sino-soviet relations: recent developments and implications for the united states

S I N O - S O V I E T R E L A T I O N S : R E C E N T

D E V E L O P M E N T S AND I M P L I C A T I O N S

F O R T H E U N I T E D STATES

Robert G. Sutter

Since the late 1960s, U.S. officials have based American policy in Asian and world affairs heavily on the premise that continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry--short of armed conflict--serves the overall interests of the United States. Most notably, Sino-Soviet rivalry has provided a major point of common ground--i.e., opposition to Soviet expansion, especially in Asia--for developing Sino-U.S. relations, and it has promoted a balance of influence in Asian affairs favorable to U.S. interests.

Over the past four years, however, China and the Soviet Union have markedly narrowed their differences and taken steadily increasing steps to improve political, economic, and other ties. This trend appears likely to continue in the near future, especially since the newly installed Gorbachev government in the U.S.S.R. has strongly underlined Soviet determination to improve relations with China as part of a broader Soviet effort to spread Soviet influence throughout the Asian and Pacific region. Gorbachev per- sonally affirmed this policy most explicitly in a July 28, 1986 speech in Vladivostok/In response, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said in an interview broadcast on September 7, 1986 that he would be willing to meet with Gorbachev if the Soviet Union would reduce its support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.-'

Improving Sino-Soviet relations have attracted wide attention and some expressions of concern from U.S. and other media, but have elicited only moderate interest from U.S. officials. In part this is because U.S. officials in recent years have come to see U.S. policy as less dependent than in the past on China's continued strong opposition to the U.S.S.R.; and because they see China and the Soviet Union having limited ability to move closer to one another on account of important security and economic concerns.

This article reviews recent improvements in Sino-Soviet relations, as- sesses continuing strong differences between the two powers, and examines likely prospects. In assessing the implication of changes in Sino-Soviet relations for U.S. interests, the article examines why recent official U.S.

Robert G. Sutter is assistant chief, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and author of Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments ,,!/~er Mao (Praeger. 1986) and The China Quandt3': Domestic Determinants of U.S.-(Ttina Polio3:1972-1982 (Westview Press. 1983).

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policy has been generally sanguine in the lace of a steady trend of improved Sino-Soviet relations in recent years?

771E SINO-SOI l E T RII,~ILRY .tND AMERI(~ tN INTERESTS, 1969-82

Sino-Soviet relations reached their low point in 1969 when armed border clashes intensified to a point where the Soviet Union threatened to attack Chinese nuclear installations and Chinese leaders countered with a nation- wide war preparations campaign against the "war maniacs" in the Kremlin. The Sino-Soviet alliance relationship of the 1950s was short-lived and rent thoroughly by widely publicized political, economic, and international disputes through the 1960s. Party and aid relations were broken, trade was at minimal levels, and each side depicted the other in official media as a dangerous international predator.

The start of Sino-Soviet talks on border issues in October 1969 eased the war crisis, but each side continued preparations for a long-term struggle against its neighboring adversary. As the weaker party in the dispute, China attempted to break out of its international isolation and gain diplomatic leverage against perceived Soviet efforts at intimidation and threat. Beij- ing's opening to the Nixon administration was an important element in this policy. The Soviet Union continued past efforts to build up military force along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders in order to offset any perceived threat from China and to provide a counterweight useful against any P.R.C. effort to exert pressure on countries around China's periphery that were interested in developing closer relations with the U,S.S.R. (e.g., India, Vietnam).

The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the gradual emergence of a more pragmatic leadership in China reduced the importance of ideological and leadership issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute: but the competition in Asia again reached a crisis in 1979. China countered Soviet-backed Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia by launching a limited military incursion into Viet- nam; and the Soviet Union responded with warnings and large-scale military exercises along China's northern border.

Subsequently, both countries attempted to moderate tensions. Soviet leader Brezhnev made several notable public gestures to China before he died in 1982. This prompted the start of a series of political, economic, technical, and cultural contacts and exchanges that have continued up to the present. 4

U.S. I N T E R E S T S

The Sino-Soviet split set the stage for a process of Sino-American reconciliation that began in the 1970s, helped foster a balance of power favorable

64 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / SPRING 1987

to the United States in East Asia, and provided other benefits for U.S. interests in Asian and world affairs. Throughout the 20th century, Amer- ican policymakers have viewed U.S. priorities in Asia in the context of the "Open Door" policy. Generally, this has entailed an interest in American access to East Asia, the prevention of domination of the region by a hostile power or coalition of hostile powers, and inclusion of East Asia in a global balance of power. Faced with a Sino-Soviet alliance hostile to the United States at the start of the Korean War in 1950, the United States undertood a major and costly buildup of its military forces and bases in Asia, estab- lished a series of bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements with non- communist Asian states, provided tens of billions of dollars in economic and military assistance to friends in the region, and gave favorable trade and investment opportunities to Asian states that were helpful in "con- taining" Sino-Soviet Communist expansion.

This policy began to change in the late 1960s when the Nixon administration fundamentally reassessed American-Asian policy in light of the Sino-Soviet split, which by this time had developed into an armed border confrontation. The administration was faced with a continuing massive American involvement in the Vietnam War that weakened our military posture elsewhere, the development of a divisive political struggle in the United States against the war and to a lesser degree against the costs and risks of U.S. containment policy, and the growth of Soviet military power to a point approaching parity with the United States. As a result, it opted to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift and improve American relations with China in order to facilitate our withdrawal from the war, while continuing to maintain a balance in Asian and world affairs favorable to the United States.

Improved U.S. relations with China resulted in a U.S. view of China as less of a threat or source of conflict. This view was consistent with a large- scale pullback of American forces from Vietnam and throughout East Asia and allowed American military planners to redesign U.S. strategy in the region. By the early 1970s, American military planning was scaled back to deal only with one major conflict in Europe and one minor conflict elsewhere (a "one and a half war" strategy), as opposed to the so-called "two and a half war" strategy--Europe, East Asia, and a third contingency elsewhere--that had prevailed when the United States viewed both the Soviet Union and China as major threats.

This change in U.S. strategy was seen as enhancing our ability to deal with the Soviet Union. The opening to China was thought to raise serious doubts among Soviet strategists about the security of the U.S.S.R.'s flank with China in the event of an East-West confrontation elsewhere. Thus, the dynamic development of Sino-American reconciliation was seen to give the United States political leverage against the U.S.S.R., as it appeared to prompt the Soviets to be more forthcoming toward the United States on

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issues such as SALT and European questions, rather than risk driving the United States closer into an alignment with China against the Soviet Union.

In sum. the Sino-Soviet split and the subsequent cooperative U.S.-P.R.C. relationship benefited U.S. strategic interests by:

�9 Assisting the United States to extricate itself from Vietnam: �9 Ending U.S. strategic confrontation with China; �9 Freeing U.S. resources and providing greater flexibility in U.S, global security

planning; �9 Increasing Soviet concern about their potential "two front" security problem.

Soviet forces opposite China increased from about 150,000 in the mid-1960s to over 400,000 in the early 1970s--from 20 divisions to well over 40;

�9 Allowing the United States and China to consider each other a strategic counterweight to the U.S.S.R.:

�9 Facilitating P.R.C. support for U.S. national security policy in some other parts of the world: and

�9 Enabling close convergence of U.S. and P.R.C. anti-Soviet interests and policies in Southwest and Southeast Asia.

The Sino-Soviet split has also reportedly inclined China to be willing to host American monitoring stations targeted on the Soviet Union, and has helped to lead to the numerous economic, intellectual, and political benefits the United States has gained as a result of its improved trade, investment, and other bilateral exchanges with China.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, 1982-86

Developments in Sino-Soviet relations since Brezhnev's death in 1982 have seen steady improvement in several key areas. Soviet leader Gor- bachev gave added impetus to improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in his July 28, 1986, speech in Vladivostok. He noted, in the most explicit terms to date, Soviet interest in reducing Soviet forces deployed along China's periphery that are seen by Beijing as a major element in dispute with the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the two powers have not diminished significantly their continued strong rivalry in Asia, reflecting an underlying mutual distrust regarding perceived antagonistic goals in the region.

Improvements in Sino-Soviet relations have focused on greater political and economic exchanges, increased trade, and reduced confrontation over international political questions:

Political exchanges, which previously had been severely restricted, have grown to a point where the two sides maintain two sets of recurring consultations at the vice foreign minister level (ostensibly one set deals with bilateral issues and the other with multilateral questions); regular annual meetings of foreign ministers at the UN General Assembly; visits of the

66 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / SPR1NG 1987

Soviet and P.R.C. vice premiers to each other's capitals; visits of parliamen- tary delegations; and exchanges involving diplomatic specialists in such fields as Asian affairs and arms control.

Trade and economic exchanges: Sino-Soviet trade doubled in value in 1984 over the previous year, and the value in 1985 (approximately $2 billion) was over three times the value in 1983. (For comparison, the value of U.S.-China trade in 1985 was over $7 billion.) An exchange of visits by vice premiers in 1984 and 1985 resulted in the establishment of economic and technical commissions which regulate growing interaction in these areas. Most notably, the U.S.S.R. has agreed to provide technical assistance to refurbish up to 17 factories built with Soviet assistance in China during the 1950s and to build seven new factories. The Chinese are expected to pay for the assistance. Meanwhile, about 200 students are being exchanged. (For contrast, about 12,000 Chinese students are now studying in the United States.)

Border issues: The Sino-Soviet border talks have not been held since 1978, but the two sides agreed on September 25, 1986, to resume talks in 1987. The first round is to take place in Moscow on February 9. Relations along the frontier have improved to a point where both sides have opened several border crossing points closed during the 1960s and 1970s, have revived interest in expanding border rail construction linking the two countries that was abandoned in the 1960s, and have begun investigating the possibility of joint use of resources of border rivers. In this regard, Gorbachev reaffirmed at Vladivostok a previously stated Soviet willingness to use the main channel of the Amur river as the border demarcation line, in contrast to the Soviet stance in the 1960s that the boundary line followed the Chinese bank of the river. Moreover, both sides responded with public restraint to a reported armed clash along the Sino-Soviet border in July 1986.

Media criticism has been reduced to a minimum. Soviet and Chinese commentary is now generally neutral or positive about the other side's internal policies. Gorbachev, for example, gave an unusually positive as- sessment of Chinese reforms during his Vladivostok speech. Mutual criticism of international issues has focused on conflicting interests in Asia, and has generally soft-pedaled conflicts that used to provoke bombastic broadsides against each other's international posture.

International Communism: Polemics over this contentious issue have also been muffled. Each side now acknowledges the other as a "socialist" state. An interest in restoring party ties is implied by the slow, but steady movement in Chinese Communist Party exchanges with the orthodox parties of the Soviet bloc.

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ISSUES IN DISPU I"E

The points of contention in recent Sino-Soviet relations focus largely on competition for influence around China's periphery in Asia. Chinese officials say that the core of the dispute now lies in the so-called "three obstacles." This refers to: 1) the presence and continued modernization and improvement of Soviet military forced deployed along China's northern border with the U.S.S.R. and with Mongolia; 2) Soviet military, economic, and political support for Vietnam in its military occupation of Cambodia; and 3) Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union also has been successful over the past two years in using increased military supplies and political support to develop a markedly closer Soviet relationship with North Korea. This has come about implicitly but un- mistakably at the expense of China's relationship with this vitally important Communist neighbor. It has caused some Western analysts to characterize Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Pyongyang as an unacknowledged "fourth" obstacle to improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. ~

Chinese leaders have repeatedly claimed that there can be no "substantial" improvement or "normalization" of Sino-Soviet relations until the U.S.S.R. moves to compromise on at least one of the three obstacles. Over the past year, Chinese leaders--including Deng Xiaoping in his September 1986, U.S. television interview responding to Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech--have placed prime emphasis on the need for movement regarding Soviet support of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. Nevertheless, Chi- nese leaders in the past four years have permitted the improvement in political, economic, and other exchanges noted above, even though they claim to have seen no movement in Soviet policy on the three obstacles.

Indeed, during this period, the Soviet Union has continued its multibillion dollar assistance effort for Vietnam, maintained active fighting forces in Afghanistan. and pursued important force modernization along China's northern border, including the expanded deployment of such con- troversial weapons as SS-20 missiles. SS-20s are widely seen as targeted against China as well as the United States and Japan. Further, as part of its Korean policy, the U.S.S.R. has provided Pyongyang with MIG 23 aircraft--which China cannot produce--as a means to gain influence in North Korea at China's expense. North Korea in turn has allowed Soviet military reconnaissance aircraft to fly missions along the Korean demilita- rized zone and into the Yellow Sea toward China--flights seen as directed against China as well as the United States and South Korean forces.

Until Gorbachev's Julv 28, 1986, speech in Vladivostok, Soviet officials had appeared resigned to the slow, incremental improvement seen in recent

68 JOURNAL OF NORTIIIL4ST+4SL4N STUDII(S / SPRING 1987

Sino-Soviet relations. They did not appear particularly interested in accommodating Chinese demands on the three obstacles in order to advance Sino-Soviet ties more quickly. In his speech, Gorbachev referred in unusually explicit terms to possible Soviet withdrawal of forces from Mongolia, pledged a token withdrawal from Afghanistan, and expressed interest in discussing a mutual withdrawal of Sino-Soviet forces from along their common border. In the event, the Soviets reportedly withdrew some troops from Afghanistan, and announced on January 15, 1987, that one Soviet division would withdraw from Mongolia in April-June 1987.

Though Chinese officials have welcomed these "new elements" in the Soviet posture, they have emphasized repeatedly that their primary concern at present relates to the need for a pull back of Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. It is on this obstacle that Gorbachev showed least flexibility in his Vladivostok speech. The Chinese may be using this public stance as a means to slow the pace of improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and curb international speculation about a possible major breakthrough in relations between the two Communist powers.

CONFLICTING MO TI VES

The balance between recent improvements and continued disputes in Sino-Soviet relations reflects competing motives influencing both Chinese and Soviet policy. Officials in both capitals are of two minds as they negotiate with one another.

On the one hand, Chinese and Soviet leaders are more pragmatic and less interested in the ideological issues of the past, and more concerned with advancing the growth of their national economies. Neither side sees military conflict with the other as serving that economic goal. In trying to ease military tension, both sides seek economic benefit, including a decline in resources devoted to military spending; and they see some compatibility involving economic exchanges of Chinese light manufactured goods (e.g., textiles that run up against protectionist barriers in other markets) for Soviet technical products, heavy industrial goods, and raw materials (e.g., logs and timber). In promoting Sino-Soviet trade, both sides employ special barter arrangements which do not draw upon either side's limited foreign exchange reserves.

Politically, Soviet leaders may be influenced in promoting Sino-Soviet relations by three goals. First, they may anticipate enhancing their international standing as they negotiate on arms control and other issues with the Reagan administration. Second, they may wish to sow distrust in the United States and Japan regarding Chinese policy, thereby slowing development of closer U.S. and Japanese relations with China. Third, they may seek to moderate the opposition to the U.S.S.R. on the part of several

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countries in Asia, notably Thailand and Pakistan, who base their current policy in part on China's support for strong resistance to Soviet and Soviet- backed expansion in Southeast and Southwest Asia.

Chinese leaders may hope that improved contacts with the U.S.S.R. might prompt the United States to pay more attention to Chinese concerns regarding Taiwan and other interests for the sake of keeping China on the U.S. "side" in international competition with the Soviet Union. And they might hope to reduce Soviet distrust of China to a point where the U.S.S.R. would begin to pull back a large part of its military forces deployed against China.

On the other hand, there is ample evidence that Soviet and Chinese leaders are deeply suspicious of the other side's longer term goals in Asia, and are not yet inclined to risk important interests in seeking accommoda- tion over security issues there. Thus, Soviet officials see the P.R.C. more than compensating for its recent improvement in Sino-Soviet relations by steadily advancing Chinese economic, political, and security ties with the United States, Japan, and other Western aligned countries. Some Soviet observers suspect that recent Chinese moderation toward the U.S.S.R. may be little more than a way to buy time so that China--the weaker party in the Sino-Soviet dispute--can gradually grow in strength, with the help of the United States, Japan, and others in the West, to emerge as a truly great power ready to confront the Soviets in Asia in the 21st century.

Chinese officials, for their part, often have depicted the Soviet goal as the establishment of dominant influence in Asia, implicitly at the expense of China's autonomy and independence. At present, they see the Soviet Union as at least temporarily on the defensive in the face of the strong reaction of the United States, its allies, and many Third World countries opposed to the steady expansion of Soviet power in the Third World during the late 1970s and early 1980s. They suggest that recent Soviet moderation toward China is largely a means to buy time, to play the "China card" against the United States, and to disrupt the prevailing anti-Soviet balance of forces, especially in Asia.

Against this backdrop of continuing suspicions, neither side has been willing to accommodate the other in areas where the risks to their interests--involving security issues in Asia and other questions--could be substantial. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union clearly recognizes that any major pullback of Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia could place at risk the multibillion dollar Soviet investment and Soviet access to important air and naval facilities in Vietnam. A substantial pullback of Soviet forces along China's northern border (involving, for example, the movement out of Asia or demobilization of five or more Soviet divisions) could have a similar effect because it could cause Vietnam

70 JOURNAL OFNORTHEASTASIANSTUD1ES/SPRING 1987

to lose confidence in Soviet ability to counter repeated Chinese threats to use military force against Vietnam a second time.

A change in Soviet policy also could risk generating possibly strong internal controversy in the Soviet Union. Opponents of change in the heretofore firm Soviet stance regarding security issues in Asia, presumably including members of the Soviet military, could argue that compromise with China in these areas would risk exposing Soviet territory to greater danger. They could add that Moscow has been successful over the past four years in gaining gradual Chinese acceptance of improved Sino-Soviet relations without making any compromise on the three obstacles, and should continue this proven policy.

Chinese officials for their part are aware that signs of Chinese acquiescence in Soviet military expansion in Asia could cause other Asian countries, notably Thailand and Pakistan, to make similar adjustments. These two countries play key roles as staging areas for forces resisting Soviet and Soviet-backed dominance in Southeast and Southwest Asia. Changes in their policy could cause the resistance forces to wither and lead to consol- idation of Soviet and Soviet-backed forces around China's periphery, pos- ing a clear threat to China's independence and development for the foreseeable future.

At the same time, Beijing recognizes that markedly improved Sino-So- viet relations or accommodating the Soviet Union in Asia could cause the United States, Japan, their allies and friends, and international financial institutions to reconsider their current, generally favorable and generous policies toward China. As a result, Beijing could face a reduction in access to foreign markets, technical and financial support, and security cooperation with these important international powers. This could seriously com- plicate China's drive for economic modernization--the paramount goal of the current Chinese leadership. No one in China is known to have argued that increased ties with the Soviet bloc could in any way compensate China for possibly sharply reduced access to the markets, technology, and resources of China's Western oriented economic partners.

SHORT- T E R M PROSPECTS

The prevailing balance in Soviet and Chinese decision-making between incentives for improved relations and continued rivalry suggests that further improvements in Sino-Soviet relations over the next year or two are likely to be marginal and incremental, rather than fundamental and dramatic. Areas of possible agreement during this time include:

Political ties: an expansion of political exchanges to include negotiations at the head of government or head of state level; a broadening of these discussions to highlight areas where China and the U.S.S.R. hold parallel

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positions (i.e., opposition to South Africa's policies, criticism of the U.S. "Star Wars" program, criticism of Israel, support for the nonaligned movement): improvement of Chinese party relations with orthodox Soviet bloc parties, and some low level exchanges between Soviet and Chinese party officials.

Economic exchanges: continued steady growth in Sino-Soviet barter trade; opening of more rail and other border links; more frequent vice premier and lower level meetings over economic issues; new Soviet offers of technical assistance, including offers to refurbish or build other factories; increased exchanges of students and technicians.

Security issues: token Soviet withdrawal (e.g., one or two divisions) from along China's northern frontier: token withdrawal from Afghanistan; Sino- Soviet discussions dealing with border issues, including longstanding So- viet offers to establish so-called "confidence building measures" (i.e., noti- fication of troop movements, of new fortifications, etc.) along the Sino- Soviet frontier: discussions on Soviet offers to sign a nonaggression treaty or a mutual agreement not to use force against each other,

OTHER POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

There seems a less than even chance that Sino-Soviet relations could progress more rapidly over the next two years. This could lead to developments in political, economic, and security relations that are similar to, but more dramatic and consequential than, the improvements noted above. They would signal an unexpectedly rapid pace of rapprochement. They could include:

�9 Reestablishment of Chinese-Soviet party relations: �9 Withdrawal of several (five or more) Soviet divisions from along China's north-

ern border: �9 Soviet granting of substantial (over $100 million) gratis assistance to China; �9 The presence of large numbers (over 1,000) of Soviet technicians in China; and �9 Sino-Soviet agreements on mutual nonaggression, or non-use of force, on

demarcation of disputed regions along the Sino-Soviet boundary.

At the same time, however, there is also a chance, probably less than even, that the two powers' relations could decline over the next two years. In particular, some U.S. analysts judge that the two sides could soon run out of ways to show tbrward movement in relations without addressing the Asian security questions that continue to divide them. 6 In this case, relations could soon appear to hit a plateau, a mutual bickering over the continuing impasse on Asian questions could increase as each side focused more attention on the obstacles to improved relations rather than the signs of improvement.

72 JOURNAL OF NORTttEAST ASIAN STUDIES / SPR1NG 1987

I M P L I C A T I O N S FOR THE UNITED STATES

Improving Sino-Soviet relations have attracted wide attention and some expressions of concern from U.S. media, but have elicited only moderate interest from U.S. officials. This is because U.S. officials in recent years have come to see U.S. policy as less dependent than in the past on China's continued strong opposition to the Soviet Union. Two perceptions help to explain this change. First is the view that China and the Soviet Union have limited ability to move closer to one another because of fundamental conflicts over important security and economic concerns. Second, policymakers have become more discriminating in assessing the impact of improvements in Sino-Soviet relations on U.S. interests. Thus, U.S. officials are generally not alarmed by the slow improvement in Sino-Soviet relations seen over the past four years. Indeed, for the most part, they seem sanguine about the implications for the United States of the likely near- term prospects for Sino-Soviet ties. 7

In particular, U.S. officials have tended to view skeptically repeated press reports regarding imminent breakthroughs in Sino-Soviet relations because neither side has shown a firm willingness to compromise on the serious security and geopolitical questions that continue to divide them. At the same time, policymakers tend to see China's room for compromise over differences with the Soviet Union as more circumscribed than in the past. Most notably, as Chinese leaders have, since 1978, increased their commit- ment to their ongoing economic modernization program, they have deep- ened China's dependence on the cooperation of the United States, Japan, Western Europe, Western-aligned countries in Asia, and international financial institutions. Without the close political, economic, and military cooperation of these states, China would likely be dangerously isolated in Asia, and would face the expanding power of the Soviet Union from a position of distinct weakness. China also would have reduced access to the markets, financial resources, and other goods of these countries. Such isolation could result from a Chinese decision to seek a reconciliation on Soviet terms, which in turn would likely prompt the United States, Japan, and their allies and friends to reconsider their strong current ties to China in favor of a more circumspect policy.

Meanwhile, American officials are markedly more confident over international affairs and perceive the United States to be in a stronger position against the U.S.S.R. than at any time in over a decade. This has resulted from several factors including markedly increased U.S. defense spending, comparatively strong support for the United States in regard to the U.S.S.R. by U.S. allies, and perceived serious difficulties for the U.S.S.R. at home and abroad. Thus, the past U.S. worry that China would accommodate the U.S.S.R., move away from the U.S. side in the East-West con-

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frontation, and thereby seriously weaken the American posture vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R., is of less concern. By contrast, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union was seen as repeatedly expanding its influence in the Third World through military means; the United States was viewed as failing to deal effectively with the Soviet challenge; U.S. allies were less than effective in supplementing U.S. efforts to meet the challenge; and the United States was seen to need close ties with China as a way to help compensate for perceived U.S. weakness in regard to the Soviet Union.

Finally, U.S. officials generally have been less inclined than during the 1970s and early 1980s to view the U.S.-Chinese-Soviet triangular relationship as a zero sum game, in which an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations is seen automatically as coming at the expense of U.S. competition with the Soviet Union. As China and the Soviet Union began to focus more on questions of economic development and dulled the sharp international rivalry seen in the past relations among the three powers, U.S. officials became more discriminating in examining the consequences for U.S. interests of specific improvements in Sino-Soviet relations. They duly note that the two communist powers might take some measures to improve their relations in the future that could have negative consequences for specific U.S. interests, but the results thus far have led them to view most of the recent Sino-Soviet improvements as having neutral or potentially positive effects on U.S. interests.

In particular, they judge that: (1) China will continue to provide a strategic counterweight to Soviet expansion in Asia; (2) the U.S.S.R. will still have to worry about its flank with China in the event of a military confrontation with the United States elsewhere; (3) Soviet efforts to use military and other means to expand their influence in Asia will continue to provide a major point of common ground between the United States and China: and (4) important Asian states close to both the United States and China (e.g., Japan, Thailand, Pakistan) are likely to be very attentive to any change in Sino-Soviet relations, but to avoid rash adjustment in their current orientation, barring a major shift in China's posture toward the Soviet Union. Indeed, carefully managed improvements in Sino-Soviet relations that result in a reduction of Soviet force deployments in Asia are widely seen to enhance the development of regional stability favorable to the United States, its allies and friends. Several U.S. observers suggest that the United States should cooperate more closely with China in supporting moderate Chinese policies toward the U.S.S.R. that would result in a substantial Soviet military pullback in Asia.

OTttER I TEH'S, POSSIBLE NEGATIVE OUTCOMES

Some American officials continue to view the triangular relationship as an essentially zero-sum game, and thus they judge that even moderate

74 JOURNAL OFNORTIIE,4ST,4SL,INSTUDII'~S/SPRING 1987

improvement in Sino-Soviet relations has negative consequences for Amer- ican interests. This minori ty view stresses the importance o f China playing a more active and cooperative role with the United States in confront ing the Soviet Union in Asian and world affairs. They believe that such an ou tcome is increasingly unlikely as China eases tensions and broadens contacts with the U.S.S.R., stressing in the process Beijing's " independent" posture in foreign affairs.

Meanwhile, even those U.S. observers who are generally optimist ic about Sino-Soviet relations point out that some steps to improve Sino- Soviet relations could have direct negative consequences for part icular Amer ican interests. For example: (1) Withdrawal o f Sino-Soviet forces from along China's nor thern boundary could result in Soviet redeployment o f its forces westward, more directly threatening U.S. interests in Europe or elsewhere; (2) Chinese acquiescence, through a nonaggression or non-use- of-force treaty, an agreement on confidence building measures along the Sino-Soviet border, or some other measure could add international legit- imacy and sanction politically the Soviet use o f military power to gain influence in Asia. This would make it more difficult for the United States to foster international support to counter the increasingly dynamic Soviet presence in the region; (3) Chinese collaboration with the U.S.S.R. on their parallel international positions regarding such areas as Star Wars, South Africa, and Israel could serve to isolate the United States over these contro- versial international questions during deliberations at the United Nations or other international forums; and (4) Moderately improved Sino-Soviet relations are likely to be seen by leaders in both Moscow and Beijing as improving their respective political leverage with the United States. This could make it more difficult for U.S. officials to deal with them over sensitive negotiations regarding such questions as relations with Taiwan and arms control.

N O T E S

This is a revised version of a paper presented at a conference co-sponsored by the llhae Foundation and the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, held in Seoul, Korea, November 1986. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Con- gressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 1. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily report, U.S.S.R. July 29, 1986. 2. FBIS, Daily report, China. September 8, 1986. 3. For good background on recent Sino-Soviet relations, see Harry Gelman, "Continuity Versus

Change in Soviet Policy in Asia." Joztrna/qfNortheasl ,4sian Stttdies. Summer 1985: 3-18: Huan, Guo-cang, "Sino-Soviet Relations to the Year 2000: Implications for U.S. Interests," Washington, The Atlantic Council, 1986. p. 38: Steven Levine, "The End of Sino-Soviet Estrangement," Current llistory. September 1986: 245-48. 279-80.

4. For useful background on Sino-Soviet relations in this period, see Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-taking Against China," Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.. 1982: and Doak A. Barnett, China and the Major Pourrs #7 East .,lsia, Washington, D.C..

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Brookings lnstitutiom 1977. See also Robert Sutter, ('hinese Foreign Policy: Developments !/icr ~lla~, New York, Praegcr Publishers, 1986.

5. For background information, see Robert Sutter, "North Korea: The Fourth 'Obstacle" in Sino-Soviet Relations'?" Korea and I I i~r/d .[/]ilir.~, Summer 1986: 370-403.

6. Consultations, Washington, D.C.: August. September 1986. 7. If,id.

sino-soviet relations: recent developments and implications for the united states

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