***1NC’s***

1NCJackson Vanik will pass – bipartisan support of congress and interest groups gives momentumAgence France Presse, 6/12 [“US senators introduce bill to end trade curbs on Russia”, Lexis, BJM]

A bipartisan group of US senators introduced legislation Tuesday that would scrap a decades-old law imposing trade restrictions on Moscow, saying it's necessary as Russia joins the WTO. Washington's former Cold War adversary has been given the green light to join the World Trade Organization, which means the Russian and US governments will need to grant each other permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) by the time the accession is complete. Washington would need to lift a 1974 law, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, under which normal trade relations are granted to Russia only on an annual basis. "This is an opportunity to double our exports to Russia and create thousands of jobs across every sector of the US economy, all at no cost to the US whatsoever," said Democrat Max Baucus, who chairs the Senate Finance Committee. "Jackson-Vanik served its purpose during the Cold War, but it's a relic of another era that now stands in the way of our farmers, ranchers and businesses pursuing opportunities to grow and create jobs," he added. Republican co-sponsor John Thune noted that presidents from both parties have been granting Russia normal trade status annually since 1992. "It is time to establish this treatment on a permanent basis so that American farmers, manufacturers, investors, and service providers will have the ability to take full advantage of the new business opportunities resulting from Russia's entry into the WTO" later this summer, he said. US business groups support the lifting of Jackson-Vanik, as Russian WTO membership will allow US companies to take advantage of additional market access, greater intellectual property enforcement and lower Russian agriculture subsidies. "Passing this bill will ensure that US businesses, ranchers, farmers and workers will not be at a disadvantage in the Russian market compared to their global competitors," US Trade Representative Ron Kirk said in a statement welcoming the legislation. US exports to Russia total about $9 billion per year, with some studies showing that the figure could double within five years after Russia earns PNTR status. Also backing the legislation were Senator John McCain as well as John Kerry, who called on Congress to pass the new bill so that the United States is not left on the sidelines while other nations benefit from favorable treatment in the Russian market. "We cannot afford to dither, delay, and deny ourselves the job creation and major export opportunities that come from passing PNTR," Kerry said.USSR.

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Political capital is key- Failure collapses US-Russian relationsMiller 2011 (Jacqueline Miller, senior associate at the EastWest Institute, April 7, 2011, “The WTO and the Reset,” EastWest Institute, http://www.ewi.info/wto-and-reset)

It took Barack Obama several months and some tough lobbying to finally win congressional approval for the New START treaty last December, which was seen as the key to the administration’s reset with Russia. Another fight could already be brewing over Obama’s support for Russia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, which is the next big goal of the administration’s Russia policy. Citing Russian human rights abuses and lack of democratic development, congressional critics want to keep Russia subject to the Jackson-Vanik amendment—a Cold War relic that, if left in place, would effectively nullify both Russian and U.S. gains from Russian WTO membership. But, somewhat surprisingly, the administration could develop a win-win outcome by taking a page from its dealings with China, another country whose human rights practices stir congressional unease. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act denies permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to non-market economies that restrict emigration. The amendment was passed unanimously by both houses of Congress to pressure the Russian Union to allow Russian Jews to emigrate. In 1994, the Clinton administration found Russia to be in full compliance with the amendment’s freedom-of-emigration requirements. And in 2002, the United States officially began describing Russia as a market economy. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and now Obama all declared their intention to work with Congress to repeal the legislation as it applies to Russia, but no action has been taken. The reason: Congress still sees Jackson-Vanik as a lever to punish Russia for its human rights record even when the executive branch is prioritizing the security aspects of the bilateral relationship. Jackson-Vanik’s ongoing application has been a major symbolic irritant in the relationship, even though the United States has granted Russia a waiver every year since 1992. But once Russia joins the WTO, which could happen next year, Jackson-Vanik will go from being a symbol of mistrust to inflicting actual

harm both to Russia and the U.S.-Russia relationship. Jackson-Vanik is inconsistent with WTO requirements on unconditional application of most-favored nation status. If Russia enters the WTO and is still subject to Jackson-Vanik, the United States will have to invoke the non-application principle, by which a member can opt out of its obligations to a newly acceded member. The United States has invoked non-application before—and is the only WTO member to have done so. Non-application, however, is reciprocal. U.S. businesses would face market barriers in Russia that other companies would not be subject to. Congressional refusal to pass legislation to permanently graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik would then hurt the U.S. economy. With U.S. support and some of the hardest negotiations behind it, Russia is, according to some observers, 95 percent of the way to WTO membership, after first applying nearly 18 years ago. By comparison, China’s accession process took 15 years; the average is five to seven years. And although there are still economic and political barriers to Russian accession—Georgia has a significant role as a possible spoiler of Russian WTO ambitions—the United States is actively working to support Russia’s bid. As Vice President Joe Biden puts it, membership would produce “stronger ties of trade and commerce that match the security cooperation we have achieved.”

Russian relations are key to solve every impact-alternative is crisis escalation and war

Commission on US Policy Toward Russia 2009 (US Senate, “THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA,” March)

Securing America’s vital national interests in the complex, interconnected, and interdependent world of the twenty-first century requires deep and meaningful cooperation with other governments. The challenges—stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, defeating terrorist networks, rebuilding the global economy, and ensuring energy security for the United States and others—are enormous. And few nations could make more of a difference to our success than Russia, with its vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, its strategic location spanning Europe and Asia, its considerable energy resources, and its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Rapid and effective action to strengthen U.S.-Russian relations is critically important to advancing U.S. national interests An American commitment to improving U.S.-Russian relations is neither a reward to be offered for good international behavior by Moscow nor an endorsement of the Russian government’s domestic conduct. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the importance of Russian cooperation in achieving essential American goals, whether preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, dismantling al- Qaeda and stabilizing Afghanistan, or guaranteeing security and prosperity in Europe. Success in creating a new and cooperative relationship with Russia can contribute to each of these objectives and many others. Failure could impose significant costs .

1NC – Russian Econ Modernization ImpactRepeal key to Russia economic modernizationICTSD 3-21, US Lawmakers Begin Debate on Russia Trade Restrictions, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Volume 16 • Number 11 • 21st March 2012, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/128997/, BJM

“[Jackson-Vanik] limits Russia’s competitiveness in international markets for higher value-added products, leaving Russia trapped in its current petro-state model of development and preventing it from transforming into a modern, diversified and more hi-tech economy,” the letter added.

Failure to modernize and diversify causes Russian economic collapseICD 10 – Institute of Contemporary Development, 2010, “Information Technology and Russia's Future,” online: http://www.riocenter.ru/en/_priorities/competitive_economy

Russia’s extremely strong economic growth is one of the country’s recent major accomplishments. Undoubtedly, the natural resources sector has played a significant role in this achievement. However, economic growth based solely on the natural resources sector is neither sufficient nor sustainable. We are entering the era of the global information society, where knowledge is the core resource and mechanism of accelerated development. Russia’s continued economic growth will depend on the successful development of the innovative industries of the nation’s economy, particularly innovative infrastructure. The advanced development of high-tech industries, including the Information and Communication Technology Sector (ICT), is also a key condition for a strong and growing economy. In most developed countries, ICT represents 8-12% of a country’s GDP and is one of the leading sectors in terms of capitalization of the global economy. This sector’s role will only strengthen with time. Alongside oil & gas, Russia’s ICT is one of the two drivers of economic development. Since 2000, this sector has developed four times faster than the average performance of the Russian economy. ICT has demonstrated rapid, steady and stable growth in all of its segments. The implementation of a number of key national projects and other large-scale government programs will also encourage the development of innovative industries.

Russian econ instability causes political instability and nuclear war.Filger 9 – Sheldon Filger, columnist and founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, May 10, 2009, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world . During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

Will pass – legislative introduction gives momentum***Uniqueness Debate***

Sacramento Bee, 6/12 [“USRBC Applauds Introduction of Russia PNTR Legislation in the U.S. Senate”, http://www.sacbee.com/2012/06/12/4556176/usrbc-applauds-introduction-of.html, BJM]

The U.S.-Russia Business Council (USRBC), the U.S.-based trade association leading the organized U.S. business community campaign for Russia's removal from the Jackson-Vanik amendment and enactment of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with Russia, applauded today's introduction of legislation by Senators Max Baucus (D-MT), John Thune (R-SD), John Kerry (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ) on Russia's graduation from the 1970s-era Jackson-Vanik law and approval of Russia PNTR. "We are pleased to see this action by a bipartisan group of Senators. This will help ensure that U.S. businesses benefit fully from Russia's pending WTO accession," said Klaus Kleinfeld, USRBC Chairman and Chairman and CEO of Alcoa, Inc. "The timely introduction of this legislation is an important first step towards ensuring that U.S. businesses can stay competitive in the Russian market." "The USRBC and the Coalition for U.S.-Russia Trade, for which USRBC serves as the Secretariat, urges the Obama Administration and Congressional leadership to enable passage of Russia PNTR by the August recess," said USRBC President and CEO Edward Verona. "We are committed to working constructively with all stakeholders towards successful passage of this legislation."

Bipartisan legislative push spurs quick passagePalmer 6/12 [Doug, “Senators pair Russia trade, human rights bills”, Reuters, http://news.yahoo.com/key-senators-push-russia-trade-human-rights-bills-150912361.html, BJM]

Senior U.S. senators on Tuesday unveiled a bill to expand trade with Russia by removing it from a Cold War-era law that links trade with human rights, a move questioned by legislators worried about the country's support for the Syrian government. The four senators said they would push for a separate bill to address Russian human rights abuses. The bipartisan move begins what the U.S. business community hopes will be a quick sprint to win congressional approval of the legislation before Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, which is expected by late August.

Experts agree passage is optimisticPalmer 6/12 [Doug, “Senators pair Russia trade, human rights bills”, Reuters, http://news.yahoo.com/key-senators-push-russia-trade-human-rights-bills-150912361.html, BJM]

However, Romney is expected to be pressed on the issue on Wednesday when he meets with the Business Roundtable, a group of corporate executives that has been aggressively lobbying Congress for approval of the bill. The group's president, John Engler, told reporters he was "pretty optimistic" Congress would come together to pass PNTR because members increasingly realized that U.S. companies will be hurt if the bill is not approved. "We're really seeing very little pushback," Engler said, shortly before the Republican senators released their letter. Bill Lane, head of Caterpillar's Washington office, said he believed both the House and Senate could pass PNTR in "a late July vote."

Public support spurs congressional passageStates News Service, 6/12 [“BROAD SUPPORT FOR EXPANDING TRADE WITH RUSSIA, Lexis, BJM]

A new public opinion survey today released as Business Roundtable kicked off a "50 Days for Trade" campaign showed broad public support for expanding trade with Russia. BRT President John Engler cited the survey of 1,000 registered voters conducted May 26-27 by The Winston Group during a 55-minute briefing with trade reporters. The issue that prompts BRT's campaign, Congressional approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations for Russia, is probably not high in the public's consciousness, but the responses still show an appreciation for the benefits of trade with Russia. To wit: A majority of registered voters supports the idea of a greater trade relationship with Russia (57 percent approve 26 percent oppose), with support increasing even further with awareness of the potential economic benefits of a greater relationship. Sixty-four percent favor a greater trade relationship with Russia, knowing that Russia will join the WTO this summer, while only 23 percent oppose. Seventy percent said they favor Congressional action to allow U.S. businesses to sell more to Russia, given that Russia is the worlds ninth largest economy yet our two countries lack a significant trade relationship, and only 21 percent oppose. The results seem a little counterintuitive. Trade (trade agreements) took a political beating in the 2008 and 2010 elections, and the Russian government is making it difficult to talk about closer ties of any kind. But the case for Russia PNTR is one about benefits to the United States, U.S. companies and employees. Russia will accede to the World Trade Organization this summer, further opening a country of 140 million people and the ninth-largest economy in the world to WTO-member countries... Except for the United States if Congress does not act on PNTR. Inaction would leave the 1974 Jackson-Vanick amendment in place, the law that used trade to pressure Russia to allow Jewish emigration. WTO rules requiring its members to treat each other equally would then preclude the U.S. companies from taking advantage of such things as lower tariffs. BRT's new website, www.brt.org/russia, provides a wealth of materials that make the powerful economic case for Congressional approval of PNTR for Russia. Every state stands to benefit, as our state data sheets document. There's a "Take Action" page that allows the public to contact members of Congress. The need for action is pressing. BRT's campaign urges Congress to enact PNTR by August to allow the United States to move quickly once Russia accedes to the WTO. As BRT President John Engler told reporters:

A2: No VoteDebates are beginning – Obama’s capital needed to round up the votesNeedham, 4/26Vikki, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1005-trade/224021-house-panel-aims-for-june-hearing-on-russia-trade-, BJM

The House Ways and Means Committee is aiming to hold a hearing in June on granting permanent normal trade relations to Russia. Panel Chairman Dave Camp (R-Mich.), who announced the meeting, urged the White House on Thursday to focus its efforts on convincing skeptical lawmakers that a long-standing and outdated Jackson-Vanik should be repealed and normal trade relations granted to Russia as the nation votes to join the World Trade Organization this summer. "While I share the view of many Members that Russia poses significant problems on foreign policy and human rights issues, holding up PNTR because of non-trade concerns does not increase our leverage to address them," Camp said Thursday during a speech at the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). "I call on the administration to intensify its efforts with regard to Russia and make its best case for why Congress should act this year on PNTR," he said. "It is time for the White House to get out front on this issue."

Top of Agenda/Obama PushingObama intensifying his push – key priorityWingfield, 4/26Brian, Bloomberg, Newsweek, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-26/obama-should-move-quickly-on-trade-status-for-russia-camp-says, BJM

The Obama administration should intensify its push to grant Russia p ermanent n ormal t rade r elations, which would benefit

U.S. companies, the Republican chairman of a House committee that oversees trade issues said. “It’s time for the White House to get out front on this issue,” Representative Dave Camp of Michigan, head of the House Ways and Means Committee, said today in a Washington speech. The U.S. would gain a powerful new enforcement tool by giving Russia improved status, Camp said, as it plans this year to join the World Trade Organization, an international arbiter of disputes among governments. In order for U.S. companies to pay lower tariffs on trade with Russia, Congress must alter the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment to 1974 trade law, which restricted trade with the former Soviet Union. Camp’s

panel plans a hearing in June, giving President Barack Obama’s administration several weeks to push for improved status, he said. Ending Jackson-Vanik is a key priority for the administration , Andrea Mead, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Trade Representative’s office,

said in an e-mail. USTR is pleased that the Ways and Means Committee will hold its hearing, she said. “We look forward to working with Congress” on the issue, she said.

PNTR top of the agenda – strong push key to passagePalmer, 4/26Doug, Reuters, “UPDATE 2-US Republican urges Obama push on Russia trade bill”, Factiva

A top Republican lawmaker pressed President Barack Obama to intensify efforts to win approval of a controversial trade bill with Russia and said separate human rights legislation might be needed to help round up votes. "It is time for the White House to get out front on this issue," Dave Camp, chairman of the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, said in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. With Russia set to enter the World Trade Organization by late July or August, the Obama administration has identified passage of "permanent normal trade relations" - or PNTR - with Russia as one of its top trade priorities for the year. But Camp, who announced plans to hold a hearing on the legislation in June, said the Obama administration has not engaged "strongly enough" to overcome resistance in Congress to passing the bill, which is also a top priority for U.S. business groups. With a major push from the White House, "it's possible" the bill could be passed by the August recess, Camp said. However, some trade policy analysts think the hot-button issue could be delayed until after the U.S. elections in November.

Top priority for CongressRashish, 3/27Peter,, Vice President for Europe and Eurasia Federal Information & News Dispatch, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia Hearing; "Creating Jobs: Economic Opportunities in Europe and Eurasia.", Lexis, BJM

While discussions about the scope and reach of a Transatlantic Economic and Trade Pact are at an early stage, Russia's imminent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is in its final lap. The Chamber congratulates the U.S. negotiating team led by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for securing the commercially strong agreement under which Russia is finally joining the WTO. Approval of PNTR and repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia is one of the Chamber's top trade priorities before the Congress this year (the other such priority is reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank of the United States). On December 16, 2011, trade ministers at the 8th WTO Ministerial Conference celebrated the conclusion of 18 years of negotiations for Russia to accede to the WTO and invited Russia to become the organization's 154th member. In those negotiations, Russia committed to enact a host of reforms to meet its extensive commitments to the WTO, and Moscow is expected to complete this work and formally join the WTO in July 2012. That Russia will join the WTO is no longer in doubt. In fact, at this juncture, the United States can neither help nor hinder Russia in doing so. However, the U.S. Congress must act to ensure that the U nited S tates benefits from the reforms Russia is undertaking as it joins the WTO. Specifically,

Congress must pass a short and simple bill that grants Russia Permanent Normal Trade Relations and repeals the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia (see details below). Failure to do so will put U.S. workers, farmers, and businesses at a unique disadvantage in the growing Russian marketplace and drive new sales, exports, and job-creation opportunities to our European and Asian competitors.

Obama aggressively pushing repeal of Jackson-Vanik --- political capital is keyFrolov, 3/23 (Vladimir, 3/23/2012, Russia Profile, “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Will Russia Graduate From the Jackson-Vanik Amendment?” Factiva)

During the post-Soviet period, all U.S. administrations , from Bill Clinton to George Bush, promised to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik , only to see little congressional support for the measure. None ventured to spend much political capital on pushing it through a reluctant Congress . In the meantime, several post-Soviet states – Ukraine, Georgia, and

Kyrgyzstan – were graduated from Jackson-Vanik and granted PNTR when they joined the World Trade Organization. Now, Russia is joining the WTO and the Barack Obama administration has jumped on this opportunity to do away with this last legacy of the Cold War in U.S.-Russian relations.

This time around, it is the U nited S tates that would benefit more from Russia's graduation. If the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is still on the books by the time Russia officially joins the WTO this summer, U.S. companies will find themselves at a disadvantage in the Russian market. Unlike competitors from other countries, they will not be protected by WTO rules and Moscow could choose to retaliate against American companies with tariffs and other barriers. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, who traveled to Russia last month, is leading the drive in the Senate to repeal the law. "We must pass permanent normal trade relations, or PNTR, to ensure that our exporters can access the growing Russian market," Baucus said. "If the United States passes PNTR with Russia, U.S. exports to Russia are projected to double within five years. If Congress doesn't pass PNTR, Russia will join the WTO anyway and U.S. exporters will lose out

to their Chinese and European competitors." The Obama administration is solidly behind the effort to graduate Russia from the provisions of Jackson-Vanik, and has launched an aggressive effort in Congress and inside the U.S. business community. Last week, during a meeting with U.S. business leaders, President Barack Obama emphasized that granting PNTR to Russia is necessary for American companies to benefit from Russia's entry into the WTO. Senior officials, such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, sent a similar message to Capitol Hill. But there is still serious opposition in Congress to lifting all trade restrictions on Russia. Some republican and democratic lawmakers want to link the trade issue and issues of human rights and corruption in Russia, arguing that Russia's graduation from Jackson-Vanik should be linked to the passage of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011, named for the anti-corruption lawyer who died in a Russian prison more than two years ago. This position has gotten support from the democracy promotion camp. David Kramer, head of the Freedom House think tank, said last week at an event sponsored by the Foreign Policy Initiative: "Politically, in light of the environment in Russia, which has been deteriorating, to simply lift Jackson-Vanik without some replacement would be viewed by Russian leadership as a sign of weakness on the part of the United States – again, that we need this relationship more than they do. And if we don't replace it, then we would, in their minds, be rewarding them despite their bad behavior by not going after them. To me, this has to be a package deal." U.S. Ambassador to Russia Mike McFaul and Assistant Secretary of State Phillip Gordon told Congress that the administration does not see the need for new human rights legislation on Russia , while the State Department has the authority to implement visa restrictions against foreign citizens suspected of

human rights violations. McFaul said last week that the administration no longer believes any such "weird linkage" is necessary to accompany the repeal of Jackson-Vanik . Leading Russian opposition figures – Vladimir Milov, Boris Nemtsov, Garry Kasparov, Ilya Ponomarev and Alexei Navalny – signed a letter to Congress arguing that repealing Jackson-Vanik would be good for Russian democracy.

Obama’s pushing nowWSJ 3/20 (“After Jackson-Vanik,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577285330434798916.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)

The Obama Administration's "reset" with Russia has muffled concerns over human rights and democracy and dwelled on business palatable to the Kremlin like nuclear proliferation and trade. The Senate now has an opportunity to restore balance to this relationship. Days after Vladimir Putin won another manipulated election, President Obama responded by calling for the Senate to repeal the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, which links trade access to Moscow's treatment of its citizens. The dispute in Washington isn't whether Jackson-Vanik should stay in place, but what should follow. With Russia set to join the World Trade Organization this summer, American companies would be hurt by Jackson-Vanik, which blocks the U.S. from granting normal trading status. Under WTO rules, Russia could adopt retaliatory tariffs. Even Russian opposition leaders consider Jackson-Vanik a "relic," as Garry Kasparov and Boris Nemtsov wrote in these pages Thursday. They support its repeal. As do we.

Hearings nowGodfrey 3/20 (Mike Godfrey, “US Senate Mulls Trade Relations With Russia,” Tax News, http://www.usa-tax-news.com/story/US_Senate_Mulls_Trade_Relations_With_Russia____54526.html)

The United States Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Max Baucus (D – Montana), has held a hearing to examine the implications of Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Baucus, in his opening statement, said that, as the largest economy currently outside the WTO and the sixth-largest economy in the world, Russia joining the WTO “presents a lucrative opportunity for the US economy and American jobs”. He insisted that Congress must act and pass Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to ensure US exporters can access the growing Russian market, noting that “if the US passes PNTR with Russia, US exports to Russia are projected to double within five years. If Congress doesn’t pass PNTR, Russia will join the WTO anyway, and US exporters will lose out to their Chinese and European competitors.”

Hearings nowGasyuk 3/16 (Alexander Gasyuk, “Trade hearings renew debates on Russia,” http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/03/16/jackson-vanik_trade_hearings_renew_debates_on_russia_15086.html)

The United States Senate Finance Committee began hearings Thursday on abolishing controversial trade restrictions against Russia under the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik amendment. American lawmakers will debate the end of trade practices, which have long prevented granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to Moscow. It is still unclear clear whether the Obama administration will convince Congress to lift the decades-old law and if so on what terms. The Jackson-Vanik amendment was adopted in 1974, when it linked restrictions on trade with the right of Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union. That issue has been dead since the collapse of the U.S.S.R., if not before. Some lawmakers and analysts believe lifting the amendment could be a boon for U.S.-Russia trade. Senate Finance Committee Chairman

Max Baucus (D-Mont.), said that lifting the provision could double U.S. exports to Russia. And Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute, said that that exports could increase to $20 billion annually in five years.

Top of the agendaICTSD 3-7 [International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development,Russia Trade Debate Prepares to Kick Off in Washington,http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/126847/]

US-Russia trade ties are entering back into the spotlight, with Washington lawmakers set to begin debating the repeal of Cold War-era trade restrictions that would allow Moscow to become a full trade partner. The visit of Max Baucus - the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, which has jurisdiction over tax and trade policy - to Russia last week was expected to kick off the debate in Washington, with the senator meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to discuss the trade situation and other subjects.

Obama’s first initiativeKyodo 3/3 (Kyodo News Service, Pressing the Putin Regime, Washington Post, Lexis)

It is therefore unfortunate that the Obama administration's first initiative after Putin's return to the presidency will be to lobby Congress to grant Russia permanent trade privileges. The White House is seeking the repeal of a 1974 law known as Jackson-Vanik, which links the trade preferences for Russia to free emigration. Repeal is logical for a couple of reasons: Russia, unlike the former Soviet Union, does not restrict the exit of Jews and others -- and if the law is not removed, U.S. companies will be penalized after Russia enters the World Trade Organization later this year. But a bipartisan coalition in Congress is concerned about removing this legacy of U.S. human rights advocacy without addressing the abuses of the Putin regime. Led in part by Sen. Benjamin Cardin, the group proposes to couple the Jackson-Vanik repeal with a measure that would require the administration to single out Russian officials responsible for gross human rights violations, ban them from traveling to the United States and freeze their assets. The Obama administration, on the other hand, is doing its best to kill it. In part it objects to Congress mandating foreign-policy actions. (In an attempt to defuse the issue, the State Department last year banned visas for a few dozen Russian officials involved in one notorious human rights case, the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, after whom the congressional legislation is named.) But the administration also worries excessively about provoking Putin. Putin's imperious return to the presidency has destroyed his political legitimacy in Russia. The sensible U.S. response is to sanction those in his regime who are imprisoning and killing journalists, whistleblowers and advocates of democratic change. Trade preferences should go forward. But so should the Magnitsky bill. (March 2)

Top of the agendaLyauv 3/2 (Bela Lyauv, “Repeal of Jackson-Vanick may create new jobs,” RusData Dialine, Lexis)

The Obama administration is pressing Congress to throw out the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik amendment to restrict trade with Russia, making a plea on behalf of U.S. farmers and manufacturers. The United States will seek to repeal the law "as soon as possible" to give American exporters the same benefits as their overseas competitors, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk told the House Ways and Means Committee on Wednesday. The legislation, passed in 1974, barred favorable U.S. trade with the Soviet Union to punish the nation for blocking emigration for its Jews citizens. Annual waivers have been allowed and widely used since 1993, two years after the communist government collapsed. "We ought to lift it," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Tuesday in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "Failing to lift it will put our farmers and manufacturers and our workers at a disadvantage." Russia is now poised to join the World Trade Organization in May or June, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said this month. President Barack Obama said he supports Russia becoming a member of the international trade arbiter, which would allow reduced tariffs and greater transparency. U.S. producers won't benefit from lower trade barriers as long as Jackson- Vanik remains in effect, said Randi Levinas, executive director of the U.S.-Russia Business Council, with members such as General Electric, Caterpillar and Chevron. The United States wouldn't gain intellectual property protection and adoption of food safety regulations on products from Russia, she said. While waivers have worked for almost two decades, Russia's joining the WTO would put the United States in violation of the trade arbiter's rules because Russia wouldn't get the certainty that trade accords provide, said Joshua Meltzer, a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington specializing in global economy and development. The United States wouldn't be able to complain about any Russian trade violations at the WTO, he said.

Obama pushing passage ASAPMoscow Times 3-2 [White House Sees Repeal of Jackson-Vanik YieldingJobs, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/white-house-sees-repeal-of-jackson-vanik-yielding-jobs/453958.html]

The Obama administration is pressing Congress to throw out the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik amendment to restrict trade with Russia, making a plea on behalf of U.S. farmers and manufacturers. The United States will seek to repeal the law “as soon as possible” to give American exporters the same benefits as their overseas competitors, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk told the House Ways and Means Committee on Wednesday.

A2: Uniqueness OverwhelmsJV is next flashpoint in Congress – no slam dunkRoth, 3/20 (Andrew, “Jackson-Vanik Trades Places”, Russia Profile, http://russiaprofile.org/international/56157.html, BJM)

The clock is ticking for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974 as Russia prepares to finalize its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) this year. The Barack Obama administration, along with U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, has called for the law to be repealed as a relic of the Cold War. Yet conservative lawmakers are uneasy about the plan, citing concerns that lifting Jackson-Vanik will be seen as a sign of weakness by the upcoming Vladimir Putin administration. The opponents are now suggesting deals to take Jackson-Vanik off the books, but not without replacing the law with alternative legislation to censure Russia for corruption and civil rights abuses. Just two days after Vladimir Putin won a disputed 64 percent in Russia’s presidential election, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that Jackson-Vanik, a law passed in 1974 to punish the Soviet Union for its restrictive immigration policy, was on the chopping block. “I think I’ve shown that I will go anywhere in the world to open new markets for American goods. That’s why we worked so hard to secure Russia’s invitation into the WTO. That’s why I have asked Congress to repeal Jackson-Vanik, to make sure that all your companies and American companies all across the country can take advantage of it. And that's something that we're going to need some help on,” Obama told a roundtable of businessmen on March 6. The push to repeal Jackson-Vanik is quickly becoming the next flashpoint for clashes in Congress over U.S. policy toward Russia. Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl said that supporters of lifting Jackson-Vanik in order to avoid punishing tariffs against American businesses after Russia’s WTO accession present the measure as a “slam dunk.” “But it isn’t a slam dunk,” he told a Finance Committee hearing, conveying concerns over both intellectual property protection and civil rights abuses in Russia. “When the U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul suggests that there is no association between a country’s respect for individual liberties and its business environment, he is simply denying reality.”

A2: Won’t Pass/Kills Relations - Magnitsky Act***read this to answer their Magnitsky will be attached arguments --- proves PC key to keep it watered down – solves relations***** If no PC means they’ll get the version which tanks relations and you can go for the relations impact separate to just this argumet

Obama’s capital critical to amending replacement bill to meet his needs and get GOP on boardIvanov, 3/28Eugene, Russia Beyond the Headlines “Open-mike diplomacy”, http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/03/28/open-mike_diplomacy_15197.html, BJM

President Obama is smart enough to understand that creating of a “civil society fund” won’t be sufficient to overcome the congressional resistance to repealing the JVA; some “replacement” to the amendment seems to be inevitable to strike a deal. Besides, while the administration is sincerely troubled with the implementation of S. 1039 in its current form, it doesn’t appear to have any ideological problem with the bill in general. Appearing before Senate Foreign Relation Committee on Feb. 28, 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called again for lifting the JVA, but stressed the “need to send a clear, unmistakable message to Russia that we care deeply about rule of law in Russia.” Addressing directly Sen. Cardin, Clinton offered him to work together with the White House to achieve both goals, to which Cardin replied: “I look forward to working with you. I do think we can do both.” The simplest interpretation of this exchange would be that in the coming months, the White House will be pressing Cardin to modify the bill to make it palatable to the administration. With a new version of S. 1039 in hand, President Obama will try again to force the Republicans in Congress to repeal the JVA. If they refuse, Obama will portrait them as hostile to the interests of American business – and make it a November election issue.

Administrative pressure key to weaken impact of Magnitsky on RussiaInside US Trade, 4/6, Lexis“ADMINISTRATION WILLING TO NEGOTIATE ON MAGNITSKY BILL TO GET RUSSIA MFN”, BJM

Despite the new engagement, the administration continues to be opposed to the fundamental premise of the bill, which is to publicly name Russian officials who are barred from visiting the U.S. as a result of being involved in gross violations of human rights. However, there may be ways to make the legislation more palatable for administration officials , sources this week signaled. For instance, the administration officials and the two Senate members discussed the possibility that the bill could be altered so that it has global application, rather than being limited to human rights abusers in Russia. The co-sponsors of the bill would be open to this type of change, sources said. Such a change could have political benefits. For instance, it would soften the negative political repercussions that the bill could have with regards to Russia in particular. It could also help the bill to gain more supporters by broadening its scope, making it more attractive for members of Congress more concerned with human rights abuses in other countries.

Democrats will block MagnitskyCornwell, 3/27Susan, Reuters, “UPDATE 1-US Senate panel may vote on Russian rights bill”, Factiva, BJM

Senator Benjamin Cardin introduced the Magnitsky bill in May of last year. A companion bill by Representative James McGovern, who like Cardin is a Democrat, was introduced in the House of Representatives. But the Obama administration did not embrace the legislation, and no action has been taken in Congress. U.S. envoy to Russia Michael McFaul recently noted that the United States had already imposed visa restrictions on some Russian officials believed to be involved in Magnitsky's death. This made the Magnitsky bill "redundant," McFaul said. "I'd like to try to put it (the bill) on a business meeting for when we return (from spring recess in mid-April), and we should aim to do it," Kerry said on Tuesday at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting after the panel's ranking Republican, Richard Lugar, urged the committee to finally take up and vote on the legislation. Cardin, who is also a member of the committee, said he was trying to work out differences with the Obama administration on the bill. Cardin thought the best opportunity for passing it would be in conjunction with legislation on trade relations with Russia that is expected to come before Congress in the coming months. Russia's expected entry into the World Trade Organization requires Congress to vote to establish "permanent normal trade relations" with Russia by removing a Cold War-era human rights provision known as the Jackson-Vanik amendment that is inconsistent with WTO rules. But trying to link the Magnitsky bill to the trade legislation could run into trouble from other Democrats. Senator Max Baucus, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, told Reuters on Tuesday that he was inclined to oppose adding the Magnitsky bill to the trade legislation.

Obama keeping trade and human rights separate – will act on Jackson Vanik first

Butler, 3/27Desmond, AP, “US trade upgrade may worsen relations with Russia”, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5haRDYl_wxvUHQ2SGzhfBvaXW9z7g?docId=633ce0bb28a14581846aed8821fbce94, BJM

Obama administration officials are trying to keep the rights and trade measures apart. They are concerned about retaliation and do not want to aggravate relations further. Tensions have been growing over issues like missile defense and the international response to uprisings in Libya and Syria. But the U.S. still hopes for a degree of cooperation with Russia on other matters, such as stopping Iran's nuclear program. "We want to deal with trade issues in one sphere and democracy issues and human rights in another sphere," said Michael McFaul, the U.S. ambassador to Russia. The administration first wants to deal with trade. It has powerful allies in the U.S. business community supporting the repeal of Jackson-Vanik, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which calls the repeal its top trade priority this year. Russia soon will get more opportunities for international trade when it joins the World Trade Organization. If the U.S. doesn't repeal Jackson-Vanik, American companies could be at a competitive disadvantage.

Obama will remove harmful languageButler, 3/27Desmond, AP, “US trade upgrade may worsen relations with Russia”, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5haRDYl_wxvUHQ2SGzhfBvaXW9z7g?docId=633ce0bb28a14581846aed8821fbce94, BJM

If Congress insists on linking the two bills, the administration wants to drop the provision calling for the naming of rights abusers. They argue that such disclosure would be inconsistent with State Department practice and counterproductive, because it would remove the uncertainty that human rights violators already face about whether they are on a U.S. blacklist.

Obama doesn’t believe linkage necessaryFrolov, 3/23Vladamir, Russia Profile, “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Will Russia Graduate From the Jackson-Vanik Amendment?”, Factiva, BJM

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Mike McFaul and Assistant Secretary of State Phillip Gordon told Congress that the administration does not see the need for new human rights legislation on Russia, while the State Department has the authority to implement visa restrictions against foreign citizens suspected of human rights violations. McFaul said last week that the administration no longer believes any such "weird linkage" is necessary to accompany the repeal of Jackson-Vanik.

Obama spending capital to block MagnitskyWashington Post 3-1 [U.S. must maintain way to press Putin regime onhuman rights, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-must-maintain-pressure-on-russia-over-human-rights/2012/02/29/gIQAA0palR_story.html]

But a bipartisan coalition in Congress is concerned about removing this legacy of U.S. human rights advocacy without addressing the abuses of the Putin regime. Led in part by Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.), the group proposes to couple the Jackson-Vanik repeal with a measure that would require the administration to single out Russian officials responsible for gross human rights violations, ban them from traveling to the United States and freeze their assets. This measure could be as effective in its own way as Jackson-Vanik was on the Brezhnev-era Kremlin. Unlike their Soviet predecessors, senior Russian officials crave contact with the West; they vacation in Europe, send their children to U.S. colleges and, not infrequently, transfer their money through U.S. banks. A visa ban and asset freeze would be severe punishment for those involved in persecuting liberal politicians and journalists, or extorting money from U.S. companies. That’s why the Russian opposition strongly supports the measure. The Obama administration, on the other hand, is doing its best to kill it. In part it objects to Congress mandating foreign-policy actions. (In an attempt to defuse the issue, the State Department last year banned visas for a few dozen officials involved in one notorious human rights case, the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, after whom the congressional legislation is named.) But the administration also worries excessively about provoking Mr. Putin. At a hearing Wednesday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told Mr. Cardin that she agreed “we should send a message about our continuing concern about human rights in Russia.” But the State Department proposes only a modest program of aid to Russian civil society groups.

And, Obama won’t agree to itMartinez 3-14 [Ken, Moscow Times, McFaul Pushes for Trade Status,http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/mcfaul-pushes-for-trade-status/454625.html]

The Obama administration will not support any human rights or democracy legislation in exchange for Congress repealing the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, the U.S. envoy to Russia said in Washington on the eve of a gathering of U.S. ambassadors Tuesday. U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul spoke about relations with Russia, telling scholars at two think tanks that refusing to lift Jackson-Vanik

would not make Russia more democratic. "If you don't believe me, ask Navalny," Ambassador Michael McFaul said, referring to an open letter published on the blog of Vladimir Milov, leader of the Democratic Choice movement, on Monday evening. The letter, which was also signed by Alexei Navalny and other key opposition figures in Moscow, urged the United States to remove the largely symbolic Cold War trade restriction. The signatories included organizers of demonstrations against President-elect Vladimir Putin who recognize the lagging enthusiasm of protesters but have found it nearly impossible to unite around a common policy agenda. The opposition leaders criticized U.S. politicians who argue that the repeal of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment should be tied to improvements in human rights and that Putin and his "cronies" would be the main beneficiaries of a repeal. "Although there are obvious problems with democracy and human rights in modern Russia, the persistence on the books of the Jackson-Vanik amendment does not help to solve them at all," the letter said. The group of opposition leaders wrote that trade restrictions imposed under the amendment inhibit Russia's competitiveness on international markets, discourage diversification from oil and leave Russia "hanging in a petro-state limbo." They argue that this model of development prevents the emergence of an independent middle class that would demand democratic political changes in the future. "Jackson-Vanik is not helpful in any way — neither for the promotion of human rights and democracy in Russia, nor for the economic interests of its people," the group said. "[The amendment] is also a very useful tool for Mr Putin's anti-American propaganda machine," the writers added, "it helps him to depict the United States as hostile to Russia, using outdated Cold War tools to undermine Russia's international competitiveness." Some in Congress support linking the repeal of Jackson-Vanik to the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011 — legislation proposed to promote human rights and named after an anti-corruption lawyer who died in prison after being beaten, tortured and denied medical care that experts said would have saved his life. The legislation would include visa bans and the freezing of financial assets for a wide range of officials involved in cases of human rights violations. The United States did quietly issue visa bans on dozens of Russian officials, but McFaul says going further would be counterproductive for the "reset" policy and offer no additional benefit. "We believe that we can ban people from coming to this country that do grossly abusive things regarding human rights. And it was strengthened by a human rights executive order last August that we took to give additional authorities. So from our point of view, this legislation is redundant to what we're already doing," McFaul said at an event on Capitol Hill organized by the Foreign Policy Initiative. McFaul, former National Security Council senior director for Russia and a key architect of the administration's reset policy, said repealing the amendment is the administration's top trade priority for 2012 and that he sees no reason for it not to happen. "Jackson-Vanik from our position is a total no-brainer. There's no upside to holding onto Jackson-Vanik right now. Zero. And viewed in human rights terms, there's no upside," the ambassador said.

Obama key to preventing GOP from linking Magnitsky bill to PNTR --- which will destroy bilateral cooperation – this answers their Ros-Leithen argumentWashington Post, 2/23 (“Baucus ends Russia trip as trade debate looms Cornyn places hold on Lippert over Taiwan jets,” 2/23/2012, Factiva)

Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) is on his way back from Russia after meeting with outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev , just months before a congressional debate over whether to establish p ermanent n ormalized t rade r elations with Moscow. The visit was carefully coordinated with the Obama administration, according to an aide to Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Baucus is anticipating a debate over granting Russia permanent normalized trade relations (PNTR) status - which would also require the repeal of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment - sometime this spring or summer. By then, Russia will be a full member of the World Trade Organization, and U.S. companies would be at a disadvantage in doing business in Russia if the PNTR issue is not resolved, according to Baucus. "Expanding trade with Russia could mean billions of dollars of new opportunities for American businesses, ranchers and farmers and create thousands of jobs here at home. But Russia has to play by the rules, and having Russia in the WTO will help to make that happen," the senator said in a statement. PNTR status, formerly known as most-favored-nation status, is a legal trade designation that one country grants to another to ensure that the recipient country receives terms equal to or better than those of any other trading partner. Russia has been denied permanent status due to the Jackson-Vanik measure but has received presidential waivers annually since 2005. The Baucus camp was keen to stress that the focus of the senator's trip went well beyond economic access for American companies, noting that he met with democracy, human rights and environmental activists - as well as with leading transparency and anti-corruption advocates. Some GOP lawmakers want to link the issues of human rights and corruption in Russia to the granting of PNTR status . Those lawmakers are pushing for passage of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011, named for the anti-corruption lawyer who was allegedly tortured and died in a Russian prison two years ago. These Republicans - including Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee - want passage of the Magnitsky bill to be the cost of repealing the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment. The administration would prefer not to link Magnitsky to this trade status , because it would prompt the Russians to take retaliatory measures against the U nited S tates in other areas of bilateral cooperation. Moscow staunchly opposes the Magnitsky bill . In fact, the Russian government and is moving forward with the prosecution of Magnitsky on criminal tax charges, even though he is dead. Baucus's home state of Montana is a major beef exporter, and Russia is the fifth-largest importer of American beef.Administration is addressing human rights concernsInside U.S. Trade, 2/24 (“BAUCUS MEETS WITH MEDVEDEV, RUSSIAN OFFICIALS AHEAD OF MFN DEBATE,” 2/24/2012, Factiva)***Philip Gordon is the Assistant Secretary of State

Gordon said he expects that members of Congress will also insist on some human rights-related trade-off for the lifting of Jackson-Vanik. But, according to a transcript of his remarks, he said the administration is "in a pretty good place in being able to say what we are doing , what we have done on that front, so that any Senator who wants to feel comfortable that we're not sweeping democracy and human rights under the carpet can know that's the case," he said.

Obama’s engagement is key --- it’s a priority but the vote will be a heavy lift

Barkley, 2/17 (Tom, Dow Jones Global FX & Fixed Income News, 2/17/2012, “UPDATE: Sen Baucus Hopes To Lift Trade Restrictions On Russia By End Summer –Aide,” Factiva)

WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--Sen. Max Baucus (D., Mont.), who as chairman of the Finance Committee leads on trade issues, heads to Russia on a fact-finding mission with the aim of lifting trade restrictions before the country is expected to join the World Trade Organization this summer. Baucus plans to meet with President Dmitry Medvedev , as well as Russia's trade and foreign ministers, to prepare for a difficult debate that stands to broaden far beyond trade to address ongoing concerns about the former Cold War foe's actions on Iran, Syria and human rights. The goal is to restore "permanent normal trade relations" before the accession, already approved by WTO members, goes into effect so that U.S. companies aren't at a competitive disadvantage. That will require revoking restrictions in place since 1974 under a measure called Jackson-Vanik, which effectively denied the Soviet Union permanent normal trade status due to past emigration restrictions. "We're certainly viewing August, potentially even earlier, as the deadline for Russia to get in, and that's the deadline by which U.S. companies will start to lose out to our competitors," a Baucus aide said in an interview. "So we would very much like to get it done by the end of the summer." U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk has also set his sights on lifting the restrictions by summer's end, expressing confidence that lawmakers won't want to hurt U.S. exporters in order to send a message to Moscow. The administration has picked up its effort to build support for the measure , most notably with Russian trade getting a mention in President Barack Obama's State of the Union address last month. "We're gearing up for an engagement with the Hill ," Philip Gordon , assistant secretary of State for Europe an and Eurasian affairs, told the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia on Friday. But Gordon said that while it is clearly in the U.S. interest to lift the restrictions, "you just can't be sure" that logic will prevail in Congress. Raising the possibility that lawmakers will make some demands on the human rights issue in return for repealing Jackson-Vanik, he said the administration is taking appropriate action on that front. But he added, "We'll see what they demand." There has been a recent push by Sen. Ben Cardin (D., Md.) and other lawmakers to incorporate measures from a recent bill he introduced, which would impose a travel ban and possible asset freeze against serious human rights violators, as part of any legislation to lift the Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions, according to another aide. The business community has also " come out in full force ," going on the Hill to make it clear Russia is a priority , said the Baucus aide. A business coalition--whose members include major groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers as well as multinationals like Boeing Co. (BA) and General Electric Co. (GE), announced earlier this month that restoring trade relations with Russia will be the top trade priority this year. But key lawmakers like Kevin Brady (R., Texas), who chairs the House Ways and Means trade subcommittee, have warned that the vote will be a heavy lift . Richter better – says that all republicans don’t want it to pass, don’t want to spend any new money

A2: Magnitsky Kills RelationsObama influencing human rights legislation to soften fallout on relationsInside US Trade, 4/20, Lexis“HORMATS SAYS ADMINISTRATION ENGAGED WITH CONGRESS ON MAGNITSKY BILL”, BJM

A senior State Department official this week said the Obama administration is working with Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) and other members of Congress on the substance of a bill to address human rights in Russia in the light of the fact that several key lawmakers are pressing for action on such legislation as a condition for lifting Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. "We understand the depth of conviction here, and we understand that it is highly likely that some kind of [human rights] legislation is going to pass, and we're just working with members as they deliberate on this," Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment Robert Hormats said after testifying at an April 18 hearing of the Senate Finance trade subcommittee. Hormats stressed that the administration is not resisting efforts by members of Congress to pass legislation akin to Cardin's Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011, but is providing its own inputs in order to shape the substance of an eventual bill. The administration began these conversations with Congress late last month (Inside U.S. Trade, April 6). "We're not resisting their desire to pass something at all. In fact, we respect their commitment to this issue. It's just a matter of trying to find the right way of doing it," he said. "They'll decide, but we can give them inputs, and we are." The Obama administration had previously refused to negotiate on provisions in the Magnitsky bill, saying it opposed the bill because it could have political repercussions for U.S.-Russia relations. The bill would publicly name Russian officials who are barred from visiting the U.S. as a result of being involved in gross violations of human rights. But the administration shifted its position late last month when it began talking with members of Congress about possible revisions that might make the bill more palatable for the White House. Sources have said one potential revision that has been discussed is to alter the bill so it has global application, rather than being limited to human rights abusers in Russia. This could serve to soften the political fallout in Moscow because the bill would not be specifically targeted at Russia.

No impact on relations- replacement increases détenteWall Street Journal, 3/15http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304692804577281210489679138.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

So we asked Mr. Navalny, who, along with several other members of the opposition leadership, signed a letter cited by Mr. McFaul calling for the removal of Russia from Jackson-Vanik. "Of course no one in Russia is foolish enough to defend Jackson-Vanik," he told us.

"But we also understand that it should be replaced with something else. And we said as much in our letter when we

recommended the passing of the Magnitsky Act, as has been done in Europe." Mr. Navalny is referring to the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011, which was introduced in the U.S. Senate last May with wide bipartisan support. Named for the Russian attorney who died in police custody in 2009 while investigating official corruption, the Magnitsky Act would bring visa and asset sanctions against Russian government functionaries culpable of criminal and human rights abuses. "Such legislation is not anti-Russian," Mr. Navalny

explained. "In fact I believe it is pro-Russian. It helps defend us from the criminals who kill our citizens, steal our money, and hide it abroad." It will not be easy to match the legacy of Jackson-Vanik. On March 15, 1973, Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson introduced the amendment on the Senate floor. It focused on a specific human-rights issue—the right of Soviet Jews to leave the U.S.S.R. The amendment's greatest opponent was then-National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who worried it would upset his vision of détente with the Soviets and instead advocated "quiet diplomacy." In contrast, the Russian dissident and Nobel Laureate

Andrei Sakharov praised the amendment as a "policy of principle" that would further détente, not hinder it . The well over one million émigrés who escaped the repressive Soviet state would surely side with Sakharov. Jackson-Vanik is a relic

and its time has passed. But allowing it to disappear with nothing in its place, and right on the heels of the fantastically corrupt "election" of March 4, turns it into little more than a gift to Mr. Putin. Our economy, like our people, will never truly flourish until Mr. Putin and his mafia structure are expunged. Moreover, if economic engagement is the best way to promote an open society, why does the Obama administration not forge a free-trade pact with Iran instead of levying sanctions? Russia will be joining the World Trade Organization regardless of what the U.S. does. But WTO membership will not undo Mr. Putin's monopolization of political and economic power. If Mr. Putin and his oligarchs believed for an instant that the WTO might weaken their grip, they simply would stay out. The Obama administration is not only attempting to overturn a law, but also its spirit. As Mr. Kissinger did 39 years ago, Amb. McFaul is trying to make the case that human rights should not get in the way of realpolitik and the business of doing business. He reminds us that the State Department already has its own secret list of banned Russian officials, and so nothing more need be done. But the entire object of such laws is to publicly shame and punish the rank and file of Mr. Putin's mob so they know the big boss can no longer protect them. The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act is an example of such legislation. Replacing Jackson-Vanik with it would promote better relations between the people of the U.S. and Russia while refusing to provide aid and comfort to a tyrant and his regime at this critical moment in history. This, too, would be a policy of principle.

Relations from JV turns this – causes protection of rightsKliger 10 (Dr. Sam, American Jewish Committee, “The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and U.S.-Russian Relations”, AJC, 2-4, http://www.ajcrussian.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=chLMK3PKLsF&b=7718799&ct=8023853)

5) Some human rights groups and NGOs in Russia like the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights and the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation also express the need for abolishing J-V and suggest that such repeal would contribute to the improvement of U.S. – Russia relations and would enhance the development of civil society in Russia. To ensure continuing emigration freedom and improve the human rights situation in Russia, J-V Amendment could be replaced by cooperation between American and Russian NGOs that would place the amendment’s provisions under civil society control. A move to abolish the amendment would be

considered a serious step toward the new approach of “re-setting” relations between the U.S. and Russia, and would contribute to the

efforts of the newly established Obama-Medvedev Commission and particularly to its Civil Society Working Group led by Dr. Michael McFaul and Vladislav Surkov, which first met here in Washington last week. This Working Group, for instance,

in cooperation with American and Russian NGOs can take control of the amendment’s provisions.

A2: ThumpersIts one the only things Congress will agree on before the electionBrown 3-21(Mike-, The Hill, “Trade relations with Russia will be a boost to the U.S.”, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/217251-mike-brown-president-national-chicken-council)

If there is one thing Congress can agree on during an election year, it is a policy that will spur job creation , boost economic growth and be budget neutral at the same time. Here is why authorizing permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) for Russia will accomplish all three. Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) formally approved late last year Russia’s terms for membership in the organization during a three-day meeting of the WTO’s ministerial conference in Geneva. Russia will take its seat at the WTO 30 days after notifying the organization that the Russian Duma has ratified the membership terms. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov is on record saying that he anticipates the accession agreement being sent to the Duma in May. In Russia, retail food and beverage sales are forecast to increase in real terms from just over $200 billion in 2010 to more than $240 billion by 2014—a 20 percent increase. This is good news for U.S. food exporters as imports are expected to meet some of this growing consumer demand. But while Russia is home to 142 million consumers and maintains the world’s eleventh largest economy, it is the largest economy not yet formally subject to the global trading rules of the WTO. For U.S. companies to benefit from Russia’s accession, it will be necessary for Congress to permanently remove Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 and authorize the president to extend PNTR to Russia. Jackson-Vanik requires Russia and seven other former Soviet states and non-market economies to comply with free emigration policies before enjoying normal trade relations with the United States. Since 1994, the United States has certified annually that Russia complies with the amendment’s provisions and has conferred normal trade relations (NTR) status. Russia at times in the past has used arbitrary sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) actions that lack scientific justification to limit or even halt poultry and meat imports from the United States. Without the ability to use WTO’s dispute settlement procedures and other related mechanisms, the United States will be at a very significant disadvantage if Russia chooses to evoke bogus SPS measures against U.S. poultry. As a member of the WTO, Russia is obligated to bind its agricultural import tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). But, if Russia misuses SPS provisions, the tariff bindings and TRQs will become a secondary concern. Other world poultry competitors will undoubtedly step up and try to replace the United States if the Russian market is disrupted for U.S. poultry exports. USTR notes that U.S. farmers and exporters will have more certain and predictable market access as a result of Russia’s commitment not to raise tariffs on any products above the negotiated rates and to apply non-tariff measures in a uniform and transparent manner. The National Chicken Council urges Congress to approve PNTR for Russia by mid-2012 to help assure the United States can continue to compete in the Russian poultry market. Exporting $300 million of poultry to Russia annually will provide better incomes for more U.S. workers and additional poultry to be produced by a growing number of family farmers across America.

A2: Presidential WaiverRecent Federal Court decision affirms notion that Congressional repeal of Jackson-Vanik needed- Obama can’t do via executive orderCourthouse News Service, 2-1-12, p. http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/02/01/43533.htm

WASHINGTON (CN) - Russian scholars cannot sue President Barack Obama to drop trade restrictions with the Russian Federation first imposed in the middle of the Cold War. U.S. presidents have discretion under the Jackson-Vanik amendment of the Trade Act of 1974 to restrict trade with countries that do not meet human rights standards. The Ford administration subjected the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to this scheme in 1975, the same year Leonid Brezhnev signed the Helsinki Accords and laid the groundwork for human rights compliance in the Soviet Bloc. After President George H.W. Bush first waived the restrictions against Russia in 1992, the country has enjoyed normal, but conditional, trade relations with the United States. Edward Lozansky, a Washington, D.C., resident who serves as president of the American University in Moscow and organizer of the World Russia Forum, sued Obama over this classification last year. Lozansky's academic aide, Anthony Salvia, is a co-plaintiff in the case. The complaint claims that Obama has both the authority and the nondiscretionary duty to permanently "graduate" the Russian Federation from compliance with the amendment's requirements. But Obama countered that the plaintiffs failed establish jurisdiction or state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Lozansky claimed that the instability in U.S.-Russia trade relations hurts his financial interests, but U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly said he did not show how the requested relief would address his alleged injuries. Salvia meanwhile could not even show injury. "Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to identify a ministerial duty the court could order the president to take, and thus fail to establish that a writ of mandamus could redress Lozansky's injury," the Jan. 26 decision states. "Finally, Lozansky's alleged injuries are outside the zone of interests of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and plaintiff Lozansky lacks prudential standing to pursue his claims."

US Federal Court has dismissed Jackson-Vanik amendment lawsuitRussian Legal Information Agency, 1-27-12, p. http://rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20120127/259819110.html

MOSCOW, January 27 - RAPSI. The Federal Court for the District of Columbia has dismissed a lawsuit to cancel the Jackson-Vanik amendment concerning Russia, the court records read. Adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1974, the amendment restricted trade with the Soviet Union due to Soviet restrictions on free emigration. Today, the amendment continues to operate with respect to the Soviet Union's successor states. The United States has declared a moratorium on the amendment annually as of 1989, but Congress has not yet annulled it formally. Head of the American University in Moscow Edward Lozansky filed a lawsuit against U.S. President Barak Obama in an effort to cancel the amendment. Lozansky argued that the amendment prevents U.S. businessmen from planning their activities in Russia in advance as they cannot rule out a waiver of the moratorium. According to Lozansky, it reflects on the attendance level of his courses and workshops and results in financial losses. The U.S. authorities have asked the court to turn down the lawsuit as the Federal Court for the District of Columbia lacks jurisdiction in the case and the claim was not convincing. In addition, in the court's opinion, the claimant has failed to explain how exactly a favorable resolution of the claim would reinstate his allegedly infringed rights.

No waiver-Congressional repeal is necessaryStephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, 11/10 (Impact of Russia's WTO Entry on U.S., www.cfr.org/russian-fed/impact-russias-wto-entry-us/p26473)

What happens now? Does the president waive the provisions of that bill each year to allow trade to go on?No. This is a common misconception. There is a waiver by the president only if a country covered by Jackson-Vanik is not allowing free emigration. Since Bill Clinton, all American presidents have found Russia to be in full compliance with the requirements of Jackson-Vanik. Meaning that there's no waiver, there's merely a report every year to Congress that Russia is in full compliance. But even that report is inconsistent with normal WTO relations.

A2: Any Non-U.S. IssueEvery single internal WTO block to accession has been settledICTSD, Intenrational Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 11/9 (Consensus Remains Elusive as WTO Ministerial Looms, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/117966/)

Currently, the ministerial conference is widely expected to approve Russia’s long-standing bid to join the WTO; the formal Working Party on Russian accession is scheduled to meet on 10 and 11 November to finalise remaining technical issues. Sources familiar with the talks note that, while there are a fair amount of technical details that are being discussed, there is no issue that seems unlikely to be resolved.The announcement last week that Russia and its neighbour Georgia had reached a compromise deal resolving their disagreements on trade monitoring along their shared border removed the last major hurdle remaining in Russia’s 18-year accession process (see Bridges Weekly, 2 November 2011). The compromise was largely made possible via the mediation of Switzerland, which trade sources note was “instrumental” in achieving an agreement.Last month, the chair of the WTO committee on government procurement also announced that the 42 countries currently finalising the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) talks were quickly approaching the finish line (see Bridges Weekly, 19 October 2011). Unlike the Doha Round of trade talks, the GPA does not extend to the entire WTO membership, applying only to those countries that choose to sign on to the process.Other countries are also working on acceding to the agreement, notably China. Another meeting of the committee on government procurement is scheduled for 15 November.Apart from these, “the number of decisions that members take will be small,” one delegate observed, adding wryly that the meeting risks becoming “the least successful ministerial since the last one.”

More ev-Russia will be accepted by the WTOKyiv Post 11/13 (IHS Global Insight: Russia's accession to WTO offers substantial benefits both to all, http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/116827/)

Russian negotiators yesterday (10 November) celebrated winning crucial backing from the World Trade Organization (WTO) Working Party on Russia's Accession. Their team, led by experienced and long-standing negotiator Maxim Medvedkov was greeted by the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, who handed over a T-shirt saying "Welcome to the WTO... finally."This encapsulated the ups and downs of 18 years of talks first launched back in 1993. Far too many times it has been announced that Russia's accession to the Geneva-based international trade regulating body was imminent, only to admit that there were still disagreements keeping Russia outside the 153-member organisation.But with the backing of the WTO Working Party, the longest accession process in the history of WTO is nearing its end. The next formality will be securing the approval of the accession package at the WTO Conference of Ministers due to take place on 15-17 December.Given that most of the obstacles have been removed the Ministerial Conference is likely to endorse Russia's membership which is not only an important milestone for opening the country to global trade but also for the WTO. As the Icelandic chairman of the WTO Working Party on Russia's Accession Stefan Johannesson put it, the breakthrough was a "historic achievement for the WTO", adding that "Russia's accession to the WTO will bring substantial benefits both to Russia and to the members of this organisation."The news also generated positive reception from the European Union (EU) Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, who said, "I look forward to the upcoming WTO ministerial in December to formally endorse Russia's accession to the WTO membership." US president Barack Obama also congratulated his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev saying that after nearly two decades Russia will finally be able to join the WTO. Once the Ministerial Conference formally endorses Russian accession, Moscow will have until 15 June 2012 to ratify the accession package and within 30 days of ratification by the Russian legislature, the country will become a formal member of the WTO.

A2: Georgia OppositionRecent Georgia agreement creates momentum for repeal in CongressStephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, 11/10 (Impact of Russia's WTO Entry on U.S., www.cfr.org/russian-fed/impact-russias-wto-entry-us/p26473)

To help end Jackson-Vanik, will Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili have to come to Congress and make a pitch on Russia's behalf? That seems to be the issue, whether the Georgians are happy?No, the Georgians are now happy because their concern has been that Russian membership should not in any way imply that trade across the border from Russia into South Ossetia and Abkhazia is not trade into Georgian territory. And they've gotten the mechanism now that satisfies them on that point. They want other things from the United States, and they are going to be pushing their case for closer security cooperation between now and the NATO summit next spring in Chicago.The hard question for Russians and the administration will be whether Congress is prepared to do a so-called "graduation vote" that is clean, meaning simply to "graduate" Russia from Jackson-Vanik and take no further action. There's a lot of understandable sentiment in Congress that Jackson-Vanik should be replaced with something else that expresses continuing American support for efforts to democratize Russia, to defend human rights, and so forth.There are disagreements in Congress about what that replacement legislation should be. There is this so-called Magnitsky bill, which would impose restrictions on entry into the United States and even on assets in the United States of Russian officials who are considered to be human rights abusers. There has been some consideration to setting up a fund which would support civil society groups in Russia. Something of this sort is meant to ease the anxiety that members have when they "graduate" Russia from the coverage of the single most important piece of legislation from the Cold War relating to human rights. They want to feel that there is somehow an expression of continuing concern, a modernization of that policy. They haven't figured out what it should be, but there's a strong interest in taking some steps along these lines.

Recent border agreement solvesStephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, 11/10 (Impact of Russia's WTO Entry on U.S., www.cfr.org/russian-fed/impact-russias-wto-entry-us/p26473)

Russia is all set to enter the WTO. Is this a major development for the world economy? Is it a major development in Russia's relations with the rest of the world?The Russians are the largest economy not in the WTO. Their accession is important in economic terms; it also has significant political interest. A few months ago, I would have predicted that it would be quite hard to solve the big remaining obstacle, which was a political one. And that was that Georgia objected to Russian membership because, in brief, Russia is occupying its territory. It wanted arrangements made that would indicate that South Ossetia and Abkhazia--the Georgian provinces that Russia has recognized as autonomous, independent states following the brief Russian-Georgian war in 2008--are still part of Georgia. And the Russians of course, were in no mood to grant this. So, it looked as though it would be very hard to broker a deal.In the end, both sides have agreed to a monitoring system (AP) on the Russian-Georgian border across from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in which an independent contractor, hired by the Swiss government, will monitor and report on trade flows. It's a jerry-rigged arrangement, but the real interest of it is that the Russians agreed to something that does, in fact, imply that there's something fishy in the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And that's what the Georgians wanted. They wanted even the mere suggestion, the merest practical compromise that these were not real countries, and they got it. So it's interesting that the Russians agreed to do this.Why did the Russians agree?It suggests both a desire for the economic benefits of WTO membership--recognition that on the question of the status of these two provinces the Russians are totally isolated in the world--and suggests a desire to move beyond the impasse on this question.

Border agreement spills over to certain accessionRT 11/9 (Russia overcomes final WTO hurdle, http://rt.com/business/news/wto-russia-wto-accession-909/)

Russia and Georgia have signed landmark agreement, giving the green light to Russia’s WTO accession.The two sides have agreed new border controls for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was the last stumbling block. The document signed in Geneva allows border trade to be electronicallymonitored, with an independent auditor also keeping an eye on things.“These corridors have been determined by geographical coordinates, and the document will not say anything about a border and will not contain terminology charged politically," Georgian media reported Sergei Kapanadze, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister, as saying.The move clears the way for Russia to end its 18 year

battle to join the WTO. Russia intends to complete all the formalities within the next couple of days. Next month the 153 members of the WTO should give their approval, with the final accesion expected to be completed by the end of the year.Russia’s WTO membership has a trial of patience and stamina, with heated, often explosive, debate.Georgia dropped its WTO vetoReuters 10/29 (US lawmakers warn Obama over Russia's WTO bid, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE79S2TP20111029?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0)

Russia is closer than ever to joining the WTO after being offered a "take it or leave it" compromise last week by its tiny neighbour Georgia, the last holdout in Moscow's 18-year path to membership. Georgia, like all WTO members, has an effective veto on Russia's membership, which it has threatened to use unless a dispute with Russia over customs controls was resolved.The two countries fought a brief war in August 2008 over two breakaway regions in Georgia and they have not restored diplomatic relations.

More ev and insider statements prove Georgia compromiseReuters 10/31 (US says Georgia-Russia WTO talks going quite well, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/russia-wto-georgia-usa-idUSN1E79U16S20111031)

Swiss-mediated talks between Russia and Georgia about Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization are going well and the United States is encouraged, the State Department said on Monday."Our understanding is that the talks are going quite well. We are encouraged by the progress. They are not finished yet, however," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters. "The Georgians have accepted the Swiss proposal. The Russians are studying it ... We remain hopeful that this will be a good avenue for resolving the outstanding issues."

A2: EU OppositionEU lifted all opposition pointsRT 10/31 (Russia could join WTO by December, http://rt.com/news/prime-time/wto-russia-membership-dvorkovich-193/)

Russia could be a member of the World Trade Organization by mid-December, declared presidential aide Arkady Dvorkovich.“If everything goes as planned, the working group will meet on November 11,” Dvorkovich said. “If the group approves the bid, Russia will join the WTO on December 15, at the ministerial conference. The next step then, of course, is to get all documents ratified.”Negations got a major boost last week after the EU put pressure on Georgia – the only member of the WTO opposing the bid.The EU threatened that if Georgia does not change its position on Russia’s bid, the EU will make an exception to WTO rules, which require the full consent of all 153 member states in order to welcome a new member.As required, Russia has already held successful negations with all WTO countries – aside from Georgia.Both the US and EU removed the last roadblocks to Russia’s membership after Moscow agreed to change its rules on car assembly, the export of farm products and quotas for wood imports.

***Link Debate***

PC KeyPC key to repeal votes on Jackson VanikMoscow Times, 4/5“Margelov Hopes Jackson-Vanik Will Be Repealed in 2012”, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/margelov-hopes-jackson-vanik-will-be-repealed-in-2012/456160.html, BJM

The United States will raise the issue of discussing the Jackson-Vanik amendment before this summer, said Mikhail Margelov, head of the Federation Council's International Affairs Committee, Interfax reported. "The administration of President Barack Obama, which has been lobbying this issue in Congress, is synchronizing watches and taking stock of its forces," Margelov told reporters after a round table that focused on the reversal of the amendment in the context of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. The event was held behind closed doors. Margelov said Ambassador Michael McFaul has been participating in the round-table process. It is important for the Obama administration to understand how many votes it can secure in Congress for the decision to repeal the amendment, which was passed during the Cold War era and which limits trading opportunities between Russia and the United States, the senator said. The issue is "a matter of the U.S. internal calendar," he said. "For us, it is interesting only from the standpoint that the reversal of this amendment will become a political signal that the relics of the Cold War will be removed from our political realities and the reset will be filled with substance," Margelov said. For the first time, the U.S. presidential administration "has been lobbying the reversal of this amendment genuinely and deeply, and has been doing so very seriously and professionally," he said.

Obama’s capital key to holding firm on repeal deadlineRussia & CIS Business & Financial Daily, 4/4, Lexis“Margelov hopes Jackson-Vanik amendment will be repealed in 2012”, BJM

The United States will raise the issue of discussing the Jackson-Vanik amendment before this summer, said Mikhail Margelov, head of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs. "A process of time check and forces' review is now underway for the administration of President Barack Obama, which has been lobbying this issue in Congress," Margelov told reporters after a roundtable that focused on the reversal of the amendment in the context of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. The event was held behind closed doors. It is important for the Obama administration to understand how many votes it can secure in Congress for the decision to repeal the amendment which was passed during the Cold War era and which limits trading opportunities between Russia and the U.S., the Russian senator said. The issue is "a matter of the U.S. internal calendar," he said. "For us, it is interesting only from the standpoint that the reversal of this amendment will become a political signal, that the relics of the Cold War will be removed from our political realities and the reset will be filled with substance," Margelov said. For the first time, the U.S. presidential administration "has been lobbying the reversal of this amendment genuinely and deeply and has been doing so very seriously and professionally," he said.

Obama is accommodating Republican demandsNeedham 2/28 (Vicki Needham, “OVERNIGHT MONEY: Bernanke returns to Capitol Hill to talk monetary policy,” http://goo.gl/j2jAI)

The Obama administration continued its delicate dance on Russian trade relations on Tuesday. Even as Russia defies the United States at the U.N. Security Council on Syria and struggles to crack down on political opposition at home, the White House is pushing to normalize trade relations. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday that the administration is willing to work with the Senate to “send a message” to Russia on human rights at the same time Congress lifts the trade-restricting Jackson-Vanik amendment. Clinton emphasized that since Russia is already joining the World Trade Organization — probably sometime this summer — keeping the restrictions in place will only put U.S. exporters at a disadvantage. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.), who wants to use the Jackson-Vanik vote this spring to send Russia a message, said he thought the amendment could be lifted at the same time a message is sent. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk will testify at House Ways and Means on Wednesday, where the topic will likely come up again.

Only our evidence is conclusive about the final voteHerszenhorn 2/24 (David Herszenhorn, “U.S.-Russian Trade Ties Face Some Political Snags,” NYT, http://goo.gl/CNlbI)

In trying to overcome the political obstacles, the Obama administration could face opposition from those who say that any concessions to Russia are not worthwhile, given the major disagreements on foreign policy, human rights and concerns about corruption, and especially because the amount of trade with Russia is small. There were slightly more than $8 billion in American exports to Russia in 2011, compared, for instance, to more than $100 billion to China. To highlight the importance of the Russian market to individual companies, Mr. Baucus visited a John Deere factory in Russia, which he said helped support jobs in the United States, including at three suppliers in his home state,

Montana. In an interview, Mr. Baucus said that despite the uphill battle of passing any legislation in a presidential election year, he believed that Congress would ultimately see the wisdom of normalizing trade relations with Russia, or at least recognize that failing to do so would only punish American business. “Even though this is an election year, the logic is unassailable,” he said. “This makes good sense for America. It will help create more American jobs.”

Obama persuasion needed to convince Congress to repeal Jackson-VanikCarnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2-1-12, p. Lexis

For the United States to take advantage of Russias WTO accession and for US businesses to trade with Russia under the new rules, Congress must repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment on trade with Russia. But there is a strong anti-Russia Republican contingent in Congress which will oppose repealing the amendment. Proposing a free trade agreement with Georgia is a good tactic to persuade these people in Congress to drop their objections. So there was also a domestic political agenda in the meeting for Obama too . Whoever is the Republican presidential candidate will inevitably try to accuse him of being soft on Russia because of his re-set policy, especially after Vladimir Putin is re-elected president in Russia in March. And, prior to this meeting, there might have been accusations about betraying Georgia. That is no longer possible and this meeting was a kind of pre-emptive strike on that issue. It was good for Obama that the Georgian president left the meeting saying, I am leaving this office very happy.

Obama’s leadership is key to ensure passageInside U.S. Trade, 1/13 (“WHITE HOUSE UNDER PRESSURE TO DO HEAVY LIFTING ON RUSSIA MFN VOTE,” 1/13/2012, Factiva )

Permanent MFN for Russia is coming to the forefront as Russia prepares to enter into the World Trade Organization. If the United States does not graduate Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment, U.S. exporters cannot gain the full benefits of Russia's trade concessions as a WTO member. Russia's WTO entry is part of the Obama administration's "reset" policy with Russia that seeks to strengthen the strategic relationship between the two countries. This policy is controversial with Republican congressional leaders, such as House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH). U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Tom Donohue yesterday (Jan. 12) publicly signaled that he wants the administration to be more visible in the fight for Russia MFN and that trade and economic arguments are unlikely to carry the day in Congress. "There are no pure economic arguments on the Hill," he said at a press conference after his state of American business address. Business will work to focus attention on economics, but "everyone's thinking about political implications," according to Donohue. "I think the administration will probably have to be motivated, particularly in an election year, to put its oar in the water here, but we're going to push them to do it because its not a very good idea to leave all that trade to somebody else," Donohue said. The commercial benefits of Russia's WTO entry are small. U.S. exports to Russia are lagging behind those to Panama, with $6.006 billion worth of goods exported to Russia in 2010, according to Commerce Department statistics. The top five goods the United States exported to Russia in 2010 were civilian aircraft, engines and related parts; poultry meat and offal; machinery parts; passenger cars and vehicles; and polymers of vinyl chloride also known as PVC plastics, according to the Commerce Department. But the business message that the White House needs to take the lead may also be influenced by informal signals from Republican aides in Congress that the commercial arguments will not generate the necessary votes for the Jackson-Vanik legislation and that it is more effective to let the administration to make the foreign policy case. In the Senate, both Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Finance Committee Ranking Member Orrin Hatch (R-UT) are perceived as being cool to the idea of extending permanent MFN this year. Hatch, for instance, appears interested in first securing stronger protections for intellectual

property rights. But a Senate Democratic aide charged that congressional Republicans want to see the administration work for this vote and incur the political costs for securing it. Other sources said some Republicans want to make any "victories"

for President Obama in an election year as difficult as possible, and a Senate Republican aide said that Republicans "will do anything" to deprive Obama of a foreign policy victory this year. Sources said that until business groups pressure Republican leaders to support Russia MFN, nothing will happen. A Senate Republican aide said that if executives from large multinational companies such as Boeing visit key Republican offices asking for this vote, it would be more difficult to ignore. So far, senior executives of major companies have been absent from the Russia lobbying push, which has been left largely to association lobbyists who do not carry the same clout, this aide said.

Only uses PC when making final pushBeckmann and Kumar 11 [Matthew N. Beckmann PhD and Associate Professor, Political Science School of Social Sciences at UC Irvine; and Vimal Kumar, “How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 23: 3, Ebsco]

Fortunately for those inside the West Wing, some researchers paint a more optimistic picture regarding presidents’ potential for passing important planks of their legislative agenda. Covington et al. (1995), Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha (2007), Edwards III and Barrett (2000), Kellerman (1984), Light (1982), Peterson (1990), and Rudalevige (2002) all observe that presidents secure greater support for their ‘priority’ items, and when they exert ‘effort’ pushing them. In addition, Covington (1987) concludes that White House officials can occasionally win greater support among legislators by working behind the scenes, while Canes-Wrone (2001, 2005) shows that presidents can induce support from a recalcitrant Congress by strategically ‘going public’ when advocating popular proposals (see also Kernell (1993)). Sullivan (1987, 1988) finds that presidents can amass winning congressional coalitions by changing members’ positions as a bill moves through the legislative process. However, even among these relative optimists, the prescription for presidents appears to be an ephemeral

combination of luck and effort, not a systematic strategy. In discussing the challenge for a president looking to push legislation on Capitol Hill, Samuel Kernell offers a comparable assessment. He writes, The number and variety of choices place great demands upon [presidents’] strategic calculation, so much so that pluralist leadership must be understood as an art…an ability to sense ‘right choices’. (Kernell, 1993: 36) Furthermore, the seemingly paradoxical findings noted above, that is, a general (if modest) pattern of president-supported legislative success on passage and policy content, but not on ‘key’ roll-call votes, remain unexplained. This paper aims to demystify the White House’s legislative strategies, both their logic and their effects. Developing a non-cooperative game in which the president allocates scarce ‘political capital’ to induce changes in legislators’ behavior, we deduce two lobbying strategies White House officials may execute and, in turn, investigate their impact on the laws that result. Interestingly, we theorize that presidents’ foremost influence comes from bargaining with congressional leaders over policy alternatives before bills reach the floor, not bargaining with pivotal voters for their support once they do. Precisely because so much of the presidents’ influence comes in the legislative earlygame (rather than the endgame), we theorize that typical roll-call-based tests of presidents’ legislative influence have missed most of it.

Obamas capital is key-has to push and convince Congress to overcome oppositionDouglas Busvine 10/30 (National interest, not votes to get Russia into WTO, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/30/us-russia-wto-analysis-idUSTRE79T1VI20111030)

Convincing a skeptical Congress of the benefits of Russia's WTO accession poses a challenge to the Obama administration as the opposition Republicans seek a contender for next fall's presidential election.John Boehner, the Republican majority leader of the House, has criticized the 'reset' in relations with Russia sought by Obama and, in light of Putin's return to the Kremlin, called for Washington to oppose Russia's WTO entry.While Congress cannot directly block Russia's WTO entry, it can vote against repealing the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment -- a 1974 provision that linked awarding most-favored trading status to emigration rights for Soviet Jews.Failure to repeal Jackson-Vanik would, however, allow Russia as a WTO member to deny the United States most-favored status, in what would amount to an own goal for U.S. business interests."If we don't lift Jackson-Vanik when Russia's accession becomes effective, we are at the risk of discriminatory treatment -- and we don't want that to occur," said the USRBC's Verona.

Even Obama admits he’ll have to consult with Congress to push through oppositionAFP 11/12 (Obama says time to end Russia Trade curbs, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iVRzEjKUPEMw27VQqBLxZTFnCHeg?docId=CNG.a7dd32f66b6231dfd54596020fa71a03.161)

US President Barack Obama said Russia's pending entry into the WTO meant it was time for him to consult with Congress on ending trade restrictions on Moscow dating from the Cold War.In a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Hawaii, Obama committed to lifting the Jackson-Vanik amendment which restricts trade privileges to nations that limited freedom of human rights and emigration.Moscow cleared its most significant hurdle for accession just Wednesday when it finally clinched a customs deal with Georgia, which was able to veto any accession bid by virtue of its membership to the trade body.

Yes CapitalDebates now – Obama expending capital others haven’tFrolov, 3/23Vladamir, Russia Profile, “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Will Russia Graduate From the Jackson-Vanik Amendment?”, Factiva, BJM

The United States Senate Finance Committee began hearings last week on abolishing controversial trade restrictions against Russia under the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment. American lawmakers will debate granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to Moscow. Will Russia finally be graduated from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment imposed in 1974 on the now non-existent country? Will the congressional opposition succeed in imposing new trade restrictions on Russia linked to the human rights situation? What will this mean for the U.S.-Russian “reset?” The Jackson-Vanik amendment was adopted in 1974, linking restrictions on trade with the right of Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union. That issue has been dead since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Russia has been deemed in compliance with the Jackson-Vanik legislation by annual presidential waivers since 1990. During the post-Soviet period, all U.S. administrations, from Bill Clinton to George Bush, promised to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik, only to see little congressional support for the measure. None ventured to spend much political capital on pushing it through a reluctant Congress. In the meantime, several post-Soviet states – Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan – were graduated from Jackson-Vanik and granted PNTR when they joined the World Trade Organization. Now, Russia is joining the WTO and the Barack Obama administration has jumped on this opportunity to do away with this last legacy of the Cold War in U.S.-Russian relations. This time around, it is the United States that would benefit more from Russia's graduation.

A2: Winners Win1. Plan isn’t a win – It’s so unpopular that it would be viewed as a legislative failure 2. Fighting for passage of the plan FORCES a trades off with other agenda prioritiesBernstein, political scientist who writes about American politics, 8/20 (Jonathan, 8/20/2011, “The power that a president does -- and doesn't -- have A president has less power than Obama's liberal critics think -- but they also have more power than they realize,” http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/08/20/bernstein_presidential_power/index.html)

Moreover, the positions of the president and most everyone else are, to look at it one way, sort of opposites. The president has potential influence over an astonishing number of things -- not only every single policy of the U.S. government, but policy by state and local governments, foreign governments, and actions of private citizens and groups. Most other political actors have influence over a very narrow range of stuff. What that means is that while the president's overall influence is certainly far greater than that of a House subcommittee chair or a midlevel civil servant in some agency, his influence over any specific policy may well not be greater than that of such a no-name nobody. A lot of good presidential skills have to do with figuring out how to leverage that overall influence into victories in specific battles, and if we look at presidential history, there are lots of records of successes and failures. In other words, it's hard. It involves difficult choices -- not (primarily) policy choices, but choices in which policies to fight for and which not to, and when and where and how to use the various bargaining chips that are available.

3. Empirically denied – Healthcare proves. He lost momentum because it was so unpopular – Republicans were screaming bloody murder and he was unable to get anything else passed4. Legislative success depletes capital – doesn’t increase itPurdum, 10 – Award winning journalist who spent 23 years with the NY Times (12/20/10, Todd S., Vanity Affair, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html)

With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—Obama has managed to achieve a landmark overhaul of the nation’s health insurance system; the most sweeping change in the financial regulatory system since the Great Depression; the stabilization of the domestic auto industry; and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair. So why isn’t his political standing higher? Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, wa y too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated , filling the airwaves and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another. Is it any wonder the guy is bleeding a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, and he has been the first to acknowledge that he has not always done all he could to explain them, sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often messy and confusing. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. There is a price for everything in politics, and Obama knows that, too. Finally, Obama is hardly in anything close to disastrous political shape. Yes, the voters administered a shellacking to his party in December, but there are advantages to working with a hostile Republican Congress as a foil, instead of a balky Democratic one as a quarrelsome ally. His own personal likeability rating remains high—much higher than that of most politicians—and his job approval rating hovers at just a bit below 50 percent, where it has held for more than a year, nowhere near the level of a “failed presidency.” Sarah Palin’s presence for the moment assures an uncertain and divided Republican field heading into the 2012 election cycle, and the one man who could cause Obama a world of trouble if he mounted an independent

campaign—Mayor Mike Bloomberg of New York—has recently made statements of non-candidacy that sound Shermanesque (even as he has remained outspokenly critical of business as usual by both parties in Washington).5. Obama’s Velcro – only blame will stickNicholas and Hook, 10 (Peter Nicholas and Janet Hook, 7/30/10, LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president,” http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730)

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro. Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve. The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape. What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no , and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."

***Impact Debate***

2nc – overviewOnly scenario for extinctionBostrom 2002 (Nick Bostrom, 2002. Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale. "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately . There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange , between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind ’s potential permanently.

Its probable - Russia will fight us if we force themBandow 12 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to Ronald Reagan “NATO and Libya: It's Time to Retire a Fading Alliance,” 1/2/12) http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13982&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)

The Cold War required an extraordinary defense commitment from the U.S. But no longer. Europe still matters, but it faces no genuine military threat. Whatever happens politically in Moscow, there will be no Red Army pouring armored divisions through Germany's Fulda Gap. Washington has much to worry about, but Europe is not on the list. Of course, the Europeans still have geopolitical concerns. Civil wars in the Balkans and Libya threatened refugee flows and economic disruption. However, the Europeans are capable of handling such issues. Potentially more dangerous is the situation in Eastern Europe and beyond, most notably Georgia and Ukraine. But not dangerous to America. The U.S. has survived most of its history with these lands successively part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Nor is there any evidence that Russia wants to forcibly reincorporate its "lost" territories into a renewed Soviet empire. Rather, Moscow appears to have retrogressed to a "great power " like Imperial Russia. The new Russia is concerned about international respect and border security. Threaten that, and war might result, as Georgia learned in 2008. It makes no sense for America to risk war on these nations' behalf. (In fact, with far more at stake Western Europe almost certainly won't do so.) Border security is vital for Russia. Preserving vibrant, boisterously independent countries along Russia's border is not vital for America. Supporting such countries might be nice, but is not worth war , especially nuclear war . And Moscow demonstrated that it is prepared to fight , even with a country nominally slated for NATO membership with a close military relationship with the U.S. It would be foolish to bet that Moscow would back down in any confrontation. Gen. Nikolai Makarov, chief of the Russian General Staff, warned about the danger of continuing NATO expansion: "In certain conditions, I do not rule out local and regional armed conflicts developing into a large-scale war, including using nuclear weapons." The dramatic decline of Russia's conventional forces has increased Moscow's reliance on nuclear weapons as the great military equalizer.

And good relations are key to solve all global problemsLegvold, 09 (Foreign Affairs, Volume 88 No. 1 2009 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora88&div=58&g_sent=1&collection=journals#672)

Reversing the collapse of US-Russian relations is one of the great tests facing the Obama administration. Among the major powers, Russia is the hard case,. And the stakes involved in getting US-Russian relations right are high—much higher than the leadership of either country has acknowledged or perhaps even realized so far. If the Obama administration can guide the relationship onto a more productive path, as it is trying to do, it will not only open the way for progress on the day’s critical issues—from nuclear security and energy security to climate change and peaceful change in the pose-Soviet area—but also be taking on a truly historic task. One of the blessings of the post-Cold War era has been the absence of strategic rivalry among great powers, a core dynamic of the previous 300 years in the history of international relations. Should it return, some combination of tensions between the United States, Russia, and China would likely be at its core. Ensuring that this does not happen constitutes the less noticed but more fateful foreign policy challenge facing this US president and the next. Washington has scant chance of mustering the will or the energy to face this challenge, however, without a clearer sense of the scale of the stakes involved. Every tally of the ways in which Russia matters begins, and rightly so, with nuclear weapons. Because the United States and Russia possess 95 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal, they bear the responsibility for making their stocks safer by repairing the now-shattered strategic nuclear arms control regime. Their cooperation is also crucial if the gravely imperiled nuclear nonproliferation regime is to

be saved. Then comes energy. Russia has 30 percent of the world’s gas reserves and sits astride the transport grid by which energy flows from the entire post-Soviet zone to the rest of the world. More recently, tensions have arisen over the Arctic’s hydrogen reserves—which are said to amount to 13-20 percent of the world’s total—not least because of the aggressive way in which Russia has asserted its claims over a large share of them. If the United States and Russia compete, rather than cooperate, over energy in Eurasia and add a military dimension to their disputed claims in the Arctic, as they have begun to do, the effects will be negative for far more than the prices of oil and gas. There is also the struggle against global terrorism, which will be sure to flag without strong collaboration between Washington and Moscow. And it has become clear that the help of Russia is needed if anything approaching stability is to have a chance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Other issues are also critical but not always recognized as such. Making real progress toward coping with the climate change, including during negotiations at the 2009 UN conference on Climate Change, will depend on whether the three countries that emit 45 percent of the world’s green house gases—the United States, Russia, and China—can cooperate. Any effort to mitigate trafficking in humans, small arms, drugs, endangered species, counterfeit goods, and laundered money must focus on Russia, since these often come from or through that country. Blocking cyberattacks, keeping space safe for commerce and communications, and averting the return of the kind of military air surveillance common during the Cold War will involve Russia, first and foremost. And attempts to reform international financial and security institutions will be optimized only if Russia is given a chance to contribute constructively. If the United States’ interests in a relationship with Russia are this many and this great and if, as Undersecretary of State William Burns said of Washington and Moscow in April, “more unites us than divides us,” then the Obama administration will need to turn a page, and not simply tinker at the edges, as it redesigns US policy towards Russia. Turning a page means setting far more ambitious goals for the relationship than is currently fashionable and then consciously devising a strategy to reach them. It also means integrating the well-intentioned symbolic gestures Washington has made toward Russia recently as well as progress on concrete issues, such as arms control, Itan’s nuclear program, and Afghanistan, into a larger design.

Relations Uniqueness

2nc relations highRelations improving but U.S. and Russia still need to expand economic tiesVOA News, 1/4 (“Gordon On U.S.-Russian Relations,” 1/4/2012, http://www.voanews.com/policy/editorials/americas/Gordon-On-US-Russian-Relations--136702383.html )

“We recognize that the U nited S tates and Russia have many common interests, and we remain guided by the belief that

we can engage effectively with Russia’s government and civil society ... without checking our values at the door,” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon said recently in his testimony to the U.S. Congress. “Our aim now is to deepen . . . and widen the arc of our cooperation. At the same time, the United States will continue to be outspoken about areas where we disagree with Russia, such as human rights and democracy concerns.” The benefits of engagement are particularly evident in the foreign policy arena. “We signed the New START Treaty. We brought into force a 123 Agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, and agreed to dispose of enough weapons-grade plutonium for 17,000 nuclear warheads,” Assistant Secretary Gordon said. “We are both key participants in the Six Party talks ... to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We are working together to hold Iran to its international non-proliferation obligations ... Russia remains an important partner ... working to implement the vision for Middle East peace outlined by President Obama in his May

2011 remarks. The U nited S tates and Russia still need to expand their economic ties. While two-way trade grew last year, they still reached just $31 billion – less than one percent of total U.S. trade. Russia received its invitation to accede to the World Trade Organization in December and is expected to join the organization this year. “For American companies to take advantage of [Russia’s] market opening, Congress must terminate the application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and extend permanent normal trading relations to Russia, ” Assistant Secretary Gordon said. President Obama is committed to working with the U.S. Congress to achieve this goal. Along with these successes, we have welcomed the Russian authorities’ acceptance of peaceful political protests, but also emphasized Secretary Clinton’s message that “Russian voters deserve a full investigation of electoral fraud and manipulation,” and urged authorities to act on the election reforms proposed by the OSCE observer mission. Assistant Secretary Gordon concluded his testimony noting, “We expect to continue our successful approach of cooperating with Russia when it is in our interests, addressing our disagreements honestly, building links to Russian society and government, and maintaining the United States’ long-held commitment to keep our values at the center of our foreign policy.”

Relations are ok now – afghan basing proves it was mostly election rhetoricWeir 3/16 (Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, “US-Russia 'reset' gets a boost with Russian offer of airbase,” 3/16/12) http://www.minnpost.com/christian-science-monitor/2012/03/us-russia-reset-gets-boost-russian-offer-airbaseIn an unprecedented move, Russia is offering NATO the use of a Russian airbas e for aircraft refueling and the transit of "non lethal" supplies and personnel. Moscow says the offer is an effort to ease the strain on the alliance's increasingly restricted supply chain to forces in Afghanistan. The tentative offer was described yesterday by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during a speech to the Russian Duma, the lower house of parliament. It could see up to 30 NATO cargo flights a day come through the Vostochny airport in the Volga region of Ulyanovsk, en route to or from Kabul, about 2,000 miles away. NATO has been struggling to deliver supplies to troops in Afghanistan since Pakistan's decision in November to close US overland supply routes into Afghanistan. And if Kyrgyzstan follows through with its announcement this week that it wants to make an airbase used by NATO a purely civilian facility, that could throw another wrench into NATO's supply efforts. The plan still needs to be approved by the Russian government, but there seems little doubt that the idea comes straight from the Kremlin and is unlikely to face any obstacles. Russian experts say the apparent change of heart in Moscow is partly because of president-elect Vladimir Putin's desire to turn away from his sometimes-strident anti-American electoral rhetoric and return to more normal cooperation with the West. Another reason, they say, is that Moscow has become alarmed at talk in the US and other NATO countries about a precipitous pullout of forces from Afghanistan, particularly in the wake of last weekend's deadly shooting rampage by a US soldier that killed 16 civilians, which appears to have undermined public support for the war. Despite its often critical stance toward the US, Moscow has long acknowledged that NATO forces are fighting for essential Russian interests in Afghanistan. Should the coalition troops depart and the Taliban return, Russia believes it would face a wave of potential consequences, including an upsurge in Islamist radicalism across former Soviet Central Asia. Since President Obama started his controversial " reset " of relations with Russia, Moscow has moved to increase cooperation by allowing NATO aircraft to use a permanent " transit corridor " through former Soviet territory (Russian and former Soviet airspace was previously off-limits to NATO military flights) and stepping up joint action against drug trafficking, which Moscow views as one of the biggest threats emanating from Afghanistan. "It's in our interests that the coalition achieves a success before withdrawing and makes sure that the Afghans are capable of defending their country and ensuring an acceptable level of security," Mr. Lavrov said. "We want those who are fending off threats directed at Russia to efficiently fulfill their tasks. Our assistance to the coalition proceeds from our own interests." After 9/11, then-President Putin acquiesced in the establishment of US-run airbases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but Moscow quickly soured on the deal and worked through the regional Russian-and-Chinese led Shanghai Cooperation Organization to get the US evicted from Uzbekistan's Karshi-Khanabad base, located near the Afghan border. In 2005 they succeeded in persuading Uzbekistan to throw NATO forces out. But despite several threats from Moscow, Kyrgyzstan has regularly renegotiated the US presence at Manas airbase, which has served as a vital link in NATO's efforts to keep its forces in Afghanistan supplied. But this week Kyrgyz leaders told visiting US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta that they want to end the military mission at Manas, located near the capital of Bishkek, and turn it into a fully civilian facility by 2014. President Almazbek Atambayev has said that the presence of the US base on Kyrgyz soil could leave the country vulnerable to "retaliatory strikes" in the event of US military action in the region, presumably a reference to widespread talk of war with Iran. Base would bring business, security Russia's offer of the airbase at Ulyanovsk (birthplace of Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin) has, ironically, generated local demonstrations against the idea. "The anti-NATO demonstrations in Ulyanovsk were, kind of ironically, organized by United Russia [Putin's

party]," says Alexei Malashenko, an expert with the Carnegie Center in Moscow. "It seems people took Putin too literally. There is a contradiction between the things Putin says about US imperialism, and the need to take practical decisions for cooperation . It's clear all that anti-American rhetoric was mostly an electoral tool ."

We control the threshold – it could be worseAdomanis 1/19 (Mark Adomanis, Forbes Writer on Russia, degrees from Harvard and Oxford, “National Review's Latest Attack On Obama's Russia Policy: Grasping at Straws,” 1/19/12) http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/01/19/national-reviews-latest-attack-on-obamas-russia-policy-grasping-at-straws/Russia is “on the verge of fundamental change” because of purely internal developments, developments which Washington has almost no influence over. How do I know this? Because this “fundamental change” has arrived precisely during a period in which American-Russian relations have become less frosty and confrontational. The Bush administration was second to none in its support for “burgeoning democratic movements” but Russia became increasingly authoritarian nonetheless. Washington can affect Russian internal politics only on the margins, and if it goes all in on aggressive anti-Russian policies (missile defense, regime change in Syria, war with Iran, “democracy promotion”) then the tentative political opening of the past several months will be weakened. The reset is not a magical success story, but it does explain the marginal improvements in Russian-American relation s over the past two years. If the reset is replaced, as Vajdic suggests, by a more hectoring and confrontational policy, then relations will swiftly worsen. This is really not particular complicated, but it should be repeated: if you want to have good relations with a country make an effort to have good relations with a country. Threats, attempted blackmail, and lectures about the inherent rightness of the American position are usually not received very well.

Putin won’t change anything – he’s been in charge while we had record cooperationPifer 3/21 (Steve Pifer, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “The Future Course of the U.S.-Russia Relationship,” 3/21/12) http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2012/0321_arms_control_pifer.aspx

Vladimir Putin will make his formal return to the Russian presidency on May 7. The presidential election process that culminated on March 4 was marked by the absence of a level playing field, process flaws and reports of fraud on election day. The turnout and vote count reported by the Central Electoral Commission in some regions strained credibility. All that said, Mr. Putin remains the most popular political figure in Russia. While ballot box-stuffing and other fraud may have inflated his vote count to the official figure of 63.6 percent, there is no compelling evidence that he did not clear the 50 percent threshold required for victory. The democratic situation within Russia has regressed since Mr. Putin entered the national scene. But politics in Russia today are different from what they were just six months ago. An opposition has emerged, however disparate it might be, which appears to reflect the concerns of the growing urban middle class. The presidential election returns in Moscow were striking: Mr. Putin fell below 50 percent. His instinct now may well be to repress the opposition, but the old tactics will not work as they did before. One of the biggest question marks about Mr. Putin’s next presidential term is how he will respond to and deal with an opposition whose sentiments are likely to spread. As for foreign policy, Washington has grown comfortably accustomed to dealing with Mr. Medvedev over the past three years. Mr. Putin’s return portends a more complicated U.S.-Russian relationship, but there is no reason to expect that relations will plunge over a cliff . There are a number of considerations to bear in mind regarding Mr. Putin and Russia’s approach to the United States. First, Mr. Putin as prime minister was nominally number two to Mr. Medvedev, but no one doubts who held real power in Moscow . As the American Embassy reportedly put it, Mr. Putin played Batman to Mr. Medvedev’s Robin—a comparison that Mr. Putin undoubtedly enjoyed in private. He kept a close eye on things. It is inconceivable that the New START Treaty, expanded supply routes through Russia for NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Moscow’s support for an arms embargo on Iran would have happened had Mr. Putin opposed them. There is no reason to assume that his return to the presidency will mean a major change in the strategic course of Russian foreign policy. We should expect a significant degree of continuity. Second, the tone of the bilateral relationship will likely change . Mr. Putin spent his formative years in the 1980s as a KGB officer. As his rhetoric during the election campaign made clear, he holds a wary skepticism about U.S. goals and policies. For example, his comments suggest he does not see the upheavals that swept countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt as manifestations of popular discontent but instead believes they were inspired, funded and directed by Washington. This may seem like a paranoiac view, but Mr. Putin has made so many allusions to it that it is hard to conclude that he does not believe it. That is a complicating factor for the bilateral relationship. Mr. Putin’s experience as president dealing with the Bush administration, moreover, was not a happy one. In 2001-02, he supported U.S. military action against the Taliban, including overruling his advisors to support the deployment of U.S. military units into Central Asia; shut down the Russian signals intelligence facility in Lourdes, Cuba; agreed to deepen relations with NATO; calmly accepted the administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and agreed to a minimalist arms control agreement that fell far short of Moscow’s desires. In his view, he received little in return. His perception is that Washington made no effort to accommodate Moscow’s concerns on issues such as the future of strategic arms limits, missile defense deployments in Europe, NATO enlargement, relations with Russia’s neighbors in the post-Soviet space or graduating Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The reset, after all, took place during Mr. Medvedev’s presidency. Third, Mr. Putin faces tough issues at home, both economically and politically. The Russian economy and government revenues remain overly dependent on exports of oil and natural gas. The Russian state budget remains pegged to the price of oil. While Mr. Medvedev called for economic modernization and diversification, there are few signs of progress or of a realistic plan to achieve those aims. Corruption remains rampant. The lack of confidence in the economy is reflected in the fact that Russia experienced capital outflow of $84 billion last year. And Mr. Putin made a striking number of electoral promises, including higher salaries, rising pensions and greater defense spending, that will need to be funded. While sustained high oil prices could allow him to avoid tough calls, economic questions could face him with a major challenge. Moreover, politics today in Russia have changed. For the first time in his experience, Mr. Putin will have to deal with the outside world without being confident that he has a rock-solid political base at home. It will be interesting to see how that affects his foreign policy choices. Soviet and Russian leaders in the past resorted to the image of a foreign adversary —all too often the United States—to rally domestic support, and one can see aspects of that in Mr. Putin’s campaign rhetoric. But the constituency to whom that appeals is already largely on Mr. Putin’s side . Will that ploy resonate with an increasingly

unhappy urban middle class? He may conclude that he can focus better on his domestic challenges if his foreign policy results in more positive relations with countries such as the United States. We do not yet know. Fourth, Mr. Putin has shown himself to be realistic, particularly when it comes to money. A major article that he published in the run-up to the election described a large military modernization program designed to reassert parity with the United States. But during his first presidency, when huge energy revenues flowed into the Russian government budget from 2003 to 2007, he chose not to increase defense spending significantly. Instead, the extra money—and there was plenty of it—went to build international currency reserves and a “rainy day” fund on which the government drew heavily during the 2008-09 economic crisis. Having a large arsenal of weapons did not save the Soviet Union. Mr. Putin understands that. If circumstances force him to make tough choices, he may prove pragmatic and not necessarily choose guns over butter. Fifth, Mr. Putin likely will not fully show his hand regarding the United States until 2013. He expects to be around for another six and possibly twelve years. He may see little harm in waiting six months to learn who will be his opposite number in the White House. The upshot is that Mr. Putin’s return can and probably will mean more bumpiness in the U.S.-Russia relationship . He will pursue his view of Russian interests. On certain issues, those will conflict with U.S. interests, and Washington and Moscow will disagree, perhaps heatedly. His style will differ markedly from Mr. Medvedev’s, and Mr. Obama may come to miss his meetings with his friend, Dmitry. But Mr. Putin is not likely to seek to turn the relationship upside down or take it back to the grim days of 2008. For all the rhetoric, Washington should be able to deal with him on a number of issues.

The link controls uniqueness – if we respect Russia more cooperative factions will rise in Russian politicsCohen 11 (Stephen F. Cohen, professor of Russian Studies and History at New York University, “Obama's Russia 'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity?” 6/1/11) http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity

Now Russia’s political class , alarmed by the deterioration of the country’s essential infrastructures since 1991, is locked in a struggle over the nation’s future— one with profound consequences for its foreign policies . One side , associated with Putin’s handpicked successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, is calling for a “democratic” transformation that would rely on “modernizing alliances with the West.” The other side, which includes ultra-nationalists and neo-Stalinists, insists that only Russia’s traditional state-imposed methods , or “modernization without Westernization,” are possible . As evidence, they point to NATO’s encirclement of Russia and other US “perfidies.” The choice of “modernizing alternatives” will be made in Moscow, not, as US policy-makers once thought, in Washington, but American policy will be a crucial factor . In the centuries-long struggle between reform and reaction in Russia, anti- authoritarian forces have had a political chance only when relations with the West were improving. In this regard, Washington still plays the leading Western role, for better or worse.

General positive trend in MATERIAL cooperation nowMasha Lipman, writer at Russian current affairs website Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 1/9/2012, “2012 US presidential campaign implications for Russia eyed,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Posted 1/11/2012, Lexis

T he foreign policy decisions of Russia, unlike its rhetoric , demonstrate an interest in limited cooperat ion - and certainly not a desire for isolationism. Confirmation of that is seen in the well known achievements of the "rese t ": the conclusion of the START III Treaty, some rapprochement in the Russian position on Iran towards the American, and the offer of Russian territory for delivering freight destined for American troops in Afghanistan. Russia's joining the WTO as well as various steps, some public and some not so very much, focused on smoothing over the negative ideas of Russia attest to continuing interest in cooperation. Here we also have the Valday Club, where Putin personally conducts sessions to give prominent Western specialists on Russia a rose-coloured view and [to make] informal contacts. Neither the one side nor the other, needless to say, is publicizing such delicate diplomacy, but , for example, the rumour that was spread at the end of the year that Russia and the United States were secretly discussing the political future of Syria and Russia's possible participation in Bashar Assad's fate seems quite plausible (although Russia denied this rumour). Such consultations - if you assume that they were in fact conducted - have a rational basis (and one common to both countries): neither the United States nor Russia would like Islamists to come to power in Syria to replace Assad .

xt rel high – elections Relations fine – downturns are election season blipsNew Europe 1/27 (New Europe, New Europe Online, “Putin slams Washington over 'external interference’” 1/27/12) http://www.neurope.eu/article/putin-slams-washington-russia-won-t-tolerate-external-interference

“Until they get through that process I expect - just like in the United States - you’ll see political rhetoric and probably some statements that people will wish were not made, if you are on the other side. But frankly I think in the end of ends we’ll see the process through and then we’ll see what the new government and the new Putin administration later in this year decides it’s going to do with the United States,” Collins said. Meanwhile, the new US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul rejected as “nonsense” accusations by a top lawmaker in Putin’s United Russia party, Andrei Isayev that he’s trying to encourage a revolution. In the early days of the administration of US President Barack Obama, McFaul made his mark as the architect of the so-called “reset” of relations with Russia. Now Obama sent him to Russia to continue this policy of seeking to improve ties. But when McFaul met with opposition activists earlier in January, within days of taking up his appointment, he annoyed the Kremlin. Those contacts with the Russian opposition are part of official US policy to spread democratic values around the world, Kommersant newspaper quoted McFaul in an interview. “The point of the reset isn’t to prepare a revolution,” McFaul said. “That’s not what we are doing.” McFaul also rejected Isayev’s contention that he’s an expert in Orange Revolutions, referring to popular upheavals in the former Soviet nations of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. “I’m an academic, a political scientist and a sociologist, not a professional revolutionary,” McFaul said. One of his predecessors, Collins, dismissed complaints inside the Kremlin that the US is trying to stir up trouble, supporting protests that have eroded Putin's popularity. “I personally think there is absolutely no justification for all this idea that America is interfering in their political process,” Collins told New Europe. “The response to Mike McFaul’s first days and other things like these statements are frankly political rhetoric. Any ambassador and any American embassy over decades has met with all dimensions of Russian society and they have done it in political times and non-political times. The idea that somehow it’s not an ambassador’s job to be in touch and engaged with all elements of the political spectrum in the Russian Federation is simply saying he shouldn’t do his job,” Collins said. “They certainly cannot be surprised that the ambassador to the Russian Federation has contacts with people other than government officials. They’ve been doing it for decades and they will continue to do it so I find all that around Mike McFaul’s arrival to be a bit surprising.” Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told reporters that McFaul should understand that he is working in Russia, not in the US. “I hope that he [McFaul] will do a good job but of course he needs to realise that he is working in the Russian Federation, not in the United States of America, and that our country has its specifics, just as any ambassador has his mandate,” he said. Russia-US relations, let alone Medvedev-Obama relations, have not been affected, the Russian president said. “There’s not been a worsening in our interstate relations or in our personal relations [with Obama],” he said. Collins said that despite the headline-grabbing political rhetoric the US and Russia want to see the relationship and the “reset” continue. He noted that he doesn’t expect US-Russian relations to backtrack once Putin replaces Medvedev, who spearheaded efforts to improve relations with the US. “I have presumed all along that you did not have a policy over the last three and a half years from Mr Medvedev without Mr Putin being a part of it,” Collins said, adding that the efforts to improve US-Russian relations over the last three years represent the work of both the Russian and the American governments.

xt rhetoric distinctionCurrent tensions are just rhetoric – cooperation is still happeningBridge 3/14 (Robert Bridge, “US missile defense: Loaded system, empty promises,” 3/14/12) http://rt.com/politics/us-missile-defense-russia-lavrov-555/

Despite the heated rhetoric and lack of trust between Moscow and Washington, the two sides show a willingness to cooperate on other fronts. Lavrov mentioned a project to create a transit station to move "non-lethal" cargo to Afghanistan, where Coalition forces are having mixed results battling the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The transportation of non-military cargo transit to Afghanistan "is regarded by us as a means of helping those who are eradicating the terrorist and drug threat in Afghanistan," Lavrov said. Draft plans for cargo shipments passing through the city Ulyanovsk, which is situated 893 kilometers (555 miles) east of Moscow, have not yet been submitted to the government for consideration.

A2: Relation ResilientRepeal key to relations reset strategy-failure would infuriate the RussiansKorea Times 10/16 (Hurting US relations with Russia, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/10/137_96741.html)

Two influential Democratic members of Congress, Scoop Jackson of Washington and Charles Vanik, responded with an amendment to a major trade law that denied the Soviet Union and its satellites the trade relations normally extended to other countries, and restricted loans, trade credits and guarantees. The amendment put a great crimp in Soviet trade with both the U.S. and the West. Seismic changes were taking place in the Soviet Union, and the emigration restrictions were gradually lifted and became moot with the fall of the Iron Curtain. Any Jews who wanted to leave, could, and not surprisingly given Russia's long history of anti-Semitism, most did.The Jackson-Vanik amendment, however, continued as a matter of U.S. law and as a great irritant to the Russian government. Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., the senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and no Cold War softie, recommended its repeal as long ago as 2003.The amendment has survived, however, with the support of some senior Republicans who want to keep it in reserve for future leverage against Russia on other issues. This, of course, infuriates the Russians. It bars them from permanent normal trade relations with the United States, what used to be called most favored nation status.Mike McFaul, the senior director for Russia on the White House National Security Council, this week urged Congress to repeal Jackson-Vanik as both an antiquated law and an impediment to President Barack Obama's efforts to "reset" relations with Russia.

In the context of US security concessions, Putin has explicitly dismissed them as insufficient and asked instead for trade-related benefits. Trade concessions are key to investment in Russia, which they desperately need to recover from the economic crisis.

And, we’ll isolate multiple other warrants:

A. Equal partnership: Putin thinks US trade restrictions are a symbol of US colonialism that prevent partnershipSkrin 2009 (Market & Corporate News , 1-30, “West should perceive Russia as equal partner: Putin,” Lexis)

Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has urged Western companies to leave behind the colonial thinking in their relations with Moscow. It is necessary to work in a civilized and honest manner and get rid of colonial ideology, Putin told a meeting of the International Business Council at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on Thursday. Russia wants to be perceived in the West as an equal partner without any exemptions or exclusions , the Russian Premier underlines. At present, we are going through tough times amid the unfolding financial and economical meltdown, Putin complains. Even so, he adds, Russia has no intention of restricting capital flows despite a large rise in capital outflow that saw a whopping 130 billion dollars leave the country last year. We have deliberately made this move, Putin explains, bearing in mind that these actions by the Russian authorities should give a clear signal that we will be seeking to stick to all our obligations. For that to happen, we will try to make our economy and our country open and we have already achieved a lot in this direction lately, Putin maintains.Saying that Russia was not allowed to buy certain technologies / and even finished products in the West Putin said that apart from the limitations inherited from the past, new ones were being imposed - in Europe to a lesser extent, while in the United States many of them remained. Above all the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US- Soviet Trade Bill, which the Russian Premier said was an "anachronism that has nothing to do with common sense". "The problem of the Jews' departure from the Soviet Union no longer exists, neither does the USSR against which the discriminatory amendment was enacted," Putin stressed. He said the main limitations remain in people’s minds, and we should get rid of them. "We are not disabled people, we do not need help, we want to be an equal and reliable partner," Putin stressed. "The world has changed in the sense that it is necessary to be self-critical and listen more to what is happening on our planet as a whole. This is exactly what we need if we want to have long-term partnership between us ," he said, the ruvr.ru website said.

B. Psychology: Economic cooperation is key to positive framing of the overall relationship, integrating Russian markets, and the Russian economyThe Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia 2009 (joint project of The Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, a research center within Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” March, http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf)

Though Russia’s economy remains one-tenth the size of America’s ,managing the global economic crisis is a top issue and a clear common interest for Washington and Moscow. Notwithstanding its serious challenges, the crisis is also an

important opportunity for the United States in dealing with Russia because it has changed the psychology of the relationship and can contribute to framing U.S.-Russian relations in positive and cooperative terms . Despite holding the world’s third-largest currency reserves, Russian officials now realize that their country’s economic future depends significantly on both the global economy and the United States and they look to Washington for solutions. The crisis has also exposed many of Russia’s continuing economic and financial weaknesses, including its failures to diversify or encourage foreign investment. The United States finally has a chance to integrate Russia fully into the international economy and to take an important step toward addressing broader concerns of other major developing economies like China, India, and Brazil that their voices are not sufficiently respected in global economic matters. The G-8 and the G-20 could be useful vehicles for this. Russian accession to the World Trade Organization is a key step in this process and would bind Moscow to WTO rules and protect American companies. More narrowly, the United States and Russia have not thus far developed extensive bilateral trade and investment. Some of this is a result of geography, but much is due to insufficient effort, an inability to overcome the Jackson-Vanik Amendment either substantively or symbolically, and under appreciation of the important economic interests at stake. Russia will become only more important to the global economy over time.

C. Cold War thinking: Even after security concessions, Putin cited trade restrictions as the most important relics of the Cold WarPrime-Tass 2009 (Prime-Tass English-language Business Newswire, 9-18, Putin urges West to take further steps to improve ties with Russia,” Lexis)

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Friday urged the West to take further steps to improve relations with Russia . He was speaking at the Kuban Economic Forum in the city of Sochi. Putin welcomed the U.S. President Barack Obama's decision to abandon a plan to deploy land-based missiles as part of a missile defense system in Poland and called on Western countries to make further conciliatory steps . The plan has been opposed by Russia. Putin urged the West to abolish restrictions on technology transfers to Russia and to facilitate the country's accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO). He also proposed abolishing Western restrictions on Russian exports, restrictions of which were inherited from the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which was established in 1947 to introduce a partial embargo on Soviet bloc exports. Putin also said he was unhappy with some Western governments' opposition to Russian investments and added that he hoped such "remnants" of the Cold War would soon be overcome . "Russian companies acquiring foreign assets often face so-called national egoism," he said. "I'm sure that these are 'birthmarks' of the Cold War that we still can't get rid of." Putin went on to say foreign energy companies investing in Russia and Russian energy companies investing abroad should be subject to the same regulatory treatment

D. This cooperation spills over: Ending trade restrictions facilitates Russian WTO accession and spurs economic cooperation that affects areas like nonprolif and IranAslund and Kuchins 2009 (Anders, leading specialist on Russia and professor at Georgetown University, and Andrew, senior fellow and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, professor at Johns Hopkins, “Pressing the “Reset Button” on US-Russia Relations,” Chapter 9, March, CSIS, http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb09-6.pdf)

US government engagement with Russia on economic integration presents an opportunity to broaden and deepen their bilateral relationship.30 Economic cooperation will build goodwill and mutual confidence, which can facilitate discussion of other areas of interest such as cooperation on nonproliferation and dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. Yet one of the most underdeveloped areas of the US-Russia relationship is commerce. The two countries’ very limited mutual trade and investment—the United States accounts for only 4 percent of Russian trade and foreign direct investment— indicate a very significant potential to expand bilateral economic relations to the benefit of both Americans and Russians. One reason direct US investment in the Russian economy is so small is that the United States does not have a ratified bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Russia, unlike 38 other nations that represent most of the major global economies and most members of the European Union. As a consequence, Americans usually invest in Russia through a European subsidiary that enjoys better legal protection. Although Russia did not ratify the 1992 BIT, it has clearly indicated that it welcomes such an agreement— which became part of the bilateral April 2008 Sochi Declaration— but the Bush administration sought to negotiate a new, better BIT only in its final months. A BIT would also encourage Russian investment in the United States. Foreign investment not only provides jobs for Americans but also, as Yale professor of economics Aleh Tsyvinski writes, “foster[s] economic interdependence.” He continues: “By investing in U.S. and European assets, Russia’s government and business elites are buying a stake in the global economy. This should bring better mutual understanding and a more rational and accountable foreign policy.”31 The United States must work with Russia to ensure that openness to foreign investment is reciprocal and that legal protections for investors are guaranteed. A crucial issue in Russia’s standing in world commerce is its WTO accession. Russia suspended its application to join the WTO in anticipation of Western sanctions against its war in Georgia, which never materialized. Hopefully, it will reinstate its application soon. It is the largest economy that remains outside the organization. The United States has consistently favored Russia’s membership in the WTO as well as in other international economic institutions, as such integration would not only boost commerce but also promote rules-based international norms of economic behavior in Russia and thus influence Russian policy. The United States should continue to support Russia’s WTO accession and work with Russia and WTO members to overcome their objections. Russia is already an active and responsible board member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In 2007 Russia showed positive engagement by proposing its own, highly respected candidate for managing director of the IMF. Economic integration will provide additional opportunities for the Russian leadership to further develop its global engagement. In addition, Russia has been a full member of the G-8 since 1997 (although the finance ministers group is still only G-7). The Obama administration should follow the lead of the Bush administration and devote more attention and resources to developing the G-20 (created by the

Clinton administration in 1998) rather than the G-8, which seems increasingly unrepresentative and obsolete. Russia shares this view. In his October 2008 speech in Evian, France, President Medvedev expressed a strong interest in reforming the anachronistic system of international financial governance.32 Although Russian proposals have not been very concrete, such efforts should be welcomed in principle. Russia’s interest in engaging in reform of the international financial architecture is a positive development, even if its views may sometimes conflict with those of the United States. Russian accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is also important. Like the WTO, the OECD is a highly legalistic organization that requires new members to adopt many rules before they are granted entry. Membership carries with it obligations such as observance of international standards relating to rule of law, transparency, and property rights, all of which must be adopted in coordination with other members, in particular close European allies. Another roadblock is the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. It requires the executive branch to certify to Congress annually that there are no restrictions on the emigration of Jews from Russia; if it were invoked, prohibitive Smoot-Hawley tariffs would apply to all Russian imports to the United States. This Cold War holdover no longer serves any useful purpose and is routinely voided. Presidents Clinton and Bush both promised to graduate Russia from the amendment. The United States should fulfill its promise, which would facilitate Russia’s entry into the WTO.

relations thresholdEven if the current state isn’t perfect – it could be worseAdomanis 3/7 (Mark Adomanis, Forbes contributor, “The Russian Presidential Election and the Future of the Reset,” 3/7/12) http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/03/07/the-russian-presidential-election-and-the-future-of-the-reset/

What Rubin does not attempt to argue, largely because its impossible, is that confrontation with Russia will better serve American interests. You think the Russians are being insufficiently supportive of our war effort in Afghanistan? You think they should more fulsomely back our efforts to sanction Iran? You think they should stop arming Assad? Great, how are you going to get them to do so? Saying nasty things about Putin won’t get them to change their policies as the man seems to truly revel in the hatred of Western hawks (recall his famous speech in Munich in 2007). The Russians have never been in the habit of giving up something for nothing, and while they are open to considering deals they will not simply fold in the face of angry Republican rhetoric. The idea, embraced by people like Rubin, that there is no conflict between America’s interests and its values is just flatly inaccurate – a country with a globe-spanning presence will always have to cut deals with some truly unsavory regimes (hello, Saudi Arabia!) and some truly nasty people. It’s not pretty, but that’s the way the world works. The alternative to the reset, then, is not a Russian policy that magically forces the Russians to do our bidding, but a policy that guarantees mutual suspicion and heightened tensions. In an environment in which the US’ position is swiftly crumbling, it has to be very careful about whom it picks its fights with. Obama and the reset architects seem to understand this, Rubin and the Republicans absolutely do not.

Even if relations are difficult – doesn’t mean impossible or that we shouldn’t tryAllison and Blackwill, 11 – * director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND ** Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October 2011) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf Some acknowledge that Russia matters to the United States, but argue that the Russian government’s foreign and domestic conduct prevents the U.S. from cooperating effectively with Moscow. Having worked with Russia over the past two decades, members of this group are painfully aware of how difficult Russian policy and action can sometimes be. Nevertheless, we believe strongly that America can engage effectively with Moscow in ways that advance U.S. national interests and values. Where best efforts by the United States are rebuffed, Washington should act to achieve what it can and continue to engage toward further progress. Those who dismiss efforts to collaborate with Moscow typically argue that the U.S. cannot collaborate with Russia because: • American and Russian national interests diverge so substantially that cooperation is impractical and unlikely to achieve substantial results. American and Russian values differ so significantly that cooperation is impossible without sacrificing key U.S. principles. • The possible benefits to the United States will not justify the effort, either because Russia is too difficult or unreliable an interlocutor or, alternatively, because Moscow is not able to deliver on important issues. This section briefly responds to each of these objections. First, U.S. and Russian national interests do indeed diverge in many areas. Despite this, however, the United States and Russia share many common interests, including some which are vital: slowing the spread of nuclear weapons; combatting international terrorism; promoting a reliable international energy system; and sustaining a prosperous world economy. Of course, American and Russian national interests, priorities, and perspectives will likely always differ in significant respects. Thus U.S. leaders must recall clearly that their obligation is to advance American national interests rather than U.S.-Russian relations. Sustainable cooperative relations with Moscow are an instrument to achieve key U.S. goals, not an end in themselves, and Washington must be prepared to confront Russia when U.S. national interests require it. Second, the fact that the United States and Russia have different political systems, and that many Americans see considerable flaws in how Russia is ruled, should not prevent cooperation with Moscow to advance American national interests. The first responsibility of the U.S. government is to ensure the security and prosperity of the American people. Because many nations important to the United States are governed differently, the U.S. government continues to have no alternative but to work with undemocratic governments when important national interests are at stake. In this context, there is no real substitute for dealing with Russia, in particular on countering proliferation, combating international terrorism and enhancing energy security.

at: afghanistanRelations high – AfghanistanJaparidze 3/14 (Misha Japaridze, “Russia to offer air base to US for Afghan transit,” 3/14/12) http://www.kansascity.com/2012/03/14/3490004/fm-russia-offers-airbase-to-us.html

Mexican cartel says no violence during papal visit MOSCOW -- A new deal allowing the United States and its NATO allies to use a Russian air base for transit of troops and military cargo to Afghanistan would help ensure Russia's own security, Russia's foreign minister said Wednesday. Sergey Lavrov said a plan to permit the U.S. and other NATO nations to use the base in the city of Ulyanovsk on the Volga River will soon be considered by the Russian Cabinet. If approved, the deal could help repair Russian ties with the United States, which have become increasingly strained over Washington's missile defense plans in Europe and the Syrian crisis. Moscow has provided the U.S. and other NATO member states with air corridors and railway routes for carrying supplies to and from Afghanistan. The new agreement would for the first time allow alliance members to set up a logistics facility for troops and cargo on Russian territory. Lavrov strongly defended such a deal, saying the success of NATO's mission is essential for fending off the spread of terrorism and illegal drugs from Afghanistan into ex-Soviet Central Asian nations and Russia. "It's in our interests that the coalition achieves a success before withdrawing and makes sure that the Afghans are capable of defending their country and ensuring an acceptable level of security," Lavrov told the lower house of Russia's legislature. Some lawmakers argued that the U.S. military's use of the Ulyanovsk facility could threaten Russia by allowing foreign troops on its soil. "We want those who are fending off threats directed at Russia to efficiently fulfill their tasks," Lavrov said. "We are helping the coalition to proceed from our own interests." In Belgium, NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said boosting cooperation on the Afghan transit would benefit both the alliance and Russia. "Clearly we welcome the cooperation we have with Russia already on transit from and to Afghanistan," she said. "We look forward to reinforcing that agreement because ... NATO and Russia have a joint interest in a stable and secure Afghanistan." Lavrov said the deal to be considered by the Cabinet would allow the transit of NATO troops but that they wouldn't be allowed to stay there. "They aren't going to live there. They will only be moving from one transportation means to another," Lavrov said. He sought to assuage the lawmakers' concern by saying that Russia would reserve the right to check the cargo, but provide specifics about the deal. Earlier this week, Russia's daily Izvestia published excerpts from an official letter sent to parliament by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, which said that the Ulyanovsk facility would be overseen by the civilian authorities and include customs control. The proposal comes amid shrinking supply options to coalition forces in Afghanistan. Earlier this month, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta met with Kyrgyzstan's leaders to stress that America needs the continued use of the U.S. air base there beyond the end of its contract in 2014, largely as a transit center to bring troops home from Afghanistan. The supply routes across the former Soviet Union also have become vital after Pakistan shut down its ground supply routes following the U.S. airstrikes in November that killed a number of Pakistani troops. The high-speed rail route through Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan handles the bulk of the ground supplies.Arguments about no cooperation in afghanistan just prove we should acknowledge the sphereAdomanis 1/19 (Mark Adomanis, Forbes Writer on Russia, degrees from Harvard and Oxford, “National Review's Latest Attack On Obama's Russia Policy: Grasping at Straws,” 1/19/12) http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/01/19/national-reviews-latest-attack-on-obamas-russia-policy-grasping-at-straws/

Writing in National Review, Daniel Vajdic of the American Enterprise Institute mounts a confused and almost incoherent attack on the Obama administration’s Russia policy. Having read Vajdic’s piece several times, I am genuinely unsure of what his actual substantive criticism is. He seems not to be presenting a structured critique of either the formulation or execution of the administration’s policy. Rather, he lays a number of inconvenient and undesirable Russian policies at the feet of “the reset” despite the fact that many of the policies in question actually predate the Obama administration (or even dear Barack’s election to the US senate). To get an idea of what I’m talking about, let’s take a closer look at a few of his criticisms. Supply routes to Afghanistan via Russian territory — the northern portion of the Northern Distribution Network — have become increasingly important since Islamabad shut down transit corridors through Pakistan in late November. U.S. relations with Pakistan are arguably at a post-9/11 nadir. Still, there are a few problems with the Russian option. First, Russia limits NATO to nonlethal equipment and only allows the alliance to ship supplies from the West to Afghanistan, not in the reverse direction. Second, the Kremlin may prove to be no less erratic than Pakistan. Moscow’s ambassador to NATO recently threatened to cut off Russian transit routes to Afghanistan unless the U.S. agrees to scale back its missile-defense plans in Europe. Finally, an expansion of the Russian route makes the U.S. even more reliant on the Kremlin, which may use its leverage to extract concessions in unrelated areas. In addition to missile defense, Russia’s demands could include reduced U.S. engagement with the countries of the former Soviet Union — Moscow’s “sphere of privileged interests” — and a diminution in U.S. criticism of what can mildly be called the Putin regime’s democratic shortcomings. Moreover, to suggest that the Kremlin is cooperating over Afghanistan because of the reset is patently wrong. Perhaps more than any other country in the world save the U.S., Russia fears the return of the Taliban and the further diffusion of Islamic fundamentalism into Central Asia, which threatens its southern periphery. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Moscow assists the U.S. in Afghanistan because “it serves our security interests.” What is Vajdic’s actual criticism? That the Russians aren’t fighting shoulder to shoulder with us in Kandahar? That they’re not sufficiently engaged in part of some grand Western crusade against Islamic extremism? The Russian policy (helping NATO, but with restraint) makes perfect sense if you realize that, while the Russians certainly don’t want the Taliban to storm to victory, they also don’t want to have a permanent NATO presence in Central Asia. Vajdic is clearly unimpressed with the Russian contribution to our war in Afghanistan, but how would he change this? Would he offer the Russians concessions in their “near abroad?” No, that’s off the table. That’s appeasement. Would he agree to tone down US criticism of the Russian government? No, that’s also appeasement. Would he just yell at them a lot? Say really nasty

things to Vladimir Putin until he agreed to offer more fulsome assistance? Maybe we could tell Susan Rice to bang her shoe on the gavel at the UN. The Russians, and Putin most of all, remember very clearly that, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when they enthusiastically signed on to the US war on terror it got them precisely zilch. Putin’s support of the American campaign in Afghanistan, something which he took very significant political risks to deliver, didn’t get him anything: Bush still unilaterally abrogated the ABM treaty (less than a month after we had officially overthrown the Taliban government), imperiously dismissed any Russian concerns over missile defense as the mindless complaints of people still stuck in the Cold War, and, of course, fomented “colored revolutions” all throughout the post-Soviet space. So why would the Russians repeat their mistake? Why would they unreservedly support our campaign in Afghanistan when they have, in the very recent past, clearly seen that such a stance is foolish and self-defeating? Why would they give us something for nothing? The Russians (very understandably!) will offer NATO assistance sufficient to ensure that the Taliban cannot win, but they will not help us so much that Afghanistan is transformed into an American satrapy. This concern about American power in Central Asia is not some strange and peculiar manifestation of Putin’s authoritarian malice, but a very basic geopolitical calculation. The Russians see Central Asia as part of their sphere of influence, and a permanent American military presence is obviously incompatible with that . The “democratic” Yeltsin administration had a very similar understanding of Russia’s role in Central Asia, that is a power broker that helped mediate disputes and which had to be consulted in all matters of importance, it was just too bankrupt and dysfunctional to pursue it. Let’s move on from Afghanistan to several more of Vajdic’s criticisms:

at: election rhetoricElection rhetoric won’t hurt relationsKudenko 3/23 (Alexey Kudenko, RIA Novosti, “U.S. Baffled by Russian America-Bashing – McFaul,” 3/23/12) http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120323/172347579.html

The rise of anti-Americanism during the Russian presidential campaign came as an unpleasant surprise to the United States but would likely do no damage to long-term bilateral relations, said U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul. The White House will counter the hostile rhetoric through “real diplomacy,” McFaul said in an interview to Voice of America radio published late Thursday. He did not elaborate. “We don’t want a throwback to some kind of ‘Cold War’ and acrimonious rhetoric. We don’t think it serves American interests,” McFaul was cited as saying in the interview, which is only available in Russian translation. He also said that the media backlash has allowed opponents of U.S. President Barack Obama to question the “reset” in Russian-American relations, which McFaul helped mastermind in 2009, when he was advisor to Obama. However, Russian officials said in informal talks that they prefer to continue dialogue with the United States, the ambassador said. McFaul met with leaders of opposition protests in Moscow in January, shortly after arriving to Russia. The meeting prompted pro-government media to accuse the opposition of being funded by the U.S. State Department. McFaul denied the allegations in his interview, saying that the United States is only sponsoring Russian non-political nongovernment organizations, involved in building the civil society, including ecological groups and independent vote monitors. Obama plans no major changes to his Russian policy and expects president-elect Vladimir Putin to support the decision, McFaul said. He added that the two presidents intend to meet on American soil in May to discuss bilateral relations. The United States will continue with their efforts to convince Moscow that U.S. missile defense shield, which is to be deployed in Eastern Europe, poses no threat to Russia, McFaul said. America will also try to reconcile its position on Syria and Iran with Russia, McFaul said. He admitted considerable differences on both issues but cited successful past compromises, as well as Russia’s support of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, as reasons for optimism. McFaul also reiterated his call to cancel the Jackson-Vanik amendment, an American piece of legislation from 1974 that introduced economic sanctions against the Soviet Union.

at: magnitsky listWon’t kill relationsRia Novosti, 10/21/2011, “'Magnitsky list' won’t undermine Russia-US relations, Lavrov says,” http://en.ria.ru/russia/20111021/167961475.html

The so-called Magnitsky list that bars entry to the U.S. for Russian officials allegedly involved in the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, will not undermine relations between the two countries, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Friday. The relations established by the Obama and Medvedev administrations are strong enough to withstand "various attempts to ruin them," Lavrov told three Russian radio stations. “I am sure, that the 'Magnitsky list'… won’t undermine the foundations of Russia-US relations," he said.

at: missile defenseTalks resuming over missile defense – its being sorted outBelyaninov et al 3/12 (Kirill Belyaninov, deputy editor in chief at FLB Investigative Agency, senior investigative reporter at Sovershenno sekretno, special correspondent at Komsomolskaya Pravda Alexander Gabuyev, Yelena Chernenko, “AMERICAN SECRET,” Defense and Security, No. 318, No 3/12/12)

The U.S. Administration is prepared to offer Russia classified data on components of the future European ballistic missile defense system. First and foremost, the matter concerns SM-3 specs. The White House hopes that it will allay Russia's fears and stifle its protests against the missile shield, the apple of discord in the American-Russian relations. What information is available to this newspaper indicates that the dialogue over ballistic missile defense systems might be reactivated before Vladimir Putin's inauguration. That the White House resumed attempts to find a way out of the cul-de-sac the talks with Russia had entered became clear from the words of Brad Roberts of the Pentagon. Addressing the U.S. Congress last week, Roberts said that Washington was considering transfer of some technical data on the future ballistic missile defense system to Russia. "Transfer of some classified data will only benefit our cooperation [with Russia]," said Roberts. April Cunningham of the Pentagon confirmed her colleague's words. "We are trying to decide at this point transfer of what information on the future system will promote our interests," she said. Sources within the U.S. Congress meanwhile are convinced that the matter concerns technical parameters of SM-3, the upgraded killer missile designed by Raytheon Co., that is supposed to become the pivotal element of the future European ballistic missile defense system. The impression is that the White House is once again promoting the idea that caused considerable friction with the U.S. Congress in late 2011 and was dropped because of the scandal that erupted then. The idea was first voiced in November 2011 when Michael Turner of the U.S. Congress announced that Ellen Tauscher since replaced by Rose Gottemoeller had offered to give this information to the Russians on her visit to Moscow a month before. VBO or velocity burnout will enable specialists to decide whether or not killer missiles pose a threat to Russian ICBMs. That Russia would dearly like to know SM-3's VBO need not be said. Senior Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told this newspaper Moscow needs to know specs of SM-3's advanced modifications (Block 2A and Block 2B to be fielded by 2020). The scandal Turner's words caused delayed endorsement by the legislature of the new U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul. In late November, some senators approached McFaul with the demand to speak up on clandestine talks with the Russians. McFaul replied that the White House was but considering this idea. He said that the matter never concerned telemetric data and that the NDPC had never even discused the issue yet. U.S. legislators calmed down some and finally endorsed McFaul as the new ambassador in Moscow. The latest statements from the Pentagon make it clear that Washington is not through with the idea. The United States has even more reasons now to sweet-talk Russia into being cooperative than it did in late 2011. Absence of progress in the missile shield talks jeopardizes the Russian-NATO Council summit scheduled for May. Cunningham made it plain that release of telemetric data remained out of the question. A spokesman for the U.S. Department of State meanwhile said that representatives of the Russian military were welcome to visit the Petersen US AF Base where the next SM-3 tests were to take place. Russia is waiting for the United States to do something about the cul-de-sac the American obstinacy drove the talks into. "We kept making them constructive offers all through 2011. We suggested several variants of the coupling of the two systems, for example," said a senior Russian diplomat. "It is the Americans' turn now." There is a chance for Moscow and Washington to discuss the matter in detail. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, is expected in the Russian capital soon. According to the information this newspaper has compiled, the visit may take place this month.

Obama will give in on missile defense Bendikova 3/26 (Michaela Bendikova, “U.S. President Willing to Give in to Russia’s Missile Defense Demands,” 3/26/12) http://blog.heritage.org/2012/03/26/u-s-president-willing-to-give-in-to-russias-missile-defense-demands/

The United States does not need to protect itself from a threat of ballistic missiles. At least that is what President Obama suggests in his recent exchange with Dmitry Medvedev, president of the Russian Federation, during the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. “On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this can be solved but it’s important for him [incoming president Vladimir Putin] to give me space,” stated President Obama. “This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility,” he continued.These comments should come as no surprise. The Administration made clear that it is willing to sacrifice U.S. missile defense when it conceded to Russian demands to limit U.S. missile defenses in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that entered into force in February 2011. A group of Senators led by Jon Kyl (R–AZ), however, objected to limitations set forth by the treaty. These Senators argued that Moscow will use this language to limit the U.S. missile defense program. Their fears materialized as Russia repeatedly threatened nuclear deployments close to NATO allies’ borders. Moscow also threatened to withdraw from New START if the United States does not “cooperate” with Russia on missile defense.

Other issues outweighVLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, AP, 10/25/2011, “NATO still hopes to link Russia to missile shield,” http://www.newsday.com/news/nato-still-hopes-to-link-russia-to-missile-shield-1.3270652

Despite the missile defense dispute, Appathurai argued that current relations between NATO and Russia are "broader and deeper than they have ever been ," pointing to Russia providing a vital overland supply link for NATO forces in Afghanistan. "We have a clear shared interest in ensuring that Afghanistan finds its feet, maintains stability and doesn't export drugs, terrorism or extremism," he said. The two sides have cooperated successfully on counter-terrorism,

anti-drug and counter-piracy missions, and "have potential for more in all of these areas," Appathurai said. "We shouldn't let missile defense become the single prism through which we see our relationship ," he added. "It's not the only part and shouldn't define the rest of it."

Won’t hurt relations – US pursuing compromiseVLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, AP, 10/25/2011, “NATO still hopes to link Russia to missile shield,” http://www.newsday.com/news/nato-still-hopes-to-link-russia-to-missile-shield-1.3270652

NATO still hopes to engage Russia in its prospective missile defense system, but won't yield to Moscow's push for the shield to be run jointly, an alliance envoy said Tuesday. James Appathurai, deputy assistant NATO Secretary General, said the alliance would like to reach a missile defense deal with Moscow by NATO's summit in Chicago next May, but added that he wouldn't "gamble on expectations." "We are always, of course, optimistic at NATO," Appathurai said at a news conference. "But we are also determined to keep the hand outstretched. I can't predict, of course, when we would arrive at agreement." Russia says the U.S.-led missile defense plan could threaten its nuclear forces, undermining their deterrence potential. It has agreed to consider NATO's proposal last fall to cooperate on the missile shield, but the talks have been deadlocked over how the system should be operated. Russia has insisted that the system should be run jointly, which NATO has rejected. Appathurai insisted that the alliance's 28 members share a treaty obligation to provide security for each other and can't outsource that. "We can't do that with any other partner no matter how trusted," he said, adding that NATO is offering Russia an "unprecedented level of transparency and cooperation." Appathurai argued that the alliance has proposed to engage Russia by sharing data and coordinating a response. He also mentioned a U.S. proposal for Moscow to have a close look at the shield's technical capabilities and see that it won't threaten its security.

Russia pursuing a compromiseRia Novosti, 10/27/2011, “Russia expects US compromise on missile defense,” http://twocircles.net/2011oct27/russia_expects_us_compromise_missile_defense.htmlRussia is hoping that the US will make reciprocal efforts to break a deadlock over the European missile shield , Russia’s envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said. "We expect that the United States and its NATO allies will, after all, make steps to meet Russia halfway , because Russia has demonstrated its absolute creativity in search of a compromise," Rogozin said after a meeting with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen Wednesday.

at: putinPutin won’t be anti west – already shifting from election rhetoricGhitis 3/22 (Frida Ghitis, “World Citizen: Russia's Putin Prepares for Next Act on Global Stage,” 3/22/12)

In the run-up to Russia’s March 4 presidential election , with opposition forces staging massive protests, Vladimir Putin sharply escalated the intensity of his anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric . His accusations of U.S. interference in Russian affairs and portrayal of America as an enemy of Russia brought back memories of the Cold War, raising the specter that Moscow would become an unmovable obstacle in the path of many of Washington's foreign policy objectives. The concern carried particular weight at a time when the U.S. and its allies are trying to muster a united front to stop Iran's nuclear program and to bring an end to the massacres of Syrian protesters by forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. That fear turned into reality when Russia -- along with China -- blocked action on Syria at the U.N. Security Council in February. But now that Putin has been re-elected president, Washington , the West and their allies in the Middle East may well rediscover the old Putin, the pragmatist , re- entering the global stage. Less than three weeks after the vote, we are already seeing signs of a more conciliatory foreign policy. Putin's shrill invective against the U.S. was , in large part, political theater . In the end, hewon the presidential election by huge margins in a decisive, if controversial, landslide at the polls. But before that victory, he had been dealt a troubling surprise that caused him to turn up the invective against the West: The size of the protests against his rule came as something of a shock to a man who had been used to enjoying largely unquestioned support from voters. Putin was afraid of a poor showing. Embracing the fiery anti-Western stance , complete with muscle-flexing at the Security Council, was a p opulist, crowd-pleasing tactic. With the election behind him, Putin is likely to subtly retune his foreign policy . The reversal will not be visibly dramatic. A sharp reversal of his stance on Syria would be too transparent. But there are reasons to expect that Moscow will take a somewhat more cooperative approach, one that will be much less disruptive to the wishes of many Arab countries, in addition to Turkey, the U.S. and its European friends. To be sure, Moscow would like to see Assad survive. After all, he is not only a friend in the crucial Middle East with ports on the Mediterranean, but also a prized customer, spending almost 80 percent of his fast-growing defense budget on Russian weapons. Damascus has engaged in a military shopping spree in Russia, ringing up $1 billion in purchases last year. But Putin, who is at heart a pragmatist, does not want to completely alienate the West or the Arab countries that would like to see the carnage end in Syria. Moscow is likely to try mending fences. For Putin, stimulating economic growth in Russia is a top priority and a key to holding onto power. The turmoil in the Middle East has driven up oil prices, boosting Russia’s export revenues. But the risk of more instability -- including a new war, whether in Syria or Iran -- could bring a costly global economic slowdown. Putin also wants to bolster foreign investment and Western demand for Russian exports. If he is seen as unpredictable and antagonistic, a wildcard in world affairs, the Russian economy could pay the price. Already there have been signs of a softening of Russia's position. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has announced that Russia, which twice blocked U.N. resolutions on Syria, is now prepared to support a Security Council statement in support of former U.N. Secretary- General Kofi Annan's mediation mission on behalf of the Arab League and the U.N. Moscow also issued a statement of support for a plan by the International Committee of the Red Cross that would establish a daily two-hour humanitarian ceasefire. Moscow has also suddenly started criticizing Assad , saying the Syrian president committed "many mistakes" that have made a bad situation worse. Russia is still calling for reconciliation rather than regime change . But for the first time, it looks as if Moscow is trying to distance itself from Assad, launching some of its toughest criticism yet since the start of the uprising. On the Iran file, Putin had already showed his pragmatic side. While Moscow has been highly critical of some of the stiffer penalties imposed against the Islamic Republic, it has also shown a remarkable willingness to negotiate on the issue. Russia has provided Iran with nuclear know-how, having built the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, and it would like to hold onto its client and its influence in the Islamic Republic. But it prefers stability in the Middle East, which could be threatened unless the West persuades Iran to stop enriching uranium. Moscow already cancelled the $1 billion sale of anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems to Tehran. And Putin has shown that when it comes to Iran, he is willing to deal with Washington. Russian officials have repeatedly warned against a military strike against Iran's nuclear installations, but Russia has supported a number of sanctions against Iran in exchange for certain benefits from the U.S. With his election to a new term as president now achieved , Putin no longer feels a domestic imperative to rouse nationalist sentiments by taking on the West. That suggests his anti-American stance will ease. But don't expect a very dramatic transformation in short order. Despite Putin’s large margin of victory, opposition to his rule has not disappeared. And if anti-Putin forces give any sign of strengthening at home, he is likely to turn up the volume of his invective against Washington and once again bring back the echoes of the Cold War.

Relations will be ok under putinPifer 3/5 (Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, “What Putin’s Return to the Presidency Means for U.S.-Russia Relations,” 3/5/12) http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0305_russia_pifer.aspx

On May 7, Vladimir Putin will be inaugurated as Russia’s president, reclaiming the position that he ceded to Dmitry Medvedev in 2008. That raises questions for Washington, which became comfortably accustomed to dealing with Medvedev. Putin’s return portends a more complicated bilateral relationship, but it should not go over a cliff. Here are five points to consider. A flag, displaying a portrait of Vladimir Putin flies during a rally to support Putin near the Kremlin in central Moscow March 4, 2012. First, although Putin as prime minister was nominally number two to Medvedev, there is no doubt who held real power. As the American Embassy in Moscow reportedly put it, Putin played Batman to Medvedev’s Robin. Batman kept a close watch on things. The New START Treaty, expanded supply routes through Russia for NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Moscow’s support for an arms embargo on Iran would not have happened had Putin opposed them. His return to the presidency should not

mean a different strategic approach toward the United States. Second, the tone of bilateral relations—particularly at the highest level—will change. Putin spent his formative years in the 1980s as a KGB officer, when the United States was the “glavniy protivnik,” the main opponent. As his rhetoric during the election campaign made clear, he holds a wary skepticism about U.S. goals and policies. For example, his comments suggest he does not see the upheavals that swept countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt as manifestations of popular discontent but instead believes they were inspired, funded and directed by Washington—and that the ultimate target is Russia. Putin’s experience as president dealing with the Bush administration, moreover, was not a happy one. Putin extended himself early on, supporting U.S. military action against the Taliban and calmly accepting U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but he believes that he received little in return. In his view, Washington made no effort to accommodate Moscow’s concerns on key issues such as strategic arms limits, missile defense deployments, NATO enlargement or graduating Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The reset, after all, took place during Medvedev’s presidency. Third, Putin faces tough issues at home, both economically and politically. The Russian economy and government revenues remain overly dependent on exports of oil and natural gas. While Medvedev called for economic modernization and diversification, there are few signs of a realistic plan to achieve those aims. And Putin made a number of electoral promises, including higher salaries, rising pensions and greater defense spending, that will need to be funded. Moreover, for the first time in his experience, Putin will have to deal with the outside world without being confident that he has a solid political base at home. It will be interesting to see how that affects his foreign policy. Soviet and Russian leaders in the past resorted to the enemy image to rally domestic support, and one can see aspects of that in Putin’s campaign. But the constituency to whom that appeals is already in Putin’s camp; will the ploy resonate with an increasingly unhappy urban middle class? He may conclude that he can focus better on domestic challenges with a less confrontational relationship with countries such as the United States. Fourth, Putin has shown himself to be realistic, particularly when it comes to money. A major article that he published in the run-up to the election described a large military modernization program designed to reassert parity with the United States. But during his first presidency, when huge energy revenues flowed into the Russian government budget from 2003 to 2007, Putin chose not to significantly increase defense spending. Instead, the extra money—and there was plenty of it—went to build international currency reserves and a “rainy day” fund on which the government drew heavily during the 2008-09 economic crisis. He understands that having a large arsenal of weapons did not save the Soviet Union. If circumstances force Putin to make tough choices, he may prove pragmatic and not necessarily choose guns over butter. Fifth, Putin likely will not fully show his hand regarding the United States until 2013. He expects to be around for another six and possibly twelve years. He may see little harm in waiting six months to learn who will be his opposite number in the White House. The upshot is that Putin’s return could and probably will mean more bumpiness in the U.S.-Russia relationship. He will pursue his view of Russian interests. On certain issues, those will conflict with U.S. interests, and Washington and Moscow will disagree, perhaps heatedly. Putin’s style will differ markedly from Medvedev’s. But he is not likely to seek to turn the relationship upside down or take it back to the grim days of 2008. For all the rhetoric now, we should not rule out that the American president will be able to deal with Putin.

You have to distinguish between rhetoric and actual relationsAllison and Blackwill, 11 – * director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND ** Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf)

Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s emergence as an independent state, Moscow is no longer America’s strategic rival. Yet, while Russia is not our enemy, neither has it become a friend. Washington and Moscow have succeeded in overcoming Cold War confrontation, but have not developed sustainable cooperative relations. A better-managed bilateral relationship is critical for the advancement of America’s vital national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return to the Kremlin as Russia’s President next year does not change U.S. national interests with respect to Russia or, for that matter, Russia’s national interests with respect to the United States. Still, at a minimum, Russia’s rhetoric vis-à-vis America and the West may become tougher under Putin. Under the circumstances, maintaining the proper focus in U.S.-Russian relations will likely require particular care and determination from U.S. policymakers.

at: republicans win elections

That’s just Republican blusterAndrew C. Kuchins, Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/2/2011, “Russia-U.S. relations after 2012 elections,” http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20111102/168361206.html

Do you expect that the relationships between the two countries will undergo drastic changes after 2012 elections in both countries? I do not think they will undergo drastic changes after the 2012 elections in Russia. I think, that president Medvedev and prime-minister Putin are basically in agreement about the advisability of the, so called “reset” of the Russian-US relations that has taken place over the last nearly three years. I think the much bigger question mark is: what is going to happen in the US elections? If Barak Obama is reelected, then, I think, we will see basically continuation of the policy. From my point of view, the “reset” has been successful. The relationship has been reset. We have now more normal and constructive relationship with Russia, as we should have. I think, we are not going to have that momentum of watershed agreements, (and one of them I forgot to mention, of course, the Civilian Nuclear-1, -2, -3 agreement, which was concluded at the end of last year). Still I think trying to build on the levels of cooperation that we have would be the case with the Obama administration. Republican administration is a much bigger question mark. Maybe it’s just pre-electoral games? Republicans have to play them, trying to undermine the Obama administration as much as possible. Right, the Obama administration views the “reset” as one of the most important foreign policy achievements. Naturally, the opposition party is going to find ways to criticize that, to try to knock it down. When you come to actual governing, it’s a different matter.

at: already lost libyan contractsRussia is well-positioned to get oil contracts nowUPI ‘11(“Russia eyes return to Libyan energy sector,” 12-29, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/12/29/Russia-eyes-return-to-Libyan-energy-sector/UPI-47751325160014/)

With Libyan oil production returning to pre-war levels, Russian energy companies might be well positioned to work with the new government , an analyst said. Russian interest in Libyan oil surfaced last year when Boris Zilbermints, the deputy chief executive of Gazprom Neft, said his company is exploring various business opportunities in Libya. Gazprom said in June 2010 that it planned to join the Elephant oil field through an asset swap with Italian energy company Eni, a major player in the Libyan energy sector. Grigory Birg, an analyst and Russia's Investcafe, told Voice of Russia the Libyan war didn't undermine business opportunities between the two countries. "The cooperation with the Russian energy companies will develop practically on the same terms as before the domestic conflict in Libya," he said. "The Russian gas giant Gazprom and the Tatneft Company, which were involved in the projects in Libya before the Arab Spring, are willing to return there."

russia moderating nowProtests will cause policy shift nowMeyer ‘11(Henry Meyer and Lyubov Pronina, “Putin Opponents to Keep Rallies Up as Presidency Vote Nears,” Bloomberg, 12-16, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-16/putin-opponents-to-keep-rallies-up-as-presidency-vote-nears.html)

Russian middle-class protests will continue against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as he tries to shore up his support less than three months before a presidential election. Opposition leaders got permission yesterday to follow up Moscow’s biggest ever anti-Putin demonstration on Dec. 10 with a rally of as many as 50,000 people on Dec. 24. That would be double the size of the crowd police estimated last week. Putin in a televised call-in show today denied fraud in this month’s parliamentary vote and warned his opponents against destabilizing the country. Growing discontent handed the ruling United Russia party its worst electoral setback in the Dec. 4 parliamentary vote and is threatening to force Putin into a runoff for the first time in his bid to return to the presidency. Protests over election fraud, led by urban professionals who benefited from Russia’s prosperous decade, have pushed equity prices lower and helped send the ruble on its longest losing streak since January 2009. “I don’t think cold weather and snow are going to be enough to put this middle-class genie back in the bottle,” Roland Nash, chief investment strategist at Moscow-based Verno Capital, which manages $175 million, said yesterday by e-mail. “I think there are enough politicized people to keep up the pressure until March.” The dollar-denominated RTS stock index has lost more than 13 percent of its value since markets reopened after the parliamentary elections, in which United Russia won just below 50 percent of votes amid accusations of ballot-stuffing. The ruble has declined for 10 straight sessions against the dollar. ‘Very Volatile Market’ “It’s a very volatile market at the moment,” Javier Garcia, a portfolio manager at Swiss & Global Asset Management Ltd. in Zurich who manages the $30 million Julius Baer Russia Fund, said in a Bloomberg Television interview yesterday. “The new government now has a big chance to listen to this new force and to implement reforms and to bring Russia into the next growth level.” United Russia’s majority in the State Duma slumped to 238 of the legislature’s 450 seats from 315 in 2007 as stalling wage growth and the government’s shortcomings in curbing corruption repelled voters. U.S. and European observers said the vote was neither free nor fair. The party won more than 46 percent of the vote in Moscow, Europe’s largest city with 11.5 million people and the epicenter of the protests to date, according to official results. That compared with 27.5 percent support in an exit poll by the Public Opinion Foundation. ‘No One-Time Phenomenon’ The momentum for protests will grow as demonstrators plan more rallies across the country, according to Vladimir Ryzhkov, a leader of Solidarity, an umbrella group that unites several opposition movements. “The authorities need to understand that this isn’t just a one-time phenomenon but a constant campaign of civil protests like in Syria, Libya, Georgia or Yugoslavia, until the people achieve their goals,” Ryzhkov said in a Dec. 12 interview. “The thousands that came to protest Dec. 10 are just the tip of the iceberg.” Elena Ivanovskaya, 33, a mother-of-three who works in publishing in Moscow, was among the protesters who braved snow and near-freezing temperatures on Dec. 10 on an island south of the Kremlin and plans to protest again on Dec. 24. “We want change,” said Ivanovskaya, who worked as a volunteer election-commission member for the pro-democracy Yabloko party during the parliamentary poll and is going to file a court complaint on vote falsification at her station. “If the authorities continue to behave in the same way, pressuring people, they will provoke even the most loyal citizens to protest.” Presidential Vote Putin, 59, said in September he plans to return to the presidency, pushing aside Dmitry Medvedev, who replaced him in 2008 after his predecessor completed the constitutional maximum two consecutive terms. He needs to win more than 50 percent backing in the March 4 election to avoid a runoff and may face billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov and Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party, which came second in the Duma vote. Putin is “determined to win in the first round,” which can only be achieved by mass fraud, according to Stanislav Belkovsky, a former Kremlin adviser who heads the Institute for National Strategy in Moscow. If this happens, “hundreds of thousands of people will take to the streets, not tens of thousands as before,” he said by phone Dec. 13. ‘Election Abuse’ There may be greater fraud in the presidential elections because there will be fewer players involved and therefore less monitoring, according to Golos, a vote-monitoring group. “This offers a greater possibility for election abuse,” Alexander Kynev, head of Moscow-based Golos’s analytical department, said yesterday by e-mail. “If the list of candidates holds no intrigue and is of no interest, turnout will be low. That will hugely increase the temptation to inflate it through fraud.” Putin would risk unleashing a “destructive force” by rigging parliamentary and presidential elections, the Center for Strategic Studies, a Moscow-based research group that advises the government, warned in a March report. Economic growth averaged 7 percent a year during Putin’s 2000-2008 tenure and he remains Russia’s most popular politician. His approval rating is 46 percent, according to a Nov. 26-27 poll of 3,000 people by the Public Opinion Foundation. No margin of error was given. The state-run All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, or VTsIOM, gives Putin 41 percent approval in a poll conducted among 1,600 people on Nov. 26-27 with a 3.4 percentage-point margin of error. Dealing With Dissent The Dec. 10 rally, which passed without violence or detentions, shows that Russian authorities are becoming better at

dealing with dissent, said Joerg Forbrig, senior program officer for Central and Eastern Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin. Putin has been “on a learning curve for the past 20 years and now better knows how to handle protests and win back popular support,” he said. “It’s very smart of Putin to let it go and give free space to protesters and let them be covered in the media. The Christmas holiday is coming and it may peter out.” To address voter concerns, Putin “should focus on reforms, push them through, bring down corruption and bureaucracy and make Russia an attractive place to invest in,” Swiss & Global’s Garcia said. Middle Class It’s the successful, urban professionals that have featured prominently at rallies so far who Putin must please, according to Andrei Nechayev, a former economy minister and president of the Russian Finance Corporation. “This means the middle-class is fed up, this is an entirely new development,” said Nechayev, who attended the Dec. 10 rally. While the emergence of a politically active middle class may prove a thorn in Putin’s side as he gears up for a return to the Kremlin, it’s positive for Russia’s development, according to Verno’s Nash. “In the past, about the only force able to discipline Russia’s leaders has been the oil price,” he said. “A politically active middle class has to be a better way of delivering that.”

Relation Impact – BrinkRels are on the brink brink- repeal is key to sustain cooperationPifer 3-21(Stephen-, Testimony to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “The Future Course of the U.S.-Russia Relationship”, http://www.brookings.edu/ testimony/2012/0321_arms_control_pifer.aspx)

The Obama administration’s “reset” policy has improved the U.S.-Russian relationship. By any objective measure, the relationship is stronger today than it was in 2008, the low point in U.S.-Russian relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This does not mean the relationship is without problems. Washington and Moscow disagree on issues such as missile defense in Europe, Syria, the post-Soviet space, and democracy and human rights within Russia. On May 7, Vladimir Putin will return to the Russian presidency. This should not entail a change in the strategic course of Russian foreign policy, though the tone and style will likely differ from that of Dmitry Medvedev. Mr. Putin will have to confront domestic political and economic challenges that may affect his foreign policy choices: he could resort to the traditional Russian tactic of depicting a foreign adversary to rally domestic support as during his election campaign, or he could pursue a more accommodating foreign policy so that he can focus on issues at home. We do not yet know. It remains in the U.S. interest to engage Russia where engagement can advance American policy goals. In doing so, the United States will at times have to be prepared to take account of Russian interests if it wishes to secure Moscow’s help on questions that matter to Washington. For example, U.S. readiness to accommodate Russian concerns in negotiating the New START Treaty contributed to Moscow’s decision to open new supply routes for NATO to Afghanistan and to support a UN Security Council resolution that imposed an arms embargo on Iran. Looking forward in its relations with Russia, the United States should pursue further reductions of nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons; continue to explore a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement; seek to work jointly to deal with the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea and Iran; and consult on steps to bolster security and stability in Central Asia as the NATO coalition prepares to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan. The United States should explore ways to increase trade and investment relations with Russia, which could help build a foundation for a more sustainable relationship. While Moscow’s decisions about its business and investment climate—for example, to strengthen rule of law and tackle corruption—are the most important factor in this regard, Congress should now graduate Russia from the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, an action that is long overdue.

Relations Impact – Link ExtensionEnding Jackson-Vanik necessary for a full re-set in relations—it has a massive symbolic effect and is the litmus test for relations:Finlay Lewis, 8/10/2008 (Congressional Quarterly Weekly, http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/081009CQ_Jackson-Vanik.shtml, “Russia Longs to Graduate At the Top of Trade Class”)

President Obama has repeatedly stressed that he intends to “reset” the relationship between the United States and Russia. But for that to happen, he first needs to perform a rewind-and-erase task that has eluded his two immediate predecessors: ditching the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War relic that used trade to punish totalitarian regimes if they denied their citizens emigration rights. The law held out the most-favored-nation trade status (i.e., non-discriminatory access to vast and lucrative U.S. consumer markets) as an inducement to enact more liberal emigration policies. China, another Communist power that fell under the law’s strictures, received annual presidential waivers to bypass its conditions until 2002, when trade relations were formalized after China won entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. But similar progress has been stymied for Russia. The measure was enacted as an amendment to a 1974 trade law under the sponsorship of two Democrats, Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington (House 1941-53; Senate 1953-83) and Rep. Charles A. Vanik of Ohio (1951-81), and the Kremlin has been in full compliance since at least 1994, three years after the Soviet Union collapsed. But Congress never managed to get a floor vote for a bill to formalize Russia’s release from the strictures of Jackson-Vanik, a process known as graduation. Bids by Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to get such a measure on track proved to be poorly timed. The first Clinton effort, in 1999, coincided with a major showdown between Russia and NATO over the Kosovo invasion. Bush tried again in the months after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but he dropped the plan when Russia angered American farm groups by erecting trade barriers against U.S. poultry products. The idea resurfaced in 2003 but fizzled after U.S. troops discovered Russian military supplies in the hands of Saddam Hussein’s forces following the invasion of Iraq — hardly an optimal time to shop a Russia trade measure in Congress. Bush pledged to push for Russia’s graduation at summits with President Vladimir V. Putin in 2006 and 2008, but alleged unfair Russian trade practices in the marketing of some agricultural products, combined with ongoing violence in the Russian republic of Chechnya, discouraged the administration from trying to persuade a manifestly reluctant Congress. Perhaps mindful of these past miscues, Obama has kept almost entirely quiet — in public, anyway — about any plans for a Jackson- Vanik repeal. However, senior Russian officials have not been shy about putting words in his mouth. After Obama met separately with Putin, now the prime minister, and President Dmitry Medvedev in Russia last month, Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, told a TV interviewer that Obama “understands the awkwardness of — let’s put it mildly — this situation for the American side and has given an assurance that removal of this amendment will be one of the priorities of his administration.” Still, the status quo clearly rankles — especially since not only China, but also lesser economic powers such as Mongolia and Vietnam got clean Jackson-Vanik bills of health. In January, Putin went out of his way as he spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, to mock U.S. lawmakers who argued to keep Russia under Jackson-Vanik because of Russian trade barriers against American poultry. To underline how little such objections had to do with the amendment’s original intent, Putin quoted former dissident Natan Sharansky, saying that he “had not served time in a Soviet prison for chicken meat.” Sharansky, who eventually emigrated to Israel, has emerged as a high-profile supporter of Russia’s graduation. Symbolic Politics But more than standard trade sniping — or unfortunate timing — has stayed Congress’ hand in lifting the Jackson-Vanik strictures, observers say. The law stands as a landmark in the battle to secure human rights legislation and has compiled a remarkably successful track record. Alan P. Larson, then undersecretary of State for economic, business and agricultural affairs, told lawmakers on the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade in 2002 that about 1 million Russian Jews had made their way to Israel between Jackson-Vanik’s enactment and the date of his testimony. Some 573,000 refugees, including Jews, evangelical Christians and Catholics, had left the old Soviet Union for the United States during the same period. Russia and Israel now authorize visa-free travel between the two nations — an unthinkable development when Jackson-Vanik was signed into law 35 years ago. Indeed, since Russia has long fulfilled the liberalization criteria of the law, the endurance of the trade penalty is not a question of policy, observers say. “Above and beyond anything else, it is symbolic politics,” said James F. Collins, the U.S. ambassador to Russia from 1997 to 2001. “This is seen as a kind of slight of Russia — a treatment of Russia that doesn’t accept its proper international standing . . . that doesn’t recognize that Russia is not the Soviet Union.” During his visit to Russia, Obama affirmed that his administration accords Russia the full respect due a great power and said he looks forward to building a deeper commercial relationship. But Obama’s powerful Russian audience probably won’t take such reassurances to heart until Jackson-Vanik is off the books. As Vladimir Lukin, then-deputy speaker of Russia’s lower house of Parliament, told The Wall Street Journal prior to a 2003 Bush visit to Russia, “This whole history of Jackson-Vanik is already so laughable, it’s legendary.” That perception is precisely why unshackling Russia “has an outsized importance,” said Stephen E. Biegun, executive secretary of Bush’s National Security Council and now Ford Motor Co.’s vice president for international affairs. “This one is low-hanging fruit. It is a tangible sign beyond good wishes and rhetoric that the United States is interested in investing in a constructive relationship with Russia. That makes it bigger than just Jackson-Vanik. There are very few issues we and Russia work on . . . that we can make progress on as dramatic as this.” Sandy Berger, Clinton’s national security adviser, likewise acknowledges that Jackson-Vanik remains freighted with symbolic importance, for better and worse. It has “become the Rorschach test for everything involved in the U.S.-Russia relationship,” he said.

Our link is reverse causal—a vote where we refuse to lift Jackson-Vanik worsens US-Russian relations—sends a signal of displeasure over human rights: Anders Åslund, 2011 (November, a leading specialist on postcommunist economic transformation with more than 30 years of experience in the field, “The United States Should Establish Permanent Normal Trade Relations with Russia,” http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb11-20.pdf)

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US Trade Act of 1974 was approved at the height of the Cold War, when Russia generated outrage by barring Jews from emigrating. It was sponsored by Senator Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson of Washington and Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio. Free emigration for Russian Jews, however, has not been in question since Russia became independent in 1991. The amendment is an outdated remnant of the politics of a distant era, though it remains a major irritant in relations between Washington and Moscow and a political issue in Congress. Many lawmakers, citing a range of disagreements

with Russia over human and legal rights in Russia and various foreign policy issues, say that refusal to lift Jackson-Vanik would send a signal of displeasure over these matters. But other tools exist for exerting pressure on Russia that would be more effective and far less destructive to US economic interests. The US government has alternative bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that can be used to engage Russia on human rights questions and political and religious freedoms, such as the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. If necessary, economic sanctions and tailored penalties, including draconian measures, are readily available under other US statutes, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Originally, Jackson-Vanik applied to almost all communist countries. Over time, nearly all of them were “graduated” when they joined the WTO. Most entered the WTO without having previously secured PNTR from the United States. Only Ukraine, which became a WTO member in 2008, was graduated by Congress in March 2006 in advance of its WTO accession. All but Moldova have eventually been granted PNTR (Pregelj 2005).

Repeal of Jackson-Vanik is the key to relations-outweighs and overwhelms all other issuesMedetsky 2009 (Anatoly, “Putin Links ‘Brave’ U.S. Shift to Trade” Moscow Times, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/383672.html)

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Friday that Washington’s decision to abandon plans to build a missile defense system in Europe give him hope that the U nited States would take further, trade-related steps to improve ties . Moscow is counting on Washington to remove restrictions on the transfer of high technology to Russia and to assist Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in joining the World Trade Organization, Putin said at an economic forum in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. “The latest decision by President Obama … suggests good thoughts, and I very much hope that this very right and brave decision will be followed by others,” Putin said. Obama abruptly announced Thursday that he would scrap plans by former President George W. Bush to install elements of a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Obama said Sunday that Russia’s complaints about the proposed shield had not influenced his decision. (Story Page 4.) President Dmitry Medvedev indicated in comments published Friday that Moscow would now be more receptive to U.S. concerns, but he stopped far short of offering to help Washington in its attempt to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear program. The Bush administration had maintained that the program represented a threat to the United States and its European allies and that the shield was needed to counter it. “The fact that they are listening to us is an obvious signal that we should also attentively listen to our partners, our American partners,” Medvedev said in an interview with Swiss media. But Russia will not make “primitive compromises,” he added. In an interview aired on CNN on Sunday, Medvedev said Russia would not supply Iran with offensive missile systems. (Story, Page 3.) The military, meanwhile, said Obama’s shift on missile defense meant that it would no longer need to deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region next to Poland, as Medvedev had threatened to do on Nov. 4, the day Obama won the U.S. presidential election. “Finally, reason has won over ambitions,” Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin said Saturday on Ekho Moskvy radio. At the Sochi conference, Putin said Obama could go a long way toward further improving ties by abandoning CoCom lists, which banned high-tech exports to the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War. CoCom stands for the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls created by NATO after World War II. “This causes damage to Russia’s cooperation with its partners , first of all the U nited States,” Putin said. “This causes damage to the U.S. businesses as well because it hampers them in developing ties with Russia .” Putin urged U.S. participants of the Sochi forum to try their best to promote eradicating such “vestiges of the past epoch” as soon as possible. U.S. attendees included David Bonderman, founding partner of TPG, one of the world’s largest private equity firms; General Electric chief executive Jeff Immelt; and John Mack, whose term as CEO of Morgan Stanley expires at the start of 2010. In addition to the trade barriers that Putin mentioned, Russia has been urging the United States for years to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Cold War-era legislation that still prevents Russia from obtaining the status of a country that enjoys “normal trade relations” with the United States. Russia desperately needs investment as it emerges from the economic recession , Putin said. The government will soon begin drafting a crisis-exit strategy that will focus on modernizing the economy by offering investors the “most favorable terms and prospects of growth,” he said. Officials realize that the “era of easy, cheap money is, of course, over” and competition for investment will be “extremely tough,” Putin said. Foreign investors, meanwhile, have not modified their Russia wish list much over the past decade or more, said Torbjörn Becker, director of Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, a center for research and policy advice in transition economies. At the top of the list is a corruption-free business environment and a strong, independent legal system, he said. “I am not sure we will see it, but that’s certainly what we would like to see,” Becker said. Some of the key industries that will require investment are transportation, energy, telecoms and digital television, Putin said. He talked at more length about the need to manufacture top-of-the-line car parts in Russia, given that some leading global carmakers, including Renault, operate assembly lines here. “It’s time to make the next step,” he said. “It will be economically viable.” Renault is already in talks with Russian car parts makers to create a network of suppliers for itself and partners Nissan and AvtoVAZ, Renault’s chief of Eurasia division said earlier this month in an interview with The Moscow Times. Russia is interested not so much in foreign money as expertise that comes with global investors , Putin said .

Jackson-Vanik repeal key to US-Russia relations and cooperation over major global issuesCarnegie Council Transcripts and Articles, 2-1-12, p. Lexis

At the same time, we are accustomed to seeing a pattern of ebb and flow when it comes to Russia and Russia policy. It has been our consistent position at the Carnegie Council that, for a host of reasons, the relationship with Russia endures as one of the most critical for the United States. Among these reasons are: [1] The nuclear question: the United States and Russia, New START notwithstanding, still possess more than 90 percent of the world's strategic nuclear warheads, along with the lion's share of tactical nukes, which remain largely unconstrained by any treaty; [2] The matter of trade and commerce: Despite Russia's recent accession to WTO, it is still subject to the anomalous and anachronistic Jackson-Vanik amendment (see Jackson-Vanik: Time for Reconsideration? and Jackson-Vanik: A Bridge to the 20th Century) which, if not removed from the books, could put the United States at a disadvantage in trading with a growing Russian market, and could indeed put us in violation of our WTO obligations; and [3] The plain fact of Russia's strategic global position: from a greater Middle East to North Korea, Russia borders virtually every trouble spot on the planet, thus suggesting that a cooperative U.S.-Russia spirit is preferable to that of confrontation.

Repeal failure undermines the resetMiller 11 [Jacqueline McLaren Miller 8/15/11 The Reset: Down - but not Out, senior associate at the EastWest Institute http://www.ewi.info/reset-down-not-out]

This is far from the only issue bedeviling U.S.-Russia relations. The ongoing application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, which links trade relations to emigration practices, is a long-standing source of Russian ire (see earlier article). Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have been unable to get Congress to graduate Russia from the amendment and grant permanent normal trade relations. Ballistic missile defense also continues to spark controversy. Obama’s decision to move away from Bush’s planned deployment of assets in Poland and the Czech Republic provided just a momentary lull. And the lingering fallout from Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia continues to provide ample opportunities for mutual recriminations, including a leaked U.S. intelligence report linking a Russian intelligence official to a bombing near the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi. Despite these contentious issues, the reset has scored some significant successes. To be sure, it was slow to deliver on its initial promises. The negotiations for New START dragged on for over a year, allowing START to expire. After finally concluding negotiations with Russia, the Obama administration had another hard-fought battle in the Senate to get the treaty ratified. But the entry into force of the New START treaty was one of the major foreign policy successes for the Obama administration and its reset policy. There has also been progress in addressing other strategic U.S. concerns, most significantly Iran and Afghanistan. Washington secured Russian agreement on both over-flight rights for lethal cargo and overland transit of non-lethal cargo to resupply the Afghanistan effort. This took pressure off the Pakistan supply route—now estimated to be used for only 35 percent of supply efforts as compared to about 90 percent two years ago. And Russia recently agreed to expand the distribution network by allowing two-way transit and overland shipment of lethal goods. The United States was also able to gain Russian and Chinese support for sanctions against Iran because of that country’s continued intransigence on international inspection of its nuclear enrichment facilities. The benefits of the reset have been mutual, as demonstrated by New START. Moscow also had reason to be particularly pleased when the U. S. implemented the 123 civilian nuclear agreement, laying out the parameters of peaceful nuclear cooperation with Russia that needed to be in place before U.S. and Russian companies could expand commercial collaboration. After the Russian invasion of Georgia, it had been withdrawn from congressional consideration. Another success of the reset is firm U.S. backing for Russia’s World Trade Organization aspirations. It is expected that Russia’s tortured 18-year application process may finally come to an end at this December’s WTO ministerial in Geneva . Russia is the largest economy outside of the organization and Medvedev’s ambitious modernization program needs the benefits of WTO membership What both sides need to understand is that the reset offers the best hope of maintaining cooperation on key areas of mutual concern and keeping inevitable disagreements within reasonable bounds. To that end, leaders in Moscow and Washington should deliver that message to their highly skeptical domestic constituencies more often. The Obama administration needs to undertake a sustained effort with a Congress that is still deeply suspicious of Russia and could still undermine the reset, especially during an election year. And Russian leaders should think twice before they engage in the kind of rhetorical overkill that only fuels Cold War thinking. Angry rhetoric won’t disappear anytime soon, but it needs to be kept in check. Otherwise, both sides are likely to lose out.

Relations decline kills cooperation with USAllison and Blackwill 11 [Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill October 2011 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care? A Report of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interest Graham Allison Director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton Administration Robert D. Blackwill is the Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Deputy national security adviser for strategic planning under President George W. Bush, presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration’s coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran.]

Just as the United States should expect Russia to adjust many of its policies to achieve a sustainable cooperative relationship, Washington should recognize that Moscow is unlikely to support U.S. policy goals if the U.S.-Russian relationship significantly deteriorates. As a result, the failure to establish an ongoing working relationship with Russia would be quite costly for the United States. As a practical matter, even a stalled relationship could be problematic. The United States and Russia are both motivated to improve relations largely on the basis of hopes for what a stronger relationship could produce. If the prospects for realizing those hopes become too remote, it is uncertain whether what has been accomplished so far is sufficient to prevent our substantial remaining differences from tearing the U.S.-Russian relationship apart. U.S. officials must carefully weigh not only the American national interests in working more closely with Russia, but also the costs and benefits of failing to do so, keeping in mind Moscow’s capacity to act as a spoiler in a number of areas and on a number of issues that are of vital national interest to Washington. In our considered judgment, the choice is clear: the United States should pursue a sustainable cooperative relationship with Russia to advance vital American national interests, but do so without illusions regarding either Moscow’s sometimes neo-imperial ambitions, or the pace of democratic change in Russia.

Failure to repeal collapses relationsAslund and Bergsten 10 [ANDERS ASLUND and C. FRED BERGSTEN June 21, 2010 Foreign Policy: Let Russia Join the WTO http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127981016]

The United States still maintains the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, adopted in 1974 denying favorable trade status to Russia, citing its restrictions on the free emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. The law, a relic of the Cold War, has no practical effect but is a serious irritant in relations between the two countries. And as a practical matter, if Jackson-Vanik remains in force, Russia would simply not apply WTO rules to the United States, perpetuating trade discrimination

against American companies. Hence the amendment should be scrapped immediately after Russia joins. Now is the right time for Obama and Medvedev to resolve the last obstacles on the way to Russian entry to the WTO. The resulting encouragement of Russia's modernization is very much in the interest of both countries. Russia urgently needs to modernize, and the United States, bogged down in Afghanistan and facing the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, needs Russian cooperation more than ever.

Repeal of Jackson-Vanik is the key to relations-outweighs and overwhelms all other issuesMedetsky 2009 (Anatoly, “Putin Links ‘Brave’ U.S. Shift to Trade” Moscow Times, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/383672.html)

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Friday that Washington’s decision to abandon plans to build a missile defense system in Europe give him hope that the United States would take further, trade-related steps to improve ties. Moscow is counting on Washington to remove restrictions on the transfer of high technology to Russia and to assist Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in joining the World Trade Organization, Putin said at an economic forum in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. “The latest decision by President Obama … suggests good thoughts, and I very much hope that this very right and brave decision will be followed by others,” Putin said. Obama abruptly announced Thursday that he would scrap plans by former President George W. Bush to install elements of a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Obama said Sunday that Russia’s complaints about the proposed shield had not influenced his decision. (Story Page 4.) President Dmitry Medvedev indicated in comments published Friday that Moscow would now be more receptive to U.S. concerns, but he stopped far short of offering to help Washington in its attempt to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear program. The Bush administration had maintained that the program represented a threat to the United States and its European allies and that the shield was needed to counter it. “The fact that they are listening to us is an obvious signal that we should also attentively listen to our partners, our American partners,” Medvedev said in an interview with Swiss media. But Russia will not make “primitive compromises,” he added. In an interview aired on CNN on Sunday, Medvedev said Russia would not supply Iran with offensive missile systems. (Story, Page 3.) The military, meanwhile, said Obama’s shift on missile defense meant that it would no longer need to deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region next to Poland, as Medvedev had threatened to do on Nov. 4, the day Obama won the U.S. presidential election. “Finally, reason has won over ambitions,” Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin said Saturday on Ekho Moskvy radio. At the Sochi conference, Putin said Obama could go a long way toward further improving ties by abandoning CoCom lists, which banned high-tech exports to the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War. CoCom stands for the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls created by NATO after World War II. “This causes damage to Russia’s cooperation with its partners, first of all the United States,” Putin said. “This causes damage to the U.S. businesses as well because it hampers them in developing ties with Russia.” Putin urged U.S. participants of the Sochi forum to try their best to promote eradicating such “vestiges of the past epoch” as soon as possible. U.S. attendees included David Bonderman, founding partner of TPG, one of the world’s largest private equity firms; General Electric chief executive Jeff Immelt; and John Mack, whose term as CEO of Morgan Stanley expires at the start of 2010. In addition to the trade barriers that Putin mentioned, Russia has been urging the United States for years to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, Cold War-era legislation that still prevents Russia from obtaining the status of a country that enjoys “normal trade relations” with the United States. Russia desperately needs investment as it emerges from the economic recession, Putin said. The government will soon begin drafting a crisis-exit strategy that will focus on modernizing the economy by offering investors the “most favorable terms and prospects of growth,” he said. Officials realize that the “era of easy, cheap money is, of course, over” and competition for investment will be “extremely tough,” Putin said. Foreign investors, meanwhile, have not modified their Russia wish list much over the past decade or more, said Torbjörn Becker, director of Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, a center for research and policy advice in transition economies. At the top of the list is a corruption-free business environment and a strong, independent legal system, he said. “I am not sure we will see it, but that’s certainly what we would like to see,” Becker said. Some of the key industries that will require investment are transportation, energy, telecoms and digital television, Putin said. He talked at more length about the need to manufacture top-of-the-line car parts in Russia, given that some leading global carmakers, including Renault, operate assembly lines here. “It’s time to make the next step,” he said. “It will be economically viable.” Renault is already in talks with Russian car parts makers to create a network of suppliers for itself and partners Nissan and AvtoVAZ, Renault’s chief of Eurasia division said earlier this month in an interview with The Moscow Times. Russia is interested not so much in foreign money as expertise that comes with global investors, Putin said.

Repeal key to relations reset strategy-failure would infuriate the RussiansKorea Times 10/16 (Hurting US relations with Russia, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/10/137_96741.html)

Two influential Democratic members of Congress, Scoop Jackson of Washington and Charles Vanik, responded with an amendment to a major trade law that denied the Soviet Union and its satellites the trade relations normally extended to other countries, and restricted loans, trade credits and guarantees.The amendment put a great crimp in Soviet trade with both the U.S. and the West. Seismic changes were taking place in the Soviet Union, and the emigration restrictions were gradually lifted and became moot with the fall of the Iron Curtain. Any Jews who wanted to leave, could, and not surprisingly given Russia's long history of anti-Semitism, most did.The Jackson-Vanik amendment, however, continued as a matter of U.S. law and as a great irritant to the Russian government. Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., the senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and no Cold War softie, recommended its repeal as long ago as 2003.The amendment has survived, however, with the support of some senior Republicans who want to keep it in reserve for future leverage against Russia on other issues. This, of course, infuriates the Russians. It bars them from permanent normal trade relations with the United States, what used to be called most favored nation status.Mike McFaul, the senior director for Russia on

the White House National Security Council, this week urged Congress to repeal Jackson-Vanik as both an antiquated law and an impediment to President Barack Obama's efforts to "reset" relations with Russia.

In the context of US security concessions, Putin has explicitly dismissed them as insufficient and asked instead for trade-related benefits. Trade concessions are key to investment in Russia, which they desperately need to recover from the economic crisis.And, we’ll isolate multiple other warrants:A. Equal partnership: Putin thinks US trade restrictions are a symbol of US colonialism that prevent partnershipSkrin 2009 (Market & Corporate News , 1-30, “West should perceive Russia as equal partner: Putin,” Lexis)

Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has urged Western companies to leave behind the colonial thinking in their relations with Moscow. It is necessary to work in a civilized and honest manner and get rid of colonial ideology, Putin told a meeting of the International Business Council at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on Thursday. Russia wants to be perceived in the West as an equal partner without any exemptions or exclusions, the Russian Premier underlines. At present, we are going through tough times amid the unfolding financial and economical meltdown, Putin complains. Even so, he adds, Russia has no intention of restricting capital flows despite a large rise in capital outflow that saw a whopping 130 billion dollars leave the country last year. We have deliberately made this move, Putin explains, bearing in mind that these actions by the Russian authorities should give a clear signal that we will be seeking to stick to all our obligations. For that to happen, we will try to make our economy and our country open and we have already achieved a lot in this direction lately, Putin maintains.Saying that Russia was not allowed to buy certain technologies and even finished products in the West Putin said that apart from the limitations inherited from the past, new ones were being imposed - in Europe to a lesser extent, while in the United States many of them remained. Above all the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US- Soviet Trade Bill, which the Russian Premier said was an "anachronism that has nothing to do with common sense". "The problem of the Jews' departure from the Soviet Union no longer exists, neither does the USSR against which the discriminatory amendment was enacted," Putin stressed. He said the main limitations remain in people’s minds, and we should get rid of them. "We are not disabled people, we do not need help, we want to be an equal and reliable partner," Putin stressed. "The world has changed in the sense that it is necessary to be self-critical and listen more to what is happening on our planet as a whole. This is exactly what we need if we want to have long-term partnership between us," he said, the ruvr.ru website said.B. Psychology: Economic cooperation is key to positive framing of the overall relationship, integrating Russian markets, and the Russian economyThe Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia 2009 (joint project of The Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, a research center within Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” March, http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf)

Though Russia’s economy remains one-tenth the size of America’s ,managing the global economic crisis is a top issue and a clear common interest for Washington and Moscow. Notwithstanding its serious challenges, the crisis is also an important opportunity for the United States in dealing with Russia because it has changed the psychology of the relationship and can contribute to framing U.S.-Russian relations in positive and cooperative terms. Despite holding the world’s third-largest currency reserves, Russian officials now realize that their country’s economic future depends significantly on both the global economy and the United States and they look to Washington for solutions. The crisis has also exposed many of Russia’s continuing economic and financial weaknesses, including its failures to diversify or encourage foreign investment. The United States finally has a chance to integrate Russia fully into the international economy and to take an important step toward addressing broader concerns of other major developing economies like China, India, and Brazil that their voices are not sufficiently respected in global economic matters. The G-8 and the G-20 could be useful vehicles for this. Russian accession to the World Trade Organization is a key step in this process and would bind Moscow to WTO rules and protect American companies. More narrowly, the United States and Russia have not thus far developed extensive bilateral trade and investment. Some of this is a result of geography, but much is due to insufficient effort, an inability to overcome the Jackson-Vanik Amendment either substantively or symbolically, and under appreciation of the important economic interests at stake. Russia will become only more important to the global economy over time.

C. Cold War thinking: Even after security concessions, Putin cited trade restrictions as the most important relics of the Cold War

Prime-Tass 2009 (Prime-Tass English-language Business Newswire, 9-18, Putin urges West to take further steps to improve ties with Russia,” Lexis)

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Friday urged the West to take further steps to improve relations with Russia. He was speaking at the Kuban Economic Forum in the city of Sochi. Putin welcomed the U.S. President Barack Obama's decision to abandon a plan to deploy land-based missiles as part of a missile defense system in Poland and called on Western countries to make further conciliatory steps. The plan has been opposed by Russia. Putin urged the West to abolish restrictions on technology transfers to Russia and to facilitate the country's accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO). He also proposed abolishing Western restrictions on Russian exports, restrictions of which were inherited from the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which was established in 1947 to introduce a partial embargo on Soviet bloc exports. Putin also said he was unhappy with some Western governments' opposition to Russian investments and added that he hoped such "remnants" of the Cold War would soon be overcome. "Russian companies acquiring foreign assets often face so-called national egoism," he said. "I'm sure that these are 'birthmarks' of the Cold War that we still can't get rid of." Putin went on to say foreign energy companies investing in Russia and Russian energy companies investing abroad should be subject to the same regulatory treatment

D. This cooperation spills over: Ending trade restrictions facilitates Russian WTO accession and spurs economic cooperation that affects areas like nonprolif and IranAslund and Kuchins 2009 (Anders, leading specialist on Russia and professor at Georgetown University, and Andrew, senior fellow and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, professor at Johns Hopkins, “Pressing the “Reset Button” on US-Russia Relations,” Chapter 9, March, CSIS, http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb09-6.pdf)

US government engagement with Russia on economic integration presents an opportunity to broaden and deepen their bilateral relationship.30 Economic cooperation will build goodwill and mutual confidence, which can facilitate discussion of other areas of interest such as cooperation on nonproliferation and dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. Yet one of the most underdeveloped areas of the US-Russia relationship is commerce. The two countries’ very limited mutual trade and investment—the United States accounts for only 4 percent of Russian trade and foreign direct investment— indicate a very significant potential to expand bilateral economic relations to the benefit of both Americans and Russians. One reason direct US investment in the Russian economy is so small is that the United States does not have a ratified bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Russia, unlike 38 other nations that represent most of the major global economies and most members of the European Union. As a consequence, Americans usually invest in Russia through a European subsidiary that enjoys better legal protection. Although Russia did not ratify the 1992 BIT, it has clearly indicated that it welcomes such an agreement— which became part of the bilateral April 2008 Sochi Declaration— but the Bush administration sought to negotiate a new, better BIT only in its final months. A BIT would also encourage Russian investment in the United States. Foreign investment not only provides jobs for Americans but also, as Yale professor of economics Aleh Tsyvinski writes, “foster[s] economic interdependence.” He continues: “By investing in U.S. and European assets, Russia’s government and business elites are buying a stake in the global economy. This should bring better mutual understanding and a more rational and accountable foreign policy.”31 The United States must work with Russia to ensure that openness to foreign investment is reciprocal and that legal protections for investors are guaranteed. A crucial issue in Russia’s standing in world commerce is its WTO accession. Russia suspended its application to join the WTO in anticipation of Western sanctions against its war in Georgia, which never materialized. Hopefully, it will reinstate its application soon. It is the largest economy that remains outside the organization. The United States has consistently favored Russia’s membership in the WTO as well as in other international economic institutions, as such integration would not only boost commerce but also promote rules-based international norms of economic behavior in Russia and thus influence Russian policy. The United States should continue to support Russia’s WTO accession and work with Russia and WTO members to overcome their objections. Russia is already an active and responsible board member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In 2007 Russia showed positive engagement by proposing its own, highly respected candidate for managing director of the IMF. Economic integration will provide additional opportunities for the Russian leadership to further develop its global engagement. In addition, Russia has been a full member of the G-8 since 1997 (although the finance ministers group is still only G-7). The Obama administration should follow the lead of the Bush administration and devote more attention and resources to developing the G-20 (created by the Clinton administration in 1998) rather than the G-8, which seems increasingly unrepresentative and obsolete. Russia shares this view. In his October 2008 speech in Evian, France, President Medvedev expressed a strong interest in reforming the anachronistic system of international financial governance.32 Although Russian proposals have not been very concrete, such efforts should be welcomed in principle. Russia’s interest in engaging in reform of the international financial architecture is a positive development, even if its views may sometimes conflict with those of the United States. Russian accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is also important. Like the WTO, the OECD is a highly legalistic organization that requires new members to adopt many rules before they are granted entry. Membership carries with it obligations such as observance of international standards relating to rule of law, transparency, and property rights, all of which must be adopted in coordination with other members, in particular close European allies. Another roadblock is the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. It requires the executive branch to certify to Congress annually that there are no restrictions on the emigration of Jews from Russia; if it were invoked, prohibitive Smoot-Hawley tariffs would apply to all Russian imports to the United States. This Cold War holdover no longer serves any useful purpose and is routinely voided. Presidents Clinton and Bush both promised to graduate Russia from the amendment. The United States should fulfill its promise, which would facilitate Russia’s entry into the WTO.

Relations Impact – Spill OverAnd, Jackson-Vanik spills over to the rest of the relationship-makes every impact inevitable and worse Trenin and Medish 2006 (Dmitri Trenin is deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Mark Medish is a vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, International Herald Tribune, November 17)

Perhaps most damaging of all, Russophobia in the United States and anti-Americanism in Russia are rampant. If unchecked, these attitudes could become self-fulfilling prophecies. Although the WTO deal is an important sign of renewed cooperation, the eventual Congressional debate over Russia's trade status could reignite controversy. To accord Russia unconditional normal trade relations, Congress would have to lift the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment originally imposed on the Soviet Union for restricting immigration. Bush now has a chance to make good on his longstanding commitment to remove the Jackson-Vanik obstacle, though the task could be harder now that his party has lost control of Congress. Bush and Putin should also build on the WTO breakthrough and try to steadily enlarge the ambit of bilateral cooperation. The gains for global security could be substantial. Concrete areas of mutual interest to focus on in the near term include: * strengthening sanctions on North Korea and Iran as an inducement for direct negotiations; * finalizing an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, allowing America and Russia to develop a more robust international nonproliferation regime; * initiating the next chapter of strategic arms reduction talks; * working together to reduce tensions in the South Caucasus, specifically in Georgia's breakaway regions; * avoiding conflict over Kosovo's final status by supporting a negotiated settlement. Russia and the United States need a change of direction, which only the two presidents can signal. Their meeting in Vietnam should remind them of history's blind alleys and the potential advantages of making U-turns.

Relations Impact – Laundry ListRelations key to energy security, terrorism, global economy, prolif and hegeCommission on US Policy Toward Russia 2009 (US Senate, “THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA,” March)

Securing America’s vital national interests in the complex, interconnected, and interdependent world of the twenty-first century requires deep and meaningful cooperation with other governments. The challenges—stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, defeating terrorist networks, rebuilding the global economy, and ensuring energy security for the United States and others—are enormous. And few nations could make more of a difference to our success than Russia, with its vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, its strategic location spanning Europe and Asia, its considerable energy resources, and its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Rapid and effective action to strengthen U.S.-Russian relations is critically important to advancing U.S. national interests An American commitment to improving U.S.-Russian relations is neither a reward to be offered for good international behavior by Moscow nor an endorsement of the Russian government’s domestic conduct. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the importance of Russian cooperation in achieving essential American goals, whether preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, dismantling al- Qaeda and stabilizing Afghanistan, or guaranteeing security and prosperity in Europe. Success in creating a new and cooperative relationship with Russia can contribute to each of these objectives and many others. Failure could impose significant costs.

More ev-relations independently solve every single impactCommission on US Policy Toward Russia 2009 (US Senate, “THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA,” March)

Protecting and advancing America’s national interests in the decades ahead requires a strategic reassessment of the United States’ relationship with Russia with an emphasis on exploring common interests. A constructive relationship with Russia will directly influence the United States’ ability to advance effectively vital national-security interests in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and energy security, and to deal with many specific challenges such as Iran or European security. If left unchecked, the ongoing deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations will begin to seriously damage our ability to achieve objectives across these interests. The Obama administration must establish an effective, comprehensive bilateral structure to facilitate consultation, dialogue, and negotiation. U.S. priorities must be defined more clearly. And we must more realistically assess Russia’s views of its interests. Though leaders in both countries have made encouraging statements in recent weeks suggesting a new commitment to improving relations, we are deeply concerned by the gap between the current U.S.-Russian relationship and the level of cooperation that the United States needs with Russia in order to advance vital American interests. Not only rhetoric but swift action is essential to build a relationship with Moscow that addresses critical U.S. goals in Iran, Afghanistan, and around the world.

Relations Impact – TerrorismRelations are key to solve terrorism-Russian coop outweighs your internalsCommission on US Policy Toward Russia 2009 (US Senate, “THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA,” March)

The September 11 attacks starkly demonstrated the common threat of terrorism to America and Russia. Moscow has since provided important assistance to the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan; however, this help may be at risk if U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relations weaken further. After initially acquiescing to a U.S. military presence in the region, Russia has complicated U.S. efforts to maintain air bases in central Asia to support operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, including Kyrgyzstan’s recent decision that the United States should close its Manas base. This in part reflects U.S.-Russian differences over both Afghanistan and the wider central Asian region. It also starkly illustrates the potential costs of treating the former Soviet Union as a competitive battleground rather than a zone of cooperation. Though the Russian government has an interest in preventing the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, Moscow might revoke its permission for transit of NATO cargoes to Afghanistan via Russia if NATO-Russia relations deteriorate further. Greater cooperation in Afghanistan is far more desirable and could build on past collaboration to develop deeper intelligence sharing and improved coordination with Russia’s long-standing allies in the country. However, it will require greater willingness to consider Russian perspectives. Broader U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation has been hindered by divergence in U.S. and Russian assessments of the challenges and opportunities presented by various non-state actors to the United States, Russia, and other countries. This divergence has prevented the two countries from agreeing on a common definition of terrorism and is one of the factors behind American reluctance to assist in Russia’s fight against Chechen separatists and Russian engagement with Hamas and Hezbollah. Despite this, working successfully with Moscow could offer major opportunities, especially in the greater Middle East, where the United States has relatively few sources of human intelligence. Intensified cooperation in the Middle East peace process could also have some impact on terrorism in the region.

Nuclear war and extinctionSpeice 2006 – 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary [Patrick F. Speice, Jr., “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon . 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Relations Impact – AfghanistanRussian cooperation is key to stabilizing Afghanistan-gains can easily be lost Commission on US Policy Toward Russia 2009 (US Senate, “THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA,” March)

The September 11 attacks starkly demonstrated the common threat of terrorism to America and Russia. Moscow has since provided important assistance to the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan; however, this help may be at risk if U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relations weaken further. After initially acquiescing to a U.S. military presence in the region, Russia has complicated U.S. efforts to maintain air bases in central Asia to support operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, including Kyrgyzstan’s recent decision that the United States should close its Manas base. This in part reflects U.S.-Russian differences over both Afghanistan and the wider central Asian region. It also starkly illustrates the potential costs of treating the former Soviet Union as a competitive battleground rather than a zone of cooperation. Though the Russian government has an interest in preventing the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, Moscow might revoke its permission for transit of NATO cargoes to Afghanistan via Russia if NATO-Russia relations deteriorate further. Greater cooperation in Afghanistan is far more desirable and could build on past collaboration to develop deeper intelligence sharing and improved coordination with Russia’s long-standing allies in the country. However, it will require greater willingness to consider Russian perspectives. Broader U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation has been hindered by divergence in U.S. and Russian assessments of the challenges and opportunities presented by various non-state actors to the United States, Russia, and other countries. This divergence has prevented the two countries from agreeing on a common definition of terrorism and is one of the factors behind American reluctance to assist in Russia’s fight against Chechen separatists and Russian engagement with Hamas and Hezbollah. Despite this, working successfully with Moscow could offer major opportunities, especially in the greater Middle East, where the United States has relatively few sources of human intelligence. Intensified cooperation in the Middle East peace process could also have some impact on terrorism in the region.

Afghan instability escalates to nuclear warCarafano 2010 James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2 http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.

Relations Impact – Turns Case

turns middle east stability

Relations turn middle east stabilityDmitry V. Suslov, Deputy Director on Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Moscow, Russia, 05 [US-Russia Relations Saved for Now, 2-28, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5348]

Russia's modernization is impossible without the United States. Decision-making in world policy is also dependent on relations with Washington. For the United States, a declining agenda with Russia will sooner or later result in overextension of US resources and global disaster. Short- and middle-term reasons for engaging Russia lie in policy toward North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and China, and the long-term - in the broader Middle East . Russia, with its imperial history, vast experience, and readiness to invest in security, is the only US ally capable of collaborating to bring about Mideast stability - a rather imperial, but necessary mission. Neither Europe nor the southern CIS have the resources to accomplish the task. Despite an EU presence in Afghanistan and some contribution to Iraq, Europe's political culture and growing Muslim populations do not allow for serious investments in missions like occupation and state-building. Ultimately, Washington and Moscow must work together, despite all the difficulties and prejudices. They should strengthen those elements of agenda - creating the NATO-Russia Council and Russian participation in the G8 - that may still facilitate cooperation and joint action. The US-Russia foreign policy priority should be stabilization and governance promotion in the broader Middle East. Radical Islamic terrorism and nuclear proliferation are facets of one single problem: degradation of this region.

turns iran Relations check IranNTI 9 [Global Security Newswire, “Russia Open to U.S. Suggestions on Improving Relations, Curbing Iran” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090318_4374.php 3/19]Russian leaders have shown an interest in improving ... outcome," the report adds (Nixon Center release, March 16).

Russian leaders have shown an interest in improving relations with Washington, a thaw that could enable the two former Cold War rivals to cooperate more closely on efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions , the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, March 16).The two nations experienced growing tensions during the Bush administration as they disagreed over a variety of international security issues, particularly a U.S. plan to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe as a hedge against potential Iranian missile threats. Regarding Iran, Russia has cautiously supported some U.N. Security Council resolutions setting mild sanctions against Iran for its refusal to freeze its uranium enrichment program, but Moscow scuttled U.S. efforts last year to boost those penalties.Trying to change the climate, U.S. President Barack Obama has sent his counterpart a letter seeking a packaged solution to U.S.-Russian disputes, and Moscow appears interested, according to some analysts and officials.Russian officials "want to send a message to the Obama administration that they're prepared to have a new relationship, but it will have to be quid pro quo," said Dmitri Simes, president of the Washington-based Nixon Center. "If they have to sacrifice their special relationship with Iran, they want to see a change in their relationship with the United States" (Pan/DeYoung, Washington Post, March 18).Simes directed a commission that called on the Obama administration this week to recognize the importance of good Russian relations to a breadth of international issues, including the Iranian nuclear crisis."Without deep Russian cooperation, no strategy is likely to succeed in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war," says the commission report. "Working with Moscow to solve the Iran problem, including possibly strengthening sanctions on Iran if necessary, should be a top U.S. priority.""However, America is unlikely to be able to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue solely through sanctions, and Russia's cooperation could contribute substantially to a successful outcome," the report adds (Nixon Center release, March 16).

turns afghanistan Relations key to Afghanistan and central asiaAllison and Blackwill, 11 – * director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND ** Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October 2011) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf

The United States, Russia, and Central Asia, including Afghanistan Europe was the central region of competition among the world’s great powers during the twentieth century. While competition in Europe has declined, the contest for influence in Central Asia has intensified. Outside powers seek access to Central Asia’s energy—and unlike past iterations of the scramble for resources, China is a key player. At the same time, the United States and those in neighboring territories share concerns about instability, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Fortunately, U.S.-Russian rivalry in Central Asia appears to have receded somewhat in the last few years, as Moscow’s anxiety over what it saw as U.S.-sponsored “color revolutions” in the former Soviet Union has subsided. The United States and Russia cooperated during instability in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, largely avoiding the bilateral tension that previous instability there and elsewhere had produced. Some in Moscow also appear increasingly to appreciate the value of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. As the United States and NATO draw down their military forces in Afghanistan, regional states including Russia will only grow in importance to Afghanistan’s stability. Transit routes through Russia have become a key component the American logistics line of communication to Afghanistan and may be even more crucial during the American and NATO withdrawal, in view of intensified military logistics requirements and ongoing worries about routes through Pakistan. This will require close and sustained engagement between Washington and Moscow. If the U.S.Russian relationship deteriorates, Russia may limit its cooperation on Afghanistan, which could harm U.S. national interests.

turns heg Low relations turn hegSimes 2007 (Dimitri Simes, President of the Nixon Center and Publisher of The National Interest, Nov/Dec 2007. “Losing Russia,” Foreign Affairs, Ebsco)But if the current U.S.-Russian relationship deteriorates further , it will not bode well for the United States and would be even worse for Russia. The Russian general staff is lobbying to add a military dimension to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and some top officials are beginning to champion the idea of a foreign policy realignment directed against the West. There are also quite a few countries , such as Iran and Venezuela, urging Russia to work with China to play a leading role in balancing the United States economically, politically, and militarily. And post-Soviet states such as Georgia, which are adept at playing the United States and Russia off against each other, could act in ways that escalate tensions . Putin's stage management of Moscow's succession in order to maintain a dominant role for himself makes a major foreign policy shift in Russia unlikely. But new Russian leaders could have their own ideas--and their own ambitions--and political uncertainty or economic problems could tempt them to exploit nationalist sentiments to build legitimacy. If relations worsen, the UN Security Council may no longer be available--due to a Russian veto--even occasionally, to provide legitimacy for U.S. military actions or to impose meaningful sanctions on rogue states. Enemies of the United States could be emboldened by new sources of military hardware in Russia, and political and security protection from Moscow. International terrorists could find new sanctuaries in Russia or the states it protects. And the collapse of U.S.-Russian relations could give China much greater flexibility in dealing with the United States. It would not be a new Cold War, because Russia will not be a global rival and is unlikely to be the prime mover in confronting the United States. But it would provide incentives and cover for others to confront Washington, with potentially catastrophic results .

Sustained US-Russian relations prevent multiple scenarios of war and ensure US LeadershipNixon Center 03 (“Advancing American Interests and the U.S.-Russian Relationship Interim Report” The Commission on America’s National Interests and Russia. The Nixon Center. September 2003. http://www.nixoncenter.org/publicants/monographs/FR.htm)The proper starting point in thinking about American national interests and Russia—or any other country—is the candid question: why does Russia matter? How can Russia affect vital American interests and how much should the United States care about Russia? Where does it rank in the hierarchy of American national interests? As the Report of the Commission on American National Interests (2000) concluded, Russia ranks among the few countries whose actions powerfully affect American vital interests . Why? First, Russia is a very large country linking several strategically important regions . By virtue of its size and location, Russia is a key player in Europe as well as the Middle East and Central, South and East Asia. Accordingly, Moscow can substantially contribute to, or detract from, U.S. efforts to deal with such urgent challenges as North Korea and Iran, as well as important longer term problems like Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, Russia shares the world’s longest land border with China, an emerging great power that can have a major impact on both U.S. and Russian interests. The bottom line is that notwithstanding its significant loss of power after the end of the Cold War, Moscow’s geopolitical weight still exceeds that of London or Paris. Second, as a result of its Soviet legacy, Russia has relationships with and information about countries that remain comparatively inaccessible to the American government, in the Middle East, Central Asia and elsewhere. Russian intelligence and/or leverage in these areas could significantly aid the United States in its efforts to deal with current, emerging and still unforeseen strategic challenges, including in the war on terrorism. Third, today and for the foreseeable future Russia’s nuclear arsenal will be capable of inflicting vast damage on the United States. Fortunately, the likelihood of such scenarios has declined dramatically since the Cold War . But today and as far as any eye can see the U.S. will have an enduring vital interest in these weapons not being used against America or our allies . Fourth, reliable Russian stewardship and control of the largest arsenal of nuclear warheads and stockpile of nuclear materials from which nuclear weapons could be made is essential in combating the threat of “loose nukes.” The United States has a vital interest in effective Russian programs to prevent weapons being stolen by criminals, sold to terrorists and used to kill Americans. Fifth, Russian stockpiles, technologies and knowledge for creating biological and chemical weapons make cooperation with Moscow very important to U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons. Working with Russia may similarly help to prevent states hostile to the United States from obtaining sophisticated conventional weapons systems , such as missiles and submarines. Sixth, as the world’s largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons (oil and gas), Russia offers America an opportunity to diversify and increase supplies of non-OPEC, non-Mid-Eastern energy. Seventh, as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia can substantially ease, or complicate, American attempts to work through the UN and other international institutions to advance other vital and extremely important U.S. interests. In a world in which many are already concerned about the use of U.S. power, this can have a real impact on America’s success at providing

global leadership. More broadly , a close U.S.-Russian relationship can limit other states’ behavior by effectively eliminating Moscow as a potential source of political support.

turns terrorism

U.S. Russian cooperation, specifically South and central Asia key to preventing terrorism Hahn, 9 - Gordon M 5/21 senior researcher, Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program, and visiting assistant professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, California; senior researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, California; and analyst/consultant. “U.s. Russian relations and the war against jihadism" http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/hahn.pdf p. 4-5 ZM

Changes in the structure of the jihadist movement since the September 11 attacks strengthen the rationale for broader and deeper U.S.-Russian coopera tion . The leading role of al Qaeda in the global jihad has weakened, and a more decentralized network of still-allied but more isolated and self-sufficient jihad ist nodes such as the “Caucasus Emirate” has emerged. In part, this restructuring is a result of better intelligence, police, and immigration performance in the West and Russia. However “leaderless” the jihad may be, the combination of continuing mutual assistance between its local nodes requires real coordina tion between the United States and Russia if not joint efforts in order to disrupt communications and attack more localized nodes. Strategically, Washington and Moscow are on the same page, which shows that the global jihadist threat is real and must be eliminated. But tactically, they diverge according to the extent that they each perceive one particular jihadist movement or another as a threat. With this in mind, in which regions can U.S.-Russian cooperation against jihadism be initiated and enhanced, and where is it a hopeless venture, at least at present? Jihadists outside of Eurasia writ large—including Eurasia proper, plus Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and the Persian Gulf region in general—represent little or no threat to Russia, but do threaten U.S. interests and/or those of its allies. Thus, in places such as Southeast Asia and northern Africa, there is little or no common interest or threat, though jihadist takeovers ultimately would affect both countries’ interests in the long run. In the Middle East, including Iraq, interests and perceptions diverge significantly, though again, a jihadist takeover in Iraq would have serious implications for both countries. Regarding the more immediate threats to their respective homelands, threats to one are, by all appearances, of less concern to the other, but mis-takenly so. A catastrophic terrorist attack in the United States would affect the entire world, something that the U.S. financial crisis and its spread around the globe underscored. Similarly, Russia’s own jihadist threat in the North Caucasus means that Russia, Pakistan, and India constitute the only countries that possess both a significant jihadist movement and large stockpiles of nuclear and other materials and weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the North Caucasus mujahedin have metastasized into a threat to the United States, albeit one with limited capacity at present. In regions bordering Russia, such as Central Asia and the South Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan, deepen ing U.S. and Western involvement creates a modus vivendi for cooperation with Moscow in the war against jihadism. In sum, South and Central Asia and the Caucasus are the two regions where sufficient common interests and threats offer realistic prospects for increased U.S.-Russian security coopera tion against jihadism.

turns prolif Strong U.S.-Russia cooperation key to check proliferationBerman 08 Howard Berman (Member of the House of Representatives, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs) “Russia, Iran, and Nuclear Weapons”, Committee on Foreign Affairs, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=519We’re here this morning to begin to assess the proposed agreement between the United States and Russian governments to expand civil nuclear cooperation. One key factor we’ll take into account during this process is the extent to which Russia is cooperating with the United States, the European Union and others to discourage Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons capability.One of the greatest potential threats to the security of the United States and its allies is an Iranian Bomb. We’ve all heard the crude threats that President Ahmadinejad makes against Israel, which he repeated as recently as last week. But Israel’s not the only state feeling the heat from Tehran’s radioactive rhetoric. Other states in the Middle East are now, suddenly, interested in developing their own nuclear energy programs, emulating Iran. I don’t believe this is a pure coincidence. As we know all too well, allegedly peaceful nuclear power programs can be used as a cover for the clandestine development of nuclear weapons.Not only would a nuclear-armed Tehran have the ability to intimidate other states in ways that could cripple U.S. national interests in the region and beyond – it would also effectively end the global nonproliferation regime. Unfortunately, we currently face a situation in which Iran is enriching uranium faster than sanctions are being applied to stop it. To date, the multilateral sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations are woefully inadequate. They have failed to change Tehran’s calculation that the benefits of a nuclear weapons capability outweigh the costs. In other words, our current policy at this particular point -- and I hope it changes, but at this particular point -- is not working. Russia’s role in persuading and pressuring Iran to cease its dangerous nuclear activities is absolutely crucial. Yet in the past, Moscow has often been the main stumbling block to tougher sanctions. While Russia recently has been more supportive, its commitment to effective international action remains in question. Just two weeks ago, Russian Prime Minister Putin publicly declared that there is no evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability; he said this the very same week that the International Atomic Energy Agency seemed to be moving toward the opposite conclusion. It is in this context that the Bush Administration has signed a new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Moscow, something that has long been promised and upon which Russia places a high value. The Foreign Affairs Committee formally received the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement on May 13th. For the record, we are now on Day 19 of the statutory Congressional review period of 90 continuous days of session. The agreement will enter into force if, during this 90-day period, Congress does not enact a joint resolution of disapproval or approves a resolution of approval with conditions over the President’s veto. This Committee has statutory responsibility to review the proposed agreement and report to the House on whether it should be approved or disapproved. This hearing is an initial step in that process. There has already been a significant amount of commentary on the benefits and drawbacks of this agreement. Its proponents argue that it may encourage Russia to be more forthcoming on tougher sanctions on Iran; critics counter that Russia will do so only if we hold the agreement back as a point of leverage. Proponents claim this agreement will allow the U.S. and Russia to work together to create a nuclear fuel bank and multilateral fuel assurances to reduce incentives for countries, like Iran, to develop their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants, that can make fuel for reactors or bombs. Critics respond that these things can be done now without this agreement. Advocates claim that this agreement will allow greater cooperation with Russia to develop proliferation-resistant reprocessing methods to extract useful uranium and plutonium from spent reactor fuel with minimal risk of diversion to military ends. Opponents charge that any reprocessing is dangerous, and efforts to expand reprocessing globally will inevitably encourage other states to start their own reprocessing efforts. To the extent that the Russia cooperation agreement assists this effort, opponents charge, it actually works against nonproliferation efforts to reduce the amount of plutonium available for nuclear weapons.

turns aids Relations solves the AIDS epidemic and saves millions of livesVERSHBOW 2004 (ALEXANDER, US AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA, STATE DEPARTMENT APRIL 22)

Without intervention, researchers predict that over 75 million people will be infected worldwide by 2010, with a loss of human life to AIDS totaling 100 million by 2020. Scientists predict that more than two million Russians could be infected by 2005 - next year - and millions more by 2010; in fact, the HIV virus is spreading more rapidly here than in almost any other country on the planet. Unless decisive action is taken - and soon - Russia faces a humanitarian catastrophe rivaling that of World War II. Fortunately, this represents an area tailor-made for bilateral cooperation. As the AIDS epidemic began in the United States years before it struck Russia, we have considerable experience in treating the disease and controlling its spread. Russia has an educated population and an expanding sector of dedicated NGOs that provide hope that concerted efforts at prevention can succeed. What these organizations lack is resources and, most crucially, high-level political support . In addition, Russia is blessed with a large and talented medical and scientific community that can play an important role in international efforts to find a cure and develop a vaccine. Given our complementary resources and our mutual interest in staving off disaster, the AIDS crisis provides an ideal opportunity to demonstrate the potential of our partnership for the betterment of Russia's own people, and all of humanity.

turns human rights Economic relations solves human rights/democracy violationsRyzhkov 3-20(Vladimir-, The Moscow Times, “Replace Jackson-Vanik With the Magnitsky Act”, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/replace-jackson-vanik-with-the-magnitsky-act/455023.html#ixzz1poAe5NtL)

In our appeal to the U.S. Congress, my colleagues and I are proposing a different approach. In our opinion, a failure to repeal Jackson-Vanik could hurt the development of economic cooperation between Russia and the United States and could badly limit needed investment in the country. Without a developed economy, democracy has little chance of taking hold in Russia. The driving force behind democratic change in Russia is the "Decembrists 2.0" movement — protests against Putin's authoritarianism by young, educated and politically savvy middle-class Russians who grew up during the past 20 years of market reforms. These are the people who have gathered on Russia's streets to demand democracy, the rule of law and punishment for criminals and corrupt government officials. The larger Russia's middle class becomes, the better chance that it will be able to influence political change in a peaceful manner and strengthen the country's democratic institutions. U.S. businesses that have invested in Russia help develop the economy and thereby expand the social base of the country's budding civil society and democracy. Any laws that act as barriers to that process should be repealed.

2nc at: no war1. Cross apply Bandow from the overview – war is possible if we endanger Russia’s national security – deterrence doesn’t work if make Russia feel we’re actively threatening their country and uniquely breaks down if we interfere in their sphere of influence – Russian military statements prove.

2. They don’t assume miscalculation – interference restarts the cold war and means nuclear brinksmanship, lack of cooperation, and faulty early warning systems make accidental nuclear war possible – that’s Cohen.

Nuclear war possible over SyriaLaRouche 12-9 (Lyndon LaRouche, political activist & economist, author of multiple books on economics & politics, Norman Bailey, formerly with the National Security Council, described LaRouche's staff as one of the best private intelligence services in the world, 12-9-11, “Why Obama has to go: to risk thermonuclear war is clinically insane,” Executive Intelligence Review, http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2011/eirv38n48-20111209/index.html)

"What's happened is, the U.S. forces in the Eastern Mediterranean , and in the Persian Gulf region, especially naval forces, in particular, are positioned for launching a thermonuclear war . The name of the game, of course, is what we're going to do to Syria, what we're going to Iran, but if you look at the forces in the area, that makes no sense. Then you look at other aspects of it, and you know that now the Russians are in on the thing, in defending Syria , in particular, against this atrocity, and you realize that we're on the edge of actually going to thermonuclear war . "What happened was, of course, and I don't know how much, or how well this is known, but our leading general officers, advisors, and so forth, who advise us on our security, have opposed any action by Obama of this type. So therefore, that is, in that degree, tied up. But, what's hanging out there, is, at any moment, a war could start. "Now, this war will be a war with thermonuclear weapons. That's the fact. The idea that this is only Syria and Iran is nonsense. What we have positioned in the Gulf area, and in the Eastern Mediterranean, is the capability for thermonuclear war, and nothing else . Our allies, including the British, do not have the depth of weapons capability for doing something like this. Only the United States, and only the thermonuclear warfare capability of the United States, could actually conduct such a war. It would be a war against the entirety of Asia, and other places."

2nc at: russia evil1. Their interpretation of Russia is overly simplistic – Russia is self interested – which means if we avoid antagonizing them we can cooperate, but if we actively harm their national security they’re forced to fight us over their sphere, that’s Bandow and Cohen.Russia just wants to be a equal – treating them well causes balanceMATTHEWS 2007 (Owen, Newsweek International, July 23, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19761840/site/newsweek/page/0/)

Moscow also began a root-and-branch rethink of Russia's relationship to the United States. "Putin's illusions about America were shattered," says political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov, a regular Kremlin adviser, recalling the policy review following the color revolutions. "No matter how much Russia supported the U.S., [Washington] still retained the same, essentially hostile, attitude." Since then, fears of Western encirclement have only increased as NATO makes overtures to Georgia and Ukraine and plans to station antimissile batteries in

Poland and the Czech Republic. Putin's response to these threats has been radical: he wants no less than "to change the rules of the world," says Sergei Karaganov, a foreign-policy adviser to the Kremlin. "The world should be ready to deal with a strong Russia." In practice, Putin means not only to restore Russia's lost might, but also to make Russia the principal counterbalance to U.S. power on the world stage. In a 2005 speech, Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century," and fondly recalled the old "bipolar" world where two superpowers checked each other 's ambitions. Luckily for Putin, the fortunes of the world economy are behind him. Sky-high energy prices have boosted Russia's economy by 40 percent in five years. A large chunk of the cash has gone into rebuilding the beleaguered Russian Army. Putin has pledged the military $189 billion over five years, commissioning a new generation of ICBMs specifically designed to evade a U.S. missile defense shield and ordering up six new carrier battle groups, which—if they are actually built according to plan—will make the Russian Navy even mightier than its Soviet predecessor within 20 years. More worrying for Washington, Putin has taken advantage of the surge in anti-Americanism that followed the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Like his Soviet predecessors, Putin has made friends with many of the world's malcontents, selling arms and missile systems to Venezuela, Syria and Iran, and offering nuclear reactors to Burma and Saudi Arabia. Before his visit to Kennebunkport last month, Putin hosted Bush-baiting Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in Moscow, where they signed a $3 billion arms deal. In February Putin toured the Middle East, scorning

American efforts to democratize the region and making a play for the loyalty of U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan. "Putin is a Soviet politician

with a Soviet mind-set," says Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a leading sociologist at Russia's Academy of Sciences. "Like the Soviets, he sees the world in terms of opposing camps. His plan is to march around the world with an anti-American flag in his hands." Does all this mean that Putin wants to start a new cold war? Not necessaril y . Rather, says former deputy prime minister Irina Khakamada, Putin desperately wants to be treated as Bush's equal . "When I spoke to Putin about relations with the U.S., his eyes lit up," recalls Khakamada. "It's a very personal thing for him. He wants to prove that America should not treat us like simpletons." Equality, to Putin, means no more patronizing lectures from the West on Russia's history—or its dismal human-rights record. Russia, he believes, has nothing to be ashamed of. As he told a group of visiting teachers last month, foreigners "must not be allowed to impose a feeling of guilt on us—after all, we did not use nuclear weapons against a civilian population [like the United States in Nagasaki]." Equality means the right to squash Russia's enemies as fiercely as America has attacked its own—witness the recent liquidation by Russian assassins of former Chechen president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev who had been hiding out in Qatar. But above all, equality means respecting the Kremlin's voice . " It's about drawing a line in the sand," says a senior Western diplomat in Moscow not authorized to speak on the record. "It's about saying, 'We're back, you can't push us around anymore'." At base, then, the new Putin wants respect—and to stake out a Russian sphere of influence in which the West won't interfere, even if Moscow bullies its neighbors (as it did with Georgia last November over a spying row) or fixes their elections (as in Ukraine in 2004). For the time being, there's precious little the United States can do to check Russia's new imperial mood, since it needs Putin's continued support on the U.N. Security Council for sanctions on Iran.

Even if Russia opposes us – they won’t fight if we don’t interfere in their sphereELAND 2008 [Ivan, Nov, Sr. Fellow, Independent Inst., former Defense Analyst for Congressional Budget Office, The Independent Institute, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2363]But the bear is now coming out of a long hibernation a bit rejuvenated . Using increased petroleum revenues from the oil price spike,

the Russians will hike defense spending 26 percent next year to about $50 billion—the highest level since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet as the oil price declines from this historic high, Russia will have fewer revenues to increase defense spending and rebuild its military. Even the $50 billion a year has to be put in perspective. The United States is spending about $700 billion per year on defense and starting from a much higher plain of capability. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military fell apart and was equivalent to that of a developing country. Even the traditionally hawkish U.S. military and defense leaders and analysts are not worried about Russia’s plans to buy modern arms, improve military living standards to attract better senior enlisted personnel, enhance training, and cut back the size of the bloated forces and officer corps. For example, Eugene B. Rumer of the U.S. National Defense University was quoted in the Washington Post as saying that Russian actions are “not a sign, really, of the Russian military being reborn, but more of a Russia being able to flex what relatively little muscle it has on the global scale, and to show that it actually matters.”[1]In addition, the Russian military is very corrupt—with an estimated 40 percent of the money for some weapons and pay for personnel being

stolen or wasted. This makes the amount of real defense spending far below the nominal $50 billion per year. U.S. analysts say, however, that increased military spending would allow Russia to have more influence over nations in its near abroad and Eastern Europe. Of course, throughout history, small countries living in the shadow of larger powers have had to make political, diplomatic, and economic adjustments to suit the larger power. Increased Russian influence in this sphere, however, should not necessarily threaten the security of the faraway United States. It does only because the United States has defined its security as requiring intrusions into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. By expanding NATO into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the United States has guaranteed the security of these allied countries against a nuclear-armed power, in the worst case, by sacrificing its cities in a nuclear war. Providing this kind of guarantee for these non-strategic countries is not in the U.S. vital interest. Denying Russia the sphere of influence in

nearby areas traditionally enjoyed by great powers (for example, the U.S. uses the Monroe Doctrine to police the Western Hemisphere) will only lead to unnecessary U.S.-Russian tension and possibly even cataclysmic war.

Moscow’s not inherently anti-westTrenin 10 (Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, senior research fellow at the NATO,Defense College in Rome and a senior research fellow at the Institute of Europe in Moscow, “Russia’s Policy in the Middle East,” 2010) http://carnegieendowment.org/files/trenin_middle_east.pdf

Unlike the Soviet Union, and despite its own multi-polar rhetoric, Russia does not see itself locked in a conflict with the United States over regional dominance. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Moscow materially assisted the United States in defeating the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Since then, Moscow has concluded Status of Forces Agreements with NATO that regulate Western military transit across the Russian territory to Afghanistan. Russia calls for closer cooperation with the United States on the Afghan drugs issue: the quantity of smuggled drugs and the number of drug addicts in Russia have been growing exponentially since the fall of the Taliban. Moscow also would want the United States to recognize Russia’s primacy in Central Asia, and establish formal relations between NATO and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. With the United States reluctant to extend such recognition, Moscow has joined Beijing in calling for the termination of U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russia welcomed Uzbekistan’s 2005 decision to close the U.S. bases, and financially rewarded Kyrgyzstan in 2009 for a similar move.

rel impact – warRussian relations key to stop nuclear war and global conflictCohen 2000 – professor of Russian studies at New York University (Stephen, Failed Crusade, p. 196-205)These assurances are manifestly untrue and, coming from U.S. officials, editorialists, an scholars, inexplicably myopic and irresponsible. Even leaving aside postSoviet Russia's enormou stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, “all of the major fault line of nuclear danger are growing," as we learn from a number of largely unheeded experts, and U.S. policy "simply has not kept up with the expansion of nuclear dangers inside Russia."The truth may not be politically correct or palatable, but the breakup of the Soviet state and Russia's "transition" have made us immeasurably less safe than we have ever been. To understand how unsafe, we must explore more fully a generalization made earlier in this book: What does it mean for our security when a nuclear-laden nation state is, depending on how we choose to characterize Russia s condition today, disintegrating, collapsing, or merely "highly unstable"?40 The short answer is, no one fully knows, because it has never happened before, which itself means that compared with the relative predictability of the Soviet system and the Cold War, we now live in an era of acute nuclear uncertainty. The longer answer is that any significant degree of disintegration, instability, or civil warfare, all of which exist in Russia today, creates not one but several unprecedented nuclear dangers. The most widely acknowledged, almost

to the point of obscuring the others, is proliferation-the danger that some of Russia's vast accumulation of nuclear weapons, components, or knowledge might be

acquired by non-nuclear states or terrorist groups through theft and black-market transactions, scientific brain drain, or a decision by a money-

starved Moscow regime to sell them. The threat derives primarily from Russia's decadelong economic collapse. The government has lacked sufficient funds to safeguard storehouses of nuclear materials properly or to pay maintenance personnel and scientists adequately, even regularly. (Nuclear workers actually went out on strike over unpaid wages several times in the 1990s and again in 2000, even though it is against Russian law.) Almost all of the existing U.S. programs to reduce nuclear threats inside Russia focus on proliferation. But even here, according to their official sponsors and other experts, the programs are "woefully inadequate" if we are "to prevent a catastrophe." By the end of 2000, for example, barely one-sixth of Russia's weapons-usable materials will be considered secure, and the "risks of `loose nukes' are larger today" than they were when the programs began. Moreover, Moscow seems to have no full inventory 0f such materials or perhaps even of its thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, and thus no sure way of knowing whether or not something is missing.*' Proliferation is the pinup of Russia's nuclear dangers, the subject of Western novels and movies, but it may not be the most serious. If a nuclear explosion is wait ing to happen, it is probably somewhere among Russia's scores of Soviet-era reactors at electrical power stations and on decommissioned submarines. Reactors, we are told, can be no less dangerous than nuclear weapons. And as the Senate's leading expert informed his colleagues in 1999, Russia's "reactors suffer from deficiences in design, operator training, and safety procedures." Indeed, according to a Russian specialist, "none of our nuclear stations can be considered safe."42 The bell began tolling loudly on reactor catastrophes with the explosion at Chernobyl in 1986, the worst nuclear accident in history. Releasing more than a hundred times the radiation of the two atomic bombs dropped 0n Japan in 1945, its lethal consequences are still unfolding fourteen years later. Since the early 1990s, many reports. including one by the Russian government itself in February 2000, have warned of the possibility of another "Chernobyl-type disaster" or, more exactly, of several accident-prone Russian power stations, even faulty research reactors.' (The world's most dangerous nuclear plants are said to be located in post-Communist Russia and other former Soviet republics.)' Scores of decommissioned but still not denuclearized Soviet-built submarines decaying in the far north greatly worsen the odds in this new kind of Russian roulette. Here too firsthand reports of "a nuclear accident wait ing to happen" are increasingly ominous. Ill-maintained floating reactors are highly vulnerable, and many submarines are already leaking or dumping radioactive materials into the seas "like little Chernobyls in slow motion. Active-duty Russian nuclear ships also pose a serious threat, their aging missiles susceptible to explosions, one likely to detonate others. If that happens Russian expert warns, "We can end up with hundreds of Chernobyls. Why, then, all the U.S. official and unofficial assurances that we are "immeasurably more secure" and ca stop worrying about "worst-case scenarios"? They clearly derived from the single, entirely ideological assumption that because the Soviet Union no longer exists, the threat of a Russian nuclear attack on the United States no longer exists and we need now worry only about rogue states." In truth, the possibility of such a Russian attack grew throughout the 1990s and is still growing Leave aside the warning that "a Russian version of Milosevic . . . armed with thousands of nuclear war warheads" – might come to power and consider the progressive disintegration of the

country's nuclear-defense infrastructure. Russia still has some six thousand war heads on hair-trigger alert . They are to be launched or not launched depending on information about activity at U.S. missile sites provided by an early-warning network of radars, satellites, and computers that now functions only partially and erratically. Russia's command-and-control personnel, who are hardly immune to the social hardships and pathologies sweeping the nation, have barely a few minutes to evaluate any threatening information, which as already been false on occasion. (In 1995, a Norwegian weather rocket was briefly mistaken by Russian authorities for an incoming enemy missile.) These new post-Soviet technological and human cir cumstances of the nuclear age are, as American

scientists have warned repeatedly, "increasing the danger of an accidental or unauthorized "attack on the United States " from Russian territory. It is "arguably already the greatest threat to U.S. national survival . Assurances to the contrary, scientists emphasize, are

"a gross misrepresentation of reality."' Readers may choose to believe that intentional nuclear war nonetheless remains unthinkable. In post- Soviet Russia,

however, it has become not only increas ingly thinkable but speakable . The Kremlin's new security doctrine expanding conditions in which it would use such weapons may be merely semantic and nothing really new. But Russia's ferocious civil war in Chechnya, which did not end with the destruction of Grozny in 2000, is, as I have pointed out before, the first ever in a nuclear country. It has not yet included nuclear warfare, but both sides have crossed a rhetorical Rubicon. Since '999, several Russian deputies and governors, and even a leading "liberal" newspaper, have proposed using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against Chechnya. Said one, think nuclear weapons should stop being virtual." Russian military spokesmen, we are told, "do not exclude that a nuclear attack could be carried out against the bases of international terrorists in Chechnya."49 And with that tiny republic in mind, the military has officially adopted a new concept of "limited" nuclear warfare in a single region, a threat against the Chechen resistance still being discussed in May 2000. From the other side, there were persistent reports that terrorists serving the Chechen "holy war" might blow up Russian nuclear power plants or weapons sites. The reports were serious enough to cause Moscow to redouble security at its nuclear facilities and go percent of Russians surveyed to say they fear the possibility.' Such threats on both sides may also be merely rhetorical, but it is an exceedingly dangerous rhetoric never before heard. If nothing else, there has been more loose talk in Russia since 1999 about using nuclear weapons than measures to .prevent loose nukes. And it will likely increase if the Chechens expand their new guerrilla tactics farther into Russia itself, as they have promised to do. And so, post-Soviet Russia still matters to America in the most fateful of ways. The Clinton administration has worsened the dangers incalculably by taking step after step that pushes a Russia coming apart at the nuclear seams to rely more and more on its nuclear stockpiles and infrastructures-by making financial aid conditional on economic "reforms" that impoverished and destabilized the state; by expanding NATO's mili tary might virtually to Russia's borders; by provocatively demonstrating during the bombing of Yugoslavia the overwhelming superiority of U.S. conventional weapons; and more recently by threatening to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to build a missile defense system. Rarely, if ever, has there been such a reckless official disregard for U.S. national security or leadership failure to tell the American people about growing threats to their well-being. The Clinton administration and its many supporters in the media, think tanks, and acade mia never seem to connect the dots between their missionary zeal in Russia and the grave dangers being compounded there. In early 2000, one of the crusade's leading policymakers suddenly told us, after seven years of "happy talk," that "disasters are inescapable in the short run." He neglected to say that the disaster is unfolding in a country laden with twentieth-century devices of mass destruction and regressing toward the nineteenth century." Russia's potential for lethal catastrophies is the most important but not the only reason it still matters. Even in crises and weakness, Russia remains a great power because of its sheer size, which stretches across eleven time zones from Finland and Poland (if we consider Belarus) to China and nearby Alaska; its large portions of the world's energy and mineral reserves; its long his tory of world-class achievements and power; its highly educated present-day citizens; and, of course, its arsenals. All this makes Russia inherently not only a major power but a semi-global one. A "world without Russia" would therefore be globalization, to take the concept du jour, without a large part of the globe. Nor can many large international problems and con flicts be resolved without Russia , especially in a "post-Cold War order" that has at least as much inter-

national anarchy as order. From the Balkans and the Caspian to China and Iraq, from nuclear proliferation to

conventional-arms transfers, from the environment and terrorism to drug trafficking and money laundering , Russia retains a capacity to affect world affairs for better or worse. On the one hand, it was Moscow's diplomatic intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 that enabled a desperate Clinton administration to avoid sending American ground troops to Kosovo. On the other, the 1990s also brought the passage of narcotics westward across Russian territory, a flood of illegal Russian money into U.S. banks, and growing markets for Moscow's weapons and nuclear capabilities among states that already worry Washington." And then there are the vast geopolitical ramifications of developments in what is still the world's largest ter ritorial country. Nearly a fourth of planet Earth's population lives on the borders of the Russian Federation, including most of its major religions and many of its ethnic identities. Many, if not all, of these nations and peoples are likely to be directly or indirectly affected by what happens in post-Communist Russia, again for bet ter or worse-first and foremost the "near abroad," as Moscow calls the other fourteen former Soviet republics, but not them alone. Finally, there is a crucial futuristic reason why U.S. policy toward Russia must be given the highest priority and changed fundamentally. Contrary to those Americans who have "rushed to relegate Russia to the archives," believing it will always be enfeebled

and may even break into more pieces, that longtime superpower will eventually recover from its present time of troubles, as it did after the

revolution and civil war of 1917-21, indeed as it always has. But what kind of political state will rise from its knees? One that is democratic or despotic? One open to the West and eager to play a cooperative role in world affairs--or one bent on revising an international order shaped during its weakness and at its expense? One safeguarding and reducing its nuclear stockpiles or one multiplying and proliferating them among states that want them? The outcome will depend very significantly on how Russia is treated during its present-day agony, particularly by the U nited S tates. Whether it is treated wisely and compassionately or is bullied and humiliated , as a growing number of Russians believe they have been since the early 1990s. The next American president may make that decision, but our children and grandchildren will reap the benefits or pay the price .

rel impact – everythingRelations key to solve all global problemsAllison and Blackwill, 11 – * director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND ** Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October 2011) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf

Why Russia Matters to the United States In view of Russia’s difficult history, sometimes troubling behavior, relatively small economy, and reduced international role since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is reasonable to ask whether the United States needs Moscow as a partner. We believe Russia must be a top priority for the United States because its conduct can have a profound impact on America’s vital national interests: • Nuclear Weapons. President Barack Obama and former President George W. Bush each identified nuclear terrorism as the number one threat to American national security. The United States and Russia together possess 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons and most of the world’s weapons-usable material, and both are major suppliers of civilian nuclear technologies around the world. Also, Russia is the only nation that could destroy America as we know it in thirty minutes. Russia’s meaningful assistance and support is critical to preventing nuclear war. • Non-Proliferation. Russia plays a key role in U.S.-led international efforts to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials and technologies, which are sought not only by nation states, but also by non-state actors. Moscow has generally supported American initiatives to combat nuclear terrorism and shared intelligence on al Qaeda with Washington. Without Russia’s assistance, the United States will face considerable additional difficulties in seeking to slow down nuclear proliferation and prevent nuclear terrorism. • Geopolitics. Russia is an important nation in today’s international system. Aligning Moscow more closely with American goals would bring significant balance of power advantages to the United States—including in managing China’s emergence as a global power. Ignoring Russian perspectives can have substantial costs. Russia’s vote in the United Nations Security Council and its influence elsewhere is consequential to the success of U.S. international diplomacy on a host of issues. Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives have engaged in terrorist attacks against the United States and have encouraged and supported attacks by domestic terrorist groups in Russia. Russia has provided the United States with access to its airspace and territory as a critical alternative supply route for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, something that has grown in importance as America’s relations with Pakistan have deteriorated. Moscow has also shared intelligence on Afghanistan and al Qaeda, helps to train Afghan law enforcement officers, and supplies hardware to them and to the Afghan National Army. • Energy. Russia is one of the world’s leading energy producers and is the top holder of natural gas reserves .Russia thus has a substantial role in maintaining and expanding energy supplies that keep the global economy stable and enable economic growth in the United States and around the world. • Finance. Russia’s membership in the G8 and the G20 gives it a seat at the table for the most important financial and economic meetings and deliberations. • Strategic Geography. Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area and the largest in Europe by population. It is located at a strategic crossroads between Europe, Asia, and the greater Middle East and is America’s neighbor in the Arctic. As a result, Russia is close to trouble-spots and a critical transit corridor for energy and other goods.

Relations with Russia key to managing global problemsCohen 11 (Stephen F. Cohen, professor of Russian Studies and History at New York University, “Obama's Russia 'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity?” 6/1/11) http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity

An enduring existential reality has been lost in Washington’s post–cold war illusions and the fog of subsequent US wars: the road to American national security still runs through Moscow. Despite the Soviet breakup twenty years ago, only Russia still possesses devices of mass destruction capable of destroying the United States and tempting international terrorists for years to come. Russia also remains the world’s largest territorial country, a crucial Eurasian frontline in the conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations, with a vastly disproportionate share of the planet’s essential resources including oil, natural gas, iron ore, nickel, gold, timber, fertile land and fresh water. In addition, Moscow’s military and diplomatic reach can still thwart, or abet, vital US interests around the globe, from Afghanistan, Iran, China and North Korea to Europe and Latin America. In short, without an expansive cooperative relationship with Russia, there can be no real US national security.

U.S.-Russia relations K2 middle east stability, global energy security, curb nationalism, global warming, pandemic diseases, prolif, and the global economy Graham 8 [Thomas Graham, foreign service officer on academic leave with RAND in Moscow from 1997 to 1998. He previously had several assignments in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, including head of the Political/Internal Unit and acting political counselor. Between tours in Moscow,

he worked on Russian/Soviet affairs as a member of the policy planning staff of the State Department and as a policy assistant in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Mr. Graham has a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University and a B.A. in Russian studies from Yale University. July 2008 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080717_graham_u.s.russia.pdf]What trends? Simply put, the world has entered a period of great flux and upheaval of uncertain duration. We are witnessing an historic shift in global dynamism from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, initially in the economic realm, but one that will eventually reorder the geopolitical realm. The middle east – or more broadly the Muslim world – is engaged in an epic battle between tradition and modernization that jeapoardizes global energy sucirty. Although the nation-state, the fundamental unit of the international system since the westphalian peace of 1648, is thrivi ng in East Asia and the United states , it is under mounting strain as Europe seeks to create a supranational structure and artifical states in the Middle East begin to break down along sectarian and ethnic lines. Globalization has fueled an unprecedented period of economic growth around the world while unleashing the forces of disorder – terrorism, transnational crime – and rasing challenges beyond the capacity of inddividual states or current international organizations to manage – global warming, pandemic diseases, proliferation of the materials and know how to build weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). With the economic growth has can a historic transfer of wealth from the West to energy exporters, such as russia, and rising manufacturing powers, such as China. In this uncertain world, the US and russia are not strategic rivals, and neither poses a strategic threat to the other ( despite some overwrought Russian rhetoric to the contrary) , in contrast to the situation during the cold war. Rather, they share a set of common strategic challenges. Russia, by virtue of ite geographic location, and the US, by virtue of its global role, must build new relationships with a Europe that is expanding and deepening; they both must find a way to cope with the growing instability in the middle east, the challenge to energy security that implies, and, at least for Russia, the threat that that instability will infect Russia’s southern reaches ; and they both must manage relations with a rising china. In addition, both countries must deal with the dark side of globalization, and both have a keen interest in the role and effectiveness of the instituions of global governance, such as the UN and G8 the world bank and the IMF. Given their standing as the world’s two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia are each Indispensable to dealing with the problems of proliferation of WMDs, nuclear terrorism and strategic stability. The US, as the world’s largest consumer of energy, and Russia, as the largest producer of hydrocarbons, are essential to any discussion of energy security and energy’s future. Global economic dynamics and transfers of wealth will require bringing Russia, along with china, india, and others, into a more central role in managing the global economy, a service long performed by Europe and the United States. In east asia, to create a favorable new equilibirum, Russia has an interest in a strong power – that is, the US – acting as a moderating influence on China, and the US has no interest in a weaking russian presence in Siberia and the Russian far east, regions rich in the natural resources that fuel modern economies. In the Middle East, both the US and russia have levers that could help promote stability, if the two countries were working in concert, or fuel conflict, if they were not . In europe, Russian energy is critical to economic well-being and the US remains essential to security and stability. On a range of other issues – for example, civil nuclear energy, pandemic diseases, climate change – each country is capable of making a major contribution, given the vast scientific talent of each. In the former soviet space, both countries will be critical to building lasting security economic structures.

U.S.-Russia relations key to Proliferation, energy security, and global warmingLaFranchi ‘08, Howard, staff writer of the Christian Science Monitor, “US, Russia announce breakthrough on new Iran resolution”, Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 2008, Saturday, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/

Of course, not all interested parties would be happy to see the US adopt a pragmatic approach to relations with Russia that puts big-picture interests over regional concerns. US allies in Eastern and Central Europe especially may shudder at the thought of the US backing off from its support of them in favor of smoother relations with Moscow. Still, the recent references by both sides to common interests - as well as a surprise fourth Security Council resolution on Iran - will reassure some that cooler heads have prevailed as the US and Russia work through new realities in their relations. "We just can't get too carried away with the sparring," says Ms. Oudraat of USIP, " because on the big issues like proliferation, energy security, even climate change, we need Russia."

US Russian relations solves for most impacts such as oil prices, proliferation, trafficking, climate change, cyber-terrorism, and securityLegvold, 09 (Foreign Affairs, Volume 88 No. 1 2009 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora88&div=58&g_sent=1&collection=journals#672)

Reversing the collapse of US-Russian relations is one of the great tests facing the Obama administration. Among the major powers, Russia is the hard case,. And the stakes involved in getting US-Russian relations right are high—much higher than the leadership of either country has acknowledged or perhaps even realized so far. If the Obama administration can guide the relationship onto a more productive path, as it is trying to do, it will not only open the way for progress on the day’s critical issues—from nuclear security and energy security to climate change and peaceful change in the pose-Soviet area—but also be taking on a truly historic task. One of the blessings of the post-Cold War era has been the absence of

strategic rivalry among great powers, a core dynamic of the previous 300 years in the history of international relations. Should it return, some combination of tensions between the United States, Russia, and China would likely be at its core. Ensuring that this does not happen constitutes the less noticed but more fateful foreign policy challenge facing this US president and the next. Washington has scant chance of mustering the will or the energy to face this challenge, however, without a clearer sense of the scale of the stakes involved. Every tally of the ways in which Russia matters begins, and rightly so, with nuclear weapons. Because the United States and Russia possess 95 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal, they bear the responsibility for making their stocks safer by repairing the now-shattered strategic nuclear arms control regime. Their cooperation is also crucial if the gravely imperiled nuclear nonproliferation regime is to be saved. Then comes energy. Russia has 30 percent of the world’s gas reserves and sits astride the transport grid by which energy flows from the entire post-Soviet zone to the rest of the world. More recently, tensions have arisen over the Arctic’s hydrogen reserves—which are said to amount to 13-20 percent of the world’s total—not least because of the aggressive way in which Russia has asserted its claims over a large share of them. If the United States and Russia compete, rather than cooperate, over energy in Eurasia and add a military dimension to their disputed claims in the Arctic, as they have begun to do, the effects will be negative for far more than the prices of oil and gas. There is also the struggle against global terrorism, which will be sure to flag without strong collaboration between Washington and Moscow. And it has become clear that the help of Russia is needed if anything approaching stability is to have a chance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Other issues are also critical but not always recognized as such. Making real progress toward coping with the climate change, including during negotiations at the 2009 UN conference on Climate Change, will depend on whether the three countries that emit 45 percent of the world’s green house gases—the United States, Russia, and China—can cooperate. Any effort to mitigate trafficking in humans, small arms, drugs, endangered species, counterfeit goods, and laundered money must focus on Russia, since these often come from or through that country. Blocking cyberattacks, keeping space safe for commerce and communications, and averting the return of the kind of military air surveillance common during the Cold War will involve Russia, first and foremost. And attempts to reform international financial and security institutions will be optimized only if Russia is given a chance to contribute constructively. If the United States’ interests in a relationship with Russia are this many and this great and if, as Undersecretary of State William Burns said of Washington and Moscow in April, “more unites us than divides us,” then the Obama administration will need to turn a page, and not simply tinker at the edges, as it redesigns US policy towards Russia. Turning a page means setting far more ambitious goals for the relationship than is currently fashionable and then consciously devising a strategy to reach them. It also means integrating the well-intentioned symbolic gestures Washington has made toward Russia recently as well as progress on concrete issues, such as arms control, Itan’s nuclear program, and Afghanistan, into a larger design.

rel impact – nationalismFurther deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations means a return a dangerous nationalismDimitri Simes, Carnegie Endowment, Moscow Center, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec2007,

But if the current U.S.-Russian relationship deteriorates further, it will not bode well for the United States and would be even worse for Russia. The Russian general staff is lobbying to add a military dimension to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and some top officials are beginning to champion the idea of a foreign policy realignment directed against the West. There are also quite a few countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, urging Russia to work with China to play a leading role in balancing the United States economically, politically, and militarily. And post-Soviet states such as Georgia, which are adept at playing the United States and Russia off against each other, could act in ways that escalate tensions. Putin's stage management of Moscow's succession in order to maintain a dominant role for himself makes a major foreign policy shift in Russia unlikely. But new Russian leaders could have their own ideas--and their own ambitions--and political uncertainty or economic problems could tempt them to exploit nationalist sentiments to build legitimacy. If relations worsen, the UN Security Council may no longer be available--due to a Russian veto--even occasionally, to provide legitimacy for U.S. military actions or to impose meaningful sanctions on rogue states. Enemies of the United States could be emboldened by new sources of military hardware in Russia, and political and security protection from Moscow. International terrorists could find new sanctuaries in Russia or the states it protects. And the collapse of U.S.-Russian relations could give China much greater flexibility in dealing with the United States . It would not be a new Cold War, because Russia will not be a global rival and is unlikely to be the prime mover in confronting the United States. But it would provide incentives and cover for others to confront Washington, with potentially catastrophic results.

A RETURN TO PURELY NATIONALIST FOREIGN POLICY ENSURES NUCLEAR WARVictor Isdraelyan, former Soviet Ambassador, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, 1998, p. 47

The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to nofirst-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together."

rel impact – accidental warRelations key to solve the nuclear infrastructure – accidental conflictStephen F. Cohen, Prof of Russian Studies @ NYU, June 25, 2001 http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010625&c=1&s=cohen

In these and other ways, Russia has been plunging back into the nineteenth century. And, as a result, it has entered the twenty-first century with its twentieth-century systems of nuclear maintenance and control also in a state of disintegration. What does this mean? No one knows fully because nothing like this has ever happened before in a nuclear country. But one thing is certain: Because of it, we now live in a nuclear era much less secure than was the case even during the long cold war . Indeed, there are at least four grave nuclear threats in Russia today: There is, of course, the threat of proliferation, the only one generally acknowledged by our politicians and media--the danger that Russia's vast stores of nuclear material and know-how will fall into reckless hands. But, second, scores of ill-maintained Russian reactors on land and on decommissioned submarines--with the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons--are explosions waiting to happen. Third, also for the first time in history, there is a civil war in a nuclear land--in the Russian territory of Chechnya, where fanatics on both sides have threatened to resort to nuclear warfare. And most immediate and potentially catastrophic, there is Russia's decrepit early-warning system . It is supposed to alert Moscow if US nuclear missiles have been launched at Russia, enabling the Kremlin to retaliate immediately with its own warheads, which like ours remain even today on hairtrigger alert. The leadership has perhaps ten to twenty minutes to evaluate the information and make a decision. That doomsday warning system has nearly collapsed--in May, a fire rendered inoperable four more of its already depleted satellite components--and become a form of Russian nuclear roulette , a constant danger of false alarms and accidental launches against the United States .How serious are these threats? In the lifetime of this graduating class, the bell has already tolled at least four times. In 1983 a Soviet Russian satellite mistook the sun's reflection on a cloud for an incoming US missile. A massive retaliatory launch was only barely averted. In 1986 the worst nuclear reactor explosion in history occurred at the Soviet power station at Chernobyl. In 1995 Russia's early-warning system mistook a Norwegian research rocket for an American missile, and again a nuclear attack on the United States was narrowly averted. And just last summer, Russia's most modern nuclear submarine, the Kursk, exploded at sea. Think of these tollings as chimes on a clock of nuclear catastrophe ticking inside Russia. We do not know what time it is. It may be only dawn or noon. But it may already be dusk or almost midnight. The only way to stop that clock is for Washington and Moscow to acknowledge their overriding mutual security priority and cooperate fully in restoring Russia's economic and nuclear infrastructures , most urgently its early-warning system. Meanwhile, all warheads on both sides have to be taken off high-alert, providing days instead of minutes to verify false alarms. And absolutely nothing must be done to cause Moscow to rely more heavily than it already does on its fragile nuclear controls. These solutions seem very far from today's political possibilities. US-Russian relations are worse than they have been since the mid-1980s. The Bush Administration is threatening to expand NATO to Russia's borders and to abrogate existing strategic arms agreements by creating a forbidden missile defense system. Moscow threatens to build more nuclear weapons in response. Hope lies in recognizing that there are always alternatives in history and politics--roads taken and not taken. Little more than a decade ago, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, along with President Ronald Reagan and the first President George Bush, took a historic road toward ending the forty-year cold war and reducing the nuclear dangers it left behind. But their successors, in Washington and Moscow, have taken different roads, ones now littered with missed opportunities. If the current generation of leaders turns out to lack the wisdom or courage, and if there is still time, it may fall to your generation to choose the right road. Such leaders, or people to inform their vision and rally public support, may even be in this graduating class. Whatever the case, when the bell warning of impending nuclear catastrophe tolls again in Russia, as it will, know that it is tolling for you, too. And ask yourselves in the determined words attributed to Gorbachev, which remarkably echoed the Jewish philosopher Hillel, "If not now, when? If not us, who?"

rel impact – iranCooperation with Russia solves IranTrenin 10 (Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, senior research fellow at the NATO,Defense College in Rome and a senior research fellow at the Institute of Europe in Moscow, “Russia’s Policy in the Middle East,” 2010) http://carnegieendowment.org/files/trenin_middle_east.pdf

On the Iranian nuclear issue, Russian and U.S. goals coincide: no nuclear weapons for Tehran. So far, however, Moscow’s and Washington’s strategies have been only partially compatible. During the Bush presidency, the Russians have been ever-suspicious of a U.S. attack against Iran, and were careful not to approve anything, within the UN context, that could have provided legitimacy for such action. The United States, for its part, has been suspicious of Russia arming Iran, especially providing Tehran with air defenses, submarines, and cruise missiles. Moscow’s “foot-dragging” on the UN sanctions issue was seen as evidence of Russia’s double play. Yet, under President Barack Obama, a more proactive U.S. diplomacy toward Iran can engage Russia as a valuable partner. Moscow, of course, should not be expected either to “bandwagon” on the U.S. position, which it would not; nor to “deliver” Tehran, which it could not. Yet, the coordinated policies of Washington and Moscow would send a convincing message to Tehran, and strengthen the hand of the more pragmatic figures within the regime. Such coordination, which would have the full support of Europe, would be an incentive for China to join in, or at least not to be seen as an impediment. The validity of that supposition will be tested in the first years of the Obama administration. So far, Barack Obama has demonstrated something that George W. Bush would not: in order to get Russia’s help on an important security issue, Washington has to be helpful to Russia’s own security interests

at: russia weakRussia can hurt the US even if they’re weaker than usAllison and Blackwill, 11 – * director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND ** Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October 2011) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf Russia is grappling with the contradictions between imperial nostalgia, on the one hand, and the dramatic decline in its power after the Soviet collapse, on the other. The Russian government’s failure to present a credible plan to reverse Russia’s decline or to develop a successful foreign policy strategy that strengthens the country’s international role makes this only more difficult and contributes to a sense of insecurity. Nevertheless, the United States has the opportunity to manage its relations with an evolving Russia in a manner that advances America’s vital national interests. The stakes are high. Russia is more than sufficiently powerful to create a host of costly—and even devastating—problems for the United States if Russian leaders believe that Washington has a hostile, or casual, disregard for Russian national interests and priorities. This is true even though most in Russia’s elite recognize that today’s Russia is not sufficiently strong to challenge American global leadership without the support of other major powers.

Russia matters – even though its declinedO’Brien-Bours 10/19 (Robinson O’Brien-Bours, “Russian Reset and Reform,” 10/19/12) http://nlt.ashbrook.org/2011/10/russian-reset-and-reform.php

The Russian Federation does not wield the type of tremendous power and influence in world affairs that its predecessor, the Soviet Union, held. It has not been able to keep up with the rapid economic advancements of the West, China, India, Japan, and Brazil. It has found itself increasingly vulnerable, and has lashed out sometimes to try and reassert itself--the most blatant incident being the invasion of Georgia a few years ago. Nonetheless, though its infrastructure is decaying and economy looking even more hopeless than ours in the near future, Russia remains a massively important country, not least because it is still the only country on the planet that poses an existential threat to the United States--Russia alone maintains the firepower necessary to destroy us. Additionally, the borders it shares with foreign countries, its veto-wielding seat on the UN Security Council, and the reserves of resources that it sits on and sells to Europe make it important. Thus, while many outside of Eastern Europe have seen fit to sort of discount Russia and just led it slide along its merry way to decline, we ought to be focusing a great deal on our former adversaries and what is happening within their borders.

Russian weakness doesn’t matter—cooperation is still useful in the context of international organizations - this is especially true for military presenceWALLANDER AND RUMER 3 (Eugene B. Rumer and Celeste A. Wallander- Eugene B. Rumer is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU). Celeste A. Wallander is director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and the Trustee Fellow at CSIS, Washington Quarterly, Winter)

Russia retains a great deal of influence in the international arena by virtue of its institutional memberships. As the United States continues to wage the war on terrorism in many theaters and fora, a constructive Russian stance on issues ranging from the U.S. military presence in Central Asia to Security Council deliberations about Iraq is far more preferable to obstructionism. To that end, Russia can prove a useful diplomatic partner even if Russian consent is no longer necessary for a country, particularly the United States, to achieve its objectives, whatever they may be, and even if Russia's status as a global power continues to decline. Russia is influential throughout Eurasia—Russian cooperation solves the case and Russian opposition turns itWALLANDER AND RUMER 3 (Eugene B. Rumer and Celeste A. Wallander- Eugene B. Rumer is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU). Celeste A. Wallander is director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and the Trustee Fellow at CSIS, Washington Quarterly, Winter)

Russia's geopolitical presence gives it influence throughout Eurasia and importance in U.S. policy in the region. Russia can be influential by working with the United States on policy initiatives , such as herding North Korea into six-

party talks or eliminating the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the same time, Russia can be influential insofar as its support for countries can undercut U.S. policies, such as Russian sales of nuclear technology and conventional military arms to Iran. The "Russia card" can give some leaders in Eurasia political and diplomatic options that make them less susceptible to U.S. influence, as is the case with Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma, Belarus's Aleksandr Lukashenka, and Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov. n5 In sum, even if Russia does

not have usable military power to bring to bear as a source of influence, geopolitics has provided Russia a diplomatic presence in Eurasia that others, including the United States, need to take into account.Finally, Russia's institutional memberships enhance its government's weight in international affairs . Russia remains the only country that negotiates and signs nuclear strategic arms control treaties with the United States. Similarly, Russia's views on European security are advanced by virtue of its importance for maintaining

and possibly adapting the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which establishes strict limits on its signatories' conventional arsenals and their deployment. Russia is present at the table of the world's major powers whenever G-8 ministers and heads of state gather. Russian participation in the G-8 informal club of leading industrialized nations -- a modern-day version of the nineteenth-century European concert of great powers -- gives it further political clout and prestige in the international community at large, as well as in the post-Soviet space where it alone has achieved full G-8 membership. Most importantly, Russia remains one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the handful of UN members capable of single-handedly preventing Security Council decisions and whose support and approval must be secured to pass resolutions.

Global Trade Impact-2NC ModuleRussian accession key to global trade ties and WTO cred-Congressional repeal is keyReuters 11/11 (U.S. wants quick vote on normal trade with Russia, http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/idINIndia-60458720111110?type=economicNews)

"I now look forward to working with Congress" to end legislative restrictions on trade with Russia to put U.S. companies on an even playing field with international competitors, he said.He was reacting to a deal reached earlier on Thursday in Geneva that paves the way for global trade ministers to approve Russia's entry into the WTO at a ministerial meeting in December, concluding 18 years of negotiations.The deal, which appears to be a significant advance for global free trade, came as officials of the 21-economy Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum were meeting in Honolulu in talks that focused on expanding trade to stimulate global economic growth. Obama joins the meetings this weekend.

Solves nuclear war and all conflictGriswold, 2007 (Daniel T., Associate director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trade, Democracy and Peace: The Virtuous Cycle, Peace through Trade Conference, April 20, http://www.freetrade.org/node/681)

A little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story a while back reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." In 2006, a survey by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half-century. Since the early 1990s, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 17, with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. The Institute's latest report found that 2005 marked the second year in a row that no two nations were at war with one another. What a remarkable and wonderful fact. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the Associated Press report, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Current estimates of people killed by war are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news--the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them--but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author argued in a forgettable book, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war. I would argue that free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, as I argued a moment ago, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies--a record high. Some studies have cast doubt on the idea that democracies are less likely to fight wars. While it's true that democracies rarely if ever war with each other, it is not such a rare occurrence for democracies to engage in wars with non-democracies. We can still hope that has more countries turn to democracy, there will be fewer provocations for war by non-democracies. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. The 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report contains an insightful chapter on "Economic Freedom and Peace" by Dr. Erik Gartzke, a professor of political science at Columbia University. Dr. Gartzke compares the propensity of countries to engage in wars and their level of economic freedom and concludes that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, "Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free." By the way, Dr. Gartzke's analysis found that economic freedom was a far more important variable in determining a countries propensity to go to war than democracy. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in a high-tech, service economy. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home. In short, globalization and the development it has spurred have rendered the spoils of war less valuable. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological

fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linier. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deep trade and investment ties among nations make war less attractive.

Global Trade Impact – BrinkRetaliation imminent without repealRoth, 3/20 (Andrew, “Jackson-Vanik Trades Places”, Russia Profile, http://russiaprofile.org/international/56157.html, BJM)

Putting aside questions over Russia’s business environment and civil rights record, the key factor driving the debate now is Russia’s imminent accession to the WTO. Experts expect Russia to finalize its accession to the WTO by July this year, leaving American businesses operating in Russia subject to retaliatory tariffs if the amendment isn’t shelved. Andrew Somers, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, told National Public Radio that tariffs for American businesses in Russia would likely remain at the current rate of ten percent, and won’t be adjusted to the seven percent required by the WTO if Jackson-Vanik remains on the books.

Global Trade Impact – Link ExtensionLack of repeal tanks US tradeThai News Service, 3/23“Russia: Russia vs. substitutions of Jackson-Vanik Amendment”, Factiva, BJM

A relic of the Cold War era between the United States and Soviet Union could soon be an obstacle to improving trade between the U.S. and Russia, experts say. Jackson-Vanik amendment The relic in question is known as the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which Congress passed as a modification to the 1974 Trade Act that regulated commerce between the United States and nations that were then controlled by communist governments. Under Jackson-Vanik, Washington could not establish normal trade relations with another country unless that country granted its citizens full and unrestricted rights to emigrate. At the time, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies severely restricted emigration. Congress initially passed the law in response to the Soviet Union's emigration restrictions, particularly with respect to its Jewish citizens, Sen. Max Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, said during a recent hearing. Jackson-Vanik served its purpose. It helped millions of Jews emigrate freely. But it is now a relic of the past, Baucus said. Every president, regardless of political party, has waived Jackson-Vanik's requirements for Russia for the past 20 years. Economic impact The Obama administration agrees, saying U.S. businesses will suffer unless Congress repeals Jackson-Vanik. Repeal would open the way for U.S. companies to continue doing normal business on a permanent basis with Russia, which is expected to become a full member of the Geneva-based World Trade Organization (WTO) this year. The WTO, which oversees the rules of international trade, approved Russia's membership application last December and trade experts expect Moscow to ratify the agreement by July. As a full WTO member, Moscow must agree to a series of trade rules, including a ceiling on tariff levels imposed on imported goods and the protection of intellectual property. In addition, Russia will have to amend its economic and trade laws to make them conform to international standards. Most trade experts agree that Jackson-Vanik should be repealed as soon as possible. First, it applies to a country that no longer exists - the Soviet Union, Anders Aslund, a Russia expert with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, told VOA. Secondly, the problem in question is emigration and that has not been a problem for many years. Business Thirdly, adds Aslund, if the Jackson-Vanik amendment is not repealed, tariffs on Russian goods to the United States could increase to 50 percent, severely curtailing, if not ending, all Russian exports to the United States. U.S. exports to Russia would also be greatly affected, he said. U.S. business leaders are closely watching the issue. They say their business in Russia will suffer unless Moscow is granted permanent normal trade relations, or PNTR, with the United States. This trade status can be granted only after Jackson-Vanik is revoked. Russia has committed upon accession (to WTO) to significantly reduce its tariffs on imported agricultural equipment, from 15 percent to five percent, Sam Allen, chairman of Deere and Company, told a recent congressional hearing. However, it is likely that Russia would not extend the lower tariff rates to the U.S.-made products until it is granted PNTR.

Russia is the linchpin of the WTO-accession is key to cred and coverageCRS Report 2008 (January 7, Russia's Accession to the WTO, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31979.pdf)

Russia is the largest and most populous country that is not a member of the WTO. If Russia accedes, it would significantly expand the geographical coverage of WTO rules to all major economies leading to a larger degree of stability and transparency to the international trading system.

This still holds-now is keyReuters 10/29 (US lawmakers warn Obama over Russia's WTO bid, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE79S2TP20111029?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0)

Russian entry to the WTO would be the biggest step in world trade liberalization since China joined a decade ago, and the United States and the European Union have urged all sides to try to settle membership terms by the end of this year.

Global Trade Impact-China WarFailure to save the WTO guarantees the world splits into US and China trade blocs Ikenberry, 2008 (G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, January/February, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87102-p30/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-future-of-the-west.html)

The United States should also renew its support for wide-ranging multilateral institutions. On the economic front, this would include building on the agreements and architecture of the WTO, including pursuing efforts to conclude the current Doha Round of trade talks, which seeks to extend market opportunities and trade liberalization to developing countries. The WTO is at a critical stage. The basic standard of nondiscrimination is at risk thanks to the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Meanwhile, there are growing doubts over whether the WTO can in fact carry out trade liberalization, particularly in agriculture, that benefits developing countries. These issues may seem narrow, but the fundamental character of the liberal international order -- its commitment to universal rules of openness that spread gains widely -- is at stake. Similar doubts haunt a host of other multilateral agreements -- on global warming and nuclear nonproliferation, among others -- and they thus also demand renewed U.S. leadership.The strategy here is not simply to ensure that the Western order is open and rule-based. It is also to make sure that the order does not fragment into an array of bilateral and "minilateral" arrangements, causing the United States to find itself tied to only a few key states in various regions. Under such a scenario, China would have an opportunity to build its own set of bilateral and "minilateral" pacts. As a result, the world would be broken into competing U.S. and Chinese spheres. The more security and economic relations are multilateral and all-encompassing, the more the global system retains its coherence.

US-China trade disputes guarantees global economic depression and large scale conflict that escalates Liu, 2005 (Henry C K, Chairman of a New York-based private investment group, Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/global_economy/GH20Dj01.html)

The danger of trade wars US geopolitical hostility toward China will manifest itself first in trade friction, which will lead to a mutually recriminatory trade war between the two major economies that will attract opportunistic trade realignments among the traditional allies of the United States. US multinational corporations, unable to steer US domestic politics, will increasingly trade with China through their foreign subsidiaries, leaving the US economy with even fewer jobs, and a condition that will further exacerbate anti-China popular sentiments that translate into more anti-free-trade policies generally and anti-China policies specifically. The resultant global economic depression from a trade war between the world's two largest economies will in turn heighten further mutual recriminations. An external curb from the US of Chinese export trade will accelerate a redirection of Chinese growth momentum inward, increasing Chinese power, including military power, while further encouraging anti-US sentiment in Chinese policy circles. This in turn will validate US apprehension of a China threat, increasing the prospect for armed conflict. A war between the US and China can have no winners, particularly on the political front. Even if the US were to prevail militarily through its technological superiority, the political cost of military victory would be so severe that the US as it currently exists would not be recognizable after the conflict and the original geopolitical aim behind the conflict would remain elusive, as the Vietnam War and the Iraq war have demonstrated. By comparison, the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts, destructive as they have been to the US social fabric, are mere minor scrimmages compared with a war with China.

Impact is extinction Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: the Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2001, The Nation, p 20

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious U.S. militarists know that china’s miniscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the Unites States, deeply divided Japan, and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is

the world’s most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China’s sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China’s borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

Russian Economy Impact-2NC ModuleAccession is key to the Russia economy-import/export balance, diversification, FDI inflows-alternative is oil dependence that causes a collapseInternational Business Tribune 11/12 (Russia WTO Accession: Success Could Spark Belated Economic Boom, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/248232/20111112/russia-wto-accession-success-spark-belated-economic.htm?cid=2)

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia never really modernized beyond energy and defense. Energy remains the backbone of its economy and exports. This strategy has succeeded in generating solid economic growth in the past decade. However, it is not sustainable and far from ideal. The Russian economy could be so much more if it became broadly modernized.The accession into the WTO could give help to Russia in this area. It could also boost exports in its already-efficient commodities sector.Accession into the WTO is expected to benefit Russia’s steel industry, which would no longer face the European Union’s quota against certain non-WTO members, according to the Moscow Times.Its fledgling IT sector could also receive a boost. Information Technology is one of the few globally competitive, non-resource sectors Russia has. It is also one of the fastest growing areas of its economy. If Russia continues to gain in this area on the global stage, it would prove a huge boon to its economy.Generally speaking, tariffs on Russian goods will be reduced across the board for WTO members. This will likely be enormously helpful because Russia conducts 92 percent of its trade with WTO members, according to Maxim Medvedkov, Russia’s chief WTO negotiator, reported Moscow Times.The more important benefit of WTO accession, however, may actually be the accession itself and the requirements associated with it.On the international business and investment stage, WTO accession is a sign of legitimacy.Being the only major economy to not be in the WTO (and not complying with its internationally accepted rules) has been a black mark on Russia, especially given the country’s high level of corruption and history of strong-arming international investors.This lack of legitimacy has severely limited foreign investment in Russia, which is sorely needed for the country to modernize.

Nuclear warFilger 2009 (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

Russian Economy Impact-Link Extension

Repeal is key to Russian economySamuel Charap (visiting fellow in the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program) and Andrew C. Kuchins (senior fellow and director of the program) Feb 2009 “Economic Whiplash in Russia: An Opportunity to Bolster U.S.-Russia Commercial Ties?”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090218_charap_econwhiplashrussia_web.pdfThe global economic crisis has hit Russia extremely hard. Its main stock market index, the Russian Trading System (RTS), has lost over 70 percent of its value since its peak in May 2008, the worst performance among emerging markets.2 After a remarkable decade of robust growth, economic performance is expected to stagnate this year or even decline.3 Since early August 2008, Russia spent more than a third (more than $200 billion) of its reserves on implementing various stimulus measures and supporting the ruble.4 Industrial production in December 2008 plunged 10.3 percent year-on-year, while the number of unemployed in Russia increased by 20 percent from October 1 to mid-January.5 Recent estimates suggest that if the average price of oil is below $35 per barrel this year, the Russian budget, after a decade of surpluses, could run a deficit of more than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).6 In 2008, capital flight was an astonishing $129.9 billion, which is over five times the previous high recorded in 2000.7 The political impact of the downturn has been amplified by the speed and degree of Russia’s economic descent—the crisis hit when Russia’s economy was at its post-Soviet peak. From the economic crisis of 1998 to the summer of 2008, Russia underwent a macroeconomic revolution. Whereas it had defaulted on its external debt in 1998, by 2005 it had become a net creditor in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and by May 2008 it held around $600 billion in currency reserves, the third largest in the world.8 Its nominal dollar GDP had increased by more than eight times from 1999 to 2008. By 2008, Russia’s stock market capitalization was over $1 trillion, the highest among emerging markets. The government’s strategic plan saw Russia becoming the largest economy in Europe and the fifth largest in the world after the United States, China, Japan, and India by 2020.9 It was from this position of economic might and policymaker confidence that Russia fell into what may be a drawn-out economic downturn.10 It is important that U.S. policymakers understand the implications of this unprecedented economic whiplash. The crisis could have a major impact on Russia’s external behavior and therefore on U.S. interests. As of this writing, many analysts many have already concluded that the crisis will spur a new period of aggressiveness in Moscow’s external stance.11 Most agree with Dimitri Simes’s maxim that “In Russia, hard times normally produce hard lines.”12 Thus far the crisis has indeed correlated with assertiveness in Russian foreign policy. For example, Russia has engaged in a highly destructive “gas war” with Ukraine, at one point going so far as to completely cut off deliveries to Europe, which caused rationing in some countries, such as Bulgaria, that are completely dependent on Russian gas. The recent announcement that Kyrgyzstan would close the U.S. military base at Manas under apparent Russian pressure would also indicate a more assertive line. Moscow seems at least in part motivated by a revanchist instinct to keep its “near abroad” under tighter political control. Despite these assertive moves, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the future trajectory of Russian policy. History provides evidence that economic downturns in Russia have often corresponded with periods of greater cooperation. Economic stagnation in the late 1980s was associated with the end of the Cold War, and the contraction of the early 1990s correlated with an accommodating foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin. Although nothing is predetermined, this historical perspective suggests that the current economic downturn could push Russia toward a more cooperative stance vis-à-vis the West, especially in terms of economic cooperation. Just nine months ago when oil was over $140 per barrel, Moscow had fewer incentives to engage with the West on economic issues. Russia was such an attractive market that it did not need to make an effort to lure Western investors; money flowed into its markets regardless of its policies. Its economy grew at a rapid clip despite the stagnation of the economic reform agenda, and it no longer needed financing from international institutions to ensure fiscal health. In short, Russia’s boom provided little incentive to reach out to the West on economic matters. With its economy in deep trouble and oil now under $50 per barrel, this situation has changed significantly. Clearly economic troubles are not exclusive to Russia, but the whiplash factor has altered the incentive structure to perhaps a greater degree than in other countries. Recovery from the crisis could require a considerably greater degree of economic engagement with the West than the boom did . In sharp contrast to the pre-crisis period, Russia may now need resources that only international, and particularly Western, investors, institutions, and trading partners can provide. This is a potentially powerful incentive for pursuing greater cooperation. Four examples illustrate the point. First, since its budget appears likely to run a large deficit this year, Moscow may need to turn to international lenders to shore up its fiscal position, especially if its stabilization funds and foreign currency reserves continue to be depleted at such a rapid clip. After having paid off virtually all its debts to other states and international financial institutions ahead of schedule in the first few years of this decade—a move intended both to prevent incoming oil and gas revenues from spurring inflation and to increase geopolitical freedom of maneuver—Russia could now once again turn to international markets and lenders for credits. According to the World Bank, Russia will be forced to do so if oil prices average below $30 per barrel for the year.13 Second, Russia’s stock market can only recover if foreign, and particularly Western, investors return.14 The massive expansion of Russia’s market over the course of the period from 1998 to mid-2008 was to a significant extent driven by Western investors. Many Russian firms held initial public offerings (IPOs) in London and New York, some listing directly on Western exchanges. After the “ring fence” that prevented foreigners from trading in its shares on the Russian market was lifted in December 2005 and the government consolidated its 51 percent stake, leaving the remainder to be purchased by private investors, Gazprom rapidly became one of the most desirable stocks in emerging markets. In May 2008, its market value peaked at $315 billion, making it the third-largest company by market capitalization in the world. In this period, Russia was viewed as one of the most attractive emerging markets. Portfolio foreign investment stood at $4.2 billion in 2007, a 31.8 percent increase from the previous year.15 Russia’s stock market expansion came despite such incidents as the “YUKOS affair,” the term used to refer to the events that began with the arrests of its parent company’s top shareholders, Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in June and October 2003 respectively. At the time, YUKOS was Russia’s largest company and top oil producer. Since the arrests, the company has been gradually dismantled by the authorities and sold off to state-controlled enterprises. In a lawsuit filed in a U.S. court, American holders of YUKOS shares alleged that they lost $6 billion due to the wiping out of YUKOS’s share value and the nationalization of its assets.16 Relations between Russia and the West suffered, and the affair became a regular subject of discussion in high-level government-to-government meetings. Such economic and political uncertainty would usually scare off investors, but Russia was such an attractive market that the attack on YUKOS made little difference. After an initial dip, the RTS recovered in a matter of months. The economic circumstances that allowed the Russian government to interfere in the market with impunity are long gone. In the context of the current economic crisis and the bottoming out of the RTS at around 500 points (compared to its high of approximately 2,500 points in May 2008), Russia needs to attract foreign, and particularly Western, investors back to the market. Without a return of foreign capital, the Russian market is unlikely to recover in the medium term. Even if oil prices increase significantly, investors have little money to spend, and if Russia remains a risky investment they will be loath to

spend it there. Third, Russian corporations and financial institutions need to refinance loans obtained from Western lenders. Russian firms obtained nearly $500 billion in private credits in the years of plenty leading up to the crisis.17 UBS estimates that around 40 percent of that went to the energy sector, mostly to Gazprom and Rosneft.18 Western lenders competed fiercely with one another to finance Russian companies’ rapid expansion, tempted by the impressive cash flows on their balance sheets. When the value of collateralized assets sank as investors fled the Russian stock market over the summer of 2008, Russian companies scrambled to make their (dollar-denominated) repayment schedules. Credit dried up fast and margin calls on 10 of the 25 wealthiest owners of large private companies forced even more asset sell-offs. As one brokerage house put it, “Russia has a solvency problem. Simply put, in August Moscow was flooded with international bankers competing to provide funding to Russian entities. By October, the only financiers visiting were those trying to get their money back.”19 In addition to cash shortage problems, Russian corporations will face difficulties refinancing as a result of the global credit crunch. Russian firms have about $100 billion in debt coming due in 2009, double the total owed by the governments and companies of Brazil, India, and China combined.20 So far, they have survived the initial wave of debt payments, in part thanks to a $50-billion government aid package specifically targeted for refinancing of foreign loans.21 Some analysts argue that Russia has weathered the worst of the corporate debt-repayment storm.22 However, debt transactions in Russia, which often involve off-shore entities, tend to be nontransparent; the $100-billion figure could be a vast underestimate. There is a significant probability that Russian firms will face serious difficulties repaying their debts. As Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes put it, “With no Western financial intermediation to roll over old corporate debts, Russia is itself in an acute crisis without any way out on its own.”23 Russia may well have few alternatives to Western lending sources if it wants to resolve its “solvency problem.” Fourth, as Russia’s leaders themselves have argued, the path out of the crisis depends to some degree on economic reform and, in the long term, diversification of the economy. President Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly and publicly argued that “the only way to stabilize the economy and sustain growth...is through transparency, competition, accountability, and protection of property rights.”24 In a recent interview, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin maintained that the crisis will force the government to return to the reform agenda: “The global financial crisis is even helpful to us, since it makes us act in a more rational way. It makes us apply new technologies, like in energy saving. It makes us think of optimizing production and providing additional personnel training and re-training. All this makes us think about leaving this time of crisis as a more mature country with better prospects for development.”25 In other words, there are indications that the Russian leadership has recognized that a return to the structural reform agenda—largely neglected for the past five years—can be a key component of a recovery plan.26 While greater integration and economic cooperation with the West may not be necessary for Russia to push ahead with such reforms, closer ties can create conditions consistent with their implementation. Measures such as WTO membership will bring increased competition to the Russian market, force firms to restructure and produce higher-quality goods, and reinforce norms of transparency and protection of property rights. Increased Western foreign direct investment (FDI) can provide the know-how and technology transfer necessary for modernization and the resources to upgrade Russia’s aging infrastructure.27 In other words, economic integration is likely to facilitate reform. Further, as the government acknowledged in its recent strategic economic policy plan, deeper economic integration will be crucial for Russia to achieve optimal growth rates and diversify the sources of growth in the long term.28 In short, the crisis has created significant incentives for Russia to work with Western partners on economic issues; Russia may need the economic resources that Western investors, financial institutions, and trading partners can provide in order to facilitate its recovery from the crisis. As a result, there could well be a greater emphasis on economic cooperation as opposed to confrontation and assertive geopolitics in Russian foreign policy. Incentives clearly do not translate directly into policies; the key issue is whether the Russian leadership will react to the incentives or to their often conservative, anti-Western instincts. If the Russians respond to the incentives, they are likely to seek cooperation with the West on economic issues. This presents a valuable opportunity for the administration of President Barack Obama to expand the role of commercial ties in its broader strategy of engagement with Russia. Currently such ties are extremely weak. Despite significant increases following 1998, Russia accounted for only 1.1 percent of U.S. imports and 0.4 percent of U.S. exports in 2006. In the same year, the United States accounted for 3.1 percent of Russian exports and 4.4 percent of Russian imports.29 In 2007, trade turnover between the two countries totaled $27 billion, versus almost $387 billion between the United States and China.30 In 2007, U.S. FDI in Russia accounted for 5 percent of the total. These numbers are proportionally quite low. In terms of FDI, the 5 percent number should be four times as high if it were to reflect the proportion of U.S. FDI in the total global FDI stock.32 Despite this considerable potential to increase trade and investment, the economic aspect of U.S.- Russia policy has long been underemphasized in favor of such issues as arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism. The Obama administration should respond to possible overtures from Moscow on economic cooperation and seek to strengthen commercial ties in the bilateral relationship. Even though arms control and other security issues will rightly remain the main priorities, there should be much more focus on economic measures than in the past. Policy Recommendations The following are suggestions for concrete steps that the administration can take to solidify the economic relationship with Moscow. First, the United States should continue to promote Russia’s integration into international economic institutions. By bringing Russia into structures such as the OECD and the WTO, the United States can foster rules-based international norms of economic behavior that can shape Russian policy and increase bilateral trade. Participation in these institutions carries with it obligations such as observance of international standards relating to rule of law, transparency, and property rights that are key to improving the investment climate and thus boosting bilateral commercial ties over the medium term. In the U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration (the so-called Sochi Declaration) signed by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in April 2008, the United States pledged to push for WTO accession and OECD membership.33 However, these efforts were derailed by the August war in Georgia, when most bilateral initiatives were shelved. Subsequently Russia reversed itself on several obligations it had taken on in bilateral WTO negotiations, by, for example, increasing quotas on chicken imports. Recently its top WTO negotiator issued an ultimatum stating that Russia would no longer observe any such obligations if it does not become a member of the organization by 2010.34 Despite these setbacks, Prime Minister Putin still maintains that WTO membership is a priority and seeks to push forward with it “on standard and acceptable terms.”35 He singled out the United States as the key actor in furthering WTO accession: “Joining the WTO is still on our agenda. We will continue talks with our American partners, and we hope they will support Russia in joining the WTO.”36 Although the two countries took a major step forward in November 2006 when they signed a bilateral agreement for Russia’s accession to the WTO, the United States still must play a role as an advocate for Russian membership in the organization, both publicly and in the multilateral negotiating process. Despite the recent hiccups, relatively few technical issues remain in the multilateral negotiations. It appears that the main impediment to moving forward is Georgia, which in 2006 pulled out of a bilateral agreement on WTO accession it had previously signed with Russia. Given the current climate of relations between the two countries, there is little chance that such an agreement can be worked out without intervention from the United States and other Western nations. Although Russia’s actions in Georgia and its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia should not be excused, the United States, together with European allies, should work with Georgia and Russia to help the two sides overcome the present stalemate. Second, the United States should graduate Russia from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 and grant it permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). The amendment is an anachronistic Cold War relic that no longer serves any purpose other than to antagonize the Russians.37 It forces the executive to certify annually to Congress that there are no restrictions on freedom-of-emigration from Russia in order to grant Moscow most-favored-nation status.38 The original intention was to compel the Soviet Union to lift limits on the emigration of minority groups, in particular Jews.39 Today, Russia imposes no such limits. Several other post-Soviet countries—Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia—have already been graduated from the amendment’s provisions. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both promised to graduate Russia from the Jackson- Vanik Amendment but did not follow

through on their pledges. Repealing Jackson-Vanik would send a clear message that the United States is serious about strengthening commercial ties between the two countries and would create general goodwill by removing an irritant in the relationship. For U.S. companies, PNTR would add stability to the investment environment. The Obama administration should encourage congressional leaders to reintroduce relevant legislation and should publicly push for its passage.

Russian economic decline causes civil war—escalates and goes nuclear.David, 99 – Professor of Politics Science at Johns Hopkins (Steven, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, lexis)

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return . Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

WTO accession results in a confidence and investment boon that allows for diversification necessary to stave off collapseKyiv Post, 10/30/2011 (“Analysis: National interest, not votes, to get Russia into WTO”, Reuters, http://www.kyivpost.com/news/russia/detail/115947/print/)

WTO entry is more about investment than trade. It would send a signal that Russia, perceived to have high political risk, corruption and a weak legal system, is committed to a rules-based system of dealing with the rest of the world."It's to say Russia is a predictable place, that Russia is rational and that it wants to be part of a club," added Frolov, who also advises the Kremlin on foreign policy.For Russia, the world's 11th largest economy, greater security for investors would help it diversify away from oil, gas and metals that together account for four-fifths of exports.A more open economy would enable Russia to "become part of the global supply chain", argues Edward Verona, head of the U.S.-Russia Business Council, which backs Russia's WTO entry."For business overall, it's a great thing," Verona said. "It shows that Russia is prepared to adhere to a set of rules and procedures supported by the international trading community."

Key to diversification and competitiveness

RT 11/9 (Russia overcomes final WTO hurdle, http://rt.com/business/news/wto-russia-wto-accession-909/)

The question now is whether it would help Russia to diversify its economy and make it more competitive. A big part of the issue is Russia's economic dependence on commodity exports, with more than 80% of state revenues now coming from the sale of raw materials.Tuesday's report from Fitch says WTO accession will be positive for Russia's economy "reducing its exposure to commodityprice shocks – by ensuring better access toworld markets fornon-commodity exports."Meanwhile, Ilya Rachenkov, Investcafe analyst, is more skeptical, referring to Russian experts, who believe the move will just strengthen Russia's economic role of a commodities exporter.This brings us on to Russia's investment attractiveness – as well as the effects on domestic producers. However, despite arguing about the short term, almost all experts agree in the longer term the economic result for Russia will be positive.The World Bank calculated that over time Russia's WTO accession should add between 1% and 3% to its GDP growth rate. And Natalia Orlova, chief economist at Alfa-Bank talks about the benefits of easier access "to global technologies and high-tech equipment, which at the moment are subject to relatively high import duties."Vladimir Chizhov, Russian Ambassador to the European Union also believes that not everybody will be immediately happy about the move, with domestic producers facing tough competition from global producers."Naturally, accession to the WTO will lead to increased competition, including in the Russian market. And for Russian export manufacturers – in markets elsewhere in the world," the diplomat said."Unfortunately, so far a significant part of our products, especially in the processing industry, struggle to compete on foreign markets," Chizhov added.However, Russian consumers are likely to benefit with a larger choice of quality goods at reasonable prices.

Russian Econ ImpactAnd, that’s bad-protracted Russian economic downturn results in nuclear confrontation with the USAlpha 2008 (Seeking Alpha, premier website for actionable stock market opinion and analysis, and vibrant, intelligent finance discussion, named the Most Informative Website by Kiplinger's Magazine and has received Forbes' 'Best of the Web' Award, “Economic Distress and Geopolitical Risks,” 11-18, http://seekingalpha.com/article/106562-economic-distress-and-geopolitical-risks)

Russia, whose economy, stock markets and financial system have literally imploded over the past few months, could become increasingly problematic if faced with a protracted economic downturn. The increasingly authoritarian and aggressive Russian regime is already showing signs of anger projection. Its invasion of Georgia this summer and increasing willingness to confront the West reflect a desire to stoke the pride and anger of its people against foreign powers—particularly the United States. It is no accident that the Russians announced a willingness to deploy tactical missile systems to Kaliningrad the day after Barack Obama’s election in the U.S. This was a clear “shot across the bow” of the new administration and demonstrates Russian willingness to pursue a much more confrontational foreign policy going forward. Furthermore, the collapse in the price of oil augers poorly for Russia’s economy. The Russian budget reputedly needs oil at $70 per barrel or higher in order to be in balance. Russian foreign currency reserves, once huge, have been depleted massively over the past few months by ham-fisted attempts to arrest the slide in both markets and the financial system. Bristling with nuclear weapons and nursing an ego still badly bruised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and loss of superpower status, an impoverished and unstable Russia would be a dangerous thing to behold.

Russian Economy Impact-Nuclear WarRussian economic decline causes nuclear warRuddy 1999 (Christopher, newsmax Russia expert, march 12, http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/3/12/53227)

The collapse of Russia's economy greatly increased the chances of war with the West. With 29 times Finland's population, Russia's budget barely matches theirs. According to news reports, millions of ordinary Russians are now struggling just to stay alive, selling family heirlooms and chopping up their furniture for kindling. Russia's political leaders and economic czars, of course, will never admit that they and their failed totalitarian system are responsible for this widespread misery, and increasingly the West is being blamed. This is particularly dangerous, because despite economic desperation, Russia continues is still a nuclear superpower. Victor Olove, director of Moscow's Center for Policy Studies, told the Los Angeles Times, "People who have nuclear warheads in their hands have not gotten their salaries for three or four months and are literally hungry."

Collapse of Russian development threatens prolif, terrorism, and nuclear warCohen 2001 (Stephen, Prof of Russian Studies at NYU, June 7, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010625&c=1&s=cohen)

In these and other ways, Russia has been plunging back into the nineteenth century. And, as a result, it has entered the twenty-first century with its twentieth-century systems of nuclear maintenance and control also in a state of disintegration. What does this mean? No one knows fully because nothing like this has ever happened before in a nuclear country. But one thing is certain: Because of it, we now live in a nuclear era much less secure than was the case even during the long cold war. Indeed, there are at least four grave nuclear threats in Russia today: § There is, of course, the threat of proliferation, the only one generally acknowledged by our politicians and media--the danger that Russia's vast stores of nuclear material and know-how will fall into reckless hands. § But, second, scores of ill-maintained Russian reactors on land and on decommissioned submarines--with the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons--are explosions waiting to happen. § Third, also for the first time in history, there is a civil war in a nuclear land--in the Russian territory of Chechnya, where fanatics on both sides have threatened to resort to nuclear warfare. § And most immediate and potentially catastrophic, there is Russia's decrepit early-warning system. It is supposed to alert Moscow if US nuclear missiles have been launched at Russia, enabling the Kremlin to retaliate immediately with its own warheads, which like ours remain even today on hairtrigger alert. The leadership has perhaps ten to twenty minutes to evaluate the information and make a decision. That doomsday warning system has nearly collapsed--in May, a fire rendered inoperable four more of its already depleted satellite components--and become a form of Russian nuclear roulette, a constant danger of false alarms and accidental launches against the United States. How serious are these threats? In the lifetime of this graduating class, the bell has already tolled at least four times. In 1983 a Soviet Russian satellite mistook the sun's reflection on a cloud for an incoming US missile. A massive retaliatory launch was only barely averted. In 1986 the worst nuclear reactor explosion in history occurred at the Soviet power station at Chernobyl. In 1995 Russia's early-warning system mistook a Norwegian research rocket for an American missile, and again a nuclear attack on the United States was narrowly averted. And just last summer, Russia's most modern nuclear submarine, the Kursk, exploded at sea. Think of these tollings as chimes on a clock of nuclear catastrophe ticking inside Russia. We do not know what time it is. It may be only dawn or noon. But it may already be dusk or almost midnight. The only way to stop that clock is for Washington and Moscow to acknowledge their overriding mutual security priority and cooperate fully in restoring Russia's economic and nuclear infrastructures, most urgently its early-warning system. Meanwhile, all warheads on both sides have to be taken off high-alert, providing days instead of minutes to verify false alarms. And absolutely nothing must be done to cause Moscow to rely more heavily than it already does on its fragile nuclear controls.

Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war and environmental collapseOliker 2002 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, “Assessing Russia’s Decline,” www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1442/)

What challenges does today’s Russia pose for the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. military as a whole? Certainly Russia cannot present even a fraction of the threat the Soviet monolith posed and for which the United States prepared for decades. Yet, if certain negative trends continue, they may create a new set of dangers that can in some ways prove even more real, and therefore more frightening, than the far-off specter of Russian attack ever was. As a weak state, Russia shares some attributes with “failed” or “failing” states, which the academic literature agrees

increase the likelihood of internal and interstate conflict and upheaval. Tracing through the specifics of these processes in Russia reveals a great many additional dangers, both humanitarian and strategic. Moscow’s efforts to reassert central control show that much control is already lost, perhaps irretrievably. This is manifested both in center-periphery relations and in the increasing failure of law and order throughout the country, most clearly seen in the increasing institutionalization of corruption and crime. Although Russia’s weakened armed forces are unlikely, by temperament and history, to carry out a coup, real concerns exist that the forces may grow less inclined to go along with aspects of government policy, particularly if they are increasingly used as instruments of internal control as in Chechnya. Moreover, the fact that the Russian military is unlikely to attempt to take power does not mean that it will not seek to increase its influence over policymaking and policy-makers. The uncertainties of military command and control threaten the possibility of accidental (or intentional) nuclear weapon use, while deterioration in the civilian nuclear sector increases the risk of a tragic accident. Russia’s demographic trajectory of ill health and male mortality bodes ill for the nation’s ability to resolve its economic troubles (given an increasingly graying population) and creates concerns about its continued capacity to maintain a fighting force even at current levels of effectiveness. Finally, the fact that economic, political, and demographic declines affect parts of Russia very differently, combined with increased regional political autonomy over the course of Russian independence and continuing concerns about interethnic and interregional tension, creates a danger that locality and/or ethnicity could become rallying cries for internal conflict. While some might argue that Russia’s weakness, or even the potential for its eventual collapse, has little to do with the United States, the truth is that a range of U.S. interests is directly affected by Russia’s deterioration and the threats that it embodies. The dangers of proliferation or use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), heightened by Russian weakness, quite directly threaten the United States and its vital interests. Organized crime in Russia is linked to a large and growing multinational network of criminal groups that threatens the United States and its economy both directly and through links with (and support of) global and local terrorist organizations. Russia is also a major energy producer and a transit state for oil and gas from the Caspian at a time when the U.S. government has identified that region, and energy interests in general, as key to its national security. Washington’s allies, closer to Russia physically, are not only the customers for much of this energy but are also the likely victims of any refugee flows, environmental crises, or potential flare-ups of violence that Russian decline may spur. Finally, recent history suggests a strong possibility that the Untied States would play a role in seeking to alleviate a humanitarian crisis on or near Russian soil, whether it was caused by epidemic, war, or a nuclear/industrial catastrophe.

Russian economic collapse causes nuclear warBlair 1999 (Bruce Blair is a senior fellow and Clifford Gaddy a fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program, Brookings Review, Summer)Western policymakers appear not to recognize that the fate of Russia’s economy is neither exclusively Russia’s problem nor exclusively an economic problem. Although Russia, with its nearly $200 billion of foreign debt, still has the ability to shake global financial markets—and likely will do so—the unquestionably bigger threat posed by its weak economy concerns national security. Russia’s economic woes increase the nuclear threat to the United States.

Russian economic collapse causes accidental nuclear warForden 2001 (Geoffrey, senior research fellow at the Security Studies Program at MIT, Policy Analysis, May 3)Because of that need, Russia’s continuing economic difficulties pose a clear and increasing danger to itself, the world at large, and the United States in particular. Russia no longer has the working fleet of early-warning satellites that reassured its leaders that they were not under attack during the most recent false alert—in 1995 when a scientific research rocket, launched from Norway was, for a short time, mistaken for a U.S. nuclear launch. With decaying satellites, the possibility exists that, if a false alert occurs again, Russia might launch its nuclear-tipped missiles.

Russian Economy Impact-China WarEconomic decline causes a Russia-China warTrenin 2002 (Dmitri, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Former Russian Officer, After Eurasia, pp 308-309)

Usually, there is no shortage of dire predictions concerning Russia’s ultimate fate. In a characteristic exchange of views on the eve of the year 2000, a prominent Russian intellectual predicted Russia’s disintegration within 10 to 15 years. His European counterpart’s vision of Russia was that of Muscovy west of the Urals, with Siberia under Chinese control. The American scholar limited himself to the vision of a Sino-Russian war. If a doomsday scenario were to become a reality, this would be the result of a major economic catastrophe. If Russia became a loose confederation, its borderlands would gravitate in different directions, and governing Russia would require the art of managing these very different orientations. In other words, Russia would still join the world, but it would do so in less than one piece.

ExtinctionSharavn 2001 (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

Russian Economy Impact-Nuclear TerrorismRussian economic decline enables nuclear terrorists to steal nuclear weapons and hire scientistsSpiece 2006 (Patrick F., JD Candidate at College of William and Mary, “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427)

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks demonstrated in horrifying fashion the serious threat posed by international organizations that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States. Several confirmed cases of terrorist groups attempting to purchase or steal nuclear material have raised the chilling prospect of an unconventional attack on U.S. soil that would result in unparalleled destruction. (1) Because of the porous border and the wide variety of methods that terrorist groups could use to construct, deliver, and detonate a nuclear device in the United States, (2) supply-side controls aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material and the knowledge of how to construct nuclear weapons in the first place are likely to be the most effective means of preventing nuclear terrorism. (3) Unfortunately, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s has given terrorist groups new opportunities to acquire nuclear material and know-how. (4) The end of the Cold War signaled the end of the East-West confrontation that was largely defined by an extensive nuclear arms race, (5) leaving both the United States and Russia with extensive stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the nuclear material and infrastructure to support their massive military-industrial complexes. (6) In Russia, the economic difficulty that has resulted from the end of the Soviet economic system and the transition to a more liberalized economy has left the remnant nuclear infrastructure insecure and in shambles. (7) Two problems in particular are of serious concern given their potential consequences for U.S. national security. First, there is a risk that terrorist organizations could acquire assembled warheads and weapons-grade fissile material that are currently stored in facilities with inadequately funded security systems. (8) Second, the nuclear scientists that occupied the Soviet Union's secret "nuclear cities" are unemployed, increasing the possibility that these scientists will sell their knowledge to hostile nations or terrorist groups that seek nuclear capabilities. (9)

That escalates to global nuclear war and extinction Spiece 2006 (Patrick F., JD Candidate at College of William and Mary, “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427)

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the

barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Russian Economy Impact-World EconRussian economic downturn will disrupt the world economyCooper 2008 (William, Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States,” May 30, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf)

The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lie in their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States and Russia operate. From this perspective, Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can be considered positive for the United States. Because financial markets are interrelated, chaos in even some of the smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world. Such was the case during Russia’s financial meltdown in 1998. Promotion of economic stability in Russia has been a basis for U.S. support for Russia’s membership in international economic organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a major oil producer and exporter, Russia influences world oil prices that affect U.S. consumers.

Russian economic collaspe would destroy the world economyAustralian Financial Review 1-8-2000

As a big debtor nation, Russia’s ability to meet its financial obligations also matters to world markets – as the Russian rouble’s collapse and accompanying loan default in August 1998 starkly revealed. The crisis raised fears of a domino effect across emerging markets that could ultimately push the global economy into recession. That, in the end, didn’t occur. But an economist specialising in Russia at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ivan Szegvari, says the confidence of international investors in emerging markets, and in transitional economies as a whole, is affected by what happens in Russia. In addition, Russia remains one of the most important clients of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. “These organisations are the major players in the whole institutional set-up of the world economy – and they are strongly preoccupied with what happens in Russia,” says Szegvari. “What happens in Russia has, and will have, a large impact on the credibility of these institutions… “So I see many, not directly economic, issues which makes me say that Russia’s importance for the rest of the world is incomparably more than the current size of its GDP should suggest.”

A2: ResilientRussian economy is not resilient—incomplete privatization makes it vulnerable to shocksBBC 10-10-2008 (Text of report by popular Russian newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets on 6 October)

Over the almost two decades that have passed since the collapse of the USSR, our economy, it would seem, has changed unrecognizably. But the scourge of the Soviet planned economy -monopoly-operation -is still alive, as if no one had ever fought it. "Our economy has turned into a giant state corporation where officially private structures are playing the role of mere cogs," a former important official in the government apparatus told me. "And not just a state corporation but a retro-style state corporation. Moreover, the monopoly that exists at a federal level is reproduced in each region and in each specific settlement. Look, for example, at the extent to which small and medium-sized businesses are hemmed in, despite all the solemn statements from the very top! Such a system kills competition and in the long term is not competitive under crisis conditions."

A2: US Key to RussiaRussia is insulated from the U.S. economyGreen 2008 (Christopher, VTB Europe, Russia Profile.org, Jan 24, http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Business+New+Europe&articleid=a1201185548)

Relative to previous episodes of global economic weakness, emerging markets are relatively better placed to endure a bout of US-led weakness, reflecting: --Cycles of global growth have recently been less synchronised than in the past, --The improved macroeconomic and financial market positions of most emerging markets, --The center of recent turmoil in credit markets has primarily been problems in the developed rather than the emerging markets, and --The current phase of US weakness has been accompanied by a pre-emptive easing in interest rates from the Federal Reserve. • While Russian growth rates are likely to be dampened in the face of a sharp slowing in US activity, the strength of Russia's macroeconomic fundamentals, together with a backdrop of supportive commodity prices, places it in a relatively strong position. • Over the past decade, the relationship between US and Russian growth rates has been reasonably weak and the direct trade linkages between the two countries are relatively small.

Russia is immune to U.S. financial declineGreen 2008 (Christopher, VTB Europe, Russia Profile.org, Jan 24, http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Business+New+Europe&articleid=a1201185548)

The last two occasions in which global growth slowed significantly were in 1998 and 2001. On both of these occasions, emerging markets suffered significant declines. However, a number of factors suggest that the emerging market economies have become somewhat less dependent on US-led growth and more insulated from financial market shocks. These factors include: • Cycles in global growth have been less synchronised than in the past, suggesting the prospect that other economic regions may be able to partially offset US economic weakness, • The improved macroeconomic and financial market positions of most emerging markets have placed them in a far more secure position to withstand external capital shocks, • The center of recent turmoil in credit markets has primarily been problems in the developed rather than the emerging markets, and • The current phase of US weakness has been accompanied by a preemptive easing in interest rates from the Federal Reserve, together with a substantial depreciation in the US dollar. While the emerging markets as a whole are less exposed to global liquidity shocks than in the past, a sustained deterioration in market conditions could be expected to increasingly highlight differences in countries' external vulnerabilities. As a result, a likely theme of asset allocation decision making over the year ahead can be expected to be an increasing need to discriminate the macroeconomic risks inherent in individual emerging markets, while growing increasingly dangerous to assume that emerging markets are homogeneous. As is the case with emerging markets generally, the potential impact on the Russian economy and financial markets will, to a large extent, depend on the magnitude of the slowing in the US. However, reflecting the current robust macroeconomic fundamentals, we expect the Russian economy to be relatively well placed to deal with a slowing in US growth. On the equity front, increasing concerns that the US could slip into recession has increasingly impacted negatively on equity market performance, with the S&P500 declining by more than 9 percent since the start of this year. However, looking at the relationship between movements in the Russian RTS and S&P500 over the past decade reveals a relatively weak correlation between these two variables. Moreover, the relatively attractive P/E valuations of Russian companies when compared with some other emerging equity markets appears to offer some insulation from a US-led global equity market decline over the year ahead.

U.S. economic downturn will not hurt RussiaGreen 2008 (Christopher, VTB Europe, Russia Profile.org, Jan 24, http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Business+New+Europe&articleid=a1201185548)

The most obvious route by which a slowing US economic activity can be transmitted through the Russian economy is via the direct trade linkages and the performance of the global economy. However, the correlation in rates of growth over the past decade between US and Russian growth has been relatively weak. The other macroeconomic route by which US-led weakness in global demand can be expected to impact on the Russian economy is through a general softening in commodity prices. Movements in commodity prices have broadly followed major cycles in the US economy - although commodity prices have tended to be more volatile and the correlation coefficient since 1980 has been a modest 0.22. Of more significance to the prospects for the Russian economy is the potential impact of a slowing US activity profile on oil prices. In particular, a strong positive relationship between rising Urals oil prices and the growth in nominal Russian GDP has existed over the past decade.

Plotting the linear relationship between Russian nominal GDP and Urals oil prices gives a correlation coefficient for these two variables of 0.89. However, despite increased concerns about a weakening US growth profile, oil futures prices continue to remain at elevated levels, suggesting little prospect - at least in the market's current assessment - of a sharp decline in prices over the year ahead. It appears likely that in the absence of an exogenous supply shock, weaker US growth is likely to result in a softening profile for oil prices. However, reflecting that Urals oil prices remain close to historic highs, we assess that it would take a substantial decline in prices to around the region of $50 to 60 per barrel before this would have a significant negative impact on Russia's growth prospects for 2008. Moreover, somewhat offsetting this historical dependency on oil prices, Russian economic growth has recently become increasingly reliant on domestic demand, generated through robust consumption and investment expenditure. In addition, any short-term easing in commodity prices can be buffered by a rise in spending from the Russian government, financed from its significant foreign exchange and oil stabilisation reserves.

Russian Nationalism Impact-2NC ModuleJackson-Vanik repeal is key to check Russian nationalism that sparks external adventurismRisen 2007 (Clay, former assistant editor at The New Republic, is managing editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, National Review Online, Jan 3 http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w070101&s=risen010307)

But it's the next few months that really matter. Congress will be under pressure to bring Russia's standing under Jackson-Vanik to a vote early in the next session, because Russia's WTO accession talks will begin early this year and its graduation is an informal requirement for them to succeed. If Congress votes no, or just tables the issue, the trade organization is unlikely to override what is essentially a U.S. veto and allow Russia into its fold. In purely economic terms, this is small beer. Export-wise, Russia is not a major manufacturing or agricultural nation, so, unlike China, it does not need the WTO to break down trade barriers. In fact, its most important asset, natural resources, will always find relatively open markets by virtue of demand. And while the growing Russian market is a lucrative one for American businesses, it is dwarfed by China and other emerging nations. Rather, the real impact of WTO exclusion will be to turn Russia further away from the West, which could have serious security consequences. While Putin's image has lost much of its luster among Americans of late because of his disdain for unfettered democracy, Russia watchers warn that he is in fact the best hope for future reforms. That's because what looks like a monolithic autocracy on the outside is actually a precarious alliance of reformers, technocrats, and the conservative siloviki (mainly security and military officials), held together by the president. As Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap write in the current Washington Quarterly, "Although other institutions and the private sector are now largely irrelevant, disputes between Kremlin factions, rather than directives from the president, often determine major policy outcomes." Putin has managed a grand economic bargain between the liberals, led by Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref, and the siloviki: Russia will take an aggressively statist approach to natural resources but in all other areas pursue market reforms. The liberals are the weakest faction and thus make the concession for pragmatic reasons, while the siloviki, the most powerful, are for now convinced that market reforms--including WTO membership--will make Russia more powerful, even though they will also open it up to foreign investment and international transparency. To be sure, Putin is no liberal. Neither, despite his provenance, is he a siloviki. Rather, he is marginally a technocrat, evinced by his apparent selection of that faction's leader, Gazprom chair and First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, as his successor. The fear among Russia watchers, then, is that a WTO failure would delegitimize the liberals and hurt Putin while elevating the anti-Western siloviki. If they gain power, then Russian intransigence could turn into Russian antipathy, or even aggression: As Bremmer and Charap note, the siloviki see NATO and the United States as active threats, talk of revanchist plans for the former Soviet republics, harbor anti-Semitic and xenophobic views, and are openly derogatory of democracy and free markets. Nor is that the worst-case scenario--a disorderly realignment could empower the extremists, who, unlike the siloviki, have no pretense of abiding by the rule of law or international agreements. In an ironic twist, then, a failure to lift the Jackson-Vanik restrictions could end up reviving the very specters it was enacted to combat.Nuclear warIsraelyan 1998 (Victor was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly, Winter)The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. <continued…> I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to

implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons."

U.S. Economy Impact-2NC ModuleJackson-Vanik key to U.S. economy and market competitivenessMarket Watch 11/10 (AmCham Welcomes Russia to WTO, Cites Benefits for US Economy, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/amcham-welcomes-russia-to-wto-cites-benefits-for-us-economy-2011-11-10)

As the World Trade Organization (WTO) working group in Geneva signed off on the final terms for Russia's accession to the WTO today, the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) heralds this is as a key victory for Russia, American businesses in Russia, the American economy, U.S. jobs, and U.S. exports."This is an important, historical accomplishment," Andrew Somers, President & CEO of AmCham, said. "This paves the way for Russia's WTO accession in mid-December, and this has been an important goal of AmCham for many years. With WTO membership, Russia becomes more attractive to foreign investors and American businesses considering the Russian market. For American companies already operating in Russia, it provides a stronger, more rule-based playing field for operations, as well as improved access and competitiveness on this market."Experts project that the benefits of WTO accession for U.S. companies in Russia will be considerable. "They will include reducing or phasing out Russian import tariffs or quotas that now exceed WTO standards, as well as a ceiling on tariff rates that currently meet WTO requirements," Mr. Somers said. "It's also a great victory for Russia. Russia's accession to WTO finally brings the only major economy not yet in the WTO into the rules-based international trade organization. And this should have a positive impact on foreign perceptions of Russia as an investment market."With the important achievement of today's events in Geneva, and with Russia's presumed WTO accession in December, according to AmCham, a remaining, related goal for American businesses with operations in Russia is the withdrawal of the U.S.'s Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a law from the 1970s that was enacted in order to support emigration from the Soviet Union for prisoners of conscience and victims of religious persecution. "Russia's free-emigration policy has been in compliance with the objectives of Jackson-Vanik for more than 20 years," Somers said. "Jackson-Vanik is entirely outmoded, and it's bad for American business in Russia."Under WTO rules, every WTO member must grant all other WTO members Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR). Currently the U.S. only grants Russia temporary Normal Trade Relations on an annual basis, due to the amendment. This law requires the President to certify to Congress every year that Russia permits free emigration of its citizens. Accordingly, Congress then grants Russia another year of normal trade relations. If Jackson-Vanik remains applicable to Russia after Russia accedes to WTO, according to AmCham, the U.S. would be in violation of WTO rules, and as a consequence, U.S. companies would be denied the full enjoyment of Russia's improved market access and tariff reductions."American companies would be at a competitive disadvantage with respect to the products of other WTO members," according to AmCham. "That's why AmCham and the majority of American businesses operating in Russia support the withdrawal of Jackson-Vanik."

Global nuclear warFriedberg & Schoenfeld 2008 [Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Gabriel, Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, The Dangers of a Diminished America, WSJ, 10/21, Proquest]Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices,

now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

U.S. Economy Impact-Link ExtensionRepeal key to multiple important sectors of the U.S. economy and doubling of exportsStephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, 11/10 (Impact of Russia's WTO Entry on U.S., www.cfr.org/russian-fed/impact-russias-wto-entry-us/p26473)

Which economic sectors in the United States would benefit the most?The United States has always exported a lot of chicken and pork, and Russian regulation of those exports was one of the difficult issues to be resolved in reaching an agreement on the WTO. The Russians will now have less basis to complain about the chemicals put into American food products, and so those exports have more of an opportunity to grow.In general, Russia will be obliged to reduce its agricultural subsidies over the next several years; to reduce its import duties on consumer goods; to reduce tariffs on heavy equipment for agriculture, construction, scientific purposes; and to reduce tariffs on pharmaceuticals, and to make it easier for foreigners to own Russian banks and insurance companies. The United States has an interest in all of these areas and an opportunity to expand its trade and investment in Russia because obstacles will have to be reduced. So the economic benefits for the United States are real here.There are credible estimates that trade between the United States and Russia could double over the next five years. I should say it doubled between 2005 and 2010 but did take a hit in response to the international economic crisis. It's still not very big, but we have a $20 billion trade deficit with Russia, which we have a chance of closing because WTO accession will give us access to the Russian market.

A2: Accession Hurts U.S.Cushion provisions in Congress on WTO accession shield businesses from the turn-the internal is unidirectional CRS Report 2008 (January 7, Russia's Accession to the WTO, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31979.pdf)

For U.S. exporters and investors, Russia’s accession to the WTO may improvethe business climate in Russia which has been unpredictable. The U.S. businesscommunity often cites poor intellectual property rights protection, inconsistent andopaque customs regulations, inconsistent enforcement of the regulations, an irrational SPS and technical trade barriers as among the impediments to trade andinvestment. Accession could bring more stability and openness in the businessclimate since Russia would have to adhere to WTO rules that promote theseconditions.The volume of U.S. imports from Russia has been low primarily becauseRussia’s limited export-base. Nevertheless, some U.S. import-sensitive industries,for example steel, may face increased competition from Russian producers. Theseindustries may press U.S. negotiators to include as part of the terms and conditionsfor Russia’s accession, a special safeguard provision, beyond that provided in theWTO agreements, that would cushion the potentially adverse impact of a largeincrease in Russian imports upon accession. Such a provision was included in theconditions for China’s accession to the WTO and was codified in U.S. law as Section421 of the Trade Act of 1974.

A2: No WarEconomic collapse precipitates great power wars Walter Mead, CFR, 4 February 2009 (Only Makes you stronger: Why the recession bolstered America, http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts)

History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

Global economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support proves, and their defense doesn’t account for global crisesJedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectations of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between international conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, the linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p. 89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak

Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.

Disregard ev that doesn’t assume the current crisis-foreign powers are stoked for adventurism making war uniquely likelyMandelbaum 2010 (Michael, Professor Foreign Policy-Johns Hopkins University, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era, p. 105-8)

It is the dominance of peace, democracy, and free markets, supplemented and bolstered by the reassurance that the United States supplies, that have made the twenty-first century a peaceful period—so far. But their domination, and the global peace they underpin, are not necessarily destined to last forever; and the recent turmoil in the global economy does raise the possibility that their era of dominance will turn out to be a short one. The severe global economic downturn that the financial collapse of September 15, 2008, catalyzed threatens not only the American role in helping to maintain peace in the world but also the foundations of the stable twenty-first-century global security itself. The international economic and security systems are not, after all, hermetically sealed off one from the other. To the contrary, each affects the other, and in the 1930s economics had a profound—and profoundly malignant—effect on politics. The crisis of the global economy led to the outbreak of the bloodiest episode in the history of international security, World War II, by bringing to power in Germany and Japan the brutal governments that started that dreadful conflict. In the 1930s the financial crash and the high unemployment that followed all over the world discredited the shaky democratic governments in place in Germany and Japan, which fell from power. The fascist regimes that replaced them proclaimed themselves models of governance for the rest of the world and did win admirers and imitators in other countries. These regimes disdained democratic politics and practices extensive (although not, as in the case of the Soviet Union, total) government control of economic affairs. Far from believing in peace, the two enthusiastically embraced aggressive war for the purpose of expanding the territories under their sway and subjugating—even, in some cases, attempting to exterminate—the people living there. Japan launched a brutal campaign of conquest in China in 1931; in 1939 Germany embarked on the murderous acquisition of an Eastern European empire and in the process conquered much of Western Europe as well. The two countries forged a nominal alliance that included fascist Italy as well. During World War II they were known as the Axis powers. Japan subdued much of Asia and Germany because the master of most of Europe before the two were finally beaten, at great cost in blood and treasure, in 1945. Could anything like the ghastly experience of the 1930s and 1940s occur in the twenty-first century? The precipitating event did, after all, repeat itself after a fashion: the economic slump that began in 2008 became, by most accounts the most severe since the 1930s. And while Germany and Japan have long since become firmly democratic in their politics and quasi-pacifist in their foreign policies, two other countries could conceivably play the roles that the fascist powers assumed in the interwar period. Those two countries are China and Russia. Each was, as the first decade of the new century ended, a large and military formidable country that had the potential to upset existing political and economic arrangements in East Asia and Europe, respectively. For much of the second half of the twentieth century the two had been governed by communist regimes that aspired to spread their form of government, by force when necessary. In the first decade of the twenty-first century neither had discarded all the trappings of its former communist identity: a communist party still ruled China, and Russians harbored nostalgia for the disbanded communist empire of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1990s, in no small part of resentment at the dominant global role of the United States, the two formed what they called a “strategic partnership.” In that term could be heard, however, faintly, the echo of the Axis alliance of World War II. China and Russia became charter members, along with five Central Asian countries, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, founded in 2001, one of whose apparent purposes was to offset American power. Like virtually every country, China and Russia each suffered, as had Germany and Japan in the 1930s, from the financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting economic distress.

And the risk of war is a function of our internal link’s strength-the more we win the economy will be hurt, the more likely war isMandelbaum 2010 (Michael, Professor Foreign Policy-Johns Hopkins University, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era, p. 111-2)The unlikelihood of a full recurrence of all the horrors of the 1930s and 1940s does not, however, mean that the global security order is certain to remain entirely free from threats of war in the years ahead. Avoiding the worst of all possible futures does not guarantee the best of them. Even if China and Russia do not unleash murderous campaigns of conquest, this does not mean that each will settle comfortably into a twenty-first-century routine as a staunch supporter of the post-Cold War security and economic orders. Each has grievances, actual and potential, against the existing order of things. The extent to which either or both choose

to act on these grievances will matter a great deal. Those choices, in turn, will depend in part on the strength of the American position in their respective regions, East Asia and Europe; and the economic constraints on the United States will weaken that position in both places.

Asia Stability Impact-2NC ModuleRussian WTO accession key to regional stabilization via APEC next termChicago Trib 11/11 (Russia eyes regional role, U.S. ties at APEC summit, http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/sns-rt-us-apec-russiatre7a9360-20111110,0,4111454.story)

Russia can demonstrate its interest in the region more forcefully next year when it takes the helm of APEC for the first time since joining in 1998 and hosts the annual leaders' meeting on an island off the port city of Vladivostok.But the problems Moscow has faced in pinning down a long-term deal to sell gas worth hundreds of billions of dollars to Beijing, despite warming political ties, underscore the challenges it faces in the region.China is Russia's largest single trading partner but the volume of Russia's trade with APEC nations is half that of its trade with the European Union.In the first nine months of 2011, Russia's trade with APEC nations was $142.5 billion -- 24 percent of its total trade volume - and its trade with the EU was $286.4 billion.The volume of trade with the United States was $22.5 billion, or 3.8 percent of its total. Russia and U.S. officials want to increase trade and hope Russia's WTO entry will help.In recent years, Russia has made its presence known on the Pacific Rim through gestures with more splash than substance, but Dvorkovich said it has big plans to develop infrastructure in its Far East region, particularly ports such as Vladivostok.It is in talks with Japanese and South Korean companies about such projects.

Middle East Impact-2NC ModuleJackson-Vanik repeal is key to Middle Eastern cooperation-that turns the case and is key to Afghan stability and checking Iranian influenceMoscow Times 11/2 (Saving the Reset from Attack, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/saving-the-reset-from-attack/446980.html)

Logic is best forgotten at this point. Every U.S. company trading with Russia — and there are hundreds of those, including some of the top companies in the Forbes 500 list — believe precisely the opposite: that the reset has been good and should be continued. They also strongly support Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization and advocate the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which they believe would both be in their corporate interests and in the interests of the country as a whole.As for security, the fact that Russia provides transport corridors for the delivery of military and other supplies to the troops of the United States and NATO along the northern route to Afghanistan makes the reset indispensable.It is a known fact that taking those supplies along the southern route via the territory of so-called U.S. ally Pakistan has frequently ended in transport convoys blown up and even occasionally casualties among U.S. servicemen. It is hardly a secret that, although the strikes were delivered by the Taliban, they acted with direct support from Pakistani secret services.Or take the problem of Iran. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland, as well as other officials of the Obama administration, have said repeatedly that Russia’s stand on the Iran issue was important.Michael McFaul, nominated as the next U.S. ambassador to Russia, likewise said in no uncertain terms at a Senate hearing on Oct. 12 that the reset was based strictly on those positions that benefit the United States and that the Obama administration had never made “gifts” to Russia.

Afghan instability escalates to nuclear warCarafano 2010 James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2 http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/

We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.

Iranian hegemony triggers expansion that escalates to nuclear warBen-Meir 2007 (Alon Ben-Meir, professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, 2/6/07, Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance, http://www.upi.com/Security_Industry/2007/02/06/Realpolitik-Ending-Irans-defiance/UPI-69491170778058/)

Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become

intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.

Middle East Impact-Link ExtensionExternal pressure like the plan will fail-only Jackson-Vanik agreement can get Russia on board to check Iran which is key to solveGlobe and Mail 11/12 (Obama seeks backup from China, Russia in face of Iran Nuke Reports, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/obama-seeks-backup-from-china-russia-in-face-of-iran-nuke-reports/article2234768/)

Still the statements were broad declarations that did not address the United States’ push for more sanctions against Iran, a step Russia and China oppose.Mr. Medvedev, for his part, was largely silent on Iran during his remarks, merely acknowledging that the subject was discussed. Mr. Hu did not mention Iran at all.The two meetings presented the first opportunity for the three leaders to discuss Friday’s report from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which raised new questions about Iran’s nuclear program. The watchdog agency provided evidence Tehran has conducted research, testing and procurement which could help it develop nuclear weapons. Tehran has rejected the material as a fabrication by the United States and its allies, maintaining its nuclear program is purely for energy and research. Mr. Medvedev thanked Mr. Obama for his support in Russia’s expected entrance into the World Trade Organization, asserting that Russia has received more help from this administration than all previous ones.Russia is expected to join the WTO next year, a step that would require Congress to approve permanent normal trade relations.While trade was the central topic of the APEC meeting, Saturday was marked by diplomacy, with Mr. Obama looking to contain deepening worries over Iran.For the U.S., the international report offered significant support for some long-held suspicions and lent international credence to claims that Tehran isn’t solely interested in developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.U.S. officials have said the IAEA report is unlikely to persuade reluctant powers such as China and Russia to support tougher sanctions on the Iranian government. But Mr. Obama’s talks with Mr. Hu and Mr. Medvedev on that issue and others, including the North Korea nuclear threat, and China’s currency, which the U.S. believes China manipulates to the detriment of U.S. interests, were sure to be closely watched.

A2: Jackson Vanik Good Impact TurnsRussia gets an exemption every year anyway—only a question of whether we have to keep reviewing the restrictions, and we’ve already repealed restrictions on tons of other countries Lugar 2002 (Richard, US Senator for Indiana,“Lugar Urges Repeal of Jackson-Vanik Amendment for Russia,” http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2003/March/20030311150123rennefl0.0325281.html)

"Since 1994, successive Administrations have found Russia in full compliance with the requirements of freedom of emigration. Because Russia continues to be subject to Jackson-Vanik, the Administration must submit a semi-annual report to the Congress on Russia's continued compliance with freedom of emigration requirements. Since 1991, Congress has authorized the removal of Jackson-Vanik restrictions from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, and Georgia. The conditions that have warranted these countries' removal from Title IV reporting apply equally to Russia. "For more than 8 years, Russia has satisfied the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik legislation. It has supported free emigration and it has signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United States allowing the application of normal trade relations status. Last year, the United States declared that Russia would no longer be considered a nonmarket economy for the purposes of trade remedies laws. Russia has made tremendous strides in the last decade. While Russia currently receives normal trade relations treatment with respect to its exports to the U.S., repealing Jackson-Vanik will remove the requirement of semi-annual reports that have been an irritant in U.S.-Russia relations. Granting permanent normal trade relations also will provide certainty that will improve the investment climate and promote enhanced economic relations between the U.S. and Russia," Lugar saidOnly a risk of an impact-Jackson-Vanik can’t block Russian accession, it can only piss them off and tank relationsThe Hill 10/31 (Supercommittee vack on the hearing circuit, http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1007-other/190855-overnight-money-)To Russia with trade love: An administration official emails that the next round of negotiations with Russia over its World Trade Organization accession will be held next week in Geneva. U.S. negotiators are continuing to push Russia on intellectual property rights, investment, sanitary barriers and other issues raised over the weekend by the heads of the congressional trade committees.The U.S. Trade Representative said it is “confident” that Russia will accede in December, a stance that makes some in Congress nervous the U.S. will cave in on long-held demands over compact disc piracy, mp3 websites, poultry barriers and restrictions on investment in automotive plants. If Russia is admitted to the WTO, Congress will have to vote to lift the Jackson-Vanik amendment permanently from application to Russia. The amendment, which prevents permanent normal trade relations, was put in place to pressure the Soviet Union to release Jewish émigrés in the 1980s. If Russia accedes and the U.S. does not lift Jackson-Vanik, Russia would be able to retaliate against U.S. goods for the U.S. failure to grant permanent normal relations.Jackson Vanik has literally zero positive impact-it can do nothing good but lots of bad thingsVoice of Russia 11/11 (Jackson-Vanik amendment pointless Russia, http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/11/11/60237838.html)The preservation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment after Russia joins the WTO will first of all hit American business interests, declared the head of the parliamentary committee for international affairs Mikhail Margelov who is on a visit to the US.The amendment which imposes restrictions on Russian-US trade and economic relations was accepted in the 1970s in response to USSR’s raising barriers on the way to Jews’ emigration.The current US Administration is very well aware that the amendment has lost all purpose. President Barack Obama has called Congress to cancel the discriminatory amendment and give Russia the status of a full-fledged US trade partner.

at: rel hurt russian demoLow relations won’t help the democratic movementAdomanis 1/19 (Mark Adomanis, Forbes Writer on Russia, degrees from Harvard and Oxford, “National Review's Latest Attack On Obama's Russia Policy: Grasping at Straws,” 1/19/12) http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/01/19/national-reviews-latest-attack-on-obamas-russia-policy-grasping-at-straws/

Russia is “on the verge of fundamental change” because of purely internal developments, developments which Washington has almost no influence over. How do I know this? Because this “fundamental change” has arrived precisely during a period in which American-Russian relations have become less frosty and confrontational. The Bush administration was second to none in its support for “burgeoning democratic movements” but Russia became increasingly authoritarian nonetheless. Washington can affect Russian internal politics only on the margins, and if it goes all in on aggressive anti-Russian policies (missile defense, regime change in Syria, war with Iran, “democracy promotion”) then the tentative political opening of the past several months will be weakened. The reset is not a magical success story, but it does explain the marginal improvements in Russian-American relations over the past two years. If the reset is replaced, as Vajdic suggests, by a more hectoring and confrontational policy, then relations will swiftly worsen. This is really not particular complicated, but it should be repeated: if you want to have good relations with a country make an effort to have good relations with a country. Threats, attempted blackmail, and lectures about the inherent rightness of the American position are usually not received very well.

weak russia bad – rus/china warU.S. Russian relations are key to reorienting the Russian military and preventing China Russo nuclear warNewsweek 95, [Michael Elliot, May 15 1995]

"Russia," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "is a big country." That it is; lop off the newly independent states born within the old Soviet husk and you've still got a lot left -- a highly educated work force sitting on top of some of the globe's most valuable resources. True, much of that vast territory has an awful climate (climate matters-for different reasons than Russia's, it explains why Australia will never be a great power). But unlike India and China, two other "giant" states, Russia will be able to husband its vast resources without the additional strain of feeding -- and employing-more than a billion souls. It also, of course, is the only country that can launch a devastating nuclear attack on the United States. That kind of power demands respect. And sensitive handling. Stephen Sestanovich, head Russia watcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, argues that present U.S. policy is geared too much to "dismantling Russian military might" -- a policy that, since it breeds Russian resentment of Western meddling, is self-defeating. " We have to reorient Russian power, " says Sestanovich, " not eliminate it. Because we can't eliminate it." Indeed, Washington should prefer a strong Russia. A Russia so weak, for example, that it could not resist a Chinese land grab of its Far East without resorting to nuclear weapons is a 21st-century nightmare . All this implies a close U.S. -- Russian relationship stretching into the future. American officials say it will be a "pragmatic" one, recognizing that Russian and U.S. national interests will sometimes collide. The danger, for the United States, is that a pragmatic relationship could be dominated by security issues. In Western Europe, some futurists say that in the coming decades Russia will talk to the United States about nuclear weapons but to the European Union about everything else-trade, economic development and the rest.

Russia China war ends in extinction Sharavin 2001 [Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3]Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.