Triumph and Collapse Russia and the USSR

1941 – 1991 Revision Guide

Exam Questions ‘Stalin’s leadership was the most significant reason for the Soviet victory over Germany in the 1941–1945 war.’ Assess the validity of this view. (Specimen) To what extent was Destalinisation responsible for Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964? (Specimen) How far was the failure to achieve effective economic reform between 1941 and 1991 responsible for the break-up of the USSR? (Specimen) To what extent had the USSR recovered from the impact of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) by the time of Stalin’s death in 1953? (June 2010) ‘Despite the policy of Destalinisation, the main features of Stalinism were still intact in the USSR at the time of Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964.’ Assess the validity of this view. (June 2010) To what extent was the failure to maintain economic growth after Stalin’s death responsible for the break-up of the USSR in 1991? (June 2010) ‘The USSR remained politically and socially stable in the years 1964 to 1982 despite the policies of the Brezhnev regime.’ Assess the validity of this view. (June 2011) ‘Gorbachev’s reluctance to commit himself fully to radical reform caused the break-up of the USSR.’ Assess the validity of this view. (June 2011) ‘Agriculture was always the fundamental weakness of the Soviet economy.’ Assess the validity of this view of the Soviet economy in the years between 1945 and Brezhnev’s death in 1982. (June 2011) To what extent was Stalin’s leadership responsible for the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945? (June 2012) To what extent did the USSR achieve economic growth under the regimes of Khrushchev and Brezhnev? (June 2012) How far was political stagnation in the USSR, in the years 1956 to 1991, due to the Soviet regime’s fear of change? (June 2012)

What do I need to know? The Great Patriotic War and its Outcomes, 1941–1953

• The impact on the USSR of German invasion and Nazi ideology from 1941 • Stalin’s role in the management of the war effort • The nature of the wartime Soviet economy • The actions of the Communist regime to enlist mass patriotism for the war effort, including

propaganda and religious concessions • The extent of wartime opposition within the USSR and the Stalinist regime’s treatment of

opposition • The relationship between the Soviet people and Stalin’s regime by the time victory was

achieved in 1945 • Stalin’s dictatorship, 1945–1953 • The cult of personality • Economic recovery after 1945 • The impact of Cold War politics on the USSR

Destalinistation, 1953–1968

• The emergence of new leaders after the death of Stalin, and Khrushchev’s victory in the power struggle

• The 1956 Party Congress and reaction to Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ • Khrushchev’s leadership • Khrushchev’s motives for industrial and agrarian reforms and their impact • The reasons for the ousting of Khrushchev in 1964 • The impact of Destalinisation within the USSR and on Soviet relations with the satellite

states The Brezhnev Era, 1968–1982

• The leadership of Brezhnev • Brezhnev’s political, economic and social policies: the era of conservatism • Attitudes towards the Brezhnev regime: the repression of dissidents and opposition to the

war in Afghanistan • Economic stagnation and the costs of the arms race

The End of the Soviet Union, 1982–1991

• Leadership changes from 1982: the leadership of Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev • Problems facing the USSR by the 1980s • The motives for, and impact of, Gorbachev’s reforms • Ideas of glasnost and perestroika and their effects; opposition to glasnost and perestroika • Economic and political problems • The growing threat of nationalism from republics within the USSR • The impact on the USSR of the collapse of Communist regimes in the satellite states at the

end of 1989 • The August coup of 1991 and the overthrow of Gorbachev • The end of the USSR

-June 1941 - Nazi Germany’s Blitzkrieg tactics rip through Eastern Europe attack on all fronts, overrunning Poland, much of the Ukraine and the Baltic states.

-September 1941 – ‘Operation Barbarossa’ starts with the Siege of Leningrad which ended in 1944 lasting 872 days! There were an estimated 632,000 deaths.

-October 1941 – Battle of Moscow, Soviets hugely outnumbered and struggling, turned city into a fortress, launched counter offensive aided by the harsh winter which crippled the Nazi’s.

-Spring 1942 – Nazi’s launch Stalingrad offensive, major turning point, Soviet counter- offensive tactics led by General Zhukov encircle and deplete Nazi army, pivotal Soviet triumph in 1943, and estimated 750,000 killed, missing or wounded Nazi soldiers, Soviets by comparison just 478,741!

-July 1943 – Battle of Kursk, WW2 largest tank battle ensues, Soviets tactics gain momentum, Nazi’s defeated estimated 500,000 soldiers killed, missing or wounded. Last major Nazi offensive.

-January – 1945 Soviets invade Germany and head for Berlin, May – German surrender, victory in Europe.

WW2 Narrative & Key battles

• 28 million Soviet citizen deaths, roughly 1/7 of pre – war population

General WW2 facts

• By 1945, 6 million Soviet soldiers taken captive, of these 75% murdered, worked to death or to starve/freeze to death

• German invaders during the War destroyed, 2/3 of pre-war Soviet property, destroyed 60% of steel, 65,000 kilometres of railway lines and rendered 25 million people homeless

The Great Patriotic War

What he did…

• Centralised power with creation of State Defence Committee (GKO, which ensured decisions regarding foreign policy, economic policy, armaments production could be made quickly by bypassing Soviet bureaucracy) and Stavka (the same except with only military affairs)

• Enforced very harsh punishment upon both troops and generals • Allowed highly skilled individuals (Marshall Zhukov) more control of army • Re-opened churches • Was initially very slow to react to Operation Barabossa • Reintroduced Leninist system of Commissars attached to army officers • Relocated factories in East across Yural mountains

Good Leader?

1. Creation on GKO + Stavka meant political/ military decisions could be made quickly, which was crucial to organisation of army and country.

2. Stalin listened: (David Reynolds) “Stalin learned from his mistakes, whereas Hitler only grew more unwielding with each failure”.

3. Control of Beria + NKVD ensured there was continued public support for war effort.

4. Sacked incompetent generals (Voroshilov)

5. Re-opening of churches meant he had support from religious pop.

6. Army was being led by skilled individuals (Marshall Zhukov): (DR) “He gave his top generals the freedom to fight”.

7. Relocation of factories allowed for continued heavy industry production

Bad Leader?

1. Made big mistakes: refusal to retreat at Kharkov, 1943 cost over 85,000 Soviet casualties. Also allowed Kiev and Leningrad to be encircled by German forces).

2. Harsh treatment (generals who lost battles were executed/ soldiers were tortured + Commissars) often lowered morale. (DR) “Stalin intended to terrorize his army into fighting”.

3. He sometimes played key figures (Beria/ Malenkov/ Molotov) off against each other.

4. Ignored build up of German forces on USSR border so there was no military response when Hitler invaded. (DR) “Stalin wouldn’t let his troops fire back”.

5. Slow reaction to German invasion meant large parts of Eastern USSR were overrun

Stalin’s role in war leadership

Propaganda

• Withheld any bad news that might be damaging to morale. • Exaggerated claims of German losses. • Stricter censorship was introduced. • A lot of focus on national pride and patriotism. • Adopted the term ‘The Great Patriotic War’ • Applauded previous Russian heroes, who had fought and

succeeded in previous wars. • Mass hatred toward the Germans generally, not just the

Nazi regime. • Stalin’s name was constantly held up as a patriotic symbol. • Emphasis of propaganda was mostly Russian, despite the

whole of the Soviet Union being involved in the war.

NKVD

• The government was worried of traitors who might try to destabilise the USSR from within.

• The NKVD rounded up anyone who had a previous record of opposition.

• Drastic action was taken against ‘defeatists’ and ‘rumour mongers’

• Thousands of suspects were shot by the NKVD, as were soldiers who retreated on the battlefield.

People’s Militias

• Made up of volunteers to back up the red army. • They had inadequate training and weapons, but were

formed spontaneously from citizens committed to the war.

Religious Concessions

• Restored the Russian Orthodox Church to favour. • Stalin met the head of the church and was given the church’s

blessing in the war effort. • This in turn meant that the Soviet Unions persecuted

Christians would begin to show support. • The church began putting out propaganda leaflets against the

Germans and raising money for the war effort. • The church also campaigned to open up a second front,

something that Stalin was also keen for. • In return the Church was able to preserve its traditional

structure and by the end of 1943 there were over 15000 Orthodox churches.

• Soviet historians, rarely acknowledge the value of the church during the war, and instead put it down entirely to the state.

• “The influence of the Orthodox Christian and other religions on the population was a far cry from what bourgeois historians claim it was and could not serve as a source of inspiration in the struggle against the enemy” Rzeheshevsky World War 2: Myths and the realities, 1984

Enlisting mass patriotism

Pre War preparation

• Provision for a massive increase in war production had been made during the mid-1930’s

• Factories had been given extra capacity to produce more weapons and munitions if required.

• The majority of its workforce was vulnerable to any attack that came from the west. Superiority of economy

• Out produced Germany in all key areas.

• Huge investments in Steel, machine tools and chemicals.

• This enabled the production of many modern weapons and munitions.

• Managed to relocate some industrial equipment.

• Built 3500 new factories during the war, mainly in the Urals and Siberia.

• Output doubled in munitions factories during the war.

• “The heroic feat of evacuation and restoration of industrial capacities during the war meant as much for the country’s destiny as the greatest battles of the war2” General Zhukov 1971

Initial impact of War on the economy

• Over half of its industrial capital was taken over by November 1941.

• Two fifths of grain production was also taken over. • Had no pre-determined plan to evacuate equipment. • Not enough transport available. • Production of coal, steel and oil were down by 1942. • Capacity shrunk to 68% of its pre-war rate. • The workload was stretched to capacity before the war,

when the war came and people began to enlist, the economy had to shrink

Historiography of Wartime economy

• On the movement of the Soviet economy from the west to the east “The most massive and most effective evacuation ever undertaken in history… a whole industrial country was moved thousands of kilometres east.” ( Rzeheshevsky, O, World War 2: Myths and realities)

• “One of the most stupendous and successful of such operations ever witnessed.” ( Chris Ward Stalin’s Russia, 1999)

• “There were too many soldiers and munitions workers compared to the few left in the supporting civilian infrastructure.” Barber J. Harrison M., The soviet Home Front 1941-45 1991.

•

The people and the economy

• Compulsory overtime of 3 hours was introduced. • Holidays were banished. • If workers were thought to be slacking they would

be fined or sent to labour camps. • The government had no plan to keep the valuable

people in the country and send the dispensable to war. Many of the most important people in keeping the economy afloat were sent to war.

• Labour Workforce was set up, to ensure the right people were in the right areas.

• Labour workforce acquired the sufficient amount of power to prevent agencies taking workers for the own needs elsewhere

Summary

Economy succeeded because the USSR massively out produced Germany. However it was relatively inefficient and relied on its massive workforce rather than its productivity

Soviet wartime economy

Nationalities

• areas such as Ukraine saw the invading Nazi’s as liberators or allies • possibly one million people from various national groups defected and

fought on the side of the Germans against the Soviets • Vlasov’s ‘Russian Liberation Army’ – Vlasov was a Red Army Commander,

captured by the German’s in 1942, which he then fought alongside Germany with ex-Russian forces who defected to the German side. Vlasov was then was captured by the Americans in 1945.

• He was then returned to the USSR, where they hung him for treason on August 1st 1946 along with other soldiers of the Russian Liberation Army.

Reaction to opposition groups by the Soviet Regime

• The regime saw many nationalities as traitors - “guilty by association”

• Crimean Tartars were deported to Kazakhstan and Central Asia – 1943-1944

• Volga Germans were deported to Siberia and Central Asia in 1941 • Many Soviets were exiled from the Baltic States, Georgia, Ukraine • Stalin was obsessed with the threat to national unity • In early years of the war, one million people were deported from

western Belorussia and western Ukraine • June 1941 – 134,000 people were deported from the Baltic States into convict camps • Around 3.3 million Soviet citizens were deported between 1941 and 1948

Treatment of Jewish Soviets

• Lived mainly in Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia, which were occupied by the Germans in 1941 to 1942.

• By 1945 about 5 million Jews had disappeared – they were either killed by the Germans, or by local nationalists

The NKVD (Secret Police)

• Displayed its massive authority under Beria during the war, ensured compliance from the population.

• Punished the people for failure, incompetence, arrested those suspected of treason or disloyalty.

• Monitored those who lived under German occupation, they were investigated on a regular basis for loyalty.

• Used convict labour (prisoners, etc.) during the war economy.

Extent of wartime opposition in the USSR

Political

• Women membership of the Communist Party rose – 18.3% • Party became more educated and less ‘working class’ • 75% of the Party joined the war effort, Party numbers grew after as it

seemed ‘more patriotic’ to join • The Communist Party had younger, more professional members during

the war, Stalin therefore trusted it more. • After the war, Stalin took back all power – he had delegated power to

his generals during the war • The GKO was set up – consisted of Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and Voroshilov, ensured

that Stalin had ‘all the power and authority of the State’ behind him, whilst giving power to politicians that Stalin favoured most.

• Stalin became more of a dictator after the war, ruling with an iron fist

Economy

• Loss of men in the war reduced the number of workers, agriculture suffered as a result. • Farms were destroyed following the Scorched Earth policy – the burning of farms that could

have benefited the Germans, damaged the fertile land • USSR spent 38.7 billion roubles on the defence industry by 1944, 17.9 billion roubles on the

military services, showing the military expenses were high • Soviet war economy meant that the economy after the war was very imbalanced, with heavy

industry being strong, yet agriculture and light industry were weak

Social

• Mass patriotism following the Soviet victory of the war • Huge loss of soldiers – 1/5 of the pre-war population had been lost • Soviet casualties made up half of the overall loss of life in the war • About 20 million Soviet men died, creating an imbalance of men and women • The people became more supressed than before, free public opinion was non-existent • Returning soldier were sent to gulags, Stalin feared they would spread Western ideas to the

Soviet people

Historiography

• Peter Kenez – “For the Soviet people, the post-war period was even more difficult than the war period.”

• Christopher Reid – “Was all the more disappointing for a society expecting some reward for wartime sacrifices and victories.

Impact of the war in the USSR

Industry Impact of the Fourth Five-year plan.

1945 Planned 1950 target

Actual 1950 results

Coal (million tons)

149 250 261

Oil (million tons) 19 35 40

Steel (million tons)

12 25 27

Cement (million tons)

2 10 10

Electricity (million tons)

43 82 91

Tractors (thousands)

15 112 242

Number of workers

(millions)

27 33 39

Index of producers’

goods (1940=100)

112 - 205

1945 Planned 1950

target

Actual 1950

results Agricultural

production (1940 index=100)

60 127 99

Grain harvest (million tons)

47 - 81

Industry was essential in order for the economy to recover. This is highlighted in the Fourth Five-year plan. The plan aimed to improve the economy by focusing entirely on quantity and ignoring the quality of the goods created. Consumer demand was ignored and focus was on heavy industry goods such as Coal and Steel.

Problems with the economy:

Soviet industry was inefficient and involved intense heavy labour. This reduced productivity and after the losses of workers during the war the productivity decreased even more.

The USSR had also lost economic support from USA and Britain. This is why there was even more focus upon quantity.

‘Even if we take into consideration the exaggerations built into soviet statistics, it is still indisputable that the Stalinist methods worked, and that the speed of reconstruction was impressive’ Peter Kenez.

Agriculture in 1945 was in a poor condition due to focus on heavy industry and scorched earth. In order to improve the economy the state took 60-70% of harvested grain and exported it in order to fund heavy industry.

However targets of production within agriculture were rarely met due to loss and workers and land from the war.

Soviet agriculture in Stalin’s final years was characterised by ‘ill-judged interventions of authority, excessive centralisation of decisions, extremely low prices, insufficient investment and a lack of adequate incentives.’ Alex Nove.

Collectivisation meant peasants were starving because their grain was being exported. This reduced the production of grain.

Agriculture was the weakest part of the soviet economy and would not improve with Stalin’s quick fix approach.

Economic recovery after 1945

Stalin’s cult of personality

• Stalin had always been portrayed as a god like figure and this status was reinforced by the Soviet victory in 1945.

• In private Stalin claimed he disapproved of the excesses of the Stalin cult that appeared throughout the media.

• In practice he showed no sign of wanting to stop it.

• He was presented as the leader who cared for his people and was ruthless in protecting their interests.

• Some argue that he recognised the political advantages of allowing his subordinates to promote his god like image.

• Stalin did not like the emphasis put on him as being the leading interpreter of Marxism.

• He claimed, “We already have the teaching of Marx and Lenin. No additional teachings are required.”

• Stalin was given titles such as “Coryphaeus of Science,” “Father of Nations,” “Brilliant Genius of Humanity,” and “Great Architect of Communism”.

• The cult of Stalin was at its height at the celebrations held for his 70th birthday in December 1949.

• There were parties, festivals and processions held throughout the USSR.

Stalin’s cult of personality

Social policies under Stalin

• Zhadanov was one of Stalin’s most trusted and favourite subordinates.

• He had similar views to Stalin.

• Zhadanov ensured that all intellectuals – writers, artists, scientists, musicians or economists - followed the Party line.

• During the war, religion had been harnessed by Stalin to boost support for the regime.

• After 1945, religious practice was tolerated as long as it presented no threat to the State’s control of ‘public opinion’.

• Stalin introduced the campaign against ‘cosmopolitanism’, which was largely associated with Zhadanov.

• ‘Cosmopolitanism’ was associated with increased anti-Semitism, which was evident in increased discrimination and violence against Jews.

• Cosmopolitanism was also reflected in a campaign to eliminate virtually any contact with the outside world.

• Only high-ranking Party officials could travel abroad. • Marriage with foreigners was forbidden. • Foreign films, books and arts were denounced.

• There was an upsurge in Russian nationalism, which took the form of praising all things Russian.

• The official Soviet line was that anything Russian was greatly superior to anything in the West.

• All great achievements of previous generations were attributed to the Russians.

• Some historians have suggested that while there were limitations to Stalin’s power, it was not due to lack of will but simply inefficiency, because decisions were sometimes made haphazardly or because Stalin become more isolated himself.

• On the other side, some historians believe that Stalin’s power was less supreme than is popularly imagined.

• Chris Ward described Stalin as ‘no self-confident tyrant in charge of a smoothly functioning totalitarian machine, but a sickly old man.’

Social policies under Stalin

Stalin’s dictatorship 1945-1951 - High Stalinism

Zhdanov promoted Stalinist themes emphasizing strict conformity to the Party line. Shostakovich was exiled.

A New Terror?

• Stalin an alcoholic • Maneuvering created fear and uncertainty ( e.g.

demoting the war hero Marshal Zhukov) • Leningrad Affair- 200 leading Leningrad Party

officials were arrested some shot. Loyalty of Leningrad party was in doubt, ‘window to the West’ - Simply the prelude to an extension of terror

across the USSR • New outburst of Anti-Semitism, 1948, even

Molotov’s Jewish wife arrested • The Georgian purge seen as an attack on Beria • Bizarre ‘Doctors Plot’; leading Kremlin doctors,

many Jewish, accused of plotting the deaths of Stalin - Stalin was ill at this time which added to his

paranoia

Stalin’s Death

In 1952 Stalin begun to criticise leading subordinates such as Molotov and Mikoyan. Likely on a verge of massive new purge. If so, in March 1953 his sudden death stopped this in its tracks, possibly saving some of his successors from liquidation (Khrushchev)

Left his subordinates in a state of relief they’d survived but uncertainty because there was no clear line of succession and each saw others as potential rivals

Government under High Stalinism

Stalin uses the war success to abuse the system; The communist party structure was now dictated solely by Stalin gaining more power.

Soviet One Party State – The Nomenklatura and politburo most privileged

Stalin the very hub of government, his orders was obeyed without question. Party leaders were terrified of getting it ‘wrong’, as he was unpredictable and had a temper

According to Molotov ‘gov. ceased to function’, Stalin dealing directly with individual officials rather than leading party colleagues as a group

Constantly jealous or suspicious of those around him

Interpretations of Stalin’s rule

Kenez- emphasized the deliberate nature of Stalin’s method of ruling- he always retained full power

Hahn- Stalin’s power was less supreme than is popularly imagined

Ward- “no self-confident tyrant in charge of a smoothly functioning totalitarian machine, bur a sickly old man- unpredictable, dangerous, lied to by terrified subordinates, presiding over a ramshackle bureaucracy and ranging… against failure and mortality”

Stalin’s dictatorship 1945 to 1951

The Impact of Cold War politics of the USSR

Origins of the Cold War pre-World War 2:

-From 1917 revolution great mistrust between USSR and West especially after West backed anti-Bolsheviks in Russian civil war

-Based on opposing economic and political systems; democratic capitalism and dictatorial communism. Both sides had already started propaganda war (Red Scare in 1920s USA and anti-western imperialist propaganda in USSR)

Post-World War 2:

-USSR and USA opposing superpowers

-Defeat of Germany led to Yalta and Potsdam agreements whereby Europe was split into two (after much disagreement)

-With mutual enemy gone previous mistrust returned. USSR imposed communism into occupied territory and US provided Marshall Aid. Escalated into Cold War with both sides fearing the other would try to assert dominance over them

Effects on USSR:

-Economically the USSR kept levels of military spending high and geared the economy towards rapid military development to counter America. Acquired atomic bomb in 1949

-Increased paranoia of Western influence and subversion. Zhdanov’s cultural reforms, Doctors plot and Hysterical isolationism

-Increased upsurge in Russian nationalist propaganda to counter image of superior West. Past inventions falsely attributed to Russians (Radio) and past Russian leaders like Peter the Great praised despite being previously labelled tyrannical imperialist by the Bolsheviks

-The development of the Cold War 1945-53 had two general effects one it threatened Stalin’s grip on power and so the totalitarianism of High Stalinism was needed to counter the threat. Second it was exploited by Stalin to increase his power through fear.

Impact of Cold War politics on the USSR

The Power Struggle 1953-1956

On the 5th of March 1953, Stalin died and his 31 year reign over the Soviet Union came to an end. No clear line of succession had been established during Stalin’s rule; therefore there was much uncertainty over who would be the next leader of the Soviet Union. A collective leadership took over the running of the USSR and nobody succeeded Stalin on their own for the first few years following his death. There was considerable competition and rivalry amongst the contenders for power. The most prominent contenders were Khrushchev, Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin.

Nikita Khrushchev

Born 1894, Khrushchev emerged from a working class background in Ukraine. Joined the Communist party in 1918 and fought for the red army during civil war. Worked his way up the Party and joined the Politburo in 1939. Entrusted with important tasks during the war years. His big break came in 1949 when Stalin appointed him as a secretary of the central committee.

Georgi Malenkov

Born 1902, descended from a long line of tsarist civil servants. Served as a political officer in the red army during the civil war. Was a prominent Party official in the 1920s and 30s. He was very friendly with Beria and Stalin and became a member of Stalin’s inner circle. Was made deputy prime minister and a member of the Politburo in 1946.

Nicolai Bulganin

Born 1895. Joined the Cheka (Lenin’s secret police) in 1918. Was active in the Moscow soviet in the 1930s, working closely with Khrushchev, and rose to become deputy prime minister in 1938. Helped organise the defence of Moscow during WW2 and became minister of defence in 1947. He was part of Stalin’s inner circle and joined the Politburo, then later became head of state.

Laverenti Beria

Born 1899, was Georgian. Wormed his way into Stain’s favour and became his agent in the Caucasus in the 1930s. Achieved great power when Stalin appointed him as head of the NKVD. Between 1941 and 1953, he was in charge of Soviet security, and was briefly minister of internal affairs after Stalin’s death. Beria even controlled Moscow Dynamo, Russia’s most famous football team.

The fall of Beria

Beria was a very powerful man. He was feared by everyone because of his powerful position and his brutality. He was the biggest threat to the other contenders and seemed the most likely to take over. However, Beria underestimated his rivals and had no power base within the Party. Khrushchev and the other leaders moved swiftly to oust Beria and took their opportunity when he was away in East Berlin. Khrushchev led colleagues in a plot, and Beria was arrested in 1953. The way was now clear for Khrushchev and Malenkov to fight for supremacy.

Khruschev vs. Malenkov

Malenkov and Khrushchev both had different policies and stregnths. Malenkov wanted power to be concentrated in the government and wanted the government to control the Presidium descisions. Whereas Khrushchev wanted the party to dominate the government. Both favoured economic reform, however Malenkov wanted more effort to be put ino light indusrty while Krushchev wanted to focus on heavy indusrty and defence sectors. Khruschev mobilised support within the party and proved himself to be stronger and more ambitious than Malenkov. In February 1955, Malenkov admitted to some mistakes in policy and resigned. Khrushchev was victorious.

The Power Struggle, 1953-1956

After emerging victorious in the power struggle following Stalin’s death, Khrushchev was in a very strong position, but not yet an unchallengeable leader. Khrushchev wanted to move away from the Stalinist era and was aware that there was a desire for change in the USSR. He had accepted some of the fundamentals of Stalinism, such as the dominance of the party, however he wanted to shift to blame for past errors onto Stalin. Khrushchev believed that economic reform was necessary and wanted to encourage initiative. He also wanted to avoid opposition and not give his rivals the opportunity to strike against him. Khrushchev was an ambitious politician, and aimed convince the Soviet people that they no longer had to fear arbitrary terror, while preserving the basic structure and ideology of a socialist state. This was the background to his speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956.

The Speech

Khrushchev’s secret speech lasted four hours and basically just denounced Stalin. He condemned Stalin’s policies during the great terror and his cult of personality, destroyed Stalin’s reputation as an infallible war leader, criticised Stalin’s behaviour and said that it went against the essence of Marxism-Leninism. Delegates strongly applauded parts of the speech, but were shocked at some of the content. Nothing like it had been heard before in Soviet history.

Highlights of the speech

• “It is foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god.”

• “Stalin originated the concept ‘enemy of the people’.”

• “We are absolutely certain that our Party will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new success, to new victories.”

Reactions to the ‘secret speech’

An edited version of the speech was sent out to local Party committees to be discussed by Party members. Although it wasn’t officially published in the USSR, it was read to several million Soviet citizens. Some welcomed the denunciation of Stalin, but felt that the blame should have been spread more widely. Others were angry at the denunciation of Stalin and by implication much of Soviet policy during the previous generation. The speech was also seen by some as an attack on those like Malenkov and Molotov who had been in Stalin’s inner circle. After the speech, Khrushchev succeeded in getting several new supporters added to the Politburo. By 1956, half of the Central Committee members of 1952 had been replaced. Khrushchev had also gained more support from intellectuals and those wanting more freedom in the arts.

Historiography

“Khrushchev had grasped the nettle. He also exhibited a characteristic recklessness. The road ahead would be rockier than he expected, for he overestimated ordinary people’s gullibility. In a sense the whole of later Soviet history may be seen as a reaction to his revelations.” J. Keep.

Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech

OVERALL IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS

ECONOMIC MOTIVES

- Despite economic growth since 1950’s, still major weaknesses in Soviet economy

- Consumer goods such as refrigerators in high supply but expensive and poor quality

- Military expenditure was draining the economy, much weaker than that of their main rival, USA (Khrushchev had publicly stated he wanted to catch up with West)

- Lagged behind more sophisticated capitalist economies which were less labour intensive and more productive

- Agriculture poor, lacked sufficient innovation and investment. Production low and inefficient, with few incentives for peasants. Weakest sector of economy

POLITICAL MOTIVES

- New regime wanted to rely on popular consent

- To gain this popular consent, people needed to see results of hard work e.g. more supplies in shops and better housing

- Communist ideology must mean something more than wishful thinking: socialism needed to deliver. Communists saw the Stalinist system as essential if country was to progress to communism

- This created a dilemma for Khrushchev, as he was unsure how to reform within Stalin’s planned economy

POSITIVE

- Foreign trade considerably increased (2/3 with European Communist states)

- Working conditions improved (shorter days, more holidays, longer maternity leave, better pensions, minimum wage decreed 1956) >>> better living standards

- 1956 education decree, increase in student numbers

- Improved medical care infant mortality significantly decreased 1950-1956

- 1957, Women banned from manual labour in mines

- Scientific and technical education prioritised, first satellite and man in space soviet space. Technology appeared superior to that of the west

NEGATIVE

- Living conditions still backwards compared with West, by 1964, only 5/1000 citizens owned a car

- 1963, USSR had to import grain from capitalist West to compensate shortages

- 15 million poor quality prefab flats built and still housing shortages

HISTORIOGRAPHY – INTERPRETATIONS OF ECONOMIC REFORM

Khrushchev "had kept peasant affairs at the centre of attention for an entire decade. No other Russian ruler had ever done this, or would do so" – JOHN KEEP

Agriculture "was insufficient to meet Russia's rural needs...by subsidising socialised agriculture the state was ensuring that it remained inefficient" – JOHN KEEP Industrial problems "were the consequence of the very nature of the highly Marxist ideology" although Khrushchev "sometimes made it worse by creating confusion" – PETER KENEZ

Khrushchev failed because "he pushed through his policies bureaucratically and often with little foresight or planning" and "he could not solve the essential problems: improving peasant morale and incentives, and giving them better equipment and investment resources with which to work" – DONALD FILTZER Impressive industrial growth "despite appalling inefficiencies and irrationalities" – PETER KENEZ

Khrushchev’s motives for industrial and agrarian reforms

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- To cope with industrial reforms, Khrushchev initially tried decentralisation. Existing ministries in Moscow abolished and replaced by 105 regional ministries. - Each region jealously guarded its own resources - Gosplan’s (state planning agency) functions were divided - 1963, some regional ministries were merged and there were new planning regions - Party split into industrial and agricultural wings but industrial sectors of party did not match geographic divisions of the ministries i.e. poorly organised - These changes caused opposition within the party, there was anger about decentralisation of power in particular>>> contributed to the anti party conspiracy

ANTI – PARTY CONSPIRACY

- Conspiracy led to Khrushchev implementing major changes within Party - October 1957, sacked Zhukov - 1958, further sackings (such as Bulganin), Khrushchev assumed position of ‘commander-in-chief of all soviet forces’ (same post as Stalin had done) - Disliked the idea of 'jobs for life' which created culture of privilege and complacency - Resultantly, in 1961, 22nd party congress Khrushchev passed rule whereby - depending on level of organisation- there must be substantial amount of new people elected, for example: - At Presidium level- 25% members must be new - At Republican level- 1/3 members must be new

CONCLUSION TO KHRUSHCHEV’S POLITICAL REFORM

>>>KHRUSHCHEV NEVER EXERTED UNCHALLENGED AUTHORITY AS STALIN HAD DONE<<<

>>>KHRUSHCHEV WAS RADICAL IN THAT HE DID NOT IMPRISON OR LIQUIDATE RIVALS; HE ONLY DEMOTED THEM TO MINOR POSITIONS AWAY FROM CENTRAL POWER<<<

HE WAS “Notoriously suspicious, indeed paranoid” – MARTIN MCAULEY

Khrushchev’s political reforms

What is De-Stalinisation?

Term coined in 70’s to describe Khrushchev attempt to eradicate Stalin, refers to either:

- Secret Speech, condemn S’s excesses - Moderate reforms embarked upon and concessions e.g. cultural freedoms

NOTE: no intention to destroy system, he believed in fundamental aspects of Stalinism, just wanted to stop repression that characterised Stalin’s regime, resulted to be contribution factor to his downfall.

Actions of De-Stalinisation... - Reform Communism, cultural reforms and the Thaw e.g. reduced censorship on literature e.g. one day in the life of Ivan Denisovich and radio more accessible - New civil liberties; couldn’t be convicted on own confessions (anti Stalinist method of torture) death penalty restricted and comrade courts introduced - Greater investment in light industry and agriculture e.g. Virgin Land Schemes - Stalin’s ‘stamp’ removed Stalingrad renamed Volgograd and statutes pulled down, reburied - Released political prisoners and rehabilitated Great Terror victims, showed liberal tendency and Leninist nature, not unchallenged totalitarian control of Stalin.

LIMITATIONS, STILL FUNDAMENTALLY STALINIST... Thaw wasn’t coherent policy, liberal reforms quickly modified - Only literature that served purpose to regime allowed e.g. Doctor Zhivago banned, yet those criticising Stalin accepted - Stalinist zeal in persecution of Jews continued, church discouraged - Dissident writers imprisoned and harassed despite no declaration of political prisoners - Party determined acceptable expression, standard arbitrary e.g. Khrushchev close abstract art exhibition - KGB active and popular surveillance persisted (Stalinist)

Comments on Destalinisation

McCauley: “if he had a fault it was his optimism which led to hasty reforms... his denunciation of Stalin weakened his position at home and abroad and destroyed forever the infallibility of soviet leadership”

John Keep Interpretation of Secret Speech that initiated programme: “[the speech] substituted old myths for new ones as a way of legitimising the Party’s continuing monopoly of power... Even so for all its faults the ‘secret’ speech was an act of considerable political courage. Khrushchev has grasped the nettle. He also exhibited a characteristic recklessness”

IMPACT - Destalinisation conveyed opportunity for satellite states to reform own political systems, was not Khrushchev’s intention, led to brutal treatment in Hungary Uprising to reinforce order =ineffective buffers - Caused deterioration of relation with China as they saw K weak - Weakened own position, growing criticism from dissidents; prevailed until fall, and call for social reconstruction (unintended) - Led to conservative opposition, angered they hindered reform - Discouraged successors to reform, led to overcautious conservatism

“Stalinism Remained BUT with a different figurehead and manifestations“

DeStalinisation – Impact within USSR and satellite states

ojiuye

• 1954 Virgin Land Scheme Initially successful as total grain harvest had almost doubled from 1953 – 1958, however from 1958 The VLS was a failure due to: unsuitable soil, hasty planning, inexperienced management and insufficient fertilisers to replenish the soil.

• 1959-65 Seven-Year Plan Were some impressive gains with gross output of steel coal and oil increasing by 60%-80%, however it didn’t meet Plan targets as well as this; - Resources got diverted to the wrong places, they even ended up stranded in railway sidings. - Managers were afraid to innovate with new methods, due to fear of disrupting production. - Was replaced by the 7th 5 Year Plan in 1961.

• Situation by 1964 Only 5 in 1,000 citizens owned a car, 82 in 1,000 owned a television and only 40 in 1,000 owned a refrigerator; were falling well behind the West.

“OFFICIAL” REASONS: Were his old age and health. REAL REASONS: Hare brained unsuccessful schemes, hasty conclusions, rash decisions and actions based on wishful thinking.

• De-Stalinisation • Economic Policy Failures • Foreign Policy Failures (Cold War)

JOHN KEEP: “Was insufficient to meet rural Russia’s needs… by subsiding socialised agriculture the state was ensuring it remained insufficient.” PETER KENEZ: “There was contradiction between the interests of the state and those of procedures and consumers.” JOHN LAVER: “Foreign policy failure provided the final straw for many colleagues.”

HISTORIO

GRAPHY

De-Stalinisation influenced Khrushchev’s attitudes and ideas, such as his political ones. As well as this he appeared anti Stalin in the way he had handled foreign country relationships, this made him highly unpopular. •De-Centralisation

Existing ministries in Moscow were abolished and replaced by 105 regional ministries corresponding to existing administrative regions. The party influenced these ministries – central planning principle remained.

• 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Arguably Most Significant! Khrushchev had looked undeniably weak; it was humiliating how he had given in to America (especially as Stalin would not have). K had lost face when he had removed his missiles publicly from Cuba. Whereas Kennedy was seen as though he fought down Communism; this essentially forced K to resign.

• 1960s Split with Communist China Mao Zedong didn’t agree with Khrushchev’s De-Stalinisation policy, he saw Khrushchev as weak and non-aggressive. International relations were one of Khrushchev’s pivotal downfalls.

Political Failures is also a reason; these were influenced and are addressed under De-Stalinisation and Foreign Policy Failures.

• May 1957: Presidium members; Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich plotted against Khrushchev as they were opposing his party influence.

• The fact his own party had detested him demonstrates how unpopular he was as a leader, especially as his reforms had not succeeded. His populist brusque style was disliked; his personality had also contributed to his downfall.

• Khrushchev even insulted his party members:

Khrushchev on Malenkov, “Your hands are covered with blood, Malenkov; your conscience isn’t clean; you’re a vile person” & Khrushchev described Bulganin as ending up “on a pile of manure”.

“Call it what you will, incentives are what get people to work

harder!”

Khrushchev’s ousting in 1964

The ‘grey’ leader A moderate man of the centre. He was expected to avoid both the excesses of Stalin and the unpredictability of Khrush. ‘Safe’ image- was he too safe?

The Politburo and Central Committee -B made few changes to administration at the lower levels to strengthen his position. Not as many as Khrush. who he criticised for ‘the unjustified transferring and replacing of personnel’.

-B promoted his supporters to the Politburo (1981: 8 protégés, 4 ‘Dnieper Mafia’) -1960-1978 average age of Politburo members rose from 58 to 68. -Met more frequently than before.

-1982 the average age of Central Committee (CC) members 63, and Council of Ministers 65. -CC increased in size dramatically (470 members 1981) -Only met 12 times 1970-1985 -Little influence!!

The Nomenklatura -Policy of maintaining STABILITY of personnel at most levels, ensuring that changes at the top weren’t accompanied by purges. (‘Stability of cadres’) -Long list or reliable personnel made up of 2-5 million people (less than 2% of population). -Promotions within the party were based on the individual’s ‘political maturity’ and reliability not to rock the boat. -Promotion usually depended on the candidate having a sponsor at the next level up in the party.

The Party -Privileges were reserved for party members who had reached a particular level: dachas, better medical facilities and access to special well-stocked shops. -Most full time party members were reassured by B’s conservative approach. -Despite the exception of people such as Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev who wanted some genuine reform. Younger party members also sympathised with this view- a more dynamic (rather than stagnant) approach to change. -Developments mirrored the lack of drive at the top. -Rate of growth of the party membership decreased. Under Khrushchev there had been sustained growth; under Brezhnev, due to stricter admission requirements and a lack of enthusiasm, growth in member ship fell from almost 7% 1965 to less than 2% 1973. -Ideological appeal losing its grip! -KGB reported an increase in corruption among party members. Peter Kenez: “Brezhnev encouraged corruption to a fabulous extent”. -John Keep described the party as ‘a refuge for nostalgics unable to accept the challenge facing all organisations in a changing world: adapt or perish’

Brezhnev -Brezhnev = stability. He lacked charisma but he did know how to build a solid base of support, and many of the people appointed in 1964 were still in post in 1982. -His leadership was never seriously under threat. 1970s it was reinforced by personality cult. Peter Kenez: “Brezhnev developed a modest personality cult”. -Partly rehabilitated Stalin’s reputation in 1966 and 1967: an era of considerable achievement with only ‘some unfortunate and temporary errors’. Yet simultaneously he gave people confidence that there would be no return to the excesses of the Stalin era.

Brezhnev’s political changes

d

On the up -Urban population grew. Soviet population in towns grew from 53% to 64% between 1964 and 1982. - Whilst 40% of Soviet citizens lived in communal apartments under

Krushchev, by 1985 the proportion had dropped to 15-18%. - Higher education became more common in adults resulting in more

specialist workers. - Min wage and real wage increase by 50%. - In 1967 the five day working week became the norm.

Developed Socialism: In1977, anniversary of Lenin’s revolution, Brezhnev sends out constitution declaring USSR to be “mature Socialist society” and guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, religion, the press etc. - Individual rights undermined however by “catch” that individual rights “must not injure the interests of society and state”

Women - Women still second class citizens. - despite better education they had less skilled jobs and earned less. - Gender defined professions: 99% of typists and nurses women, 74% of

schoolteachers women, 70% doctors women. Despite constituting 45% of workforce.

- laws protecting women from excessive manual labour were ignored. - Domestic differences, Women spent, on average, 15 more hours a week than men

doing chores.

On the contrary

- European russian population growth slows. In 1970 population growth of just 6.5%. Tajik population grows by 35.7%!

- Life expectancy fell as a result of serious alcoholism and pollution.

- 20% of soviet workforce too “hungover” to work on mondays

- Crisis of too many specialised workers. Blue collars ended up earning more then white collar workers in places as a result.

- Black market grew to a gigantic scale. 20% of GMP outside books.

- High divorce rates due to gender inequalities and alcoholism.

- Poor social mobility.

- Nomenklatura existed as a privileged, nepotistic, upper political class.

- “Brezhnev era encouraged corruption to a fabulous extent” P Kenez

- Anti-soviet movements grew amongst the ethnic minorities, notably amongst Russian Jews and Georgians.

Society under Brezhnev

Economic Stagnation and the cost of the arms race

Kosygin reforms 1965 -Kosygin tried to encourage: 1. innovation and responsibility by giving enterprise managers more incentives and independence. 2. to take account of costs and profits (rather than just throw resources at targets). -He asked managers to set sales targets, and he cut the number of plan indicators that managers had to follow. -Reforms failed due to restrictions of centrally planned economy: 1. clashes between managers who wanted to be innovative and bureaucrats who still had the responsibility of ensuring quantitative targets were met and wanted to stick with what they knew. 2. managers/ administrators scared to attempt innovation. 3. work bonuses were still linked to the fulfilment of targets based on quantity, not quality. 4. consumer demand was still low on list of priorities. 5. prices were decided centrally- bore no relation to what should have been relevant indicators (costs, profits, demand or need). E.g. the price of coal was set too low so that the coal industry worked at a loss. 6. enterprises which performed badly were rarely penalised. (‘we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us’) -Reforms were abandoned by 1970.

Agriculture -Peasants given internal passports reducing difference between urban and countryside lifestyle. -Farms given lower plan targets to meet. -Fewer restriction on how peasants could use their private plots. -End to experiments of K era. -There was increased investment in agriculture: 1976-80 it received over 26% of state investment compared with 20% 1961-65 (during the B era state investment in agriculture tripled).

Mixed results! -There was a rise in output- 1970s the USSR became the world’s largest wheat producer. -The returns in relation to investment input declined. -People were earning more = higher demand = food shortages. -Prices in the collective farm markets doubled. -Increasing gap between supply and demand for food (increased dependence on foreign imports).

Developed Socialism -1977 USSR was declared to be in ‘Developed Socialism’. Brezhnev declared that it was not yet possible “to launch the direct transition to communism”. He asserted there had been “the gradual obliteration of any essential distinction between town and country, between mental and physical labour, and adoption by all working people of the ideological and political positions of the working class”

Industrial reform = little -1972 accepted the concept of a 15-year programme with specific technical and scientific goals. -Gosplan to continue 5-year plans (e.g. 1971 9th 5-year plan, 1976 10th 5-year plan) Economic progress -1964 Oil + mineral resources discovered in Siberia. By 1983, 357million tons of oil had been extracted, 60% of Soviet oil production. -Both 10th&11th 5-year plans put a high priority on developing gas and coal reserves. 1974-1984, 30 billion roubles were spent on over 3000 kilometres of Baik-Amur (BAM) railway, and an expensive 3500-mile pipeline was built in Siberia to exploit the reserves. -Scientific progress confined to defence and space industries. Drain on resources!? Necessary!? -Civilian sectors which were developing in the capitalist world, were largely neglected (technology such as typewriters, personal computers were seen as threats to the State’s control over the spread of information) -There was no major restructuring of the economy. It stayed under the Stalinist model. No development= Stagnation!

Black Market -Peter Kenez: “the black market..... On the one hand violated the law, on the other hand fulfilled a necessary function; it smoother over the difficulties that the planned, highly centralized, rigid system created”

Brezhnev’s economic reforms

Brezhnev and dissidence

Problems facing USSR by 1980s

Economy – After years of declining growth the economy needed to be addressed. However, the proposal of anything other than a state-owned economy was met with outrage. Hence, economic restructuring needed to happen, but for the sake of political popularity, without radically changing anything. This presented a tricky problem. Additionally, there was huge expenditure on arms, which many felt a necessity due to relations with the US.

Political – Any change to the economy was likely to have an effect on the party, as they were so intertwined. Corruption was rife and both Andropov and Gorbachev felt like this was a problem that needed addressing. In regard to foreign policy, the USSR was struggling to maintain its superpower status. They were still involved in Afghanistan, which was a very unpopular war, and negotiations and détente with the USA were constantly being discussed.

Social – In any country there is dissent, the USSR was no exception. There were other relatively minor social issues to address, e.g. quality of consumer goods. More worryingly was the state of the republics, where there was potential trouble.

1985 - 1991

1984 - 1985

Son of a railway man he left school at age 16 to work on shipyards and serve in WWII. Then he served as ambassador to Hungary (1954-57), and later became the head of the KGB.

1982 - 1984

Chernenko was meant to be Brezhnev’s successor. However, Andropov was popular enough, and had the support of the KGB and the military, that he was elected General Secretary. It was a ‘bloodless coup’.

Born in a Siberian village, was a Chinese border guard and was in NKVD during the ‘Great Terror’. In 1948 he was in charge of propaganda for Moldavia. Soon became Brezhnev’s holiday and booze buddy.

Born in 1931 to a well off peasant family, he studied for a degree in law, and then agronomy. Andropov took a shine to Gorbachev and by 1980 he was in the politburo. He saw the corruption in judicial system.

-Removed Brezhnevites -20% regional part secretaries replaced -33% departmental heads replaced -Broke up monopolies -Rounded up absent employees (for every 100 working, 30 absent) -Bond with US -Shot Korean plane KAL 007, 269 dead -Anti-corruption

When Andropov died, there were enough Brezhnevites alive to demand Chernenko appointment of General Secretary, as opposed to the more dynamic Gorbachev. Gorbachev was comfortable to wait until ‘after’ Chernenko to be appointed Secretary.

Gorbachev had enough support to become General Secretary in 1984, but allowed Chernenko to go first. A member of the central committee commented: After one leader who was half-dead, another who was half-alive, and another who could hardly speak, the youthful, energetic Gorbachev was vey welcome

-Largely failed to address problems, just tried to cope with them -No mark on foreign policy -Continued to clash with conservatives -Too ill and in power too short a time

-Stopped anti-corruption, tight on censorship and hard-liner against dissent

-Irrigated Siberian land to increase amount of cultivated land

-Continued Andropov’s industrial programme

-Glasnost and Perestroika

-70% of party officials at district and city level replaced

-52% of Central Committee was new and well educated

-He wanted to make current system more efficient

-Chernenko was in hospital by the end of 1984

-Politburo had 10 members, split 50:50 old and young

-Chernenko was no reformer

-His reign was really a courtesy paid by Gorbachev and more youthful politicians

-Tried desperately to save the Soviet Union without too much radical change

-Last soviet leader

-Loved by the West and some intellectuals for Glasnost policy

-Hated by conservatives within party

Background Rise to Power Policies Impact

Leadership changes 1982-1985

Gorbachev's Reforms MOTIVES -

Economic: stagnation/punishing emphasis on heavy industry Political: creating identity of change to consolidate own position as general secretary (had been running it under Chernenko) by promoting supporters (Ligachev, Cherbinkov, Ryzhkov) to counter enemies in the politburo/address corruption and inefficiency (under Brezhnev)

PERESTROIKA - reconstructing economy to address stagnation

Stages: 1985-1987 = acceleration 1987-89 = radical reform from above 1989-1990 = attempted market based reform and reaction 1990-1991 = break up

Support: intellectuals/scientists

Opposition: established political elite (as they benefitted form privileges of system)/defence and heavy industry sectors (the 'military-industrial complex')

GLASNOST - openness and publicity/complete freedom of media (but still monitored marginally)

Motives: believed there would be no effective reform unless faults were admitted (this got off to bad start with Chernobyl disaster - international publicity as a result of liberal Glasnost)

Support: intellectuals

Opposition: conservatives (wanted control; majority for personal protection from scandal/fearful of western criticism)

ECONOMIC SITUATION - declining, stagnating because of sabotage, corruption and siphoning off of state supplies for personal gain

perestroika make things worse: theoretical/not planned/lack of coordination

Stupid decisions: e.g. Jan 1991 (PM) withdrew all high denomination bank notes and public lost savings

Faults: old central control mechanism were being dismantled yet new market was still restricted/ cannot combat stagnation without incentive (which contradicts communism)

POLITICAL SITUATION - developments began 1988 = new constitution guaranteed individual rights/legal changes to make the system independent of the party/ democratic congress of the peoples' deputies people elected by the people not party)

Criticism: 750/250000 of congress of peoples' deputies were reserved for specific organisations e.g. communist party had 100 seats minimum reserved = so limited democracy

Impacts: two political bodies (Congress and Supreme Soviet) and the relationship between them was not clarified they would oppose and antagonise each other e.g. forum for Yeltsin to oppose Gorbachev vocally/ impedingly long democratic process before anything is changed

DEATH OF COMMUNISM - new programme for party drafted in 1991

No formal commitment to the idea of a communist system

Old Bolshevik commitment to instigating global revolution was abandoned along with Marxism and Leninism

Very similar to western democratic idea

Gorbachev wanted to speed up the economy with a Command Economy (Communist) with Market Based Economy ideas (Capitalist) MAJOR CONTRADICTION.

Wanted to reduce the power of the party to interfere in the economy, this proved they were part of the problem. The results of this were disappointing, made things worse.

Politics affected the economy – Political changes undermined the role of the party. Republics took measures for their own survival as nationalist tensions grew; soviets striking etc.

Economic Plan October 1990. However this was still ambiguous as there was no clear distinction between whether it was a command economy or market based economy!

ECONOMY FAILED DUE TO BAD PLANNING, CONFUSION AND LACK OF COORDINATION, STUPID DECISIONS, UNHAPPY WORKERS, AND CORRUPTION.

OVERVIEW - Could a one party state with a one party rule allow different views? No not really. - Gorbachev’s ideas were not well thought out and resulted in a flawed democracy. - Made the USSR worse and contributed in a break up. Mehrannisa Sadiq.

WHAT HAD CHANGED Legal changes to make judges and the law system independent

from the party. A new constitution would guarantee individual rights. A new law making body – The Congress of People’s Deputies. Supreme Soviet would become a working parliament. Local soviets were to be made more accountable and more

professional.

WHAT STAYED THE SAME Wanted to maintain the leading role of the

party.

PROBLEMS CAUSED Contradictory, want party dominance but

then want to create a separation of powers. There could be no real separation of powers

with the party subordinated to the law.

GORBACHEV’S REFORMS

ECONOMY REFORMS PERESTROIKA

(RESTRUCTURING) PHASE 1: ACCELERATION

PHASE 2: RADICAL REFORM PHASE 3: POLITICS/ECONOMY PHASE 4: INDECISION, CRISIS

AND BREAK UP.

POLITICAL REFORMS

Gorbachev wanted to preserve; the party, local soviets

and economy. Gorbachev wanted to change;

democratisation, feeling of participating in

decision making.

• Satellite state

• Novemeber 1998.

• Mass demonstration - rise up against repression.

• Overnight the government and Deutschland Democratic Republic are gone. Gorbachev does nothing.

Effect?

Other states, both satellite and republic see the mass demonstration and begin to think the same ideology. The evidence that Gorbachev does nothing represents the idea that if you want something and protest for it, you get it.

• Late 1980s the Ukraine party split and Nationalist protests grew.

• Orthodox Ukrainian party lost membership.

• By 1991 it was declared its own sovereignty.

• April 1989.

• March in support of independence was attacked by troops.

• Sovereignty declared in November 1989.

• Call for independence supported by 99% of Georgians by 1991.

• May 1991 was the first free election of a Republic leader.

Impact?

First free election of Republic leader allowed other Republic states to recognise that it was not just the satellite states that could uproar and gain the independence they want.

• Velvet revolution.

• Posters spread about getting rid of Czech leader.

• November 1989—Police suppress peaceful student protests which sparked more protests.

• By November 20th the protest swelled from 200,000 to 500,000 protesters.

Impact?

Showed evidence of successful demonstrations that had fuelled off others, encouraging other states to do the same.

• Suffered most during WW2 with 1/4 of their population dying.

• Communists remained strong against opposition in 1990.

• No changes were made due to the protests calling for political changes.

Impact?

Showed that the Belorussia leader and Gorbachev were not the push overs that they seemed.

The Nationalities Issue

• 18th August 1991 Gorbachev is swamped by the KGB and placed under house arrest.

• Plotters declare a state of emergency renouncing Union Treaty and banning Glasnost newspapers.

• Yeltsin is called for resistance of the coup and announced president of Russia.

• Plotters accused of treason.

• Yeltsin overtook control of the army whilst the Soviet parliament met - decrees were cancelled.

• Gorbachev seemed to have some strength as he refused to give in.

• Yeltsin was seen as heroic and a natural leader.

• Resistance of ordinary people heightened as they began to fight for what they wanted.

• Although Gorbachev was seen as a strong leader for not giving into resistance and resigning Yeltsin was the main reason for his fall.

• Yeltsin’s strength and saviour of the USSR in a crisis due to the August Coup essentially led to Gorbachev’s overthrow as it was evident that Gorbachev was doing nothing successful for the USSR.

The August Coup and Gorbachev’s Fall

23rd August parliament held a televised session that showed Yeltsin criticising Gorbachev over allowing conservatives to remain in parliament after the August coup.

23rd August Yeltsin suspends operations of the Communist Party and a few days later the Supreme Soviet declares the same of the USSR.

24th August Gorbachev willingly resigns after seeing the damage he has effectively done and witnessing opposition against him as a leader.

29th August Supreme Soviet banned all activities by the Communist party.

Succession of Ukraine in December 1991 finally kills off any prospect of a loosely federated Soviet surviving.

The new states began forming their armies.

Impact?

Fall of Communism.

How?

August coup was the catalyst for the collapse but other factors such as Yeltsin, economic and political reforms and ‘the system’ helped in favour of the collapse.

The End of the USSR