By Joseph P. Whalen (May 29, 2015) http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5  Page 1 of 5 

Smoke and Mirrors and Premature Whining By Joseph P. Whalen (May 29, 2015)

I have  read  several articles  recently  that  suggest  that one particular non-precedential BIA case decision,  In Re Grace Estrellado, A089 056 676 (BIA Nov. 19, 2014),1 has somehow reinterpreted “longstanding application of the law” relating to I-140 priority date retention for EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 shifts. I am not buying it.    

“The Immigration Judge denied the respondent's request for a continuance and pretermitted her application for adjustment of status because she did not have a visa currently available (I.J. at 4-6). The Immigration Judge found that the respondent could not utilize the January 10, 2006 priority date from her original I-140 visa petition, and that the priority date of her subsequent I-140, which is January 3, 2011, was not current and was unlikely to become so for several years (l.J. at 4-6). It is uncontested that the respondent's original I-140 visa petition was withdrawn by her employer on June 26, 2006  (I.J. at 5). The  record also contains a notice of  revocation  from  the USCIC dated August 31, 2006 (Respondent's Brief, filed August 31, 2012, at Tab H).” at p. 1 

 The whining on this subject matter is excessively premature UNLESS there is more out there beyond the REMAND ORDER from the BIA, of Nov. 19, 2014, which also included this tidbit in footnote 2, on page 3. 

 “2 On appeal, the respondent argues that she remains eligible for adjustment of status under the  "no fault exception" at section 245(c) of the Act (Respondent's Brief at 8-11). The Immigration  Judge did not address the applicability of section 245(c), nor did she make any findings of fact  on such issue. As the Immigration Judge did not reach these issues, and we are remanding the  record, we decline to address the respondent's arguments.” 

   The crux of the arguments has been that the IJ should have allowed the  old  priority  date  to  be  retained  as  a  matter  of  equity  or  equitable estoppel,  which  does  not  exist  as  an  option.      Unsupported  legal-lite arguments  that miss one needed  ingredient  (substance), play  to emotions and rely on obfuscation. Keep folks confused between concepts from “AC21 portability” and longtime regular old “retention” and you too can write an article  that  falls  short of another needed  ingredient  (reality).   With  really nothing worth saying on this non-issue—I’ll stop here.                                                               1 The BIA Decision and the underlying IJ Decision are appended.

By Joseph P. Whalen (May 29, 2015) http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5  Page 2 of 5 

For easy reference: 

8 C.F.R. § 204.5 

(e) Retention  of  section  203(b)  (1),  (2),  or  (3)  priority  date. A  petition approved on behalf of an alien under sections 203(b)  (1),  (2), or  (3) of  the Act  accords  the  alien  the  priority  date  of  the  approved  petition  for  any subsequently  filed petition  for any classification under  sections 203(b)  (1), (2), or (3) of the Act for which the alien may qualify. In the event that the alien is the beneficiary of multiple petitions under sections 203(b) (1), (2), or (3)  of  the Act,  the  alien  shall  be  entitled  to  the  earliest  priority  date. A petition revoked under  sections 204(e) or 205 of  the Act will not confer a priority date, nor will any priority date be established as a result of a denied petition. A priority date is not transferable to another alien. 

INA § 204 

(e) Subsequent finding of non-entitlement to preference classification 

Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle an immigrant, in behalf of  whom  a  petition  under  this  section  is  approved,  to  be  admitted   the United  States  as  an  immigrant  under  subsection (a), (b),  or (c)of section 203 of  this Act  [8 U.S.C  1153]  or  as  an  immediate  relative  under section 201(b) of  this Act  [8 U.S.C 1151(b)]  if upon his arrival at a port of entry  in  the  United  States  he  is  found  not  to  be  entitled  to  such classification. 

INA § 205 Revocation of approval of petitions; effective date  The Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 204 of this Act  [8 U.S.C 1154]  . Such revocation shall be effective as of the date of approval of any such petition.  

 

By Joseph P. Whalen (May 29, 2015) http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5  Page 3 of 5 

8 C.F.R. § 205.1   Automatic revocation. 

(a) Reasons  for  automatic  revocation. The  approval  of  a  petition  or  self-petition made under section 204 of the Act and in accordance with part 204 of this chapter is revoked as of the date of approval: 

(1)  If  the  Secretary  of  State  shall  terminate  the  registration  of  the beneficiary  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  section  203(e)  of  the Act before  October  1,  1991,  or  section  203(g)  of  the  Act  on  or  after October 1, 1994; 

(2) If the filing fee and associated service charge are not paid within 14  days  of  the notification  to  the  remitter  that his  or her  check  or other  financial  instrument  used  to  pay  the  filing  fee  has  been returned as not payable; or 

(3)  If  any  of  the  following  circumstances  occur  before  the beneficiary's  or  self-petitioner's  journey  to  the  United  States commences or, if the beneficiary or self-petitioner is an applicant for adjustment  of  status  to  that  of  a  permanent  resident,  before  the decision on his or her adjustment application becomes final: 

****** 

(iii) Petitions under section 203(b), other than special immigrant juvenile petitions.  

(A) Upon invalidation pursuant to 20 CFR Part 656 of the labor certification in support of the petition. 

(B) Upon the death of the petitioner or beneficiary. 

(C)  Upon  written  notice  of  withdrawal  filed  by  the petitioner,  in  employment-based  preference  cases,  with 

By Joseph P. Whalen (May 29, 2015) http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5  Page 4 of 5 

any  officer  of  the  Service who  is  authorized  to  grant  or deny petitions. 

(D) Upon  termination  of  the  employer's  business  in  an employment-based  preference  case  under  section 203(b)(1)(B),  203(b)(1)(C),  203(b)(2),  or  203(b)(3)  of  the Act. 

(iv) Special immigrant juvenile petitions. …. 

****** 

(b) Notice. When  it  shall  appear  to  the  director  that  the  approval  of  a petition has been automatically revoked, he or  she  shall cause a notice of such  revocation  to  be  sent  promptly  to  the  consular  office  having jurisdiction over the visa application and a copy of such notice to be mailed to the petitioner's last known address. 

[61 FR 13077, Mar. 26, 1996, as amended at 71 FR 35749, June 21, 2006] 

 

8 C.F.R. § 205.2   Revocation on notice. 

(a) General. Any  Service  officer  authorized  to  approve  a  petition  under section 204 of the Act may revoke the approval of that petition upon notice to  the petitioner on any ground other  than  those specified  in §205.1 when the necessity for the revocation comes to the attention of this Service. 

(b) Notice of intent. Revocation of the approval of a petition of self-petition under  paragraph  (a)  of  this  section  will  be made  only  on  notice  to  the petitioner or self-petitioner. The petitioner or self-petitioner must be given the opportunity to offer evidence  in support of the petition or self-petition and in opposition to the grounds alleged for revocation of the approval. 

By Joseph P. Whalen (May 29, 2015) http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5  Page 5 of 5 

(c) Notification  of  revocation. If,  upon  reconsideration,  the  approval previously granted  is  revoked,  the director  shall provide  the petitioner or the  self-petitioner with a written notification of  the decision  that  explains the  specific  reasons  for  the  revocation.  The  director  shall  notify  the consular officer having  jurisdiction over the visa application,  if applicable, of the revocation of an approval. 

(d) Appeals. The  petitioner  or  self-petitioner  may  appeal  the  decision  to revoke  the  approval  within  15  days  after  the  service  of  notice  of  the revocation. The appeal must be  filed as provided  in part 3 of  this chapter, unless  the  Associate  Commissioner  for  Examinations  exercises  appellate jurisdiction over the revocation under part 103 of this chapter. Appeals filed with  the  Associate  Commissioner  for  Examinations  must  meet  the requirements of part 103 of this chapter. 

[48 FR 19156, Apr. 28, 1983, as amended at 58 FR 42851, Aug. 12, 1993; 61 FR 13078, Mar. 26, 1996] 

 

Dated this 29th day of May, 2015

X

/s/ Joseph P. Whalen That’s my two-cents, for now!

 

Hanlon, Daniel P., Esq. Hanlon Law Group, P.C. 225 South Lake Ave., Suite 1100 Pasadena, CA 91101-0000

Name:ESTRELLADO,GRACE

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals Office of the Clerk

5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000 Falls Church, Virginia 20530

OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - LOS 606 S. Olive Street, 8th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014

A 089-056-676

Date of this notice: 11/19/2014

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.

Enclosure

Panel Members: Malphrus, Garry D.

Sincerely,

D� CtVVU

Donna Carr Chief Clerk

Userteam: Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit www.irac.net/unpublished

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

U.S.-Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virgihia 20530

File: A089 056 676-Los Angeles, CA

In re: GRACE ESTRELLADO

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL

Date:

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Daniel P. Harilon, Esquire

APPLICATION: Adjustment of status

NOV 19 2014

The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge's decision dated January 23, 2013, finding her removable as charged, and denying her application for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). The respondent's appeal will be dismissed in part, and the record will be remanded for further proceedings.

We review for clear error the findings of fact, including the determination of credibility, made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review de novo all other issues, including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion. 8 C .. F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).

The Immigration Judge denied the respondent's request for a continuance and pretermitted her application for adjustment of status because she did not have a visa currently available (I.J. at 4-6). The Immigration Judge found that the respondent could not utilize the January 10, 2006 priority date from her original I-140 visa petition, and that the priority date of her subsequent I-140, which is January 3, 2011, was not current and was unlikely to become so for several years (l.J. at 4-6). It is uncontested that the respondent's original I-140 visa petition wa5 withdrawn by her employer on June 26, 2006 (I.J. at 5). The record also contains a notice of revocation from the USCIC dated August 31, 2006 (Respondent's Brief, filed August 31, 2012, at Tab H).

We affirm the Immigration Judge's conclusion that the respondent may not utilize the priority date from her original 1-140 visa petition because it was withdrawn and the USCIS revoked it (I.J. at 5; Respondent' Brief at 5-7). Relying on 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(e), the respondent contends that she can retain the January 10, 2006, priority date from the previously approved employment petition (Respondent's Brief at 6; Tr. at 21). Unfortunately for the respondent, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(e) provides that "[a] petition revoked under sections 204(e) or 205 of the Act will not confer a priority date.'' As the USCIS revoked the original visa petition, 8 C.F.R. § 204.S(e) does not permit the retention of that visa petition's January 10, 2006 priority date. Section 205 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155. Moreover, the Immigration Judge did not err in denying a continuance given the DHS's opposition and the remoteness of the respondent's January 3, 2011 priority date at the time of the hearing. Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009).

Nevertheless, during the pendency of the respondent's appeal, her January 3, 2011 priority date has become current. We take administrative notice of the fact that the current State Department Visa Bulletin provides June 1, 2012, as the cutoff date for 3rd preference

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

A089 056 676

e�ployment vi�as.1 See Matter of Rajah, 25 l&N Dec. 127, n. 6, 132 (BIA 2009). As the Immigration Judge denied the respondent's adjustment of status application based on the absence of an immediately available visa, and the respondent's priority date is now current, we will remand the record to allow the respondent to pursue such relief from removal. 2 In doing so, we express no opinion as to the ultimate resolution of the respondent's applications for relief. Matter of L-0-G-, 21 l&N Dec. 413, 422 (BIA 1996).

Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

ORDER: The respondent's appeal is dismissed in part, and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.

FOR THE BOARD

1 Available at http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/bulletin/2015/visa­bulletin-for-november-2014.html.·

2 On appeal, the respondent argues that she remains eligible for adjustment of status under the "no fault exception" at section 245(c) of the Act (Respondent's Brief at 8-11). The Immigration Judge did not address the applicability of section 245(c), nor did she make any findings of fact on such issue. As the Immigration Judge did not reach these issues, and we are remanding the record, we decline to address the respondent's arguments.

2

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

UN ITED STATE S DEPARTMENT O F JUST I CE

EXECUT IVE OFF ICE FOR IMM IGRAT I ON REV IEW

UN I TED STATE S IMM IGRAT ION C OURT

LOS ANGELES, CAL I FORN IA

File: A089-056-676

In the Matter o f

GRACE ESTRELLADO

RE SPONDENT

January 23, 2013

I N REMOVAL PROCEED INGS

CHARGES: Section 237(a) (1) (B) o f the Immigration and

Nationality Act as amended, in that a fter

admission as a non-immigrant under Section

lOl(a) (15) o f the A ct you have remained in the

United States for a time longer than permitted in

violation o f the laws o f the Un ited States.

APP L I CA T I ONS: Adjustme nt o f status pursuant to Section 245(a)

and volu ntary departure pursuant to Section

240B(b) (1) .

ON BEHALF OF RE SPONDENT: EVA L. CARRA S C O

O N BEHALF OF OHS: MARK C. TOMINES

ORAL DEC I S ION O F THE IMM IGRAT ION JUDGE

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Respondent is a female native o f the Philippines and a

citizen o f Canada. United States Department o f Homeland

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

Se curity (OHS) has brought these removal pro ceedings against

respondent under the authority o f the Immigration and

Nationality A ct (A ct or INA) . Pro ceedings were commen ced with

the filing o f the Noti ce to Appear (NTA) with the Immigration

Court on August 18, 2009. See Exhibit 1. Respondent admits as

alleged in the NTA that she is not a citizen or national o f the

United States but is a native o f the Philippines and a citizen

o f Canada, that she was admitted to the United States at

Van couver, British Columbia on or about July 25, 2007 as a non­

immigrant TN NAFTA pro fessional with authorization to remain in

the United States for a temporary period not to ex ceed July 24,

2008, but that she remained in the United States beyond that

date without authorization. Respondent also con cedes that she

is removable pursuant to Se ction 237(a) (1) (B) of the A ct, in

that a fter admission as a non-immigrant she has remained in the

United States for a time longer than permitted. Based on

respondent's admissions and con cessions and other eviden ce of

re cord, the Court finds respondent is removable as charged.

Respondent de clined to designate a country o f removal, and

Canada was dire cted by the Court upon re commendation by the

Government.

Respondent has applied for relie f from removal in the

form of adjustment of status under Se ction 245(a) o f the Act.

In the alternative respondent has requested post-hearing

voluntary departure under Se ction 240B(b) o f the A ct.

A089-056-676 2 January 23, 2013

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

Respondent has requested no other relie f from removal. At a

prior hearing the Court advised respondent that it did not

believe that she was going to be eligible for ad justment at this

time be fore the Court, but gave counsel an opportunity to br ie f

the issue regarding respondent's adjustment of status

eligibility. Moreover, the Court advised both parties that it

would issue a written decision advising the parties o f its

intent in this regard. By order d ated June 28, 201 2 the Court

advised both parties that the Court was i nclined to make a

finding that respondent was not statutorily eligible for

adjustment of status and gave respondent up a nd to December 31,

201 2 to file any and all other relie f applicat ions that she

w ished to pursue. The Court received no other applications for

relie f, and in court on today's date respondent through counsel

made it clear that she would be seeking no other ave nues o f

relie f. The Court also advised respondent in the order dated

June 28th, 201 2 that i f she was going to seek prosecutorial

discretion from the Department o f Homeland Security, it should

so be done be fore the heari ng on today's date, as the Court

would not continue the case for this reason. By motion dated

Ja nuary 4, 2013, respo ndent through counsel d id make a motion to

co ntinue for the sole purpose o f trying to work out an agreement

for prosecutorial discretio n with Government Counsel. By order

dated January 7, 2013, that request was denied, as respondent

was warned that no co nt inuances would be granted for that

A089-056-676 3 January 23, 2013

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

reason. On the hearing on January 23, 2013 the Court did

inquire of both parties regarding the request for prosecutorial

discretion, as it did advise the parties that if a joint

agreement had been made and was ready to be signed on today's

date that the Court would entertain such a motion. According to

Government Counsel and respondent's counsel, no joint agreement

had been reached. According to Government Counsel, respondent's

request for prosecutorial discretion had been reviewed and had

been declined.

LAW, ANALYSIS, AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT

The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted

or paroled into the United States may be ad justed to that of an

alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if she applies

for adjustment, is eligible to receive an immigrant visa, and is

admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and an

immigrant visa is immediately available to her at the time her

application is filed. INA Section 245 (a) . In the instant case

respondent is seeking ad justment of status based on an approved

I-140 labor visa. However, based on the documents submitted

into the record, it appears that respondent's I-140 approval has

a priority date of January 3, 2011. This is approval as a

skilled worker or professional under Section 203 (b) (3) (A) (i) ( I I)

of the Act. Reviewing the current visa bulletin for January, it

appears that visa numbe rs are only current for individuals who

have a priority date before February 1, 2007. Looking forward

A089-056-676 4 January 23, 2013

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

by one month to the February 2013 visa bulletin, it appears that

the category jumps to March 15, 2007. Given that respondent's

priority date is not until 2011, at least four years away, it is

clear that respondent does not have a visa immediately

available, and because respondent does not have a visa

immediately available, she is currently ineligible to adjust her

status before the Court. Respondent contends, however, that she

should be allowed to capture a prior visa that was filed on her

behalf back in 2006. Now it is clear from the documents of

record that respondent had an original I-140 filed on her behalf

with a priority date of January 10, 2006. However, this I-140

was withdrawn by her employer on June 26, 2006, and that is not

contested. This prior I-140 is also through a different

petitioner, that being Quality Registry Inc., whereas

respondent's current approved I-140 is through Sherman Oaks

Hospital. Respondent has provided no legal support that she is

entitled to capture the prior priority date of the I-140 which

has been withdrawn and is no longer valid. Although respondent

makes arguments that the prior January 2006 priority date should

be captured as a matter of equity, the Court finds that it has

no authority to do so under the law. The Immigration Court is

not a Court of equity but is in fact a Court of law and

regulation, and because respondent is unable to point to any

specific regulation or provision of the Act or case law which

allows for the capturing of a prior priority date based on a

A089-056-676 5 January 23, 2013

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

separate labor cert if icat ion f iled by a separate employer wh ich

has been w ithdrawn to be attached to a new approved labor

cert if icat ion from a new employer, the Court f inds it does not

have the author ity to do so. And therefore, the January 2006

pr ior ity date cannot be used to make respondent's imm igrant v isa

currently ava ilable to her. As such, the Court f inds that

respondent is not el ig ible to ad just her status under Sect ion

245 (a) of the Act and must deny that requested rel ief.

Respondent has requested post-hear ing voluntary

departure in the alternat ive. To establ ish el ig ib il ity for

voluntary departure, respondent must prove that she has been

phys ically present in the �n ited States for at least one year

immed iately preced ing serv ice of the NTA, is and has been a

person of good moral character for at least f ive years

immed iately preced ing her appl icat ion for voluntary departure,

has not been conv icted of an aggravated felony or removal for a

secur ity-related ground, and has establ ished by clear and

conv inc ing ev idence that she has the means to depart the Un ited

States and intends to do so. See INA Sect ion 240X (b) (1) of the

Act. Respondent has establ ished her el ig ib il ity for post­

hear ing voluntary departure and the Court sees no reason as a

matter of discret ion to deny such request. Therefore,

respondent's request for post-hearing voluntary departure w ill

be granted.

A089-056-676 6 January 23, 2013

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net

ORDERS

IT I S HEREBY ORDERED that respondent's request for

ad justment of status pursuant to Section 245 (a) of the Act be

denied.

IT I S FUR THER ORDERED that respondent's request for

voluntary departure in lieu of removal without expense to the

United States Government be granted.

IT I S FURTHER O RDERED that respondent shall post a

voluntary departure bond in the amount of $500 with the

Department of Homeland Security on or before January 30, 2013.

IT I S FURT HER ORDERED that respondent shall depart

from the United States no later than March 25, 2013.

IT I S FURTHER ORDERED that if respondent fails to

comply with any of the above orders, the voluntary departure

order shall without further notice or proceedings vacate the

next day and respondent shall be removed from the United States

to Canada on the charge contained in the Notice to Appear.

A089-056-676

TARA NA SEL OW-NAHA S

Immigration Judge

7 January 23, 2013

Imm

igrant & Refugee A

ppellate Center | w

ww

.irac.net