Sudan: Recent DevelopmentsAuthor(s): Babiker KhalifaSource: Africa Today, Vol. 36, No. 3/4, Shari'a Law and Strife in the Sudan: Is Peace Possible?(3rd Qtr. - 4th Qtr., 1989), pp. 5-10Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4186582 .

Accessed: 14/06/2014 13:56

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 13:56:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Sudan: Recent Developments

Babiker Khalifa

The Sudan is currently passing through one of its most difficult times. Socio-economic and political crises have severely struck the country. The long list of chronic ailments includes declining productivity in agriculture and industry, a worsening balance-of-payments position, fiscal difficulties, rising rates of inflation, mounting and unmanageable debt and repayment problems, a substantial influx of refugees, severe drought, damaging floods, millions of displaced persons, and a civil war.

The government has embarked, since 1978, on a series of structural adjustment programs that involve devaluation of the currency and the adop- tion of a flexible exchange rate policy, relaxation of price controls, establish- ment of strict demand control measures, privatization of state enterprises operating in commercial fields, and increasing autonomy for the remaining ones. The impact of these policies was, on the whole, very disappointing. The real growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged only 0.4% yearly during the period 1980-1984, while per capita GDP fell at an average annual rate of 2.1% during the same period. The Sudan's external debt reached over $11 billion by the end of 1985.1

In the wake of the April 1985 uprising which toppled the regime of Ga'far al-Nimeiri the government has attempted to change the direction of past economic policies and to reach an agreement with the IMF to allow new capital to enter the country. Because of great opposition to IMF structural adjustment provisions, self-reliance policies were considered as altematives. However due to external and internal pressures the elected govemment of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi found no other way than to accept the IMF conditions.2 Among these severe conditions were the devaluation of the Sudanese currency and the removal of government subsidies on gas, sugar, bread, and other consumer items. These policies have led to social stress, resentment, riots and demonstrations, particularly among students, workers and poor people. The government, however, maintained Nimeiri's emergency regula- tions and used them to suppress protests.

1. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report A/40/372 and add. I July 1986, Critical Ecoamoic Sltaatkh Is Afria, p. 42

2. Report of Ambassador Omer Y-Birido, Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations, African-American Institute Seminar for Congressional Aides, June 1986.

Babiker Khalifa is a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. Until recently. he has been in the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has represented the Sudan at the United Nations.

3d- & 4th Quartes, 1989 5

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 13:56:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The Impact of Natural Disaster and Famine

Sudan in normal circumstances is self-sufficient in food. However the Sudan has experienced since 1981 and until now serious famines all over the country. The severe drought was followed in 1988 by heavy rains and floods that damaged hundreds of villages and affected even large cities, including Khartoum.' Two million persons were displaced. Today the whole country is suffering in all regions from severe food shortages. The Sudan receives some regional and international assistance. It is essential that this support continue through 1990 and beyond for the provision of food supplies, storage facilities, essential drugs and medicines, health care, immunization programs and other emergency measures. Substantial assistance is also needed to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure. Agricultural inputs and tool production must be rehabilitated in order to increase output. Assistance should be provided in a way which produces a lasting impact on the economy, e.g., the distribution of food in return for work rather than as a handout.

Special attention should be paid to meeting the recovery needs of people who have been displaced from their homes and who have lost their posses- sions as a result of famine or war. It is essential and urgent that additional resources should be provided to improve handling facilities, to supply fuel, trucks, railway wagons, equipment and spare parts. Assistance in this sector will strengthen transport capacity in the Sudan and help it in future to avoid recurrences of the present constraints. Further, there is a need to enhance the national capacity to establish an early warning system to monitor the crops and sound an alert when shortages are imminent, as well as to strengthen national relief machinery. Emergency situations should not be dealt with in isolation from the medium and long-term needs. The fundamental cause of famine in the Sudan and many African countries is not - in my view - the drought or the floods. It is mainly due to the underdevelopment and poverty of these countries within the unfair and unjust existing international economic system.

The Impact of the Civil War

The sad situation in the Sudan is severely aggravated by the continuation of the civil war in the south. This civil strife has serious effects on the country's resources and its own ability to meet the demands of the victims of the famine. The problem was inherited from the previous regime of Nimeiri, especially after his betrayal and violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 and his imposition of Islamic Shari'a laws in September 1983.

3. Africa Confidential, Vol, 29, Number 17, 26 August, 1988, p. 8.

6 AFRICA TODAY

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 13:56:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Babiker Khalifa

The transitional government that came to power after the 1985 uprising took a number of measures to solve the problem by peaceful means. These included a general amnesty and a unilateral cease fire. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) rejected all these peaceful proposals and insisted on the abolition of the Islamic laws along with other conditions. The war has become more severe and some neighboring countries, particularly Ethiopia, give great support to the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the military wing of the SPLM. The political parties of the coalition government in power until early 1989 had different views of the problem. The National Islamic Front (Moslem Brothers), one of the parfies in the coalition, has rejected any attempt to abolish the Islamic laws or to replace them by secular laws.

Sadiq al-Mahdi, the ex-Prime Minister and leader of the Umma Party, advocated three channels to solve the problem. These are the diplomatic channel, necessary because of the involvement of external factors and forces in the problem; the military channel, to strengthen the Sudanese military forces; and the constitutional channel, to hold a constitutional conference to discuss and solve all the problems in the Sudan related to wealth, power, and religion.

In November 1988, Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, leader of the third party in the coalition, the Democratic Unionist, met in Addis Ababa with John Garang, leader of the SPLM, and they reached a general agreement: to impose a cease fire, to freeze the Islamic laws, and to hold a constitutional conference to negotiate and solve the problems of the whole country. This agreement was rejected by both the Umma Party of Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Islamic Front Party of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. Ironically, this agreement was similar to the agreement reached with the SPLA/SPLM at Koka Dam in 1985, which was endorsed by the majority in the National Alliance, a grouping of unions, professional associations, and political parties, including al-Mahdi's Umma Party but excluding the National Islamic Front. But the Koka Dam agreement was rejected by al-Mirghani and his Democratic Unionist party. It was clear and unfortunate that the political parties were highly involved in their internal problems, tactics, jealousies and antagonisms and because of this failed to endorse jointly either of the above mentioned agreements.

Due to the worsening situation and the severe fighting in the south, the military in February 1989 gave the government an ultimatum and a warning combined with a demand for genuine steps to solve the Southern issue and end the war. This political crisis forced the political parties to form a national coalition government which was intended to consist of all the political parties, including the Communist Party, and representatives in the cabinet of the trade

3rd & 4th Quarters, 1989 7

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 13:56:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

unions and the military. The Islamic Front party, however, refused to participate in the government and chose the opposition side.4

At that stage the government adopted and endorsed the Addis agreement between al-Mirghani and Garang of November 1988. A ceasefire was declared for two months, open for renewal. Talks between the new government and the SPLA/SPLM were established within a peace process designed to lead to the constitutional conference. Meetings between the two parties were supposed to resume in early July 1989.

The Advent of the Military Government

However, on June 30th the military took over and overthrew the civilian government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. A 15 man Revolutionary Council headed by General Omar al-Bashir as well as a civilian cabinet were established. The new military government announced that the main motive of the military takeover was to address seriously the Southern problem and to solve it peacefully. The government renewed the ceasefire for another two months, abolished all previous agreements, and expressed its readiness for direct talks and negotiations with the SPLM. However, the SPLM refused to recognize the new military government and called for the formation of a national coalition government with representatives of all political parties, trade unions, and the military as well as the SPLM. The role of the suggested government would be the preparation of a constitutional conference to nego- tiate and agree on all Sudanese issues as well as the holding of a general election. Despite their announced position, representatives of the SPLM met in Addis Ababa on the 17th of August 1989 with their counterparts in the Sudanese government. There were strong rumors that Egyptian mediation helped in the resumption of talks between the two parties. However, the brief communique of the joint meeting clearly showed that the two parties had reached a deadlock in their negotiations.5

The new military government organized a National Dialogue Conference in Khartoum on the 9th of September, a gathering of intellectuals, professors and other national figures and experts on the Southern issue with different political orientations and affiliations. An invitation was also extended through the Sudanese embassy in Addis Ababa to the SPLM to participate in the Khartoum conference, but the invitation was declined. The conference nevertheless was convened and has been discussing all the issues related to the conflict as well as the ways out. This is the right track.

4. Alayan, (daily newspaper, Khartoum), 22 Feburary, 1989, p. 1.

5. Alsbarg Al Aweat, (daily irnternational Arab newspaper, London, New York), 24 August 1989.

8 AFRICA TODAY

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 13:56:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Babiker Khalifa

Following the conclusion of the conference on October 21st, General al- Bashir announced that his government was in full accord with its recommen- dations. These included a federal system for Sudan under a national president, with wide authority to be given to the governors and parliaments of the federated states. While either Islamic Shari'a or Urf (traditional laws) are proposed as the main sources of legal codes, each state is to be empowered to develop its own laws and legal codes in accordance with its unique situation and the preferences of the majority of its citizens. Islam, Chrisitianity and traditional beliefs were proclaimed to exist in the Sudan side by side. The choice of legal codes and laws by the various states are to be made in such a way as to avoid adversely affecting the rights of the minority and their personal and religious freedom. All existing laws are to be revised in the the light of these recommendations.6

These recommendations, if accepted by all the conflicting parties, could well lead to the restoration of peace. However, subsequent to the presentation of these recommendations reports have come of renewed fighting in the south as well as in southern Blue Nile province.

Nevertheless, representatives of both sides met again in Nairobi from December 1st to December 5th with former U.S. President Carter as mediator. Once again, agreement could not be reached, primariy because the govern- ment delegation said they had no mandate to discuss the abolition of Shari'a law, while the SPLA held firm on the question of the treaties with Libya and Egypt. However, both sides agreed to meet again.7

Conclusion

Most observers believe that there can be no military solution to the conflict. The present situation seems to be a stalemate. The danger of not accepting this reality is that more innocent lives of civilians as well as soldiers will be lost; conditions of famine and lack of health facilities will persist; the economy will not only fail to recover but is more likely to be further eroded.

The actual differences between the government and the SPLA/SPLM standing in the way of ending the fighting are critical but reconcilable. They are, first, the failure to revoke the September 1983 laws, and the declared intention to substitute a new set of Islamic laws; and second, the issue of Article 4 of the constitution which derives from the notion of Sudan as a secular state.

6. Alsbarg Al Awst. Sunday 22 October 1989, p. 1.

7. Alsbarg Al Awsat, Thursday 7 December, 1989.

3rd & 4th Quarters, 1989 9

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 13:56:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

I believe that the current crisis is not one of the North versus the South, or the Muslims versus the non-Muslims; it is a national crisis in which the majority of the Sudanese seek an undivided country with a democratic constitution negotiated freely by all its representative leaders. No constitutional conference can be legitimate or effective unless it is fully representative of the varieties of parties and factions in the whole country. I do not minimize the difficulties in the way of achieving broad agreement on a new constitution given the great diversity of cultural, religious and other interests. Also in recent years the difficulties of attaining consensus have been increased partly because past agreements have been broken, and partly because extemal support to all the conflicting parties has increased.

While recognizing the role of foreign interests in the Sudanese internal struggle, I think that once all the Sudanese parties agree to a ceasefire and to the conditions for starting the peace process, the extemal forces are unlikely to be in a position to frustrate the will of the parties engaged in the negotiation. In the Sudan we have our previous experience of the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 which led to peace in the country for a decade. Also we can borrow and leam from the experience of similar conflicts. A country like Nigeria, which has many problems similar to those found in the Sudan, has found, after bitter experience, that a federal constitution based on 19 states provides the best hopes of satisfying the interests of regional communities and to remove the fear of domination by one major region over the rest.

Clearly, the problems and formidable challenges which we are facing in the Sudan are not going to be solved automatically. However, to succeed we have to maintain the democratic approach and direct negotiation in order to reach a national consensus for a lasting peace.

10 AFRICA TODAY

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 13:56:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions