provision of the disaster relief and reconstruction processes, with most people in the disaster‐affected areas having been relocated to safer places and shelters, schools quickly having been rebuilt in a much safer condition, infrastructures reconstructed and repaired, and people’s livelihoods being restored. From June to August 2008, China’s National Audit Office published three auditing reports on various aspects of disaster relief work for Sichuan and found “no serious incidents of breach of laws” in the process of disaster relief and reconstruction. At the meso and micro levels, however, various problems were seen in the social protection programme during its implementation. At the county level, there were problems of uneven progress and unequal implementation. The Audit Office found that, one month after the earthquake, only people in 28 out of 65 towns/townships in the three audited counties were receiving the temporary stipend. The time lag among counties could be as long as one month and the affected people had to wait even for the most urgent assistance. Interviews with the Wenchuan Earthquake Taskforce (WET) team indicated that the criteria to decide who were “qualified” for stipends and subsidies varied greatly from place to place. In Chengdu, only “people without housing” could receive stipends. In Mianzhu, all people with local hukou were qualified. In the neighborhood Luojiang County, only one‐third of the population could receive the stipend. Naturally, the people in Luojiang protested and demanded, “Why are people at the other side of the river eligible for stipend even though their houses were intact, while we cannot get subsidy when our houses have become uninhabitable?” The entitlement of the emergency disaster assistance required the recipients to hold the local hukou. If people were reallocated to the settlement sites, they had to go back to their hukou locations, which also had to be the officially defined earthquake‐affected counties for a certificate of local hukou registration. Many of them may not have been able to find the local cadres or officials in time. This policy completely excluded the migrants who did not belong to the officially defined earthquake‐affected counties. Also, different settlements distributed stipends differently. Some provided free meals as well as a standard stipend (10 yuan and 0.5 kilogram of grain, per person per day), some cut the
30
grain due to provision of free meals, some provided free meals and no stipend at all, while others provided standard stipend but no free meals. This varied implementation of social assistance led to a lot of complaints to the governments. At the village level, most regions did not differentiate between social protection targets. They either distributed resources evenly by household (regardless of household size), or did a lottery (regardless of different family situations). Similarly, the programme was biased because it only considered household economic conditions, but vulnerable groups such as women, children and the elderly, were not given special consideration. Some local leaders believed that only equal distribution among households or per person constitutes fairness, and any special treatment to selected groups is unfair. Another problem is that the number of people reported to be qualified for receiving stipends was often inaccurate. More often than not, the number was exaggerated at the county level so that more resources could come from the provincial government. Finally, there was no formal channel for redressing the grievances of the people during programme implementation. The WET team found that some people were unsatisfied with the progress or implementation of the social protection programme but found no regular channel to express their opinions. Since local officials, and not personnel from social protection agencies, were often in charge of the temporary programmes, local people could rely only on the personal reactions of higher‐level officials to right the wrong, and they were afraid of facing the vengeance of local officials. 5.2 Equity and Equality Concerned with fairness during the relief and reconstruction operations, people and cadres laid great emphasis on equality (sameness) of treatment by social protection institutions.
“It will be fine if no one receives the assistance, but if someone else has it, I must have it” (quote from an interview with an individual survivor in July 2008).
“If you cannot provide enough relief to everyone, it is better not to allocate anything to my village. I cannot decide who should be eligible, and if I cannot distribute the relief equally, I am afraid it will cause social unrest” (quote from an interview with a village cadre in August 2008).
Table 9 presents the allocation principles of the disaster assistance from the perspectives of the cadres and people. A significant difference was found between the two groups in terms of how the relief materials and funds were allocated. Over 50 per cent of the people reported that the relief materials and funds were allocated to the bigger households, while the cadres thought that they had allocated the relief materials and funds to the households which suffered bigger losses. Twice the number of cadres as compared to the number of people believed they had allocated more assistance to the poor. And the people believed that those who were powerful and had connections, and those who came in early with their
31
demands got more than the others. Interestingly, the cadres believed that those “crying babies” would get more, but the people did not believe so.
Table 9: Allocation of the Relief Materials and Fund
How the Relief Materials and Fund Were Distributed
Category (%) People Cadres
Each Household Was About the Same 25.0 20.0
Bigger Households Got More 53.0 26.7
Households That Suffered Bigger Losses Got More 10.4 44.7
Poor Got More 1.9 4.1
Rich Got More 0.2 0.5
Powerful Got More 2.2 0.9
Households with More Connections Got More 4.5 0.6
‘Crying Babies’ Got More 0.4 2.1
Those Who Came Early Got More 2.5 0.6
(Source: Compiled from the Baseline Household Survey and Cadre Survey in Mianyang) These differences in allocating principles had an impact on how people perceived the fairness of the disaster assistance. Table 10 presents the findings.
Table 10: Equity Concerns over the Disaster Assistance
Were the Relief Materials and Fund Distributed Fairly
Category (%) Cadres' View on the ProcessCadres' View on the Outcome
People's View
Fair 23.3 17.9 34.5
Relatively Fair
73.0 76.5 45.2
Not Fair 3.8 5.7 20.3
(Source: Compiled from the Baseline Household Survey and Cadre Survey in Mianyang)
A majority of the cadres believed that the processes and outcomes of relief materials and funds allocation were fair. Although a fairly high percentage of the affected people believed that the allocation was fair (78.7 per cent), still 20 per cent of them believed that the allocation was not fair. Table 8 indicates that both the cadres and the people laid great emphasis on equality (sameness) of treatment by social protection institutions.
5.3 Decision‐making Dilemma Differences among the quake‐affected counties in terms of the social, economic, environmental and geographical conditions necessitated that the policies on redevelopment should suit local conditions while being consistent with the national policies. In addition, the local situation changed rapidly. The complexity required the policy‐makers to be cautious and
32
the policies to be tailored to local needs and capacities. But the urgency to get people back to normal life demanded quick policy responses. Information asymmetry was also intensified and created more challenges in decision‐making and implementation. Although information dissymmetry existed in all policy design and implementation processes, the situation was especially complex during the Wenchuan mega earthquake because of the large area and number of the affected regions, disparities in their original social and economic development, as well as the different types of damages caused by the disaster. In addition, as the forms of emergency assistance were urgent and the situation in the region changed quickly, information dissymmetry got worse. Finally, many grassroots units were damaged and, consequently, the information channel to local governments was also lost. During the field visits, the WET team found that the Government’s responsibility extended beyond its normal range. Due to the heavy social and economic damages, the Government had to bear almost all the responsibilities, and the boundaries between the Government, society, and individuals became hard to define. All these issues contributed to a “decision‐making dilemma” in the disasters, and the role of the Government went much beyond mere implementation of the regular social protection system.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper uses the case of the Wenchuan earthquake to examine the social protection system, the policies and practices of social protection during disasters, and to identify implementation gaps in social protection during disasters.
The study finds that the existence of a pre‐disaster social protection system, quick policy responses and innovative approaches in both the financing and delivery of social protection are essential for meeting needs when people and communities are hit by disasters. The damaged social protection system and the daunting tasks of offering social protection after earthquakes can be managed by reallocating the local government personnel and local cadres. The severely damaged social protection institutions can restore functionality in a very short period of time by intensifying the use of surviving resources. However, this “burst” overstresses the local system in the long run, as human resources become over‐exhausted and the existing organisational structures become over‐extended and frayed. This can result in an “after‐shock” dip in functionality or near‐systemic failure several months after the initial impact.
In sum, it can be said that the problems in social protection policies and implementation, as well as the functionality of the social protection system reveal some typical weaknesses and challenges faced by a social protection system during and after major disasters. First, there can be lack of personnel and lack of means of communication and transportation for social protection agencies to perform normally. Second, the principle of social protection (that is, more help to the vulnerable groups) is not familiar to most people who are assigned to replace the lost formal social protection personnel. Third, there are inherent difficulties in
33
accurately assessing and verifying information in disaster situations. Fourth, in disaster situations, people’s expectations for social protection tend to be different from those during normal times, and they lay greater emphasis on equality than what a social protection system is designed to ensure. Lastly, the chaotic situation during disasters provides windows of opportunity for some people and organisations (local government included) to pursue their own agendas, and there is no built‐in mechanism to counter the effect of this. At a deeper level, if one focuses on these problems of social protection at the early stages of disaster recovery, one may fail to take into consideration the social protection system itself: how its capacity has been affected and how the system could fix itself. In particular, one may overlook the double challenges faced by the social protection system: to solve the damages caused by the disaster, and to rebuild and expand its capacities to address the new problems resulting from the disaster. This lack of consideration for the organisational capacities can result in a mismatch between implementation plans for new programmes and the disrupted capacities of the system. This is particularly important when we consider the system beyond the formal structures to include the intangible assets, networks and communication resources, and the interface between suppliers and users of social protection.
Finally, volunteers played important roles in delivering social protection after the disaster. There is thus a need to examine in detail the prospects of their increased involvement in the social protection system during disasters.
34
References Aysan, Yasemin (2006) ‘Risk Reduction Indicators: Institutional Capacities’, Available at http://www.ifrc.org/docs/pubs/updates/triams‐rri.pdf, (Accessed on 11 January 2010) Buchanan, Sally (2000) ‘Emergency Preparedness’, in Paul Banks and Roberta Pilette (eds), Preservation Issues and Planning, Chicago: American Library Association Chen, Caiqi; Li, Yan; Tian, Weiwei; Chen, Rong and Zhang, Qing (2009) ‘The Behavioural Problems and Their Determinants of Wenchuan Earthquake‐affected Children’, Journal of Huanan Normal University (Social Sciences) 4: 54–8. Christoplos, Ian (2006) ‘Risk Reduction Indicators: Linking Risk to Relief and Development. TRIAMS (Tsunami Recovery Assessment and Monitoring System)’, Working Paper. ProVention Consortium, Available at http://www.proventionconsortium.org/themes/default/pdfs/TRIAMS_LRRD.pdf (Accessed on 11 January 2010) Dai, Qin; Feng, Zhengzhi; Yang, Guoyu; Zhang, Xie and Wang, Tao (2009) ‘The Psychological Status of and Interventions to the Wenchuan Earthquake‐affected People’, China Journal of Health and Psychology (Zhong Guo Jian Kong Xin Li Xue Za Zhi) 17(9): 1139–41. Del Ninno, Carlo (2008) ‘Role of Cash Transfers and Other Social Safety Nets after a Disaster’, Presentation at the workshop on ‘Building Resilient Communities: Risk Management and Response to Natural Disasters’, June 13, Bangkok Gillespie, David F. and Murty, Susan A. (1994) ‘Cracks in a Post‐disaster Service Delivery Network’, American Journal of Community Psychology 22(5): 639–60 Glenn, David (2005) ‘Disaster Sociologists Study What Went Wrong in the Response to the Hurricanes, but Will Policy‐makers Listen?’, The Chronicle of Higher Education, Available at http://chronicle.com/free/2005/09/2005092904n.htm (Accessed on 11 January 2010) Haag, Stephen; Cummings, Maeve and McCubbrey, Donald J. (2005) Management Information Systems for the Information Age. Toronto: McGraw‐Hill Ryerson Higher Education. Hoffer, Jim (2001) ‘Backing Up Business—Industry Trend or Event’, Health Management Technology (January) . Hou, Laurent (2009) ‘Earthquake Geopolitics in China: The Case of the 12th May 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake’, Master Thesis at the University of Paris 1 (La Sorbonne), Paris, France. Kelly, C. (2008) ‘Damage: Needs or Rights?—Defining What is Required after a Disaster’, London: Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre
35
Kluver, Randolph (2005) ‘The Architecture of Control: A Chinese Strategy for e‐Governance’, Journal of Public Policy 25: 75–97 Lin, Zhiang; Zhao, Xia; Ismail, Kiran M. and Carley, Kathleen M. (2006) ‘Organisational Design and Restructuring in Response to Crises: Lessons from Computational Modelling and Real‐world Cases’, Organization Science 17(5): 598–618 Liu, Fang; Gao, Fa‐bao; Fu, Ping; Qiu, Hong‐yu; Hu, Hong‐de; Tang, Hong; Zhang, Ling; Song, Bin; Tang, Wan‐xin; Tao, Ye and Huang, Song‐min (2009) ‘Isolated Non‐compaction of Ventricular Myocardium in a Victim of the Wenchuan Earthquake with Crush Syndrome and Acute Renal Failure’, Chinese Medical Journal 122(18): 2196–8. Lustig, Nora (2000) ‘Protecting the Poor against Natural Disasters’, Social Protection for Equity and Growth, Washington, DC: Inter‐American Development Bank Newcombe, Tod (1996) ‘Disaster Recovery Planning Gets No Respect in Emergency Management’, Available at http://www.govtech.com/em/96102 (Accessed on 11 January 2010) Norris, Fran; Friedman, Matthew J.; Watson, Patricia J.; Byrne, Christopher M.; Diza, Eloia and Kaniasty, Krzysztof (2002) ‘60,000 Disaster Victims Speak: Part I. An Empirical Review of the Empirical Literature, 1981–2001’, Psychiatry 65(3): 207 Perrow, C. (1994) ‘The Limits of Safety: The Enhancement of a Theory of Accidents’, Journal of Contingencies Crisis Management 4: 212–20 Perrow C. (2007) The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rutzick, Karen (2005) ‘Agencies’ Disaster Recovery Plans Get a Real‐world Test’, Available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0905/090705r1.htm (Accessed on 11 January 2010). Shi, Peijun; Liu, Lianyou; Liu, Jifu; Fang, Weihua; Zou, Ming; Fan, Yida; Zhang, Xiaoning; Wang, Ying; Xu, Guodong and Liu, Jing (2008) ‘The Damage Assessment of the Wenchuan Earthquake’, WET Working Paper 3: 3–13. Starbuck, William H. and Farioun Moshe (eds) (2003) Organization at the Limit: Lessons from Columbia Disaster, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Su, Bai‐hai; Qiu, Li; Fu, Ping; Luo, Yan; Tao, Ye and Peng, Yu‐lan (2009) ‘Ultrasonic Appearance of Rhabdomyolysis in Patients with Crush Injury in the Wenchuan Earthquake’, Chinese Medical Journal 122 (16): 1872–6 Subbarao, Kalanidhi (2005) ‘Disasters: Role of Social Protection’, Presentation at the Conference, ‘Protecting the Vulnerable: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety
36
Nets’, November 28–December 9, Washington D.C. Tausig, Mark (1987) ‘Detecting “Cracks” in Mental Health Service System: Application of Network Analytic Techniques’, American Journal of Community Psychology 15 (3): 337–51 Vakis, Renos (2006) ‘Complementing Natural Disasters Management: The Role of Social Protection’, Washington, DC: The World Bank Social Protection Paper No. 0543 Xiang, Yanhui; Wo, Jianzhong; Zou, Gaoxiang; Shen, Li and Li, Erxia (2009) ‘The Characteristics of Wenchuan Earthquake‐affected People’, China Journal of Mental Health (Zhong Guo Xin Li Wei Sheng Za Zhi) 23(7). Zhang, Jingqiu; Tang, Yonglong; Deng, Lili; Liu, Lingshuang; Zhao, Yufang and Hu, Li (2009) ‘Surveys of Social Support to the Sichuan Earthquake‐affected People’, Psychological Sciences Progress (Xin Li Ke Xue Jin Zhan) 17(3): 542–6. Zhao, Yandong, Fenyu Wang, Guangxi He, Dasheng Deng, Ying Ma, Mei Xu, Xinxin Kong and Yuan Wang (2008) ‘The Living Condition and Policy Demand of the Wenchuan Earthquake‐affected People’, Available at http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/zhuanti/09zgshxs/content_17099440.htm (Accessed on 11 January 2010).