Copyright © 2013 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved. 1

Shiny Expensive Things: The Global Problem of Mobile Phone Theft

David RogersSchool of Design, Engineering and Computing

Bournemouth University3rd December 2013

The Problem

Millions of mobile phones are stolen each year globally Some countries have not recognised it as a problem

– UK has led the way 2001 Home Office study:

– 710,000 phones stolen in the UK every year– Large percentage of this was likely to be insurance fraud

Despite many technical measures, it is still a problem today

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Types of Theft

Street theft / theft from user– Individual handsets (muggings etc.)

Theft from shops– Multiples (burglaries)– ‘Steaming’ – group distraction /

disruption theft while shop is open Bulk theft

– Pallet loads (truck theft etc.)

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Youth on Youth Crime

School bag in 2011 is £000s different to 1991 Issues with bullying, theft, abuse of service and re-sale of stolen

handsets Education is key:

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

CRAVED

Six elements that make products attractive to thieves:– Concealable– Removable– Available– Valuable– Enjoyable– Disposable

Report argues that “how much depends on ease of disposal”

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

From: Ron Clarke - ‘Hot Products: understanding,anticipating and reducingdemand for stolen goods’ http://www.popcenter.org/problems/shoplifting/PDFs/fprs112.pdf

Violent Theft must be Addressed

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

From: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2051414/iPhone-BlackBerry-phones-targetted-thieves-leads-7-rise-knifepoint-robbery.html?ito=feeds-newsxml

Police Awareness Campaigns

UK Home Office TV Advert Campaign

Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers

Root Causes

Value of device– Can be shipped and sold overseas where it will still work

Features and commodities on device– Apps, music, money– WiFi enables device to continue to be used– Theft of service – still an issue e.g. calls abroad

Possession– It is just something else someone is carrying (belts have been stolen in the

past!)– not allowing user to call for help

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

„...what we have got to do is get to a situation where there is no point in stealing them. The only way we can do that is with the industry.“

Commissioner Sir Ian Blair 13/04/06

Has been a focus for a long time…

Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers

Car Crime v Phone Crime

Analogy everyone uses in government (especially the ‘Nudge’ unit* in the UK):

“we solved car crime by putting pressure on the manufacturers to introduce security, we can do the same for mobile phones”

Mobile is different!– Remember CRAVED– Users need to access device very regularly – ease of access is very important– Much lower cost device than a car– Easy to lose, then subsequently stolen– Small, easy to export– High youth on youth crime

Attention to car crime has reduced it significantly but:– Increases in carjacking and aggravated burglary (for keys)– Hacking of wireless ignition systems

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

* Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team

Explanation of how a phone is disabled after theft

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

How blocking works

Blacklisting (whitelists and greylists exist too)

Also: in UK - NMPR – Police database of property can be checked while on patrol

UK operators operate a ‘virtual’ SEIR (only take UK data from CEIR)

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

CEIR

357213000000290357213000000128357213000030123

EIREIREIREIR

SEIR

Operator

GSM AssociationCountry

EIREIREIR

EIR = Equipment Identity Register, NMPR = National Mobile Phone Register, SEIR = Shared EIR, CEIR = Central EIR

Industry steps over 10 years

Vastly improved IMEI security– Manufacturers have fought a long battle with embedded systems hackers

Industry “IMEI Weakness and Reporting and Correction Process”– 42 day reporting for fixes

Progress reported regularly to European Commission UK charter on mobile phone theft and UK SEIR Operators still lagging with CEIR sign-up

– Very few connected – getting better though!– National governments still need to take an active lead, but very few have– Some operators not investing in EIRs

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010/11 2012

EICTA / GSMA 9 Principles

OMTP Trusted Environment:

OMTP TR0

OMTP Advanced Trusted Environment: OMTP TR1

TCG MPWG Specification

GSMA Pay-Buy-Mobile

Fragmented Security

Handset Embedded Security Evolution

Google / Apple Proprietary hardware

security features

Banking / film industryrequirements

WAC

RIM / Nokia proprietary security features

webinos

Mobile Telephones (Re-Programming) Act (2002)

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/31/contents Offences:

– Change a unique device identifier– Interfere with the operation of a unique device identifier– Possession (with intent) of tool and offering to re-program

Maximum 5 years imprisonment

2009-2011 - 2 years, 5 investigations, no convictions*

Problem – most tools were dual use (maintenance, SIMlock removal AND IMEI change). Very difficult and costly to prove

Other offences involved are often more serious– e.g money laundering

Deterrent effect?

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

* Source: National Mobile Phone Crime Unit

Recycling and Export

Lots of stolen phones are exported, re-sold abroad through the web or “recycled”

Recyclers Charter and Code of Practice– Check incoming phones are not stolen

Some foreign recyclers offering to take blocked phones from the UK

Very difficult to work out exactly how many stolen phones are exported as they just disappear– Each network looks after their own data– Evidence to suggest that stolen phones are exported to classic shipment hubs

overseas such as Dubai

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Regional Theft Guard

Investigated at length by industry An alternative method of disabling mobiles as not all operators

were using the CEIR 3 solutions were investigated but proved to be at issue:

– Could be subverted by other means once in place– High threat of collusion at a low level– Tough to prove originating operator / owner – e.g. whether stolen– Not a panacea by any means

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Counterfeits

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

From: http://reviews.ebay.com/Avoid-Buying-Fake-Nokia-Cell-Phone-Battery-On-eBay_W0QQugidZ10000000001916166And: http://www.slashgear.com/uk-could-become-key-counterfeit-route-after-trademark-ruling-1452340/

Counterfeits (2)

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

From: http://www.littleredbook.cn/2009/07/06/obamas-sponsorship-of-shanzhai-blockberry-chinese-netizens-reactions/

Global Blacklisting Problems

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Jurisdictional Differences

Is the IMEI “personal data”?

What about other features of the phone that are not disabled?

Counterfeit devices deliberately copying

legitimate IMEIs

User error – wrong IMEI

Human error in call centres

Lost then found

Blacklisting for other reasons such as fraud

Network Operator A cannot trust data

from Network Operator B

Mass duplicates of IMEIs from

counterfeit devicesNot blacklisting quickly enough

Social engineering of call centre staff

Near Field Communications

Samsung, RIM, Google Wallet and others…

Another reason to steal a phone

Demo application developed for capturing credit card numbers Numerous attack scenarios outlined already Peer-to-peer payments

From: http://www.retroworks.co/scytale.htm

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Access control is becoming much more important

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4396831.stm

Biometrics

Still immature on mobile devices– Early solutions easy to defeat (e.g. gummy finger etc.)– Requires significant processing power– May see some kind of cloud-based solution emerge (e.g. voice biometrics)– Android 4.0 started facial recognition based on acquisition of Pittsburgh

Pattern Recognition – not widely used by users– iPhone 5S introduced TouchID– 990 million devices with fingerprint sensors predicted by 2017

Increased risk for the user– User as unlock key means user becomes the target of attack– Same issue as car crime

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Also see: http://blog.mobilephonesecurity.org/2013/09/you-are-key-fingerprint-access-on.html

Apple TouchID Hack / Reported Issues

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

26

Repeating the ‘gummy finger’ - tools needed

One trip to HobbyCraft….

100g Gedeo Siligum (Silicone Moulding Paste) £9.99

250ml Gedeo Latex£3.99

Total Cost: £13.98

Note: Experiment conducted in 2005 by the author on an optical scanner. Originally described by Ton van der Putte in 2000 and by Tsutomu Matsumoto in 2002

Challenges for Biometrics

False negatives:

– Eyelashes too long– Long fingernails– Arthritis– Circulation problems– People wearing hand cream– People who’ve just eaten greasy foods– People with brown eyes– Fingerprint abrasion, includes: Manual labourers, typists, musicians– People with cuts– Disabled people

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Biometrics (2)

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4396831.stm

Result of: “User Is The Key”

Sources: ITV, Evening Standard, BBC

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Helpful Technology

“Cloud” and 3rd party client applications:– Offline backup– Lock and wipe functionality– Locate my phone– Traditional anti-virus vendors are providing packaged functionality– Parental controls

Not just technology – also consumer awareness and education Mobile industry is still well aware of the problem and willing to

help

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Tracking Stolen Phones

Being introduced as standard on many handsets Privacy concerns if misused

What good is it if your phone appears abroad?

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

From: http://www.apple.com/iphone/built-in-apps/find-my-iphone.htmlAnd: http://www.samsungdive.com/DiveMain.do

3rd Party Solutions

Traditional AV vendors can finally add real value Packaged, holistic apps:

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

From: https://www.mylookout.com/features/missing-device/

Point of Sale Registration?

http://www.immobilise.com

http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

Political Initiatives

• Not just US and UK, South American countries (through CITEL) taking a strong lead and others are gradually following

Political Bandwagon?

“Each of your companies promote the security of your devices, their software and information they hold, but we expect the same effort to go into hardware security so that we can make a stolen handset inoperable and so eliminate the illicit second-hand market in these products”

Boris Johnson, Mayor of London, July 2013

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/10192726/Smartphone-manufacturers-told-to-introduce-kill-switch.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/borisjohnson/10487320/Is-it-beyond-the-wit-of-tech-wizards-to-stop-phone-theft.html

1st December 2013

• But: cutting the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit’s budget at the same time!

New solutions example: Activation Lock

Apple introduced in iOS7 (but under some political pressure) This is the right thing to do Politicians are right that this type of thing is CSR* Functionality becomes the target of hacks though

* Corporate Social Responsibility

http://cir.ca/news/prosecutors-rally-against-phone-theft

“Kill Switch”

Doesn’t accurately describe solutions being deployed by Apple, Samsung– Not all the same! Some apparently subscription based

Politicians and media love the term If we really had a true ‘kill switch’ it would be a massive target for

cyber attacks– Imagine killing every phone in the world?

Some technological solutions are becoming viable– Not all about operators blacklisting IMEIs anymore– Devices phone home to OS vendors

• Value is in the things they access – e.g. software updates, app stores• OS vendors could take whitelists from GSMA• Verify location if stolen – give legitimate owner the option about what to do• Work with law enforcement to understand theft fencing / trade routes

Divide and Conquer?

Politicians are looking at the problem too simplistically Separate operator and vendor meetings don’t help

– Just creates a blame game– It didn’t work in 2001 and it doesn’t work in 2013

Some politicians stating that industry is deliberately profiting from theft so is therefore not taking action– This is crazy and false– Have to remember it is the criminal who steals the phone– More action is needed on all sides and some could do much better

All parties need to work together– Government, Police, users and industry are all part of the solution– Need to keep looking at things such as insurance fraud– GSMA Device Security Steering Group is doing a lot of work on the technical

side

Statistics – people will always steal things?

2001

-02

2002

-03

2003

-04

2004

-05

2005

-06

2006

-07

2007

-08

2008

-09

2009

-10

2010

-11

2011

-12

- 1,000,000 2,000,000 3,000,000 4,000,000 5,000,000 6,000,000 7,000,000 8,000,000 9,000,000

Acquisitive crimes

Involving mobile phones

Source: Crime Survey for England & Wales

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/bcs25.pdf

• How much has mobile phone ownership gone up in the last 10 years?• We need to compare theft stats against ownership figures to give a true picture

Digging into the UK ONS mobile theft stats

Phone theft fell between 2008 and 2010 – the authors attribute it to the MICAF charter.

There was a decrease in theft rates among children aged 10-17 The figures are only estimates and are extrapolated from the survey of a small

number of people The estimated increase last year has not risen above the 2008/09 figures. The survey asks people if they had a phone stolen – but that could be that

person’s perception still, it could easily have been lost. The report acknowledges that phone theft peaked in 2003/04 and states that “it

is clear that mobile phone theft incidents remain a small fraction of overall acquisitive crime”.

Incidents of mobile phone theft are more likely to be reported to the network provider than the Police.

25% of incidents were not reported to the network provider:– 43% of these “the phone was returned to the owner” – i.e. it probably wasn’t actually

stolen! http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/bcs25.pdf

Copyright © 2013 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved. 41

Questions?

david.rogers {@} copperhorse.co.uk@drogersuk

Mobile Security: A Guide for Users: http://www.lulu.com/gb/en/shop/david-rogers/mobile-security-a-guide-for-users/paperback/product-21197551.html

References

Immobilise: http://www.immobilise.com Mobile Phone (Re-programming) Act 2002:

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/31/contents NMPCU: http://www.met.police.uk/mobilephone/ CCSG / MICAF: http://www.micaf.co.uk/home.asp 9 Principles: http://

www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Security-Principles-Related-to-Handset-Theft-3.0.0.pdf

OMTP TR1: http://www.gsma.com/newsroom/omtp-documents-1-1-omtp-advanced-trusted-environment-omtp-tr1-v1-1