sino-israeli relations and associated impact on arab-israeli relations, 1949-1993

7/31/2019 Sino-Israeli Relations and Associated Impact on Arab-Israeli Relations, 1949-1993

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Author: Malcolm ScottDate: April 23, 2012

Sino-Israeli Relations and Associated Impact on Arab-Israeli Relations, 1949-1993

Vacillations between pragmatic and ideologically driven foreign policy have driven the

relationship between the Israeli and Chinese governments over the time period 1949-1993. The

Peoples Republic of China alternated between relatively pragmatic foreign policy to extend its

own international influence and relatively ideological foreign policy to attempt fulfillment of

specific aspirations. Earlier in the stated time period, interactions with the Soviet Union and Arab

states in the Middle East limited Sino-Israeli relations, and this would be the situation even when

the Chinese government attempted to pursue pragmatic foreign policy. Only at the end of the

Cold War and the establishment of the Camp David Peace Accords did the Chinese government

manage to be constructive in Sino-Israeli relations and the Arab-Israeli conflict in its pursuit of

pragmatic foreign policy. For clarity, the Peoples Republic of China is noted as the government

of China compared to the Republic of China noted as Taiwan.

1949-1955

A combination of ideological and geopolitical restrictions hindered relations between

Israeli and Chinese government relations during the 1950s. The problem potentially existed even

at the inception of the Chinese nation. When the Chinese Communist Party achieved sufficient

victories and established the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong stated the

geopolitical and ideological problems associated with Sino-Israeli relations (Behbehani 1981,

46). Mao Zedong had noted awareness of antagonism against Israel from the Arab world;


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furthermore, he regarded relations with Israel problematic because of beliefs held about Israel as

a conduit for imperial influence (Behbehani 1981, 46). At least publicly, Mao Zedong espoused

beliefs that the United States, United Kingdom, France and West Germany were imperial powers

exploiting Israel (Behbehani 1981, 46). However, from 1949 to 1952, it was not certain that this

assessment would necessarily continued unchanged without the war of the United States in

Korea.

Initially promising relations between the State of Israel and the Peoples Republic of

China deteriorated. Cold War geopolitics had essentially corroded early goodwill. Prior to 1955,

the Peoples Republic of China had considered formal diplomatic ties with the State of Israel. On

January 9, 1950, the State of Israel was the first government of the Middle East to recognize the

Peoples Republic of China through a cable to Premier Enlai from Israeli foreign minister

(Shichor 1979, 21). In its early pursuits of diplomatic ties with the Israeli state, Mao Zedong and

the Chinese government had displayed a noticeable degree of pragmatism; the Chinese

government was intent on further recognition within the international community, and it did not

object to mere diplomatic ties with nations under American influence (Shichor 1979, 21). Once

more, there was a divergence since 1949 in the appraisal of Israel between the Soviet Union and

the Peoples Republic of China. While the Soviet government had already altered its assessment

of Israel, the Chinese government maintained flexibility in relations with ideologically dissimilar

governments such as Israel (Shichor 1979, 21-22). Indeed, Chinese diplomats for affairs in

Moscow attempted to contact the Israeli legation present there in June 1950, but the Israeli

government had earlier declined to establish a diplomatic site in Beijing and merely to maintain

communications through its legation in Moscow (Shichor 1979, 23). Despite these events, the

Israeli and Chinese governments remained on good terms, and, on September 19, 1950, Israeli


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delegates supported a resolution that would have replaced Republic of China/Taiwan delegates

with those of the Peoples Republic of China (Shichor 1979, 23). Without the intervention of

external circumstances, it was unlikely that Chinese-Israeli relations would have failed so early

and indefinitely. Indeed, the Chinese special representative in the Security Council specifically

praised Israel as one of sixteen nations supporting the September resolution (Shichor 1979, 24).

Until January 1951, there would have been little indication that the two governments would not

develop full diplomatic ties with each other within coming ten years. However, the geopolitics

associated with the Cold War proved to be a major divide for the Israeli and Chinese

governments.

The debates within the United Nations over the Korean War eventually led to failed

relations between the Israeli and Chinese governments. At this point, there were significant

divergences in preferred responses to the Korean War. The Chinese governments desired a

conference of seven nations that would resolve the problem (Shichor 1979, 24). The Israeli

government desired a different solution in which there would be a truce between warring sides;

this was not acceptable to the Chinese government, because the Chinese government interpreted

this Israeli proposal as a stratagem by which the United States could reorganize its military

forces as the United Nations became mired in discussions (Shichor 1979, 24). This divergence on

the issue of the Korean War was not enough for the Chinese government to part ways with the

State of Israel. More specifically, while critical of this approach, the Chinese government did not

directly criticize the Israeli government and had theNorth China News Agency note the

disapproval of another delegate to the Israeli proposal (Shichor 1979, 24). As part of a long trend

in Middle Eastern relations, the Chinese government attempted to balance ideology and

pragmatism in its geopolitics. The Peoples Republic of China had its preferences and concerns


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became noticeably hostile (Shichor 1979, 24). This paralleled the severed ties of the Israeli and

Soviet governments, and this time was also when the Chinese government more openly

condemned Israel and Zionism in general (Shichor 1979, 25). However, Chinese relations with

Israel improved at the same time as the Soviet relations with Israel later in 1953 (Shichor 1979,

25). During 1954, Israeli and Chinese relations quickly became cordial again (Shichor 1979,

25). However, because of Chinese activities at the Bandung Conference, the Chinese government

was more discrete and cautious in its relations with the Israeli government during 1955 (Shichor

1979, 25). Within the space of three years, from 1952 to 1955, the Chinese relations with the

Israeli government fluctuated considerably. The attitude of the Chinese government could vary

between cordiality, hostility or neutrality depending on Soviet attitudes and Chinese relations

with other Middle Eastern states. Sometimes, the Chinese government was ideological in its

geopolitical affairs and was pragmatic in other circumstances. These vacillations demonstrated a

conflict between ideology and pragmatism within Chinese government and its choices of foreign

policy.

Mao Zedong and the Chinese government in general tried to employ careful logic and

choices of distinctions to balance ideology and pragmatism. It is important to note that Mao

Zedong maintained a belief about the role of different regions and countries as buffers between

the United States and the Soviet Union. Zedong had a belief known as the Intermediate Zone

Theory (Shichor 1979, 12). During World War II, Mao Zedong had observed that the key regions

existed between major fighting powers, and he had extrapolated this observation to the Cold War

between the United States and Soviet Union (Shichor 1979, 11). His expectation was that the

United States would try to acquire control of key regions to gain an advantage over the Soviet

Union (Shichor 1979, 12). Lu Ting-Yi, Director of the Department of Information at the Chinese


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Communist Party, expounded that a collection of neutral territories existed between the United

States and the Soviet Union (Shichor 1979, 12). A result of this perspective was that Chinese

government had a key priority to inhibit what it perceived as imperial expansions in the Middle

East, and this ideological perspective had a dimension of national security; activity by seemingly

hostile powers was a deemed concern for national security (Shichor 1979, 12). However, Israel

would not necessarily have fallen into the category during the 1950s at all.

Any concerns about Israel as a security threat as interpreted in the Intermediate Zone

theory probably occurred after the early 1950s mostly. This assessment probably was concurrent

with the rise in ideology in Chinese foreign policy, but this is contextual to the ideological, Cold

War geopolitics in general. Within this perspective, Israel was not necessarily significant itself as

much as its believed use for ends threatening Chinese security. An integration of ideological and

national security was a main barrier for relations between Chinese and Israeli governments, but it

was arguably secondary to the greater role the Chinese government desired in the international

system.

1955-1964

There was an early ideological antagonism of the Chinese government towards the Israeli

government in the mid 1950s period as being conceived as an extension of Western imperialism

(Behbehani 1981, 20). However, ideology would not necessarily have been such a great hurdle in

mutually beneficial relations between the Israeli and Chinese governments. Common

expectations in the Chinese government were that the role of the United States in Israeli affairs

would decline, and the Israeli Communist Party expectedly held the role to facilitate the decline

(Behbehani 1981, 20). The Chinese government placed a higher premium on international


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recognition and also recognition by Arab states in particular (Behbehani 1981, 20). This was the

greatest impetus for nominal support of Palestinian refugees (Behbehani 1981, 20). Examination

of these circumstances indicates that the Chinese government did not necessarily have

ideological inclinations to oppose Israeli nationalism and policies indefinitely; likewise, the

government would not set its support for the Palestinian cause in stone. Indeed, the Peoples

Republic of China pragmatically managed to integrate its ideological inclinations into an equally

pragmatic foreign policy. However, specific circumstances impacted the degree of support for

either Arabs and Palestinians or Israelis.

The Bandung Conference was a significant event impacting Sino-Israeli relations and not

merely Sino-Arab relations. On April 18-24, 1955, the Conference of Afro-Asian States

convened in Bandung, Indonesia, in which Arab states formed significant blocs (Behbehani

1981, 21). Attending states often focused on issues about colonialism and national independence

from colonial legacies (Behbehani 1981, 21). Part of this conference included efforts by Arab

states to further the cause of Palestine and interests of Arab nationalism beyond the limits of the

Cold War (Behbehani 1981, 21). Gamal Abdel Nasser was especially vocal for these issues

(Behbehani 1981, 21). The Chinese Premier Chou Enlai discovered the strength of Arab states to

discuss Palestinian issues; perceiving the pivotal role of Palestine amongst those states, Premier

Enlai then offer Nasser and PLO Chairman Ahmad al-Shukairy his support for the Palestinian

issue, which took many Arab representatives by surprise (Behbehani 1981, 21-22). That this

demonstration of support by Enlai was unexpected is a probable indicator of decisional

randomness. Indeed, there was no ideological preference at stake in Chinese support of

Palestinians. The greatest priority for Premier Enlai was greater Chinese recognition in the

international system; if that involved address of the Palestinian issue in order to curry favor with


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Arab regimes, that would not have been a problem. If the Chinese government also managed to

balance Arab and specifically Egyptian relations with Israeli relations, there would not have been

any dilemmas of principle. The Chinese government had optimal flexibility within which to

manage international relations.

The Bandung Conference marked a circumstance in which pragmatic foreign policy had

the greatest emphasis and flexibility was generous. This perspective is noticeable from analyses

of a speech at the Bandung Conference by Enlai (Behbehani 1981, 22). During his speech on

April 19, 1955, Enlai stressed nonviolent coexistence between ideologically and culturally

differing states and assured no intentions of Communist propagation; indeed, an imam was

among those of the Chinese delegation (Behbehani 1981, 22-23). These circumstances

demonstrate that the Peoples Republic of China had to exercise pragmatism to maintain

relationships with states ideologically and culturally dissimilar to each other and the Chinese

state. The Chinese government during the 1950s had to exercise pragmatism out of necessity

regardless of ideological preferences, and short-term exercises of pragmatism in the context of

Cold War politics had prompted greater favor of Arab states and the Palestinian cause compared

to the new Israeli nation. However, pragmatism not simply demanded better relations with more

states but also greater influence in the international sphere based on immediate geopolitical

circumstances.

The decisions of the Chinese government at the Bandung Conference were pivotal to its

international relations within the Middle East. There had been almost no formal relations

between the Peoples Republic of China and the states of the Middle East prior to the Bandung

Conference (Shichor 1979, 20). Middle Eastern states typically did not have a positive regard for

the Chinese government (Shichor 1979, 20). Prior to the conference, the Chinese government


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had to manage its relations through left-wing movements in countries of the Middle East

(Shichor 1979, 20). All else being considered, it made sense for the Peoples Republic of China

to support Palestinians nominally and to access numerous Middle Eastern states into the future.

By comparison, Israel was one nation within the Middle East of which simply its very existence

provoked the wrath of the Arab world. Due to the strategic nature of the pro-Palestinian support,

the Arab-Israeli conflict did not actually merit violent conflict or military intervention from the

perspective of the Chinese government. The Peoples Republic of China desired to acquire better

security and Middle Eastern relations, but the government did not invest itself in the elimination

of the Israeli state.

Opposition to the United States was significantly fuelling the Chinese perspective on the

Arab-Israeli conflict. Initially, from the Bandung Conference and 1963, the Chinese government

focused on what it regarded as American exploitation of the Israeli state against the Arab states,

and Palestinians themselves were not particularly important in this regard (Behbehani 1981, 23).

As was common during the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a proxy war with the United

States, and contents of one author Tsui Chi from The Peoples Daily during these years reflecting

the different aspects of this perspective (Behbehani 1981, 23). Chi had written that the United

State was fomenting ill will between the Israeli and Egyptian states, and this was supposedly to

use Israel against Egyptian sovereignty (Behbehani 1981, 23). That support for Arab states in a

proxy war was even then still pragmatic, as indicated by another release ofThe Peoples Daily,

in a section known as the Observer; the advocated perspective was that peaceful negotiations

were essential to resolve the Palestinian problem (Behbehani 1981, 23). In this article, the writer

deemed it necessary that there would be consultations with countries in the region according to

United Nations procedures and that there be no military force (Behbehani 1981, 23). This is a


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notable contrast to anti-Israeli belligerence of Arab states during the 1956 and 1967 wars. The

contrast also indicates the motivations of the Chinese government at the time.

The Chinese government then was not an advocate of Israeli elimination as much as

resolution of the Palestinian problem. Their stance towards Israel during the 1956 War and Suez

Crisis is notable in the use of ideology. During October and November of 1956, the Chinese

expressed its opposition to intervention by the United Kingdom and France, but there was not an

attempt to identify Israel as an aggressor (Behbehani 1981, 24). The Soviet Union identified

Israel specifically as an instigator, but the U.S.S.R. identified that role as a part of a war between

Israel and Egypt planned by Britain and France (Behbehani 1981, 24). China and the Soviet

Union generally agreed about the role of the Israel in the Suez Canal crisis, and they had

allocated blame to the declining imperial powers. This was actually in accordance with

pragmatic policy procedures. However, it is important to deconstruct pragmatic nature of

Chinese public relations at this time and its harmonization with ideological preferences.

Pragmatism in foreign policy is necessary to understand Chinese blame towards Western

powers and Israel in the 1956 Suez Crisis. The Chinese government had made distinctions

between primary and secondary enemies in its Middle Eastern foreign policy (Shichor 1979, 14).

Primary enemies were always meant to be the target of the Communist struggle, but secondary

enemies were less dangerous and would be acceptable partners in temporary alliances (Shichor

1979, 14). Previous press statements from official Chinese news, the statements of the Premier

Chou Enlai and the Chinese response during the Suez Crisis indicate that the Chinese

government had regarded Israel as a secondary enemy. The Chinese government expressed

ideological antagonism towards what it claimed was Western imperialism, but the government

also made these distinctions between primary and secondary enemies. This was not an optimal


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relationship between the Chinese and Israeli governments, but this classification nevertheless

probably kept the possibility open for better Chinese-Israeli relations in the future.

The greatest driver for Chinese partiality in the Arab-Israeli conflict was the pursuit of

recognition by Arab states. The Peoples Republic of China received recognition from forty nine

states by 1965, and only eight of those states were predominantly Arab (Behbehani 1981, 31).

During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, only the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen

recognized the Chinese government (Behbehani 1981, 31). Nominally siding with the

Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict, vis--vis Arab governments, was a means to build

relationships with Arab states (Behbehani 1981, 31). Greater collaboration with Arab states via

support for Palestinians was a means towards greater influence in the Middle East and

recognition by Arab states. There was not significant ideological opposition to Israel, but it was

less expedient for greater influence in world affairs and less feasible in the context of Cold War

politics. If there had been fewer Cold War tensions and better relations with many Arab states

already in place during this time, antagonism of the Chinese government towards the Israeli state

would have been weaker if not non-existent. These conditions are present more so during the

1990s, but those different circumstances required changing geopolitical and internal Chinese

dynamics in the decades prior to the 1990s.

1964 and 1967 Arab-Israeli War/Six Day War to 1970

At the summit of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese foreign policy became especially

radical. The Chinese government under Mao Zedong had become particularly supportive of

movements and military attempts deemed derivative of popular sovereignty (Behbehani 1981,

56). This was more the case after the 1967 war, but in the buildup to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,


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the Chinese government became vehemently supportive of Arab regimes and the Palestinian

cause (Behbehani 1981, 56). This is a noticeable difference of the previous decade, and it is also

a revealing indicator of the implications of the Cultural Revolution. From the time 1964 to the

year 1973, the radicalized Chinese government apparently renounced much of its pragmatic

policies of the previous decade. Whereas support for either sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict was

tempered during the previous decade, the Chinese government more overtly supported the use of

force by Arab states immediately before the war (Behbehani 1981, 56).

Support for revolutionary movements represented a startling change in Chinese foreign

policy. This immense change was noticeable at numerous levels. On June 5, 1967, a publication

ofThe Peoples Daily disclosed statements of Chairman Mao to the effect that enemies of the

Arab states would essentially be wiped out if the enemies were to fight, and Israel was among the

considered enemies (Behbehani 1981, 57). While the Chinese government was trying to balance

good relations with both Israeli and Arab states during the 1950s, the Chinese government is

explicitly, violently pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian. The Chinese government during the 1950s

preferred to use mediation to resolve the regional disputes of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whereas

the government during the 1960s was openly supportive of grassroots revolutions to propagate

ideology. The increasing radicalization of politics within the Chinese government was the

Cultural Revolution is the most noticeable cause of these dramatic changes in policies. In light

of this radicalization and the desire to support peoples movements, the Palestinian movement

offered one of the few avenues to accomplish this during the 1960s (Ismael 1986, 210).

1970-1994


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The ideological element strongly expressed in Chinese foreign policy goes into decline

after 1970. During 1971 and 1972, the Chinese government began to reestablish ties with nations

in the Middle East it had previously criticized as being imperialist, including Lebanon, Kuwait,

Iran and Turkey (Ismael 1986, 213). During the decade, many nations voted in effort of Chinese

expulsion from the United Nations, and few Middle Eastern states had voted otherwise although

with many abstentions (Ismael 1986, 213). However, the Chinese government had diplomatic

ties with more Middle Eastern states by 1979 (Ismael 1986, 213). In addition, as Soviet influence

in the Middle East decline, Chinese involvement in the region and its more aggressive support

for the PLO also subsided (Ismael 1986, 214-215). At this time, the more pragmatic foreign

policy more visible during the 1950s became increasingly visible again. The Chinese

government had underwent internal power struggles, and the government was probably also

reacting to increasing international isolation. In response to these internal and external

circumstances, the Chinese government probably then decided to curtail its more radical

variations of foreign policy. This would also permit a more but not entirely neutral stance

towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and these circumstances would improve the likelihood of better

Chinese-Israeli relations. This would more be the case after the death of Mao Zedong.

The death of Mao Zedong and the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the Peoples Republic of

China in 1976 would eventually facilitate renewed ties between the State of Israel and the

Peoples Republic of China. The regime of Deng Xiaoping had an emphasis on economic

development, as internal conflicts petered and international recognition improved

(Kumaraswamy 1999, 26). This was a turning point in Chinese-Israeli relations, as the Chinese

and Israeli states were willing to engage in a defense partnership despite a lack of formal

diplomatic ties (Kumaraswamy 1999, 26). The connection between political pragmatism and the


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quality of Sino-Israeli relations continues to be noticeable even twenty years after the Bandung

Conference. As soon as the Chinese government shifted to pragmatic foreign policy and away

from revolutionary, violent ideology, there was groundwork for better relations between the

Chinese and Israeli governments. This was with all circumstances in international relations aside.

However, other circumstances of international relations would not be irrelevant, but changes in

those circumstances would be more accommodating to the Chinese and Israeli governments.

A shift in the Middle Eastern precedent would improve Sino-Israeli relations further after

the rise of Deng Xiaoping. Specifically, the Camp David Accords are a significant shift in the

relations between Israeli and Arab states even when the agreements involved simply Israel and

Egypt. That the leading regional, Arab power in the Middle East was willing to seek a negotiated

settlement to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict sent a distinct signal to the Chinese government

(Kumaraswamy 1999, 27). With this change in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Chinese government

had greater flexibility to pursue Israeli relations (Kumaraswamy 1999, 27). Greater acceptability

for negotiation and moderation most likely eased the capacity of the Chinese government

theoretically to balance relations with Israel and other Middle Eastern governments. These shifts

were not sufficient to open Chinese-Israeli relations, but these changes foreshadowed the better

relations of the 1990s. Chinese and Israeli ties until the Peoples Republic of China and the State

of Israel officially recognized each other on January 24, 1992 (Kumaraswamy 1999, 29).

A significant component of this change in Chinese-Israeli relations and its impact on the

Arab-Israeli conflict was the end of the Soviet Union. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese

government had fallen in and then out with the Soviet Union; after the death of Mao Zedong, the

Chinese government had supported the PLO partly to try to outmaneuver the Soviet Union

(Sufott 1997, 17). However, if the Soviet Union ceased to exist, a Sino-Soviet rivalry had


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become irrelevant in parallel. Because the Soviet Union and the former Chinese regime of the

Cultural Revolution no longer existed during the early 1990s, the Chinese government could

manage to be on better official terms with the State of Israel, and it was for the first time in

nearly forty years. These improved relations had positive impacts for the Madrid Conference and

the Oslo Peace Accords.

Improved Sino-Israeli relations marked a new, constructive role of the Peoples Republic

of China in Arab-Israeli negotiations. A member of Israeli diplomatic ranks, E. Zev Sufott,

described the positions of the Chinese government in the 1991 Madrid Conference as positive

and supportive (Sufott 1997, 17). He further described their reception towards covert dialogue

for the 1993 Oslo Accords as warmly welcomed in Beijing (Sufott 1997, 17). This was not at

all the only issue of contention between China and Israel, but this change in negotiations between

Israel, the PLO and China is notable. The attitude of Chinese officials in the 1990s was strikingly

different compared to sentiments espoused in the 1960s. Sufott recalled that the Vice Foreign

Minister Yang Fuchang emphasized direct Israeli-PLO negotiations (Sufott 1997, 18). Even

during the 1990s, the Chinese government was conscious of its relations with Arab states (Sufott

1997, 19). As had been done during the 1950s, Chinese officials tried to manage conflicting

international relations through pragmatism.

The Chinese government was attempting to build relations with Israel but also sought to

manage its relations with other Arab states, including the PLO. It is important to note

conversations between the diplomatic team of Sufott and the Vice Minister Yang Fuchang. The

minister noted that better Arab-Israeli relations would improve the viability of Sino-Israeli

relations (Sufott 1997, 19). The vice minister then recommended more extensive dialogue

between the PLO and Israeli that was away from public scrutiny, and this greater privacy would


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then avoid the ire of other interested parties (Sufott 1997, 19). It is also important to note that

Chinese willingness to engage with Israel was a direct result of suggestions by Arafat, in which

he had hinted at the necessity of Arab-Israeli negotiations at a 1988 Geneva conference (Sufott

1997, 81). In attempts to manage conflicting relations, the Chinese government often merely

reinforced trends peace negotiations in the 1990s as well as Arab-Israeli wars in 1967, because

its primary interest was often those relations and management of alliances.

The Peoples Republic of China was not the most significant state actor in the Arab-

Israeli conflict. To the extent that it was influential, the nature of influence depended on the

nature of Chinese foreign policy and external geopolitical circumstances. As Cold War politics

became increasingly irrelevant and Arab states began (not universally) to negotiate with the state

of Israel, there was greater potential for Sino-Israeli relations, and there were then more

opportunities for the Chinese government to mediate and to help enhance the dialogue between

Israel and the Palestinians. These opportunities more easily fit into a foreign policy for which

China has desired better international relations. As the Chinese government regained foreign

policy pragmatism after the 1960s, changing international circumstances left the Chinese and

Israeli government with an opportunity to build ties that decayed during the 1950s.


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Works Cited

Behbehani, Hashim S.H. Chinas Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955-1975: Three Case

Studies. Kegan Paul International Ltd.: Boston, 1981. Print

Ismael, Tareq Y.International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World

Politics. Syracuse University Press: Syracuse, 1986. Print.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence. Sage Publications:

Thousand Oaks, 1999. Print

Shichor, Yitzhak. The Middle East in Chinas Foreign Policy. Cambridge University Press: New

York, 1979. Print.

Sufott, E Zev.A China Diary: Toward the Establishment of China-Israel Diplomatic Relations.

Frank Cass: Portland, Oregon. 1997.

sino-israeli relations and associated impact on arab-israeli relations, 1949-1993

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