slow train to vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategic reinforcement in 1863

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This article was downloaded by: [Heriot-Watt University] On: 06 October 2014, At: 03:12 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The RUSI Journal Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20 Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategic reinforcement in 1863 Dr David Kirkpatrick a b a Senior lecturer in the Defence Engineering Group , University College London , b Associate Fellow at RUSI , Published online: 20 Mar 2008. To cite this article: Dr David Kirkpatrick (1997) Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategic reinforcement in 1863, The RUSI Journal, 142:4, 76-81, DOI: 10.1080/03071849708446172 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849708446172 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategic reinforcement in 1863

This article was downloaded by: [Heriot-Watt University]On: 06 October 2014, At: 03:12Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The RUSI JournalPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20

Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capabilityfor strategic reinforcement in 1863Dr David Kirkpatrick a ba Senior lecturer in the Defence Engineering Group , University College London ,b Associate Fellow at RUSI ,Published online: 20 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Dr David Kirkpatrick (1997) Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategicreinforcement in 1863, The RUSI Journal, 142:4, 76-81, DOI: 10.1080/03071849708446172

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849708446172

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose ofthe Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shallnot be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategic reinforcement in 1863

MILITARY HISTORY

SLOW TRAIN TO VICKSBURG—THECONFEDERATE CAPABILITY FOR

STRATEGIC REINFORCEMENT IN 1863DR DAVID KIRKPATRICK

The Battle of Gettysburg is per-haps the most well-known of theAmerican Civil War, garneringthe most attention and analysis.But in terms of subsequent im-portance to the outcome of theWar, the concurrent Union cam-paign in Mississippi in the earlysummer of 1863, which led to thefall of the Confederate heldVicksburg and Port Hudson, wasmore decisive, with far higherConfederate losses and seriousimplications in opening up Unionsupply lines. In looking afresh atthe supposition that reinforce-ments from Virginia might haveaverted the Confederate disas-ter Dr. Kirkpatrick assesses, therole of the railroad system in anypossible salvation. Given that theoptions of delivering reinforce-ments were few and relativelytime-consuming and that theConfederate railroad system wassubstantially poorer in qualityand quantity than that of theNorth, Dr Kirkpatrick concludesthat even had the decision to sendhelp from Virginia been takenthe reinforcements were unlikelyto have arrived in time forVicksburg or its garrison.

The battlefield of Gettysburg attracts two million visitors each year. Eachof these visitors may see a series of well-planned exhibits portraying thebattle of Gettysburg on 1-3 July 1863 as the turning point in theAmerican Civil War, arguing that earlier there was a significant possi-

bility that the Confederacy might secure its independence, but afterwards itsdefeat and reconstruction were virtually inevitable. Because of that battle'sperceived importance to the outcome of the Civil War, and because of its wealthof dramatic incidents culminating in the doomed charge of Pickett's division, thebattle of Gettysburg has been extensively analysed and finds an honoured placein most almanacs of Great Battles.

Dr. David Kirkpatrick it a senior lee-turer in the Defence EngineeringGroup at University College Londonand an Associate Fellow at RUSI.

However, the concurrent Unioncampaign in Mississippi, leading to thecapture of the fortified towns ofVicksburg and Port Hudson and theirConfederate garrisons, has attractedmuch less attention even though itsoutcome was much more decisive thanthe Gettysburg campaign. The bestestimates of the losses sustained by theUnion and Confederate armies in theGettysburg campaign were approxi-mately equal, and when it ended thedepleted opposing armies were againmanoeuvring in the valleys of theRapidan and the Rappahanock wherethey had begun. In contrast, in theVicksburg/Port Hudson campaign theConfederate losses far exceeded thoseof the Union; furthermore the Unioncapture of those two fortified towns onthe Mississippi opened that great riverto Union commerce, boosting thetrade and the loyalty of the Unionstates in the Ohio and Missouri valleysand concurrently depriving the Con-federacy of recruits and livestock fromits extensive Trans-Mississippi statesof Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana. Thelosses in these two 1863 campaignswere:

Gettysburg Vicksburg/Port Hudson

Union 29 006 14 871Confederate 29 155 46 837

It has been claimed that the Con-federacy might have avoided disasterin the Mississippi valley by sendingsubstantial reinforcements fromVirginia to Vicksburg in the earlysummer of 1863. This policy, and al-ternative policies for offensives in

Tennessee or in Pennsylvania, weredebated at a crucial strategy confer-ence in Richmond on 16—17 May1863, and it was resolved (almostunanimously) that an invasion ofPennsylvania by General Robert E.Lee's victorious Army of NorthernVirginia offered the greatest hope ofvictory. Subsequent debates on thisstrategic dilemma have speculatedwhether this decision was primarilydriven by General Lee's presumedpreoccupation for his native state ofVirginia and relative indifference toevents in the Mississippi valley, or bythe need for his army to subsist on theunravaged farms of Pennsylvania, orby the hope of a decisive victory overthe Union Army of the Potomac if itsgenerals or their political masters pan-icked and blundered under thepressure of invasion. This article takesa different perspective; it reviews thecapabilities of the Confederate rail-road system and considers whetherreinforcements from Virginia couldhave been in time to save Vicksburg.

Since this paper focuses on anAmerican conflict, I have chosen touse the American term 'railroad' (andits abbreviation RR) rather than theBritish term 'railway', and regret anyresulting offence or confusion toBritish readers.

The Confederate railroadsystem

At the outbreak of the AmericanCivil War, the Confederacy was out-numbered in all the resources which

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MILITARY HISTORY

Vicksburg

Map1

represented military power, as shownin the Table2 below.

This table suggests that the Con-federacy's inferiority in rail transportwas less severe than in other militaryresources, but in reality its railroadnetwork was much less developed thatthe mileage total implies and was 'en-tirely unsuited to war.'3 The shortfallarose from an incomplete network,the need for frequent train changes,and the shortage of railroad equip-ment and infrastructure.4

A significant part of the Confed-eracy's railroad mileage—that inFlorida and in the three Trans-Missis-sippi states—was not linked to themain railroad network serving theother seven Confederate states. Evenwithin the main network, there wereinconvenient strategic gaps whichdemanded the use of another mode oftransport or a long detour. TheDanville-Greensboro gap in North

Table 1

Carolina meant that all trafficbetween Virginia and the Carolinas •had to go through Weldon, using thePetersburg RR, or face the long detourvia Knoxville, Chattanooga andAtlanta. The other major strategicgap was the lack of an east-west lineacross central Alabama, fromMontgome'ry towards Meridian. TheConfederate Government madevigorous efforts to reduce these gaps,despite a chronic shortage of labourand of rails, and the Danville-Greens-boro gap was finally closed in May1864. In central Alabama some newtrack was laid along the route betweenMeridian and Selma (which fromDecember 1862 formed the Alabama& Mississippi Rivers RR,6) butthroughout the war troops travellingacross Alabama had to travel bysteamboat between Montgomery andSelma and to use a ferry to cross theunbridged Tombigbee river at

PopulationWhite military manpowerIndustrial workersFirearms manufactureRailroad mileage

MMM$M

Union _20.72.581.302.2721973

Confederacy9.10.790.110.079283

Ratio

2.33.311.832.12.4

Demopolis, or alternatively take along detour south to Tensas, followedby a ferry trip across Mobile Bay toMobile, and another long rail journeynorthward to their intended area ofoperation.

At the start of the war the Confed-eracy had only one lateral east-westline—the Memphis & CharlestonRR—providing a direct and continu-ous rail link between the Atlanticcoast and the Mississippi valley, andthis line was irretrievably cut by theUnion capture of Corinth in May1862. Thereafter troops travelling tothe Mississippi valley were delayed byslow or circuitous routes acrossAlabama (cited above). In contrastthe Union railroad network had fourdirect east-west railroads7—the Balti-more &. Ohio, the Pennsylvania, theNew York &. Erie and the Central—and only the first of these wasintermittently interrupted by hostileforces.

Secondly, the main Confederatenetwork was divided between some90 railroad companies, some using 4ft8V2 gauge track and some using 5ftgauge. It was therefore necessary, onany long journey, to change trainswhere the rails of one company met

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Page 4: Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategic reinforcement in 1863

MILITARY HISTORY

those of another using a different railgauge. Even at the junction of twocompanies using the same gauge,there was generally no union station.In such cases the travelling troops,horses, artillery and wagons had to bedetrained at one end of town,marched through the streets, andentrained at the other end. Some ofthe best-disciplined Confederate regi-ments may have been able toaccomplish this manoeuvre withoutmany of their men straggling in searchof food, drink, clothing and to visitcousins, but even these regimentswould have had trouble when theirhorses and mules were faced with theprospect of boarding another train sosoon after being released from the last.The delay associated with changingtrains would have been greater whena ferry crossing was involved (as forexample at Wilmington and at WestPoint) or when the operations ofadjacent companies were not wellsynchronised.

Although the railroad companiesappreciated the inconvenience totheir passengers (and the ConfederateGovernment deplored the delay to itsforces and supplies) resulting from theseparation of railroad termini inSouthern towns (Richmond hadfive), any changes were vigorouslyopposed by local interests, led by theteamsters and hoteliers. Even whenPetersburg agreed to track being laidthrough the town, it initially stipu-lated that the rails must be removedagain as soon as the war was won,which discouraged the railroad com-panies from undertaking theinvestment. However, military neces-sity was sometimes able to overridelocal opposition, and interline linkswere completed in Richmond andPetersburg during the summer of1861, and elsewhere at a slower paceconstrained by the shortage of rails.

Thirdly, Confederate railroadswere undercapitalised relative torailroads in the North. Union rail-roads represented an investment (onaverage) of $42 000/mile of track.Confederate railroads' quality variedwidely (from the Virginia railroadsequipped to northern standards downto the apocryphal 'right of way withtwo streaks of rust'), but their averageinvestment was only $27 000/mile oftrack. It follows that Confederaterailroads had generally less doubletrack, fewer locomotives, weakerpermanent way and lighter bridges,and hence less overall carrying capac-

ity than the track mileage implies. Asthe war continued the dearth ofrailroad supplies (in the year beforethe Civil War the unindustrialisedsouthern states produced only 19locomotives compared with 451produced in the north) induced aprogressive deterioration of rolling

-stock and track, leading to accidentswhich further exacerbated thedecline in capability.

Confederaterailroads hadgenerally lessdouble track,fewer locomotives,weaker permanentway and lighterbridges, andhence less overallcarrying capacitythan the trackmileage implies.

Achievements in strategicreinforcement

Although it cannot be classified asstrategic reinforcement, no accountof the Confederate railroads' achieve-ments can omit mention of ManassasGap RR's transport of four brigadesand 20 guns of the Confederate Armyof the Shenandoah from PiedmontStation to Manassas Junction duringthe 19-21 July 1861. These fourbrigades (some 8900 men) played acrucial role in the Confederatevictory at the First battle of Bull Runon 21 July, and thereby ensured thatthe Civil War would not be quicklyconcluded.

The following year the strategiccapability of the railroads wasproperly demonstrated by a trial inwhich McCown's division of 3000men was carried 776 miles fromTupelo ,. (via Mobile, Tensas,Montgomery and Atlanta) to Chat-tanooga in six days, 27 June to 3 July1862. This journey involved ferrytrips across Mobile Bay and on theAlabama River, two gauge changesand six companies. On 21 July the

25 000 infantrymen of the Army ofthe Mississippi were ordered to followthe same route, while its cavalry,artillery and wagons travelled, moredirectly, by road. The leading infan-try took four days, (from 23—27 July)but the last troop trains did not arrivetill a week later.

On 2 May 1863, in response to theUnion threat to Vicksburg, Confed-erate reinforcements were ordered toMississippi from the Atlantic coast.Walker's brigade (2500) left Savan-nah on the 4th and travelled some800 miles to arrive in Jackson on the1 Ith, in time to march out and coverthe Confederate retreat after the bat-tle of Raymond on the 12th. Gist'sbrigade (2500) left Charleston aboutthe 5dv and followed a 900 mile routeto reach Jackson on the 14th, just intime to participate in vain resistanceto a two-corps Union attack. As theoutnumbered Confederate forcewithdrew northward, the Unionforces captured and destroyed Jacksonand its rail junction, thus inhibitingfuture Confederate reinforcementswhich had to complete their journeyon foot to the new assembly arearound Canton (30 miles north ofJackson). Evan's brigade (2000) fromSouth Carolina set out on the 15thand arrived in Mississippi on the25th. These three brigades wereaccompanied by attached artillerybatteries.

On 9 May further reinforcementswere ordered to Mississippi fromTennessee. McCown's division(3000) left Tullahoma on 10 May andtravelled 800 miles to reach Cantonon the 21st; Jackson's cavalry division(3000) and Breckenridge's division(5500) followed, leaving on 9 and 27May respectively and arriving on orabout 3 June. It should be noted, how-ever, that General Joseph E. Johnsoncomplained that these reinforcementswere quite deficient in equipment,especially wagons and draughtanimals, and he was unable to beginactive operations until 29 June havingassembled sufficient field transportand other supplies.

In September 1863 the divisionsof Hood and McLaws (12 000 men)were ordered from Virginia to northGeorgia, to join the Confederatearmy deployed south of Chattanooga.The direct route on the Virginia &Tennessee RR had been cut by theUnion capture of Knoxville at thebeginning of the month, so thesetroops had to take a roundabout route

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B MILITARY HISTORY

through the Carolinas and Georgia,965 miles on a dozen different rail-roads from Orange Court House toCatoosa Station near Chattanooga (afew troops were diverted, to relievecongestion, to follow an even-longer1200 mile route). The leading brigade(Benning's) travelled from OrangeCourt House 840 miles to Atlanta,between dawn on 9 September anddusk on the 12th, but was delayedthere by congestion on the line north-ward towards Chattanooga. Otherbrigades followed, boarding the trainsat various Virginia stations. Robert-son's brigade was first to reachCatoosa Station on 17 September;two other brigades (Benning's andLaw's) arrived in time to fight at thebattle of Chickamauga on the 19thand two more (Kershaw's andHumphrie's) fought on the 20th.These five infantry brigades includedsome 7000 men. But although theleading infantry brigades moved withcommendable speed, Alexander'sartillery battalion with 26 guns andthe associated caissons and wagonswas sent by road to Petersburg whereit entrained on the 17 th and arrivedat Chickamauga on the 24th (fourdays too late for the battle), andlaggard divisional units did not arriveuntil the 27th.

For comparison it is relevant tonote the contemporary capacity of theUnion railroads, which in 1863moved the Union XI and XII Corps(20 000 men, 60 guns, horses andbaggage) 1200 miles from Culpeper inVirginia to Bridgeport in Tennessee.Orders for the move were issued on 24September, the leading troops begantheir journey on the 25th and arrivedon the 30th, and the whole force wasassembled in Tennessee by 2 October.

From the accounts of these variousConfederate troop movements, it maybe concluded that after movementorders were issued, it required one ortwo days to assemble the troops andorganise the trains, before the leadingtroops could entrain and set off.Thereafter infantry could be trans-ported at up to 250 miles per day(station to station) through theConfederate Atlantic states, butconsiderably more slowly on the less-developed railroads farther west.Artillery and supply units, with theirheavy vehicles and increasingly-fractious horses, could not be trans-ferred as quickly from train to trainand from train to ferry, and hencecould not travel as rapidly as infantry.

Infantry could be delivered to theirdestination at a rate of some 3000 perday, or less if they were accompaniedby artillery and supply units whosevehicles and horses placed extrademands on the railroad's capacity.

Artillery andsupply suits, withtheir heavyvehicles andincreasingly-fractious horses,could not betransferred asquickly from trainto train and fromtrain to ferry, andhence could nottravel as rapidly asinfantry.

This synthesis of the availableinformation on the Confederaterailroads' capability for strategic rein-forcement provides a reasonable basisfor hypothesis, but it should beremembered that records are some-times incomplete and occasionallydistorted by exculpatory hindsight.

The Vicksburg campaign

After six months of abortiveadvances against Vicksburg from thenorth, the Union army of the Tennes-see commanded by General Ulysses S.Grant moved south down the Missis-sippi's west bank and crossed atBruinsberg, 50 miles south ofVicksburg, on 30 April 1863. Insteadof moving directly against Vicksburg,Grant inarched north-east, defeatingsmaller Confederate forces at PortGibson and Raymond to capture anddestroy the railroad junction at Jack-son on 14 May. He then turned east,defeated the Confederate forces un-der General John C. Pemberton atChampion Hill and Big Black River,and drove the remainder intoVicksburg. Throughout these opera-tions the Union army had no assuredline of supply; the road down the west

bank of the Mississippi was very poorand insecure, and transports andbarges could not safely pass the Con-federate batteries at Vicksburg andPort Hudson to reach the Union baseat Grand Gulf, 40 miles south ofVicksburg. Accordingly, the Army ofthe Tennessee marched with its wag-ons full of reserve ammunition and ateonly what its men could carry (hard-tack, salt and coffee) or forage fromthe rich Mississippi countryside. Thisdangerous period ended on 19 Maywith the Union capture of HaynesBluff north of Vicksburg, whichopened a supply route of river and firmground from the Union depots inOhio and Tennessee to the armybesieging Vicksburg. After two unsuc-cessful assaults on 19 and 22 May,Vicksburg was bombarded andstarved into surrender on 4 July.

Concurrently in Virginia, theUnion Army of the Potomac took theoffensive against the smaller Confed-erate Army of Northern Virginia(133 000 and 59 000 respectively),crossing the Rappahannock on 28April. Two days later, as the scale ofthe Union advance became apparent,the Confederate divisions of Hoodand Pickett (then besieging Suffolkand foraging in south-easternVirginia) were ordered to rejoin theArmy of Northern Virginia withoutdelay, but the withdrawal of wagonsand siege equipment took time andthese Confederate divisions (togethersome 13 000 men) did not reachPetersburg until 5 May. Before thenGeneral Lee's inspired manoeuvreshad won the battle of Chancellors-ville against heavy odds, and theUnion army retired across the Rappa-hannock on 5 May. On 9 May theConfederate Secretary of Warsuggested that the divisions of Hoodand Pickett should be sent to Missis-sippi. The following day General Leeopposed the transfer, and on 15 Maycame to Richmond to propose to theConfederate President his own prefer-ence for an invasion of Pennsylvaniausing all the forces which could bemade available in Virginia, and theCarolinas. Following Cabinet meet-ings on the 16th and 17th, it wasdecided to restore the divisions ofHood and Pickett to the Army ofNorthern Virginia which, thusstrengthened, moved north in earlyJune on the offensive which justmight have won the war for theConfederacy but which actually led todefeat at Gettysburg.

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Page 6: Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategic reinforcement in 1863

Z™J MILITARY HISTORY

Timing of potentialreinforcements

In early May, when the Army ofNorthern Virginia was fighting des-perately against superior numbers,there could have been no question ofsending Confederate troops awayfrom Virginia. Only after 6 May,when the Union retreated northwardacross the Rappahannock becameknown, and four days after reinforce-ments were ordered to Vicksburg fromthe Atlantic coast, could the Confed-erate Cabinet seriously haveconsidered alternative employmentfor the divisions of Hood and Pickett.Instead of rejoining the Army ofNorthern Virginia, these divisionscould be used to reconquer Tennessee(as advocated by Generals Beauregardand Longstreet) or to rescueVicksburg (as argued in the Confed-erate Cabinet by the Secretary of WarMr James A Seddon and by the post-master, Mr John H Reagan).

It is to the credit of the Confeder-ate Cabinet that its members roseabove the numbing loss of 13 000casualties (including one of the mostfamous generals, General Thomas J.(Stonewall) Jackson) at the battle ofChancellorsville, and decided theirgrand strategy for the next phase ofthe war, despite conflicting advicefrom senior generals, within twoweeks of the Union retreat. If hypo-thetically the Cabinet had actedimmediately after Mr Seddon's pro-posal and had on 10 May ordered the

divisions of Hood and Pickett west-ward from Virginia to Mississippi,these divisions could have travelledon the Virginia & Tennessee RR bythe more-direct route throughKnoxville and Chattanooga toAtlanta, and thereafter shared withreinforcements from Tennessee and

-the Atlantic Coast the roundaboutroute via Mobile (or the shorter butslower route via Selma and Demopo-lis). to central Mississippi. Thisjourney of 1300 miles could not havetaken less than nine days, even ignor-ing the congestion induced by otherunits moving west simultaneously, sothe two divisions (having started onor after 11 May) would have reachedthe Jackson area over the period of20-27 May, with artillery and supplyunits arriving a few days later.9 Thusthese two divisions would not con-ceivably have been in time to preventthe loss and ruin of Jackson on 14May, or the investment of Vicksburgand the establishment of a Union sup-ply line via Haynes Bluff on 19 May.Before then, another major battle fol-lowing Champion Hill might haveexhausted Grant's artillery ammuni-tion, but afterwards the campaign wasirrevocably lost by the Confederates.Instead the two divisions would haveformed part of the army being assem-bled at Canton by General Joseph E.Johnson to march to die relief ofVicksburg. This army otherwise con-sisted of units from Vicksburg, PortHudson, Tennessee and the Atlanticcoast and totalled some 30 000 in

early June; with the Virginia divisionsit would have reached 43 000. Butbetween this army and Vicksburg dieUnion army was rapidly being rein-forced; Grant had some 51 000 menin the army besieging Vicksburg at dieend of May, but other units arrivingraised his strength to 72 000 by mid-Junel With such strength Grant couldhave contained die increasingly de-bilitated and immobile garrison ofVicksburg (subsisting on goober peasand its own horses and mules) andtaken equal or superior numbers toconfront Johnson's relieving army,whether or not it had been reinforcedby two divisions from Virginia.

By contrast the course of theVicksburg campaign might have beensignificantly altered by earlier Con-federate orders to send substantialreinforcements from Tennessee. Ifsuch orders had been issued on 2 May(a week before they were actuallyissued) in parallel to similar orders tomove Confederate forces from dieAtlantic coast, the leading brigades ofMcCown's and Breckenridge's infan-try divisions would have arrived inJackson on and after 9 May, in timeto increase substantially the numberof defenders available (from 6000 toabout 16 000), when the Union corpsof McPherson and Sherman (28 000men) approached on 14 May. Thestrengthened Confederate force,aided by some improvised fieldworks,could then have defended Jackson ina fight against odds better than insmaller actions at Port Gibson and

APRIL26 28 30 2

HISTORICALChancellorsville campaign ,

Army of the Tennessee -crosses Mississippi •;•- captures Jackson- captures Haynes Bluff

Confederate reinforcements from Atlantic Coastfrom Tennessee

Confederate Cabinet Meeting about reinforcements from Virginia

HYPOTHETICAL

Earlier Cabinet meeting

Confederate reinforcements from Virginia

Earlier Confederate reinforcements from Tennessee

MAY4 « 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Chart 1

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Page 7: Slow train to Vicksburg—the confederate capability for strategic reinforcement in 1863

W, MILITARY HISTORY

Raymond. Whatever the result of thehypothetical 'battle of Jackson', itwould certainly have depleted Unionammunition reserves at a critical stageof the campaign, and would havemade it more difficult for Grant toassemble the decisive superiority(30 000 to 22 000) which produced aUnion victory in the hard-foughtbattle of Champion Hill on 16 May.

The chronology of the actualVicksburg campaign, and of the twohypothetical reinforcement optionsdiscussed above, are illustrated in thechart above (Chart 1). It-should benoted that in this chart the horizontalarrows denoting each reinforcementrefers to the transit of the leadingbrigade; the following brigades, artil-lery and wagons would have arrivedover the next several days.

Conclusion

It may be concluded that, at thetime when the Confederate Cabinetconsidered the dispatch of reinforce-ments from Virginia to Vicksburg, itwas already too late for such reinforce-ments to retrieve the situation inMississippi; accordingly it was a more-promising strategy for such troops tostrengthen the Army of NorthernVirginia's invasion of Maryland andPennsylvania. The best hope of avert-ing the fall of Vicksburg was theimmediate dispatch (in the first fewdays of May) of troops from both, theAtlantic coast and Tennessee, undera more sanguine commander thanGeneral Johnson.

Grant's successful Vicksburg cam-paign has rightly been classed as amasterpiece of strategy, but hissuccess was at least partially due tothe inadequacies of the Confederaterailroad system which delivered rein-.forcemeats to Mississippi too littleand too late. Early in the twentiethcentury the German General Staffraised the deployment of troops by railto a fine art (in August 1914,13 linesbrought 1500 000 fully-equippedGerman troops to the western front inten days),1 but it is important torecognise that half a century earlierthe Confederate railroads were stillunderdeveloped and their capacitywas very limited. In the Confederacy'scrisis in May 1863, the lack, of a directeast-west link proved fatal, and Grantcould be reinforced by steamboat asfast as Johnson could be reinforced byrail.

This analysis does not detractfrom the credit due to Grant's out-standing generalship. Even with thelimitations of the Confederate rail-roads and delays in Confederatedecisions, Grant had only a brief win-dow of opportunity which totransform his precarious invasion ofMississippi into a glorious victory,with his supply lines re-establishedand the principal enemy force encir-cled. In the 18 days after crossing theMississippi, Grant's army establishedits base at Grand Gulf, marched 200miles and won five battles—a per-formance no less impressive than'Stonewall' Jackson's 1862 campaignin the Shenandoah Valley. HadGrant at any stage hesitated or taken

counsel of his fears, accumulatingConfederate reinforcements wouldprogressively have lengthened theodds against his success. His campaignwell illustrates the importance for amilitary commander of prompt deci-sion and energetic action. •

Notes1. Shelby Foote, The Civil War (RandomHouse, New York, 1963), Vol 2, pp. 348-613.2. Allan Nevins, The War for the Union(Charles Scribners Sons, New York,1959), Vol I, pp. 24-6, presents this dataon the basis that loyalty in Kentucky andMissouri was so deeply divided that their,populations and white military manpowerare best omitted from any Union/Confederate comparison.3. Steven A Charming, ConfederateOrdeal, (Time-Life Books, Alexandria Va,1984), p. 26.4. Robert C Black III, The Railroads of theConfederacy, (Broadfoot Publishing,Wilmington NC, 1987), pp. 1-11.5. Ibid, p. 153.6. Ibid, p. 158.7. Donald D Jackson, Twenty MillionYankees, (Time-Life Books, AlexandriaVc, 1985), p. 3.8. As 1, p. 425.9. Allan Nevins, The War for the Union,(Charles Scribners Sons, New York1959). Vol III, p. 85 quotes General Lee'sestimate that reinforcements starting fromVirginia after the Confederate Cabinetmeetings on 16-17 May could not arrivein Mississippi before the end of May.10. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War,(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,England, 1977), p. 112.

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