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Speculaions I



EdiorialPaul Ennis

Aricles

Science-Laden TeoryOulines o an Unseled Alliane

Fabio Gironi

Tinkin Aains NaureNaue, Ideaion, and Realism beween Lovea and Shelling

Ben Woodard

o Exis Is o Chane A Fiendly Disageemen Wih Gaham Haman On Why Tings Happen

Michael Ausin

Inerviews wih Graham Harman, Jane Bennet,im Moron, Ian Boos, Levi Bryan and Paul Ennis

Peter Graton

5

9

47

66

84

E P E, U C, D

Board o RevieersA I, U V

J C, L S UP Gt, U S DS E, D UI B, T G I TS S, W S U

L B, C CS H, D L I A, D TP R B, B S U

[email protected].

isbn 978-0-557-57344-8

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Ediorial

Posiion PapersNomologcal Dispuaion

Alain Badiou and Gaham Haman on Objes

Nahan Coombs

Response o Nahan CoombsGraham Harman

Neworkologes A Manieso, Seion I

Chrisopher Viale

Book Revies

Deleuze/Guaai & Eologyedied by Bernd HerzoenrahAdrian Ivakhiv

Te Eologial Tough by im MoronPeter Graton wih a response by Tim Moron

Ae he Posseula and he Posmoden:New Essays in Coninenal Philosophy o Religionedied by Anhony Paul Smih and Daniel WhislerAusin Smid

135

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184

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Speculaions I Paul Ennis – Edioial

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Fabio Gioni

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20 Ibid., 158.21 I, lous lassius ‘ ’ - S’ 1994 C U. L -q : ‘L . T’ . T’ . T’ . O , , , , . T j , , , , , , z, , , , , x , , , “,” “ ,” - . T E . T , , . T - x , q , , . O , -, - U, . O

. I , , . T E .T , , . V, . St, . L , E . I - x. T t . T , , , ’ ’( D, Te Oxod Book o Moden Siene Wiing , 395).

9 G H, Pine o Newoks: Buno Laou and Meaphysis. (M- : ., 2009), 148,149.10 Q Mx, Ae Finiude: an Essay on he Neessit o Coningenc. (L: C, 2008), 114.11 H q - H G Pj, .12 I x A - M 1969. T - . T x human () .

13 E - L B ‘[] cgi . W x ole - z ? D Udoxa x - ?’ (t://j../21/5/3/--j--/). M : , ( ‘’) .14 A ( t ) LH C t . T , x xj , x , . T - z q x ,

, ‘’ .15 H, “S, T, E: A Oj-O A,” owads Speulaive Realism. (W, uk: Z B, 21), 141 (-). I, G’ , Collapse III, : C MB R map , - - t H S T mm-N .




36 37

31 I , M F ( ) : ‘ S R .O R B, G H, I H G Q M-x, S R . T ’ j x ; ’ ’ (t://w../A.x?=). F - TeImmanen Fame ( US- SS R C) t://..//-/--2/.32 I L F ‘I-’ x

-x z. S L F, Philosophy and Compuing: an Inoduion.(N Y L: R, 1999) t://w../. I F’ L’ -- x ,

philosophial .33 N, j . T . N, . I Ae Finiude A S ‘[j] [Mx] G P’. S AS “B G O: S R P S.” Cosmos and Hisor: Te Jounal o Naual and Soial Philosophy,V 5, № 2 (2009), 309, t://w../x./j///118/272. H j ‘ ’? W S R , I . I , , I 199, . T

‘’ I , I . O , I S R ( ) I , ‘’.34 F S R

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../x.?=_&=&=10:zz----&=6:&I=16).23 B, Nihil Unbound, xi.24 A t ‘’ ‘’ xB’ Alien Teor B’

Alien Phenomenology. A I , , .25 I ‘ ’ I , E ‘ ’ ‘ ’. S R e al. “O E S A U C C.” Te Asonomial Jounal, 116:3, 1998: 1009-1038, Pt e al. “M Ω 42 - .” Te Asophysis Jounal, 517, 1999: 565-586.26 B, Nihil Unbound, 228.27 Mx Ae Finiude , 116.28 B, Nihil Unbound, xi.29 t://j../2010/01/12/j------/.30 I x - ( inees ) . A Ax Tf R (Ax. ) Cosmi Vaiane, C S C ( ) .




38 39

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: ‘ S wondeul’, - - ( BBC Cx’ ‘W’: ‘A S S’) ’ . W q boh ‘’ , t , ( , ) z z ( , ) , q - TV .40 D Fx, Cold Wold: Te Aesheis o Dejeion and he Poliis o MilianDysphoia. (H: Z B, 2009), 4.41 t://j../2101/12/j------/.42 A I B, ‘L ’ j/ , x - . F x ‘ , , , , , , , , ’

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40 41

51 I , ‘ ’ , . F , , x ‘ ’ , -.52 I Speulaions I B - x, ‘I x . B t ( ), I’ , I’ t. P x- : ’ , x . I , I ’ ’ ( ) .... , ’

q?’ (. 116 ).53 D V, “E I.” Angelaki, 10:1, 2005: 2.54 I, , V ‘[] R B’ ‘‘ - ’’ j’ (Ibid., 19).55 M D B, “S O.” Angelaki 10:2 (2005): 121.56 I 1963 ‘T T C: ’ C.P. S, Te woCulues. (C: C, 1998).57 E ’ , , x, . F , t://w..///_x..58 t://w../3_/59 P Edge I . I , , j poliial . Q B’ -: ‘A E A. T

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42 43

“ t”, , ’ , ’ (G B e al. “S R”,Collapse V. III 2007: 360).64 W j ‘’. F - M Hä, Radial Aheism: Deida and he ime o Lie. (P A:S U P, 2009),

D’ - ‘’ C N, Agains Relaivism: Phi-losophy o Siene, Deonsuion and Ciial Teor. Ox: B, 1999.65 S : -

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44 45

bibliographyD B, M. “S O.” Angelaki10:2 (2005): 109-122.

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―Nihil Unbound: Enlighenmen and Exinion. L: P, 2007.

―“A A N.” I B I ansizone,29. A t://w.-./z/--..

B, R; G, I H; H G Mx,Q “S R”, Collapse V. III 2007: 307-449.

C, N “I G M S?” Te Alani J 2008. A : t://w..//200807/.

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D, R. Te Oxod Book o Moden Siene Wiing. Ox: oup, 2008.

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Fx, D. Cold Wold: Te Aesheis o Dejeion and he Poliis o MilianDysphoia. H: Z B, 2009.

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’. J M,Pos-Coninenal Philosophy: an Ouline. (L: C, 2006), 3.69 t://z2../2010/02/18/-/. I - H , R Tt ‘[] -, x , - . A , , , ’ (R Tt, “D M-: P A.” Collapse V.II, 2007: 168-169), ( speulaive ,

ealism) . S x J L, ‘ ’, ‘ j ...I ... ’ -, j , I j x- z. S, , , ’ (J L,

“W’ S?” Collapse V. V, 2009: 140). T, U D, S, G H - t J L’ ( D R’) , j j ‘ , I , j . I , ’ . T , , images images. I , f f ’ (t://z2../2010/05/09/----/).70 B Alien Teor , 22.



47

Speculaions I

46

2006.

N, C. Agains Relaivism: Philosophy o Siene, Deonsuionand Ciial Teor. Ox: B, 1999.

P, J. Eahise: how man fs saw he Eah. N H L:Y U P, 2008.

Pt, S. e al. “M Ω 42 - -.” Te Asophysis Jounal, 517, 1999: 565-586.

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S, A. “B G O: S R P- S.” Cosmos and Hisor: Te Jounal o Naual and SoialPhilosophy, 5:2, 2009: 304-321.

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83-169.

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ž, Sj “U N. E A N.” 29.A : t://w.../x.?=_&=&=1:zz----&=6:&I=16).

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1 H.P.L, “F C L A J H F” H.P. Lovea Te Fiion Complee and Unabidged, (N Y: B N, 2008), 102.2 F.W.J. S , Ideas o a Philosophy o Naue, . E H PH, (N Y: C U P, 1995), 54

3 Q Mx, Ae Finiude: An Essay on he Neessit o Coningenc,(L: C I P G, 2008), 5.4 Ibid. 66.5 Ibid, 83.6 F.W.J. S , Sysem o ansendenal Idealism, . P H, (V-: U P V), 18.7 F.W.J. S, Fis Ouline o a Sysem o he Philosophy o Naue, (A:S U N Y P, 2004), 98.




62 63

8 Ibid. 198.9 R B, I H G, G H Q M-x, “S R”, Collapse: Philosophial Reseah and Developmen,. III, (F: U, 2007), 340-342.10 F.W.J. S , Te Gounding o Posiive Philosophy, (A: S U N Y P, 2007), 143.11 Ibid. 14112 Ibid. 136-137.13 F.W.J. S , Philosophial Invesigaions ino he Essene o Human Feedom,(N Y: SUNY P), 28.14 S, Ideas, 174.15 S,Fis Ouline, 196.

16 I H G, Philosophies o Naue Ae Shelling, (L: C- I P G, 2006), vii

17 S, Ideas, 150.18 S, Sysem, 103.19 F.W.J. S, Sj Zz, Te Abyss o Feedom/Ages o he Wold, .

J N, (A A: U M P, 120-121).20 Ibid., 122.21 Bj N, “Hoo empois,” Collapse: Philosophial Reseah andDevelopmen, IV, (F: U, 2008), 277.22 H.P. L, “T C C,” H.P. Lovea, 355.23 H.P. L, “T U,” H.P. Lovea, 260.24 Ibid. 256.25 Ibid. 257.26 S,Sysem, 10-13.27 G, Philosophies, 176-177.28 Ibid. 181.

29 S, Gounding, 129.30 Ibid. 131.

31 Q Mx, “S C: Dz, I, Mt M” Collapse: Philosophial Reseah and Developmen,. III, (F: U, 2007), 103-104.32 S. T. J, H.P. Lovea: Te Deline o he Wes, (B H: WP, 1990), 89.33 S, Sysem, 6.

34 S, Ideas, 17.35 G H, “O H P” Collapse: Philo-sophial Reseah and Developmen, IV, (F: U , 2008), .343.36 R B, Nihil Unbound: Enlighenmen and Exinion , (N Y:P M, 2007), 137-138.37 Ibid., 139.38 Ibid.39 Ibid. 138-139.40 Ibid.41 Ibid. 120.42 Ibid. 142.43 S, Ages, 13044 Ibid. 13145 S, Ibid, 31-3246 Ibid. 42.47 B, Nihil Unbound, 11948 S, Ideas, 17549 M DL, Inensive Siene and Viual Philosophy, (N Y: C- P G, 2005), 10550 Ibid. 78-7951 Ibid. 157.52 Ibid. 160.53 J, Deline, 7.54 Mx, Ae Finiude , 80.55 S, Fis Ouline,. 35.56 S, Ideas, 78.57 B, Nihil Unbound, 134.58 B, “Oj C,” L B, N S G- H (.) Te Speulaive un: Coninenal Maeialism and Realism ,(M: R.P, ), 59 Ibid.6 B ’E, On Physis and Philosophy, (N J: PU P), 1861 Ibid. 5.




64 65

62 S, Ideas, 26.63 Ibid. 172.64 Ibid. 87.65 J, Deline, 32.66 Ibid. 110.67 F.W.J. S , Claa o, Naue’s Conneion o he Spii Wold, . FS, (A: SUNY P), 22.68 L, “C C,” Lovea, 378-379.69 L, “S H L,” Lovea, 1043.70 B, Nihil, 139.71 S, Ideas, 162.72

Mx, Ae Finiude , 47.73 Ibid. 37.74 Ibid. 64.75 Ibid. 81.76 L, “T T,” Lovea, 14.

bibliography

B, R, I H G, G H Q Mx,“S R”, Collapse: Philosophial Reseah and Developmen,V. III, F: U, 2007.

B, R. Nihil Unbound: Enlighenmen and Exinion, N Y: PM, 2007.

―“Oj C,” L B, N S G H (.) Te Speulaive un: Coninenal Maeialism and Realism, M:R.P, .

DL, M. Inensive Siene and Viual Philosophy, N Y: C- P G, 2005.

’E, B. On Physis and Philosophy, N J: P U- P.

G, I H. Philosophies o Naue Ae Shelling, L: C- I P G, 2006.

H, G. “O H P” Collapse: Philo-sophial Reseah and Developmen, V IV, F: U, 2008.

J, S. T. H.P. Lovea: Te Deline o he Wes, B H: WP, 1990.

L, H.P. H.P. Lovea: Te Fiion Complee and Unabidged, N Y:B N, 2008.

Mx, Q. Ae Finiude: An Essay on he Neessit o Coningenc,L: C I P G, 2008.

―“S C: Dz, I, Mae and Memor” Collapse: Philosophial Reseah and Developmen, V. III, F-: U, 2007.

N, Bj. “Hoo empois,” Collapse: Philosophial Reseah andDevelopmen, V IV, F: U, 2008.

S, F.W.J. Claa o, Naue’s Conneion o he Spii Wold , . FS, A: SUNY P.

―Fis Ouline o a Sysem o he Philosophy o Naue , A: S U N Y P, 2004.

―Ideas o a Philosophy o Naue, . E H P H, NY: C U P, 1995.

―Philosophial Invesigaions ino he Essene o Human Feedom, N Y:SUNY P.

―Sysem o ansendenal Idealism, . P H, V: UP V.

―Te Abyss o Feedom/Ages o he Wold, . J N, A A:U M P.

―Te Gounding o Posiive Philosophy, A: S U N Y P, 2007.



Michael Ausin – o Exis is o Change

6766

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o Exis Is o Chane

A Friendly Disareemen Wih GrahamHarman On Why Tins Happen

Mihael Ausin

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noes1 H B, Ceaive Evoluion, . A M (N Y: HH C, 1911), 7.2 A E, Te Bon-Einsein Lees; Coespondene beween AlbeEinsein and Max and Hedwig Bon om 1916 o 1955, (W, N Y, 1971).3 W “”

x .4 A x , - .5 M H, Being and ime, . J Mq ER (L: SCM P, 1962), 98.6 Ibid.




82 83

7 H, “Oj-O P,” , 4-5 ( ). F H’ - Being andime, ool-Being: Heidegge and he Meaphysis o Objes, (C:O C, 2002). A H’ ausalit, - j .

I I S H (t://..). T , “Oj-OP” , , “I OjF N-H,” . I H’ , .8 G H, Gueilla Meaphysis: Phenomenology and he Capenro Tings (C: O C, 2005), 74.

9 G H, “O V C,” Collapse II: ‘SpeulaiveRealism,’ 193.10 H,Gueilla Meaphysis, 92.11 G H, “I Oj N-H,” , 8.12 Ibid., 6. S H’ x C10 Gueilla Meaphysis.13 T , , .14 H, “O V C,” Collapse II: ‘Speulaive Realism,’220.15 “T , ,” ibid, 195. S G H, Pine o Newoks:Buno Laou and Meaphysis (M, R.P, 2009), 147.16 H,Gueilla Meaphysis, 180.17 Ibid.18 Ibid., 118.19 H, “O V C,” 213.20 Ibid., 215-216.21 H,Gueilla Meaphysis, 233.22 Ibid., 149.23 “W H a pioi, , , t .” Q Mx, Ae Finiude: An Essay onhe Neessit o Coningenc, . R B (L: C, 2008), 90.

24 I K, Ciique o Pue Reason, . N K S (L-: P-MM, 2003), b124.

25 F Mx, Ae Finiude , RB, Nihil Unbound: Enlighenmen and Exinion (L: P, 2007).26 Mx, Ae Finiude, 5.27 S idealism x

Mx, H Wt .28 H,Pine o Newoks, 109.29 Ibid., 81.30 Ibid., 114.31 Ibid., 132-134.32 H q UC D “A N T S.” A anhem (t://-./)

bibliographyB, H. Ceaive Evoluion, . A M. N Y: H

H C. 1911.

B, R. Nihil Unbound: Enlighenmen and Exinion. L: P.2007.

E, A. Te Bon-Einsein Lees; Coespondene beween Albe Ein-sein and Max and Hedwig Bon om 1916 o 1955. W: N Y. 1971.

H, G. ool-Being: Heidegge and he Meaphysis o Objes. C-: O C. 2002.

―Gueilla Meaphysis: Phenomenology and he Capenr o Tings. C:O C. 2005.

―“O V C,” Collapse II: ‘Speulaive Realism’ (2007). 187-221.

―Pine o Newoks: Buno Laou and Meaphysis. M: R.P. 2009.

―“Oj-O P.” U .

―“I Oj N-H.” U ,

t://..//.―“A N T S.” U . R

t://-./.

H, M. Being and ime, . J Mq ER. L: scm P. 1962.

K, I. Ciique o Pue Reason, . N K S. L:P-MM. 2003.

Mx, Q. Ae Finiude: An Essay on he Neessit o Coningenc,. R B. L: C. 2008.



Peer Graton – Inoduion

8584

The context for these interviews

I S

2010. T I j , I ’ ; , . T q . T , , q “” - , , , .

Inerview wih Graham Harman“You an’ have Realism wihou Individual Objes”

Gaham Haman is Assoiae Povos o Reseah Adminisaionand Assoiae Poesso o Philosophy a he Ameian Univesitin Caio, Egyp, and has wien numeous books and ailesaguing o an “obje oiened onology.” His ,whih we disuss below, is o oe a oune-evoluion o he lin-

Inerviews

Graham Harman, Jane Bennet, im Moron,Ian Boos, Levi Bryan and Paul Ennis

Pee Gaon

A P PU S D

guisi un in onempoar philosophy. Haman’s wok looks oside wih he oppessed objes said o be held unde he humbo ou onepual shemes, languages, o subjeive sanes. woquesions elae o Haman’s wok on aesheis, olleed in he

ohoming T S R: E L (London: Zeo Books, 2010), whih oe geae deph o Haman’slaim ha “aesheis is s philosophy.”

Peer Graton: G, j , ’ : Pine o Newoks, “O V- C,” “I Oj,”

. I , . T, I I’ - q, S R : ?

Graham Harman: I’ , ’ I’ . A ’ ( ) . A , , D M .

T .T t . I’ x, - I -

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T z , q. I I’ J S



Speculaions I Peer Graton – Ineview wih Gaham Haman

86 87

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(t://z2../), Mx “” . Y, , “ -” . A j, .

Graham Harman: N, I ’ - j. O, ’ j “” “”

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92 93

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Graham Harman: Y ; I ’ . M Gueilla Meaphysis I

“.” W I D’ A asExpeiene, , . D I q , I’

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Graham Harman: I, q t I , I . R B , . T I’ . O I , . I t , I , x .S I ’ . B I q , I : “, ’ t .I’ t .”

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Peer Graton – Ineview wih Jane Benne

96 97

Speculaions I

x . B , Iz I ’ ’ G , M . P A , I . I , G , . I , .T . F “

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B , I t , j .A P A . Tt P , Nz H ( P). B I’ P ’ , P .

B I’ q, I :“ ’ ?” I’ I’ I . I ool-Being I .

Inerview wih Jane Bennet“Tee is Nohing Simple abou Maeialit”

Jane Benne is Poesso and Chai o he Depamen o PoliialSiene a Johns Hopkins Univesit, and he V Mt: AP E T has isel been a viban mae o aenion sine is publiaion ealie his yea. V Mtbuilds on he ealie books, T E M:

C, E, E (2001) and T’ N:E, P, T W (1994), ting ogehe well eenwok in eology and new oms o maeialism. Benne wok havebeen iial in linking movemens in een Coninenal philosophy,namely a vialis adiion ha uns om Begson o Deleuze andeven, on Benne’s eading, Buno Laou, wih a “poliial eologyo hings” ha should speak o anyone onsious enough o beawae o he devasaing hanges undeway in he wold aound us.

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G H t . O , I , , I ’ , . O , , . W () ?

Jane Bennet: T , (E-A) t ’ . T : , ,, , j, q , , v’ ,, , , t, t, t. T A “C H” “H” x x -, ’ , : “S J, P R—R []… t- x A O. T []… - G P G



Peer Graton – Ineview wih Jane Benne

100 101

Speculaions I

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q , f .

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Jane Bennet: Y f q-. L “M,” .., q stle , ( ouna) ( ) “ .”T I - “” indie : t I t , , t, , . P t . I , ,I , . M - , , - -.

I , I



Peer Graton – Ineview wih im Moon

102 103

Speculaions I

j , , . T , ( D’ -) .

Inerview wih imohy Moron“A ‘New’ Maeialism ae Maxism”

imohy Moon is Poesso o Lieaue and Envionmen a

he Univesit o Calionia, Davis. He is auho o T P S and S R T, as well asedio o T C C S and C T/T A. Mos eenly, he is he auho o a “pe-quel,” T E T (Cambidge, MA: HavadUnivesit Pess, 21), o his 28, E N (28), in whih he iiques pevious onepions o naue asinimial o eologial hinking. In hese las wo woks, Mooninodues he idea o he “mesh” as a means o undesandinghe “ineonneedness” o exisene. Moon seeks ou his emas a means o hinking he om o onneions and sepaaionsamong he objes o he wold, wihou aguing ha hee is somesubsane (e.g., Tales’ wae) hoveing in he bakgound o allhings. o hink he “mesh” is o hink hese onneions and blankspaes ha is he (no)hing ha onnes all hings in a manne akin o Buno Laou’s ieduionis heor o assemblages, wheeinhee ae no subsanes bu only olleives o elaions.

Peer Graton: W’ j , J Bt’ Viban Mae . Y t

H “ ” C. PI z “-q”…

im Moron: T “q” , Eology wihou Naue. I z x. I “.” Y j . H Te Eologial Tough

“q,” Te Phanom Menae…T x ’ -

, , ’

j , . S ’ .I ,

t , I .

T - : ’ . A W B , “I ’.” Y - .I’ t .

Peer Graton: I , I

“” . W

?

Tim Moron: I’ . H . T




104 105

Speculaions I

. T . I . T q, ’ t P E x, .

I (), I’ : E . I Sz, t

. T - ’ . Sz’ S C …

W t , ( “ ”).T Dz, Sz Lz . A

Dz Lz. A E L, . H , L. T , .A ’ DI ’ ! H Z, . I , D, j x TeEologial Tough.

E I “ ,” ’ . V , : z

“” “.” B ’ . I

’ G . I . I D P, . I’ …

Peer Graton: Y . L ’ : ’

, “”

wha i is. T x, “” “,” (. 7), I “” , L , / . I , q “ ” , ’ “-” . I I’ j “” (, ) “” ().

Tim Moron: I’ . O I J Bt’ . T , ? dna . H

- , . T -- “” t , . N . T t (’ P q ) .W , .




106 107

Speculaions I

W I’ , ’ . I Te EologialTough I I , -D (D Dt ) ’ . M I’ j I

. I’ t q (I !) . P , ( N B ., S M q ).

T , . I , - , , -. I , ’ . Y ’ , x x…I .

Peer Graton: A , q “-j,” , G U S. Y “-j” - . B , , , ?

Tim Moron: Y! F , .G E , , j . W ? I B,I, ’ , . G . - “” ,

t , ’ “” E . I , , ’ , .

T bp L F x j, j , , , “,” . I - , C . I , q ( , )

. W ’ , . T .

W j -, . I , , ( I’ ) f t. O , x, , bp , , -, …

Peer Graton: W / ?

Tim Moron: I’ . I I’ , , I’ x . T “” q ! S ! A I’ “ .” T “- ” S L, F, . C “” E L . W E L “ ” ’ -




108 109

Speculaions I

, .

L I . I x . T “” - ï , . T– ( “–” , ). T’ - “”(.. D) E A-A , . I’ t

j t.T - D J B : “I hus.” T , - . B,D ! D J’ …

I “” Mx. A q . I ’ , . A z N ’ t ’ t - x x ?

Peer Graton: W “ ,” “-” . S J Bt, x, , “” x. W ?

Tim Moron: G q. M - . T I

t . A ,t, , , . C U, .

I , z ’ t , , . T Mx . H Mx , N,? H Dz Gt’ “E

”? T ’ , , . TN q, - .

M , ’ q . I’ , - (I’ x ). I q x - . F , . T , q ’ . Q q ( , ), t ’ . I P .

W t . T , - . I

. I ’ – , , ’ , , - . T



Peer Graton – Ineview wih Ian Bogos

110 111

Speculaions I

, U. I ’ - . B , Sz-, , . Y . O , .

N, , I’ , - x, . I

, ’ “.” T x, , ( ) . F x, I . M E’ , x. I . T , x. Y

erv-3, ’ dna - . A .

S , , !

Inerview wih Ian Boos“An ‘Applied’ Speulaive Realism”

Ian Bogos is Assoiae Poesso in he Shool o Lieaue, Com-muniaion, and Culue a Te Geogia Insiue o ehnology,whee he’s a video game designe and inepee, pushing he limiso game design in soially onsuive ways. A sough-ae speake and wie, Bogos no only designs games mean o amelioaesoial disodes, bu also woks o daw aenion o he ways inwhih video games have an “expessive powe” ha demands ou

ull due in an ea when mos Ameian households have video gamedevies; he way ha we play hem makes hem no jus gamesanymoe (i eve hey wee). Among hee books he is now wokingon, Bogos is wiing a philosophial ex, A P-, ha exends his wok in U O (2006) o hinknon-sysemi onepions o objes and hei elaions. Te “faonology” he inodues in his new wok, ohoming lae his

yea, seeks o eognize he sangeness o he wold aound us, aealit ound no jus in ompuaional sysems, bu also in hewold aound and in us.

Peer Graton: Y , “A ,

j j q j ?” I I’ , ? I , j?

Ian Bogos: I’ G H’ j- I , ool-Being. I’ ( - Uni Opeaions), I q “ .” I’ , . I , I q H’ j, j j .

T 2007–2008, N M I Ra-ing he Beam, A V C S.T , -. W , , i/o , - - . A , I




112 113

Speculaions I

.

I’ N I Raing heBeam. B : A . A , , ’ x ’ -. I A . I’ , : t (’ T I A,

ia) . I’ ( ) : ’ ia? O mos T- 6502 ? H z ? W ?

T A j . H’ x: A I’ L m8 . I j, - “” “.” F x,I 1935 50 /2 S , . I x , ? S, j

, z - , j.

Peer Graton: “A ” t “” “” “ .” A j, “” : (1) : j; (2) , “,” -

j x (j , ); (3) , x : j. Y , I , j

( “”), ,

.W ? I “ ” , A -

?Ian Boos: I’ Alien Phenomenology : - j , j x? E - ’ ( ’ H L), j, ? I, j, j j. H .

M, , j , , . T ia A , , P H. I , (’ zz). T .

C - A - . I ia ? F ? I r ? I ? A ? D , ?A j, j - , j zz.




114 115

Speculaions I

W j , . T I’ , I I .

Peer Graton: O - , - J Bt, Dz. H “”j ?

Ian Boos: I’ j Bt’ , I I -: - - . I Bt j j Viban Mae , I Alien Phenomenology j -, ... I’ H’ Gueilla Meaphysis.

W x j-, ’ Gf’ W, t j -t. B - . T ’ j- -j -. I j x, j z x.

Peer Graton: D ’ ? I x , ?Ian Bogos: I x . B t (

), I’ , I’ t. P x : ’ , x . I , I ’ ’ - ( ) . I’ t x (t://w..//__.), I : , ’

q?T’ : , . W’ - - ( ). B , , , . I Oj OO S G T ( ), ’ . P .

I’ j , C.P. S’ . I , “-” : “F G.” W , , , ?

Peer Graton: O “” ’ , ’ -



Peer Graton – Ineview wih Levi Bran

117116

Speculaions I

q . T q q , , , , ’ - . B , . W q ?

Ian Bogos: F ’ x- :

? E , , , x. I’ SUV , I q j j . I ?

O j f : , ’ t ’ x. B , I j- x . A -, L B I . S, ’ q x.

N , , z -. B , , , fq j’ . D -

j ? D S , ?O , S T’

P D? T q , I ’

, j .

O , I (A E, ). B , , .

Inerview wih Levi R. Bryan“Pehaps his Calls o a New So o Philosophy...”

Levi R. Bran is Poesso o Philosophy a Collin College, and is pehaps he mos polif online wies on speulaive ealisma his blog, L Sj. He is he auho o D G: Dz’ T E O I, o-edio o he ohoming TS T wih Nik Sniek and Gaham Haman, andauho o a numbe o ailes on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Laan,and poliial heor. Bran was a paiing Laanian analys,and hus undesands well he aeas o onempoar Coninenal

philosophy ha he iiques as oo iealis. His “oniology” is he ous o his D Oj (ohoming om Re.Pess).

Peer Graton: O “” .T : , q j .B ’ . T I’

, I G H, -q : new ? O t ?

Levi Bryan: I’ q




118 119

Speculaions I

j- -. I OOO , OOO

q j in addiion o .S D, j, x j j.I , edues j by , j - . OOO

x .A OOO H “ - ” human . A , , ’ j - .

I q, , I , q j- . H neual . R, , ,, , , , , , x -, , ., aods - , onsains . I ML’, “ ?” and “ ?”

A epesenaional ool - . H — . T , , -

x . H H’ , j ’ . R, “----”, “--”, “-”,. T .

O OOO - objes , ’ . L j j, q . I Undesanding

Media, ML “… … ” (9). A, - onen. A , , . T x j, f x, x t. A “ ” . F, j- , - j, , , .

T , - j .

I , x, SR x. T , , ’




120 121

Speculaions I

x t. T C- j SR. H, - . T j j SR, , . A , , , ,I ,

, t . A .

D t ? A wiing . H, x - 45 . W . O . H Lz’ New Essays on heHuman Undesanding t j J L. Lz L . T , , . T , , . W t , t . W , q . A q, z- q . P , ’ x .

Peer Graton: T Mx’ Ae Finiude, H’ Being and ime “TT,” M Dt . W G H’ L “j .” P

“” “j ” .

Levi Bryan: I j- ,

“” . T “” “ j” j, , D’ “.” H

. T j, j, j, . F H q . R q .

T “” , , j. I , t j. Oj , . I , H, I “” t

, t j ’ . W P N , j.




122 123

Speculaions I

Peer Graton: W ’ L, ’ q x. B , ’ q H’ “ ” “ ” j. T q: j H, I , I’ , “ H t ?”

Levi Bryan: I , , H ’ , I ’

t awully . I - H’ : F, H’ j t , . F ,

, j aualit, poenialit. I z j “ ” “ ,” I powes apaiies doing aing . I j spli -j. O , z qualiies popeies j I “ ” j, j I “

.” T j q, .

T j - j z . R, x j. T I q j j. T z j j.I q as j.Q j has, j does

j .T , -

j. G q j has . O,

, j does. I t j “” j being . I , - j . P, x, . A , , ! N . N . N . N . T

j , powe . T “ ”. I “-”.A . T . T . W j qua , ees .

T . T - . I I , I j . T .L, .T, . S, z

. A q . A, . O j , j , . T, I , H’ j . H, I , H j ,



Peer Graton – Ineview wih Paul Ennis

125124

Speculaions I

q. T .S, I’ f H’

. H j . I’ f - j - . W H I j , I I . W , j qua - x . T j

. Y ’, , j ’. T q , q .

Peer Graton: W I j . Y j . I ?

Levi Bryan: I - . T j . O , j , . T A’ t. Mt A . T . Y , . T . T /t , j t - .

W , . R j , I enanglemens j. I - -, j , . T K B “t” Meeing he Univese Halway.A -

t . Y . B t . A t boh . T . R j j

j, j among t .

T . I - j - j.T q . R - j, - j j - j .

Inerview wih Paul Ennis“Te Phenomenal and he Real ae Happening Alongside Eah Ohe”

Paul Ennis is a PhD andidae a he Univesit College, Dublin,whee his wok on Heidegge and onempoar Coninenal

philosophy is aleady gaining him a name. He is he edio/ine-




126 127

Speculaions I

viewe o P C V (Ze0 Books, 21), whihis an exellen se o ineviews om some o he younge voiesin he feld and has a well-oneived inoduion ha akes hemeasue o a eain hange aking plae in wha he alls “PosConinenal” philosophy.

Peer Graton: F, ’ …?

Paul Ennis: I , , I . T ‘-’ t I

‘ ’ . A I Pos-Coninenal Voies , , . I I’ hemeneuis o he eal I ‘.’ H ‘C R.’ L I . T - . B Dz ’ . S . D .

B I ( ) . I , I’ ‘ ’ . T j I / . B I ‘’ . I I’ .

I j

‘’ [ ‘ ’] x ‘’[ ‘ ’]. I . T . I x I . M j . I / ‘’ .. z / , I I ‘ .’ U I I’ / I .

Peer Graton: W H, , . D “-C” ( , z “C” )?

Paul Ennis: I . I .O I x t - (U C, D). W I I .

S , ‘’ , I H, H, M-P, S D. O H. A I Dz B ! T I I H. WI - I t - t I Mx .I , Mx , t . B . I I Ae Finiude I




128 129

Speculaions I

I t I .

B j - - , q, Mx - . T x . I . T - ,

H , - . I /-

/, / . Mx z I Ae Finiude .

Peer Graton: A , Speulaions. T x , -C ?

Paul Ennis: I f A-A/ .I ‘’ z . A j . I H L, G S, Mx B , B Dz . B I x . S t I H I . Y j Dz D-

. R .

F I (x : I q ‘’ Mx ‘z ’). B I I . P q . Y .B . I , I , . Y

: ‘’ ( , ). F Mx , ’ t. T j x . W .

B z t -, . Y ’ , ’ . T , , S . Y poinless. I ’ .A q . E - t x .

Peer Graton: L’ H. T , A-A , H q (H D’ H ). Y, , -




130 131

Speculaions I

H - : x.

Paul Ennis: I H . T I E A H. I , q H ( j ) / . I ’

j ‘ .’ I - .H , , H .

T singula ( ) ( ) H. T ‘’ q. H x D .T : D q , ’ … C . SD x .O D x ( x !).

N D’ - . D, , — H H -. S D . A ‘’ ‘’ () D. O D ’ . S D— .

Peer Graton: I , H “” , ’f “x”….

Paul Ennis: Y H H . I j j, H’ (.. ) ‘’ j. S j? H K t x - -

. T x j (x j D) , .. . A , H x j, t ( ) ‘’ x . T , ‘x’ need !

Peer Graton: Y’ ’ . I x “” “x,” “” “” q E “’ .” I “apoia.” J , D , ’ G “--” “-,” D - ’ . T, x, H “-,” ,




132 133

Speculaions I

( ) D (I’ …) A I ’ H US E. I , I H E: . B , US , H , H D , , q .B , , A A j H - , ’ q -. I ,

I’ q : , H ’ “” …

Paul Ennis: I j . W H D …I - H . H , onologial . I H apoia -. I ‘I B?’ S ‘

’ z H — I , j H t, . S ‘’ ‘’

q . H , , H ( ).

I , H I , - ( -z ‘’). M x - . F . I .. faly.

Peer Graton: I ’ ,

’ q , I j - q : I Mx I “,”I I ’ . F ’ ( )Mx “ -” - . T

“,” . O , : .H : , , ; - ( ) t .I ? W I , , ’ : H -. A H , I , K q , R .

Paul Ennis: T t q .I’ .. . T q q



135134

Speculaions I

. T q . S I — . T Mx B . S x .

F I ( ‘-’). I , I also -

. W ? B I ‘’ .T , , . I . I beome .T !

T I : I - . T t , ‘’ .B . T I . T -. W j : T aone .

Comparing he obec in AlainB’ ‘ P’ G H’ j

‘ ’ x j . O , B’ j Logis o Wolds (low ) P x is, j . O ,H’ j (, , ,H Pt, G, .) j - j, . F H j , x; , , . T j B’ H’ j : . A B , H j ,

Nomologcal Dispuaion

Alain Badiou and Graham Harman on Objecs1

Nahan Coombs

D P I RR H, U L

@.



Nahan Coombs – Nomologial Dispuaion

136 137

Speculaions I

x.

Y - - , . B

A B j, j H-’ , ; ‘’ B, H. I

H’ j ,

’ ‘’; , low ‘’ j ’ x. T j , , q . T x B’ x , (1) j - x; (2) ‘ ’. T x H’ , j . H j . T j .

Badiou’s Axioms o Maerialism

A B’ low x , t j - -. T :

1. Oj 2. T

(1) O B’ xobjes appea as onesin a wold; , - .S , -, , , - , j .O , B “” “” ; - is . F B x

j, , P x. T x x, - H R’ hough as one,hey hus ae one , . I B , , . T j .A , Being and Even (b e), ( ouned as one2 ). R, - ‘- x’ j : j x x, j , j ‘’ exisene j. A x x , muais muandis x.Ex , ,




138 139

Speculaions I

. T H .3 A , j , tj .(2) I G L B : “T OC W I L C.”4 U- , B . A

, . B - z j, b e O A’ , . H q

j eahes aual infnit. S - x . A , - b e, x . O , x ( → ) z . T “” ( “ -”5 J M’ ) .

T /- . BB , O x ,inonsisen ‘’. O, , ,6

. B x B - , . H low 7 -, ; C z.

I H B’ j, , I :

1. B j – con2. B’ ‘’ j , , , q, – pro3. T ( ) B’ j – ??

I H / j B’.

Harman Conra Relaionism

I j, G H x H-’ -- -- ‘-’ - j. B H j , x , -

. A W : “ j




140 141

Speculaions I

---, .”8 R : “T j x . I - t; -- . A H -, , - j.”9 A x ool-Being (tb) t z . A

j , t , j x . T x . A ; . H : “ t z, - .”10 S, , , .

U x j . R t , j j. T j:

j. YH “ ‘- ’ , . I

, ; - j, .”11

H’ X Z j. F x- , j , , . T q j- , j, j, .. j’ j

? H Z’ j.F , - , ; “

’ , - .”12 T q, , j ? Rj A Z, H ever elaion oms a new auonomous obje. A : “ j j, .” 13 A , j j ( ), , q, -

, j.E j, x j . I j ; j, j z , x.




142 143

Speculaions I

Mahemaisin Relaions?

I H’ B’ low , , . T B’ x : ; - x. O, H x - j;

B j, x, . N, H’ j . H t

“ B’ .”14 A , , H’ B’ . T H H H .

P f q j. F H j - , x ? W q ?S j - x j, B’ : . R,

,

j . O , B’ P - . A B’ j j - xj , I -q B’ .

P . I P-

, - . I , H H I .Y, q, x x q j. O , model j x - , j,

, .

W B x , H . R, x P - , ,15 / ? T x, B x H - j . T .



145144

Speculaions I

noes

1 P ‘R Oj M Sj?’ P D U D, S, M27-28, 2010.2 “Te one , I , . I , …I oun-as-one, o suue, , e-

e, .” A B, Being and Even, . O F(L: C, 2005), M 7, §4, 90.3 A B, Logis o Wolds: Being and Even II , . A T(L: C, 2009). B II, G L, 1, §3, 167.4 B, Logis o Wolds, G L, 3, Ax, 345.5 J M, “T R M, O A AB” Angelaki: jounal o he heoeial humaniies, 12 (1), 2007: 127-143 (138)

6 I Tz T B H S x ; ; x C’ . A B Tz T, “N Hz M P C: A I A B”Pahesia 3, 27 [ ] t://w.j./-03/03_. 7 B, Logis o Wolds, G L, 3, §3, 335.8 G H, Pine o Newoks (M: R.P, 2009), 152.9 G H, ool-Being (P, IL: O C P, 2002 ), §24, 276.10 H,ool-Being, §20, 223.11 H,Pine o Newoks, 215.12 H,ool-Being, §23, 25313 G H, “O V C” Collapse II, 2007, 191.14 G H, “O U Oj: G, B

R P,” I: Te Speulaive un [ M:R.P, 2010]15 A J x : “O, [B’] - , U .” A J, “W Mt() O: AB, - ,” Angelaki: jounalo he heoeial humaniies 13 (1), 2008: 27-46 (31).

Firs I ould like o hank N C

A B, E . M , -- C’ B’ : , -z . H x . I C’ f, q .

C t B’. B - j “P ” (I B P). B , C, “j.... j.” T , j (“, , , H Pt, G”) I j: . O j . T

Response o Nahan CoombsGaham Haman

A P R A A P PA U C, E

@.



Graham Harman – Response o Nahan Coombs

146 147

Speculaions I

, - j , q.1 R j q j . B B L2 ( ), j- .

N, C - B. R , C . T “ B j, j

H’ , ; ‘’ B, H.” N (- ) q B, B j, I j .T , j B , I . F C’ : “H’ j , -’ ‘’ ...” A B’Logis o Wolds,3 C’ B’ . DC’ , I : t - , j.

I “H C R,” C . H “ ” x ool-Being,4 j j . H -

( X Zí5) j. B I j, C j- I . Y , . F “” “x” . I , : ,

. F j- , j , x . A . S x, ( ) . B .T .

N, x : ( ) . M , C, Bz S, q , . S . B q; j I x. S , j . I I x E , , x, ex hypohesi . C x.A j fx, x. T I j .




148 149

Speculaions I

I , , x. L j I , I .

T j , . M I : , ,, , , dna, ,, . C I x, I x: I x,

.T , , , x f, . H, I - , I . T , x . T “ ,” , . F, I .S , - - H H . M I .

T : j- x . A B, . F : “x .”6 A x B’ , j, , , ; () Logis o Wolds j j, I B j

. T x , .

T .C ,7 . F “ H’ B’ .” C H , “ H- H H .” I

H , I C - H’ . H H G’ “ [] - .” C I , ( ) .8 B . B I “ , ,” C

“ .” A , I - , z.

M , C, , -. W I , , : , . B Hö

E B,




150 151

Speculaions I

. R, T K -

“” , I . K z zz z -q : .9 A ( B) , ’ j t .M K’ “”

. I, I j q . I , . F S , j, q . A , , , j, , . T q x P’ , P j P . B C, . M (I ). I, j , j, . I , f B’ . I j , x . B

. I z f, .

I I . C “ j -.” I . R j, , j . W , , j : - , ,

. W C x , . H, x - Q Mx’ Ae Finiude, B “ j

j .”10 A I C’ x j, “[ ] B’ : .” T j . M j . Oj , z.A I C B I “ - j” “ .” N, I C’ :

“T .”



153152

Speculaions I

noes

1 G H, “O V C,” Collapse II, 171-205.2 S B L, “I,” . J L, Te Paseuizaiono Fane, . A S J L. (C, MA: HU P, 1988.)3 A B, Logis o Wolds: Being and Even II , . A T(L: C, 2009).4 G H, ool-Being: Heidegge and he Meaphysis o Objes. (C-: O C, 2002.)5 S ool-Being, 243-268.6 Logis o Wolds, 226.7 G H, “O U Oj: G, B R P,” I: Te Speulaive un, . L B, N S,G H (M: ., 2010).8 G H, Te Quaduple Obje (W, uk: Z B, - 2011). T F :L’obje quaduple, . O Dz (P: pu, 2010).9 T S. K, Te Suue o Sienif Revoluions. (C, MA:MIT P, 1970.)1 Q Mx, Ae Finiude: Essay on he Neessit o Coningenc, 3. E . T. R B. (L: C, 2008.)

Neworkologes

A Manieso, Secion I

Chisophe Viale

M C/V SP I



154

Speculations I

Networkologies: A Manifesto, Section I

Note to the Reader

[The following essay presents excerpts from the soon to be completed work in progressentitled Networkologies – A Manifesto: Towards A New Philosophy of Networks. Thisbook is the second and central book in the projected networkologies series. Themanuscript for the first book in the series, The Networked Mind: A New Image of

Thought for a Hyperconnected Age, is complete, and currently being proofread inpreparation for solicitation for publication. This text provides the preparatory contextfor a philosophy of networks by placing this endeavor within the context of philosophical and scientific debates of the twentieth century. By means of

examinations of recent developments in artificial neural networks, cognitive

neuroscience, and contemporary continental philosophy and critical theory, TheNetworked Mind works to demonstrate the need for the philosophy of networksdeveloped in Networkologies – A Manifesto.

A network is a diagram for the thinking of relation. This diagram, which does notmerely describe relation, but performs it, can help us to understand the structure,

dynamics, and potentials of our networked age. Networkological thought works to

extract the potential meanings, concepts, programs, and perspectives which thenetwork diagram makes available to us, and it is with this in mind that the primary

commitment of a philosophy of networks must be to the thinking of relation, and tounderstanding what relation could mean in regard to the network diagram.

The text is written in manifesto form, and as such uses mostly propositional language

and minimal citations, so that the entirety of the system can be presented in

microcosm. The graphic format of the text aims to demonstrate what anetworkological text looks like, a matter which is discussed in the text itself.

The first section of the manifesto, which comprises the body of this article, is dividedinto two parts: orientations (comprised of principles and forms, and

diagrammatology . Within the section on orientations, the principles segmentdescribes the basic principles which guide the networkological project, while the

forms segment describes the manner in which these principles manifest themselves

within the presentation of networkological thought. The section entitleddiagrammatology describes the network diagram itself in its many permutations, so asto demonstrate how an entire worldview can be extracted therefrom. Forthcoming

sections of the manifesto then perform the work of developing an ontology and ethics

based on the intersection of the network diagram with the notions of the oneand amdthe commitment to relation, which are the primary ontological and ethical notions,respectively, which structure the networkological endeavor.]

Networkologies a manifesto

The network is increasingly one of the fundamental metaphors whereby we

have described the character of our age. Despite this, there has yet to be a

philosophy of networks, a philosophy which takes the network as its

foundation.1 A networkological approach aims to address this fact.

A network is a diagram for the thinking of relation. This diagram, which does

not merely describe relation, but performs it, can help us to understand the

structure, dynamics, and potentials of our networked age.

Our age is one in which relation is increasing, reified entities are being

reworked, and previously existent relations are becoming ever more evident.

These changes, which have given rise to what might be called the ‘networked

age,’ are partially due to the rise of the Internet, the World Wide Web, global

capitalism, etc. But such changes cannot be reduced to the sum of their parts,

they are always the result of the interplay of material and ideal, actual and

virtual.

From the networkological perspective, the entire world can be viewed as

composed of networks. A chair is a network, and so are atoms, concepts,

words, societies, organisms, brains, economies, etc. Understanding thedifferent types of networks, their modes of structuration, appearing,

interaction, and potentials, is the work that needs to be done to create a

philosophy of networks.

To paraphrase a famous philosopher – “To those who look at the world

networkedly, the world will look networkedly back.”2 This is the fundamental

wager of the networkological endeavor. The networkological perspective takes

the notion of relation and works to elevate it to the notion of a concept,

diagram, and project.



156 157

Speculations I Christopher Vitale – Networkologies

orientations [principles] Relation, Process,

Reification, Refraction [forms] Method, Discipline, Text,

Context, Immanence, Networkologies, Groundings

diagrammatology Diagram, Precision, Intensity, Topology,

Combination, Symmetry, Difference, Identity, Societies, Combinatories,

Dynamics, Systems, Genetics, Levels

[Forthcoming Sections:]

matrixology [extension and appearance] Matrix, Extension, Mattering,

Actuality, World, Self-Differing, Paradox, Quandry, Obstacle, Opening,

Potential, Privacy, Mind, Complexity [mnemosystemics and combinatorics]

Memory, Intertwining, Form, Structure, Virtuality, Manifestation, Governing,

Understanding, Affection, Mentalities, Machines, Life, Memory System,

Evolution, Persons, Perception, Awareness, Excess, Qualities, Experience,

Horizon, Excess, Brains, Consciousness, Modulation, Self-Consciousness,

Wideware, Quasi-Life, Plexes, Culture, Semiotics, Mediology, Meaning,

Psychology, Emotions, Mental Structures, Emotional Structures, Psyche,

Metabolics, Reflection, Intuition, Praxis, Knowledge, Objects, Metaphysics,

Adaptation, Problematics, Critique, Experimentation, Landscape, Meta-

Understanding, Philosophy, Meta-Philosophy, Relationalism, Fundament,

Synergy [freedom and opening] Freedom, The Virtual, Universe, Opening,

Generation

network ethics [metaleptics] Ethics, Value, Attribution, Proto-Value, Control, Development, Regulation, Diversity, Learning, Programming,

Cultural Evolution, Supra-plexes, Meta-Evolution, Paranoia, Paranoid Social

Structures, Capitalism, Limitation, Meta-Robustness, Liberation, Choice, Trust,

Exchange, Leap, Metalepsis, Historicity, Call, Embeddedness [practics] Maxim,

Practics, Heuristics, Evaluation, Duty, Example, Pain, Pleasure, Harm,

Curiosity, Therapeautics, Clinic, Diagnostics, Social Practics, Network Analysis,

Science, Democracy, Socialism, Competition, Political Practics, Cross-Activism,

site mapArticulation, Crossing, Discourse of the Oppressed, Access, Pedagogy,

Education, Academics, The Public Intellectual, Ways of Knowing, Obsolescence,

Hope, Art, Inspiration, Aesthetics, Production, Creation, Pataphysics, Decision,

Modernity, Catastrophe, Appeal, Pax Capitala, The Age of Networks, god,

Relationalism, Commitment

[principles]

Relation. A network is a diagram for the thinking of relation. That is, a

network shows how entities relate. A network does not merely describe relation, it

performs it. Networkological thought works to extract the potential meanings,

concepts, programs, and perspectives which the network diagram makes

available to us, and it is with this in mind that the primary commitment

of a philosophy of networks must be to the thinking of relation, and to

understanding what relation could mean in regard to the network

diagram. This is not to deny the existence of relatively isolated elements in the world,

so long as these are seen as ultimately related to the contexts and processes of their

production. The networkological approach is, however, against any theory which

presupposes fundamental divisions between mind and body, epistemology and ethics,

the social and the natural, science and culture, or any approach which views any given

binary opposition, reified entity, or limited list of hypostatized terms as ultimate or

fundamental, for any term or entity is merely an aspect of what is. The only ultimate

we can know, and even then only an aspect of what is, is the open.

orientations

the open



158 159


Process. The networkological approach, as a philosophy of relation, is also

necessarily a philosophy of process, for relation needs to be

understood not only spatially, but temporally as well. From such a

perspective, any entity which has individuated itself from a

ground is necessarily related to that ground, and to other entities

to which it may be related at a different level of scale or

abstraction. No entity is ever absolute, but rather an element of

more encompassing frames of reference, and no product is ever

more fundamental than the processes of its production. Since all

networks, no matter how static they appear, have at some point been produced, all

networks and network elements are necessarily dynamic, examples of relational

entities-in-process, any one of which is an x-in-process .

Reification. When an entity is viewed in a way which is separate from

processes of its production, this is known as reification. Reification gives rise to forms

of knowledge and understanding which are based upon firm separations, hypostatized

entities, otherworldly or transcendent standards of value, rigid categories, unrelated

histories, etc. Following Alfred North Whitehead, who describes reification by means

of the notion of the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness,’ 3 the networkological

endeavor views reification as a necessary step towards understanding what is, but one

which is vastly overutilized, and in a manner which has many potentially harmful

effects. The forms which reification takes, which will be examined in greater detail in

later sections, include serial repetition, hyper-objectification , hyper-linking , hyper-

resonance, over-grounding , and transcendence . In its many forms, the networkological

enterprise therefore seeks to limit the damage which reification creates in its many

forms.

Refraction. The attempt to think relation in

regard to the network diagram manifests itself in the

networkological endeavor from many possible angles and

levels of scale. As expressions of the whole from which

they emerge, each entity and network in the world are

ultimately perspectives thereupon, and in this sense, each

part contains, in its way, the whole of what is. The

networkological approach is therefore not only

networkologicalprinciples:

relation, process,holography,

fractality,inter-mediation,emergence

individuation, ground, level, x-in-process,reification

relational/processural, but also holographic. This holography extends to all levels of

scale, such that within the bounds of all that we know that exists, the holographic

principle not only holds but, in a weak and relative sense, holds in a manner which is

fractally self-similar in nature. That is, within the limits of the existent at either end

in regard to the open, all networks are the product of networks at a micro-scale, and

produce other networks at a macro-scale. Furthermore, in their relational,

processural, holographic and fractal intertwinings, all entities mediate all other

entities, if in differing degrees, both in regard to each other, as well as in regard to

the whole of what is. This intermediation is what constitutes space and time, as well

as mind and matter, for mind is the mediation of matter by itself, just as matter is

the actualized localization of mind in space and time. E ach of these abstractions

indicates an aspect of the manner in which matter is virtually present in other matters

in the whole of what is. Both these abstractions and the matters they describe are

expressions of the manner in which the nested networks of all that is comes to

experience itself via relation by means of a process of self-differentiation known as

emergence. From this perspective, the ethico-epistemo-ontological commitment to

relation which founds the networkological endeavor articulates itself in regard to the

five corollary principles articulated above, namely, those of process (relation-in-

time), holography (relation-in-space), fractality (relation-in-level), inter-mediation

(relation-in-virtuality), and emergence (relation-in-differing). It is based on these

principles that the networkological approach articulates its relation to the wider world

of nature, meaning, matter, mind, and society.

[forms]

Method . The networkological enterprise aims to describe a philosophical

system which can help us understand what is. In what follows, the formal aspects of

this system will be explained. Due to its commitment to relation and process, as well

as to the project of reducing the harmful impact of excessive reification on human

cultural relations to the world, the networkological

approach is transgressive of traditional atomizations,

distinctions, and reifications which often serve to

structure contemporary discursive and philosophical

networko-logical critique



160 161


projects. Not only does the networkological perspective work to transgress traditional

reifying formulations, but it also implies a method of critique thereof, a method of

analysis. Any reified entity (ie: the subject, the signifier, production, being, etc.) or

distinction (ie: mind/body, subject/object, etc.) will necessarily be broken down by

networkological critique, and re-related to the wider contexts within which it exists

and from which it has emerged. Networkological critique blasts apart reified entities,

revealing the dynamic networks contained within. Drawing inspiration from the

analytical methods of Gilles Deleuze, Gilbert Simondon, G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and

Henri Bergson, the goal of networkological critique is to demonstrate the relations

hidden behind, beneath, within, and around what others view as elementary. For

while some networks may work to reify particular networks or parts thereof, the

networkological approach views any reified structure as ultimately a derivative of the

process of its own production.

Discipline. Networkological critique is necessarily transgressive of traditional

disciplinary boundaries. Ranging freely from physics to metaphysics, societal analysis

to abstract math, literature to art and culture, politics to ethology, networkological

philosophy is necessary committed to a polyform perversity in regard to conventions,

strictures, and norms.

Text. Networkological texts are necessarily polyform, and seek to increase

potential modes of relation between texts and their interactors. Networkological

texts aim to use many different voices and forms of writing, such that many different

types of interactors can access these texts. Reified categories which

dictate that certain forms of writing need to be used to express

certain types of ideas are simply not applicable to our networked age.

This does not mean, however, that networkological texts dispense

with all forms of division or separation of elements within them.Rather, these texts often increase the atomization of their

components so as to allow a greater multiplicity of the forms of their potential

(re)combination by potential readers. In this manner, networkological texts are

symbolic assemblages which take Bertolt Brecht’s imperatives for theater and apply

them to the realm of theoretical text. Working to undermine the mythologization of a

text as a unified whole, parts of a text are separated out so as to allow for multiple

forms of their potential interrelation. Brecht’s dictum of a “radical separation of the

elements”4 can therefore serve as a guide for the construction of a networkological

networko-logical text,

interactors

text. With this aim in mind, networkological texts are structured such that images,

citations, captions, and written bits all float, while various textual, graphical, and

organizational devices are deployed so as to the assist the potential de- and re-linkage

of parts. Furthermore, because networked diagrams show as much as they say,

performing the thought they describe, networkological texts make extensive use of

diagrams and images. The goal is to present ideas visually as much as verbally. The

result is a text which is perhaps uniquely suited to the reading styles at work in our

hypervisual age. Networkological texts are

multi-planar products, inspired by the ‘surfing’

employed when users jump between websites,

windows, screens, texts, captions, images, and

devices in our hypermediated times. The activity

of reading today is suffused with surprise jumps, tunnels, fragments, and layers of text

and image, and networkological texts aim to capture aspects of this not only in what

they say but also what they do. This is not only so as to be in sync with the needs of

our times, but to also experiment to find more relational forms of textual

structuration. Beyond books and websites, the goal is to push through distraction to

new forms of ideational proliferation and association. Networkological writing

therefore aims to interact with its readers in a manner which is inherently multiple

and complex. While not all networkological texts may employ all of these means at

any one time, it is imperative that the networkological enterprise as a whole do so.

Context. Many of the philosophies and theories which have influenced the

development of the networkological perspective were written in a particular context,

namely, in France during the period immediately before and after the failed

revolution of 1968. The movements associated with this period in France, which

generally go under the names of structuralism and post-structuralism (the critique and

continuation of structuralism), have had an enormous influence on nearly all fields of

the humanities within the English-speaking world in the last twenty to thirty years.

Most of the philosophies in question, however, were written before the massive

technological and social changes which have brought about a new era, that of the

internet, an age of networks. It is hard to underestimate the massive changes which

the internet has and will bring to our whole way of being in the world, of which

reading, writing, and philosophy indicate one small part. It would be naïve to think

that we can simply do philosophy in the same way as before. While structuralism and

post-structuralism were written during the rise of what many have called late-

“radical separationof the elements”

- Brecht



163162

Speculations I

capitalism, we need new models to help think our new age. While there are many

ways in which the networkological perspective differs from the post-structuralism

which preceded it, the most immediately apparent, particularly on a textual level, is

that of access. Post-structuralist texts in particular were often written in a manner

which aimed to combat the increasing

commodification of knowledge by means of an

effort to make the concepts presented in these

works difficult to reify and commodify. The

primary goal of this was to stop this form of

thinking from being reduced to sound-bites, and

the philosophers to stars (as often happened inFrance at the time). But we live in different

days. Few contexts could be more different than

France in 1968 and the global English netscape of the early twenty-first century. No

longer is there much of a danger of philosophers becoming stars, nor do we really

imagine that the difficulty of a text is likely to stop efforts to reify its content. Rather

than try to escape the influence of commodification on our forms of knowing by means

of defensive structures, we need instead to understand what this commodification

might mean, and what hidden potentials for philosophy and action it may conceal.

Evolution does not go backwards, and if we are to take what is good in the age of

networks use it to fight that which is harmful, we need to understand these mutations

so as to go through and beyond them, rather than nostalgically yearn for what has

been left behind. It is for this reason that the networkological endeavor aims to

update the writing of philosophy and theory so as to fit the needs of the age of the

internet. Rather than avoid sound-bites and accessible discourse, the networkological

perspective aims to proliferate the separation of the elements, to use different sorts

of discourses for different aims, just as networked systems alter their approach basedon the circumstances in which they find themselves. A 'one-size-fits-all' approach to

discourse hardly indicates an approach in sync with the proliferation of discourses,

perspectives, and connections inherent to our ever more networked age. It is for this

reason that the networkological approach will not sacrifice the development of novel

terminologies, so necessary for the imagining of new worlds, nor accessible discourse,

so necessary to bring theory beyond the realm of universities and academic writing.

Within the cultural context within which this text was written, the university is where

our society sends thoughts to die, and where it sends dangerous minds when it wants

to put them out to pasture. From such a perspective, writing a text accessible to the

“a network is adiagram for thethinking of relation.it does not merely describe relation, it

performs it.”

non-specialist, which speaks to multiple audiences, which explains implied context in

a manner which does not support the contemporary separation of texts into exegetical

and novel, is a political act. Academics who defend their writing as deep because

inaccessible retain a myth that a writer must be one or the other, but if the age of

networks has taught us anything about authorship and the self, it is that we are always

plural. It is in this sense that just as networkological texts aim to proliferate the

separation between the elements of which it is composed, so does networkological

discourse aim to operate at multiple levels. Speaking in philosophical jargon in some

circumstances and slang in others, drawing examples from obscure areas in the

sciences in some cases and pop culture in others, switching tones and modes of

address within the same text and sometimes within the same paragraph or sentence,

the networkological approach to discourse is based on relevance to context rather

than an ultimately atavistic notion that there is only one form in which philosophy can

and should be written.

Immanence. Due to its commitment to the development of a fully relational

way of looking at the world, the networkological perspective aims to develop a

completely immanent or ‘flat’ philosophical system. This has two primary

implications. The first is an injunction against any term which implies some sort of

reified, transcendent entity needed to provide for the coherence of its system. This

approach, known as ‘old fashioned metaphysics,’ will be avoided, and new forms of

metaphysics, immanent and relational forms, will be substituted in its place.

Metaphysics is unavoidable, for there are many aspects of the world which cannot be

known directly, but only by means of their effects. And as we will see later in this

inquiry, metaphysics is also a part of all knowledge. Thus, it is not a question of

avoiding metaphysics, but of the extent to which one does metaphysics, and how. For

the networkological endeavor to be relational, it is essential that its metaphysical

terms are defined relationally, rather than in a reified manner. Beyond this, the

second implication of its desire to produce a flat and immanent system is that the any

metaphysical terms which are developed must not conflict with the findings of

contemporary science. This is not to overvalorize science, but simply to argue the

need for what Freidrich Nietzsche might call a ‘this-worldly’ type of metaphysics

which can form a part of a this-worldly philosophy. To be consistent with the findings

of science is not to necessarily agree with the way scientism frames the world, and

more will be said about this later in this work. But for now let it be said that science is

one of the ways in which our actions come into greater sync with the world, and one



164 165


of the primary goals of the networkological enterprise is to increase this sync.

Relational philosophy, including metaphysics, and non-reified forms of scientific

practice can and should both be a part of this endeavor. While there are many

controversies about how to interpret science, the networkological endeavor will

employ aspects of the discourse produced by science in an effort to create a this-

worldly, immanent philosophy which does not contradict the best aspects of the way

in which scientific practices have worked to increase the sync between human action

and the world. All of which means, of course, that aspects of the networkological

endeavor can be brought into question by future scientific discoveries. The fact that

many of its aspects can become obsolete is a necessary admission on the part of

relational approaches to the world. That said, even when parts of the networkological

approach need to be reworked due to future scientific discoveries, or other types of change within our relation to the world which we cannot have foreseen, the general

relational commitments which structure the networkological approach point the way

in which future scientific and cultural discoveries could be integrated into the general

relational perspective articulated therein. In this sense, the networkological

perspective is in some sense realist in its relation to science, so long as we do not take

the term realism to mean a belief in the impoverished view of reality put forth by

scientism. Rather, this approach to realism is grounded in the belief in unavoidability

of metaphysics, and the benefits of some forms of metaphysics and scientific practices

over others. Thus, the realism put forth by the networkological approach is also

necessarily speculative, a type of speculative realism. The full meaning of these terms

in relation to scientism will be developed in full later in this text.

Networkologies. Beyond text and discourse, the networkological

position takes a transgressive relation to the standard divisions that structure

philosophy. Philosophy has traditionally fractured its investigation of the world into a

series of domains, such as epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, and ethics. In its

commitment to thinking relation, the

networkological perspective does not see these

as anything more than various lenses upon the

relation-in-process of all that is. While the

details of the concepts structuring the

networkological enterprise will be discussed in detail later in this text, the brief

sketch which follows will help describe the overall relationality of the form of this

conceptual network. The networkological perspective manifests its commitment to

grounding (ethico-), giving rise to (onto-),manifestation (epistemo-)

relation epistemologically by means of its concept of the open, ontologically by its

concept of the oneand , and ethically by its concept of the call to robustness. As with

all networkological terms, these concepts do not indicate domains or realms as much

as aspects, sides, moments, or perspectives, such that multiplication of conceptual

names and terms should therefore be seen as so many holographic views on the

emerging relation of what is. Thus, each of the primary sides of the networkological

philosophical system has its own way of relating to other terms, in that the

commitment to relation (ethico-) grounds the oneand (onto-) and the open (epistemo-

), the oneand gives rise to the open and the commitment to relation, and the open

provides the perspective whereby we can see the oneand and the need for the

commitment to relation, that is, it manifests them. Any examination of one of the

terms will lead ultimately to the others.

Furthermore, when we examine each of

these terms in greater detail, we will see

that they then shatter, fractally giving

rise to conceptual sub-networks which

repeat their inter-mediation at further levels of scale. From an epistemological

perspective, for example, the open gives rise to more refractions of key terms as they

interact with fragments of the others already mentioned. This manifests according to

three forms, namely, the undecideability known as the fundamental obstacle, the

ontological quandary of potential, and the ethical demand known as the appeal of

the other . Moving from the epistemological to the ethical, we see how the call to

robustness (freedom, ethics from the future) requires an attentiveness to this appeal

of the other (attention, ethics in the present), resulting in the commitment to relation

(decision, ethics in the past), which grounds the system as a whole. And from an

ontological perspective, the oneand, which gives rise to space and time, actual and

potential, also gives rise to emergence. Emergence then displays relation under the

aspect of potential, just as relation displays emergence under the aspects of the

actual, while both of these are manifestations of self-differing in the process of

coming to be as relation-in-process/emergence-in-relation. Continuing this line of

thought by further dividing its approach to what is (the onto-), the networkological

perspective describes the foundation of all that is in regard to its existence by means

of the term matrix . The investigation of matrix and its modes of appearance,

including, the open, the oneand, and the other, gives rise to the series of perspectives

known as matrixology . The modes of appearance of matrix include emergence,

relation, spacetime, location, perspective, matter, mind, actual, potential, past,

self-differing,relation-in-process,emergence-in-relation



166 167


commitment torelation

(grounds . . .)

emergence-in-relation/relation-in-process

future, present, variance, invariance, separation, connection, aspect, element,

context, etc. When emergence occurs in matter in the past, it is called actual, while

the term potential is used when emergence in matter has yet to occur. And when

emergence gives rise to itself, and hence relation, it is known as self-differing,

emergence-in-process, or simply as emergence, for emergence always contains itself

at a higher dimensional level, it is what gives rise to the production of layers of

difference and relation as such. Moving to the ethical, the extraction of guides for

action of individuals and collectives from the analysis of networks in the world is

known as network ethics, just as the analysis of the potentials inherent in the

network diagram is known as diagrammatology . Because diagrammatology describes

the network diagram in its most basic form, it is from this aspect of the

networkological perspective that we will begin, though in principle any of these

divisions of the networkological enterprise could act as a point of entry. In light of all

that is stated above, we can see that the networkological perspective recasts the

traditional philosophical divisions, such that ontology through a networkological lens

becomes matrixology, epistemology becomes diagrammatology, while the study of the

implications of these are considered by network ethics. The rest of this text will work

to fill out precisely what the concepts just described mean.

Groundings. All of the concepts and terms employed by the networkological

perspective are developed so as to be in sync with the varied aspects of the principle

open(manifests. . .)

oneand (gives rise to . . .)

of relation, including process, holography, fractality, inter-mediation, and emergence.

Each concept is necessarily a holographic and fractal intermediation of the relation-in-

process of the whole, indicative of the manner in which emergence manifests itself as

relation within philosophy. When terms are contained, nested, or intertwined within

each other, these points of self-containment do not indicate self-contradictions, as

might be assumed from a non-relational perspective, but rather describe the structure

of the networkological enterprise itself. For in fact, these nestings

indicate foldings between levels of the networkological enterprise,

thereby manifesting its topological form, the manner in which its

terms and concepts layer and intertwine around the self-

containing self-differing which is emergence-in-relation / relation-in-process.

Emergence is fundamentally non-totalizing, it moves within itself while standing still,as relation-differing and differing-in-relation. It is how relation manifests itself in time

as that which is not one with itself. Emergence is always nested within itself, giving

rise to itself, such that self-containment is not something to be eliminated as much as

understood. Emergence as a temporal structure is thus perhaps best described by

means of means of 4...n-dimensional, non-orientable surfaces such as a cross-cap or

Klein bottle, so long as these shapes are only seen as illustrations of a process which is

fundamentally plural, composed of non-linear networks

of relation-in-process at multiple levels of scale, of

which non-orientable diagrams describe a mere part.

From such a perspective, however, we can begin to see

the manner in which the networkological perspective

grounds itself by means of a process of ‘eating its own

tail,’ one which follows the temporal and logical structure of emergence in its process

of differing with itself. For in fact, all that is is the result of that which contains itself

fracturing and differentiating itself and then re-relating to and recontaining itself at

multiple levels of scale. Within all that exists, threads of potential emergence remain,

indicating the network that connects the potential of all to all, if at differing degreesof intensity. Understanding the topologies of such intensity in relation to what is is a

large part of what is entailed in the networkological enterprise itself, which will now

move through a series of linked investigations into precisely how this complexity

manifests from a networkological perspective on our world. While the presentation of

the networkological perspective in this text moves from diagrammatology through

matrixology to ethics, ultimately, it could have begun anywhere, for the parts all

contain the whole in miniature. The entirety of the system is what grounds it, by

“emergence alwayscontains itself at ahigher dimensionallevel”

thethreeand



168 169


means of what it gives rise to via its movement within itself. And as we will work to

show, what it gives rise to is itself, the networkological perspective, by means of the

intertwining of the oneand of emergence-in-relation / relation-in-process and the

threeand of the network diagram in its many forms.

Diagram. The networkological project is an attempt to develop the concepts

implicit in the network diagram. A network is an iconic sign of the relational aspects

of the world. The three primary components of a network diagram are the node, or

individual, the link, or relation, and the ground, or context, from which these

emerge. When a node emerges from a ground, we say that it has

individuated , and when a link emerges between nodes, it has

connected them. Networks, nodes, links, and grounds may be static or

dynamic, heterogeneous or homogeneous. Nodes may encompass all of

an element, or only an aspect thereof. Links may be uni-, bi-, or

multi-directional, precise or fuzzy (indicative of what Ludwig Wittgenstein would call

a ‘family resemblance’5), single or multi-threaded, etc. Networks include any and all

of these permutations. From this diagrammatic germ – node, link, ground - the entire

networkological project springs.

Precision. Any aspect of a network may be precise or fuzzy. Fuzziness does

not necessarily indicate messiness, for in fact, it can be measured quite precisely in

mathematical terms. Rather, fuzziness may indicate states such as partial belonging

(ie: a shade of green is so many degrees between blue and yellow), a

condition of so-called ‘family resemblance’ (in which a specific

diagrammatology

node, link, ground

precise, fuzzy

number of a group of traits are shared by all members of a network, even if not all

traits are present in all members or in equal degree), or loose coupling/sync between

parts. Fuzziness also often indicates a state from which more precise formations

emerge, and to which they may return. Most networks and their parts are fuzzy to

varying degrees, for in fact it is rigidity and precision which are in fact rare conditions

within the world.

Intensity. Among networks and their elements, there are

differences in intensity in regard to the rest of what is. Such intensity

can be measured relationally in a variety of forms. The number of

levels of emergence within a network is called its depth. The number

of networks and/or the components which are intertwined with each

other on a given level indicates that level’s interior diversity (or

breadth), while networks and/or components from without indicate

that network’s exterior diversity . The complexity of a network is determined by a

combination of the degree of diversity (both interior and exterior), the degree of

depth, and the contribution of the potential of each component in question.

Determinations of degree can only be made retroactively and relationally by networks

which come to know the network in question.

Topology. Networks may take different shapes, and these are generally

referred to as indicating a network’s topology. Topology is the name of a branch of

mathematics that deals with the way surfaces can vary so long as they are not torn or

broken. Likewise, network topologies indicate the manner in which networks can be

reshaped without being broken into smaller parts. Many

topologies are constrained by the nature and number of links

between nodes. Some nodes may have only a few links to other

nodes, while others, often called hubs, have many. Thedistribution of hubs often alters the potential topologies of a

given network. While many topologies are possible, some standard network topologies

include grid, chain, bus, star, multi-hub, distributed, self-similar/fractal,

star/centralized/hierarchical network, etc. Some networks have balanced topologies,

while others are more contractive or expansive at particular sites. Many networks

join to others at such sites, for the contraction and expansion of aspects of the world

is one of the most powerful ways in which networks understand and transform the

hubs,contraction,

expansion

intensity,depth,

diversity/breadth



172 173


changes of quantity within mathematics. Physicists often describe the universe as

exhibiting a symmetry in regard to the conservation of energy. Even dynamic

structures such as a whirlpool can be seen as governed by symmetry. With tools such

as phase or state space diagrams10, any regularity within even highly complex forms of

motion can be plotted as a node, or attractor, which then acts as a point or axis of

symmetry within a relatively simple network diagram: all that is needed is a change in

perspective. The expansion, contraction, alteration, and disparation of symmetries

indicate the manner in which relative forms of invariance give structure to worlds of

various sorts. Symmetry, as well as symmetry breaking 11 or emergence, indicate two

key ways of understanding the changes within networks in physical, symbolic,

mathematical, and many other varied types of worlds.

12

simple symmetries: 360 ̊ , 90 ̊ , 45˚

state space diagram of asimple pendulum withthree attractors (twoends of the pendulumswing and the center point at rest)

Difference. Just as

networks depict what unites, they

may also depict that which divides.

Networks that describe sameness or

similarities can therefore be called

symmetrical or invariance

networks, while those which are

used to describe difference will be

called asymmetrical, variance, or

difference networks. When

symmetries are broken, they give rise

to boundaries between states which

are no longer invariant in relation to each other,

as well as points of juncture where these

boundaries meet. These points of juncture,

which emerge either due to the intersection of

boundaries or because they indicate adisturbance within a ground

which may eventually give

rise to a boundary, are

known as events, or singularities. Pure singularities are nodes

with nothing in common, not even a shared ground, and as such

are an abstraction from singularities in the world, for any singularity we could know

about must have some relation to other singularities, shared grounds, and the world

around it. When singularities float within a ground of dynamic flux, they may create

state space diagram of a complex dynamic system governed by a Lorenz attractor (note the two symmetry-defining nodes/attractors around whichthe pattern swirls)

(a)/symmetricalnetworks

a phase diagram for H 2O withboundaries, territories, triple point, and critical point: noticehow some phases emerge or vanish depending on how one‘moves’ through the diagram



174 175


patterns of flow within this ground, but singularities may also divide up the ground

into aspects thereof, and even bring about the formation of links of difference

between the singularities. Such links indicate boundaries between these aspects of

the ground, called territories. A ground divided into territories is known as a plane,

and territories may be co-planar or multi-planar. While it is possible to think of

singularities as breaking the symmetry of the ground within which they emerge, such

an event can also be thought of as an intersection of separate grounds, that of the

singularity and that of the ground, into a single plane. From such a perspective, any

singularity indicates the presence of one ground within another, and thus, depending

on the perspective, all planes can be seen, in this sense, as multi-planar.

Identity. When territories in a difference network, whether co- or multi-

planar, are united by additional networks that link elements, flows, or networks

between them, they give rise to intertwined networks that describe specific

parameters of sameness and difference. This unique type of network, called an

identity network or simply an identity , describe entities

which maintain certain traits while others vary under changing

circumstances. H2O, for example, is both the same

(molecularly) and different (inter-molecularly) over changes in

temperature and pressure, therefore requiring an identity

network to describe this ability to both change and stay the

same. A more abstract entity, such as ‘catholicism,’ can be

multi-dimensional color-space diagramin which x, y, and z axes are mapped to

green, blue, and red, respectively

identity,substance,object, set,category,location,thing, idea,concept

seen to function in a similar, if perhaps more fuzzy, manner. All identities have

certain conditions under which they cease to be the same thing, but these conditions

vary, depending on the structure of meta-identity networks which determine these

conditions. When a meta-identity network is static, we call it a set, and when it is

dynamic, we call it a category (the foundations of modernist mathematics, and post-

modern mathematics, respectively).13 When a class of entities (ie: H20) is described by

an identity network, we say that it is a substance, and when a single entity is

described by such a network (ie: a particular molecule of H 20, catholicism) we say this

entity is an object. Ultimately this distinction is relative, for some entities may be

classes or individuals, depending upon the networks to which it is currently connected

in a given instance (ie: H20 as an element of a table of chemicals, H20 as a description

of the molecular structure of all the water in the world). When an identity is linked to

a particular segment of the extended networks of spacetime, independent of what

else is located in that particular segment of spacetime, it is called a location, but

when an identity is linked to a particular segment of matter, independent of location,

we say it is a material object, or thing. Identities which are neither located nor

materialized can still exist as networks within a mind which can think them, and can

continue within minds that posses the ability to store them in memory. Such objects

are known as mental objects, of which there are two types, ideas, or impressions,

object

a sample identity network



176 177


and abstract conceptions of ideas, meta-ideas known as concepts. When networks of

ideas are linked by a mind, we say they are associated, and when associations reach

the level of structuration of identity networks, these second-order ideas are concepts.

A common everyday object of experience often links all these networks and more, and

needs to be broken down into all its relevant networks in order to be fully understood.

Societies. Societies are organized networks of networks, and include entities

such as organisms, languages, etc. The simplest form of society is an aggregate, for

example, a pile of sand. But more complex aggregates

include layered intersections of networks, known as a

combinatories, but beyond this, there are also societies of

combinatories, known as hypercombinatories, as well as

societies of combinatories which control societies of

aggregates. These complex intertwinings of combinatories

and aggregates, known as complex societies, indicate

some of the most complex entities on the planet. Societies

of humans, for example, and their various extensions

(signs, objects, etc.) are perhaps the most complex

network formations on earth, involving networks of

networks of symbol systems, associations, organisms, raw materials, energetic flows,

etc. Humans internalize various materials, process them, and produce them in a cycle

which continually fractures entities to produce raw materials for new creativity. In the

process, humans give rise to not only themselves, but meta-systems, such as semiotic

structures and systems of objects. Linking symbolic, locational, energetic, material,

mental, economic, and varieties of other types of networks layered and nested within

and on top of each other, societies are perhaps the most intricate networks we know.

Combinatories. When networks intersect with each other, they often

impact aspects of each other. In such circumstances these intersections give rise to

compound networks known as combinatories. The networks they give rise to, which

are both at another level of scale and which

govern the modes of interrelation of the orignal

networks in question, are known as

combinatorials. A combinatorial occurs when

different matters affect each other by means of

a form of processing which occurs between the networks in question. The simplest

combinatorial,machinic/complex

aggregate,society,combinatory,hyper-combinatory,complex society

combinatorials. A combinatorial occurs when different matters affect each other by

means of a form of processing which occurs between the networks in question. The

simplest

type of combinatory is ephemeral, and occurs when networks intersect such that there

is a temporary influence between them. Many combinatories, however, persist over

time, developing complex combinatorials between them. There are many types of

combinatories, and the combinatorials that govern these can be single or multi-level,

rigid or fuzzy, static or dynamic. Two general poles govern the types of combinatories

that exist – the machinic and the complex. Machinic combinatories link many objects

with each other according to series of rules whereby the parts determine the

potentials of the whole. An engine, for example, is such a combinatory, as is a

contemporary digital computer. Such devices rarely surprise us, for they are designed

in a manner which maximizes the role of matter and actuality in their construction.

a mentalcombinatory

combinatorial

matter plane

mind plane



178 179


energetic systems which are metastable, thereby providing conditions which are

between order and disorder within the environment of that combinatory. Languages,

for example, are complex combinatories, and it is the relation of language to humans,

just as it is the relation of humans to the sun, which allows both humans and their

languages to continually surprise us, for the sun, humans, and language are metastable

systems, each in their own way. The most complex type of combinatory, however, is

one which links dynamic sets of elements to others by means of a combinatorial which

is itself a complex combinatory. This is called a hypercombinatory, or mind . Minds

link a series of elements together, at another level of scale, via a set of processes or

rules, and then actualize one of several potential actions. When a mind is observed by

another conscious mind, either from within or without, these potentials are mapped

out by a system which connects the first set of elements to the second set by a series

of processes or rules. When hypercombinatories organize a complex combinatory, we

say this complex society is alive. Combinatories go from the simple to the complex,

and understanding the varied types of combinatories in our world is essential to

understanding the potentials inherent within aggregates of networks.

Dynamics. Networks may be dynamic in a wide variety of ways. Grounds may

be static and homogenous, or they may indicate mixtures of constituents or conditions

of viscosity, varied density, and flows. Grounds can combine and flow into each other,

flows may condense into nodes, or nodes may emerge from the

interaction of a ground with entities beyond it. Nodes may individuate

and de-individuate from a ground, alter patterns of flow around them,

and resonate with each other by means of the disturbances carried by

constituents of the ground from which they emerge. Nodes may link or

de-link from each other, and if these links are themselves dynamic, they

may increase or decrease the amount of flow moving between nodes, increase or

decrease the fuzziness of the connection between nodes, allow for branching and

multiple pathways to emerge within links, etc. Singularities may individuate, merge,

or link and de-link to other singularities to produce or collapse new boundaries or

territories. Networks or their components can also go in and out of varying states of

resonance or sync. Determining dynamics and its extent requires that there be some

standard in regard to which change can be determined. Every network, from the

simplest to the most complex, can be linked up with a network known as a metric

which can establish conditions to determine distance between the separate elements

in a network, and from this metric, a netspace can be mapped. In dynamic networks,

metric,netspace,nettime

network withmetric

a temporal metric can be used to establish nettime.

Systems. All dynamic networks require a

relation to a difference in the distribution of

potentials, either within themselves or their

contexts. Under metastable14

conditions, flows of

the various forms of this potential, or unleashed by

this potential, may organize into locations in which

networks may emerge in a sustained fashion,

thereby creating dynamic networks. To describe

dynamic networks, we will need to rework the

terms employed in more static network diagrams. When dynamic,

a ground is referred to as field composed of flows, each which

may be hetero- or homogenous. When a field is relatively

bounded, it is known as a system. Nodes and links may be

heterogeneous to the flows in a given field, in which case they may create obstacles,

boundaries or channels within this flow. Systems produce and

reproduce themselves by means of energetic potential, stored

or in motion, and when flows of such potential congeal, we

speak of these concretized forms of potential flow as stocks.

Stocks may themselves then circulate, creating meta-flows

within a system in addition to ground-flows. Beyond stocks,

there may also be meta-stocks known as currency , and meta-

meta-stocks known as capital. Examples of currencies include

molecular-ATP in many living organic cells, or money in

economic networks. Examples of capitals may include status, machinery in a factory

(labor congealed in the form of a labor amplifier), or fat stores within an animal. Most

systems remain robust when there are multiple capitals circulating within a system,

but the economic system known as capitalism, a variation on the star-network

topology, indicates a cancerous condition in which one type of capital attempts to

reduce all others, via resonance or conversion, into its type, in a manner which is

ultimately harmful to the robustness of the system. Much more will be said about this

in the section on network ethics.

Genetics. Networks can be thought of spatially, dynamically, and also

field, system, flow, stock,currency,capital,capitalism



180 181


genetically , that is, in relation to the historical and/or logical process whereby a

network emerges, or individuates, from its surroundings. While all networks have a

particular history, all networks can also be seen as composed of elements of the

logical genetic chain of moves, from simplest to most complex,

which exist as potentials within the network diagram. The

genetic approach attempts to give a general description of the

potentials of networks as a series of logical moments. If the

network diagram consists, in simplest form, of the three terms

node, link, and ground, then genetics needs first understand

how it is that a node, link, or ground come to be. From a logical perspective, then,

the first stage of network development would be that of indifference, a condition inwhich everything is possible, but nothing in particular has taken shape. Indifference

indicates neither symmetry nor asymmetry, sameness nor difference, but that from

which these notions emerge. When something emerges which differs from

indifference, we say that an event has occurred in relation to a ground . Event and

ground are co-constitutive, for they indicate the emergence of difference from within

indifference, and each can be thought of as the ground to the event of the other, and

vice-versa, depending on the perspective in question. Within a given ground, however,

multiple events may emerge, and the degree to which these events interact, either

with themselves or with the ground surrounding them, may vary. Events may be

ephemeral or relatively stable, and when events endure over time they may enter in

relation with other events with which they share one or more grounds. If these events

in any way relate, we say that they then share a structure, and these events can then

be seen as elements of that structure. The aspects of an element which has something

in common with a structure is known as a node, that which connects nodes is a link,

and the structure as a whole is a network. Thus the emergence of any of these three

indicates the emergence of the other two. Nodes may be completely determined by a

network, and hence identical to their elements, or only slightly determined by a

network, indicative of a large distinction between node and element. Ultimately, the

determination of relation between any of these terms depends upon the networks

from which these elements are understood.

Levels. Nodes, links, and grounds are differentiated via the notion of

individuation, or emergence. A node individuates from a ground, links individuate from

nodes, and networks individuate from links. If we reverse this process, however, a

indifference,event,structure,element

network may involute into a series of disconnected links, links into a series of nodes,

and nodes back to ground. Involution and individuation are two sides of the same

process, and in many networks-in-process, we see network elements transforming into

each other on a regular basis. None of the terms used to describe networks, such as

ground, node, field, structure, link, topology, module, layer, individuation, etc., are

elements which exist separately from each other, for they are only defined

relationally. That is, as theorists such as Manuel Castells

have argued, a node is ‘where a curve intersects itself’, 15

or, as some theorists have argued, ‘ a node is a shortened

link, a link an extended node.’16

We can also say that a

node is where a ground curves into itself, for each node

that individuates from a ground is itself a network at another level of scale, just as

every network is itself a node, all the way up and down at every level of scale until

one reaches the open. What then is a level of scale? It is a differentiating link between

a node and a node – or, depending on one’s perspective, a network and a network,

ground a from ground, a link from link - distinguishing one from another as part from

whole, container from contained, layer from layered. Mathematic ians often speak of

a singularity as the presence of one dimension in another, 17 and so it is with networks,

in that each structure can indicate, depending on the perspective, an interpenetration

of levels. While levels may have a relation of verticality with each other, this is not a

necessity. A level is a sheet or zone of emergence, that from which nodes, links,

grounds, and networks individuate. Furthermore, these elements are not only

elements, but also moments, for a node is always a noding, a link always a linking, a

ground always a grounding, and a network always a networking, for relation is always

in-process. The dynamic separation and intersection of levels or dimensions of

difference within the world is emergence, relation in the process of self-differing. At

each point in which levels indicate the manner in which emergence contains or layersupon itself, and whenever it folds upon itself in this manner, emergence is then in the

process of relating to itself, of suturing together the dimensions of itself which it has

caused to diverge from itself in the first place. The spatio-temporal paradoxes which

result from many prior attempts to describe aspects of emergence are the result of

the non-relational manner in which these attempts try to describe its fully relational

structure. Any attempt to define emergence ultimately returns to where it began, but

with an infinite and multiplicitous twist, and this torsion is precisely emergence itself.

It is from emergence that the networkological project comes to be, at the site of

difference in relation, at the site of the disparation which gives rise to levels and their

“relation is

what mind

does”



182 183


elements and connections. Any philosophy which aims to describe the structure of

relation must perform this very torsion itself, as this text will attempt to do. The

networkological perspective attempts to enact this torsion in its unfolding of the

potentials of the network diagram, a diagram which performs relation in its very

structure. And yet, it is not enough for the diagram to be relational, for the unfolding

thereof must be relational as well.

Cover Image: The image used for the cover is a modified version of ‘Little Rock Lake TrophicWeb: Cannibal Image 2,’ The image was produced with FoodWeb3D, written by R.J. Williamsand provided by the Pacific Ecoinformatics and Computational Ecology Lab (www.foodwebs.org, Yoon et al. 2004). The image itself can be found at Yoon, I., R.J. Williams, E. Levine, S.

Yoon, J.A. Dunne, and N.D. Martinez. 2004. Webs on the Web (WoW): 3D visualization ofecological networks on the WWW for collaborative research and education. Proceedings of theIS&T/SPIE Symposium on Electronic Imaging, Visualization and Data Analysis 5295:124-132.

Acknowledgement: I’d like to thank the Santa Fe Institute in Santa Fe, New Mexico, for makingpossible my attendance at the Complex Systems Summer School 2006 for research related tothis paper.

1 The closest to a philosophy of networks in the existent literature is the work of Bruno Latourand his associates (ie: John Law) on ‘actor-network theory.’ However, what is primary forthese theorists, compared to this work, is not networks, which are ultimately a supportingstructure, but actants. There are other theorists, however, which can be seen as clearprecursors of the networkological enterprise, even if networks were for them not thefoundation of their theoretical enterprise. Gilles Deleuze is certainly a theorist for whomnetwork forms are essential (for more, see my blog post from December 30, 2009, entitled“Deleuze as Networkologist: ‘The Logic of Sense’ and the Networkology of Events,” athttp://networkologies.wordpress.com /2009/12/30/ deleuze-as-networkologist-the-logic-of-sense-and-networks-of-events/. For more on Whitehead and Leibniz as networkologicalthinkers, see my blog post from Dec. 27, 2009, entitled “Manifoldness: Spacetime asHypernetwork with Leibniz, Whitehead, and Riemann,” as well as my post from Nov. 15, 2009entitled “World as Medium: Or, How Self-Differing Substance Makes Strange Bedfellows ofWhitehead, Hegel, and Deleuze” (these and other related posts available at http://

networkologies.wordpress.com). For more on Latour’s actor-network theory, see Bruno Latour,Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory , Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,2007).2 “To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back.” Georg WilhelmFriedrich Hegel, Reason in History (New York: Prentice Hall, 1996), 13.3 See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1997), pp.51-8.4 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theater , (New York: Hill and Wang, 13 th Edition), 37.5 For more on the notion of family resemblance in Wittgenstein, see PhilosophicalInvestigations, (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 35-7.

6 For a general introduction to quantitative network analysis, see Linked: How Everything isConnected to Everything Else and What it Means, by Albert-Lásló Barabási (New York: Plume,2003). An intermediate level text is Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and Randomness, by Duncan Watts (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), while a moreadvanced text is The Structure and Dynamics of Networks , by Albert-Lásló Barabási, MarkNewman, and Duncan Watts (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006).7 For more on distributed networks, see Barabási, op.cit., 143-162, 219-226.8 For more on the political ramifications of network topologies, see Philip Ball, Critical Mass:How One Thing Leads to Another (London: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), 295-3719 For more on symmetry as invariance, as well as its relation to group theory, see Leon M.Lederman and Christopher T. Hill, Symmetry and the Beautiful Universe (Amherst: PrometheusBooks, 2008), 1-116. 10 For more on state and phase space diagrams and their uses, see Klaus Mainzer, Thinking in

Complexity: The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind, 5th Edition, (Berlin:Springer, 2007), 30-43.11 For more on symmetry breaking, see Lederman, op.cit., 189-202.12

The three diagrams in this section are public domain images, retrieved on 11:00 p.m., Feb.28th 2010, from the following sources: pendulum state-space diagram(http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Image:Terman_pendulum.jpg), phase-space diagram of water(http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/File:Phase-diag.svg), and color-space (http://www.mathworks.com/access/helpdesk/help/toolbox/images/color7.gif). 13

For more on the analysis of the history of mathematics by means of the terms modernism andpost-modernism, see Jeremy Gray, Plato’s Ghost: The Modernist Transformation of Mathematics (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008), 18-33. For more on set theory in itshistorical context, see ibid., pp. 157-169. For more on category theory in its historical context,see Ralf Krömer, Tool and Object: A History and Philosophy of Category Theory (Basel:Birkhäuser Basel, 2007), xxi-xxxvi.14 For an extended philosophical meditation on the ramifications of metastable energeticconditions, see Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation psychique et collective: A la lumière desnotions de Forme, Information, Potentiel, et Métastabilitié (Paris: Editions Aubier, 2007). Foran examination which focuses more on the scientific end of things, see Ilya Prigogene andIsabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam,

1985).15

“A node is the point at which a curve intersects itself,” Manuel Castells, The Rise of theNetwork Society: Volume One (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 501.16

I am quite sure that this notion is not my own, but I am currently unable to locate thesource, a matter which will hopefully be addressed in future editions of this text.17

For more on the notion of a singularity as the presence of one dimension in another, see

more on the manner in which the complex plane was generated in the history of mathematics,as well as the manner in which complex or ‘imaginary’ numbers are used in contemporaryquantum physics to understand the structure of the wave function in the Schrödinger equation.For more on the history of the complex plane, see Paul Nahin, An Imaginary Tale: The Story of

√ -1 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998), 31-66. For more on the uses of this idea in physicsin regard to the wave function, see Bruce A. Schumm, Deep Down Things: The BreathtakingBeauty of Particle Physics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2004), 154-168.



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