seven levels of interorganizational connectivity an ... · seven levels of interorganizational...

Proceedings of the 29th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1996

Seven Levels of Interorganizational Connectivity An Examination of the U.S. Grocery Distribution Channel

Theodore H. Clark Department of EMT

Honn Kona Universitv of Science and Technology - - [email protected]

William T. Schiano Department of MIS Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration wschianoQhbs.harvard.edu

Abstract 2.

This paper examines interconnectivity within the grocery channel and suggests an interorganizational connectivity framework modeled in part on the IS0 model of systems connectivity. This seven-level model of interorganizational connectivity and channel interdependence is illustrated using examples of processes that span multiple levels of interconnectivity and interdependence within the grocery channel between diferent groups of customers and suppliers.

1. Introduction

Case studies of grocery product manufacturers, wholesalers, and retail chains suggest that while a detinite hierarchy of levels of lT-enabled interorganizational connectivity exists, not all relationships necessarily evolve to the highest level of “virtual integration.” Indeed, limits on executive attention preclude this level from being achieved by more than a small fraction of trading partners.

This paper examines existing patterns of interorganizational connectivity within the U.S. retail grocery channel, suggesting a descriptive framework (modeled in part on the IS0 model of systems connectivity) for classifying progress in developing organizational interdependence. This seven-level model of channel cooperation and information sharing is illustrated using two examples of generic processes (product ordering and payment) that span multiple levels of interconnectivity and interdependence between different groups of customers and suppliers.

The paper is divided into five sections. This first section introduces the major themes and describes the overall format of the paper. Section two provides a brief review of the literature relevant to the issues addressed in this research and paper. The t&d section describes the research design and methodology used to develop the research findings and model presented in the fourth section of the paper. Finally, the implications of these findings for managers are discussed and several suggestions for extending this research are offered.

The potential for interorganizational systems (10s) to fundamentally redefine relationships among suppliers, buyers and even competitors within an indusltry and change industry structure has been described extensively (e.g., Badaracco [l]; Cash [2], Clemons [33; Hammond [4]; Malone et al., [4]; McFarlan, [S]; Miller et al. [6]; O’Callaghan, [73). Recent interest in interorgamzational connectivity, including EDI, has been fueled by the opportunities created as a result of the dramatic reduction in communications costs, particularly for computer-to- computer linkages and interorganizational connectivity (Scott Morton, [S]; Keen, [9]). The digital connectivity applications now being implemented were all teclhnically feasible in 1980, but prohibitively expensive (Scott Morton, [lo]). Transaction cost economics theory predicts that significant reductions in transaction costs should enable new organizational and channel structures (Ciborra, [ll]; Williamson, [12]).

Studies have found ED1 connectivity alone is not sufficient to generate substantial savings and organizational changes are necessary. Malone et. al [4] refer to the electronic integration effect, in which adjacent channel members create “joint, interpenetrating processes” at their interfaces. Skagen [13] in interviews with thirty companies found strategic and partnership benefits represent the chief gain for colmpanies employing EDI. Brousseau [14] found ED1 could only be successful if business processes were standardized along with EDI, and “the payoff of ED1 is not due to ED1 itself, but rather to the implementation of the new coordinating techniques” (p. 333).

Organizational boundaries and relationships in the grocery industry evolved over a period of several decades to minimize the sum of transaction and production costs (Clark, [15]). Badaracco [l] suggests reductions in transaction costs enable firms to join in information alliances or partnerships, reducing the need for integrated ownership structures. Although these network types of organizational and industry structures were always technically feasible, the associated connectivity costs were too high relative to hierarchical modes of organization to make the networked organization practical (Malone and Rockart, [16]). Declining

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Proceedings of the 1996 Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-29) 1060-3425/96 $10.00 © 1996 IEEE


connectivity costs have enabled networked-organization structures to become a preferred design for many complex environments (Nolan and Croson, [17]).

The economics literature on motivations for the formation of strategic alliances and the MIS literature on the motivations for interorganizational systems have diverged somewhat in recent years. Mody [18] defines an alliance as “a flexible organization that allows firms with complementary strengths to experiment with new technological, organizational, and marketing strategies.” In examining the literature on the role of information (and, by extension, information technology) in the motivations to form or sustain such alliances, we note that economic models of partnership tended to be modeled using analytical tools of incomplete contracts, reputation, and transaction costs analyses (e.g., Schmidt and Fellerman, [19]; van Koenig and Wijk, [20]). A bridge between these theoretical constructs and established sociological perspectives on alliances (Kanter and Myers, [213) is needed. In contrast, studies of interorgnizational interdependence in the MIS literature have been more qualitative. In those papers which do take an integrative view, the emphasis lies mostly in explaining multinational expansion rather than innovative uses of technology for “business as usual” (Harrigan, [22]).

We describe a preliminary, descriptive seven-stage path from independence to virtual integration, along with suggestions for empirical validation. In the spirit of Bensaou and Venkatraman [231’s study of the automotive industry, we seek to describe a set of empirical regularities occurring in technology-enabled interorganizational relationships in the U.S. retail grocery distribution industry. We propose our preliminary seven-level structure not as a definitive taxonomy of interorganizational interdependence, but as

a framework, built around repeated observation of common obstacles, that captures some of the difficulties of smooth transition Tom one level of interdependence to another, with or without the aid of 10s. The multistage structure of our model generates hypotheses testable across industries and over time within the retain grocery value chain.

3. Research Design and Methodoloey

The research design integrates both case-research and phone-survey methodologies. Case-studies afforded the authors insight into the causal processes involved in a complex environment (Bonoma, [24]; Yin, [251), and are recommended by several authors as essential for understanding the complex interactions between technology and organizations, an essential element of research in MIS (Benbasat et al., [26]). In conducting research on phenomena that are not well understood, case research is often the most useful approach, enabling researchers to develop frameworks and models that can later be validated using more quantitative research methodologies.

Case-based research can be especially powerful when the research design involves multiple case studies examining a single issue from different perspectives (Eisenhardt, [27]; Yin, L2.51). Multiple sites were selected to explore changes in relationships between industry leaders. The case sites included two manufacturers, Procter & Gamble and Campbell; two retailers, H.E. Butt Grocery Company (HEB) and Hannaford Brothers (Hannaford); and three wholesale distributors,Wl, W2, andW3. Table 1 offers a brief description of these firms.

Table 1. Summary Data on Case Study Sites

Site Campbell H.E.B. Hannaford Brothers Wl, w2, w3 Type Manufacturer Retailer Retailer Wholesalers Location New Jersey Texas New England Regional 1993 Sales ($ millions) 6,600b 4,618~ 2,050c >6OOc Industrv Rank 12b 1oC 24c <26c Case Skdy Reference Clark & Clark, Croson, Scbiano, Clark forthcoming

McKenney (1994) McKenney, & & McKenney (1995) Nolan (1994)

a Source: Chemical Week, May, 1994. b Source: Food Processing, December, 1994. c Source: Progressive Grocer Marketing Guidebook, Trade Dimensions, Stamford, CT, 1995.

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Although the companies examined lead the industry in both processes and channel relationship innovation, each of these case sites has idiosyncratic relationships with a wide range of suppliers or customers within the grocery channel. This sample provides the opportunity to examine technology-mediated channel relationships from the perspective of these innovation leaders.

Each of the seven case studies used in this research design involved several days of visits to company offices, with interviews conducted with at least eight managers from each company. Those interviewed included executives from marketing, logistics, operations, information systems, and senior general managers (i.e., President or Vice President level) from each company. Following these initial interviews, we conducted follow-up telephone interviews with other managers recommended by these initial contacts, especially when additional data was required to complete a case study describing each of these companies in detail. The interview findings from each company were summarized in Harvard Business School case drafts, and were extensively reviewed by the senior managers involved in the original site visits. These case drafts

were then revised and released by a senior officer of each company for use in research and teaching at YHarvard Business School and other business schools.

A telephone survey of nineteen grocery industry executives supplemented the seven case Istudies, providing additional insight into the generalizability of the findings. The telephone survey was conducted with selected executives chosen from those grocery retailers listed in the Progressive Grocer Marketing Guidebook [28]. This phone survey was one part of a broader written and phone survey of grocery retailers, described in detail in Clark [15]. Of the 109 retailers to whom surveys were distributed, twenty-six returned completed surveys, and nineteen of these agreed to participate in one-hour phone interviews to supplement the written data collection, The survey design was formed with the assistance of several industry experts, including academics experienced in survey design for retailers in the grocery and apparel industries (Hoban., [29]; Hammond, [303).

4. Research Model and Findings

Figure 1. Seven Levels of Organizational Interconnectivity

New Information-Intensive Processes and Data Transmission

Electronic Data Interchange

Electronic Order Transmission

Physical Data Transfer

This research on the evolving nature of relationships in the grocery channel was conducted without a strong hypothesis to validate, but assumed discernable levels of interorganizational connectivity would emerge. These

levels of connectivity were expected to fit into an 10s OSI-style model, with some differences and unique aspects anticipated, but the particular levels that would arise were neither anticipated nor well understood during the period of research design.

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Anecdotal evidence from the case studies provided strong support for a model of increasing levels of connectivity, enabling the construction of a hierarchy of connectivity relationships. Research findings from case studies and survey data provide support for this descriptive framework and are used to provide examples of each level of connectivity and interdependence.

Seven levels describe the levels of connectivity observed, with technological advances providing the critical driving force for migration from level to level for the first three levels only, as shown in Figure 1. Process innovations emerged as the key factor enabling organizations to move to level four. Both policy and process changes were required to shift to level five. The sixth level of the framework involves deliberate investments in channel relationships that surpass structured process and policy innovations. At this level, firms begin investing in the relationship broadly, even in the absence of well-defined short-term return on investment, to explore previously unidentified opportunities for improving channel operations. At the seventh and highest level, senior managers in both companies establish close relationships based on mutual trust, and become willing to disclose sensitive and proprietary information. At this level of connectivity, firms behave almost as if there were joint equity ownership of the channel, even as allying firms retain separate ownership structures.

But even proving that potential benefits from virtual integration are sizable does not automatically make such arrangements desirable, or even workable: risks created by transforming a previously arms-length transaction must also be taken into account. Clemons and Row [31] point out that sharing information and eliminating inventory in these situations benefits the partner with better outside alternatives, in keeping with the analysis provided by Will iamson [12] and Klein et al. [32]. One partner in such an alliance might thus appropriate more than 100% of the value gained from virtual integration; the rational anticipation of this expropriation indicates that such alliances would not be formed, even though their social value from enabling cost savings might run into the billions of dollars (Kurt Salmon Associates, C331).

Trust in these alliances must be constructed not through nebulous psychological trust-building exercises, or through “cheap talk’ claiming total commitment while secretly maintaining options for reversion or escape, but through the deliberate undertaking of irreversible actions that commit both parties equally and irrevocably to the success of the partnership.

The key separators between adjoining levels of connectivity were technology improvements for the

transitions from the first two levels, transmission of new or more complex information for the shift from level three to level four, and adoption of new policies and new processes for the step to the fifth level of connectivity. The transition to the sixth level of connectivity comes when the scope of the interdependence relationship shifts from a focus on one or two processes to a focus on each company individually recognizing the importance of their role in the relationship as a means to improve operations for both firms in multiple areas. Buoyed by their success in a narrow arena, both firms strengthen their relationships through investments in time, effort, and capital across all areas of interaction. The seventh level of connectivity extends this broad relationship to the top management groups within each firms and involves the creation of close strategic alliances between firms within the channel, who might previously have regarded one another as rivals (Croson, [34]).

Increased Connectivity in Invoicing and Payment:

Automation of the invoice-payment process in the grocery channel illustrates an application of the levels of connectivity shown in our framework. At the lowest and most traditional level of connectivity, invoices are mailed to customers, and checks to suppliers. Faxed invoices are uncommon, and faxed payments impossible. Electronic payment and invoicing systems enable companies to migrate to the third level of connectivity, using ED1 to sending invoices and electronic funds transfer to send payments. At the fourth level, ED1 or another similar form of electronic data transmission is also used to exchange pricing changes, bill-back charges, advanced shipping notices, and other information related to invoicing and payment that, in the absence of an infrastructure that makes these transmissions almost automatic and free, might not otherwise be shared. In this level, the ordering or payment processes still require human intervention and are essentially manual processes supplemented by new process and technological innovations that improve channel communications and efficiency.

Companies moving to the fifth level of connectivity in their payment systems must implement new channel policies for invoicing and payment. For example, invoices might be paid automatically when received, with a discount or float period negotiated as compensation for real-time payment. Any invoice disputes would then be resolved later, through a new charge-back or dispute resolution process, without disrupting the day-to-day flow of ordinary invoices. The replacement of existing processes for payment with new processes thus requires new management policies. Such payment systems are no longer technological innovations aimed at improving process efficiency or

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providing more information within the channel, but represent new ways of supporting essential business activities for both customers and suppliers.

Increased Connectivity in Grocery Product Ordering:

Product ordering and inventory management provide another example of the use of the framework. The lowest level of connectivity relies on direct physical transfer of information in the channel. Although unusual today, some smaller grocery retailers still place orders using physical delivery of a paper order via U.S. mail or by sending tomorrow’s order back on today’s delivery truck, a practice especially common for retailers in rural areas served by wholesalers, including Wl . This mode is clearly slow and labor-intensive relative to more advanced technologies, and has largely been replaced by some form of electronic order transmission using a platform common to all channel members. Transmitting orders using telephone or fax, for example, eliminates the legal contract of the ordering document, an omission which concerned retailers and manufacturers during the early period of adoption. The declining cost of telephone and fax ordering and the increased speed of information transmission has resulted in this ordering mode becoming the dominant design (McKenney, [35]) in the grocery industry of 1995, even as these technologies are themselves replaced by more direct data transmission. The information transmitted between customers and suppliers is well structured and non- ambiguous, enabling less formal means of transmission to substitute for physical transport of a paper-based order.

The adoption of ED1 ordering eliminates several manual steps in the ordering process, representing a new stage of connectivity in the channel. 80% of the executives in the phone survey, and all of the case study sites, noted that ED1 usage per se did not significantly increase interdependence within the channel. ED1 ordering was described by several executives as similar to faxing orders, but more reliable and more expensive. Firms justified the expenses associated with ED1 adoption primarily through its ability to eliminate manual data entry costs and to increase order reliability and accuracy. One advantage occasionally cited for ED1 ordering is increased speed (Emmelheinz, [361X However, for grocery product ordering and in many other industries, placing orders via fax or phone is just as “fast” as using EDI, with data transmitted as fast as the rest of the system can handle it. ED1 ordering is only faster or more efficient when the data transmission process is more tightly integrated with the order- processing information systems within the manufacturer, which enables ED1 orders to bypass some steps of the less automated phone or fax ordering process.

The fourth level of connectivity involves changing channel processes and the nature of information transmitted. This moves beyond simply using new technological capabilities for transmitting information faster, more cheaply, or more accurately. An example of this level of connectivity in the grocery channel is retailer transmission of warehouse inventory levels (or, in a further refinement) retail point-of-sale information to suppliers, in addition to transmitting product orders. The information on product movement costs the retailer or wholesaler little on the margin to provide, and adds significant value for many suppliers in managing production and forecasting future order volumes.

The transition to the fifth level of connectivity comes when customers shift from placing orders with suppliers to allowing suppliers to ship products as needed to replenish inventory when goods are sold. In the grocery industry, this new vendor-managed-inventory process is called a Continuous Replenishment F’rocess (CRP). Both case-study and survey data indicate that this new CRP mode of product “ordering” not only creates much greater interdependence between firms in the industry but also enables dramatic improvements in channel efficiency (Clark, [15]; Clark and Hammond, [361; Clark and Stoddard, [37]). The process changes for each partner involved in implementing CRP are clearly different from the purely technological tradeoffs and issues involved with migrating up prior levels of connectivity; at this level, mid-level or senior managers from functional operations must for the first time become involved in the necessary investment and policy decisions.

The Transition Beyond Processes at the ‘Top of the Connectivity Pyramid

The sixth level of connectivity moves the relationship beyond the ordering process to the operation process in general, and involves meetings and discussions between firms’ representatives :focused specifically on improving the existing relationship and seeking new opportunities for further eliminating costs and otherwise improving joint operations. At this level, the firms involved invest in the relationship even absent short-term return on investment, anticipating that opportunities to improve channel efficiency and effectiveness not specifically identified in advance will arise. This relationship-building stage, a shift in perception of adjacent channel occupants from rivals to partners, often emerges concurrently with policy changes that enable connectivity to move to the fifth level of the framework. All of the case-study sites enthusiastically supported developing this type of expl.oratory relationship with channel partners. A few retailers were clearly willing to change policies and strengthen coordination to implement CRP when specific paybacks

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could be demonstrated, but were unwilling to extend this operational relationship to new and unproven innovations. These retailers viewed investing in CRP as a strategic necessity [3] to compete, but remained unwilling to trust their suppliers in a collaborative relationship, viewing channel management purely as a distributive negotiating process (Fisher et al., [39]).

The seventh level of connectivity requires close cross-firm relationships between senior managers for the first time, and involves sharing of information traditionally considered proprietary and very sensitive (e.g.. information on costs, margins, or plans for product introduction). The limited availability of top management attention and the time required to develop the trust necessary to support this level of interdependence and connectivity combine to constrain the number of these highest-level relationships a firm can maintain. HEB, one of the grocery retailer case sites, implemented the third level of connectivity (EDI ordering) with vendors supplying 96% of its grocery products, and achieved 50% of its grocery volume using CRP (fifth level). HEB skipped the fourth level of connectivity entirely because they were unwilling to supply manufacturers with data on HEB sales and inventory levels without a commitment from the manufacturer to use that data solely to support a more efficient channel replenishment process using CRP. Although HEB shared the fifth level of connectivity with more than fifty firms, only fifteen to twenty of these firms could be accurately described as level six relationships, and only seven of these favored firms had evolved to the seventh level of forming virtual channel alliances with HEB. HEB senior management indicated they would be unable to support more than ten to twelve virtual alliance relationships at this highest level of connectivity due to the heavy load on management time and attention imposed by alliance formation and maintenance.

HEB management saw no such limitation on development of more sixth level relationships, however, as these involved investments of the time of mid-level or front-line managers in the companies (rather than top- level executives) and could thus be justified by productivity improvements in the channel relationship. Although HEB led retailers in CRP penetration, senior management viewed CRP as simply the vehicle through which they could enter into mutually beneficial partnerships with their suppliers through forming these level six channel optimization relationships. HEB viewed the development of and investment in interdependent channel partnerships as essential to maintaining a market leadership position and to continued reductions in costs and improved efficiency. HEB management furthermore viewed improvement of channel efficiency as a continual process that required ongoing investments in coordination and interdependence

to discover new opportunities for improvement, rather than as an enabler for a single process improvement such as CRP.

Hannaford also viewed channel relationships as important sources of potential competitive advantage and actively invested in developing stronger coordination linkages with many of its suppliers. Hannaford management also viewed CRP as a means to develop these “Joint Optimization Relationships” (JOR) with vendors. Twelve manufacturers had committed to investing in JOR linkages with Hannaford by late 1994, but only three of these JOR partners were considered strategic alliances that would fit within the seventh level of the connectivity framework. P&G and Campbell also described differing levels of partnerships and interdependence with their customers, with no more than ten customers meeting the characteristics of level seven alliances with either manufacturer. While both manufacturers had many customers at level three and many retailers at level four, each had fewer than forty customers at the fifth level and fewer than twenty-five at the sixth level of connectivity. Campbell management offered several examples of firms that had moved to the fourth level of connectivity, sharing data on warehouse inventory levels to prepare for or to test CRP capabilities, but who proved unwilling to make the policy changes required to implement CRP. For these retailers, allowing the manufacturer control over determining ordering quantities and placing orders was the real barrier; sharing the data was almost an afterthought. Few retailers had problems implementing ED1 or other technological innovations, but many were reluctant to make the policy changes required to shift to a new level of efficiency in ordering due to the requisite increased dependence on the manufacturer. These retailers remain stuck at level four, with little hope of advancement.

Wholesalers were particularly reluctant to make the shift to CRP processes, as the required policy changes involved extensively renegotiating contract terms with their retailer customers to maintain existing wholesale margins, but removed traditional profit opportunities that had sustained wholesalers under the traditional ordering process. Although the wholesalers participating in the case studies were leaders in the industry, and publicly committed to adopting CRP, the difficulty with renegotiating policies with their customers required these firms to move more slowly on CRP adoption to survive the transition. These wholesalers and some retailers, for example, were working with manufacturers to develop alternative pricing and shipment policies that would enable them to realize benefits from CRP benefits without eliminating the “inside margins” that had resulted from traditional pricing and procurement policies in the channel. Without a pre-negotiated industry’plan for distributing the gains from improved channel

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efficiency, wholesalers feared that CRP process would first arbitrage the very economic inefficiencies in the traditional ordering process that had provided wholesaler profits.

Again, the barrier for increased connectivity for wholesalers was not technology or even process innovations, but the fundamental policy changes required to take advantage of these new technological and process innovations. Even so, one wholesaler, W3, had invested extensively in developing relationships at the sixth and seventh level of the framework with several manufacturers, and had similar relationships in place with several of its retailer customers. W3 had pursued a strategy significantly different from that of most wholesalers in that the company had aggressively marketed its services to large chains and large manufacturers as a potential outsourcer, who could provide a more efficient way of accomplishing distribution functions within the channel. Most W3 customers could provide, and had provided, their own distribution services, but were less cost-efficient at doing so than W3. By acting as, in effect, the in-house distribution arm of several of these firms, W3 developed strategic relationships at either the sixth or seventh level of the connectivity framework. These relationships required extensive investments of senior management time and attention, the limits on which comprised the most serious limitations on W3 revenue growth. Even so, investing in developing high levels of connectivity and interdependency had helped W3 to grow substantially.

5. Conclusions Imnlications

and Manaperial

While the rewards for successfnlly achieving higher levels of organizational connectivity can be significant, these rewards cannot be achieved without increased risk and interdependence. Policy decisions can be avoided or delayed at the early stages of connectivity, but higher levels of interorganizational coordination required significant levels of trust and mutually agreed upon standards or terms of agreement to be established before the top two or three levels of the connectivity hierarchy can be realized. Establishing this trust can be difficult to achieve when there is a dramatic imbalance of power in the relationship, but it is possible to achieve when binding commitments to the relationship are voluntarily made by the firm in a stronger bargaining position. This outcome also requires a clear recognition of the potential benefits of cooperation by senior management of both firms.

In spite of power differences and intense price/margin negotiations between firms within the


grocery channel that make the evolution of cooperation possible, cooperation can evolve in the repeated Imulti- player environment where the benefits of cooperation are substantial but the risks of “defection” in negotiations are significant (Axelrod, [403). However, the demands on managerial time and attention for investing in and forming such relationships is significant, and create a natural limit to the number of such alliances that can be simultaneously sustained by any specific company in the industry. This provides leading companies that are actively working with channel partners to create these high level connectivity relationships with an effective barrier to entry for firms seeking to develop these high level channel relationships later. Thus, the blenefits from investing in channel relationships and coordination may prove to be more sustainable than many investments that firm make in technology or process innovations.

6. Onnortunities Research

for Extenti

This research model is based on limited data based on case studies and survey interviews within a single industry, so may not be generalizable across all industries or contexts. Many industries, including apparel, hardware, health care, electronic components, auto parts and mass merchandisers face similar issues of maintaining inventories of myriad SKUs from scores of suppliers. This research focused on U.S. firms, and may have limited applicability to non-US contexts where anti-trust regulations are less restrictive.

Only leading wholesalers and manufacturers were included in this study, and a broad industry survey of these groups would afford a broader perspective on the relationships in the industry. However, this model applies to several contexts within the grocery channel, including retailer to manufacturer, retailer to wholesaler, and wholesaler to manufacturer. The model could also be extended to include relationships between retail.ers and “store door delivery” vendors.

This model could be validated through a. larger empirical study focusing on classifying relationships across the channel and exploring the distribution of levels. A cross-industry study would also be useful to explore what drives the distribution within an industry, e.g. industry characteristics of concentration, competitiveness, profitability, etc. A later study could also combine data on organizational performance measures with survey on level of coordination to examine statistically the relationship between increased coordination and improved channel or firm performance.

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[38]Clark, T. H. and Stoddard, D. B. (1994). “Interorganizational Business Process Redesign: The Procter & Gamble Case,” HBS Working Paper No. 94-077, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA.

[39] Fisher, R., W. Ury, and B. Patton. (1991) Getting to Yes. New York: Penguin Books.

[40] Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.

Miscellaneous References:

Bakos, J. Y. And Brynjolfsson, E. (1993). “Information Technology, Incentives, and the Optimal Number of Suppliers.” Journal of Management Information Systems. (Fall), 10:2, pp. 37-53.

Brynjolfsson, E. (1994) “Information ,4ssets, Technology, and Organization.” Mana,gement Science 40:12 (December), pp. 1645-1662.

Clark, T. H., Croson, D. C., McKenney, J. I-., and Nolan, R. L. (1994). “H. E. Butt Grocery Company: A Leader in ECR Implementation.” HBS Case No. 9-195-125, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA.

Clark, T. H. and McKenney, J. L. (1994). “Campbell Soup Company: A Leader in Continuous Replenishment Innovations.” HBS Case No. 9-195- 124, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA.

Clark, T. H. and McKenney, J. L. (1995). “Procter & Gamble: Improving Consumer Value Through Process Design.” HBS Case No. 9-195-126, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA.

Clemons, E. K, and P. R. Kleindorfer. (1992) “An Economic Analysis of Interorgamzational Information Technology.” Decision Support Systems 8, pp. 431-446.

Clemens, E. K. and McFarlan, F. W. (1986). “Telecom: Hook Up or Lose Out.” Harvard Business Review, (July-August), pp. 91-97.

Schiano, W. T. and Clark, T. H. (1995). “Hannaford Brothers: Leading the Grocery Channel Transformation.” HBS Case No. 9-195-127, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA.

Wang, E. And Seidmann, A. V. (1995). “Electronic Data Interchange: Competitive Externalities and Strategic Implementation Policies.” Management Science. 41:3, (March), pp. 401-418.

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