sino‐south asian ties: problems & prospects

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This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz] On: 30 October 2014, At: 15:28 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Strategic Analysis Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20 SinoSouth Asian ties: Problems & prospects Swaran Singh a a Research Fellow at IDSA Published online: 25 Apr 2008. To cite this article: Swaran Singh (2000) SinoSouth Asian ties: Problems & prospects, Strategic Analysis, 24:1, 31-49, DOI: 10.1080/09700160008455194 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455194 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: Sino‐South Asian ties: Problems & prospects

This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz]On: 30 October 2014, At: 15:28Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Strategic AnalysisPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20

Sino‐South Asian ties: Problems & prospectsSwaran Singh aa Research Fellow at IDSAPublished online: 25 Apr 2008.

To cite this article: Swaran Singh (2000) Sino‐South Asian ties: Problems & prospects, Strategic Analysis, 24:1, 31-49, DOI:10.1080/09700160008455194

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455194

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in thepublications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representationsor warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoevercaused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Sino‐South Asian ties: Problems & prospects

Sino-South Asian Ties:Problems & Prospects

Swaran Singh

Known as Tian Zhu (the Western heaven), the Indian subcontinenthad historically enjoyed a revered image amongst the Chinese. At leastfor the last 2000 years, this view has since been affirmed by a series ofarchaeological discoveries as also by written records that trace Sino-Indianinteractions to 221 BC. Even though these interactions were sporadicand confined to culture and commerce, they constituted great influenceon their evolution over the ages with Buddhism providing the strongestlink between the two societies. This positive image was to receive itsfirst serious blow with the consolidation of the British Empire in theIndian subcontinent. Expansionist policies of the British collided withthe Chinese 'Middle Kingdom' pride which resulted in the Opium Wars(1840) and later in Younghusband's military expedition into Tibet (1905).It was these historical legacies of disputed border claims and mutualsuspicion that were to later determine New China's policies vis-a-visSouth Asian countries thus guiding Beijing's South Asia policy by securityconsiderations. This connection was further reinforced by the Cold Warbipolarism which was partly responsible for the Sino-Indian war of 1962.This war, followed by the emergence of a Sino-Pak nexus has sincedominated the security debates amongst South Asian countries. It is inthis backdrop that this paper tries to examine and highlight the China-connection to the South Asian security scenario during these last fiftyyears.

China-connection : Fundamental elements

Before analysing the details of China's more recent indulgence withsmaller South Asian states, which more often than not have beendependent on China's policies and perceptions about India, it seemsimperative to broadly glance through the overall profile of this China-

Dr. Swaran Singh is a Research Fellow at IDSA.

Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXIV, No. 1© The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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connection of the South Asian security profile. In brief, the following canbe cited as some of the fundamental elements of Qiina's policies andinitiatives vis-a-vis South Asian countries that have had a direct impacton the nature and other parameters of South Asian security as. it hasevolved during the last 50 years:

• Firstly, conventional wisdom tells us that boundary disputes havebeen the root cause of inter-state threat perceptions. Of the sevenSouth Asian states, China shares common borders with four whichmakes China very integral to South Asia. What makes theseboundaries critical is that all of these have been disputed andhave populations that overlap into each other's claimed territories.China has since resolved most of its land borders with othercountries yet, its unresolved boundary with India makes thesesmaller South Asian states very critical buffers between Chinaand India. Even Bangladesh, that was not on the scene until1971, and does not directly share a border with China remainsimportant for China as, at one stage, China had toyed with theidea of using it for finding an outlet to the Indian ocean.

• Secondly, the ethnic Chinese community, which has been themajor concern as also instrument of China's policies in SoutheastAsia, has been virtually non-existent in South Asia. Except forthe Indian metropolis of Calcutta, South Asia has no visible traceof the Chinese ethnic community that could have any impact onthe South Asian security environment. Instead, the Chineseminority of Tibetans has been a major point of irritation in Sino-Indian ties and this has greatly influenced China's dealing withother South Asian countries. Similarly, some communities inBhutan, Nepal and India's northeastern region occasionallyemphasise their racial affinity with the Chinese ethnic minorities.But, these have also not played any role in China's South Asiapolicy.

• Thirdly, ideologies form another major influence in determiningthe nature of this China-connection of South Asian security. Butit needs to be emphasised that despite Mao's condemnation ofpost-colonial South Asian political regimes as being reactionaryand wishing them to be overthrown by communist revolutions,ideology had nothing whatsoever to do with China's policiestowards these South Asian countries. Given their sensitivitiesabout Tibet which has traditionally been seen by the Chinese astheir "soft strategic underbelly", China's South Asia policy hadalways been guided purely by its security considerations. These

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trends were clearly visible in China's military invasion andfortification of Tibet and later by its tilt towards the militaryregimes of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma that became part ofChina's indirect approach in dealing with New Delhi.Fourthly, even amongst China's 'special relationships' with SouthAsian military regimes, the Sino-Pak nexus presents a uniqueexample of inter-state ties, which has no comparison whatsoeveranywhere around the world. This is a unique case where onenuclear weapon state has been responsible for propping upanother nuclear weapon state. Similar attempts were also madeby China in Burma yet, China's indulgence has had only limitedsuccess with their military regime. Given the proximity andinterdependence of smaller South Asian countries with India,Chinese indulgence has not resulted in any formal militaryalliance with any of India's neighbours. However, this indulgencedoes have a major influence on South Asian threat perceptionthat mainly moulds the South Asian security profile.

Fifthly, despite the absence of ideological linkage or militaryalliances, China has tried to tie down India to South Asia byseeking influence by building friendship with all its neighbours.Between 1956-1973, when Sino-Indian ties were at their lowestebb, nearly 20 per cent of China's total world aid was targetedto these South Asian countries, with Pakistan receiving 13.1 percent, Sri Lanka 3.5 per cent and Nepal 2.9 per cent.1 The mainfocus was generally on supplying these countries with militaryequipment resulting in China emerging as the single largestsupplier of military equipment to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladeshand Burma.2 This extreme indulgence has to be understood interms of Beijing's strategic vision of emerging as the Asian leaderwhich has a direct bearing on South Asian security. To give oneexample, in November 1985, China's 3,000-ton Guided MissileDestroyer paid a "friendly visit" to Islamabad and Colombo andit completely omitted ports of the largest littoral state, India.3

This was despite the fact that by this time the Sino-Indian tieshad overcome their post-1962 problems.

And finally, given China's limited leverage amongst South Asiancountries, Beijing has continued to modulate its South Asianpolicy objectives to suit its national objectives. Failing to forcethese smaller neighbours to become pawns for China, Beijing hasrepeatedly resorted to emphasising that these smaller states mustfollow an 'independent" policy, implying thereby that they should

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not allow India to influence their decision-making. Occasionally,China also tries to offer itself as a moral and politicalcounterweight to what it perceives as India's attempts at bullyingthese South Asian regimes. But following improvement in Sino-Indian ties since the early 1980s, Beijing has gradually lost itsmotivations to prop these smaller states against India.Accordingly, recent years have witnessed China encouragingthese states to improve their ties with New Delhi.4

In addition to these aforesaid salient features of the China-connectionto South Asian security during the past 50 years, even the Chinese expertsagree that despite fast changing realities of geo-strategy and geo-economics, this China-connection to South Asian security will continueto be integral to it in the coming years.5 • But given the diversity ofpolitico-strategic culture as also the diversity in the capabilities of SouthAsian countries, the majority of issues will still remain outside theframework of any discussion on the China-connection of South Asiansecurity. To understand those critical nuances, therefore, it perhapsbecomes imperative to survey China's relations with each of these SouthAsian states and to highlight China's overall influence in the evolutionof South Asian security profile.

China and India

Without doubt, India remains the single most decisive factor indetermining China's policy initiatives and objectives vis-à-vis South Asia.A brief look at the nature of the post-liberation history of Sino-Indianties, shows that these had been deeply influenced by (a) British India'simperial policies and (b) the nature of interactions between their nationalliberation movements that was based on their common anti-colonialsentiments. Very briefly, starting from the early 1930s, Indian NationalCongress leadership had publicly expressed its sympathies with Chinesenationalists and communists fighting together against the ruthlessonslaughts of Japanese militarism. Apart from exchange of visits andletters by Jawaharlal Nehru, Rabindra Nath Tagore and Dr. S.Radhakrishnan, it was the medical mission led by Dr. Komis during theSino-Japanese war that had created an indelible imprint on Chinesememories. During his visit to China during August 1939, JawaharlalNehru had talked eloquently of the "imperishable links" which boundour peoples together. He even talked of an "Eastern Federation of China'and India" and of other eastern countries and was "astonished andgrateful" for the desire of the Chinese people "for a close and friendlyunion with the people of India."6 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan during the courseof his visit to wartime Chungking in May 1941 talked of "our civilisations

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possessing a common cultural and spiritual background with an identityof ideals of happy life and friendship", which at the political plane present"a unique example of good neighbourly behaviour."7 Tagore who visitedChina in the midst of Japanese onslaughts during 1937 was so impressedby the similarities of the two Asian civilisations that on his return he laidthe foundations of India's very first center for China studies atShantiniketan.

It was against this backdrop, followed by the euphoria of HindiChini Bhai Bhai, that Indian leadership had surrendered India's entiremilitary and administrative presence in Tibet under the PanchshilaAgreement of April 29,1954. These Indian concessions were based onan understanding that China and India would soon finalise a packagedeal on their entire boundary dispute which, however, never came aboutas the Chinese side belied their promises. This was partly because theChinese became suspicious when both the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lamatogether visited India during 1956 and this was followed by the DalaiLama being formally granted asylum in India in 1959. But, with theadvantage of hindsight, the Chinese leaders had perhaps begun to thinkdifferently even before the ink on Panchshila agreement had dried. Thefirst expression of the fact that Sino-Indian ties had begun to getcomplicated came during the April 1955 Afro-Asian summit at Bandung(Indonesia). During one of its meetings, the Chinese Premier Zhou.En-lai told Pakistani Premier, Mohammed Ali Bogra, that there was "noconceivable clash of interests which could imperil friendly" relationsbetween their two countries."8 Bogra would have visited China the sameyear, but he was ousted from power. Yet, the next Pakistani Premier H.SSuhrawardy visited China in 1956 and Premier Zhou En-lai reciprocatedhis visit in 1957 and this laid the foundations of the Sino-Pak ties thatwere to later emerge as the single most critical irritant in Sino-Indianrelations.

As regards the Sino-India border conflict of October-November 1962,numerous studies have detailed on how their ties began to get derailedfollowing the publication of China's official map in 1959. Each of thesestudies had reached their own conclusions as to whose policies and actionswere responsible for such an impasse in Sino-Indian ties. Nevertheless,most of them agree on the fact that the Chinese side was apparentlyfound far better prepared for such an eventuality, while the Indian sidewas not only found ill-prepared but seemed to have been taken bysurprise. What further-proves the strength of China's pragmatism is thefact that within a matter of a few weeks following the Sino-Indian borderconflict, China and Pakistan had finalised their border settlement byDecember 1962 and a formal agreement in this regard was signed on

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March 1963. With this ended the only dispute that could have stoppedthese two countries from forming a joint front against their commonenemy, India. However, conforming to the same pragmatism, whileBeijing had cultivated 'special relationship' with Islamabad, the Chinesehad also continued to make positive overtures towards India. Forexample, when Beijing signed the border settlement with Pakistan, theyinsisted on a clause which said that this agreement would be renegotiatedin case the final settlement of the Indo-Pak dispute over this territoryends with transfer of these areas to India. Similarly, during the BeijingAsian Games of 1967, China formally wrote to the Indian governmentinviting the Indian delegation to participate in the Asian Games. Later,in May 1981, Deng Xiaoping had voluntarily revived the 1960 proposalof Premier Zhou En-lai for a package deal on the entire Sino-Indianboundary dispute.

From the Indian side, such overtures commenced with Sardar SwaranSingh (then foreign minister) making a statement in the Indian Parliamentin August 1970 expressing his government's desire "to settle allmatters...peacefully through bilateral negotiation" and this was followedby the two sides allowing installation of telex with each other's Embassiesin Delhi and Beijing, India supported China's candidacy for Manila-basedAsian Development Bank, inviting China to a regional conference ofUNESCO at Delhi, and finally, Mrs. Indira Gandhi made a personal visitto the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to sign the condolence bookfollowing the death of her father's dear friend Zhou En-lai. Thisrapprochement finally resulted in India and China resuming theirdiplomatic ties at the Ambassadorial level in 1975. Similarly, India notonly became the first to announce as well "as resume Ambassadorialexchange (July 1975), it was also the first to send its Foreign Minister(February 1979), Prime Minister (December 1988) and President (May1992) to Beijing. These visits were, of course, aptly reciprocated by theirChinese counterparts during 1984,1991 and 1996 respectively, at the endof which Pakistan became the last South Asian country to be told by theChinese to bilaterally sort out its ties with New Delhi. The last few yearshave witnessed China endorse India's views on various issues includingKashmir, and except for a brief problematic period following India'snuclear tests during May 1998, China's appreciation of India's policieswas visible in China's neutral posture during the fourth Indo-Pak war inKargil in May-July 1999.

Especially, since the post-Belgrade bombing of the Chinese embassy,the Chinese have since begun to focus on evolving their ideas about amulti-polar world far more seriously with security frameworks like aRusso-Sino-Indian trilateral strategic triangle becoming an increasingly

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important item in their list of priorities for China's foreign policy. Thisexperience has further reinforced their belief that the Chinese cannotafford to have any problems with neighbouring countries, at least notduring thé first quarter of the 21st century. This arrangement equallysuits Indian foreign policy and both thus have a perfect opportunity towork together towards evolving their common ideas on how to evolvethe new world order for the 21st century. It is in such a positiveenvironment of greater mutual trust and understanding that lies the hopethat the Chinese and Indian leaders might finally find some answers to•their perennial mutual suspicions as also a lasting solution to other moreintractable problems like their disputed boundaries.

China and Pakistan

The Sino-Pak 'special relationship' has been unique in more waysthan one:

Firstly, Pakistan constitutes the only exception where China hasmanaged to have stable ties throughout these last five decades. The onlycomparable example is that of North Korea, though they have sufferedoccasional disruptions and more recently Beijing's engagement with Seoulhas clearly undermined their unstinting support to the North Koreancommunist regime. Secondly, Sino-Pak defence cooperation, especiallyChina's assistance and supplies of nuclear and missile technologies arethe only example where one nuclear weapons power has not only virtuallycreated another nuclear power but has continued to enjoy stable tieseven after the latter formally declared itself as a nuclear weapon state.And finally, Sino-Pak ties, despite their being primarily dominated bytheir one-sided military cooperation and supplies have not flowered intoa full-fledged military alliance. All this has confounded experts aboutChina's motivations for such unstinted commitment to ensuring thesecurity of Pakistan.

To begin with, the Chinese were extremely suspicious of Pakistanwhich was seen to be a close ally of their chief enemy, the United States.Pakistan had been part of the Western sponsored anti-China allianceslike the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) as also of theCentral Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Although, some Pakistani scholarsclaim that Islamabad had recognised the New China in January 1950(that is before India) the Chinese official records and scholars believethat the formal diplomatic ties between China and Pakistan wereestablished only on May 21, 1951.9 Even after this formal extension ofofficial recognition nothing much really occurred until early 1960s. Butthis was the period that witnessed China complicating its ties both with

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India and the former Soviet Union. Indeed, there had been no high-levelSino-Pak interaction until Premier Zhou En-lai met his Pakistanicounterpart Mohammed Ali Bogra during the Afro-Asian Conference atBandung in April 1955. It was their meetings at Bandung that madethese two leaders realise that (a) China and Pakistan could evolve aworking relationship despite differences in their ideologies and politicalsystems, (b) China and India were emerging as rivals for leadershipamongst Afro-Asian countries, and (c) China and Pakistan could cooperateto increase their leverage against India and the Soviet Union.10 Later,Premier H.S. Suhrawardy visited China in 1956 and Zhou En-lai visitedboth West and East Pakistan in 1957. The meaningful Sino-Pakinteractions began only from early 1960s when the two signed (a) a tradeagreement in January 1963, (b) a border demarcation agreement in March1963, (c) an air services agreement in August 1963 and finally (d) acultural agreement in March 1965."

To recall the sequence, within a matter of a few weeks following theSino-Indian border conflict of October 1962, China and Pakistan hadfinalised their border settlement (December 1962) and a formal agreementin this regard was signed in March 1963. This removed the only irritantthat had existed in Sino-Paķ ties. As a result, during the 1965 Indo-Pakwar, China not only supplied Pakistan military equipment and providedindications of intervening in case India extended the war to East Pakistan,but the Chinese media clearly condemned India as the aggressor.12 The1971 Indo-Pak war had come at the time when China was obliged toPakistan for its role in arranging Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijingin July 1971 which facilitated the historic Sino-US détente, as alsofollowing the Indo-Soviet Treaty that was signed in August 1971.Accordingly, China not only provided moral and political support, butbegan to supply military equipment to Pakistan through the KarakoramInternational Highway since March 1971 and, at the height of this conflict,trips *of 100 lorries were made per day to replenish Pakistan's arms andammunition.13 Later, Chinese media was to compare India's role in thebirth of Bangladesh to that of the Japanese creation of Manchu Guo.lt

The year 1971 had also witnessed a complete transformation in theprofile of South Asian security complex as a third important power—Bangladesh—came into the picture.is For China's strategic thinkers, thefact of Pakistan getting dismembered had not only made India the mostpowerful country in South Asia but breached their unique leverage ofcountering India from two sides i.e. East and West Pakistan. This wasto be followed by India's nuclear explosion of May 18, 1974. All thisperhaps compelled Beijing to enhance its commitment towardsdismembered Pakistan and to accept the latter's persistent request to

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assist it in building its independent nuclear posture which was finallyagreed in a Sino-Pak agreement of September 1974.16 However, given therising crusade of non-proliferation by Western powers China has latelybegun to distance itself from Islamabad's adventurist policies in promotingterrorism in India's Kashmir or Afghanistan. The most recent episodewhich underlines this basic shift in China's policies towards Pakistanwas reflected in Beijing's strong neutral posture in the fourth Indo-Pakwar in Kargil. This has introduced a slight change in the nature of China-connection to South Asian security.

China and Sri Lanka

Apart from its usual Indian connection, studies on China's motivationsin building ties with Sri Lanka have often cited Sino-Sri Lankan ties asbeing extremely critical in completing China's encirclement of India. Asregards Colombo's motives, these have been overcast by its attempt tocome out of the overshadowing Indian pre-eminence in South Asia andthis has goaded Sri Lanka to encourage external powers' involvement inSouth Asia. To quote one Sri Lankan scholar, "From the point of viewof small states of South Asia, a stronger presence of China as acountervailing force is a desirable phenomenon in view of the growingand unquestionable supremacy of India in the region."17 A similar viewhas also been echoed from China by another Peking University professorwho believes that it is "the short-sighted policy pursued by successiveIndian governments to make India the sole dominant power in SouthAsia" that has created such suspicions in the minds of smaller states likeSri Lanka.18

To recall, the evolution and impact of Sino-Sri Lankan ties, Colombohad been initially aligned to the West (Defence Agreement with Britain)and was seen as hostile to all communist countries. This was partly bothas a cause as also the consequence of China not letting Sri Lanka becomea member of the United Nations until the end of 1955. In such an anti-China environment* during 1948-1956 period, the Rubber-Rice Agreementof 1952 stood as an exception where Colombo had decided to underminethe prevailing US embargo on the sale of strategic materials to China.Economically, however, it was a boon to Sri Lanka as it not only provideda market for its surplus rubber but obtained access to low-priced foodgrainand this treaty has since been renewed several times. Secondly, Sino-SriLankan ties have also been very clearly influenced by their domesticpolitics and its personalities. In 1956, for example, when the Sri LankaFreedom Party breached the UNP's singular hold on power since 1948,the new leadership under SWRD Bandaranaike and SirimavoBandaranaike marked a major shift in Sri Lanka's foreign relations.

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Asserting a genuine non-aligned policy, British bases in Trincomalee andKautanayake were closed in 1957, though the Defence Agreement wasnever formally abrogated. As the first step, Colombo extended diplomaticties with China on February 7, 1957 and this was followed by PremierZhou En-lai visiting Sri Lanka in 1958 and 1964. Given this leverage ofthe Sri Lankan leaders, during the Sino-Indian conflict of October 1962,Sirimavo Bandaranaike was able to take the initiative for a conference ofthe non-aligned countries to mediate between India and China. Sheeven visited Beijing in 1963 to explain what has since come to be calledthe Colombo proposals.

A more pro-India UNP, on the other hand, was not only critical ofSirimavo Bandaranaike for not branding China as the aggressor but alsodenounced the Sino-Sri Lanka Maritime Agreement of July 1963 andaccused the ruling SLFP of handing over Trincomalee base to the Chinese.In 1965, the UNP returned to power with Dudley Senanayake'sgovernment reasserting their pro-West tilt leading to Colombo rejectingBeijing's nominee for Ambassador and China being without anAmbassador in Colombo for the next five years. This period also coincidedwith China's Cultural Revolution and those internal convulsions alsohad their negative impact on Sino-Sri Lanka ties. As a result, Sri Lankaeven toyed with the idea of joining the Association of South East AsianNations (ASEAN) which was formed in 1967 and was clearly seen asanti-Chinese. The return of SLFP to power in 1970 (this time as leadingpartner in left parties coalition), was followed by China, once again,becoming a major actor in Sri Lankan affairs. Apart from a brief periodof confusion during the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) insurrectionduring 1971, Sirimavo Bandaranaike paid a highly publicised visit toBeijing in 1972 where, following her audience with Chairman Mao, shedescribed Sino-Sri Lankan ties as "a model of inter-state relations".19 Thiswas followed by a number of Chinese loans and projects for Sri Lankaincluding a gift of five high-speed naval boats to the Sri Lankan Navy.There had also been allegations of the Chinese hand in Sri Lanka allowinglanding facilities and even troops to the Pakistan Air Force fighters ontheir way to then East Pakistan and it also took some time before itfinally extended its official recognition to the new state of Bangladesh.

Though the 1977 elections witnessed the decimation of SLFP and theUNP again came to power yet, in view of the big shift in terms ofrapprochement between Beijing and Washington in early 1971, Colombocould continue to evolve its ties with Beijing. But it was the escalationof the Tamil ethnic insurrections since 1983 that made Sri Lanka lookinwards and also made India virtually the single most influential externalfactor in Sri Lanka. Though China continued to strengthen its ties by

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extending high-level visits and military equipment yet, with improvementof Sino-Indian ties as also China's limited role in Sri Lanka, Beijinggradually accepted the pre-eminence of India in South Asia. These newequations were aptly surmised by President Jayawardene who is quotedhaving said that, "They were good friends and gave us militaryequipment, guns, etc. at reasonable terms. But what could they do? Icould not ask them to start a border war in the north to keep the Indiansbusy. Even if I had, I doubt if they would have done it."20 And since thenthese new equations had continued to determine the nature of Chinaconnection in Sri Lanka's vision of South Asian security environment.China, fully appreciating the changed reality, never made any publiccomments against Indian Peace Keeping Force's (IPKF) operations in SriLanka and the matter was strictly handled between Sri Lanka and Indianruling regimes which, of course, have had their own differences. But, atthe same time, the theologies of Colombo being one of the critical linksin China's encirclement of India have not yet disappeared from thestrategic debates on South Asia.

China and Nepal

Nepal has been another important country that has greatly influencedSino-South Asian ties. Despite Nepal's inalienable cultural, commercialand civilisational roots in India, it is their desire to assert independenceand identity that has constantly compelled Nepalese ruling regimes toplay north against the south. This has also often resulted from theirdesire to obtain concessions from both sides though, given its geographyand history, Nepal has generally remained closer towards India ratherthan China. Secondly, Nepal's attempts at maintaining equidistancebetween India and China has been influenced by views of Nepal'sdominant ethnic communities as also their representatives i.e. the NepaliCongress and the Communists. The Kings and their loyalists have actedas the balancing third force, though often even they have become part ofthe same power struggle. The Chinese attitude towards Nepal has beenguided by their historical legacies like territorial claims and their 'MiddleKingdom' traditions as also by their contemporary security concerns aboutTibet and its Indian connection. China has cultivated Nepal as part ofits larger security agenda and has been too willing to offer itself as Nepal'scounterweight against India that has enjoyed a special position owing tothe Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950. As regards their territorial claims, Chinaand Nepal had a few minor points of disagreement that were settled in1961.

In terms of the evolution of Sino-Nepalese ties, though Nepal hadextended its official recognition of the Communist regime on August 1,

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1955, direct interactions between them did not take place until 1959 forNepal was known for its closeness with India. It was in the context ofNepali Congress taking over power and the beginning of Sino-Indianconfrontation on the boundary question that year that had made theChinese deeply interested in Nepal. Prime Minister B.P. Koirala, however,tried to balance his policies by engaging the Chinese without disturbingthe basic framework of Indo-Nepalese ties. And, while he paid a visit toBeijing in March 1960 and signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship andobtained Rs. 100 million in economic aid, he declined to sign a non-aggression pact as also a Chinese offer to build a road link. Later, KingMahendra accepted the same offer of Lhasa-Kathmandu road when itwas presented to him by the Chinese as a bargaining chip for resolvingthe boundary dispute.21 This road has since been considered as providingChina a strategic access to South Asia, which is the only all season roadother than Karakoram highway that connects China and Pakistan whichwas also built around the same time. But an even more important decisionof King Mahendra was to dismiss the Koirala government in April whichcaused Nepal to tilt temporarily towards China. Nehru, already perturbedby developments in Sino-Indian ties, feared that these internal politicalupheavals would make Nepal vulnerable to Chinese designs and criticisedthe King's action as "a set back" to Nepal's democracy.22

King Mahendra responded to Nehru's tough posture by building hisleverage against India. China, of course, was more than willing to walkin, given the deteriorating trends in Sino-Indian relations. But withChina's limited leverage across Great Himalayas as also its securityconcerns about Tibet, Beijing's engagement with Nepal has never hadany satisfying results for the Chinese side. Accordingly, China has alwayssettled for very limited objectives of ensuring Nepal's neutrality in anySino-Indian struggle and for this China never encouraged Nepalicommunists to threaten the system of monarchy in Nepal. In the longrun, however, this continued engagement did create a certain proximitybetween China and Nepal and especially with the construction ofKathmandu-Lhasa road, Nepal was no longer India-locked. Meanwhile,China has also repeatedly used anti-Indian sentiments of both Nepalicommunists and the King to wean away Nepal from India and this foundexpression in the Nepalese demand for the withdrawal of the IndianMilitary Liaison Group and Indian personnel from checkposts on Nepal-Tibet border. Beijing, however, was only trying to project Nepal as aseparate entity as also build it as a strategic buffer between India andChina. • But it still could not undermine India's special position anddespite this equidistance, King Mahendra's period saw India and Nepalsigning an agreement in 1965 which established a framework for India'ssupply of arms to Nepal.

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The death of King Mahendra and accession of his son Birendra to thethrone in 1972 witnessed historic events like the Sino-US rapprochementand bifurcation of Pakistan that made India the most dominant power inSouth Asia. The follow up events like India's nuclear test and merger ofSikkim had aroused ' concerns in Nepal. And as Mrs. Indira Gandhiadopted a tough posture towards Nepal, young King Birendra respondedby continuing his father's policy of building closer ties with China. The1970s, therefore, saw China supporting Nepal's proposal of 'Zone ofPeace', expanding their aid and trade, including a direct air link thatresulted in several high-level visits between the two sides. King Birendrahimself paid several visits to Beijing and these were reciprocated byvisits by Deng Xiaoping and his prime minister and foreign minister toKathmandu during 1978,1979, and 1981 respectively. As a result, duringlate 1980s, when the monarchy was challenged collectively by all politicalforces combined—some of them were openly supported by India-NewDelhi decided to play neutral.

Considering that late 1980s and early 1990s was the period of collapseof communist regimes around the world and that in its post-Tiananmenincarnation, China had high stakes in improving ties with India, Beijinghas shown no inclination to encourage the King's independence. WithinNepal, all major parties were united against the monarch and during theJanuary 1990s convention of the Nepali Congress, most of the Indianpolitical parties sent delegations. Meanwhile, differences with themonarchy also led to the closure of various routes by India for trade withNepal; this increased the hardship of Nepali people and further increasedtheir disaffection against the monarch. Considering that all attempts torescue the monarchy were in vain, Prime Minister Li Peng, during hisvisit to Kathmandu in November 1989, advised Nepal to mend its tieswith India on their own. The collapse of the partyless panchayat in April1990 led to the formation of a coalition under K.P. Bhattarai who, despitehaving communists as part of his government, issued a call to restore'natural' ties with India. India also reopened the trade routes that wereclosed, and Bhattarai assured India of safeguarding its interests in Nepaland virtually buried the Zone of Peace proposal. The G.P. Koiralagovernment tried again to maintain equidistance between China andIndia though with improved Sino-Indian ties, Nepal's leverage to use theChina card diminished. Particularly with the Communists coming topower, despite some noises about re-writing the Indo-Nepal Treaty of1950, it did not really disturb the traditional Indian pre-eminence inNepal. Thus China's leverage with "Nepal for influencing South Asiansecurity profile remains limited.

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China and Bhutan

Despite its small size and limited interest in the outside world, Bhutanhas played an important role in connecting China to South Asian affairs.Mainly due to Bhutan's geographical location—south of the GreatHimalayas—as also due to the long-standing commercial and culturalinteractions between the two sides, India had always been the mostimportant external factor in the evolution of Bhutan. Once Bhutan acceptedits special relationship with New Delhi starting from mid-1960s, it nevertried to undermine this relationship, not even to emulate the Nepaleseexample of 'balancing' between New Delhi and Beijing. Till today Bhutanhas only two Ambassadors—from India and Bangladesh—and despitehaving joined the United Nations since 1971, Bhutan has not establisheddirect diplomatic relations with any of the other nation states. To lookat its China connection, it was the Chinese military invasion of Tibet thattilted Bhutan towards India as this was followed by hundreds of Tibetanrefugees crossing over to Bhutan, as also the Cultural Revolution whichwitnessed Chinese propaganda inciting Bhutanese people to "overthrowthe government of Bhutan."23 As regards China's motivations, major issuesthat dominated Sino-Bhutanese ties included Beijing's accusations ofIndia's expansionist policies and it is this major issue that had alsomoulded China's attitude towards the Sino-Bhutanese boundarydemarcation as also Bhutan's ethnic problems. Yet, China continued itsefforts not only to find a foothold in Bhutan but also to wean it awayfrom its traditional tilt towards India.

Right from the days when India's own independence was beingnegotiated, Indian leadership had recognised Bhutan's special status andthere was no question raised of Bhutan joining the new Indian republicor adopting the Indian .political system though it was also not encouragedto evolve an international profile. This insulation from the external worldwas further reinforced by the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 where Article2 stipulated that "The Government of India undertakes to exercise nointerference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part theGovernment of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of theGovernment of India in regard to its external relations." It is on this basisthat India opted to negotiate Bhutan's boundaries with Tibetan portionof China. The very map that was published in July 1958 and whichmarked the beginning of Sino-Indian problems had included the entireeastern district of Tashigong and pockets of northeastern and northwesternBhutan as part of sovereign China. The centuries old traditions of tradeand commerce between Tibet and Bhutan also came to an abrupt haltfollowing China's military takeover of Lhasa. Especially, following Dalai

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Lama's exit from Tibet, Bhutan dosed all its trade routes northwardsfrom Paro, Punakha and Tashigong to Shigatse and Lhasa, as also itstrade in Chumbi valley in the west via Yatung. In view of thesedeteriorating ties between Tibet and Bhutan, Nehru visited Bhutan in1958 and this followed in Bhutan focusing its trade and commercesouthward which led to a series of joint projects between India and Bhutan.Later, the responsibilities of the defence of Bhutan and military trainingmissions etc. were also entrusted to India under some unpublishedagreements that were signed during the Bhutanese King's visit to NewDelhi in 1961.24 This was followed by Indian military teams trekkingthrough Bhutan and India's newly created Border Roads Organisationbeginning construction of roads between Phuntsholing and Thimpu. Thesame year formal developmental planning was initiated in Bhutan withIndia underwriting 100 per cent technical and financial responsibility forthe first two Five Year Plans which has since been reduced to less than25 per cent, as international financial agencies and bilateral donors likeSwitzerland and Japan have come in, as also Bhutans internal resourceshave begun to accrue dividends. Despite all this the Chinese did notattack Bhutan during the 1962 Sino-Indian war though they did not giveup their legal claims to those territories.

India's special position has been one of the major contentions inSino-Bhutanese ties right from early 1960s and Beijing continues to askBhutan to confer on Beijing a status equal to that of New Delhi andpossibly to accept a Chinese Ambassador to Bhutan. This demand delayedtheir border talks with Bhutan until 1980s which again had a directrelationship with India's own improving ties with Beijing. The first majorincident on the Sino-Bhutanese border had occurred during 1966, whenon the tri-junction of Bhutan, Chumbi Valley and Sikkim, Tibetan grazersalong with Chinese troops had entered Doklam pastures against warningsfrom Bhutanese officials. Later China formally extended its claim toabout 300 sq. miles of northeastern Bhutan and also substantial areasnorth of Punakha, the former capital of Bhutan.25 While Bhutan wantedNew Delhi to take up this matter with Beijing, an official statement fromBeijing in October 1966 asserted that Sino-Bhutanese boundaries hadnever been demarcated and that while Beijing would like to do so"through friendly consultations" the matter "concerns China and Bhutanalone" and "the Indian government has no right whatsoever to intervenein it."26

Meanwhile, in 1971, China voted in favour of Bhutan's membershipat the UN which obviously amounted to recognising Bhutan's status asa sovereign state in its own right. Even this apparent concession fromBeijing did not lead to any positive outcome as soon Bhutan used its new

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status as UN member for strongly supporting India in its initiativestowards creation of a new state of Bangladesh which annoyed Chineseleaders. China continued to woo Bhutan and during this period thoughit also found an ally in a small group of rebels who were opposed toeverything royal including the King's close ties with New Delhi andwent across to join the Communist Party of Nepal. This being a positivesignal for Chinese designs, Beijing sent a high-level delegation to attendthe coronation of the new King during summer of 1974 and Chinesemedia played up the sentiment for Bhutan's self-reliant developmentand attacked India's 'annexation' of this mountain kingdom. Especially,given the example of Sikkim where Nepali settlers had threatened theLepcha culture and Kingdom of Sikkim, this had its echoes in Bhutanand the Bhutanese King visited New Delhi to obtain assurances fromMrs. Indira Gandhi. Following Mrs. Gandhi's defeat in 1977 electionsthe gulf between Thimpu and the Janata régime increased further and atthe Havana Non-Aligned summit of 1977 Bhutan voted opposite to Indiaon the question of who should represent Cambodia which was construedby some as voting with the Chinese, but it was reported that Bhutan'sKing was already considering to 'up date' the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of1949.27

On the boundary question, the Chinese were successful in finallystarting direct negotiations between Chinese and Bhutanese officials in1984 and the two sides have since finalised their boundary demarcation,which was never a major problem as far as China was concerned. India,on the other hand, played an important role as stipulated in the Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949 and despite having no direct participation inthese talks, New Delhi was kept fully informed and assured by Bhutanthat it was not going to compromise India's vital interests, while Indiaprovided guidance and advice to the Bhutanese officials in dealing withthe Chinese. And finally, just like the case of most other South Asiancountries, the apparent improvement in Sino-India ties since early 1980shave since diminished Chinese interest in Bhutan. Besides, the 1990shave witnessed Bhutan becoming excessively preoccupied with itsproblems of Nepali settlers in southern Bhutan which has made it further 'suspicious of the role of both Nepal and China and has increased Bhutan'sdependence on India. However, China has continued to maintain astudied silence on Bhutan's treatment of its Nepali refugees which flowsfrom its commitment to Panchshila, as also from its own track-record onhuman rights issues.

China and Bangladesh

China's ties with Bangladesh are being discussed in the end not

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because it had lesser influence over the South Asian security profile butsimply because until 1971 it did not exist as an independent nation. Also,unlike China's ties with other South Asian states, its relations withBangladesh also were not only determined by its inevitable Indianconnection but also by Bangladesh's ties with Pakistan. Bangladeshileaders and experts have also tried to project their country as China'sconnection to the Islamic world, both West and Southeast Asia and triedto carve a special space in China's vision of South Asia. Besides, the twocountries have been sharing a working relationship since East Pakistanwas the main beneficiary of China's involvement with Pakistan's militarybuild-up. Lately, the two have also worked together at various commonplatforms from the United Nations to Economic and Social Council forAsia-Pacific (ESCAP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) whichhas further strengthened their mutual stakes and understanding, leadingto a series of trade, technology and political exchanges over the years,none of which has been of a permanent kind.

Recalling the circumstances under which Bangladesh was liberatedwith assistance from Indian armed forces, Beijing had described it's birthas an example of Indo-Soviet manipulation of regional unrest and refusedto recognise it for a long time. Even later, China repeatedly urgedBangladesh to stand on its own and revive its contacts with Pakistan.Therefore as long as the Mujib government was in place China neverextended its recognition to the new state of Bangladesh and continued toveto its entry into the United Nations and other international bodies. Itwas only 15 days after the bloody coup against Mujib-ur-Rehman thatBeijing extended its recognition to Bangladesh on August 31,1975 andthis was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations on October4, 1975. The editorial of China's Communist Party mouthpiece ChinaDaily of October 8,1975 clearly expressed China's support for the policiesof the new regime in Dhaka especially its 'opposition to outsideinterference'.28 Then the 1980s witnessed China supplying a large quantityof military equipment to Bangladesh and at one stage becoming thelargest supplier for weapons, especially in the naval arm where much ofthe smaller boats were all Chinese.

The Zia-ur-Rehman's period witnessed normalisation of Pak-Banglaties, and this was clearly put to use by Bangladesh in improving andexpanding its ties with China. Successive regimes from both sides havesince continued to place a high premium on their mutual trust andunderstanding. But just as in the case of most other South Asian states,improvement in Sino-Indian ties had resulted in China keeping restraintin propping up Bangladesh to disturb the South Asian security scenario.Unlike other South Asian states Bangladesh has been exceptional for its

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sensitivities about China's indulgence in Myanmar since the early 1990sand this has since seen Bangladesh trying to play an independent role inimproving Indo-Pak and also Sino-Indian ties by promoting largerregional frameworks for cooperation.

Conclusion

To conclude, therefore, the aforesaid examination of the China-connection of the South Asian security scenario shows how purely securityconsiderations have determined China's initiatives towards South Asiancountries. Similarly, owing to its location, size and involvement, Chinahas continued to be a major influence in determining the nature andprofile of South Asian security. Thirdly, the nature of China's ties withIndia has been most decisive in determining China's South Asia policy.Fourthly, going by the broad trends so far, China's improving ties withIndia have generally undermined its motivations for greater involvementwith other South Asian countries. And finally, given the increasing globalinterest in South Asian affairs during the post-Cold War era as alsogiven China's steady movement towards becoming the next global powerof the 21st century, this China-connection of South Asian security is verylikely to persist in the coming years as well. Very briefly, therefore, itshows that while various factors may have influenced China's role indetermining the security yet, China managed to retain its importance indetermining the nature of South Asian security profile. And going bythe current trends, in both China and South Asia, this China connectionis very likely to continue asserting a similar influence on the South Asiansecurity scene in the 21st century.

NOTES1. Jayanta Dhanapala, China and the Third World, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing

House, 1985), p.115.2. Bates Gill, "Curbing Beijing's Anns Sales'", Orbis (Pennsylvania), Summer 1992

reproduced in Strategic Digest (New Delhi), November 1992, pp. 1428-46.3. "Chinese Warships Leave for South Asian Goodwill Visit", Summary of World

Broadcasts,FE/8111/1, November 18, 1985.4. Yu Gang, "Security of South Asia in the New Situation: A Chinese Perspective",

Iftekharuzzaman (ed.), South Asia's Security: Primacy of Internal Dimensions,(New Delhi: Sage, 1995), p.309.

5. Guo Jingan, "Ways and Means to Promote Peace and Development andSafeguard the Security of Small States", M. Abdul Hafiz and Abdur Rob Khan(ed.). Security of Small States, (Dhaka, 1987), p. 306.

6. Parshotam Mehra, "China and South Asia - Some Reflections on the Past andthe Future", China Report (New Delhi), Vol. 30 No. 3 (July-September 1994),p. 302.

7. Ibid.

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8. Ibid9. "China and South Asia in the 21st Century", Spotlight on Regional Affairs

(Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies), Vol.xviii No.10, (October 1999), p.2.10. P.L. Bhola, Pakistan-China Relations: Search for Politico-Strategic Relations,

Gaipur: 1986), p.69.11. "China and South Asia in the 21st Century", Spotlight on Regional Affairs

(Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies), vol.xviii, no.10, (October 1999), p.2.12. See J.K. Jain, China South Asian Relations 1947-1980, (Delhi: 1981), pp. 31-97.13. J.N. Mohanty, "China and the Emergence of Bangladesh: Role of Great Power

Global Perceptions", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol39 no.2 (April-June 1983),p.139.

14. Beijing Review (Beijing), December 10, 1971, pp. 7-8.15. Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, "The Future of the South Asian Security

Complex" in Barry Buzan and Gawher Rizvi (ed.), South Asian Insecurity andthe Great Powers, (London: 1986), p. 237.

16. P.L. Bhola, Pakistan's Nuclear Policy, (New Delhi, 1993), p52; also Zulfikar AliBhutto, If I am Assassinated, (New Delhi, 1979), 223.

17. Mahinda Werake, "China and South Asia: Some Historical Perspectives", inShelton U. Kodikara (ed.), South Asian Strategic Issues: Sri Lankan Perspectives,(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990), p.65.

18. Lin Liang Guang, "India's Role in South Asia: A Chinese Perspective", inVemon L.B. Mendis (ed.), India's Role in South Asia, (Colombo: BandaranaikeInstitute for International Studies, 1992), p. 45.

19. Gamini Navaratne, The China-Connexion—A Study of Sri Lanka-ChinaRelations in the Modern Period, (Colombo: Sandasa News Agency Publications,1976), p. 9.

20. S.D. Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis, (NewDelhi: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 100.

21. Mira Sinha, "Nepal's role in Sino-Indian Relations", IDSA Journal (New Delhi),vol.2, no.4 (April 1970), p. 481.

22. A.S. Bhasin (ed), Documents on Nepal's Relations with India and China 1949-66, (New Delhi: Academic Books, 1970), pp. 51-53.

23. Daljit Singh Adel, China and Her Neighbours, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep,1984), p. 172.

24. Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, Diplomatic History of Modern India,(New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 295.

25. Kohli, n. 27, p. 173. [Daljit]26. R.K. Jain, China and South Asia, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1981), p.29.27. Manorma Kohli, "China Factor in Indo-Bhutanese Relations", in Virender

Grover (ed). International Relations and Foreign Policy of India, Vol. 2 (NewDelhi: Deep & Deep, 1992), p.203

28. R.K. Jain (ed), China Pakistan and Bangladesh, Vol. II, Basic Documents; 1950-76, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1984), pp. 245-47.

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