some reflections on perceptual consciousness - sellars

7/31/2019 Some Reflections on Perceptual Consciousness - Sellars

1/15


2/15


3/15

betweenseeing of a physical object its facing surfaceandseeing that the facing surface of a physical object is (e.g.)

red.10. Schematically the distinction is between seeingobjects , thusseeing O (where O is a physical object)orseeing O' (where O' is a perceptible constituent of O)and what is often called 'propositional seeing', thusseeing that O (or O') is 11. These distinctions are reflected in traditional accountsof the mental activity involved in visual perception. I shalllimit my remarks to those accounts which speak of perceptual takings , where takings are construed asoccurrent beliefs (in the sense of believ ings ) which (givenones perceptual set) we are caused to have in visualperceptual situations. In standard conditions the objectsseen are in a legitimate sense (by no means easy toanalyze) the external causes of takings.

12. Occurrent believings are construed as mental acts, theappropriate expression of which is the tokening of asentence. Where the sentence is a subject-predicatesentence, we can speak of the subject and the predicateof the corresponding believing. It is commonly held thatperceptual takings have subject-predicate form and thatthe subject constituent is appropriately expressed by ademonstrative. This constituent is itself construed as ademonstrative, not because acts of belief are linguistic,but because they are sufficiently analogous in essentialstructure and function to the sentence tokens whichexpress them in candid speech, for it to be appropriate tomake an analogical use of semantical terminology indescribing them.

13. It is often noted that we express at least some of ourperceptual experiences by using sentences, the


4/15

grammatical subject of which is a complex demonstrativephrase, thusThis red brick is larger than that oneThis sentence is obviously related to the compoundsentenceThis is a brick and it is red and it is larger than that oneThose who carefully distinguish between thought and itsverbal expression can be tempted to construe the thoughtwhich the first of these sentences expresses in terms of the structure of the second sentence.14. If this move is made, the result is to construe thesubject of the perceptual taking as a bare 'this,' allcharacterizing being put in an explicitly predicativeposition; thus, to return to our original example, This is ared brick facing me edgewise.

15. The referent of 'this' in perceptual contexts isconstrued as the object seen. Thus, if the referent is acertain black bush, the perceiver is said to see the bush. If his taking has the formThis is a bearthen he is said to take what is in point of fact a bush to be

a bear. In our example, which I shall suppose to be a caseof veridical perception, the perceiver sees a certain redbrick facing him edgewise and sees that it is a red brick facing him edgewise, by virtue of the occurrence of aperceptual believing or taking of the formThis is a red brick facing me edgewise.16. But this division of visual takings into a subject whichis a pure demonstrative and predicative constituent in anexplicitly predicative position simply won't do as it stands.

To appreciate this, however, we must back up a little.17. Thus it is not clear, to begin with, that all perceptualtakings are to be construed on the model of sentenceswith demonstrative subjects, though they may (and,perhaps;, must) contain a demonstrative component.Thus, on certain occasions one can correctly be said to see


5/15

that an airplane is flying high overhead without seeing theairplane. Perhaps in such cases the taking has the formThere is an airplane flying way up thereOn the other hand, a distinction between the situation wesee, and what we see of the situation may convince us of the primacy, in some sense, of the demonstrative analysis.What we see of the situation might be, for example, avapor trail which grows at one end and fades at the other.The vapor trail is an object, and it seems natural togeneralize the example and conclude that visualperception always in some sense includes the perceptionof an object, 2 and a taking of the form, to use the aboveexample,

This is a vapor trail18. Leaving this issue aside for the moment, it must alsobe noted that even within the demonstrative mode1 adistinction must be drawn between what we see, andwhat we see it as . The point is a familiar and importantone, and part of its importance lies in the fact that thefact that the pure demonstrative model is incapable of handling it.

19. On the other hand, the complex demonstrative phrasemodel shows promise. Thus it is not implausible tosuggest that one who sees a bush as a bear has aperceptual belief or taking of which the subjectconstituent is the complex demonstrativeThis large black bear ...

20. If the believing of which the demonstrative phrase isthe subject can be said to be a perceptual believing,perhaps

This large black bear is moving toward methen we might distinguish betweentakings that andtakings as and suggest that what one sees an object as is what


6/15

belongs in the demonstrative phrase along with 'this.'21. Indeed, one might go further and say that, properlyspeaking, takings simply are the complex demonstrativeconstituents of perceptual beliefs and that the explicitly

predicative constituent of the belief is not part of what istaken , but simply what is believed about what is taken.

22. The model for taking, then, would be presupposition insomething like Strawson's sense. The concept of occurrentbelief could be extended to cover this sense of taking, bydistinguishing between believing that and believing in . Aperceptual believing in would be illustrated by the subjectconstituent of the believing expressed byThis red brick facing me edgewise is too large to fit thatgap.

23. The complex demonstrative constituent could beconstrued as a presupposing that the referent of 'this' is ared brick facing one edgewise, and argued that by virtueof this presupposing the referent of 'this' is perceptuallytaken by the perceiver as a red brick facing him himself edgewise.

24. Suppose that the referent of 'this' is a brick shapedpiece of red modeling clay. Is the occurrence of the takingsufficient to warrant us in saying that the perceiver(Jones) sees a red brick shaped piece of red modeling clayfacing him edgewise as a red brick facing him edgewise?

25. Clearly part of the problem is to give a clear account of the sense in which the 'this' of This red brick facing me edgewise ....can be construed as having a reference which isindependent of the predicates which accompany it in thecomplex demonstrative phrase, so that it makes sense tosay that 'this' refers to something which is not a red brick.The proper move to make here seems to be the move fromthe phrase to what it presupposes, put in explicitlypropositional form, e.g.,This is a red brick,


7/15

and determine the referent of 'this' in the latter context.One must be careful to do this, however, withoutconstruing the perceptual believing expressed byThis red brick facing me edgewise is too large

as identical with the perceptual believing expressed byThis is a red brick and it faces me edgewise and is toolarge.These considerations will loom larger at a later stage of the argument.26. If we leave them aside, the question raised above (inparagraph 24) can be put more accurately as follows:Should we say that Jonas' seeing a certain object as a redbrick facing him edgewise consists in his believing in a redbrick facing him edgewise, where this believing in is visualin the sense that his having this belief is, given his mentalset, brought about by the action of that object on hisvisual apparatus?III27. Before tackling this question we must refine ourdistinction between the object seen and what we see of the object. For what we see of an object includes not justthe dependent particulars we call 'parts' or 'constituents'

(e.g. the surface of the brick). It also, as was suggested atthe time, includes certain qualities or attributes andrelations. That it includes them will be clear enough,though just how it includes them will be highlyproblematic.

28. Consider, for example, my favorite object, this pink icecube. Its consisting of ice is largely a matter of its causalproperties. It cools tea and is melted by fire.

29. We see the pink ice cube and, supposing theconditions of perception to be normal, we see that thetransparent pink cube is made of ice. We even see thepink ice cube as a cube of pink ice. But do we see of thepink ice cube the causal properties involved in its beingmade of ice?


8/15

30. Of course in seeing it as a pink ice cube we are seeingit as having the causal properties characteristic of ice. Butdo we see of the object these causal properties? Thequestion is, to be sure, an awkward one. But if we

consider certain other questions of a similar form, theanswer seems to be no .

31. Thus, by contrast, we not only see that the ice cube ispink, and see it as pink, we see the very pinkness of theobject; also its very shape -- though from a certain pointof view.

32. Even more interesting is the fact that in seeing thecube as a cube of ice we are seeing it as cool. But do wesee of the cube its coolness? Here we are torn in a familiarmanner. On the one hand we want to say that thepinkness and coolth are 'phenomenologically speaking' ona par, and are tempted to say that the idea that we don'tsee its coolness is a matter not of phenomenology, but of scientific theory. On the other hand, when asked pointblank whether we see its coolness, we find an affirmativeanswer intuitively implausible and are tempted to fallback on the idea that its coolness is believed in , i.e. that itis taken as cool.

33. Obviously we want to say that the ice cube's verycoolness is not merely believed in, even though its verycoolness is not seen. It clearly won't do to say that we feelor imagine a coolness on seeing the cube; what is inquestion is its coolness.

34. But though this topic is of great intrinsic importance,it must be postponed to another occasion, although Ibelieve that the framework I am about to develop --

enriched with an account of synaesthesia -- provides thekey to the answer.IV35. Sufficient to the occasion is an analysis of the sense inwhich we see of the pink ice cube its very pinkness. Here,I believe, sheer phenomenology or conceptual analysis


9/15

takes us part of the way, but finally lets us down. How fardoes it take us? Only to the point of assuring us thatsomething, somehow a cube of pink in physical space ispresent in the perception other than as merely believed

in.36. In traditional terminology, the somehow presence of acube of pink does not consist in its intensional in-existence as the content of a conceptual act. Nor is itscharacter as a cube of pink in physical space facing meedgewise a matter of its actually being a cube of pink inphysical space. It is somehow a cube of pink in physicalspace facing me edgewise without actually being a cube of pink in physical space facing me edgewise, yet without

merely being the content of a belief in a cube of pink inphysical space facing me edgewise.

37. Seeing of the cube its very pinkness and its cubicity(from a point of view) would be analyzed in terms of thissomehow, other than merely believed in presence of acube of pink in physical space facing one edgewise in thevisual experience.

38. I say 'visual experience' because it is time to take into

account, at least provisionally, the fact that we can seemto see a cube of pink ice from a point of view in physicalspace when there is, in point of fact, no cube of pink ice inthe neighborhood.

39. We can use the phrase ' ostensible seeing of a cube of pink ice facing one edgewise as a cube of pink ice facingone edgewise' to refer to a visual experience which wouldbe a case of seeing a cube of pink ice facing one edgewiseas a cube of pink ice facing one edgewise, if there was

such a cube of pink ice and it was (in a sense requiringanalysis) causally responsible for the ostensible seeing.

40. Thus the somehow , other than as believed in,presence of a cube of pink ice facing one edgewise wouldbe common to what can provisionally be called veridicaland non-veridical ostensible seeings of a cube of pink ice


10/15

facing one edgewise.

4l. Now the obvious move is to introduce visual sensationsas proto-theoretical states of perceivers to explain theseresults of phenomenological or conceptual analysis. Thusthe fact that we see (veridical perception) from a point of view or merely ostensibly see (unveridical perception)from a point of view, the very pinkness and cubicity of acube of pink ice would be explained by postulating theoccurrence in the perceivers of a sensation of a cube of pink facing one edgewise. The fact that we don't see itsvery character of being made of ice would be explained bythe exclusion of the proto-theory of the expression'sensation of a cube of ice'.

42. It is by the introduction of visual sensations that wetranscend phenomenology or conceptual analysis. Theyare not yielded by phenomenological reduction, butpostulated by a proto-(scientific)- theory.

43. A sensation of a cube of pink facing one edgewise is asensation of a certain kind , the kind normally broughtabout by the action on the visual apparatus of theperceiver by transparent physical cubes of pink (e.g. pink

ice) which face the perceiver edgewise from a certaindistance.

44. Visual sensations, which are states of the perceiver,are not (for example) literally cubes of pink facing theperceiver edgewise. On the other hand it is not simply false that they are cubes of pink facing the perceiveredgewise. It is tempting to appeal to the tradition of analogy and say that the pinkness and cubicity of asensation which belongs to the 'of a cube of pink' kind are

analogous to the pinkness and cubicity of its standardcause.

45. But analogies are useful only if they can be cashed orspelled out. One way of doing this is by saying -- as I havesaid on a number of occasions --According to this version of the adverbial theory of


11/15

sensing, then, sensing a-pink-cube-ly is sensing in a waywhich is normally brought about by the physical presenceto the senses of a pink and cubical object, but which canalso be brought about in abnormal circumstances by

objects that are neither pink nor cubical, and, finally,according to this form of the adverbial theory, themanners of sensing are analogous to the common andproper sensibles in that they have a common conceptualstructure. Thus, the color manners of sensing form afamily of incompatibles, where the incompatibilitiesinvolved are to be understood in terms of theincompatibilities involved in the family or ordinaryphysical color attributes. And, correspondingly, the shapemanners of sensing would exhibit, as do physical shapes,the abstract structure of a pure geometrical system. 3

46. I have come to see, however, that we must be able soto formulate the analogy between manners of sensing andperceptual attributes of physical objects, that it is madeevident that the analogy preserves in a strict sense theconceptual content of predicates pertaining to theperceptible attributes of physical objects, whiletransposing this content into the radically differentcategorial framework to which manners of sensingsbelong. Just what more (if anything) this would involvethan spelling out in greater detail the analogies referredto above, and (perhaps) adding additional dimensions of analogy, I am not able to say. I believe, however, theproblem is an important one, and that an adequateanswer is necessary to explain the sense in which colorconcepts preserve their content throughout theirmigration from the manifest image to the scientific image.

47. In particular, the idea that there is a sense in whichconceptual content can be preserved through a change of category seems to me necessary to give meaning to theidea that the very pinkness and cubicity of pink ice cubescan be somehow present in ostensible seeings of pink icecubes as pink ice cubes.V


12/15

48. It is an essential feature of the sensings postulated bythe proto-theory I have been describing that they are notsensing as . To sense (a cube of pink)ly is not to sensesomething as a cube of pink, though it is a state

postulated by a theory designed to explain what it is tosee (or seem to see) a cube of pink as a cube of pink.Thus, sensing, though it is a constituent of seeingsomething as something, is not itself a case of seeingsomething as something.

49. I have distinguished two constituents of an ostensibleseeing of a cube of pink ice as a cube of pink ice, 4

1. the taking or believing in , construed on the model of the complex demonstrative phrase

This cube of pink ice

2. the sensing (a cube of pink)ly.The crucial question concerns how these constituents arerelated, the kind of togetherness they have.50. It might be thought that the relation is merely a causalone, i.e. that given a certain perceptual set, the sensing isthe immediate cause of the taking. If the perceptual set

includes the belief that the room is illuminated by pink light, the perceiver might have a perceptual belief in acolorless ice cube. In this case he would beconceptualizing a cube of colorless ice, though sensing (acube of pink)ly.

51. Would we say that he is seeing a cube of pink ice as acube of colorless ice? In any event, he would not be seeingits colorlessness. A necessary condition of seeing itscolorlessness is to sense (a cube without color)ly.

52. That the relation between the sensing and the takingis at least in part that of the former (given a certainperceptual set) the immediate cause of the latter, is, Ibelieve, clear. Might not the relation be even moreintimate?


13/15

53. To appreciate this possibility, let us ask: What, in acase of veridical perception, is the referent of thedemonstrative phraseThis cube of pink ice ...

The obvious answer would seem to be a certain cube of pink ice.54. Suppose that what is in fact there is a cube of colorless ice. Would we say that the reference has failed,i.e. that the demonstrative phrase has no referent?Perhaps we would be willing to say that it does have areferent, namely, the cube of colorless ice, but that theperceiver is taking it to be a cube of pink ice. Would wealso say that he sees the referent as a cube of pink ice?We can not say that he sees its very pinkness, but we cansay that he ostensibly sees (or seems to see) its verypinkness. A similar move can be made if we suppose thatwhat confronts the perceiver is a cube of glass.

55. But suppose that there is nothing there, i.e. that theperceiver is hallucinating. Would we say that thereference has failed, i.e. that the demonstrative phrasehas no referent? Many philosophers would say that theanswer is obviously yes. They would argue the previousmove to save reference is no longer available for there isnothing over there in physical space of which it can besaid that the perceiver takes it to be a cube of pink ice.The latter is, indeed, the case ex hypothesi . But is it theend of the matter?

56. What of the possibility that when all of thepresuppositions packed into the complex (Mentalese)demonstrative phrase

This cube of pink ice facing me edgewise ...have been put into explicitly propositional form, it makessense to preserve the reference of 'this' by construing thereferent as the sensation of a cube of pink facing oneedgewise?57. This suggestion faces a high hurdle, however, in the


14/15

fact that if we construe the process of making thepresuppositions embedded in the (Mentalese)demonstrative phrase explicit on the model of moving inthe direction of minimal perceptual takings, e.g.

This dangerous black bear standing on its hind legs ....This dangerous black bear ....This black bear ....This black object ....

.

.

.the minimal takings belonging to such series seem to

concern items in physical space, thus, as in our example,This cube of pink (over there) facing me edgewise.The latter seems to require that the referent of 'this' mustbe the sort of thing which could be over there facing meedgewise. And it is surely a categorial feature of sensations that they are not over there facing me.58. Nevertheless the possibility remains that whereas onecan properly deny that the perceiver is seeing anythingover there in space facing him edgewise, let alone a cube

of pink ice, it would be incorrect to deny that he seesanything. After all, the perceiver is not imaginingsomething, which is what the denial that he is seeinganything would normally imply.

59. Indeed, if we take seriously the idea that the thinningout of perceptual commitment which is implied byphenomenological reduction ends not withThis cube of pink over there facing me edgewise ....

but rather withThis somehow (a cube of pink over there facing meedgewise) ...then the way would be open to save the reference byconstruing it to be the sensation, for the sensation isindeed that in the experience which is somehow a cube of pink over there facing one edgewise.


15/15

60. Notice that this move does not require the perceiver toconceptualize his sensation as a sensation.

61. Notice also that 'somehow' admits as a special case'straightforwardly.' Thus while the referent of the mostcautious perceptual taking can be construed as asensation, we need not conclude that the referent of allperceptual takings is a sensation. For while it could beargued that the ultimate referent is always a sensation, byconstruing our original complex demonstrative phrasealong the lines of phenomenological reduction asThis somehow (a cube of pink facing me edgewise) whichis a cube of pink ice facing me edgewise ....the initial stages of reference saving can proceed withoutinterpreting the referent as a sensation.Wilfrid Sellars

Pittsburgh, October 15, 1975 Notes

1 Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science , Vol. I, edited by Herbert Feigl and MichaelScriven, pp. 253-330; reprinted as Chapter 5 of Science, Perception and Reality , London, 1965.

2 Of course the object need not be a physical object in the narrow sense in which the red brick is anexample. It might be a flash of lightning.

3 "The Structure of Knowledge: Perception", the first of a series three Matchette Lectures for 1971at the University of Texas, published in Action, Knowledge and Reality , edited by Hector-NeriCastaneda, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1975, p. 313.

4 For purpose of, simplification, I omit the perspectival element.

some reflections on perceptual consciousness - sellars

Documents