MA Thesis International Relations, University of Amsterdam.

A Nuclear Iran: Whats Next?

An Assessment of Three Alarmist Hypotheses

Supervisors First: Drs. Paul Aarts

Second: Dr. Leonard Suransky

Name: Ghassan Dahhan

Date of Birth: 13/02/1985 Address: 69 Camelot House, Camden Park Road

NW1, 9AS, London, United Kingdom Telephone Number: +44 7 551006013

Email Address: ghassandahhan@gmail.com Date: 10/01/2011

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction 4 Part II: Theoretical Framework 17 2.1. Introduction 18 2.1.1.Realism 19 2.1.2. Liberalism 22 2.1.3. Constructivism 25 2.2. Alliance Formation 28 2.3. Conventional Deterrence and Armed Conflict 32 2.4. Nuclear Deterrence 36 2.5. Crawfords Pivotal Deterrence 39 2.6. Nuclear Weapons Do Not Guarantee Success 42 Part III: Assessing the Hypotheses 44 3.1. Hypothesis One: Nuclear War Between Iran and Israel 45 3.2. Irans Foreign Policy: Rhetoric vs. Practice 46 3.3. Irans Perception of Threat 48 3.3.1. United States 48 3.3.2. Israel 49 3.4. Explaining Irans Alliance 51 3.5. The Iranian Bomb and the Prospect of War 54 3.5.1. Conventional War 54 3.5.2. Nuclear War 56 3.6. Conclusion 59 4.1. Hypothesis Two: Regional Arms Race 60 4.2. The Moderate Arab States: The Bandwagoning Coalition 61 4.2.1. Alignment with Israel and/or the United States 62 4.2.2. Inflating the Iranian Threat 66 4.3. The Technological and Financial Barriers of Going Nuclear 68 4.4. Israeli-American Concerns and Strategies: The Osirak Scenario 70 4.5. Conclusion 75 5.1. Hypothesis Three: Nuclear Terrorists 77 5.2. The Strategic Logic of Proliferating Nukes to Non-State Actors 79 5.2.1. Iranian Proliferation Incentives 79 5.2.2. Transfer of Nuclear Technology 81 5.3. The Dirty Bomb Scenario 82 5.4. Conclusion 85

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6. Conclusion 88 Bibliography 92

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1. Introduction

Ever since the Iranian dissident, Alireza Jafarzadeh, publicly announced in 2002 that he

had reliable information about two secret Iranian nuclear facilities in the cities of Natanz

and Arak, the Iranian nuclear ambitions have become one of the most important security

concerns for the West.1 The allegations by the member of the dissident group were

supported by the International Atomic Energy Agencys (IAEA) discovery of traces of

enriched uranium at the nuclear site in Natanz.2 Subsequently, the Iranian nuclear

program has been subjected to heavy criticism from the West for disclosing insufficient

information about its nuclear activity. The United States and its European allies (i.e.

France, Great Britain, and Germany) have been pressuring Iran who has been a

signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1968 to sign and implement the

additional protocol that grants inspectors of the IAEA more rights to monitor its nuclear

activity.3

In accordance, the United States and its allies have been actively pushing for

international sanctions against Iran yet these attempts have hitherto been to little avail.4

Iran has effectively capitalized upon the political division among global major powers in

its attempt to continue with its nuclear project. By increasing economic cooperation

with two out of five permanent members of the Security Council Russia and China

Iran managed to prevent considerable international isolation from taking place.

Furthermore, Russia perceives Iran as a counterbalance to the expansion of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and hence as an important strategic partner.5

China, which is heavily dependent on oil imports as a result of its growing economy, has

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1 Kessler G., Group Alleges New Nuclear Site in Iran, The Washington Post, February 20, 2003. 2 GOV/2003/63, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. August 26, 2003. 3 GOV/2006/15, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 27, 2007. 4 Despite numerous calls upon the United Nations Security Council by the United States, Great Britain and France to implement effective sanctions against Iran, Russia and China have been reluctant to agree on the content of a majority of proposals. For instance, Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, outlining Russias policy with regard to Iran, has repeatedly stated that, treaths, sanctions and threats of sanctions [] would be counterproductive. See also, Mathew Lee, Russia Resisting Sanctions Against Iran, The Washington Post, October 13, 2009. 5 Rakel 2009, p. 178.

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tripled its oil imports from Iran between 1994 and 2000.6 More recently, both countries

signed a trade agreement concerning oil and natural gas exploration worth approximately

around $70 billion.7

From a geopolitical point of view, China considers Iran as a counterbalance to

American attempts to expand its influence in its backyard, especially with respect to

Taiwan. For instance, the report of an arms deal between the United States and Taiwan

worth $6.4 billion was met with heavy resistance from the Chinese government after

which Beijing vowed to take retaliatory action against the US concerning "key

international and regional issues", including the withdrawal of Chinese support within

the UN framework for sanctions against Iran.8

Nevertheless, both China and Russia are concerned about the prospect of Iran

becoming a country with nuclear military capabilities. On the long term, Irans relative

geographical proximity to Russia and China while having a nuclear deterrent can pose a

strategic threat to both countries. China has repeatedly reiterated that it has become

more concerned about the current situation but has also been reluctant to endorse

sanctions against Iran because, according to the Chinese government spokesman,

sanctions do not provide a fundamental solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.9

Russia and China take fully advantage of Irans diplomatic dependence on their

support within the UN Security Council, and as such, they currently hold a pivotal

position between the opposing factions i.e. the West and Iran. Therefore, Russia and

China would most likely not welcome any change in the status quo as they have much to

gain from a continuation of the current standoff.

However, it is unlikely that the status quo can be sustained for much longer. There is

enough reason to believe that, assuming that Iran is a rational actor, it will most

probably seek the acquisition of the bomb. As the renowned Israeli military strategist,

Martin van Creveld, stated: Had the Iranians not tried to build nuclear weapons, they

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6 Jaffe and Lewis 2002, p. 124. 7 Zweig and Jianhai 2005, p. 28. 8 BBC World Report, China Accuses US of Arrogance over Taiwan Deal, February 1, 2010. More information available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8490537.stm, retrieved on May 11, 2010. 9 Reuters, China more concerned about Iran, wary on sanctions, March 16, 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62F2WK20100316, retrieved on May 20, 2010.

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would be crazy.10 Until recently Iran was to a large degree concerned about the

stationing of over more than 230 thousand American troops along its western and

eastern border especially against the backdrop of American allegations that Iran was one

of the principle state sponsors of terrorism and Geaorge W. Bushs repeated stance of

not ruling out military options against the Iranian regime. 11

One could question whether the Iranian nuclear program is the source of the threat

it currently faces or vice versa. According to Van Creveld, the mechanisms that spurred

Iran to restart its program were externally driven:

If you sit in Tehran right now, and you make a tour, in all directions wherever you look, you see

American forces. And you know very well that wherever American troops make their appearance,

nuclear weapons are not far behind. And there is only one-way to make sure [an American

invasion] does not happen to you; and that is [by] building nuclear weapons.12

The West, led by the United States, has repeatedly attempted to destabilize Iran by

supporting the latters adversaries, most notably by providing Saddams Iraq with

intelligence on Iranian military movements and offensive weapons during the Iran-Iraq

War.13 Yet it was mainly after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq that the

clerical regime decided to step-up its efforts in developing nuclear energy.14

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10 Martin van Creveld, Sharon on the warpath: Is Israel planning to attack Iran? The New York Times, August 21, 2004. 11 US Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country, June 30, 2009. Important to note, however, is that these figures do not include the presence of NATO forces in the two countries or the US presence in the Gulf. 12 Interview with Martin van Creveld on Iran's nuclear activities and the future of the Middle-East. VPRO-Tegenlicht. May 7, 2007. 13 For a detailed account on the American support for Saddam against Iran see Alan Friedman, The Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq. (New York: Bantam Books, 1993). 14 Irans nuclear program has a complex history. Under the Shah, Iran was heading towards becoming a nuclear power; it had bought yellowcake from South Africa and despite the concerns, Western companies were eager to invest in Irans nuclear sector. However, shortly after the Shah was toppled and the Islamist regime came into power the program experienced heavy setbacks: Western benefactors withdrew their support, along with dozens of experienced nuclear scientists that were forced into exile. More importantly, during the Iraq-Iran War, many nuclear facilities came under attack by Iraqi fighter planes, turning the program into a liability in case nuclear materials might spill. Then, in the 1990s Iran developed better relations with the Russians and the Chinese, in which the former helped Iran develop a nuclear program in Bushehr. Shortly after the invasion in Afghanistan, Iran accelerated its nuclear process. See G. Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007).

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Another source of concern for the Iranians is the vicinity of Israel; a country that is

broadly believed to possess a considerable nuclear stockpile of its own.15 Israel has always

maintained a policy of nuclear ambiguity (i.e. neither confirming nor denying the

existence of its nuclear arsenal) and has never been a signatory to the NPT. This enabled

the Jewish state to deter its rivals while avoiding sanctions by the international

community. The established intelligence expert on Israel, Yossi Melman, explained the

benefits of this approach as follows: The Arabs [and the Iranians], knowing that Israel is

a nuclear superpower and a conventional weapons superpower, probably reduced their

aspirations or limited their plans to attack Israel, while successfully maintaining secrecy

prevented pressure on Israel from the international community.16

In addition, the recent arms-buildup in the region by Arab countries worries Iran.

Arms expenditures by the Arab Gulf states have dramatically increased over the last

couple of decades. For instance, Saudi Arabia currently accounts for about sixty percent

of the total military expenditures in the region while the expenditures of smaller Gulf

countries such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates almost top that of Iran; despite

the fact Irans population is approximately twice the size of the three countries

combined.17 Furthermore, the weapons purchased by the Gulf States are far more

advanced than those acquired and developed by the Iranian regime, although its army is

perfectly capable of waging defensive and asymmetric wars.18

In sum, Iran has found itself being situated in a hostile environment, in which any

attempt to fend itself by conventional means is very much difficult. However, Iran has

several means to counter threats. It has established excellent ties with several non-state

actors in countries like Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, that can cause

grave damage to the security interests of Irans adversaries. To be sure, the Iranian

material support for the Shiite Lebanese armed movement Hezbollah has proved its

strategic value on numerous occasions. A striking example was the 2006 war between

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15 Estimates of Israels nuclear arsenal ranges between 100 and 200 nuclear warheads. See Nuclear Security Projects country report on Israel: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/index.html, retrieved on May 26, 2010. 16 Joshua Mitnick, Why Israel maintains nuclear ambiguity, The Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 2006. 17 Hossein Askari et al. 2007, p. 36. 18 Cordesman 2007, p.2.

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Hezbollah and Israel, in which Hezbollah dealt a serious blow to Israels deterrent

whereby over more than a hundred fifty Israelis (mostly soldiers) were killed.19

Furthermore, Iran maintains extensive ties with several Iraqi Shiite organizations

whose activities of course are closely monitored by the Americans in particular. Iran

perceives its Shiite allies within Iraq as a strategic asset to counterbalance American

dominance in the region.20 According to the Brookings Institutes foreign affairs expert,

Kenneth Pollack, Iran could make Iraq hell for the Americans, thereby referring to

Irans support for extremist factions like the Mahdi Army that is led by the Shiite cleric

Moqtada al-Sadr, in addition to its support for the Badr Brigades a loyal ally to Irans

clerical establishment.21 Thus, Iran has a plenty of options in confronting regional

threats.

Nonetheless, the current strategy of Iran contains several hazards, most importantly

because its success depends on too many factors. In order to guarantee Irans security, its

allies should be permanently strong enough and constantly willing to counterbalance

common threats. This seems to be practically impossible as the reports of past Syrian-

Israeli talks indicate. These talks have troubled Iran because it undermines the

consistency of the anti-Western coalition.22 Also, contrary to what their rhetoric seems

to suggest, most of Irans allies are highly opportunistic in their dealings with Iran, and

perceive the latter as a strategic rather than as an ideological ally. For example,

supposedly loyal factions to Iran, like the Shiite Dawa Party in Iraq which is headed by

the current Iraqi president, Nuri al-Maliki, has shown that loyalty to Iran is not as deep-

rooted as the Iranian clerical establishment hoped for.23 Most of the so-called factions

loyal to Iran, would switch sides to the West if their interest prescribes them to.

Moreover, for Iran to place its future security in the hands of powers like Russia and

China is not a preferred alternative for its nuclear program. The military ties between the

two major powers and Iran are indeed favorable, but far from sufficient when it comes to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

19 See Efraim Inbar, How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 57-65. 20 See Steven, J. Costels (2008), Surging out of Iraq, New York: Nova Science Publishers, chapter Irans Influence in Iraq. 21 James Fallows, The Nuclear Power Beside Iraq, The Atlantic, May 2006. 22 See for example, Yaakov Amidror, The-Hizballah-Syria-Iran Triangle, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 1-5. 23 Iraqs majority Shiite population voted for anti-Iranian Shiite politicians during the latest elections in 2010. See Michael Theodoulous, Iran in silent fury over Iraq election result, The National, April 1, 2010.

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Irans long-term security, because no one knows what the future might bring. Therefore,

acquiring nuclear independence would be the most logical recourse.

However, pursuing that goal is easier said than done. As mentioned by Ted

Carpenter of the CATO institute, the West will try to thwart Iranian attempts at getting

its hands on nuclear arms.24 Carpenter states that the West has four options regarding

Irans nuclear ambitions. The first option is to impose economic sanctions on the regime.

But as Carpenter himself acknowledges, this strategy would most likely fail to curb Irans

ambitions because similar sanctions normally do not persuade regimes to give up such

high priority policies.25 Furthermore, the endorsement of economic sanctions, let alone

the crippling sanctions particularly in the framework of the United Nations as some

US policymakers are proposing that would require a tremendous amount of time and

effort to win over hardheaded countries like Russia and China.

The second option is to intensify efforts to subvert Irans clerical regime. This

option, however, would probably enable the Iranian regime to ascribe the governments

failures to foreign elements and would only lend political support to the regime.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Iranian opposition will deviate from the

current regimes path with regard to its nuclear program. Worse still, several high-

ranking individuals within the opposition have expressed their support for the countrys

nuclear program; some of them have even been personally involved with the program

itself.26 Thus, evidence shows that the ongoing nuclear program is probably the only

point of consensus among the various Iranian parties and that therefore any attempt to

subvert the current regime on the basis of its nuclear program will not suffice.

The third option includes the use of military force against Irans nuclear facilities.

Among all options this is by far the most perilous and therefore the least expected choice.

First, the Americans are currently bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq. The process of

maintaining relative stability in these countries has been a tremendous financial burden

on the already strained US economy.27 An attack on Iran would undoubtedly have

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24 Carpenter 2006, p. 1. 25 Ibid., p. 1. 26 The IAEA reported in 2009 that during the tenure of the main Iranian opposition figure, Mir Hossein Moussavi, Iran started a secret nuclear facility. Moreover, the Iranian nuclear approach under the reformist government of Khatami was not substantially different from the conservatives. 27 According to a US Congress report on the American expenditures in the war on terror, both wars have cost the US taxpayer roughly about $864 billion between 2001 and 2009. For a

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disastrous effects on the situation of both countries, in which the clerical regime would

actively support attacks against American troops.

Second, the high number of American military casualties has generated negative views

among the American public leading and a reduced willingness to send out American

servicemen to remote places for purposes that do not immediately seem to serve

American interests or security needs.28 Third, it will cost more effort to persuade both

the domestic public and the international community to support a fresh war following

the 2003 Iraq War.

But most important, many analysts question the possibility that an American strike

could destroy Irans nuclear capabilities.29 Also, Iran could use an asymmetrical

response in which it would facilitate attacks on American interests in the region by one

of its allied non-state actors.30 Iran could as well respond by threatening all naval activity

in the Gulf Region along its coast near the Strait of Hormutz, thereby sparking a global

energy crisis.31 Simply put, the United States is not in the position to take the military

option seriously into consideration because a thorough risk assessment of this option

shows that the potential benefits are outweighed by the costs; at least in the foreseeable

future.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that the risk of a military confrontation with any

pro-Western country is completely ruled out. Israel has its own military means and

policies and is capable to disrupt Irans nuclear program. Israeli F-15s and F-16s are able

to successfully deliver their payloads on the intended targets.32 Yet, there are reasons why

Israel will probably not take such actions against Iran. Serious restraints involve the fact

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full account of the costs, see the CRS Report for Congress, The Costs of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, September 28, 2009. 28 A poll conducted by CNN in 2009 shows that the American domestic support for its operations in Afghanistan has dwindled to a record low of 39 percent, opposed to 53 percent five months earlier. This decline of support is not surprising because the Americans experienced their most deadly episode in Afghanistan in the period between both surveys were taken. 29 See David Albright and Jacqueline Shires, Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable, Institute for Science and International Security, January 21, 2009. 30 Frost 2009, p. 32. 31 Even some neoconservative pundits, like Charles Krauthammer, who favored the war against Iraq and supported Americas hawkish policies in the past, expressed his concerns of the possibility of a military strike against Iran. He predicted that the costs of such an act will be terrible and that the oil prices might steer to $150 a barrel if Iran decides to close the Strait of Hormutz. See Charles Krauthammer, The Tehran Calculus, TheWashington Post, September 15, 2006. 32 Simon 2009, p. 1.

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that Israeli intelligence on Iran is generally poor.33 This data, juxtaposed to the

estimation that a third of the bombers that is needed to carry out such an operation will

be taken down by the Iranian military; a feat that would far exceed historical ratios of

bomber losses by any country in any previous war, makes such an operation extremely

hazardous and thus less likely.34

Moreover, Israel is less inclined to take military action against Iran because of the

political consequences. Currently, Israel is experiencing an unprecedented amount of

international pressure as a result of its policies in the region. The wars against Lebanon

and Gaza in respectively 2006 and 2008, the continuation of its settlement policy in the

occupied Palestinian territories, and the assault on the Turkish flotilla in May 2010, are

only few examples of the many strategic mistakes that have contributed to its isolation. If

Israel would decide to launch a military assault on Iran, its relations with the US could

come under severe pressure. Some US senior policy advisers even went so far as to say

that if they [Israel] fly over [US controlled territory in Iraq], you go up and confront

them".35 Based on the present circumstances it seems highly unlikely that Israel would

actually precipitate an attack against Iran. In sum, neither an American nor an Israeli

military option is likely to produce sufficient gains to be worth the potential costs.36

Nonetheless, one could not rule it out completely either.37

The fourth option that has often been mentioned is that of a grand bargain

between the West and Iran.38 This would basically mean, according to Carpenter, that

the US would assure that it would not use force against Iran the way we [the United

States] did against such nonnuclear adversaries as Serbia and Iraq.39 Furthermore, Iran

would be offered normal diplomatic relations with the West. In return, Iran would have

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33 Amos Harel, Speak Persian? Israels secret service wants you. Haaretz, December 11, 2009. 34 Simon 2009, p. 1. 35 Interview with former US National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinsky, by The Daily Beast. For reference see www.dailybeast.com, retrieved on June 1, 2010. 36 Riedel & Samore 2008, p. 94. 37 On several occasions Israel surprised the world by taking risks, which no one deemed Israel to be willing of taking. Case in point is the decision to launch an air strike on the Iraqi nuclear structure Osirak in 1981. 38 For a detailed overview see Karim Sadjadpours, Guidelines for Approaching Iran, Carnegie Policy Outlook, June 2007. 39 Carpenter 2007, p. 23.

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to open up its nuclear facilities for inspections and prove that its program is for civilian

purposes only.40

However, the logic underlying this scenario is not particularly sound. Instantly

questions arise, among others: despite the regional security concerns of the Iranians

regarding the American military presence near its borders with Iraq and Afghanistan, why

would Iran be interested in safety assurances by the United States if the possibility of a

military strike is already considerably slim? Furthermore, Iran is, as Shahram Chubin

correctly notes, not a pariah state under UN sanction like Saddam Husseins Iraq, nor

is Iran a hermit-like failed state like North Korea.41 The West lacks the diplomatic

leverage vis--vis Iran that the supporters of this idea seem to suggest. Contemplating a

grand bargain with Iran while not addressing Irans security concerns is therefore not

realistic.

External dynamics are not the only factor that shape Irans foreign policy; domestic

developments have a profound effect on the decision-making as well. The Iranian

presidential elections of 2009 in which the incumbent conservative leader, Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad, ran against the prominent pro-reform opposition leader, Mir Hussein

Moussavi, was widely believed to have been manipulated to the advantage of the former.

Over the course of the year, the supposedly rigged elections sparked various public

upheavals directed against the conservative regime. The high turnout during the

demonstrations showed that the regime was lacking the broad political support it

claimed to enjoy. The legitimacy of the regime was further undermined after some

protests resulted in violent confrontation, followed by massive government retaliation.

Not surprisingly, domestic stability has become, more than ever, besides its nuclear

program, one of the key priority concerns for the current regime.

Still, there are currently no indications that the Iranian government is likely to give

up its nuclear program and that the West will suddenly have its way. It is clear that Iran

has more to gain by continuing the current situation than the West; heading towards the

control over the full nuclear cycle while having the Americans and/or the Israelis sit idly

by as it unfolds.

There are many contradictory reports floating around the globe about Irans nuclear

program and its intentions. To be sure, I do not claim that Iran is actually trying to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

40 Ibid. p. 23. 41 Chubin & Litwak 2003, p. 101.

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develop nuclear weapons, since no one except for the Iranian government itself can

actually be sure this is the case. Therefore, whether Iran is actually trying to develop a

nuclear deterrent or not will not be discussed in this thesis also because this topic has

been thoroughly discussed by others.42 First, because I do not expect a smoking gun to

be found any time soon, any discussion about evidence is so speculative that it will not

contribute to our understanding of the situation. Moreover, any conclusive evidence

regarding Irans nuclear program is not likely to be found by me while writing this thesis,

nor by any other political scientist; this debate should therefore be left to nuclear

experts. Finally, most policymakers and academics have dwelled on the issue of evidence,

but nevertheless they seem to overlook a much more important question: what would

actually happen if Iran would lay its hands on nuclear weapons? Accordingly, this thesis

focuses on the question what possible future socio-political consequences a nuclear-

armed Iran would have on the Middle East.

Several political analysts have predicted that a nuclear-armed Iran might trigger a

series of events of ominous magnitude.43 The three most often mentioned scenarios are:

1. A (nuclear) war between Iran and Israel;

2. A regional nuclear arms race;

3. Nuclear terrorists.

The first scenario implies that a war between Iran and Israel is inevitable once the former

acquires a nuclear weapon since its clerical regime is pursuing a messianic policy. The

prominent American orientalist, Bernard Lewis, explains this policy outlook as follows:

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42 For more information on this debate see Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwaks, Debating Irans Nuclear Aspirations, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 99-114; Greg J. Gerardi and Maryam Aharinejads, An Assessment of Irans Nuclear Facilities, The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1995), pp. 207-213. 43 Foreign policy expert, Richard Haass, for example, stresses that a nuclear-armed Iran will become a classical imperial power, with ambitions to remake the region in its image and the potential to translate its objectives into reality. See Richard S. Haass, The New Middle East, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Issue 6 (December 2006), p. 3.

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There is a radical difference between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other governments with

nuclear weapons. This difference is expressed in what can only be described as the apocalyptic

worldview of Irans present rulers. This worldview and expectations, vividly expressed in

speeches, articles and even schoolbooks, clearly shape the perception and therefore the policies of

Ahmadinejad and his disciples.44

According to this view, Israel, where the experience of World War II is still fresh in

mind, is not likely to sit idle by while its existence is being threatened. As the Israeli

Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated: If we learned something from the

Holocaust, it is that we cannot remain quiet or flinch in the face of evil."45 The never

again principle would get a new meaning as a result of an emboldened, nuclear-armed

Iran. The clerical regime would become a destabilizing factor in the region whose

expansionist policy is aimed to wipe Israel off the map.46 Therefore, a war between

Israel and Iran is inevitable once the latter acquires a nuclear weapon.

The second scenario constitutes the prospect that a nuclear-armed Iran will unleash

a regional, nuclear arms race. Some analysts foresee that an Iranian bomb will disrupt the

fragile balance of power in the Middle East, sparking other regimes like those of Saudi

Arabia, Egypt and Jordan to develop nuclear arms as well.47 Likewise, this would mean

the end of the viability of the NPT.48 As Henry Kissinger concludes: The strongest

shock wave, the greatest danger, is that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will

open the floodgates to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. It will

cause a chain reaction.49

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44 Bernard Lewis, 22 August: Does Iran have something in store? Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2006. 45 Haaretz Service, Netanyahu: World is gradually accepting Irans extermination calls, April 11, 2010. 46 Although it is presumably widely known that Ahmadinejad has actually made this statement during a conference on A World Without Zionism, in fact he has not. The actual statement made by Ahmadinejad was as follows: the occupation regime over Jerusalem should vanish from the page of time. This statement is fundamentally different than the message picked up by Western media. See Shiraz Dossa, A Muslim Scholar Speaks His Mind: The Explanation We Never Heard, Literary Review of Canada, Vol. 15, No. 5 (June 2007). 47 Pedatzur 2007, pp. 519-522. 48 Ibid, p. 521. 49 Yossi Melman, Kissinger is Very Worried, Haaretz, June 28, 2005.

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The third scenario conveys a picture in which Iran, or some other nation, might slip

a nuke or two to terrorists.50 Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and

Hamas, but also rogue states like Syria could deploy nuclear weapons against common

enemies of Iran. This indirect mode of operation, according to Efraim Inbar, enables

Iran to threaten practically every world capital with destruction, yet at the same time

making Iran a somewhat less likely subject to retaliation.51 According to this line of

argument, through means of transferring nuclear weapons (or knowledge) to terrorist

organizations, states will be able to avoid accountability in the case they are being used,

which in itself will increase the likelihood of nuclear usage.

In this thesis I will assess the likelihood of each individual scenario abovementioned,

by means of examining these on their validity i.e. line of argument, theoretical

consistency, and historical evidence. In order to substantiate my claims I will also

thoroughly examine the behavioral record of the actors involved.

In the second chapter I focus on the theoretical framework in which the following

issues will be discussed: the structure of the international system, the causes of war, the

role of the domestic environment on foreign policy, the aspect of rationality, the logic of

deterrence, and the effect of material and ideological forces on foreign policy-making.

Concurrently, the most suitable theory will be judged on its explanatory power with

regard to present-day Middle East. In other words, which theory provides most answers

in explaining the current state of Middle Eastern politics?

In order to determine which theory is suitable and which is not, I will examine the

theories assumptions and to which extent they are consistent with established

contemporary and historical patterns of Middle Eastern socio-political developments. By

means of providing the thesis with a theoretically solid basis enables others to judge the

validity of my claims. Also, I believe that past behavior can provide an indication of how

actors might act in the future.

Chapters three, four, and five, include an assessment of the scenarios. By doing so,

each of these chapters starts with a comprehensive account of the hypotheses, and then

moves to an assessment of the historical evidence and theoretical consistency bearing on

the scenarios.

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50 Etzioni, p. 123. 51 Inbar, p. 92.

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It is important to note that by no means I hold the conviction that my conclusions,

while assessing the different scenarios, are in fact certain. As King, Keohane and Verba

correctly remark, Reaching perfectly certain conclusions from uncertain data is

obviously impossible. [] A researcher who fails to face the issue of uncertainty directly

is either asserting that he or she knows everything perfectly or that he or she has no idea

how certain or uncertain the results are.52

To assert that my final findings are conclusive would be highly inappropriate, if not

foolish. I am fully aware that this thesis will in any case involve some fallacies. One

reason for that is because, inevitably, there are simply more variables that have an effect

on the outcome than I can account for. Another reason is that any research, including

mine is prone to error.53 In my case, the error-margin is more likely to play an important

role because, rather than offering a description of past events, the thesis is of an

explanatory and future-orientated nature. The calculations of the chain of events are

based upon the expectation that all circumstances are equal (i.e. ceteris paribus). For

instance, I do not take into account the possibility that a war between Israel and

Hezbollah might break out soon and/or how that might affect the regional balance of

power in regard to Iran.

Nevertheless, testing your hypothesis by assessing different scenarios is a good way, if

not the best possible guarantee to avoid accusations of adjusting your claims to fit the

evidence.54 Still, in some parts of the thesis it appears that my conclusions are indeed

presented as if they were factual. To that I want to add it has only been for the sake of

argument.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

52 King et al. 1994, p. 9. 53 Ibid, p. 31. 54 Mearsheimer 2001, p. 8.

! "(!

Part Two: Theoretical Framework

! ")!

2.1. Introduction

Within the realm of International Relations there are in fact three theoretical

perspectives that dominate literature, notably realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

However, the distinction between the theories might not always be as clear-cut as it

seems. Even within certain schools of thought there exists widespread disagreement over

a wide range of issues. For instance, defensive realists and offensive realists are at variance

with one another about the limitations of the pursuit of power by states and in what way

this is conducted.55 Also between classical liberalism and neo-liberalism there are many

disparities; ranging from their assumptions of the international system to the role of ideas

on foreign policy.

Conversely, there exists agreement between different schools of thought on other

issues as well. Neo-realism and neo-liberalism share several (ontological) assumptions

with regard to the structure of the international system. Also, both traditions are

attached to rational choice theory and share the same epistemological outlook, namely

positivism. Constructivists, on the other hand, believe that both material and ideational

forces define the world.56 Constructivists hold the belief that the world is a social

construction, and that social facts depend on human agreement. Not surprisingly,

constructivists find themselves at the interpretive side of the epistemological spectrum, as

opposed to neo-realists and neo-liberals.

As in practically any discipline of social science, there is mention of a stiff debate

between materialists on the one hand and idealists on the other. When applied to

International Relations, the former believes that material capabilities and interests

constitute the driving forces behind the international system, whereas the latter sees it

quite differently: normative structures or so-called belief systems comprising shared

knowledge, material resources, and practices are supposedly at the heart of the

international system as we know it.57

This thesis is clearly written from a realist point of view. However it would not be

fair to do so without mentioning rival theories, most notably constructivism and

liberalism. I will therefore first start to outline the main assumptions of the respective !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

55 Snyder 2002, p. 151. 56 Baylis et al. 2008, p. 9. 57 Wendt 1995, p. 73.

! "*!

theories. Henceforth I argue on which criteria the realist theory provides more answers

to the issues being discussed in the thesis than the others.

Because the theoretical discussion includes an infinite array of topics, it would be

futile to point out each individual aspect of this debate this on itself would at least

require an entire library rather than a single volume. Instead, I focus on the issues that

deal directly with the subject of the thesis. Subsequently and in order of sequence I will

discuss the following topics: (1) the role of alliances; (2) conventional deterrence and

armed conflict; (3) nuclear logic; and (4) the notion of pivotal deterrence. But first I will

start to outline the basic assumptions of the most important theories in the field of

International Relations.

2.1.1. Realism

Realism is primarily associated with pessimism and perceived as a status-quo enforcing

theory. Although realism, as a political theory, is indeed intrinsically pessimistic it

generally does not imply that change within the international system is unattainable. On

the contrary, changes within the international system occur on a daily basis given that

these changes transpire along the lines of the realist dictate.

Neorealists hold the belief that international politics is largely shaped by states

pursuit of power and by the distribution [] of power among states.58 They claim that

the international system and the behavior of states is not primarily determined by human

nature also termed as the animus dominandi as the classical realists assert, but

through the balance of power and the international anarchy that exist respectively

between and among states. Neo-Realism considers states as the most important actors

within the international system.59 It should be noted that no Neorealist claims that

states compose the only actors on the international stage; non-state actors, such as

pressure groups and social movements are considered to be important as well.

Nonetheless, their impact on the international system is rather trivial compared to states.

But what sets Neorealists apart is their special emphasis on material interests when it

comes to our understanding of foreign policy. The balance of power is determined by

material factors comprising factors such as military capabilities, population, wealth, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

58 Van Evera 1999, p. 7. 59 Morgenthau 1948, p. 10.

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territory, and industrial resources.60 These and other factors, which I will discuss more

extensively later on, determine the position a state holds within the system. Not

surprisingly, the relative position of states vary profoundly; with some constantly

operating under constraints regarding their relatively small populations and an equally

limited territory, in which they will try to bridge the gap with their (potential) rival by

spending more on their defense budget and/or by seeking alignment with other powerful

nations, while other countries might enjoy material advantages such as a large territory

and vast industrial resources so that they can afford to play a more active role in

international politics. Thus, the material position in large part determines the behavior

of states within the international system.

Neorealists assume that the external environment primarily determines the behavior

of states, rather than their internal composition; states, therefore, are often associated

with black-boxes or billiard balls that vary only in size.61 Additionally, states are

rational actors who constantly compete for power as a result of the uncertainty and fear

imposed by the system of anarchy. Therefore, in order to survive the jungle of the

international system, states seek power in terms of material capabilities.62

However, not all Neorealists do agree upon the explanation of the methods applied

by states to secure themselves. Defensive-realists assert that states are more concerned

with preserving power rather than about power maximization.63 As defensive-realist

Kenneth Waltz notes, [i]n anarchy, security is the highest end.64 The underlying logic

of this theory, as opposed to Mearsheimers offensive realism who clearly inspired by

Thomas Hobbes believes that the structure of the international system encourages

states to pursue hegemony,65 is that having too much power would inevitably spur ones

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

60 Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 55-82. 61 Mearsheimer 2002, pp. 17-18. 62 Gilpin 1984, p. 290-291. 63 Snyder 2002, p. 152. 64 Waltz 1979, p. 126. 65 Mearsheimer 2002, p. 12. Mearsheimers view of the way states pursue power is reminiscent to what Thomas Hobbes calls the natural condition of mankind. The latter wrote in his masterpiece, Leviathian, about mans pursuit of power the following: man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him after which he adds that their urge for power extends farther than their security requires. See Thomas Hobbes (1962), Leviathan. New York: Macmillan.

! #"!

opponents in joining forces against you; which is why states seldom if ever strive for

hegemony.66

Mearsheimer claims that it is practically impossible to become a global hegemon.

Instead, at best, states aim to become the biggest and baddest [sic] dude on the

block67 , after which he asserts that, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the

only regional hegemon in the world [emphasis added].68 Thus, global hegemony is

practically impossible; the highest achievable goal is regional hegemony because no state

in the world possesses the material capabilities to impose its rule on a global scale.

Regional hegemony prevents other states from being attacked, but in order to prevent all

other states from launching an attack against you, one needs to become the sole regional

hegemon in the world.

Nevertheless, realists are united in their denial of the liberalist notion of a

government over governments that can force states to abide by the rules set forth by

international bodies like the United Nations.69 Instead, they assert that institutions do

not hold the power to alter states behavior, and as such, are epiphenomenal. In fact,

most often institutions are at best a reflection of the balance of power.70 Above anything

else, states cooperate with and through institutions as a means to further their interests.

For example, it is no accident that the five members of the UN-Security Council who

hold veto-power are concurrently among the most powerful nations in the world and

that it is in their interest to maintain membership. In that light, institutions are merely

perceived as instruments of power.

Indeed, states do seek security through institutional cooperation with other states as

a result of the uncertainty produced by anarchy; states simply cannot survive on their

own. Yet, institutional cooperation is not the most common practice in which this

process occurs, and when it transpires, this should be perceived as a temporary

marriage.71 Institutional adherence by states should therefore be viewed as a means to

an end rather than an end in itself whereby states comply with international regulations

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

66 Waltz 1988, p. 616. 67 John J. Mearsheimer, "Through the Realist Lens," interview with Harry Kreisler, part of the "Conversations with History" series, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, April 8, 2002. 68 Mearsheimer 2001, p. 42. 69 Inis 1971, p. 14. 70 Mearsheimer 1994, pp. 13-14. 71 Ibid, p. 11.

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as long as their interests prescribe them to. Thus, states seek security through

cooperation on the basis of common interests and threats, not on common beliefs, as

Lord Palmerston once said: We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual

enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to

follow.72

Realism has, like any other theory, also its limitations and flaws. Most important, it

has the tendency to overstate the importance of the state while understating the

significance of non-state actors, domestic politics and ideational factors. An example is

the attack on September 11; one could hardly deny the effect of this event caused by a

non-state actor on American foreign policy that of other states. Without the attacks on

September 11, the United States would have probably not invaded Afghanistan and Iraq;

the latter would have been more difficult as result of the lack of international support

yet we will never know, as this constitutes a counterfactual claim. Nevertheless, there are

realists who have successfully attempted to account for this problem which will be

discussed later on in this chapter.73

In addition, the notion of black boxes cannot account for many important events

taking place in the world. For instance, the domestic unrest in Iran in the 1960s and

1970s, which eventually led to the establishment of a new regime, also had a profound

effect on the countrys foreign policy outlook. Simply put, what happens domestically

and whos in power in a country does matter. However, most Realists do not dismiss the

importance of domestic factors completely; they simply believe these factors are not the

primary force behind international politics.

2.1.2. Liberalism

Liberalism generally holds an optimistic view of politics and is, moreover, primarily

associated with concepts such as democracy, individual liberty, and cooperation. Though

diverse, most contemporary liberals draw heavily upon the work and ideas outlined by

Immanuel Kant and John Locke. In fact, they share numerous identical assumptions. In

this thesis I will discuss the contemporary version liberalism and its basic assumptions

only. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

72 He made this speech to the House of Commons, Hansard (March 1, 1848). 73 See for example, Robert Papes, Dying To Win (New York: Random House, 2005).

! #$!

Generally speaking, liberals believe that a more democratic world will lead to an

unprecedented period of prosperity and freedom whilst abundant of war and conflict.

Some even went as far by (prematurely) claiming that the fall of the Soviet Union

marked the end of history.74

Liberals believe, in contrast to realists, that values and internal composition of states

are important factors in determining the way states behave. They believe that states, that

pursue their internal aims peacefully in other words, by democratic means will also

try to achieve their foreign goals likewise. Not because democracy prescribes

incumbent leaders to behave peacefully, but because elected leaders can be held

democratically accountable for their actions. This facet forces elites to act cautiously

when it comes to issues like war. This logic is also known as the democratic-peace

theory.75 Accordingly, this line of thinking has influenced many prominent people around

the world, including American presidents like George W. Bush, Bill Clinton and

Woodrow Wilson. Case in point, in a debate with former presidential candidate John

Kerry, then president Bush spoke about the ability of liberty to transform societies, to

convert the world to a peaceful world.76

Of course, not all liberals hold such simplistic view of world politics. Many liberals

also called neoliberals share several assumptions as those proclaimed by realists. They

concede to the realist assumption that the international structure is shaped by

international anarchy. In addition, they share the neorealist assumption that states are

key actors on the international stage and that interests determine the way states

behave.77

It is therefore not surprisingly that liberals hold generally favorable views towards

establishing multilateral institutions that increase economic interdependence, whilst

simultaneously fostering economic growth. As Robert Keohane notes: When states can

jointly benefit from cooperation, on the other hand, we expect governments to attempt

to construct such institutions.78

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

74 See Francis Fukuyamas, The End of History, The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18. 75 See for a more detailed account, John, M., Owens, How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 87-125. 76 Russett 2005, p. 395. 77 Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2008, p. 132. 78 Keohane & Martin 1995, p. 42.

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Furthermore, liberals believe that state behavior is largely shaped by its domestic

composition.79 Andrew Moravcsik explains that the [liberal] state should not be seen as

an actor but as a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture,

construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors.80 In other words, the

foreign policies of liberal or democratic states are constantly subjected to change

depending on the social group that controls power. This shows a sharp contrast with

realism that believes that domestic politics do not carry much weight when it comes to

foreign policy.

But unlike realists they assert that the problems addressed by realists such as war,

conflict and security-competition can be tamed by a network of relations between

states, between states and other types of actors, and between other types of actors

themselves81 , in which the latter refers to international and non-governmental

organizations. Liberals believe that when states cooperate more intensively primarily

on the economic level the incentives for security competition will decrease. Economic

interdependence between states will ease tensions between states because their material

capabilities will benefit from not engaging in any act of war.

Consequently, they believe that the lack of information between states leads to

uncertainty, which in its turn causes them to compete against one another. Therefore,

institutions can function as a facilitator that enables states to exchange information,

reducing the level of uncertainty.

This argument partly contradicts with the Clausewitzian assumption of imperfect

knowledge.82 Clausewitz explains that the lack of information between states about

each others capabilities creates a situation in which they tend to overestimate their

opponents strength, thereby delaying the progress of military action and moderating the

principle that underlies it [emphasis added].83 Uncertainty is according to this view a

force of moderation rather than conflict exacerbating.

Another argument put forth against liberalism is that it has neither much to say

about situations whereby state interests are fundamentally conflicting, nor what states

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

79 Mearsheimer 2001, p. 15. 80 Moravcsik 1997, p. 518. 81 Hill, Christopher and Smith 2005, p. 24. 82 Clausewitz 2008, p. 25. 83 Ibid. p. 25.

! #&!

should do if institutions are absent.84 In the case of the former, states are less interested

in absolute gains (i.e. states are only concerned about their own profits, irrespective of

how much others might benefit) rather than in relative gains, which means that states are

more concerned of how much they might profit in comparison to the other.85 This is due

to the fact that military considerations prevail above economic ones, since todays

alliance partners might be tomorrows enemy and vice versa.86

Liberalism is therefore better at explaining economic cooperation between allies than

in accounting for processes considered to be part of the military realm.87 For instance,

liberalism has little to say about Iranian-Israeli relations except that both countries

would perhaps be better off if they decided to establish economic links instead of looking

for ways to gain material dominance at the expense of the other because the extent of

institutional cooperation (in terms of regional security) between the two nations is in

fact absent. Despite the attractiveness of the ideas put forward by several liberal scholars,

the fact that the theory covers primarily issues that relate to peace and international

cooperation and to a lesser degree to situations that involve war and security, renders it

irrelevant in this thesis.

2.1.3. Constructivism

Constructivism is generally associated with the theory that puts most of its emphasis on

the role of ideas within international relations. Constructivists often criticize the

frequent use of concepts like the state, interests, and security, by liberals and realists, as

they do not believe that these concepts are fixed, but rather socially constructed.

Constructivists believe that shared norms and beliefs help shape identities and interests

of elites who, according to the theory, embody the state. Not surprisingly, most often

elites consist the constructivists main unit of analysis.

Constructivists also claim that the described effect of material forces on states

behavior by liberals and realists is exaggerated and that the so-called security dilemma is

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

84 Mearsheimer 1994, p. 15-26. )&!See Grieco, Joseph M. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507. !86 Mearsheimer 2001, p. 33. 87 Mearsheimer 1994, p. 18.

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mainly due to ideational considerations rather than just material.88 There are, however,

more factors other than material interests that shape foreign policy; these constitute for

example culture goals or ideological aims.89 Furthermore, constructivists believe, like

realists, that history matters90 , but go further by assuming that human progress is

possible; behavioral patterns such as the security dilemma, wherein measures that

enhance one states security typically diminish that of others91 , can be broken since they

are not acts of God but effects of practice.92

Peter Katzenstein puts forth the example of the end of the Cold War in which he

states that the mix of factors affecting national security is changing and that issues

dealing with norms, identities, and culture are becoming more important than ever

before.93 Constructivists believe that, as the world changes, people change, and so do

factors that affect foreign policy. Therefore, universal theories like realism, whose

assumptions apply across time and space, are flawed.

Moreover, constructivists challenge the realist notion of interests, in which these are

seen as a given. Katzenstein notes: security interests are defined by actors who respond

to cultural factors. Cultural and social norms, shared by individuals, tribes, social classes

and/or elites, shape interests in a way that is unique for every country. Interests are

therefore seen as social constructions that vary profoundly across time and space. The

same accounts for the perception of threats. Contrary to realists, who assert that the way

states behave is forced upon them by the anarchic system, constructivist believe that,

anarchy is what states make of it94 and that, if today we find ourselves in a self-help

world, this is due to process, not structure.95 Thus, if we were all to believe that war is

not in the interest of world society, it would not exist.

Constructivists believe that shared social norms affect the decision-making process.

For instance, countries in which religious and conservative values tend to dominate its

respective society will most likely uphold these values in their foreign policy likewise.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

88 Katzenstein 1996, p. 33. 89 Shaffer 2006, p.51. 90 Wendt 1995, p. 77. 91 Waltz 1988, p. 619. 92 Ibid, p. 77. 93 Katzenstein 1996, p. 2. 94 See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425. 95 Wendt 1992, p. 394-396.

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Consequently, according to this logic, a country like Saudi Arabia is expected to uphold

the values of Islam in its foreign policy whereas a generally Christian country like

Armenia is most likely to have good relationship with other likeminded states.

Constructivists therefore tend to focus on discourse and the importance of language used

by any given elite in order to describe past events. But more important, because they

believe that because foreign policy is socially constructed, it could be molded into any

desired form, thus also an intrinsically peaceful one.

However it would not be unfair to depict constructivism as a set of normative ideas

instead of a scientific theory, despite the attractiveness of the arguments put forward by

some scholars belonging to this school. As Mearsheimer rightly concludes: the goal [of

world peace] is desirable in principle, but not realizable in practice. The main problem

is that many of the constructivist assumptions lack empirical evidence, and when it does

not, it is in most cases selected arbitrarily. Constructivists like for example Barbara

Farnham, who argues that Roosevelts response to the Munich crisis shows that threat

can be assessed primarily on the basis of intentions[emphasis added],96 tend to focus on

speeches made by elite members who hold key positions in the decision-making process.

In doing so they make frequent use of public statements, but also of biographical

evidence.97

Although public statements by elite members can be an important indicator of a

states foreign policy outlook, it does not necessarily always carry much weight. As

Mearsheimer rightly notes, there exists a major difference between rhetoric and

practice.98 The value of public statements by leaders can therefore only be determined

in comparison to their behavior. Sometimes, rhetoric and practice can coincide, but only

when there is no conflict between the pursuit of power and the pursuit of principle.99

Unfortunately, constructivists have yet not adequately developed the methodological

tools to differentiate between (empty) rhetoric and practice.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

96 See Barbara Farnham, The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, (2003), pp. 395-415. 97 Furnham, for instance, focuses on how the personal views of Roosevelt towards Hitler in the run-up to WOII changed the course of history. She describes how the former underestimated the aggressive intentions of the latter by not linking his perception of threat to regime type and how his personal views attributed to the countrys indifference towards Hitlers expansionist policy. 98 Mearsheimer 2001, p. 25. 99 Ibid, p. 26.

! #)!

Another methodological limitation of constructivism is their main unit of analysis,

being an individual or a group. In order to examine the former, constructivists frequently

make use of the psychological idiosyncratic approach, in which they endeavor on

psychological profiling in order to understand the motives underlying the behavior of

certain important elite members. However, there are some concerns with this approach.

First, unless there exists a theory, which can exactly point out under what circumstances

the personality of an individual elite member of a certain state affects its respective

foreign policy, any link between the personality of certain elite members and foreign

policy remains speculative.

This critique also applies to constructivists who focus on a more macro-level. For

instance, Ibrahim Karawan, who analyzes Egypts foreign policy, asserts that the Egyptian

elite identifies itself with at least seven identities at the same time.100 Leaving aside the

academic value of his analysis: to observe and to elucidate the variety of identities within

Egypts elite is one thing, to assert there is a causal link between these identities and its

foreign policy is another. Moreover, the hypothesis is almost impossible to falsify because

any change into Egypts foreign policy can be ascribed to the influx of any particular

identity i.e. practically every outcome can be explained by the theory. Constructivism

does not lend itself to falsification, because, as Robert Cox admits, it is more focused on

the process of change rather than on its ends101 . Therefore, as Cox concludes: It is

impossible to predict the future.102 In assessing scenarios, social constructivism is of

little use because it is, as Stephen Walt concludes, better at describing the past than

anticipating the future.103

2.2. Alliance Formation

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

100 Ibrahim A. Karawan, Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Egypt in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002). 101 Cox 1987, p. 393. 102 Cox, Towards A Post-Hemegonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun, in James N. Rosenau, and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 139 103 Walt 1998, p. 38.

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It is practically impossible to have a clear understanding of the current political Middle

Eastern landscape without any knowledge on the role of alliances. Alliances have been an

important factor in Middle Eastern politics for centuries, and still are, whether tribal,

national, or regional, constantly subjected to shifts. This does, however, not make this

region unique; on the contrary, alliances are inherent to practically every form of human

organized activity also known as politics. As Ole Holsti puts it, alliances are apparently

a universal component of relations between political units, irrespective of time and

space.104

Regarding the concept of alliances, Walt notes that, states form alliances primarily

to balance against threats. As earlier mentioned, a state can hardly retain possession of

its political independence without the support of allies. The reason for that is that most

countries do not posses enough resources to effectively balance against threats.

Furthermore, the price of balancing is considerably cheaper by means of forging alliances,

than by taking the burden on your self. However, it has not been said that the more

allies means the less enemies, or that states with many allies are more secure than those

with less. Consequently, the former can for that same reason be perceived as (potentially)

dangerous to and by others, and might therefore become subjected to more threats than

the latter. States, therefore, carefully select their allies.

No state would, however, regard a situation without allies as being favorable. As

Winston Churchill once put it: There is at least one thing worse than fighting allies and

that is to fight without them.105 In those rare instances in which states find themselves

almost completely isolated, it is most often the result of external imposition.106 Unless

these countries do not develop the means to deter a potential aggressor from attacking

they are most likely to remain vulnerable (i.e. under a constant risk of total defeat). This

is therefore the worst situation in which a state can find itself.

But how do states select their allies, and under what circumstances do shifts in

alliance formation occur? Walt explains that there are two types of alliances that depend

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

104 Ole et al., p. 2. 105 Walter Reid, Churchill 1940-1045: Under Friendly Fire, (London: Birlinn, 2008). 106 Several examples of countries that have been isolated during the last decades are Cuba after the missile crisis, Iraq under Saddam, North Korea under the incumbent president Kim Jong-Il, and, although not officially recognized as a state, Hamas-ruled Gaza.

! $+!

on the existence of external threats.107 The first type that Walt describes is that of

balancing; this means that a state forges an alliance with others against the source of

threat, whereas the second type, bandwagoning, refers to alignment with the source of

danger [emphasis added].108 Balancing and bandwagoning are more a response to

threats, which is why Walt refers to balance of threat rather than balance of power in

determining state behavior.109

Walt then proceeds to defining the term threat. In doing so, he identifies four factors

that determines the extent of the threat:

1. Aggregate power:

This refers sheer (material) capabilities a state has at its disposal e.g. industrial

resources, population size, military technology, or for example geographical

features such as mountains, and forestation. The more aggregate power a state

has, the more potential it has to threaten others.

2. Geographic proximity:

This implies that the more distant states are situated from one another the less

they pose a threat to each other. For instance, a nuclear-armed Cuba would

trigger a different reaction from the United States than a nuclear-armed South

Africa would.

3. Offensive power:

This is being referred to as the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial

integrity of another state at an acceptable cost.110 This has however nothing to

do with the sheer number of offensive weapons a states has in stock, since by

the same token defensive weapons could function as a means to launch an attack

without paying a heavy price. For example, the plans for a defensive rocket shield

by the American administration are clearly seen as an offensive threat to Russian

national security by its government.

4. Aggressive intentions:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

107 See Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987). 108 Ibid. p. 17. 109 Ibid. p. 22. 110 Ibid. p. 24.

! $"!

States that exhibit aggressive behavior are more likely to be seen as a threat by

others, especially if others fear meeting the same fate as the aggressors prior

victim(s). For instance, the Syrian and the Iranian governments were clearly

worried by the speech made by president George W. Bush in which he labeled

them as part of the so-called Axis of Evil. When the latter decided to invade

formers neighboring country, Iraq, they started to display balancing behavior.

Conversely, countries that feared the Americans, but were not on the list, chose

to bandwagon.

Depending on the source and extent of the threat, states can either opt to balance or

bandwagon. According to Walt, the most common form of alliance behavior is balancing

because of two reasons. The first reason is that states that choose to balance are more

independent than those who opt to bandwagon; the latter exists merely by the grace of

the threat. The second reason is that by means of balancing, an actor has relatively more

to add within a coalition if it chooses to balance rather than if it bandwagons, because

the weaker side has greater need for assistance than the stronger side.111 By means of

balancing, states can enhance their relative position vis--vis the source of the threat and

increase political leverage on their allies at the same time.

Bandwagoning behavior on the other hand can derive from two factors. The first type

of bandwagoning also called defensive bandwagoning is when states align with the

source of the threat in the hope to avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere.112 An

illustrious example of this behavior was the Libyan rapprochement to the West shortly

after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the US led coalition, in which it abandoned its

(non-existent) weapons program and adhered to Western demands in order to avoid

being added to the list the axis of evil. A more striking example of defensive

bandwagoning was the Pakistani support for the US against the Al-Qaeda and the

Taliban, shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001. The then Pakistani president,

Pervez Musharraf, explained year after the invasion why Pakistan joined the Americans:

The [US] intelligence director told me that [the former US Deputy Secretary of State]

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

111 Walt 1987, p. 18-19. 112 Ibid. p. 21.

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Mr Armitage said, Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone

Age.113

The second type of bandwagoning also called offensive bandwagoning is when

states choose to side with the stronger side in order to share the spoils of victory.114

For example, when the United States invaded Iraq in 1991 during operation Desert

Storm, Syria chose to align with the invading forces along its doorstep. In return for its

support, the Americans gave Syria carte blanche to enter Lebanon, marking the beginning

of the Pax Syriana.115

As explained earlier, alliances come in different shapes, depending on the source and

the extent of the threat a state faces. Shifts constantly take place through minor, almost

undetectable, changes. There are nevertheless important moments in history when

alliances underwent complete transformations. For example, the sudden demise of the

USSR and the end of the Cold War led to a new power distribution together with a

threat reassessment by its former allies, in which former Soviet friendly states joined the

former rival coalition: NATO. Key to these changes is that they took place concurrent

with significant power shifts.

In Chapter four, I argue that any change in the balance of power in the Middle East

(caused by the acquisition of a nuclear bomb by Iran) will inevitably lead to a shift in the

current, prevailing coalitions in the Middle East, in which more states (predominantly

the moderate Arab states) will shift more closely towards Iran rather than balancing

against it; mainly because Iran has not exhibited any aggressive intentions towards the

moderate Arab states and therefore is perhaps a more suitable alternative than Israel

and/or the United States.

2.3. Conventional Deterrence and Armed Conflict

Power-shifts are considered to be a main cause of war the phenomenon that actors

within the international system fear most.116 According to one of the greatest military

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113 US threatened to bomb Pakistan, BBC News, September 22, 2006. 114 Walt 1987, p. 21. 115 See Carl L. Browns (2004), Diplomacy in the Middle East, Chapter The Foreign Policy of Syria. 116 Van Evera 1999, pp. 73-105.

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strategists in history, Carl von Clausewitz, [w]ar is merely a continuation of policy by

other means.117 There are many different types of war (e.g. conventional war, nuclear

war or low-intensity war), waged by a wide array of actors (states, resistance movements,

intelligence operatives), fought by different means (airpower, nuclear weapons, terrorism,

mortar shelling), and for at least as many reasons (expansionism, self-defense etc.).

States operate under the constant threat of war, in which they tend to enhance their

(sense of) security by arming themselves and by forging alliances, sparking arms races,

which eventually could precipitate war.118 Sudden alterations in the balance of power

between adversaries heighten the risk of armed conflict. As Robert Gilpin notes, the

fundamental cause of wars among states and changes in the international system is the

uneven growth of power among states.119

However, Mearsheimer argues that the uneven growth of power among states is not

decisive in the recurrence of armed conflict, but rather the distribution of power itself, in

which peace benefits most when equality is greatest among poles. Power inequalities

invite war by increasing the potential for successful aggression; hence war is minimized

when inequalities are least.120

Because the risk of power inequalities is more likely to play out in a multipolar

system than in a bipolar system, peace and stability are better suited in latter case. In a

multipolar system, so the argument goes, there is mention of more security

interdependence among alliance partners, whereby each individual partners security is

intertwined with that of other members. Consequently, if one partner enters into war

it will inevitably drag the other into an all-out war.121

In addition, whereas some scholars believe that the declining power is more likely to

initiate a war against the rising power in order to turn the tide,122 others believe that

rising powers are more likely start a war.123 The causal logic of the latter is not

particularly sound; as Clausewitz concludes, it is in the interest of the rising power to

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117 Clausewitz 2008, p. 28. 118 Waltz 1988, p. 619-620. 119 Gilpin 1981, p. 94. 120 Mearsheimer 1990, p. 18. 121 Christensen and Snyder 1990, pp. 140-141. 122 See Jack S. Levys, Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Oct. 1987), pp. 82-107. 123 See A.F.K. Organsky and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)

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wait for a better moment before acting because time is at its side.124 From the

perspective of the declining power, Clausewitz notes that, if it is in As interests not to

attack B now [that is, the waning power] but to attack him in four weeks, then it is in

Bs interest not to attack in four weeks time, but now.125 Thus from a purely rational

perspective, declining powers have more incentives to start hostilities than rising powers.

Furthermore, armed confrontation between powers might arise when one (or more)

overestimates its military prowess, in conjunction to the belief that victory over the

opponent is easy to achieve by military means.126 Stephen Van Evera concludes that if

the losing side could foresee the outcome, it would often decline to fight, making war

less probable.127 A famous example is the Iraqi decision to attack Iran in 1980; Saddams

conviction was that the Iranian revolution, which had supposedly left Iran badly

weakened, provided a window of opportunity to invade. In the end, Iraq was left worse

off than when it started it would be fair to conclude that it basically lost the war.128

Consequently, if national leaders would have crystal balls that revealed the future

many wars would be prevented.129 Yet, although Van Everas hypothesis correctly

accounts for the losing side of a war no reasonable actor would start a war it is bound

to lose and for those wars in which both sides rather lose than gain, that same crystal

ball could instead make war more likely. For instance, opponents who are not initially

interested in fighting each other could become so if one of them knew that the outcome

of a war would be settled in its favor. In fact, Van Everas idea runs counter to that of

Clausewitz, who asserts that the lack of information can in fact delay the progress of

military action and [moderate] the principle that underlies it.130 The very fact that

states do not have such crystal balls dissuades them from taking military action.

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124 Clausewitz 2008, p. 22; Mearsheimer, 2007 p. 81-82. 125 Clausewitz 2008, p. 24. 126 See Stephen Van Everas, Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 5-43. 127 Van Evera 1999, p. 5. 128 Although Iraq was better equipped than Iran, the former did nevertheless fail in its attack, whereas the latter succeeded in its defense. This has to do with the fact that countries that have underwent a revolution, most often have little difficulty to mobilize masses needed for war. For more information on the defensive capabilities of revolutionary states, see Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998). 129 Van Evera 1999, p. 5. Other realist theorists reaffirm this position. John Mearsheimer states that, [a] potential attacker who expects to lose a war is very unlikely to start it. See John J. Mearsheimers, Conventional Deterrence (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 24. 130 Clausewitz, p. 25.

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But more importantly, war is an act of policy in which its aim is to either put the

enemy in a position where it becomes literally defenseless131 , or to influence an

adversary by inflicting pain.132 In the real world, the former is more difficult if not

almost impossible to achieve than the latter, unless there is clearly mention of an

asymmetrical military balance between adversaries. This has to do with the fact of the

advantage that defense has over offense, in which the attacker in order to be successful

is required to have a advantage of 3:1 in combat power over the defender: the latter is

familiar with its own territory and fights from prepared positions, whereas the former is

not.133 Thus, whenever two equal forces clash, the defender is most likely to turn out

victorious.

Based on the Clausewitzian assumption that war is an act of policy, adversaries

have no interest in engaging to armed confrontation unless they have some sort of

confidence that the outcome is favorable to them. However, this logic derives from the

premise that two (rational) actors are at play. In the real world the amount of actors are

manifold, and thus much more complicated.

In many cases, third parties might drag two competing forces into a war, although

initially it does not appear to be in their interest to do so which could make this

behavior to seem irrational, while in fact it is not. For instance, the United States did not

have any interest in taking part in the hostilities in Europe at the beginning of the

1940s, nor did Germany have any interest in declaring war against the United States.

Nevertheless, when Germanys main ally, Japan, launched attacks on American forces in

the Pacific they forcedly went to war, because the risks of doing nothing [was

seemed] greater than the risk of military action.134 Thus, although actors can act against

their will, this does automatically stem from irrational behavior.

In chapter three I will argue that neither Iran nor Israel can succeed in its ambitions

to disarm the other, and therefore it would, from a strategic point of view, not make

much sense for any of the two actors to initiate hostilities. Furthermore, I explain why

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131 Ibid. p. 15. 132 Snyder 2003, p. 31. 133 For a detailed account see John J., Mearsheimer, Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics, International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring, 1989), pp. 54-89; and Joshua M. Epsteins, The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies, International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring, 1989), pp. 90-127. 134 Mearsheimer 1984, p. 21.

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the lack of information between the two sides is more likely to have a constraining effect

on the will to fight rather than exacerbating tensions between the two nations.

2.4. Nuclear Deterrence

The logic of (conventional) deterrence and the causes of war as stipulated above are not

prevalent when it comes to nuclear weapons, or as Robert Jervis concludes, many

prenuclear [sic] ideas are now inappropriate.135 The scale of destruction inherent to

nuclear weapons one single bomb can flatten entire villages, cities, or even whole

regions and the absence of an effective defense system against nuclear weapons

neutralizes the logic underpinning the 3:1 offense-defense ratio in its totality.136

The likelihood of a nuclear war is however much less present than the chances of

conventional wars for the very simple reason that there are only a few countries who

posses offensive nuclear capabilities capable of using them.137 The downside however is

that if such a war occurs, the scale of destruction would be far more disastrous than if

fought by conventional means.

Some claim that because of the extreme costs a nuclear war entails, states are less

inclined to use them, thus making the world safer.138 The logic of this argument entails

that