Developmental Review 27 (2007) 277–282

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Editorial

Special issue: Developmental cognitive neuroscience

The focus of this special issue is developmental cognitive neuroscience, a rapidly emerg-ing area of inquiry that focuses on the intersection of brain and cognition in the context ofdevelopment. My interest in this field began as a graduate student when I read both Patri-cia Goldman-Rakic’s seminal paper in Child Development regarding how the developmentof cortical circuitry, specifically prefrontal networks, contributes to the early emergence ofworking memory skills (Goldman-Rakic, 1987) as well as Adele Diamond’s (1990) volumeon the developmental neuroscience of higher-order cognitive functions. I was fascinated bythe notion that animal models could be used to predict how cognitive functions such asmemory and executive functions might be represented in the human infant brain, andthese works (among others) greatly influenced the development of my research programand choice of training. Expertise in this area requires an appreciation of neuroanatomy,neurobiology, physiology, cognition—and importantly, how these domains interact notonly in the adult but in the young organism from the prenatal period onward, appreciatingthat the nature of brain-behavior relations is rarely, if ever, static. By definition, then,developmental cognitive neuroscience is broad in scope, interdisciplinary, and more mech-anistic than descriptive. The main question of interest concerns how it is that brain andbehavioral development synergistically interact to impact one another. That is, the typicalcourse of brain development naturally leads to a host of behavioral changes but how is itthat these behavioral changes, in turn, impact the process of brain development?

Since Charles Nelson and I published our edited volume, the Handbook of Developmen-

tal Cognitive Neuroscience (2001), at least three journals (Developmental Neuropsychol-ogy, 2004; Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2004; Neuropsychologia, 2006) havedevoted special issues to the topic, and others (Child Development; Developmental Psy-chology) are in progress. This issue represents the first acknowledgment by a mainstreamdevelopmental journal to this discipline, which is timely. To illustrate how the field hasgrown, I conducted Medline searches spanning the interval from 1902 to 2007 using thefollowing three search parameters combined: brain, development, and cognition. From1902 to 2001, there were 972 articles that represented this intersection of topics. From2002 to 2007 alone, there were 988 articles. Thus, developmental cognitive neuroscience,following the pattern of its parent discipline, cognitive neuroscience, is growing at anexponential rate with evidence of massive proliferation over the past five years. Manyaccomplishments within the field have been due to the application of new methods to

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developmental samples. Accordingly, a brief overview of the history of cognitive neurosci-ence is warranted.

Historical context: The rise of cognitive neuroscience

Cognitive neuroscience was formalized as a scientific area of inquiry in the late 1970swhen scholars from various disciplines sought to bring together their investigations ofhow brain processes enabled mental functions (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002). Lessformally, the field began almost two-hundred years earlier when Franz Joseph Gall intro-duced the concept of phrenology, the theory that the brain is organized around a group ofcognitive tasks, each of which has a hypothesized basis in brain function that can be in-ferred by the size and distribution of protuberances on the surface of the skull (Gall &Spurzheim, 1810; Spurzhim, 1825). It is commonly known that the theory was rejectedby contemporary scholars (Flourens, 1824), yet the general goal of localizing cognitiveand other behavioral functions within the brain remained a viable one. Attempts to de-scribe structure–function relations were pursued by early experimental neuropsycholo-gists, such as John Hughlings Jackson, in the mid-1800s (Taylor, 1958). Paul Broca(1865), a French neurologist, treated a stroke victim who was left with the ability to under-stand language, although he could not speak. After the patient’s death, it was discoveredthat the area of the brain that was damaged was localized to the left anterior portion of thefrontal lobe, which came to be called Broca’s area. Soon afterwards, in 1876, it was dem-onstrated by Carl Wernicke that damage to the temporal–parietal junction, also on the leftside, rendered one able to speak but unable to understand language (Wernicke, 1908). To-gether, these findings were monumental, suggesting dissociations between discrete aspectsof language and specific structures within the brain’s left hemisphere. Human case studiessuch as these led neuroanatomists, such as Brodmann, to focus on mapping cytoarchitec-tural features of the cerebral cortex. At the same time, methods were being developed todescribe basic structural properties of the nervous system. For instance, neurons wereidentified, through the use of staining techniques, as unitary entities that unidirectionallytransmitted electrical impulses (Cajal, 1906). Human electroencelphalographic (EEG)studies were published by Hans Berger in 1920. These case reports and methodological ad-vances inspired scientists to derive animal models of brain-behavior relations. Animalstudies were highly informative regarding the effects of cortical ablations and/or corticaldeprivation. Carlyle Jacobsen, Wolfe, and Jackson (1935) used the lesion technique toexamine the effects of removing the frontal lobe on cognitive functions in adult monkeysand chimpanzees. This group popularized the delayed response task as a measure of spa-tial working memory. As developmental psychologists appreciate, this task is formallysimilar to Piaget’s A-not-B task (Piaget, 1936). In addition, Hubel and Wiesel’s classic sin-gle-unit recordings from neurons in the cat visual cortex demonstrated that individual neu-rons in primary visual cortex respond reliably to discrete forms of experiential stimulationand that these response patterns change when early experience is altered, provoking a hostof questions regarding the dynamics of experience, neurobiology, and their interactions(Hubel & Wiesel, 1962, 1965).

David Ingvar and Neils Lassen revolutionized cognitive neuroscience when they de-vised a method for the measurement of changes in metabolism and cerebral blood flowduring cognitive performance (Raichle, 1998), a technique that gave way to positron emis-sion tomography (PET). The successful measurement of hydrogen atoms in a magnetic

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field prompted the development of the first magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanners,and subsequently, a method of tracking blood flow using MRI made functional magneticresonance imaging (fMRI) possible (Gazzaniga et al., 2002; Raichle, 1998). FMRI mea-sures and localizes activity in the behaving human brain and is broadly considered tobe the most profound breakthrough, methodologically speaking, within the past century.In addition, the use of high-density electrophysiological recording systems to record andlocalize sources of brain activity in the course of cognitive performance has revolutionizedthe study of infant cognition (Johnson et al., 2001). Indeed, it could be argued that themajority of the developmental cognitive neuroscience literature is ERP-based and thatstudies of this type (Courchesne, 1977; Nelson & Salapatek, 1986) gave rise to the fieldas a formal discipline.

The ability to view the living brain in action permits an examination of how suchactivity changes or is altered in response to experiences, including illness, pharmacolog-ical treatment, and normal aging processes. In the context of the heated philosophicaldebates regarding nature and nurture that have motivated psychological inquiry sinceits inception, it has been natural to apply questions regarding brain-behavior relationsto the study of child development and to use these methodologies to address such ques-tions. Indeed, functional neuroimaging has now been applied to the study of children asyoung as three months of age (Dehaene-Lambertz, Dehaene, & Hertz-Pannier, 2002),and even neonates have been the focus of studies using MR spectroscopy (Munson, Sch-roth, & Ernst, 2006).

The organization of this issue

Given this historical backdrop and the multitude of authors who have used cognitiveneuroscientific techniques to study developmental processes (see recent volumes by deHaan & Johnson, 2003; Nelson & Luciana, 2001; Nelson, de Haan, & Thomas, 2006),it was a daunting task to organize a special issue on the topic of developmental cognitiveneuroscience that would represent the vast amount of information that has accumulated.The four topics selected for inclusion here together represent a diversity of methodologicalapproaches, applications of these approaches across various age groups spanning from in-fancy to adolescence, and implications for our understanding of clinical conditions rang-ing from autism to infantile amnesia to childhood psychosis to attention-deficithyperactivity disorder. Thus, with this issue of Developmental Review, I am pleased tohighlight the work of four young investigators in the field, each of whom I consider tobe a rising star in her area of inquiry and each of whom approaches important develop-mental questions through the use of novel designs that are informed by cognitiveneuroscience.

The paper by Karatekin comprehensively reviews a psychophysiological technique (eyetracking) that has been with us for decades but which has only relatively recently been ap-plied to developmental populations. Karatekin illustrates that eye tracking is a particularlynon-invasive means of understanding how individuals direct their visual attention whileviewing and responding to complex scenes. Studies of healthy developmental populationsindicate that the neural systems that support visually directed attention continue to maturethroughout childhood and into adolescence, which is an important point to emphasizegiven that vision is the primary means through which we perceive our surroundings.Moreover, when coupled with the appropriate behavioral tasks, this technology can

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differentiate performance variables that are mediated by vigilant attention versus thosethat are mediated by inhibitory control over behavior. When applied to the study of var-ious psychopathological conditions, such as autism, schizophrenia and attention deficitdisorder, intriguing patterns emerge that help to dissociate among the deficits observedwithin each disorder. This work naturally leads us to consider how endophenotypes (Got-tesman & Gould, 2003) can be measured early in development and prospectively followedthrough the lifespan. Importantly, Karatekin’s review and her subsequent critique to-gether serve to emphasize that we must always consider the limitations of a given approachbefore applying it to a given population.

The second paper by Richmond and Nelson is a comprehensive review of the devel-opmental cognitive neuroscience of memory processes. The studies reviewed in this pa-per emphasize how the use of neurobehavioral and electrophysiological recordingtechniques can inform our understanding of infant memory from the encoding phaseto the execution of remembered behavioral sequences. From this review, it is clear thatneonates are active processors of higher-order information and that this informationshapes their later abilities to form contextual associations between stimuli. The workof Richmond and Nelson also nicely illustrates how animal models of dissociable mem-ory systems can contribute to human experimentation in terms of suggesting whichtasks should be the focus of investigation and which neural substrates underlie humaninfants’ performance on such tasks.

The third paper by Durston and Konrad provides an integrative overview of how amulti-method assessment approach using behavioral tasks, molecular genetic probes,functional neuroimaging and psychopharmacology can facilitate our understanding ofthe neural determinants of attention and how these processes go awry in clinical disordersthat emerge during the developmental period, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disor-der (ADHD). This paper reinforces the notion that the brain operates as a set of coordi-nated systems that serve specific behavioral goals. In this sense, Durston and Konrad’sapproach can be considered ‘‘the wave of the future’’ in developmental cognitive neurosci-ence research. As a discipline, we must advance beyond pure descriptions of neurophysi-ological processes that change with age to consider how differences in brain activation aremodulated by specific neurochemicals or other neurophysiological parameters, under-standing that these systems are at least in part genetically determined, that deficienciesin function contribute to disease onset and that chemical interventions may or may notstabilize activation patterns that are disrupted in a disorder. If pharmacological treatmentscan be shown to normalize brain activity patterns in children with ADHD, particularly iftreatment responders have a specific genetic profile, then this strategy represents a power-ful tool through which to understand the heterogeneity of this disorder and to understandwhich symptom profiles (and brain systems) respond to biological treatments. Work ofthis type may lead to individualized treatment paradigms based on pharmacogenetic pro-files. Durston’s chapter also includes a brief review of how computerized training tech-niques, incorporating tasks that are derived from the neuroscience literature, might beuseful for the amelioration of attention and executive control deficits (c.f. Klingberget al., 2005). Whether behavioral training of this type can impact neurological systemsas they develop, leading to permanent change, is, I believe, an up-and-coming hot areaof research within this field.

Finally, the last paper in the series by Henderson and Wachs, reminds us that cognitiondoes not operate in a vacuum. We cannot achieve a full understanding of cognitive

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processes without considering individual differences in emotional dispositions that impactsensory thresholds, cognitive interpretations, and behavioral responses. Moreover, someof what we have studied in the cognitive realm (inhibitory control, for example) may rep-resent dispositions that are reflected in early temperament and later personality. Whetherthe capacity for cognitive control emerges early and remains stable over time within indi-viduals is an important avenue for longitudinal investigation.

Thus, this selection of papers serves to emphasize (a) that we must be attentive to, butduly critical of, methodologies that can be informative about brain-behavior relations andused in a non-invasive way throughout the lifespan (Karatekin), (b) that there is a synergybetween findings from the animal literature and our understanding of early brain develop-ment at least as it contributes to attention, memory and learning, which collectively rep-resent the cornerstones of our cognitive existence (Richmond and Nelson), (c) that thefield is in a state of transition with respect to how methods can be implemented. We arenow at the point where we should consider the potential of combined methodologies inthe context of asking hypothesis-driven questions about how the brain controls behaviorin development and how these patterns are disrupted in psychopathology (Durston andKonrad), and (d) that developmental cognitive neuroscience is not purely a cognitive sci-ence. It is growing to accommodate recognition of the affective and social processes thatalso contribute to the individual’s ability to control his/her behavior (Henderson andWachs).

The volume concludes with a commentary by a pioneer in the field, Bruce Pennington,who together with his colleagues Rob Roberts and Kelly Snyder, encourages us to keep inmind that although neuroscience has contributed a great deal to the study of developmentover the past decade, it is also the case that developmental psychologists bring a uniqueperspective to neuroscientists in terms of inspiring them to consider that the neural land-scape is changing as behavior is emerging, that we must develop reliable methods forindexing these plastic changes, and that, indeed, our greatest challenge is to understandhow experience interacts with biology to effect change across the lifespan.

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Monica LucianaDepartment of Psychology and Center for Neurobehavioral Development,

University of Minnesota, Minneapolis MN 55455, USA

E-mail address: lucia003@umn.edu

Available online 30 July 2007